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Articles 804; 810-813; 825-839; 1335; 1337-1338

Cases:
1. Casiano vs. CA (158 SCRA 451)
2. Molo vs. Molo (90 Phil 37)
3. Rodelas vs. Aranza (119 SCRA 16)
4. Azaula vs. Singson (109 Phil 102)
5. Codoy vs. Caluga (312 SCRA 333)
6. Roberts vs. Leonides (129 SCRA 33)
7. Nepumuceno vs. CA (139 SCRA 206)
8. Nuguid vs. Nuguid (L-23445, 6/23/1966)

CASE DIGEST: CASIANO V. CA (158 SCRA 451)

Casiano v. CA
158 SCRA 451

FACTS:

On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and
testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunts estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending the parties
Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement
of Adrianas estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts
among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the
trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964.

3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo
Hervas, discovered a document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),
dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be thelast will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma
claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some
materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was
submitted to the clerk of court of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still
named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more
valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement
of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise givesdevises and legacies to
other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of
Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in the
same court which approved the EJ settelement a motion for reconsideration and annulment of
the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will which was denied by the CFI. Upon
petition to the SC for certiorari and mandamus, the SC dismissed that petition and advised that
a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to
thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be
probated had been revoked by the burning thereof by the housemaid upon instruction of the
testatrix.

ISSUE:

W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.

HELD:

No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.

The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It
may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of
the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will
itself.
Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last
will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction.

There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one,
the document or papers burned by Adrianas maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning
was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the
burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating
that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen)
was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.

The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be unequivocably positive that
the document burned was indeed Adrianas will. Guadalupe believed that the papers she
destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other
hand, obtained his information that the burned documentwas the will because Guadalupe told
him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.

It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to
its very foundations.
Molo v. Molo Digest
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation


Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any
forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate
of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the
petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and
thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it
was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle
of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a
will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2013/02/molo-v-molo-
digest.html#sthash.GtI349SY.dpuf

Rodelas v. Aranza
119 SCRA 16

FACTS:

Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:

1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of
Court;

2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely
an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by
the decedent;

3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as
required by law.

MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.

The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that in
the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that in the matter of
holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the
material proof of authenticity of said wills.

And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla
died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the
will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located
shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his death.

Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to
forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE:

W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.

HELD:

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot
be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It
is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will.

But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The
probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the contents
of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses
who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. But,
in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court,
You are here: Home / 2013 / July / Case Digest: Nepomuceno v. CA (139 SCRA 206)
CASE DIGEST: NEPOMUCENO V. CA (139 SCRA 206)
Published by paul on July 2, 2013 | Leave a response

Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206

FACTS:

Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died.
Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married
to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been estranged
from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator MartinJugo and the petitioner were married despite
the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner.
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez
and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and
that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in
his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the
respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying
the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the
devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision.

HELD:

