Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. P-11-2980 June 10, 2013

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-3016-P)

LETICIA A. ARIENDA, Complainant,

vs.
EVELYN A. MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
4, LEGAZPI CITY,Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a court employee and abuse of
authority filed by complainant Leticia A. Arienda against respondent Evelyn A. Monilla, Court
Stenographer Ill of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 of Legazpi City.

In her letter-complaint1 dated October 8, 2008, complainant alleged that respondent and Atty.
Zaldy Monilla (Atty. Monilla), respondent's husband (together referred to as the spouses
Monilla), went to complainants house on January 13, 2002 and offered their services in settling
the estate of complainants deceased mother. According to the spouses Monilla, they would
prepare an extrajudicial settlement for complainant and the latters siblings, while respondents
brother, Engineer Matias A. Arquero (Engr. Arquero), would conduct the survey of the estate.
Everytime the spouses Monilla went to complainants house, they would ask for partial payment.
Six Temporary Receipts show that complainant had paid the spouses Monilla a total
of P49,800.00. Complainant repeatedly requested from the spouses Monilla the approved
survey plan prepared by Engr. Arquero, but the spouses Monilla demanded that complainant
first pay the P20,000.00 she still owed them before they give her the approved survey plan and
extrajudicial settlement of estate. Complainant subsequently learned that the spouses Monilla
had no authority to settle her deceased mothers estate as Atty. Monilla was currently employed
at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and respondent was not even a lawyer but an
ordinary court employee.

In her comment2 dated May 23, 2009, respondent denied that it was she and her husband who
offered complainant their services in settling the estate of complainants deceased mother.
Respondent averred that it was complainant and her sister, Ester, who came to respondents
house sometime in December 2000 and requested respondent to convince her brother Engr.
Arquero, a geodetic engineer, to partition the four lots left by complainants parents situated in
Bigaa, Legazpi City. Respondent was initially hesitant to accede to complainants request
because of complainants reputation in their locality as a troublemaker. However, respondents
husband, upon learning that complainant was a relative, urged respondent to assist the
complainant.

Respondent alleged that she was not privy to the agreement between Engr. Arquero and
complainant. Complainant scheduled the survey of one of the lots, Lot No. 5489, on January 13,
2001. After Engr. Arquero conducted the survey, complainant was nowhere to be found and
respondent had to shoulder the expenses for the same.

Respondent further narrated that without her knowledge, complainant and her siblings filed a
case for partition of estate before the RTC, Branch 7 of Legazpi City, on May 24, 2001. When
their case was dismissed by the RTC, complainant and her siblings argued at the Hall of
Justice, thus, disrupting court proceedings. Knowing that respondent was a court employee,
complainant approached and asked respondent to intervene. Respondent, during her lunch
break, met with complainant and the latters siblings at respondents residence located near the
Hall of Justice. Complainant and her siblings, already wishing to partition their deceased
parents estate out of court, pleaded that respondent prepare an extrajudicial settlement.
Respondent declined to get involved at first because complainant and her siblings were
represented by a lawyer in the partition case before the RTC, but complainant and her siblings
said that they had no more money to pay for the continued services of their lawyer. Respondent
understood the predicament of complainant and her siblings, so respondent agreed to help
them. Respondent called her brother, Engr. Arquero, and requested him to bring the sketch plan
of Lot No. 5489 he had previously prepared. In the presence of Engr. Arquero, complainant and
her siblings chose their respective shares in the property. Respondent prepared and finalized
the extrajudicial settlement and handed the said document to complainant and her siblings.
After a year, complainant, her sister Ester, and a buyer of their shares in Lot No. 5489, Marlyn
Dominguez (Dominguez), again approached respondent. Complainant asked that Engr. Arquero
continue with the partition of Lot No. 5489 as Dominguez advanced the money to pay for the
expenses, including the preparation of the lot plan. Engr. Arquero, despite his misgivings and
persuaded by respondent, conducted the survey, but complainant did not show up and
respondent had to shoulder the expenses once more.

Respondent went on to recount that on January 20, 2003, complainant, Ester, and a sales agent
came to respondents house, asking respondent to again convince her brother Engr. Arquero to
re-survey Lot No. 5489 because the boundaries were no longer visible. According to
complainant, the new buyer, Galahad O. Rubio (Rubio), wanted to see the exact location and
the boundaries of the lot. Respondent refused and told complainant to directly negotiate with
Engr. Arquero. When complainant and her companions returned in the afternoon, complainant
tendered P9,000.00 to respondents husband, Atty. Monilla, as partial payment for the latters
services. The following day, complainant and her companions came back and complainant
handed over anotherP9,000.00 as partial payment for the services of respondents brother,
Engr. Arquero.

Respondent admitted receiving from complainant payments amounting to P49,800.00, all made
at respondents residence in Rawis, not at complainants house in Bigaa. The P25,000.00 was
for the preparation by Atty. Monilla of the following documents: (a) four deeds of sale to different
buyers; (b) two copies of extrajudicial settlement; (c) two contracts to sell; (d) two authorities to
sell; and (e) one demand letter. The remaining P24,800.00 was for Engr. Arqueros services in
subdividing Lot No. 5489 into 13 lots.

Respondent asserted that she had already turned over to complainant on March 30, 2003 the
notarized extrajudicial settlement for Lot No. 5489, the blueprint of the subdivision plan for the
said lot, and the deed of sale between complainant and Rubio. The subdivision plan was not
approved by the Bureau of Lands because of complainants failure to submit other
requirements. Because of complainants broken promises, respondent and her husband, Atty.
Monilla, no longer prepared the other documents complainant was requesting for, and
respondents brother, Engr. Arquero, discontinued his services as a surveyor.

Lastly, respondent maintained that complainant knew that Atty. Monilla was a DAR employee.
Complainant and her siblings had often consulted Atty. Monilla regarding the properties left by
their parents, as well as their ongoing family feud. Complainant was likewise aware that
respondent was not a lawyer and was a mere court stenographer since complainant and
respondent are neighbors and they are related to one another. Respondent had already filed for
early retirement effective April 23, 2007, and she claimed that her former co-employees at the
RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City conspired and confederated with one another to induce
complainant to file the instant complaint against her.

In a Resolution3 dated June 23, 2010, the Court referred the instant administrative matter to
Vice Executive Judge Pedro R. Soriao (Investigating Judge Soriao) of RTC, Branch 5 of
Legazpi City, for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In his report4 dated September 22, 2010, Investigating Judge Soriao made the following findings
and recommendations:

Substantial evidence appearing of record demonstrates that Evelyn A. Monilla committed a

simple misconduct unbecoming of court personnel while she was a court stenographer. The
imposition upon her of an administrative penalty of fine equivalent to two months of the salary
that she was receiving when she resigned to be deducted from her retirement benefits is hereby
recommended.

Finally, it is submitted that Evelyn A. Monillas liability over the amount of 49,800 pesos that she
received from Leticia Arienda is a legal matter that can be properly ventilated in a separate
appropriate judicial proceeding.5

After evaluation of Investigating Judge Sariaos report, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated July 14, 2011, likewise recommending
that respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct but that the amount of fine imposed
against her be increased to four months salary, to be deducted from her retirement benefits.

In her Manifestation7 dated May 2, 2012, respondent informed the Court that Dominguez filed a
case against complainant for a sum of money and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 5287,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Legazpi City. Dominguez wanted
to recover the partial payments she had made on Lot No. 5489, plus other damages, after
complainant sold the very same property to someone else. In a Decision dated July 7, 2006, the
MTCC ruled in Dominguezs favor. Respondent wanted this Court to note that neither
complainant nor Dominguez mentioned in Civil Case No. 5287 the participation of respondent or
her brother in the transaction involving Lot No. 5489.

It bears to note that respondent admitted in her comment that she prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of complainants deceased mother. The preparation of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice of law as defined in Cayetano v.
Monsod,8 to wit:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." x x x.

Not being a lawyer, respondent had no authority to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial
settlement of estate. Worse, respondent also admitted receiving money from complainant for
her services. Being a court employee, respondent ought to have known that it was improper for
her to prepare and finalize the extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only a lawyer is
authorized to perform, and to receive money therefor.

It is true that respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement of estate pursuant to
a private agreement between her and complainant. However, respondent is an employee of the
court whose conduct must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let her be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. She
is expected to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of
her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people to preserve the
courts good name and standing.9

Respondents behavior and conduct, which led other people to believe that she had the
authority and capability to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of estate even when
she is not a lawyer, clearly fall short of the exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed
upon court employees.

Respondents mention of Civil Case No. 5287 before the MTCC does not help her
defense.1wphi1 That case is irrelevant herein for it is between complainant and Dominguez.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate

or intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the established norm, whether
it be work-related or not, amounts to misconduct.10 In preparing and finalizing the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and receiving compensation for the same even when she is not a lawyer,
respondent is guilty of simple misconduct, punishable under Section 52(B)(2) of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service with suspension for one month and
one day to six months. Considering that this is respondent's first offense and that she had
served the judiciary for almost 16 years, a suspension of four months would have been proper.
Since respondent had already retired, the Court instead imposes the penalty of a fine equivalent
to her salary for four months, to be deducted from her retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent Evelyn Monilia, retired
Stenographer III of RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City, GUILTY of simple misconduct and imposes
upon said respondent a FINE equivalent to four months salary to be deducted from her
retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
 EN BANC
CECILIA A. AGNO, A.C. No. 4515
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, VELASCO, JR.,
Respondent. NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 14, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty. Marciano J.
Cagatan for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The record shows that respondent was the President of International Services Recruitment
Corporation (ISRC), a corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas
employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRCs recruitment license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC
was forever banned from participating in overseas recruitment.[1]

On Sepetember 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLEs cancellation of ISRCs license with
the Office of the President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in respondents favor in the
Resolution dated March 30, 1993[2] which set aside the order of cancellation and directed both the DOLE
and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC
subject to the payment of a guarantee bond which was double the amount required by law.

Since ISRCs recruitment license had already expired on September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April
12, 1994, an application for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA.[3]

However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the President,
particularly on August 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement[4] with a United
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma,[5] the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A.
Agno. The Memorandum of Agreement is quoted in toto hereunder:

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E. national, and Mr.
MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Filipino citizen, have entered into this Memorandum of
Agreement this 9th day of August 1992, at Manila, Philippines, concerning the joint
ownership and operation of INTERNATIONAL SERVICING AND RECRUITMENT
CORPORATION (ISRC) and have mutually agreed, in connection therewith, as follows:

1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by the herein parties on a 50-50 basis and
accordingly, immediate steps shall be taken to submit the necessary documents to the
Securities and Exchange Commission to legalize the arrangement and to cause the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of stocks to Mr. Khalifa and his group;

2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits shall be on an equal basis (50-50) after
deducting all the pertinent expenses that the officers of the corporation shall be:
Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, President and
General Manager, Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN or his designated representative,
Treasurer, Ms. Cecilia Agno all of whom shall be members of the Board of Trustees
together with two others;

3. That for and in consideration of the above joint ownership of the corporation,
Mr. KHALIFA undertakes as his contribution to the stock ownership thereof, the
following:

(a) To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) initially on or before AUGUST 25,
1992, said amount to be used to have the license of ISRC reinstated;

(b) Upon the release of the license, to pay the additional amount
of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) to
 start the business operations of the corporation and to liquidate pending
government and other obligations, if any;

4. The management of the corporation shall be handled by Mr. KHALIFA and

his group while the legal and government liaisonship shall be the responsibility of Mr.
CAGATAN; mutual consideration with each other in the course of the business
operations shall be maintained in order to avoid problem with the government, the
workers and the employers;

5. There shall be a regular accounting of the business every month, with the
assistance of a qualified accountant and each of the herein parties shall be furnished copy
thereof; the share of the parties may be released to each of them as often as the parties
agree, however, advances against the share of each may be agreed upon by the parties;

6. Any claim of workers or other parties against the ISRC before the signing of
this agreement shall be the sole responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr. KHALIFA or
his 50% ownership shall be free from such claims.

Manila, August 9, 1992.

JOMA HUMED KHALIFA MARCIANO J. CAGATAN

CECILIA AGNO

WITNESSES:
_______________ _________________

On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the aforesaid
agreement, a Complaint-Affidavit[6] for disbarment was filed with this Court by the complainant against
the respondent claiming that the latter used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her husband,
Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount of P500,000.00 and that although the respondent
received the aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from her inquiries with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of Agreement could
not be validated without the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent even had the
complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her appointment as
Treasurer was not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed that the Board of Directors,
officers and stockholders of ISRC remained unchanged and her name and that of her husband did not
appear as officers and/or stockholders thereof. From the POEA, on the other hand, the complainant
learned that ISRCs recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.
 The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the P500,000.00 that
she and her husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return the said sum of
money, respondent issued a bank check dated March 30, 1994[7] in favor of the complainant in the amount
of P500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Despite repeated
demands by complainant, the respondent failed to settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check,
prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the
respondent. An information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the
respondent with the said offense and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter
failed several times to attend his arraignment. The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the
respondent for issuing a bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that
the Memorandum of Agreement would suffice to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which
induced them to invest in said corporation the amount of P500,000.00.

In his Comment,[8] respondent denied the charges against him and averred that while ISRCs
recruitment license was cancelled by the DOLE in 1988, such cancellation was lifted by the Office of the
President on March 30, 1993, on appeal. During the pendency of the said appeal, he and complainants
husband Khalifa entered into a Memorandum of Agreement because the latter offered to buy shares of
stock of ISRC in order to finance the then pending appeal for the reinstatement of the ISRC license and
for Khalifa and the complainant to undertake the full management and operation of the corporation. The
respondent further alleged that Khalifa H. Juma, through the complainant, paid on various dates the total
amount of P500,000.00, which respondent claimed he used to reimburse borrowed sums of money to
pursue the appeal with the Office of the President. According to the respondent, while there were still
legal procedures to be observed before the sale of shares of ISRC to non-stockholders, Khalifa and
complainant were in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC. Consequently, respondent sold and
assigned his own shareholdings in ISRC for P500,000.00 to Khalifa as evidenced by a Deed of
Assignment[9] dated April 26, 1993. The respondent, in turn, issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00,
which was not intended to be encashed but only to guarantee the reimbursement of the money to Khalifa
and the complainant in case the appeal would be decided adversely against ISRC. Conversely, the check
would be returned to respondent if the appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The respondent denied
employing fraud or misrepresentation since allegedly, Khalifa and the complainant decided to buy his
shares after being told, upon inquiry in Malacanang, that ISRC had a good case. The respondent averred
that complainant was motivated by bad faith and malice in allegedly fabricating criminal charges against
him instead of seeking rescission of the Deed of Assignment and refund of the consideration for the sale
of the shares of stock. The respondent surmised that they decided not to proceed with the Memorandum
of Agreement when complainant had secured her own license after she had received the Deed of
Assignment and assumed the position of acting treasurer of the ISRC. The respondent justified the non-
submission of copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Assignment and complainants
appointment as Acting Treasurer with the SEC because of the cancellation of ISRCs license to recruit and
the pendency of the appeal for reinstatement since 1989. Aside from a copy of the Deed of Assignment in
favor of the complainant and her husband Khalifa regarding the five hundred shares of stock, respondent
also presented in support of his allegations copies of 1) his Letter[10] dated April 12, 1994 to the POEA
requesting the renewal of ISRCs license, and 2) a Letter[11]dated May 24, 1994 from the Licensing and
Regulation Office of the POEA requiring him: (1) to submit an escrow agreement with a reputable
commercial banking corporation in the amount of P400,000.00 to answer for any valid and legal claim of
recruited workers; cash bond deposit of P200,000.00; and surety bond of P100,000.00; and (2) to clear
ISRCs pending cases with said agency before respondents request for reinstatement of ISRCs license as a
land based agency.

In a Resolution[12] dated May 22, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan,
held several hearings, the last of which was on November 13, 2003. During those hearings, the
complainant presented her evidence. For his part, the respondent, instead of presenting his defense before
the CBD in open court, opted to present a position paper which was allowed by the Order dated April 20,
2004[13] of Commissioner San Juan. However, in lieu of said position paper, the respondent submitted a
Memorandum[14] after the complainant had filed her formal offer of evidence. Eventually, on October 12,
2004, Commissioner San Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation.[15] Said the Commissioner in
her report:

There is no question that the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties

was executed on 9 [August] 1992. In said Memorandum, no mention was made of the
assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her husband. The
conditions stated therein was that the amount to be contributed by the complainant shall
be used for the reinstatement of the license of the ISRC. No mention was made regarding
the assignment of shares in favor of the complainant and her husband. Respondent
presented a Deed of Assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her
husband worth P500,000.00 dated 26 April 1993, however, it is noted that there is a super
imposed date of 24 November 1994 in a notarial series of 1993 of Mario S. Ramos,
Notary Public, which raises doubt as to the date it was executed. Apparently, the Deed of
Assignment was executed when the complainant started her investigation regarding the
true condition of the corporation. Anent the reinstatement of the license of the company
 there is no showing that the respondent used the amount he received from the
complainant in compliance with the respondents undertakings in the Memorandum of
Agreement. The accusation of enticement employed by respondent is supported by the
fact that complainant was made to appear that she will be appointed as treasurer of the
corporation, however there was no action on the part of the respondent to change the
composition of the Board of Directors and the treasurer in the records of the corporation
on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondent did not fully
reveal the true condition of the corporation regarding the reinstatement of the
corporations license to operate. Likewise the issuance of a check in favor of the
complainant on 30 March 1994 against a closed account shows the respondent had no
desire to return the money entrusted to him for the reinstatement of the license of the
corporation. The letter of the POEA dated 24 May 1994 xxx clearly show that the
payment of surety bond will not suffice to reinstate the license of the corporation in view
of several cases of violations of recruitment pending before the POEA against said
corporation. This fact was not disclosed to complainant when the Memorandum of
Agreement was entered into by the parties.

Thus, the Commissioners recommendation:

Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested lack of candor,
when he knowingly failed to provide the complainant with accurate and complete
information due her under the circumstances. It is respectfully recommended that
respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law in the maximum period prescribed
by law and to return the money received from the complainant.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-
102[16] adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the
investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A, and finding, the Recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents lack of candor when he
knowingly failed to provide complainant with the accurate and complete information due
her, Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years and Restitution of the money received from complainant.

Two (2) days later, or on November 24, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted
to this Court the Notice of Resolution together with the records of Administrative Case No. 4515.[17]

On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18] of the Investigating Commissioners
Report and Recommendation with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. In IBP Resolution No. XVII-
2006-83[19] dated January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondents motion on the ground
that it has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

After this Court noted the aforementioned IBP Resolution on June 28, 2006, a Motion for
Reinvestigation[20] was filed by the respondent on September 12, 2006.

Subsequently, on November 15, 2006, the parties were required to manifest within ten (10) days
from notice, if they were willing to submit this case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[21]

In our Resolution[22] dated March 5, 2007, we noted without action respondents motion for
reinvestigation in view of respondent subsequent compliance and Manifestation dated December 27,
2006. In the same resolution, the Court noted (1) the said respondents compliance and manifestation of
December 27, 2006 relative to the aforementioned November 15, 2006 Resolution; (2) complainants
Manifestation dated December 19, 2006, stating that she was willing to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings filed and the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; (3) respondents Comment
on Complainants Manifestation dated January 4, 2007; and (4) complainants Manifestation dated January
10, 2007.

At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondents challenge as to complainants personality to file
this complaint. In his Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the IBP Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation of October 12, 2004, respondent contends that complainant, not being a party-in-
interest in the agreement between respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal standing to file the
instant complaint.

Respondents argument lacks merit.

Section 1, Rule 139-B[24] of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the IBP upon the verified complaint of any person. Accordingly, we held in Navarro v. Meneses III,[25] as
reiterated in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin,[26]that:
 The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is
unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury
from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and
the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence
submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its
resolution and recommended sanctions. (Emphasis ours)

The rationale was explained by us in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,[27] viz:

[The] rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding

for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
(Word in brackets ours)

Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether or not complainant herein was a party to the
subject transaction. In any event, complainant is actually a party-in-interest thereto because she is
mentioned as the treasurer of ISRC in the Memorandum of Agreement;[28] as well as one of the assignees
in the Deed of Assignment of shares of ISRC stocks which respondent alleged to have executed; [29] and as
the payee in the bank check issued by the respondent for the amount of P500,000.00.[30]

We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.

The pivotal issue herein is whether respondent employed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when
he entered into the Memorandum of Agreement with Khalifa and received from the latter a sum of money
in the amount of P500,000.00.
 We rule in the affirmative.

The complainant contends that pursuant to their agreement, she gave the amount of P500,000.00
to the respondent to be used for the reinstatement of ISRCs recruitment license as well as to start the
business operation of the corporation. The respondent, however, claims that complainant misinterpreted
their agreement because the P500,000.00 the latter gave him was in payment of his personal shares of
ISRC stock, as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment.

We are constrained to give credence to the complainants contention. The due execution and authenticity
of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the parties are undisputed. Moreover, the terms
thereof are clear and explicit that for and in consideration of the joint ownership of ISRC, the husband of
the complainant, Mr. Khalifa Juma, would pay the amount of P500,000.00, P250,000.00 of which would
be used for the reinstatement of ISRCs license, while the other P250,000.00 was for the start of the
operation of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other obligations, if
any.[31] Nowhere in said MOA is the alleged assignment of shares mentioned. The testimony of the
complainant[32] on this score is more credible than that of the respondent because it conforms with the
written stipulations in the MOA. In contrast, the respondents explanations with respect to the P500,000.00
in question had been inconsistent. The respondent averred in his Comment that the P500,000.00 was
given to him initially for the purpose of pursuing the appeal with the Office of the President and that he
used the same to pay loans or to reimburse borrowed money spent for the said purpose. However,
respondent also alleged that since the complainant was in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC,
the money was used to buy his own shareholdings in the corporation for which he executed a Deed of
Assignment in complainants favor, which respondent claimed he could validly do without the approval of
ISRCs Board of Directors. His subsequent Memorandum[33] submitted to the IBP contained new
allegations that aside from the P500,000.00 paid by the complainant for his personal shares of ISRC
stocks, an additionalP500,000.00 should have been given to him as fresh capital of the corporation and
because of this failure of complainant to put up the alleged fresh capital, ISRC was not able to put up the
deposits required by the POEA resulting in the non-renewal of the license of ISRC up to the present.
 Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the respondent was seemingly evident right
at the outset when he entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and operation of ISRC with
the complainants husband, knowing fully well that he could not do so without the consent of and/or
authority from the corporations Board of Directors. The unilateral execution by respondent of the Deed of
Assignment is a lame excuse offered by the respondent. We agree with the observation of Commissioner
San Juan that the said deed, which was not at all mentioned in the MOA, was executed by the respondent
after the complainant had conducted her investigation of the true condition of the corporation. The so-
called guarantee check appears to have also been issued by respondent for the same reason.

Moreover, while the respondent made it appear in the MOA that the complainant would be
appointed treasurer and her husband Chairman of the Board of ISRC, the respondent had not complied
with the said undertaking as per the Certification[34] dated October 13, 1995 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The respondent could not justify his non-compliance with the terms of the
MOA by citing ISRCs inability to comply with other governmental requirements for the reinstatement of
its license for various reasons, since the respondent failed to disclose the same to the complainant and her
husband.

Particularly, the respondent failed to apprise the complainant as to the true state of ISRCs affairs
that the reinstatement of the corporations recruitment license would require not only a favorable action by
the Office of the President on ISRCs appeal and the payment of a surety bond, but also ISRCs clearance
or exoneration in its other cases for recruitment violations pending with the POEA. [35] The respondent
could not pass the blame to the complainant because of his belated excuse that complainant failed to
infuse an additional amount of P500,000.00. This new defense is clearly an afterthought and not
supported by evidence.

In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as his attorneys oath.

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following :

 Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer
not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. [36] A lawyer must
conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times.[37] For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor. [38] Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting
the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. [39] Thus, lawyers
may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such
conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[40]

Hence, in this case, we are in accord with the findings of the IBP Commissioner, as affirmed by
the IBP Board of Governors. What is more, we find respondent to be guilty of gross misconduct for
issuing a worthless check.

In Sanchez v. Somoso,[41] the Court ruled that a lawyer who paid another with a personal check
from a bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely low regard to his
commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the
profession which he should hold in high esteem. In Moreno v. Araneta, [42] we held that the issuance of
worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.

Respondent herein admitted having issued a check but claimed that it was only to guarantee the
reimbursement of the P500,000.00 given to him by the complainant in case of an adverse decision in
ISRCs appeal with the Office of the President. We note, however, that said check was issued on March
30, 1994 or one year after the appeal adverted to had already been favorably acted upon on March 30,
1993. Hence, our conclusion is that the check was issued only after the complainant demanded the return
of theirP500,000.00 investment in ISRC. In any event, respondents act of issuing a guarantee check
for P500,000.00, when he was presumably aware that at the time of his issuance thereof his bank account
against which the check was drawn was already closed, clearly constitutes gross misconduct for which he
should be penalized.

In sum, the amount of P500,000.00 was received by the respondent for the reinstatement of the
license, but there is no showing that it was used for such purpose, as the respondent failed to give any
credible accounting or explanation as to the disbursement of the said amount in accordance with the
stipulations in the MOA. Respondent failed to disclose all the existing hindrances to the renewal of ISRCs
recruitment license, which enticed complainant and her husband to part with the aforesaid sum of
money. He also admittedly issued a check drawn against a closed account, which evinced his lack of
intention to return the money to the complainant pursuant to his supposed guarantee. It is thus proper for
the Court to order its restitution as recommended by the IBP.

We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years by the
IBP Board of Governors to be too harsh considering that this is respondents first administrative offense. It
is settled that the appropriate penalty which the Court may impose on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[43] Accordingly, for employing deceit
and misrepresentation in his personal dealings as well as for issuing a worthless check, we rule and so
hold that the penalty of suspension for one (1) year and one (1) month from the practice of law is
sufficient to be meted out to respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1)

YEAR and ONE (1) MONTH from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or
similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE the amount of P500,000.00
to the complainant.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

EN BANC

JERRY T. WONG, A.C. No. 6972

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, TINGA,
Respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 17, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a complaint[1] dated December 1, 2003 for the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Salvador N. Moya II filed by complainant Jerry T. Wong with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1172 for violation of Batas
Pambansa 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

Complainant avers that he is the owner of J & L Agro-vets, a company engaged in the business of
selling agricultural and veterinary products and medicine. Sometime in 1997, he retained the services of
respondent for the purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of the company. Respondent
also handled personal cases of complainant and his wife.

As their relationship prospered, respondent asked financial help from complainant for the
construction of his house and purchase of a car. Complainant willingly helped him. Pursuant to their
arrangement, complainant purchased a car on installment basis from Transfarm for respondent. He issued
postdated checks to cover its payment to Transfarm. The respondent in turn issued checks in favor of the
complainant to reimburse the latter.

The checks issued by complainant in favor of Transfarm were duly encashed upon
presentment. However, the checks issued by respondent to reimburse complainant were dishonored for
the reason Account Closed. Respondent refused to comply with the repeated demands of the complainant
to replace the dishonored checks.

Furthermore, complainant introduced respondent to Quirino Tomlin and to the owner of Unisia
Merchandising Corporation, from whom respondent obtained construction materials for the construction
of his house on credit in the amount of P164,000.00. Respondent also failed to pay this indebtedness,
which remained unsettled and thus caused embarrassment to complainant.

Respondent as well handled another case of complainant against Berting Diwa, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1482 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. It was decided
on September 21, 2000. After the decision became final and executory, complainant and his wife sought
the execution of the judgment through respondent.
 On August 15, 2001, Diwa paid the amount of P15,680.50 for the satisfaction of the judgment. As
complainants counsel, respondent received the payment but he did not inform complainant about
it. Complainant had knowledge of it only when he got hold of a copy of the Manifestation with Prayer to
Terminate Proceedings filed by respondent before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

On December 1, 2003, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to file his answer to the complaint for
disbarment within 15 days from receipt of thereof. He filed three motions for extension of time to file his
responsive pleading/answer. The first motion dated January 5, 2004 asked for a 15-day extension
from January 5, 2004 or until January 20, 2004within which to file his responsive pleading. He filed
on January 20, 2004 his second motion for extension of time for another 15-day or until February 4,
2004.[2] On February 4, 2004, he filed a Manifestation/Explanation for Extension of Time to File
Responsive Pleading/Answer/Motion to Dismiss, citing that as early as October 1, 2003, complainants
third cause of action pertaining to a debt with Unisia Merchandising was already filed in court.

Subsequently, he filed his Motion to Dismiss[3] dated February 27, 2004 on the following
grounds:

That complainant is not the proper party in interest and has no cause of action.

That complainant has prematurely prejudged respondent relative to the latters intention of
not paying his debt as the former impresses the honorable body that respondent would not
pay at all.

That complainants action in the Berting Diwa case should be addressed to the Municipal
Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and not to the IBP.

In the aforesaid motion, respondent never denied and even acknowledged what he described as
honest debts to Unisia Merchandising and Mr. Tomlin,[4] which he admitted he was unable to pay on time
due to financial constraints. He added that the IBP, being not a collection agency, was not the proper
forum to lodge the complaint against him that merely concerned the collection of his monetary
obligations which were then subject of pending court suits. Similarly, respondent argued that the
complaint against case should be addressed to the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

On April 28, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an Order[5] denying respondents motion to dismiss as it is
prohibited pleading under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Respondent
was given a new period of fifteen (15) days within which to file his verified answer.
 On May 28, 2004, respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration[6] which was denied in an
Order dated June 16, 2004.[7]

On June 28, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Give Respondent Extension of
Time to File His Answer/or Responsive Pleadings,[8] requesting for a fresh period of fifteen (15) days or
until July 13, 2004 to file his answer. In the Order dated June 30, 2004, respondents motion was granted
with warning that no further request for extension shall be entertained.[9]

On July 13, 2004, respondent filed another Very Urgent Motion for Extension to File
Answer,[10] seeking another period of ten (10) days within which to file his answer or responsive
pleading. On July 21, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an Order finding the ground for extension not
justifiable. Respondent was also declared in default and complainant was directed to file his verified
position paper within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order, after which, the case shall be considered
submitted for report and recommendation, with or without the position paper.

On July 23, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Terminate Proceedings on the
Ground of Prescription, considering that six (6) months had already passed from the date of discovery of
the offense.[11]

On August 10, 2004, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Recall Order Dated July 21,
[12]
2004 in the interest of higher justice and fair play.

On January 3, 2005, the IBP-CBD issued an Order giving both parties a period of ten (10) days to
file their respective verified position paper, as follows:

Respondent should be informed that a complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline

of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct. (Section 1, Rule VIII, Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline). And records show that the acts complained of took place in 2002.

In the interest of justice, both parties are given ten (10) days from receipt of this Order to
file their respective verified position papers. After the expiration of the said period, with
or without the position paper, the case shall be considered submitted for report and
recommendation.
 Respondent did not file any responsive pleading at all.

Thus, on April 27, 2005, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
submitted her Report and Recommendation.[13] She recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year. The pertinent portions of the said Report and Recommendation read as
follows:

After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence presented, we
find merit to warrant disciplinary action against respondent. His failure to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and to appear on the
scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary
sanction. (Ngayan v. Tugade, 193 SCRA 779).

Respondents contention that there were cases already filed in court against him is
of no moment. The pendency of a criminal action against a respondent from the facts of
which the disciplinary proceedings is predicated, does not pose a prejudicial question to
the resolution of the issues in the disbarment case (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1; Calo v.
Degamo, 20 SCRA 447).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is hereby recommended that respondent ATTY.

SALVADOR N. MOYA II be SUSPENDED for a period of ONE YEAR from receipt
hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[14]

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Maala in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-113.[15] Respondent
was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of two
(2) years must be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of two
(2) years in CBD Case No. 03-1171, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of B.P. 22 and for failure
and refusal to comply with his obligations, Atty. Salvador N. Moya is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a notification that this suspension of two years
must be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of
two years in CBD Case No. 03-1171.[16]
 On January 12, 2006, respondent through counsel filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a notice informing it that respondent is filing an Appeal Memorandum.On the same date,
respondent filed his Appeal Memorandum with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION FORM
THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY
FAILED TO FILE HIS ANSWER ON THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT
DESPITE DUE NOTICE.

II

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF

THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING
ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE BOUNCING CHECKS LAW.

III

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF

THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING
ALLEGEDLY REFUSED TO SETTLE HIS OBLIGATIONS.

On January 31, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution noting the aforesaid Notice of Resolution No.
XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of the IBP.[17]

On various dates,[18] the Court issued Resolutions noting the following pleadings filed by the
respondent:

1. Appeal Memorandum filed on January 12, 2006;

2. Manifestation/Supplement[19] to the Appeal Memorandum With Motion to Give Due

Course To said Pleading More So That The IBP Had Gone Beyond the Period Provided
For By Law To Conduct Investigation As In The Case of Malonzo v. Principe, 447 SCRA
1.
 3. Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the Case to the IBP-CBD and Treat the
Appeal Memorandum as Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution of the IBP-CBD
filed on November 3, 2006.

At the outset, respondents Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the Case to the IBP-
CBD and Treat the Appeal Memorandum as Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution of the IBP-
CBD, is denied. It is not necessary to remand this case to the IBP because the latter no longer have
jurisdiction over the case which had already been endorsed to this Court for final action. Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

Xxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.

Regarding the merits of the case, we sustain the findings and conclusions of Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala, as approved, adopted and modified by the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as
payment for his loan from complainant and the latters friends which were incurred at the time when he
was engaged as complainants counsel. He did not deny the aforesaid allegations but he contended that he
committed neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility nor any dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct because he never denied his debts and he was only unable to pay them on time due to
financial constraints.

Respondents contention is untenable.

Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.[20]

In Lao v. Medel,[21] we ruled as follows:

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the

Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code
specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. In Co v. Bernardino, [ A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA
102] the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as violation of this Rule and
an act constituting gross misconduct.

Moreover, in Cuizon v. Macalino,[22] we also ruled that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Similarly, Sanchez v.
Somoso[23] held that the persistent refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests a lawyers
low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. This conduct deserves
nothing less than a severe disciplinary action.

Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in
the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial
condition. Respondent should not have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If
he suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have explained with particularity the circumstances which
caused his failure to meet his obligations. His generalized and unsubstantiated allegations as to why he
reneged in the payment of his debts promptly despite repeated demands and sufficient time afforded him
cannot withstand scrutiny.

The Court finds unmeritorious the justification of the respondent as to his failure to immediately
deliver to the complainant the payment made by Diwa for the satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 1482 of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Respondent is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum
of money due to his client. His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation that
the same had already been transmitted to the complainant.

His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of serious
concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of time to file his answer.
His failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show
a callous disregard of the lawful orders of the duly constituted authority, which caused undue delay in the
IBP proceeding. This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility[24] and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. Respondent has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with

conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal Profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This
authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. [25] Sadly, herein
respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the legal
profession. Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct.

We come now to the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v. Bernardino[26] and Lao v.
Medel[27] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-
CBD, i.e., respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, because aside
from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent also had seriously breached his
clients trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBPs
Orders in the course of its proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of the IBP which found
that respondent Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is AFFIRMED in toto. He is hereby SUSPENDED for two years from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to
append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
---

FIRST DIVISION

WALTER WILKIE, A.C. NO. 7505

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,*
CARPIO, **
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, *** JJ.

ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS,

Respondent. Promulgated:

October 24, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a Complaint dated April 27, 2005[1] initially filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), La Union Chapter, and forwarded to the IBP, National Office
in Pasig City, by Mr. Walter Wilkie against Atty. Sinamar E. Limos. In the complaint, it was alleged that
the respondent committed deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan from the complainant
and issued two (2) postdated checks in the latters favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge of
insufficiency of funds to cover the same.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP, Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) in this wise:

Complainant alleged that on 2 April 2003, he engaged the services of respondent

regarding his intention of adopting his wifes nephew, Reynal Alsaen
Taltalen. Complainant has given his full trust and confidence on
respondent. Notwithstanding their lawyer and client relationship, on March 30, 2003,
respondent borrowed money from complainant in the amount of P250,000.00. The loan
agreement was evidenced by a Contract of Loan with a stipulation of interest in the
amount of 24% per annum and that respondent will issue two (2) post dated checks
representing the principal amount of P250,000.00 and the interest in the amount of
P60,000.00.

When the checks became due, complainant deposited the same to his account at Equitable
PCI Bank but to his surprise and dismay, the checks were returned as they were drawn
against insufficient funds. Despite demands made, respondent failed to pay her
obligation.

Complainant decided to engage the services of a counsel who also made a formal demand
to respondent but to no avail. Criminal complaints were filed against respondent before
Branch 2,Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union.

Complainant has also withdrawn the adoption case from respondent who did not do
anything regarding the case despite the lapse of almost a year.[2]
In its Order[3] dated July 21, 2005, the CBD gave respondent a period of fifteen (15) days to
submit her Answer to the Complaint. Through Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
the CBD also sent a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing[4] dated February 8, 2006 to the parties
which required them to appear before the Commission on March 29, 2006. [5]

In response to the aforementioned Notice, a Manifestation and Motion[6] dated February 23, 2006
was filed by the respondent, requesting that she be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given a
reasonable time after receipt of the complaint to submit a responsive pleading thereto. Respondent also
moved for the cancellation and re-scheduling at a later date of the mandatory conference/hearing.
In her Order[7] dated March 1, 2006, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala rejected respondents claim
that she did not receive the complaint in view of the registry return receipt attached to the records
showing that a certain JE Limos received the Order dated July 21, 2005. However, in the interest of
justice, respondent was given a non-extendible period of ten (10) days to file an Answer but the
mandatory conference/hearing set on March 29, 2006 was maintained.