No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor
of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area
of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The
rule, however, is not inflexibleand absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of
the Will.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made
between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and
Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living
in concubinage.
Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on January 4, 2012
(Special Proceedings Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance)
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will
be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one
of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition
of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits
the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
Share this:
Roberts v. Leonidas (April 27, 1984)
Ramon Aquino, J.:
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.
PROBLEM: A will already probated in Utah was filed before Manila CFI Branch 38 while
intestate proceedings for the same estate were ongoing in Manila CFI Branch 20.
HELD: The two proceedings must be consolidated and the testate proceeding should be
continued. It would be anomalous to undergo intestate proceedings when the deceased died
with two wills.
FACTS:
EDWARD Grimm, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, was married twice.
o FIRST MARRIAGE (divorced) = Juanita Kegley Grimm (MRS. GRIMM). Children:
JUANITA Grimm Morris and ETHEL Grimm Morris.
o SECOND MARRIAGE = MAXINE Tate Grimm. Children: Edward Miller Grimm II
(PETE) and LINDA Grimm.
Jan. 23, 1959 Edward executed 2 wills, one for his Philippine properties (PH WILL) and
one for his properties abroad (FOREIGN WILL).
o Edward described his Philippine properties as conjugal property of his second
marriage.
o In the PH will, Juanita and Ethel were given their legitimes.
o They were not given anything in the foreign will, because according to Edward he
had already given them their legitimes in the PH will.
o The rest of the 2 wills favored Maxine and her children
Nov. 27, 1977 Edward died in the Makati Medical Center.
Jan. 9, 1978 Ethel instituted intestate proceedings for Edwards estate before Manila
CFI Branch 20.
o Ethel was named special administratrix.
o Maxine admitted that she was notified of the proceedings
March 7, 1978 Maxine presented the 2 wills for probate before the 3rd Judicial District
Court of Tooele County, Utah, USA.
o Juanita and Ethel were notified of the proceeding
March 11, 1978 Maxine, through ACCRA, moved to dismiss the intestate proceeding
on the ground that Edwards wills were being probated in Utah.
April 10, 1978 Utah court admitted the 2 wills to probate.
April 25, 1978 COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO CAMPS
o made in Utah with knowledge of the intestate proceedings before the Manila CFI
o signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by
Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of
Ethel, Juanita and Mrs. Grimm
o STIPULATIONS
Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as administrators of
Edward's Philippine estate
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her
and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and
Sta. Mesa, Manila.
Computation of the "net distributable estate"
Recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the ACCRA law
firm
Pete, Linda, Ethel and Juanita "shall share equally in the Net Distributable
Estate"
Ethel and Juanita should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the
net distributable estate and marital share.
Included a supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978
May 23 and June 2, 1978 Pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, CFI Branch 20
(intestate court) allowed Maxine to withdraw her opposition. Maxine, Pete and Ethel
were appointed administrators of the estate. The court ignored the will already found in
the record (I think it was there because it was submitted together with the
compromise).
March 21, 1979 Maxine, Pete and Ethel, acting as administrators, sold one of Edwards
businesses (Palawan Pearl Project) for P75,000, to a company named Makiling
Management Co. [whose incorporators were Ethel, her husband Rex Roberts and
Maxines former lawyer William Limqueco]
o The admins also sold 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation to Joseph Server and
others for P1,546,136.
July 27, 1979 Branch 20 Judge Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the
Edward's Philippine estate and one-eight (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2%. No
mention at all was made of the will in that order. (anlabo mo judge)
August 9, 1979 Maxine, through a new lawyer, moved to defer approval of the
partition (as per the Utah agreement ata). Court considered it moot because the shares
had already been adjudicated in the July 27 order.
April 18, 1980 Juanita moved for accounting of the estates properties filed a motion
for accounting to facilitate partition and close the present intestate estate.
June 10, 1980 ACCRA filed appearance as collaborating counsel for Maxine
Sep. 8, 1980 Maxine, through Rogelio Vinluan of ACCRA, filed the assailed petition
for probate of the 2 wills already probated in Utah. The case was heard before Manila
CFI Branch 38
o ALLEGATIONS
Maxine and her children were defrauded due to the machinations of the
Roberts spouses
1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal
the intestate proceeding is void because Edward died testate
the partition was contrary to Edward's wills
o Petition also asked that:
the 1979 partition approved by Br. 20 be set aside and the letters of
administration be revoked
Maxine be appointed executrix
Ethel and Juanita be ordered to account for the properties received by
them and to return the same to Maxine
Ethel moved to dismiss, Judge Leonidas denied.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
o RELIEFS SOUGHT:
Dismissal of the testate proceeding, OR
Consolidation of the two proceedings in Branch 20
That the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be
heard prior to the petition for probate
ISSUE (HELD): Can a petition for allowance of wills and annulment of partition - approved in an
intestate proceeding by one branch of the CFI - be entertained by another branch (after a
probate in the Utah district court)? (YES)
RATIO:
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Edward died with two wills and "no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (NCC 838;
ROC 75, Sec. 1).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara and Baluyot vs. Pao).
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding.
The intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file her answer to the petition anyway.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied, CFI affirmed.

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