At the scheduled March 29, 2006 mandatory conference/hearing, the complainant was present but the
respondent failed to appear. Furthermore, respondent failed to file an answer. Thus, the Commissioner
considered respondent in default and deemed the case submitted for report and recommendation in her
Order[8] dated March 29, 2006.

Eventually, the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation,[9] dated July 28,
2006, was submitted to the IBP Board of Governors with the following conclusion and recommendation:

A lawyer who issued bouncing checks violates the law and is subject to
disbarment or suspension. Violation of B.P. 22 is considered a crime involving moral
turpitude as this mischief creates not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. Although it does not relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer, however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person. The Court has stressed that the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires
that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby recommend that respondent ATTY.

SINAMAR E. LIMOS be suspended for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from receipt
hereof from the practice of her profession and as a member of the Bar.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

On December 15, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-591[10] in
CBD Case No. 05-1534 adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and
recommendation of the commissioner, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as annex A; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and for respondents deceitful and dishonest conduct, Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is
hereby REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar conduct
will be dealt with more severely.
 On March 21, 2007, the CBD transmitted the Notice of Resolution pertaining to Resolution No.
XVII-2006-591 together with the records of CBD Case No. 05-1534, [11]which this Court noted in its
Resolution[12] dated June 27, 2007.

On October 16, 2007, the additional records of the case were transmitted to the Court by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.Notably, the transmittal included
the letter[13] dated December 11, 2006 of the respondent explaining her failure to attend the hearing of
CBD Case No. 05-1534 and pleading for the consideration of the members of the IBP Board of
Governors. According to respondent, she was not able to attend the mandatory conference/hearing
because she was physically unfit at that time. Her office staff whom she relied upon to receive
communications for the office went on leave without her knowledge and she was made to believe that the
administrative complaint would be withdrawn in view of the Affidavit of Desistance[14] dated August 24,
2005 executed by complainant. Respondent claimed that her loan from complainant was actually an
accommodation she extended in behalf of a client, Hilario Inocencio. She issued the postdated checks on
the belief that Inocencio will send her the funds to cover the said checks pursuant to their agreement. To
this day, however, Inocencio had not complied with his promise in spite of the loan having been fully
paid by respondent on August 21, 2005 to the complainant who had filed cases against her for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). Inocencios demise had left her without any recourse. To support her
allegations, respondent attached to her letter the Affidavit of Desistance and the Order[15] of the MTC, San
Fernando, La Union, datedAugust 31, 2005 dismissing the criminal cases for violation of BP 22 against
her (respondent).

We find the records sufficient to support the IBPs findings.

In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[16] we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that
the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of which explicitly states:

CANON 1-- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
 Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Respondent did not deny that she obtained a loan in the amount of P250,000.00 with interest from
the complainant. Respondents bare claim that the loan was, in fact, only an accommodation for a former
client who according to respondent had already died cannot be given credence and, indeed, too specious
to be believed. Besides, she did not file any answer to the complaint nor even appeared personally before
the CBD despite being duly notified, to allege such claim. Added to this observation is the fact that in her
Manifestation and Motion dated February 23, 2006, no mention was made with regard to the
complainants August 24, 2005 Affidavit of Desistance. It was only mentioned in her letter to the IBP
dated December 14, 2006 which was received in the IBP-CBD on January 3, 2007. By then, the Report
and Recommendation dated July 28, 2006 of the Commissioner was already submitted to the Board of
Governors which resolved to affirm said Report in its Resolution dated December 15, 2006.

At any rate, the excuses given by respondent cannot exculpate her from an administrative
sanction considering her acknowledgement that worthless checks were issued by her in payment of the
loan.

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. [17] It
shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.[18] It
also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.[19]
Respondent, however, to secure her exoneration from the consequence of her act in issuing
worthless checks, heavily relies on the complainants Affidavit of Desistance dated August 24, 2005. But
such reliance is misplaced because while the complainant filed his affidavit with the trial court, he did not
do the same thing in this case. Notably, at the time of the mandatory conference/hearing before
the CBD on March 29, 2006, complainant did not even inform the Commissioner that he already desisted
in prosecuting the criminal cases he filed with the MTC against the respondent and that such desistance
resulted in the dismissal of said cases. In any event, the Court has consistently frowned upon the
desistance of complainants because of legal and jurisprudential injunction.

Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides in part:

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. . . . .

 xxxx

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

Pertinently in Rangwani v. Dino,[20] citing Bolivar v. Simbol,[21] the Court ruled that the discipline
of lawyers cannot be cut short by a compromise or withdrawal of charges. We ratiocinated, thus:
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that this settlement operated as
an absolution and remission of his offense. This view of the case ignores the fact that the
exercise of the power is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties,
but to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in
his profession. He had acted in clear disregard of his duty as an attorney at the bar, and
without good fidelity to his client. The public had rights which Mrs. Curtis could not thus
settle or destroy. The unworthy act had been fully consummated.[22]

Accordingly, an administrative sanction on the respondent is warranted. We disagree, however,

with the recommended sanction of reprimand by the IBP Board of Governors for being not commensurate
to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent.

Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.[23] While we will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not
disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[24]

In Barrios v. Martinez,[25] we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he
was convicted in the criminal case filed against him.

In Lao v. Medel,[26] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer
in Rangwani v. Dino[27] having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment
of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by the complainant.

But in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[28] we meted out only a six-month suspension to Atty.

Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro for having issued several checks to the complainants in payment of a pre-
existing debt without sufficient funds, justifying the imposition of a lighter penalty on the ground of the
respondents payment of a portion of her debt to the complainant, unlike in the
aforementioned Lao and Rangwani cases where there was no showing of any restitution on the part of the
respondents.

In this case, the respondent has fully paid her obligation to the complainant which according to
the receipts dated July 21, 2005 and August 24, 2005,[29] amounted toP400,000.00. The criminal cases
filed by the complainant have been dismissed and this is the first time a complaint of such nature has been
filed against the respondent. Under these circumstances, the Court rules and so holds that a suspension of
three months from the practice of law would be sufficient sanction on the respondent.

On a final note, we reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a
high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.[30] Sadly, herein respondent fell short of the exacting
standards expected of her as a vanguard of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is SUSPENDED FOR THREE

MONTHS from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a
more severe penalty. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the
Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
 FIRST DIVISION
CESAR TALENTO and MODESTA HERRERA A.C. No. 7433
TALENTO, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1554]
Petitioners,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus
CARPIO MORALES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA,

Respondent.
Promulgated:

December 23, 2009

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is the administrative complaint filed by mother and son Modesta Herrera Talento and
Cesar Talento charging Atty. Agustin F. Paneda of violation of his oath as a lawyer and neglect of duty.

This case was initiated by petitioners with the filing of a Complaint[1] before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on August 29, 2005. In the said Complaint, petitioners alleged the following:
 a. Sometime in October 17, 2000, a civil complaint was filed by Leticia
Herrera. The same complaint was raffled to Regional Trial Court Branch 31, Agoo, La
Union presided by Hon. Clifton U. Ganay;

b. This case was entitled: LETICIA HERERRA, Plaintiff vs. MODESTA H. TALENTO
and CESAR TALENTO as Defendants for Quieting of Title, docketed as Civil Case No. A-
2043;

c. [Petitioners] secured the services of Atty. Agustin Paneda to help and defend
[them] in the aforementioned case. [Petitioners] paid the attorneys fees he required
from [them] in order that [they] could avail of his services as counsel;

d. Atty. Paneda filed [petitioners] answer to the complaint on November 14,

2000 and the case was set for pre-trial. The Honorable Court in an order required both
parties counsels to submit their respective pre-trial briefs and appear during the
scheduled pre-trial hearing on December 18, 2000;

e. Despite the order and notice to [their] counsel, he did not file or submit a pre-
trial brief for [petitioners] behalf. Much more to [their] surprise and predicament,
although [petitioners] attended the pre-trial hearing, he did not appear;

f. As a result of his non-appearance, the counsel for the other party spoke of
things beyond our knowledge which the Honorable Court granted being expressly stated
and provided in the Rules of Court. [Petitioners] were declared in default because of the
failure of [their] counsel to file and submit [petitioners] pre-trial brief. The Honorable
Court allowed the case to be heard ex parte much to our damage and prejudice;

g. The Honorable Court issued a decision against [petitioners] simply for failure
of [their] counsel Atty. Paneda to submit [petitioners] pre-trial brief and for his failure to
attend the pre-trial of the case. It was simply because of technicality and not based on
the merits of the allegations of both parties that [petitioners] lost the case;
 h. Atty. Paneda filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 27, 2000,
but the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court;

i. Atty. Paneda told [petitioners] that he will appeal the case to the Court of
Appeals and [they] agreed because [they were] confident of [petitioners] claim over the
parcel of land subject of this case. He filed a notice of appeal on February 8, 2001.
[Petitioners] paid the required fees and he even required [petitioners] to shell out more
money for the preparation of the Appeal brief;

j. [Petitioners] waited for so long for the decision of the Honorable Court of
Appeals and [petitioners] found out later that [petitioners] appeal was dismissed due to
lack of an appeal brief only when [petitioners] went to Atty. Paneda.[2]

In the Order[3] dated August 30, 2005 issued by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission), respondent was required to submit his Answer to the Complaint within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice. Respondent filed his Answer[4] on October 24, 2005.

In his Answer, respondent states that he honestly believed that he had not violated his oath as a
lawyer nor did he commit negligence in handling the case of the petitioners.He likewise avers that there
were other considerations and incidents which had intervened in the case that produced adverse
reactions. He cites as reason for the non-filing of the Pre-trial Brief the fact that, before the date set for
pre-trial hearing, respondent was informed by petitioners that they had already entered into an
Amicable Settlement with the plaintiff. Respondent advised petitioners to submit the said agreement to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in lieu of the Pre-trial Brief. Respondent did not appear during the pre-trial
conference scheduled in the morning of December 19, 2000 because he chose instead to attend the pre-
trial conference of the replevin case involving his personal vehicle inDagupan City which was also set on
that same morning.[5] With regard to his failure to file the required Appellants Brief before the Court of
Appeals (CA), he points to his secretarys oversight in promptly informing him of the latters receipt of the
Notice of Submission of Appellants Brief.[6] Respondent insists that he was not negligent in his practice
but there were circumstances beyond his control and were unavoidable. He contends that petitioners
should not altogether blame him but they should also accept that the debacle was due to their
inaction.[7]

Petitioners refute the foregoing assertions of the respondent.[8] They vehemently deny
respondents claim that they allegedly informed him of the Amicable Settlement prior to the date of pre-
trial hearing. In fact, they intended to show the document to him for the very first time at the pre-trial
conference in which he did not appear. They likewise belie respondents claim that he gave instructions
to petitioners on what to do during the pre-trial conference in his absence. They further deny
respondents claim that he had informed them beforehand of his inability to attend due to a conflict of
schedule. Granting that there was indeed a conflict of schedule, petitioners maintain that respondent is
required by Rule 18, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court[9] to file the Pre-trial Brief at least three (3) days before
the date of pre-trial conference. Finally, petitioners insist that, contrary to respondents assertion in his
Answer, respondent did not exert his best efforts for his clients because, after negligently abandoning
them at the RTC, respondent likewise failed to fulfill his duty of safeguarding their interests in the CA
when respondent failed to perform a basic legal requirement of filing an Appeal Brief in order for the
said court to take cognizance of their Appeal.

The parties were then required by the Commission to appear at a mandatory conference held
on November 30, 2005. Petitioner Cesar Talento appeared together with his counsel, Atty. Matthew L.
Dati. Co-petitioner Modesta Herrera Talento executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Cesar
Talento and Atty. Dati. Respondent appeared on his behalf.

After the termination of the hearing, the parties were directed to file their respective verified
position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order[10] and were informed that with or
without said position papers, the case shall be deemed submitted for report and recommendation. Only
petitioners submitted a Position Paper[11] which was received by the Commission on January 4, 2009.

On April 28, 2006, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of gross violation of his duties as a lawyer and of inexcusable
negligence with the recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year. The salient portion of the Report reads:

Respondents failure to file complainants Pre-trial Brief, his failure to appear

during the Pre-trial Conference because he has to attend to another case, his failure to
file complainants Appeal Brief and his failure to inform complainants of the dismissal of
the case at the Court of Appeals are in gross violation of his duties as a lawyer and show
inexcusable negligence on his part.

His contention that he told complainants to present the Amicable Settlement

agreed upon by the parties for the courts appreciation does not excuse him of his
obligation to his clients, much more his allegation that he advised complainants of the
 futility of the case. It should be noted that the Amicable Settlement was forged by the
parties after the case was already filed in court, therefore the same has no legal effect.

The lawyer owes a duty to his client to be competent to perform the legal
services which the lawyer undertakes on his behalf. The lawyer should serve his client in
a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and he should provide a quality of service
at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a
like situation (citation omitted).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby recommend that respondent

ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA be SUSPENDED for a period of ONE YEAR from receipt
hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.[12]

On November 18, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-495 adopting the
aforequoted Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents inexcusable negligence, Atty. Agustin F. Paneda is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.[13]

The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or
misconduct in handling petitioners case both on trial in the RTC and on appeal in the CA which led to its
dismissal without affording petitioners the opportunity to present their evidence.

After a careful consideration of the records of the instant case, this Court agrees with the IBP in its
findings and conclusion that respondents documented acts fall extremely short of the standard of
professional duty that all lawyers are required to faithfully adhere to.

The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

 CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxxx

Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

There is no doubt that respondent was woefully remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and
competence in protecting the interests of his clients. The records of this case clearly detailed dire
instances of professional neglect which undoubtedly showed respondents failure to live up to his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. Petitioners lost Civil Case No. A-2043 in the RTC
mainly because they were barred from presenting their evidence in court. This was a result of their
being declared in default in the said case as a consequence of respondents failure to appear at the pre-
trial conference. Respondent defended his non-appearance by stating that he had informed petitioners
beforehand of a conflict of schedule and that he had instructed them on what to do in his absence, but
petitioners vehemently denied this claim.

Even if we are to give credence to respondents justification, this does not excuse him from the
fact that he was unable to file a Pre-trial Brief at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled pre-trial
conference, as required by the Rules. Respondent alleges that he already prepared the Pre-trial Brief but
did not push through with filing it because he was allegedly furnished by petitioner Modesta Herrera
Talento with an Amicable Settlement that was forged between the parties before the Barangay Lupon of
San Pedro, Agoo, La Union. He claims that he instructed his clients to present said document during the
pre-trial conference as he had another hearing to attend.[14] However, respondents excuse is untenable
as any lawyer worth his salt would readily know that once a case has been filed in court, any amicable
settlement between the parties must be approved by the court in order for it to be legally binding in
accordance with Section 416[15] of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to the last paragraph
of Section 408[16] of the same Code. Thus, he cannot assume that the case will be deemed closed by
virtue of the supposed amicable settlement so as to excuse him from filing the Pre-trial Brief and from
appearing at the pre-trial set by the court.

With regard to his subsequent error of failing to file the required Appeal Brief which led to the dismissal
of his clients appeal before the CA, respondent did not give any plausible explanation other than merely
placing the blame on the incompetence of his secretary in not promptly informing him about her receipt
of the Notice of Submission of Appellants Brief.[17] This mistake by respondent is exacerbated by the fact
that he did not care to inform his clients of the dismissal of their appeal in 2002 and it was only in 2005
that his clients learned about this unfortunate turn of events.

It is beyond dispute that respondent is duty-bound by his oath as a lawyer to diligently prosecute the
case of his clients to the best of his ability within the bounds of law.Regrettably, the facts of this case
illustrate respondents dismal performance of that responsibility, which in its totality could amount to a
reprehensible abandonment of his clients cause.

A lawyer, when he undertakes his clients cause, makes a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication and care, and he
should do no less, otherwise, he is not true to his lawyers oath.[18]

As held in the case of Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose:[19]

The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve
his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect,
within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a
practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare
adequately and give the appropriate attention to his legal work.

In Balatbat v. Arias,[20] the Court also held that:

 It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in
the prosecution or defense of a clients cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client, he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of
administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms
are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with ones oath of office and
the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Accordingly, for seriously prejudicing his clients interests due to inexcusable neglect of his professional
duties as a lawyer, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent for
one (1) year from the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors acceded to this recommendation.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Agustin F. Paneda GUILTY of violating Canons 17 and 18 as well
as Rules 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
 Manila

FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA, A.C. No. 7907

Petitioners,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA,

Respondent.
December 15, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by the spouses Virgilio and
Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty. Elayda), with gross negligence
or gross misconduct in handling their case. The spouses Aranda were the defendants in Civil Case No.
232-0-01, entitled Martin V. Guballa v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio Aranda, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72.

In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006,[1] the spouses Aranda alleged that Atty. Elaydas handling of
their case was sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure
and evidence,[2] to wit:

4. That on February 14, 2006 hearing of the said case, the case was ordered
submitted for decision [the spouses Aranda] and [Atty. Elayda] did not appear; certified
copy of the order is attached as Annex C;

5. That the order setting this case for hearing on February 14, 2006 was sent
only to [Atty. Elayda] and no notice was sent to [the spouses Aranda] that is they were
unaware of said hearing and [Atty. Elayda] never informed them of the setting;

6. That despite receipt of the order dated February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda]
never informed them of such order notwithstanding the follow-up they made of their
case to him;

7. That [Atty. Elayda] did not lift any single finger to have the order dated
February 14, 2006 reconsidered and/or set aside as is normally expected of a counsel
devoted to the cause of his client;

8. That in view of the inaction of [Atty. Elayda] the court naturally rendered a
judgment dated March 17, 2006 adverse to [the spouses Aranda] which copy thereof
was sent only to [Atty. Elayda] and [the spouses Aranda] did not receive any copy
thereof, certified xerox copy of the decision is attached as Annex D;
 9. That they were totally unaware of said judgment as [Atty. Elayda] had not
again lifted any single finger to inform them of such adverse judgment and that there is
a need to take a remedial recourse thereto;

10. That [Atty. Elayda] did not even bother to file a notice of appeal hence the
judgment became final and executory hence a writ of execution was issued upon
motion of the plaintiff [Martin Guballa] in the said case;

11. That on July 18, 2006 Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag implemented the writ of
execution and it was only at this time that [the spouses Aranda] became aware of the
judgment of the Court, certified xerox copy of the writ of execution is attached as Annex
E;

12. That on July 19, 2006, they wasted no time in verifying the status of their
case before Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo City and to their utter shock,
dismay and disbelief, they found out that they have already lost their case and worst the
decision had already become final and executory;

13. That despite their plea for a reasonable period to take a remedial recourse
of the situation (the Sheriff initially gave them fifteen (15) days), Sheriff Madarag
forcibly took possession and custody of their Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. 529;

14. That they were deprived of their right to present their evidence in the said
case and of their right to appeal because of the gross negligence of respondent.[3]

In its Order[4] dated August 15, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed Atty. Elayda to
submit his Answer to the complaint with a warning that failure to do so will result in his default and the
case shall be heard ex parte.

Atty. Elayda filed his Answer[5] dated September 1, 2006, in which he narrated:
7. That this case also referred to [Atty. Elayda] sometime December 2004 after the
[spouses Aranda] and its former counsel failed to appear in court on February 7, 2005;

8. That from December 2004, the [spouses Aranda] did not bother to contact [Atty.
Elayda] to prepare for the case and in fact on May 30, 2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to ask for
postponement of the case for reason that he still have to confer with the [spouses
Aranda] who were not around;

9. That contrary to the allegations of the [spouses Aranda], there was not a single
instance from December 2004 that the [spouses Aranda] called up [Atty. Elayda] to talk
to him regarding their case;

10. That the [spouses Aranda] from December 2004 did not even bother to follow up
their case in court just if to verify the status of their case and that it was only on July 19,
2006 that they verified the same and also the only time they tried to contact [Atty.
Elayda];

11. That the [spouses Aranda] admitted in their Complaint that they only tried to
contact [Atty. Elayda] when the writ of execution was being implemented on them;

12. That during the scheduled hearing of the case on February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda]
was in fact went to RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City and asked Mrs. Edith Miano to call
him in Branch 73 where he had another case if the [spouses Aranda] show up in court so
that [Atty. Elayda] can talk to them but obviously the [spouses Aranda] did not appear
and Mrs. Miano did not bother to call [Atty. Elayda];

13. That [Atty. Elayda] was not at fault that he was not able to file the necessary
pleadings in court because the [spouses Aranda] did not get in touch with him;

14. That [Atty. Elayda] cannot contact the [spouses Aranda] for the latter failed to give
their contact number to [Atty. Elayda] nor did the [spouses Aranda] go to his office to
leave their contact number;
 14. That the [spouses Aranda] were negligent in their I dont care attitude towards
their case and for this reason that they alone should be blamed for what happened to
their case x x x.

At the mandatory conference hearing held on March 14, 2007, all the parties appeared with their
respective counsels. The parties were then given a period of 10 days from receipt of the order within
which to submit their position papers attaching therewith all documentary exhibits and affidavits of
witnesses, if any.

After the submission of the parties position papers, Investigating Commissioner Jordan M. Pizarras came
out with his Decision[6] finding Atty. Elayda guilty of gross negligence, and recommending his suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six months, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is

suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, which shall take effect
from the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this DECISION. He is sternly WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty.[7]

Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-128[8] dated March 6, 2008,
adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Pizarras report, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of
respondents negligence and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients, Atty.
Emmanuel F. Elayda is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
 with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe
penalty.[9]

Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a Petition for Review maintaining that he was not negligent
in handling the spouses Arandas case as to warrant suspension, which was too harsh a penalty under the
circumstances.

After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate
from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was negligent and
unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients.

In Abay v. Montesino,[10] this Court held:

The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public
service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. Thus, the practice of law is
considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications required for the conferment of
such privilege.

Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and of morality which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients
in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.Any conduct found wanting in these considerations,
whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary
action. In the present case, the failure of respondent to file the appellants brief was a
clear violation of his professional duty to his client.[11]

The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

 CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request
for information.

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
THE LAW.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of
his clients. He should be conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda
should give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases he is handling. As the spouses Arandas
counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said spouses case and is obligated to exert
all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the
spouses Aranda.
Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never
knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the
spouses whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility between a counsel
and his clients, it is the counsels primary duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the
orders which have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry
about the developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for
them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the
case. Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the
initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other. Again, Atty. Elaydas excuse that
he did not have the spouses Arandas contact number and that he did not know their address is simply
unacceptable.

Furthermore, this Court will not countenance Atty. Elaydas explanation that he cannot be faulted for
missing the February 14, 2006 hearing of the spouses Arandas case. The Court quotes with approval the
disquisition of Investigating Commissioner Pizarras:

Moreover, his defense that he cannot be faulted for what had happened during
the hearing on February 14, 2006 because he was just at the other branch of the RTC for
another case and left a message with the court stenographer to just call him when [the
spouses Aranda] come, is lame, to say the least. In the first place, the counsel should not
be at another hearing when he knew very well that he has a scheduled hearing for the
[spouses Arandas] case at the same time. His attendance at the hearing should not be
made to depend on the whether [the spouses Aranda] will come or not. The Order
submitting the decision was given at the instance of the other partys counsel mainly
because of his absence there. Again, as alleged by the [the spouses Aranda] and as
admitted by [Atty. Elayda] himself, he did not take the necessary remedial measure in
order to ask that said Order be set aside.[12]

It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses Arandas case
for decision. Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a sum of money. Notice of
said judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file any notice of appeal or motion for
reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and executory. Atty. Elayda did not also inform the
spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case. The spouses Aranda came to know of the adverse RTC
judgment, which by then had already become final and executory, only when a writ of execution was
issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff.

Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal
profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his clients
case but in fact abandoned his clients cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients, but also to the Court of
which he is an officer.[13]

On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a fee or
free.[14] Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas,[15] the Court held:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law
of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much
is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to
the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[16]

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the Decision of the
Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL F.
ELAYDA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Elaydas personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

EN BANC

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, A.C. No. 1302[1]

Complainant, A.C. No. 1391[2]
A.C. No. 1543[3]

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
 June 30, 2008
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW,
Respondent.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal for reinstatement to the Bar of respondent Dionisio C. Antiniw.

The record shows that respondent was disbarred and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
on April 26, 1991 in a consolidated Decision[4] of this Court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw

DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll
of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against Atty.
Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543
DISMISSED.

In the aforesaid consolidated Decision, respondent was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a
notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the same as evidence for his client in court.

Respondents motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision disbarring him was denied
by the Resolution of August 26, 1993.[5] In the same Resolution, the Court also held with respect to
respondents plea for mercy and compassion that:

x x x the same is merely NOTED until such time as he would have been able to
satisfactorily show contrition and proof of his being again worthy of membership in the
legal profession.

Subsequently, in a Manifestation dated September 17, 1993,[6] respondent proffered his apologies
to the Court for his shortcomings as a legal practitioner asserting that ifthere was an offense or oversight
committed against the legal profession, it was due to his sincere belief that he was doing it honestly to
protect the interest of his client. He pleaded that, pending his submission of proof showing that he is
again worthy of membership in the Bar, he be permitted to continue with his notarial work. In a
Resolution datedOctober 19, 1993,[7] the Court denied respondents plea in the aforesaid Manifestation.
 On January 4, 1994, respondent filed a Petition dated December 8, 1993[8] praying for leave to
submit proof of his being again worthy to be re-admitted to the legal profession. Attached to the Petition
were testimonials, affidavits and sworn certifications of known and outstanding members of his
community at Urdaneta, Pangasinan, as well as manifestos and resolutions of groups and associations
representing various sectors thereat, all attesting to his honesty, worthiness, respectability and
competency as a lawyer and as an elected Board Member in Pangasinan. In a Resolution dated January
27, 1994,[9] the Court denied said petition. A Letter dated February 1, 1995[10] which was sent to the Court
by Bishop Jesus C. Galang, D.D. of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, pleading for respondents
reinstatement, was noted in the Courts Resolution dated March 14, 1995.[11]

Respondent filed an Appeal for Reinstatement dated March 8, 1996,[12] declaring that since his
disbarment, he had embarked on and actively participated in civic and humanitarian activities in the Fifth
District of Pangasinan where he was again elected for the third time as a Provincial Board Member and
for which activities he received Plaques of Appreciation and Recognition, Resolution/Letters, Awards and
Commendations from local government officials of Pangasinan and different groups and associations in
the province, all showing that he is worthy to once again practice the legal profession. His appeal,
however, was denied by the Resolution dated April 23, 1996.[13]

On December 17, 1996, respondent filed a Plea for Re-Admission dated December 8,
1996,[14] reiterating his earlier plea for the lifting of his disbarment. The plea was also denied on January
28, 1997.[15]

On September 1, 1997, respondent again filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to
the Bar dated August 30, 1997,[16] submitting in support thereof the favorable indorsements, letters and
resolutions from the Pangasinan Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); the Executive
Judges of the Regional Trial Courts at Lingayen and Urdaneta, Pangasinan; the Provincial Prosecutors
Association of Pangasinan; Eastern Pangasinan Lawyers League; the Provincial Board of Pangasinan;
Rotary Club of Urdaneta; and the past National President of the IBP, Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo Jr. The
foregoing plea was merely noted by the Court on October 14, 1997.[17]

The following year, respondent filed an Appeal dated July 8, 1998,[18] reiterating therein his
apologies to the Court and promising that should he be given back his license to practice law, he will live
up to the exacting standards of the legal profession and abide by the Code of Professional Ethics and the
Lawyers Oath. Among the written proofs appended to his appeal was the Letter dated June 18,
1998[19] from Bishop Galang, of the Diocese of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, wherein he reiterated his earlier
plea for respondents reinstatement.
 In a Letter dated July 13, 1998[20] received by this Court on July 23, 1998, Bishop Galang
withdrew his letter dated July 10, 1998 recommending respondents reinstatement for being misled into
signing the same.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 1998,[21] wherein he
pointed out that more than seven (7) years had elapsed from the time of his disbarment and that others
who were likewise disbarred but for a shorter duration, namely Attys. Benjamin Grecia and Benjamin
Dacanay,[22] had already been reinstated to the law profession. Among the attachments to respondents
Manifestation was Resolution No. 98-7c dated 6 July 1998 issued by the IBP, Pangasinan Chapter,
strongly indorsing respondents plea for judicial clemency and reinstatement, and the letter dated June 18,
1998 from Bishop Galang supporting his reinstatement to the Bar.

In a Resolution dated February 9, 1999,[23] the Court noted (a) the letters dated June 18, 1998 and
July 13, 1998 of Bishop Galang; (b) Appeal dated July 8, 1998 and Manifestation and Motion
dated December 22, 1998 both filed by respondent. Respondent was also required to comment on Bishop
Galangs letter dated July 13, 1998 within ten days from notice.

In his Comments with Motion dated March 23, 1999,[24] on Bishop Galangs letter dated July 13,
1998, respondent denied the existence of a letter dated July 10, 1998 of Bishop Galang but acknowledged
the existence of the letter dated June 18, 1998. Respondent averred that if the Bishop was indeed referring
to the June 18, 1998 letter, he never misled or had any intention to mislead the bishop into signing the
same. By its Resolution dated June 22, 1999,[25] the Court noted the aforesaid Comments with Motion of
respondent
An Appeal Reiterating Earlier Petition, Appeal, Pleas and Motion for Reinstatement to the Bar
dated August 28, 1999[26] was filed by the respondent on September 21, 1999. In a Resolution dated
November 16, 1999,[27] the Court noted said appeal and denied for lack of merit respondents prayer that
his Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement dated September 1, 1997 and Manifestation and Motion
for Reinstatement dated December 22, 1998 be approved and given due course.

Thereafter, respondents wife, Manuela A. Antiniw, sent to the Court a Letter of Appeal dated
February 7, 2000,[28] asking for clemency in behalf of her husband and affirming therein that her husband
had for eight (8) years continuously pleaded for his reinstatement and that he had submitted proof by way
of testimonials of (a) his character and standing prior to his disbarment, (b) his conduct subsequent to his
disbarment, and (c) his efficient government service. Attached to the letter of respondents wife was a
sworn testimonial of one of the complainants in the consolidated administrative cases, Lydia Bernal,
attesting to the respondents character reformation. The aforesaid letter was noted by the Court in a
Resolution dated 28 February 2000.[29]

Respondent filed a Plea for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement dated March 19,
[30]
2001, therein asserting that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to soul-search
and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself, and prove once more that he would be able to
practice law and at the same time uphold the dignity of the legal profession. The Court, in its Resolution
of June 26, 2001,[31] denied the aforesaid plea.

By its Indorsement dated September 10, 2001,[32] the Office of the Chief Justice referred to the
Bar Confidant the letter dated August 24, 2001[33] of Assistant Commissioner Jesse J. Caberoy of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) requesting comment on the contention of respondent that the
disbarment of a lawyer only prevents him from practicing his profession and does not operate to divest
him of his earned eligibility by passing the Bar examination. In a Letter dated September 20,
2001,[34] respondent cited pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws in support of his aforementioned stand.The
aforesaid Letters dated August 24, 2001 and September 20, 2001, of CSC Assistant Commissioner and
respondent, respectively, were noted by the Courts Resolution datedNovember 20, 2001.[35] Likewise in
said Resolution, the letters were referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report
and recommendation.

In its Report and Recommendation dated January 25, 2002,[36] the OBC opined that the eligibility
vested in a successful bar candidate would not be prejudiced or forfeited by his disbarment and the matter
of enjoying first- grade eligibility by passing the Bar, in relation to the position of City Administrator,
should be determined by the CSC.Nevertheless, the OBC was of the view that the controversy between
the CSC and respondent could not be considered as already ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the OBC
recommended that the CSC, through Assistant Commissioner Caberoy, and respondent be advised to
institute the corresponding legal remedy before the proper court.

In a Resolution dated February 12, 2002,[37] the Court held that it could only resolve actual
controversies brought before it and would thus, refrain from rendering advisory opinions. Accordingly,
the Letter dated August 24, 2001 of Assistant Commissioner Caberoy and Letter dated September 20,
2001 of respondent were merely noted.

Respondent then filed a Plea for Reinstatement to the Bar dated February 28, 2002, [38] stating
therein that for the past ten (10) years since he was disbarred, he had deeply regretted having violated his
obligations as a lawyer; that he realized the gravity of his mistakes; and that because of such disbarment,
he even lost his chance to be permanently appointed as City Administrator of Urdaneta City and/or as
City Legal Officer, after his stint as a Provincial Board Member in Pangasinan for three (3) consecutive
terms. In the event his disbarment is lifted, respondent then promised never to cause dishonor again to the
legal profession and to abide by the ideals and canons thereof. Attached to his Plea for Reinstatement to
the Bar were certifications from various civic and religious groups attesting to his good moral character
and to his worthiness to be a member of the legal profession. In a Resolution dated April 23, 2002,[39] the
Court noted the aforesaid Plea. Subsequently, the Court required the IBP to Comment on the aforesaid
respondents Plea through its Resolution dated July 23, 2002.[40]

In its Comment of September 9, 2002,[41] the IBP, through its Commission on Bar Discipline,
recommended the following:

Considering that the respondent has shown that he has been repentant of what he
had done which was a gross violation of his lawyers oath and of the Canon of
Professional Ethics and that he has been completely reformed and is therefore worthy to
be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys as evidenced by Certifications of different religious
and civic groups, it is recommended that he be allowed to again practice the legal
profession.

It is, however recommended that he be placed on probation, meaning that the

reinstatement should only be temporary and that he be placed under observation for one
year.

If during the period of one year, he proves that he has completely lived up to the
high standards of the legal profession, by then it will be recommended that his
reinstatement as a member of the Bar be made permanent.[42]

The aforesaid comment was noted and referred to the IBP Board of Governors for comment and
recommendation by the Resolution dated December 3, 2002.[43]

The IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No. XVI-2005-99, dated March 12,
2005 [44] resolving as follows:

xxx to approve respondents Plea for Reinstatement and recommend the

reinstatement of Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw as member of the bar immediately.

On June 6, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution[45] referring the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for study and recommendation.

On March 23, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation,[46] to wit:
 Indeed the high standards of the Bar require an impeccable record but our
findings show that respondent has been sufficiently punished for the last fifteen (15)
years of his disbarment and he has sufficiently reformed to be a worthy member of the
Bar. In all candor, he promises the Court that should he be reinstated to practice the legal
profession, he will faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession
and by his oath as a lawyer.

xxx

In the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the disbarment of

respondent DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the practice of law be LIFTED and he be
allowed to resume the practice of law. [47]
We agree with the foregoing recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent was disbarred from the practice of law pursuant to the Decision promulgated
on April 26, 1991[48] which pertinently reads, as follows:

There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification

of a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the
administration of justice as an officer of the court.

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client. (Santos vs. Dichoso,
84 SCRA 622) but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs.
La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his clients cause in utmost
earnestness and with the maximum skill he canmarshall, he is not at liberty to resort to
illegal means for his clients interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with
truth and honor. (Pangan vs Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T.
Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show
his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA
112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that
courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison 125
SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.[49]
 However, the record shows that the long period of respondents disbarment gave him the chance to
purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness
and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the
bar and officer of the court. During respondents disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to
the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice
law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and
members of the judiciary.

In Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[50] the disbarment of a lawyer was lifted for the reasons
quoted hereunder:
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite
apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice
law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of
guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once
more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its
practitioners.[51]

Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the
individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public
from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice, not retribution, is our
goal in disciplinary proceedings.[52]

Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily
showing his contrition and his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the Court finds
that it is now time to lift herein respondents disbarment and reinstate him to the august halls of the legal
profession, but with the following reminder:

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the

rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well x x x. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of
its members.[53]
 Likewise, respondent is enjoined to keep in mind that:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws, as he is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.[54]

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of DIONISIO C. ANTINIW from the practice of law

is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal
fees. This resolution is effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION
GERONIMO C. FUENTES, Complainant, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1204
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-355-MTJ)

Present:

- versus -
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

JUDGE ROMUALDO G. BUNO,

Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court Promulgated:
(MCTC), Talibon-Getafe, Bohol,
Respondent.
July 28, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 This administrative case against Judge Romualdo G. Buno of the 4TH Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, stemmed from a complaint filed by Geronimo C. Fuentes charging him
with abuse of discretion and authority and graft and corruption.

In his complaint, Geronimo Fuentes alleged that he is one of the nine (9) heirs of Bernardo
Fuentes, their father, who owned an agricultural land located at San Jose, Talibon, Bohol, and that
respondent judge prepared and notarized an Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed
of Sale of the said agricultural land, executed by complainants mother Eulalia Credo Vda. de Fuentes,
widow of Bernardo Fuentes, and Alejandro Fuentes, on his own behalf and on behalf of his brothers and
sisters, including Geronimo Fuentes, as heirs/vendors and one Ma. Indira A. Auxtero, as vendee; that in
the aforesaid document, the aforementioned agricultural land was sold, transferred/conveyed by the
heirs/vendors to the vendee despite the fact that in his Special Power of Attorney (SPA), he merely
appointed his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage said agricultural land but not to partition, much
more to sell the same. According to complainant Geronimo Fuentes respondent judge notarized said
document as ex-officio Notary Public, thereby abusing his discretion and authority as well as committing
graft and corruption.

In his 1st Indorsement dated December 2, 1997, the then Court Administrator required the respondent
to file his comment on the complaint within ten days. In compliance thereto respondent judge
submitted his answer, which prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. He admitted that on December
24, 1996, while he was the Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, stationed at Talibon, Bohol, he
notarized an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Property with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale,
described as Document No. 1158, Series of 1996. He explained his reasons and related the
circumstances surrounding the case as follows:

1. That in the last week of the month of September, 1996, Mrs. Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes,
Alejandro Fuentes together with Mrs. Helen A. Auxtero and Miss Ma. Indira Auxtero
came to my house and requested me to make and prepare a document of sale between
the Heirs of Bernardo Fuentes and Ma. Indira Auxtero as Vendee and upon verification
of the papers they presented to the undersigned it was found out that the land subject
of the sale is a conjugal property of the deceased Bernardo Fuentes and Eulalia
Credo Vda. de Fuentes. Being a conjugal property, the undersigned advised them to
secure special power of attorney for the children of Bernardo Fuentes who are out of
town.
2. On the 20th of December, 1996 Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes came
back to the house bringing a special power of attorney executed by Bonifacio Fuentes,
Benjamin Fuentes, Urbano Fuentes, Samuela Fuentes, Rufina Fuentes and Bernardo
Fuentes, Jr. carbon copy of the said Special Power of Attorney herewith attached as
Annex A of the answer. All these special power of attorney empowers Alejandro Fuentes
to execute a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
24937 registered in the name of Bernardo Fuentes, their deceased father.
 Since no special power of attorney was presented to the undersigned executed by PO2
Geronimo Fuentes, the undersigned refused to make their document of sale but
Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes earnestly requested the undersigned to
make and prepare the necessary document saying that the special power of attorney of
PO2 Geronimo Fuentes is coming and they are in urgent need of the money and
because of their request, the undersigned prepared the document, and Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Property with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of Ma.
Indira Auxtero. That PO2 Geronimo Fuentes was included in the Deed of Sale because of
the assurance of Alejandro Fuentes and Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes that the Special Power
of Attorney of PO2 Geronimo Fuentes is coming.
3. That after the necessary document was prepared Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes and
Alejandro Fuentes together with the vendee, Ma. Indira Auxtero signed the document
on December 24, 1996 and on that day the said document was notarized by the
undersigned.
4. That few days after the document was notarized, the undersigned learned that the
Special Power of Attorney executed by PO2 Geronimo Fuentes empowered Alejandro
Fuentes only to mortgage the property so Mrs. Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes, Alejandro
Fuentes and the vendee, Ma. Indira Auxtero were called by the undersigned about the
Special Power of Attorney executed by PO2 Geronimo Fuentes but Eulalia Fuentes and
Alejandro Fuentes explained to the undersigned that they will be responsible for PO2
Geronimo Fuentes considering that the money was already spent by them and the
vendee, Ma. Indira Auxtero also assured the undersigned that if PO2 Geronimo Fuentes
insists to take back his share, she is willing and in fact she reserved the share of
Geronimo Fuentes, hence, the transaction was completed.
5. The undersigned is making and notarizing the document outside of office hour cannot
be said to have abuse his discretion and authority since he was earnestly requested by
Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes to prepare and notarized the document
with authority from his brothers and sisters and with respect to Eulalia Vda. de Fuentes,
she is selling her share of the conjugal property which is one-half (1/2) of the entire
parcel of land.

In the aforementioned answer, respondent judge contended that he could not be charged of
graft and corruption, since in a municipality where a notary public is unavailable, a municipal judge is
allowed to notarize documents or deeds as ex-officio notary public. To support his claim, he presented
two certifications: one, from Atty. Azucena C. Macalolot, Clerk of Court VI of the RTC, Branch 52,
Talibon, Bohol, who certified that according to their records and dockets, no petition for commission
and/or renewal of commission as notary public was granted by the said court for calendar year 1996 and
no appointment as notary public was issued for that year; and the other, from Mayor Juanario A. Item of
Talibon, Bohol who also certified that no notary public was staying and residing in the Municipality of
Talibon, Bohol during the year 1996.

Respondent judge contended that he did nothing wrong in preparing and notarizing the said
document and that he acted in good faith and in obedience to the earnest plea of complainants mother
and siblings who were in urgent need of money, and with their assurance that complainants SPA was
forthcoming. In his attempt to explain his lack of malice, respondent judge narrated that after learning
that the SPA only authorized his brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage the property, he summoned
the latter, his mother and the buyer of the land. Alejandro then assured him that they would be
responsible to the complainant and that the buyer was willing to return complainants share in the
property. Respondent further questioned complainants sincerity in filing the complaint because the
latter allegedly wanted merely the respondent to persuade the buyer to return the whole property to
him instead of his share only.

In its Memorandum Report, the OCA recommended that the present case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent be fined in the amount ofP10,000.00 for unauthorized
notarization of a private document, the same to be deducted from his retirement benefit. The said OCA
recommendation was premised on the lack of authority of respondent judge to prepare and notarize the
document in question, which had no direct relation to the performance of his official functions as a
judge.

While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296,[1] as amended, and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code[2] authorize MTC and MCTC judges to perform the functions of notaries public ex
officio, the Court laid down the scope of said authority in SC Circular No. 1-90. Pertinently, the said
Circular reads:

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of
documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties [Borre
v. Mayo, Adm. Matter No. 1765-CFI, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA 314; Penera v.
Dalocanog, Adm. Matter No. 2113-MJ, April 22, 1981, 104 SCRA 193]. They may not, as
notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private
documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to
the performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not
only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk
of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private
practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
 However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still
municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC
judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in
the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the competency of a
regular notary public, provided that:(1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of
the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos,
Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made
in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit.

The above-quoted SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyances which have no direct
relation to the discharge of their official functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he
prepared both the document itself, entitled Extra-judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of
Sale and the acknowledgment of the said document, which had no relation at all to the performance of
his function as a judge.These acts of respondent judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.
While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent judges
territorial jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal
Mayor of Talibon, Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a certification attesting to the
lack of any lawyer or notary public in the said municipality or circuit be made in the notarized
document. Here, no such certification was made in the Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Deed
of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to indicate in his answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was
charged for that transaction, and if so, whether the same was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of
Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe,
Bohol, failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC Circular No. 1-90, even if he could
have acted as notary public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary public in the municipality or
circuit to which he was assigned.

Whether or not respondent judge truly acted in good faith when he prepared and acknowledged
the subject document is beside the point since he failed to strictly observe the requirements of SC
Circular No. 1-90. As noted by the then Court Administrator, the document involved here is Document
No. 1158, which shows that numerous documents were notarized by respondent judge in the year 1996
alone. Respondent judge was silent as to whether he charged fees when he notarized documents and if
so, whether he turned over the notarial fees to the municipal treasurer. Moreover, contrary to Rule IV,
Sec. 6(a) of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004,[3] respondent notarized the said document without
the SPA of the attorney-in-fact of the vendors which gave rise to the legal problem between the vendors
and the vendee concerning the scope of authority of the aforesaid attorney-in-fact. By failing to comply
with the conditions set for SC Circular No. 1-90 and violating the provision of the Rules on Notarial
Practice of 2004, respondent judge failed to conduct himself in a manner that is beyond reproach and
suspicion. Any hint of impropriety must be avoided at all cost. Judges are enjoined by the Code of
Judicial Conduct to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with
their judicial duties.[4]
 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court deals with the administrative sanctions imposable on erring
judges. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars is a Less Serious Charge punishable by
suspension from office or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However,
respondent judges application for optional retirement had already been approved by the Court en
banc on March 10, 1998 in Administrative Matter No. 9449-Ret. and the release of his retirement
benefits was allowed provided that the amount of P20,000.00 was withheld from the said retirement
benefits, pursuant to the Resolution of this Courts Third Division on June 16, 1999 in this administrative
case, formerly docketed as Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 97-355-MTJ.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge ROMUALDO G. BUNO, now retired, of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, is found LIABLE for failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-90 and the
Rules on Notarial Practice. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00),
to be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

EN BANC

RE: JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN A.M. RTJ-07-2039

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), (formerly A.M. No. 05-1-37- RTC)
BRANCH 14, DAVAOCITY, PRESIDED
OVER BY JUDGE WILLIAM M.
LAYAGUE.

PAUL L. CANSINO, A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2055-RTJ

- versus -

JUDGE WILLIAM M. LAYAGUE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC),
BRANCH 14,DAVAO CITY.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF A.M. No. 05-2177-RTJ

THE PHILIPPINES,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
JUDGE WILLIAM M. LAYAGUE, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), CARPIO,
BRANCH 14,DAVAO CITY. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
April 14, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On October 4 to 15, 2004, a judicial audit was conducted by the judicial audit team of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Davao City, then
presided over by Judge William M. Layague. The audit unearthed numerous undecided/unresolved cases,
prompting the filing of an Administrative Case, A.M. No. 05-1-37- RTC, against respondent Judge
William M. Layague.

Previous to this administrative case, several administrative complaints were already filed against
respondent Judge William M. Layague, two (2) of which were: (a) A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2055-RTJ,
entitled Paul L. Cansino v. Judge William M. Layague, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, charging the latter
with inefficiency and delay in the disposition of cases in connection with the two (2) separate criminal
informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 45,973-2000 and 45,974-2000, for Malversation and Illegal
Exaction, respectively; and (b) A.M. No. 05-2177-RTJ, entitled Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Judge William M. Layague, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, also charging herein respondent judge with
inefficiency and grave misconduct relative to Civil Case No. 29,386-02, for specific performance,
damages, etc. with urgent prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and writ of prohibition. These
three (3) cases were later on consolidated. However, in our Resolution dated June 20, 2006,[1] the Court
ordered the said two (2) administrative complaints closed and terminated considering that the incidents
therein were already resolved by respondent Judge.

After the audit team had submitted its report, the OCA issued a Memorandum Report [2] addressed
to the then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., informing the Court that since the last audit in 1996 of
RTC, Branch 14 of Davao City, respondent Judge Layague had accumulated a total of 83 cases (inclusive
of one inherited case) submitted for decision already beyond the reglementary period to decide. These did
not include the 230 cases submitted for resolution which were already beyond the reglementary period to
resolve, 93 cases with no further action, 19 cases with no further settings and 9 cases with no action taken
yet since the filing thereof.

The Report revealed that respondent judge incurred several absences from 1996 to 2004 as a
result of his poor health, as shown by the latters medical certificates, which adversely affected his work
efficiency. Quoted hereunder is the account of the audit team regarding respondent judges various
illnesses:[3]

Also, Judge Layague is suffering from various illnesses which admittedly has
slowed down his work.

Information as well as the records show that, since the early 70s, Judge Layague
has already been saddled with various illnesses which he attributes to his slow disposal
and resolution of cases. In 1974, he had his gall bladder surgically removed. In 1976, he
developed duodenal ulcer for which he underwent treatment for three months. In January
1995, he was diagnosed with emphysema and since then he had been suffering from
numbness in the lower extremities and acute erosive and atrophic gastritis. In 1998, he
was hospitalized for vertigo (Meniers Syndrome).He also suffers from Goiter (Thyroid
Nodule); including Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy, Hypercholesterolemia, acute gastritis
with Gastro Esophageal Reflux Disease, Systemic Viral Illness and Musculoskeletal
Pain. In addition, and just lately, it appears from the Certification, dated 4 August 2004 of
one Dr. June Anadith Eborde-Buenaventura, a dentist, that Judge Layague is afflicted
with periodontal problem which necessitated the extraction of all of his teeth from 7-19
July 2004. In addition to what was not stated above, he (Judge Layague) also informed
the Judicial Audit Team that he also had TB.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended the appointment of an assisting judge to hear, try and decide the
cases in said sala at least twice a week until respondent judge has decided/resolved all cases submitted for
decision/resolution which have not been decided/resolved or until further orders from this Court.

Acting on the said Memorandum Report and the Recommendation of the Court Administrator,
this Court issued an en banc Resolution dated January 25, 2005,[4] stating, thus:
 (a) DIRECT Hon. William M. Layague, Presiding Judge,
RTC, Br. 14, Davao City

1. to EXPLAIN in writing, within the period mentioned in par. (A), subpar. 3, in

connection with par. (D) below, why no administrative sanction should be taken
against him for: (a) failure to decide the following cases which are already
beyond the reglementary period to decide, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 30,811;
34,403; 36,954; 37,841; 38,573; 38,790; 39,088; 39,337; 39,338; 39,339;
39,340; 39,341; 40,094; 41,092; 41,643; 42,138; 42,139; 42,140; 42,651;
42,695; 43,003; 44,929; 44,930; 44,931; 44,932; 45,238; 45,239; 45,240;
46,750; 47,828; 48,976; 50,739; 51,747; 51,748; 51,749; 51,750; 97,370;
97,371; 97,372; 97,373; 52,369; and Civil Cases Nos. 049; 12,271; 19,835;
20,097; 21,329; 22,687; 23,263; 23,323; 24,480; 24,502; 24,610; 24,930;
25,104; 25,110; 25,206; 25,232; 25,411; 25,542; 25,663; 25,912; 26,457;
27,050; 27,097; 27,112; 27,511; 28,073; 28,172; 28,481; 28,549; 28,577;
28,695; 28,842; 28,958; 29,033; 29,093; 29,224; 29,240; 29,512; 29,551;
29,648; 30,087; 30,340; 54,140; (b) failure to resolve the following cases which
have not been resolved with (sic) the reglementary period, to wit: Criminal
Cases Nos. 5186; 24,854; 24,855; 26,888; 27,011; 31,181; 31,436; 31,437;
34,403; 34,534; 35,917; 36,953; 37,089; 37,090; 37,100; 37,347; 37,348;
37,349; 37,350; 37,351; 37,352; 37,353; 37,354; 38,542; 38,875; 38,876;
38,877; 38,878; 39,688; 39,812; 39,986; 40,084; 40,391; 40,953; 41,460;
41,538; 41,539; 41,619; 41,657; 41,658; 42,197; 42.198; 42,336; 42,337;
42,338; 42,339; 42,340; 42,341; 42,619; 42,705; 42,816; 42,817; 42,818;
43,756; 43,822; 44,139; 44,466; 44,749; 44,807; 44,952; 44, 955 (sic); 44,953;
44,954; 44,955; 44,956; 44,957; 44,958; 44,959; 44,960; 44,961; 44,962;
45,122; 45,973; 45,974; 46,034; 46,155; 46,192; 46,193; 46,194; 46,195;
46,196; 46,197; 46,198; 46,199; 46,200; 46,201; 46,202; 46,361; 46,362;
46,363; 46,364; 46,365; 46,366; 46,367; 46,368; 46,369; 46,370; 46,371;
46,372; 46,373; 46,374; 46,375; 46,376; 46,377; 46,378; 46,379; 46,380;
46,381; 47,028; 47,362; 47,661; 48,217; 48,608; 48,627; 48,719; 48,771;
48,772; 49,079; 49,080; 49,081; 49,082; 49,083; 49,084; 49,085; 49,086;
49,087; 49,088; 49,089; 49,090; 49,091; 49,092; 49,093; 49,094; 49,095;
49,096; 49,097; 49,098; 49,099; 49,100; 49,101; 49,102; 49,103; 49,104;
49,105; 49,106; 49,107; 50,143; 51,165; 52,011; 52,779; 53,565; 53,657;
53,713; 53,714; 53,715; 54,037; 54.038; 54,054; and Civil Cases Nos.
024; 2933; 17,670; 22,603; 22,993; 23,224; 23,471; 23,675; 24,328; 24,541;
24,714; 24,875; 24,969; 25,165; 25,513; 25,589; 25,694; 25,732; 26,254;
26,304; 26,322; 26,356; 26,552; 26,694; 26,775; 26,873; 26,899; 27,298;
27,271; 27,304; 27,309; 27,335; 27,340; 27,355; 27,408; 27,424; 27,526;
27,652; 27,670; 27,820; 27,838; 27,845; 27,981; 28,003; 28,037;
28,127; 28,192; 28,335; 28,401; 28,501; 28,572; 28,822; 28,871; 29,085;
29,162; 29,253; 29,302; 29,353; 29,383; 29,386; 29,552; 29,732; 29,801;
30,028; 30,253; SP 4319; SP 5640; SP 28,099; LRC 044; and (c) failure to take
appropriate action on the following cases, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 30,303;
33,438; 33,439; 33,440; 33,441; 33,657; 33,658; 33659; 38,558; 40,119;
39,706; 40,888; 41,953; 43,894; 44,078; 44,531; 44,595; 45,162; 45,163;
45,179; 45,209; 45,694; 45,954; 46,488; 46,489; 46,490; 46,495; 46,728;
46,860; 47,180; 48,585; 48,892; 48,906; 49,165; 49,757; 49,836; 50,626;
50,794; 51,973; 52,105; 52,334; 52,406; 52,749; 52,832; 52,857; 52,996;
 53,079; 53,476; 53,477; 53,478; 53,479; 53,480; 53,481; 53,482; 53,483;
53,484; 53,485; 53,486; 53,487; 53,549;and Civil Cases Nos. 018; 2884; 5926;
7404; 10,790; 15,852; 15,853; 15,854; 15,855; 15,856; 16,269; 19,246; 20,973;
22,266; 22,291, 22,397; 23,059; 23,467; 23,776; 24,072; 24,178; 24,634;
24,866; 24,879; 24,889; 24,892; 24,897; 25,089; 25,132; 25,159; 25,222;
25,274; 25,358; 25,377; 25,409; 25,430; 25,558; 25,570; 25,574; 25,624;
25,698; 25,797; 25,866; 25,871; 25,952; 26,100; 26,244; 26,320; 26,556;
26,704; 26,786; 26,920; 26,996; 27,027; 27,038 27,115; 27,214; 27,243;
27,429; 27,449; 27,460; 27,476; 27,499; 27,534; 27,551; 27,552; 27,553;
27,666; 27,709; 27,715; 27,776; 27,798; 27,801; 27,847; 27,895; 27,911;
27,982; 27,984; 28,082 28,162; 28,224; 28,343; 28,364; 28,383; 28,460;
28,469; 28,565; 28,567; 28,623; 28,674; 28,702; 28,768; 28,773; 28,818;
28,901; 28,930; 28,935; 28,962; 28,660; 29,012; 29,017; 29,076; 29,079;
29,111; 29,150; 29,152; 29,190; 29,191; 29,250; 29,285; 29,392; 29,402;
29,435; 29,538; 29,598; 29,629; 29,684; 29,746; 29,787; 29,792; 29,812;
29,821; 29,850; 29,910; 29,925; 30,007; 30,052; 30,101; 30,255; SCA 17,308;
SP 3451; SP 4284; SP 7159, which have not been further acted (NFA) upon for
a considerable length of time since the last action taken thereon; as well as the
following cases, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 42,665; 50,261; 52,630; and Civil
Cases Nos. 24,342; 24,343; 24,344; 24,529; 25,110; 26,635; 26,729; 26,806;
26,890; 27,375; 28,060; 28,089; 28,463; 28,481; 28,892; SP 22,052, which have
not been further set (NFS) for a considerable length of time since the last settings
made thereon.

2. to INFORM the Court, though the Office of DCA C.O. Lock, whether the following
cases were decided within the reglementary period, to wit: Criminal Cases
Nos. 36,047; 42,164; 43,689; 43,858; 43,859; 47,600; 47,601; 51,742; Civil
Cases Nos. 238; 268; 278; 24,434; 30,002 and SP 7293; and, in case he has not
yet so decided, for him to do so; and

3. to IMMEDIATELY CEASE from hearing cases in his sala and confine himself to the
following tasks, to wit: to DECIDE and RESOLVE, as the case may be, the
cases mentioned underpar. (A), subpar. 1 (a) and (b); and 2 WITHIN
NINETY (90) DAYS from notice.

4. to SUBMIT himself for a medical examination to determine whether or not he is still

capable of performing the functions of his office. In this connection, a Medical
team from the Supreme Court Medical Services be AUTHORIZED to conduct
the medical examination of Judge Layague for the purpose.

(b) DESIGNATE Hon. Paul T. Arcangel, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 12,
Davao City, as Assisting Judge of RTC, Br. 14, Davao City, to hear and decide the cases
thereat at least twice a week until Judge Layague has fully complied with the directive to
him in connection with the aforestated recent judicial audit conducted in his sala or until
further orders from the Court;

xxx xxx xxx

(e) DIRECT Judge Arcangel to take appropriate action on the cases mentioned
in par. (A), subpar. 1 (c) as well as the following cases, to wit: Criminal Case No.
53,702 and Civil Case No. 22,956, in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-
 92 dated 21 June 1993, within ninety (90) days from notice; as well as to INFORM the
Court, through the Office of DCA Christopher O. Lock, of the status of Civil Case No.
28,621.

(f) DIRECT Judge Layague and Judge Arcangel to SUBMIT their

compliance hereof, as well as the copies of the resolutions/orders, etc. in the aforecited
cases to this Court, through the Office of DCA Lock, Office of the Court Administrator,
this Court, on or before the lapse of the ninety-day period mentioned in par. (A), subpar.
3 or par. (B), as the case may be.

On April 26, 2005, the Court amended its January 25, 2005 en banc Resolution by designating
Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray, RTC, Branch 18, Digos City, as the Assisting Judge of RTC, Branch
14, Davao City, in addition to her duties in her own court, in lieu of Judge Paul T. Arcangel because of
the latters subsequent application for optional retirement.[5]

In his Partial Compliance and Request for Extension[6] (with attachments) dated August 25, 2005
addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, respondent stated that in compliance with
our en banc Resolution of January 25, 2005, he rendered decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 28,822 and
23,323-94[7] and issued orders in the following cases:
Criminal Cases Nos. 5186; 24,854-92 and 24,855-92; 26,888-92; 27,011-92;
31,181-93; 35,917-95; 36,953-96; 37,089-96 and 37-090-96; 37,100-96; 37,347-
96, 37,348-96 to 37,354-96; 38,542-97; 39,688-97 and 39,812-97; 39,986-97; 40,084-
97; 41,619-98; 41,657-98 and 41,658-98; 42,197-98 and 42,198-98; 42,619-99; 42,705-
99; 42,816-99; 44,139-99; 44,466-99; 44,749-2000; 44,807-00; 44,953-00 to 44,955-00;
44,956-00 to 44,962-00; 45,122-00; 46,034-00; 46,155-00; 47,362-01; 48,217-01;
48,608-01; 48,719-01; 49,079-01; 49,080-01 and 49,081-01; 49,082-01; 49,083-01 to
49,088-01; 49,089-01; 49,090-01 to 49,094-01; 49,095-01; 49,096-01 to 49,101-01;
49,102-01; 49,103-01; 49,104-01 to 49,105-01; 49,106-01 to 49,107-01; 50,143-02;
52,011-03; 52,779-03; 53,565-03; 53,713-04 to 53,715-04; 54,037-04 and 54,038-04.

Civil Cases Nos. 23,323-94; 23,675-95; 26,304-98; 26,356-98; 26,552-98;

28,822-01; 28,871-01; 29,253-02; 29,383-02 and 30,253-04.

Special Proceedings No. 4319-96 and 5640-2000.

Respondent attributes his failure to fully comply with the Courts en banc Resolution of January
25, 2005 to his failing health as evidenced by the medical certificates attached to said letter. He asked for
an extension of three (3) months reckoned from August 29, 2005 within which to comply with the said
resolution.
 To determine whether respondent judge had complied with the Courts directives, a follow-up
judicial audit was conducted in the same court from June 27, 2005 to July 6, 2005. The OCAs Judicial
Audit Team[8] submitted its report[9] dated September 1, 2005, containing among others, the following
findings:

Information gathered during the follow-up audit showed the following

information, to wit:

A. DATA ON THE CASES WHICH JUDGE LAYAGUE WERE ABLE TO

DECIDE/RESOLVE, ETC.:
xxx xxx xxx

a. SFD CASES:[10]
Judge Layague was able to decide only 12 cases (10 criminal and 2 civil cases),
representing only about 11% of the 102 cases (84 cases [41] criminal cases and 43 civil
cases) plus (14cases [8 Criminal Cases and 6 Civil Cases]), which he was directed to
decide in the Resolution, dated 25 January 2005 of the Supreme Court (En Banc).
His average output, thus, from the time he received the subject Resolution on 23
February 2005 until we audited him (from 27 June to 6 July 2005) or a period of
approximately 4 months, is 3 decisions a month, which output isvery
disappointing. (Emphasis supplied) Considering the remaining time left, i.e. less than a
year, his (Judge Layague) retirement being August 2006 next year), he should now
average at least 8 disposed cases a month up to the date he retires, assuming the court
grants him extension of time up to that time. This is besides the SFR Cases which he was
directed to resolve as well as newly discovered additional cases submitted for decision,
among others, as a result of the follow-up conducted. Specifically, the following are 10 of
the [49] criminal cases which Judge Layague was able to decide, to wit (with date when
the cases were promulgated/decided indicated in parenthesis): Criminal Case Nos.
36,047 (1 December 2004); 41,092 (25 January 2005);51,747, 51748, 51,749, 51,750,
97,370, 97,371, 97,372 and 97,373 (25 January 2005). Regarding the 2 out of the
[49] civil cases, which he (Judge Layague) was directed to decide, these are:Civil Case
Nos. 28,841 (7 February 2005); 30,087 (25 April 2005).

Regarding the others, there are 18 cases (3 criminal cases and 15 civil cases),
which although still undecided are with draft decisions already. The remainder, about 42
(23 criminal cases and 19 civil cases) are without even any drafts. Unaccounted are 16
cases (3 criminal cases and 13 civil cases SFD).

b. SFR CASES:[11]

Of these 226 SFR Cases (156 criminal cases and [69] civil cases) which he
(Judge Layague) was directed to resolve in the subject Resolution of the Court, he was
able to resolve only about 11 cases (4 criminal cases and 7 civil cases), representing only
about 4% of the total cases which he was directed to resolve. His average output during
the 4 month period (from the time he received the Resolution of the Court until we
audited him anew) is about 2 cases a month, which is very disappointing. (Underscoring
supplied) Considering that he (Judge Layague) has a huge number of SFR cases to
resolve; and considering, further, that he has less than a year to go before he retire in
August 2006, next year, he has to resolve approximately at least 28 cases a month or
more, if he wants to resolve all the SFR cases before he retires, if he still have the will
and determination to finish it, which we can just hope he still has. The following are
the 4 of the156 criminal cases SFR he was able to resolve, to wit: Criminal Case Nos.
5,186, 48,217, 53,565 and 52,011. On the other hand, these are the 7 of the [69] civil
cases SFR he was able to resolve, to wit: Civil Case Nos. 28,335; 29,253 (30 January
2005); 28,401 (23 February 2005); 26,356 (NOTE: Case already decided but with an
incident SFR); 30,253 (21 April 2005); 25,694(2 November 2004); 27,981 (6 December
2004).
Regarding the others, there is a lone unresolved criminal case with a final draft
ready for signing. Likewise, the other lone unresolved criminal case is with an unfinal
draft decision already. The rest of the unresolved criminal cases, about 131 criminal
cases, are still without even any drafts. Relative to the civil cases, there are 4 civil
cases, which although still unresolved were with draft decisions already. The rest are
unresolved civil cases, about 51 civil cases, are still without even any
drafts. Unaccounted are 27 cases SFR (19 criminal cases and 8 civil cases).

B. UNACCOUNTED CASES:

The following are the cases, subject of the Resolution, dated 25 January 2005 of
the Court in A.M. No. 05-1-37, which were not shown to the audit team:

1. SIXTEEN (16) SFD CASES: Criminal Case Nos. 42,164; 51,742;

51,750 and Civil Case Nos. 238; 268; 278; 23,323; 24,434; 24,480;
25,150, 25,542; 28,073; 28,549; 30,002; 54,140 and SP 7293.

2. FOURTEEN (14) SFR CASES: Criminal Case Nos. 34,403; 34,534;

43,756; 45,973; 45,974; 53,657; 54,054 and Civil Case Nos. 26,873,
26,899; 27,526; 27,652; 27,838; 29,302and 30,028.

C. NO UPDATED MONTHLY REPORTS, DOCKET INVENTORY AND

DOCKET BOOKS:

The Docket Inventory of RTC, Br 14, Davao City is a year behind. Its
last Semestral Docket Inventory was for July to December 2003.

On the other hand, with respect to the Monthly Reports, based on records
provided by the court, its last Monthly Report was for December 2004. NOTE:
When the court was audited in 2004, its last Monthly Report was for July 2004.

During the October 2004 Audit of the court, the above problem has
already been duly noted and relayed to Judge Layague and concerned employees
who were admonished to do something about it. After almost a year, it seemed
that nothing happened, as there are still no updated Monthly Report/Semestral
Docket Inventory in the court and the Docket Books are still not yet updated.

D. INVENTORY CONDUCTED BY JUDGE DARAY UNCOVERED THE

FOLLOWING:

(1) UNAUDITED CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION/RESOLUTION:

 Judge Marivic T. Daray, Assisting Judge, RTC, Br. 14, Davao City
informed the Judicial Audit team that when she conducted an inventory of her
own of the cases in the court assigned to her, she found out that there were cases
submitted for decision (SFD), which upon verification of the records by the
Audit Team were not shown during the 2004 audit of the court, the reason why
these cases were not audited, hence, not included in the Resolution, dated 25
January 2005 in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC. These cases are as follows: Criminal
Case No. 55,263; Civil Case Nos. 21,701 [decided already]; 35,995; 27,733;
30,523, 30,633, SCA 21,274.

xxx xxx xxx

These cases were not included in the Report of the Team which last
conducted an audit of the court, hence, not included in the subject Resolution,
dated 25 January 2005 of the Court.

(2) CASES AUDITED DURING THE LAST AUDIT WHICH

WERE NOT SFD/SFR DURING THAT TIME, BUT HAVE
MOVED, AND AFTER THE AUDIT ALREADY SFD/SFR:

These cases are the following: Criminal Case Nos.

53,476, 53,477, 53,478, 53,479, 53,480, 53,481, 53,
482, 53,483, 53,484, 53,485, 53,486, 53,487 and 54,397; andCivil Case
Nos. 22,405; 27,385.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) CASES INADVERENTLY OMITTED IN THE REPORT:

These cases are as follows: to wit: Civil Case No. 26,480;

29,610; 30,230 and 29,330.

xxx xxx xxx

(4) CASES NOT ACCURATELY RECORDED DURING THE

LAST AUDIT:

These cases are the following, to wit: Civil Case Nos. 29,499,
30,118; and 30,094.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) MISMANAGEMENT OF THE COURT:

In 2004, the Audit Team has no knowledge, nor were they

forewarned of how disorganized the court (RTC, Br. 14, Davao City)
was, such that the same needs more time and attention than the other
courts (with retiring judges) which was first audited that time. The Team,
has to maximize the use of the short time left for them to audit the court.
 One of the many measures adopted was to concentrate more on the
movement of cases, especially those with 2003 settings and below, not so
much those cases with 2004 settings, except SFD/SFR Cases, inasmuch
as the audit was conducted in 2004, and cases with 2004 settings were to
be considered still to have moved on time.

When the court was audited, tell-tale signs or indicia that the
same has been mismanaged were already evident. (1) There was no
proper safekeeping of expedientes of court cases, especially the active
ones. They were found anywhere, i.e. on desk tops or on the floor, etc.
(2) The Audit Team which audited the court in 2004 were not shown all
the records of active cases. That is why there were still unaudited cases
not included in the Report of the Team; (3) The pleadings, etc. inside
the expedientes were not hand-stitched but were just kept together by
fasteners with some loose pleadings, orders, etc. not yet held by
fasteners; (4) The arrangements of the pleadings, orders, etc. in some, if
not most of the expedientes, are not in chronological order, the reason
why the team, who were troubled with time, failed to record accurately
the correct last action taken; In some, the latest orders were not yet
attached to the expedientes, not even paper-clipped on front of the folder
of the same (expedientes), the reason why the last action taken were not
up to date; (5) The Audit Team cannot reconcile the cases they
audited vis--vis the records of the court because the courts last Semestral
Docket Inventory was a year behind and neither were the Docket Books
of help inasmuch as the entries were not updated; (6) Unaccounted
Cases: There were cases, subject of the Resolution, dated 25 January
2005 of the Court in A.M. No. 05-1-37, which were not shown to the
Audit Team, to wit: sixteen (16) SFD cases; and twenty-seven (27) SFR
cases. (7) No updated Monthly Reports, Docket Inventory and Docket
Books. The Docket Inventory of RTC, Br 14, Davao City was a year
behind. Its last Semestral Docket Inventory was for July to December
2003. On the other hand, with respect to the Monthly Reports, based on
records provided by the court, its last Monthly Report was for December
2004. Note may be taken that when the court was last audited in 2004, its
last Monthly Report was for July 2004. The Docket Books were not
properly maintained and updated. The above problems were duly noted
and relayed, accordingly, to the Judge, as well as the employees
concerned, who were orally admonished to correct the problem. Almost a
year after, It seemed that nothing happened, as the courts Monthly
Reports, Semestral Docket Inventory and Docket Books are not yet up to
date.

On the basis of the foregoing findings of the OCA, and acting on the latters recommendation, the Court
issued an en banc Resolution[12] dated September 20, 2005, thus:

(a) DIRECT Judge William M. Layague and Branch Clerk of Court Ray Uson
Velasco, both of RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, to
 (i) EXPLAIN, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, why
(1) the following cases, which were audited in 2004 and subject of the
Resolution dated 25 January 2005 and which apparently were not among
the cases decided/resolved by Judge Layague, were not shown to the
Audit Team so that the same may be checked for compliance with the
Resolution of 25 January 2005, to wit: sixteen (16) SFD (submitted for
decision) cases: Criminal Case Nos. 42,164; 51,742; 51,750 and Civil
Case Nos. 238; 268; 278; 23,323; 24,434; 24,480; 25,150, 25,542;
28,073; 28,549; 30,002; 54,140 and SP 7293; and twenty-seven (27) SFR
(submitted for resolution) cases: Criminal Case Nos. 26,888; 31,181;
34,403; 34,534; 37,348; 37,349; 37,350; 37,351; 37,352; 37,353; 41,658;
42,197; 43,756; 44,955; 45,973, 45,974, 48,608; 53,657; 54,054; and
Civil Case Nos. 26,873, 26,899; 27,526; 27,652; 27,838; 28,822; 29,302;
and 30,028; (2) the courts Monthly Report, the last one accomplished
being for December 2004, and Semestral Docket Inventory, the last
one accomplished being a year ago, i.e. July to December 2003, were not
updated; and (3) there is no proper and orderly safekeeping and
upkeeping of expedientes of court cases, in that, expedientes were found
anywhere in the court, i.e. from desk tops to the floor, etc.; almost all
were not properly hand-stitched; a number thereof have pleadings
improperly and not chronologically arranged, etc.;

(ii) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION, within thirty (30)

days from notice hereof, to update the courts Monthly Reports and
Semestral Docket Inventory Reports; otherwise, the following provisions
of Rule 1, par. 8 of Administrative Circular No. 4-2004 dated 4 February
2004 and Part C of Administrative Circular No. 10-94 dated 29 June
1994 shall be applied to them:

8. Failure to submit the Form, as well as the documents required

in the preceding paragraph, shall warrant the
withholding of the salaries of the judge/s and clerks
of court xxx, without prejudice to whatever
administrative sanction the Supreme Court may impose
on them or criminal action which may be filed against
them. The same sanction shall apply to those submitting
reports with incomplete or inaccurate entries or
attachments. (Emphasis supplied)

...

C. Penalties

Willful non-compliance with the circular shall constitute

serious misconduct and shall warrant imposition of the
appropriate penalties. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall report to the Court non-compliance
with the circular within thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the period for compliance.
 (iii) SUBMIT all pending monthly reports of cases and
semestral docket inventory of cases to the Court Management Office,
thru the Office of DCA Christopher O. Lock, within the same period of
thirty (30) days from notice hereof; and
(iv) DEVISE immediately a more effective and efficient system
not only in the accomplishment of the Monthly Report and Semestral
Docket Inventory but also in the proper filing, updating, up keeping and
safekeeping of expedientes of court cases with
a STERN WARNING that their failure to comply with the foregoing
directives shall be dealt with more severely in the future;
(b) REMIND Branch Clerk of Court Velasco of the provisions of Circular No. 11
dated 16 September 1986, re: maintenance and updating of Docket Books, which
states:

Quoted hereunder, for your information and guidance, is the

pertinent portion of the resolution of this Court (First Division) in
Administrative Matter No. R-459-P, entitled The Court Administrator,
etc. vs. Numeriano Galang, etc., et al., promulgated on 15 September
1986, to wit:
The Court takes this opportunity to remind all Clerks of
Court and personnel concerned in lower courts to make the
proper entries, without skipping any page, in the general docket
book, docket books for civil and criminal cases, judgment and
entries book, and execution books as contemplated in Sections 8,
9 and 10, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, to the end that by
reference to a single page the history of the case may be seen and
so that the actual number of pending cases reflected in the
monthly reports as submitted to this Court tally with the actual
physical count of cases in their respective Salas.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that

all Salas of lower courts, upon proper requests and requisition,
are regularly furnished with the necessary docket books so that
the respective personnel thereof may be in a position to
effectively comply with Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.
Strict Compliance is hereby enjoined.
(c) REQUIRE Branch Clerk of Court Velasco to EXPLAIN, within thirty (30) days
from notice hereof, his failure to maintain and update the courts Docket Books
for criminal and civil cases;
(d) ADVISE Branch Clerk of Court Velasco to devise a systematic and orderly method
of updating the entries in the Docket Books, with a STERN WARNING that a
same or similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely;
(e) REQUIRE Branch Clerk of Court Velasco to SUBMIT to the Court, thru the Office
of DCA Christopher O. Lock, a report of compliance with the foregoing
directives within thirty (30) days from notice hereof;
(f) DIRECT Judge Layague to (i) DECIDE the following unaudited SFD cases, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 55,263 and Civil Case Nos. 35,995; 27,733; 30,523;
 30,633 and SCA 21,274; (ii)DECIDE the following cases audited in October
2004 which were not yet submitted for decision at that time but had moved and
now submitted for decision, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 53,476; 53,477; 53,478;
53,479; 53,480; 53,481; 53,482; 53,483; 53,484; 53,485; 53,486;
53,487 and Civil Case No. 22,405; (iii) RESOLVE the following SFR cases, to
wit: Criminal Case No. 54,397 and Civil Case No. 27,385; (iv) DECIDE the
following SFD cases inadvertently omitted in the Report of the Team which
conducted the 2004 audit of the court, hence, not included in the 25 January 2005
Resolution, to wit: Civil Case Nos. 29,330 and 30,230; (v) RESOLVE the
following SFR cases inadvertently omitted in the Report of the Team which
conducted the 2004 audit, hence, not included in the 25 January 2005, to wit:
Civil Case Nos. 26,480 and 29,610; (vi) DECIDE the following SFD cases
inaccurately recorded during the October 2004 audit, to wit: Civil Case
Nos. 30,094 and 30,118; and (vii) RESOLVE the incident in the following SFR
case inaccurately recorded during the October 2004 audit, to wit: Civil Case No.
29,499, all within ninety (90) days from notice hereof; and

(g) GRANT the request of Judge Layague for an extension of three (3) months from 29
August 2005 within which to fully comply with the Resolution of 25 January
2005, with a STERNWARNING that the same shall be the last and should he
fail to do so, he shall accordingly be dealt with and with severity.

In compliance with the above directive, Atty. Ray Uson Velasco, Clerk of Court, Branch 14, Davao City,
filed his explanation by letter[13] dated October 12, 2005, and stated that about seven (7)
cases[14] mentioned in the said Resolution do not belong to the docket of RTC, Br. 14, Davao City but to
other branches of the court as per certification[15]of the Office of the Clerk of Court. These are: Civil
Cases Nos. 24,480; 25,150; 25,542; 26,899; 28,549;[16] 30,028; and 54,140. Atty. Velasco also
apologized for his administrative lapses and human frailties and asked that he be given more time to
comply with the inventory and monthly reports.

Respondent Judge Layague, in his Consolidated Compliance[17] dated October 6, 2005, clarified
that, regarding the complaint of Paul L. Cansino in A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2055-RTJ respecting
Criminal Case No. 45,973-2000 and Criminal Case No. 45,974-2000, the motion to quash the information
and/or to dismiss filed in those cases were jointly resolved in a resolution dated February 24,
2005. Respondent judge explained that the delay in the resolution of said motion was attributable to the
fact that the prosecution moved to hold in abeyance the resolution of the same on account of the motion
for further certification filed by Ombudsman Desierto in G.R. No. 105965-70 (George Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, Ombudsman and Roger C. Berbano, Sr., Special Prosecutor), which fact has been
explained in the resolution thereof.

In A.M. No. 05-2177-RTJ, entitled Development Bank of the Philippines v. Judge William M.
Layague, respondent Judge Layague, in his letter[18] dated March 10, 2005, stated that he had already
resolved the pending motion to dismiss in the aforementioned case, attaching therewith a copy of the said
order dated February 23, 2005. Respondent Judge also requested that he be allowed to incorporate his
comments on this instant administrative complaint with those in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTJ.

In our Resolutions dated July 11, 2005[19] and December 14, 2005,[20] we ordered the
consolidation of A.M. OCA IPI NO. 04-2055-RTJ and A.M. No. 05-2177-RTJwith A.M. No. 05-1-37-
RTC, considering that the cases involved in the said first two administrative cases were among those
mentioned in the third case, A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC.

On December 1, 2005, respondent judge submitted his Second Partial Compliance and Last
Request for Extension[21] (with attachments). He requested a final extension of two (2) months reckoned
from November 29, 2005 within which to fully comply with the Court en banc Resolution of January 25,
2005. Again, he advanced his recurring illnesses as his excuse for not complying with the said
order. Hereinbelow is the list of respondent judges decisions, orders and resolutions, as stated in the
Second Partial Compliance:

Criminal Cases Nos. 31,436-93 and 31,437-93; 34,403-94; 36,954-96; 37,841-

96; 38,875-97; 38,876-97; 38,877-97; 38,878-97; 42,138-98, 42,139-98 & 42,140-98;
42,336-99 to 42,341-99; 42,665-99; 43,003-99; 43,756-99; 43,822-99; 44,952-2000;
46,192-2000 to 46,202-2000; 46,361-2000 to 46,381-2000; 47,028-2001; 47,661-2001;
48,627-2001; 50,261-2002; 51,165-2002; 52,369-2003 and 53,657-2004.
Civil Cases Nos. 024-99; 044-2000; 238-2004; 268-2004; 278-2004; 7293-
2003; 12,271; 17,670-85; 22,052-93; 22,603-94; 22,687-94; 22,993-94; 23,471-95;
24,529-96; 24,969-97; 25,104-97; 25,513-97; 26,254-98; 26,322-98; 26,635-98; 26,694-
98; 26,729-98; 26,775-98; 27,304-99; 27,309-99; 27,526-99; 27,820-00; 27,845-00;
28,003-2000; 28,060-2000; 28,127-2000; 28,172-2000; 28,549-2001; 28,572-2002;
28,577-2001; 28,842-2001; 28,958-2002; 29,033-2002; 29,162-2000; 29,224-2002;
29,353-2002; 29,552-2003; 30,002-2003 and 30,340-2004.

Of the cases left for appropriate action by the respondent judge, he was able to act on the
following cases as per report[22] by the follow-up judicial audit team:

(a) DECIDED CASES: Criminal Case Nos. 34,403; 36,954; 37,841; 42,138,
42,139 and 42,140; 43,003; 52,369; 31,436 and 31,437; 43,756; 43,822;
44,952; and 47,028; including Civil Case Nos. 12,271; 22,687; 25,104; 28,172; 28,549;
28,577; Civil Case No. 28,842; 28,958; 29,033; 29,224; 30,340;
26,322; 26,694; 27,304; 27,845; 28,003; 28,572; 29,162; 26,635; 28,060;238; 268; 278;
30,002; SP 7293; 22,603; 25,513; and

(b) CASES WHERE UNRESOLVED INCIDENTS RESOLVED BUT CASE STILL

ACTIVE: Criminal Case Nos. 38,875; 38,876; 38,877; 38,878; 42,336; 42,337;
 42,338; 42,339; 42,340; 42,341; 45,973; Criminal Case No. 45,973, together with
another case, to wit: Criminal Case No. 45,974 have already been resolved in the
negative by Judge Layague in an Order, dated 24 February 2005); Criminal Case No.
45,974 (It appears that the unresolved incident(s) in this case, i.e. a motion to quash
and/or to dismiss this case (Criminal Case No. 45,974),together with another case, to
wit: Criminal Case No. 45,973, have already been resolved in the negative by Judge
Layague in an Order, dated 24 February 2005.); Criminal Case Nos. 46,192; 46,193;
46,194; 46,195; 46,196; 46,197; 46,198; 46,199; 46,200; 46,201; 46,202; 46,361;
46,362; 46,363; 46,364; 46,365; 46,366; 46,367; 46,368; 46,369; 46,370; 46,371;
46,372; 46,373; 46,374; 46,375; 46,376; 46,377; 46,378; 46,379; 46,380;
46,381; 47,362; and 47,661; 51,165; 52,011; 52,779;
53,565; and 53,657; 50,261; 42,665; 48,627; including Civil Case Nos. 024;
17,670; 22,603; 22,993; Civil Case No. 23,471; 24,969; 26,254; 26,775;
27,309; 27,526; 27,820; 28,127; 29,353; 29,552; LRC 044; 24,529; 26,729; SP
22,052; 17,670; 22,993; 23,471; and 24,969.

On April 7, 2006, respondent judge filed his Third Partial Compliance and Last Request for
Extension[23] (with attachments) dated April 3, 2006. Here, respondent judge ratiocinated his recurring
illnesses for not complying with our en banc Resolutions of January 25, 2005 and September 20,
2005. He submitted the pertinent medical records in support of his explanation. He declared that he had
complied with the report of cases and had prepared a decision in Criminal Case No. 44,234-99, in
compliance with the letter dated November 23, 2005 from Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O.
Lock directing him to decide the said case within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Lastly, he
requested for a last extension, up to May 29, 2006 within which to comply with the directive stated in the
two resolutions and asked for an audit of his cases after May 29, 2006 in view of his impending
compulsory retirement on August 7, 2006. In said letter/Third Partial Compliance, respondent judge
submitted a list of cases, together with the copies of his decisions and orders thereon:
Criminal Cases Nos. 38,789-97 and 38,790-97; 39,088-97; 39,337-97 to
39,341-97; 40,094-97; 40,391-98; 41,092-98; 41,460-98; 41,538-98 and 41,539-98;
41,643-98; 42-164-98; 42,695-99; 43,689-99; 44,929-2000; 44,930-2000; 44,931-2000;
44,932-2000; 45,238-2000 to 45,240-2000; 45,973-2000 and 45,974-2000; 47,600-2001;
47,601-2001; 47,828-2001; 48,771-2001 and 48,772-2001; 48,976-2001; 50,739-2002;
51,742-2003; 51,747-2003 to 51,750-2003.

Civil Cases Nos. 049-2000; 2933; 20,097-90; 21,329-92; 24,342-96; 24,343-96;

24,344-96; 24,541-96; 24,610-96; 24,875-96; 25,165-97; 25,206-97; 25,232-97; 25,589-
97; 25,663-97; 25,694-97; 25,732-97; 26,806-98; 26,873-98; 27,335-99; 27,355-99;
27,408-99; 27,424-99; 27,511-99; 27,652-99; 28,037-2000; 28,073-2000; 28,401-2001;
28,481-2001; 28,501-2001; 28,892-2001; 29,093-2002; 29,240-2002; 29,386-2002;
29,551-2003; 29,732-2003; 29,801-2003; 30,087-2003.

Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court issued Resolution[24] dated June 20, 2006, which we quote:
 (a) NOTE the Third Partial Compliance dated April 3, 2006 filed by Judge
William M. Layague;

(b) GRANT the request of Judge Layague for an extension until May 29,
2006 within which to fully comply with the resolutions of January 25,
2005 and September 20, 2005 issued in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC;

(c) DENY the request of Judge Layague for an audit of his cases after May 29,
2006, as this administrative matter is the result of the judicial audit conducted sometime
in 2004 in view of his forthcoming retirement;

(d) DIRECT Judge Layague to

(i) DECIDE the following remaining undecided cases as required in the

resolution of January 25, 2005 in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC, to wit: Criminal
Cases Nos. 30,811; 34,403, 38,573; 42,651; 43,858; 43,859; 46,750; and Civil
Cases Nos. 19,835; 23,263; 24,434; 24,502; 24,930; 25,110; 25,411; 25,912;
26,457; 27,050; 27,097; 27,112; 28,695; 29,512 and29,648.

(ii) RESOLVE the unresolved incidents in the following cases as

required in the resolution of January 25, 2005 in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC, to wit:
Criminal Cases Nos. 34,534; 40,953; 54,054; and Civil Cases Nos. 23,224;
24,328; 24,714; 25,165; 27,298; 27,271; 27,340; 27,670; 27,838; 28,192;
28,501; 28,085; 29,302; 29,732 and SP 28,099; and

(iii) FULLY AND FAITHFULLY COMPLY with the resolution

of September 20, 2005 in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC, the relevant portion of which
is hereby quoted, to wit:

(f) DIRECT Judge Layague to (i) DECIDE the

following unaudited SFD cases, to wit: Criminal Case No.
55,263 and Civil Case Nos. 35,995; 27,733; 30,523, 30,633 and SCA
21,274; (ii) DECIDE the following cases audited in October 2004 which
were not yet submitted for decision at that time but had moved and now
submitted for decision, to wit: Criminal Case Nos.
53,476, 53,477, 53,478, 53,479, 53,480, 53,481, 53,482, 53,483, 53,484,
53,485, 53,486, 53,487 and Civil Case Nos. 22,405; (iii)RESOLVE the
following SFR cases, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 54,397 and Civil Case
Nos. 27,385; (iv) DECIDE the following SFD cases inadvertently
omitted in the Report of the Team which conducted the 2004 audit of the
court, hence, not included in the January 25, 2005 Resolution, to
wit: Civil Case No. 29,330 and 30,230; (v) RESOLVE the following SFR
cases inadvertently omitted in the Report of the Team which conducted
the 2004 audit, hence, not included in the January 25, 2005, to wit: Civil
Case Nos. 26,480and 29,610; (vi) DECIDE the following SFD cases
inaccurately recorded during the October 2004 audit, to wit: Civil Case
Nos. 30,094 and 30,118; and (vii) RESOLVE the incident in the
following SFR case inaccurately recorded during the October 2004
audit, to wit: Civil Case No. 29,499, all within ninety (90) days from
notice hereof; and xxx
 (e) CONSIDER A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2055-RTJ (Paul L. Cansino vs. Judge William
M. Layague, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City) as CLOSED AND
TERMINATED, considering that Judge Layague has already resolved the incidents
therein. (Emphasis supplied).

Based on respondent judges Third Partial Compliance and Last Request for Extension, the
OCA made the following findings:[25]

2. A reading of his other compliance, i.e. THIRD PARTIAL COMPLIANCE AND

LAST REQUEST FOR EXTENSION(,)dated 3 April 2006 filed by Judge
Layague in A. M. NO. 05-1-37-RTC submitted by him relative to the Resolution
of the Court En Banc dated 25 January 2005 (but does not include that for 20
September 2005 as erroneously stated by him {Judge Layague} issued also in
A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC) show that he has already decided/acted on the following
cases (with date of decision or other action indicated in the footnotes), to
wit:Criminal Case Nos. 38,790; 39,088; 39,337, 39338, 39,339,
39,340 and 39,341; 40,094; 40,391; 41,092; 41,460; 41,538 and 41,539; 41,643;
42,164 42,695 43,689; 44,929; 44,930; 44,931; and 44,932 45,238; 45,239;
45,240; 45,973 and 45,974; 47,600 and 47,601;
47,828; 48,771 and 48,772 48,976; 50,739; 51,742 (D: 23 January
2006); 51,747; 51,748; 51,749;and 51,750; including Civil Cases Nos. 049; SP
No. 2933; 20,097; 21,329; 24,342;
24,343; and 24,344; 24,541; 24,610; 24,875; 25,265; 25,206; 25,232; 25,589; 25
,663; 25,694; 25,732; 26,806; 26,873; 27,335; 27,355; 27,408; 27,424; 27,511;
27,652; 28,037; 28,073; 28,401; 28,481; 28,401 28,892; 29,093; 29,240; 29,386;
29,551; 29,801; and 30,087. [26]

B. CASES STILL UNDECIDED AND UNRESOLVED AFTER THE THIRD

PARTIAL COMPLIANCE AND LAST REQUEST FOR EXTENSION(,)
DATED 3 APRIL 2006 FILED BY JUDGE LAYAGUE:

(i) Regarding the 25 January 2005 Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 05-1-37-
RTC:

Considering the LATEST COMPLIANCE FILED BY JUDGE LAYAGUE, I.E.

THIRD PARTIAL COMPLIANCE AND LAST REQUEST FOR EXTENSION(,) dated
3 April 2006, only the following cases, as stated in pars. 1 (a) and 2 of the 25 January
200(5) En Banc Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC, remained undecided,
to wit: Criminal Case Nos.30,811; 34,403; 38,573; 42,651; 43,858; 43,859;
46,750; and Civil Case Nos. 19,835; 23,263; 24,434; 24,502; 24,930; 25,110; 25,411;
25,912; 26,457; 27,050; 27,097; 27,112; 28,695; 29,512; 29,648; and 54,140. Regarding
the unresolved cases, as stated in par. 1 (b) of the 25 January 2005 En Banc Resolution of
the Court in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC, remained unresolved, to wit: Criminal Case Nos.
34,534; 40,953; 54,054; and Civil Case Nos. 23,224; 24,328; 24,714; 25,165; 27,298;
27,271; 27,340; 27,670; 27,838; 28,192; 28,501; 29,085; 29,302; 29,732; andSP 28,099.

(ii) Regarding the 20 September 2005 Supreme Court En Banc Resolution

issued in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC:
 Before Judge Layagues recent Compliances has yet to fully comply with the
above resolution of the Court. The following cases remained still undecided/unresolved,
to wit: (1) Cases submitted for decision (SFD Cases): (a) Unaudited Cases: Criminal
Case No. 55,263 and Civil Case Nos. 27,733; 30,523, 30,633 and SCA
21,274; (b) Audited Cases: Criminal Case Nos. 53,
476; 53,477; 53,478; 53,479; 53,480; 53,481; 53,482; 53,483; 53,484; 53,485; 53,486; 5
3,487; and Civil Case Nos. 22,405; (c) Cases inadvertently omitted in the 25 January
2005 Resolution, to wit: Civil Case No. 29,330; 30,230; (d) Inaccurately recorded cases,
to wit:: Civil Case No. 30,094; and 30,118. (2) Cases submitted for resolution (SFR
Cases): (a) Criminal Case Nos. 54,397; and Civil Case Nos. 27,385; (b) SFR Cases
inadvertently omitted in the Report of the Team which conducted the 2004 audit, hence,
not included in the 25 January 2005, to wit: Civil Case Nos. 26,480; 29,610; and (vii)
SFR Cases inaccurately recorded during the October 2004 audit, to wit:: Civil Case Nos.
29,499. (Emphasis supplied)

On August 10, 2006, respondent judge filed his Full and Final Compliance and Full Compliance,
both dated July 26, 2006, attaching thereto the list of the decisions and orders rendered by him, as well as
copies of the same:

FULL AND FINAL COMPLIANCE:

Criminal Case Nos. 30,811-93; 36,047-95; 38,573-97; 40,953-98; 42,651-99;

43,858-99 and 43,859-99; 46,750-01; 52,630-03.

Civil Case Nos. 19,835-89; 22,956-94; 23,224-94; 23,263-94; 24,328-96;

24,434-96; 24,502-96; 24,714-96; 24,930-97; 25,110-95; 25,411-97; 25,912-97; 26,457-
98; 26,890; 27,050-99; 27,097-99; 27,112-99; 27,271-99; 27,298-99; 27,340-99; 27,375-
99; 27,670-99; 27,838-2000; 27,981-2000; 28,089-2001; 28,099-2000; 28,192-2000;
28,335-2000; 28,463-2001; 28,621-2001; 28,695-2001; 29,085-2002; 29,302-2002;
29,512-2003; 29,926-2003; 29,648-2003;

Crim. Case Nos. 34,534-1994; 53,702-2004; 54,054-2004; 54,140-2004 and

Civil Cases Nos. 24,480-96; 25,542-97; 26,899-96; 30,028-03 and 25,150-97.[27]

FULL COMPLIANCE:

Criminal Case Nos. 26,888-92; 31,181-93; 34,403-94; 37,347-96, 37,348-96, 37,349-

96, 37,350-96, 37,351-96, 37,352-96, 37,353-96 and 37,354-96; 41,657-98 and 41,658-
98; 42,164-98; 42,197-98 and 42,198-98; 43,756-99; 44,953-00 to 44,955-00; 45,973-
2000 and 45,974-2000; 48,608-01; 51,742-03; 51,747-03 to 51,750-03; 53,476-03 to
53,487-03; 53,657-04; 54,397-04; 55,263-04;

Other cases 230-2004; 268-2004, 278-2004;

 Special Proceedings 7293-03;

Civil Case No. SCA-21,274-92; 22,405-92; 23,323-94; 24,434-96; 26,480-98; 26,873-

98; 27,385-99; 27,526-99; 27,652-99; 27,733-99; 27,838-2000; 28,073-2000; 28,549-
2001; 28,822-2001; 29,302-2002; 29,330-2002; 29,499-2003; 29,610-2003; 30,002-
2003; 30,094-2003; 30,118-2003, 30,230-2004; 30,523-2004; 30,633-2004;

Crim Case Nos. 54,140-04; 35,995-1995; 54,054-2004; 34,534-1994 and Civil Case
Nos. 24,480-96; 25,542-97; 30,028-03; 26,899-98; 25,150-97.[28]

With the submission of respondent judges Full and Final Compliance, the OCA made the
following evaluations/findings as per Memorandum Report:[29]

A consideration of the captioned FULL AND FINAL COMPLIANCE, and

the FULL COMPLIANCE, both dated 26 July 2006, show that Judge Layague,
has FULLY acted uponon all the remaining cases still undecided, unresolved and
unacted upon, as directed by the Supreme Court in its above Resolution. The others, as
will be shown below, were already acted upon by Judge Layague in his previous
Compliances, to wit:

Re: par. (a), subpar. 1 (a) of the Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, these cases
were already acted upon, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 30,811; 34,403; 36,954; 37,841;
38,573; 38,790; 39,088; 39,337; 39,338; 39,339; 39,340; 39,341; 40,094; 41,092;
41,643; 42,138; 42,139; 42,140; 42,651; 42,695; 43,003; 44,929; 44,930; 44,931;
44,932; 45,238; 45,239; 45,240; 46,750; 47,828; 48,976; 50,739; 51,747; 51,748;
51,749; 51,750; 97,370; 97,371; 97,372; 97,373; 52,369; and Civil Case Nos. 049;
12,271; 19,835; 20,097; 21,329; 22,687; 23,263; 23,323; 24,480;24,502; 24,610;
24,930; 25,104; 25,110; 25,206; 25,232; 25,411; 25,542; 25,663; 25,912; 26,457;
27,050; 27,097; 27,112; 27,511; 28,073; 28,172; 28,481; 28,549; 28,577; 28,695;
28,842; 28,958; 29,033; 29,093; 29,224; 29,240; 29,512; 29,551; 29,648; 30,087;
30,340; and 54,140.

Regarding par. (a), subpar. 1 (b) of the Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, the
following cases were already acted upon, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 5186; 24,854;
24,855; 26,888;27,011; 31,181; 31,436; 31,437; 34,403; 34,534; 35,917; 36,953; 37,089;
37,090; 37,100; 37,347; 37,348; 37,349; 37,350; 37,351; 37,352; 37,353;
37,354; 38,542; 38,875; 38,876; 38,877;38,878; 39,688; 39,812; 39,986; 40,084;
40,391; 40,953; 41,460; 41,538; 41,539; 41,619; 41,657; 41,658; 42,197;
42,198; 42,336; 42,337; 42,338; 42,339; 42,340; 42,341; 42,619; 42,705;42,816;
42,817; 42,818; 43,756; 43,822; 44,139; 44,466; 44,749; 44,807; 44,952; 44,953;
44,954; 44,955; 44,956; 44,957; 44,958; 44,959; 44,960; 44,961;
44,962; 45,122; 45,973; 45,974;46,034; 46,155; 46,192; 46,193; 46,194; 46,195;
46,196; 46,197; 46,198; 46,199; 46,200; 46,201; 46,202; 46,361; 46,362; 46,363;
46,364; 46,365; 46,366; 46,367; 46,368; 46,369; 46,370; 46,371; 46,372; 46,373;
46,374; 46,375; 46,376; 46,377; 46,378; 46,379; 46,380; 46,381; 47,028; 47,362;
47,661; 48,217; 48,608; 48,627; 48,719; 48,771; 48,772; 49,079; 49,080; 49,081;
49,082; 49,083; 49,084; 49,085; 49,086; 49,087; 49,088; 49,089; 49,090; 49,091;
49,092; 49,093; 49,094; 49,095; 49,096; 49,097; 49,098; 49,099; 49,100; 49,101;
49,102; 49,103; 49,104; 49,105; 49,106; 49,107; 50,143; 51,165; 52,011; 52,779;
 53,565; 53,657; 53,713; 53,714; 53,715; 54,037; 54.038; 54,054; and Civil Case Nos.
024; (SP) 2933; 17,670; 22,603; 22,993; 23,224; 23,471; 23,675; 24,328; 24,541;
24,714; 24,875; 24,969; 25,165; 25,513; 25,589; 25,694; 25,732; 26,254; 26,304;
26,322; 26,356; 26,552; 26,694; 26,775; 26,873; 26,899; 27,298; 27,271; 27,304;
27,309; 27,335; 27,340; 27,355; 27,408; 27,424; 27,526; 27,652; 27,670; 27,820;
27,838; 27,845; 27,981; 28,003; 28,037; 28,127; 28,192; 28,335; 28,401; 28,501;
28,572; 28,822; 28,871; 29,085; 29,162; 29,253; 29,302; 29,353; 29,383; 29,386;
29,552; 29,732; 29,801; 30,028; 30,253; SP 4319; SP 5640; SP 28,099; and LRC 044.

Going back to the latest Compliances submitted by Judge Layague, a reading of

the FULL AND FINAL COMPLIANCE, dated 26 July 2006, show that the following
cases, as stated in par. (d) (i) of the abovementioned Resolution of the Court was decided,
dismissed, resolved or acted upon, to wit: Criminal Case No. 30,811; Criminal Case
No. 38,573; Criminal Case No. 42,651; Criminal Case Nos. 43,858 and 43,859 (D: 24
May 2006); Criminal Case No. 46,750; and Civil Case No. 19,835; Civil Case No.
23,263; Civil Case No. 24,434; Civil Case No. 24,502; Civil Case No. 24,930; Civil
Case No. 25,110; Civil Case No. 25,411; Civil Case No. 25,912; Civil Case No.
26,457; Civil Case No. 27,050; Civil Case No. 27,097; Civil Case No. 27,112; Civil
Case No. 28,695; Civil Case No. 29,512; and Civil Case No. 29,648; Criminal Case
No. 34,534; Criminal Case No. 40,953; Criminal Case No. 54,054; Civil Case No.
23,224; Civil Case No. 24,328; Civil Case No. 24,714; Civil Case No. 27,298; Civil
Case No. 27,271; Civil Case No. 27,340; Civil Case No. 27,670; Civil Case No.
27,838; Civil Case No.28,192; Civil Case No. 29,085; Civil Case No. 29,302; and SP
28,099.

Next, a consideration of the captioned FULL COMPLIANCE, also dated 26

July 2006, show that, with respect to par. (d) (i) also of the above Resolution: the
following case was already decided, to wit: Criminal Case No. 34,403. Regarding Civil
Case Nos. 25,165; 28,501; and 29,732; per the THIRD PARTIAL COMPLIANCE AND
LAST REQUEST FOR EXTENSION, dated 3 April 2006 these cases, as indicated in the
footnotes were already decided. Inadvertently, this case was not reflected as decided
already in this Office Memorandum, dated 3 May 2006 which was made the basis for the
latest Supreme Court En Banc Resolution, dated 20 June 2006 in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC,
etc., which directed Judge Layague to still act thereon.

Regarding Par (f) thereof, the following cases were acted upon as follows, to wit:
(a) Decided/dismissed: Criminal Case No. 54,397; 55,263; Civil Case Nos. 22,405;
26,480; 27,385; 27,733; 30,118; 30,230; 29,330; 29,610; 30,094; 30,523; 30,633; SCA
21,274; and (b) As indicated in the footnotes, to wit: Criminal Case
Nos. 53,476, 53,477, 53,478, 53,479, 53,480,53,481, 53,482, 53,483, 53,484, 53,485, 53,
486, 53,487) Civil Case Nos. 29,499and 35,995.

Judge Layague has already retired last 7 August 2006.

As to Judge Marivic T. Daray and Atty. Ray Uson Velascos compliance with the directives of this
Court, here is the report and recommendation of the OCA:[30]

II. RE: HON. MARIVIC T. DARAY, Assisting RTC, Br. 14, Davao City:
 xxx xxx xxx

It would seem that Judge Darays tenure as Assisting Judge in RTC, Br. 14, was
automatically terminated by reason of the above resolution of the Court, i.e. in view of
the full compliance by Judge Layague with the directive of the Court in its Resolution,
dated 25 January 2005.

Recently, however, she was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of the court.

The following cases mentioned in par. (a), subpar. 1 (c) of the 25 January
2005 Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc in A. M. NO. 05-1-37-RTC
were already acted upon, with the action taken indicated in the footnotes, as per the
Compliance, dated 8 November 2006 (with annexes) submitted by Judge M.T. Daray,
i.e. forty-seven (47) Criminal Cases and sixty-six (66) Civil Cases (exclusive of the 28
civil cases subject of the Order, dated 26 October 2006 of Judge Daray, or a total of 94
Civil Cases), or a total of 141 Cases,[31] to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 30,303; 38,558;
40,119; 39,706; 40,888; 41,953; 43,894; 44,078;;44,531;;44,595; 45,162; 45,163;
45,179; 45,209; 45,954;;46,488; 46,490; 46,495; 46,860; 47,180; 48,585; 49,757;
49,836; 50,626; 50,794; 51,973; 52,105; 52,334; 52,406; 52,749; 52,832; 52,857;
53,079; 53,476; 53,477; 53,478; 53,479; 53,480; 53,481; 53,482; 53,483; 53,484;
53,485; 53,486; 53,487; 53,549; and Civil Cases Nos. 018; 2884; (Misc. Case No.)
7404; 15,852; 15,853; 15,854; 15,855; 15,856; 19,246; 22,291; 23,059; 23,776; 24,178;
24,634; 24,897; 25,089; 25,377; 25,558; 25,570; 25,624; 25,797; 25,952; 26,100;
26,556; 27,038; 27,214; 27,243; 27,429; 27,460; 27,476; 27,666; 27,798; 27,801;
27,847; 27,911; 27,984; 28,082; 28,364; 28,469; 28,565; 28,567; 28,623; 28,702;
28,930; 28,962; 29,152; 29,190; 29,191; 29,435; 29,538; 29,598; 29,787; 29,821;
29,850; 29,910; 29,925; 30,101; 30,255; SCA 17,308; Criminal Cases Nos. 42,665;
50,261; 52,630; and Civil Cases Nos. 26,729; 26,806; 28,060; 28,089; 28,463; 28,892;
and SP 22,052.

The following twenty-eight (28) Civil Cases, included in the 25 January

2005 Resolution of the Court in A. M. NO. 05-1-37-RTC, where either no summons were
issued or served upon the parties or no return of summons were made by the Sheriff of
RTC, Br. 14, Davao City, is the subject of the Order, dated 26 October 2006 of Judge
Daray, where she directed the Branch Clerk of Court and the Sheriff to comply with the
directive of either serving the unserved summons or making a return of summons within
15 days from notice, otherwise she will be constrained to bring the matter to the attention
of the Court Administrator, to wit: Civil Cases Nos. 22,266; 24,072; 24,866; 24,879;
24,889; 24,892; 25,132; 25,409; 25,430; 25,574; 25,871; 26,244; 26,320; 26,996;
27,115; 27,551; 27,552; 27,553; 27,895; 27,895; 28,162; 28,460; 28,818; 28,935;
29,012; 29,402; 29,684; and 30,052.

The following cases mentioned in the same par. (a), subpar. 1 (c) of the 25
January 2005 Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc in A. M. No. 05-1-37-
RTC remained unacted, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 33,438; 33,439; 33,440; 33,441;
33,657; 33,658; 33,659; 45,179; 45,694; 46,489; 46,728; 48,892; 48,906; 49,165;
49,836; 52,996; and Civil Cases Nos. 5926; 10,790; 16,269; 20,973; 22,397; 23,467;
25,159; 25,222; 25,274; 25,358, 25,698; 25,866; 26,704; 26,786; 26,920; 27,027;
27,449; 27,499; 27,534; 27,709; 27,715; 27,776; 27,982; 28,224; 28,343; 28,383;
28,674; 28,768; 28,773; 28,901; 28,660; 29,017; 29,076; 29,079; 29,111; 29,150;
29,250; 29,285; 29,392; 29,629; 29,746; 29,792; 29,812; 30,007; SP 3451; SP 4284; SP
7159, 24,342; 24,343; 24,344; 24,529; 25,110; 26,635; 26,890; 27,375; 28,481.

II. RE: (JUDGE LAYAGUE) AND ATTY. RAY USON

VELASCO, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, RTC, BR. 14, DAVAO CITY:
In his COMPLIANCE AND MOTION FOR EXTENSION(,) dated 10
November 2005, which Judge Layague submitted in connection with the abovementioned
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution, dated 20 September 2005 Judge Layague alleges
that: (1) He specifically instructed Atty. Velasco to coordinate with the Audit Team and
to furnish them all the court records that they wish to examine; (2) It took the Audit Team
2 days to conduct the audit for they proceeded to Tagum City to conduct the audit of
another court, leaving with Atty. Velasco a list of cases the records of which they failed
to find with instruction that they will come back to finish the audit as soon as the records
will be made available. (3) That when the audit team returned from Tagum City,
however, only Atty. Runez appeared to inform that they were leaving for
Manila; (4) Regarding the failure to submit monthly reports and semestral docket
inventory, in December 2004, he ordered his staff to conduct an inventory but what was
completed was for year 2003, and as there appears a discrepancy in the number of cases
raffled to Branch 14 and number of active cases he ordered another inventory in January
2004 to reconcile the discrepancy when the Audit Team arrived which explains why they
observed that records were on table tops and some were on the floor; (5) In view of the
discrepancy, no monthly reports could be prepared, and with the assumption of a new
Assisting Judge (Judge Daray) she suggested that before the submission of Monthly
Reports for the period from January up to her assumption in 1 June 2005, an actual
inventory be conducted to find out the actual number of active cases of Branch 14 vis--
vis the total number of cases assigned and raffled to Branch 14.

In his Letter, dated 12 October 2005, which Atty. Velasco submitted, in

compliance with the (En Banc) Resolution, dated 20 September 2005 issued in A.M. No.
No. 05-1-3-RTC, he states that: (1) 7 of the 21 civil cases mentioned therein are not
found in the courts docket and upon verification by the Civil Case (I)n-Charge (clerk in
charge with civil cases), they were raffled and belong to either RTCs 8, 11 or 33. In a
Certification, dated 12 October 2005 (Annex A of Letter) issued by Atty. Edipolo P.
Sarabia, Jr., OIC Clerk of Court V, these 7 (not 8) civil cases are Civil Case Nos. 24,480;
25,150; 25,542; 30,028; 28,549; 54,140; 26,899; (2) He, together with clerks in charge
with criminal and civil cases, will conduct a re-inventory of the records from 17 to 28
October 2005 so that the court will be able to submit an accurate monthly
reports; (3) There was delay in the entries in the criminal docket because the position of
criminal cases clerk had been vacant for a long period of time and there was difficulty in
coping up with the entries; (4) As to the records placed in the staff room floor, they were
filed neatly near the tables of the Supreme Court team for them to go over. All records
were shown to them but I had no control over what records they chose to inventory. After
the Supreme Court team returned from Tagum City, they informed me that the inventory
is already finished. Nobody complained to me or to the Executive Judge that the
inventory was not yet finished. (5) It is true that there are records at the courtroom. We
already ran out of space for them that is why the records are filed orderly and neatly on
the side of the courtroom. The records found on my table are those subject for my draft
orders and draft decisions which had accumulated. (6) I was paralyzed on the right side of
my body for more than a month. In fact, when I met the Supreme Court team on their
second day, I still could not hold a pen. At present the records are now in their proper
places. (7) He is sorry for the administrative lapses and human frailties. He asked that he
be given more time to comply with the inventory and monthly reports.

In compliance, dated 12 October 2005 (to the Supreme Court En

Banc Resolution, dated 20 September 2005 issued in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC) addressed
to the Court Administrator (Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.) and Atty. Ma. Luisa D.
Villarama, Clerk of Court, En Banc, Supreme Court, he (Atty. Velasco) states the
following, to wit: (i) About seven (7) cases mentioned in the said Resolution do not
belong to the docket of RTC, Br. 14, Davao City but to other branches of the court. xxx

Re: inventory and monthly reports, a re-inventory of the records will be done from 17 to
28 October 2005 so that accurate monthly reports may be submitted; (ii) There was delay
in the entries in the Criminal Docket Book because the item for Criminal Cases Clerk
was vacated a long time ago and there was difficulty in coping up with the
entries; (iii) As to the records placed in the staff room floor, they were filed neatly near
the tables of the Supreme Court Team for them to go over. All records were shown to
them but I have no control over what records they chose to inventory. After the Supreme
Court team returned from Tagum, they informed me that the inventory was already
finished. Nobody complained to me or to the Executive Judge that the inventory was not
yet finished; (iv) It is true that there were records at the courtroom. We already ran out of
space for them that was why the records were filed orderly and neatly on the side of the
courtroom. The records found on my table were those subject of my draft orders and draft
decisions which had accumulated. I was paralyzed on the right side of my body for more
than a month. In fact, when I met the Supreme Court team on their second day, I still
could not hold a pen. At present the records are now in their proper places; (v) He is very
sorry for the administrative lapses and human frailties. He begs that time be given him to
comply with the inventory and monthly reports.

In his COMPLIANCE AND MOTION FOR EXTENSION(,) dated 11 November

2005, Atty. Velasco alleges that he adopts the Compliance and Motion for Extension
filed by Judge Layague, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 14, Davao City. Moreover, he states
that he will be applying for emergency leave for 2 weeks as there is a need for an
immediate operation of his kidney in Manila. Further, He is attaching with the said
Motion a certification/referral from a Urologist. Further, when the Audit Team was still
in RTC, Br. 14 to audit the court, Atty. Velasco informed the Team Leader that only very
recently then, he suffered a mild stroke. He states that for humanitarian considerations, he
is asking that the deadline for the submission of the reports be extended for a period of 2
months from 10 November 2005 (which is more or less up to 2 January 2006). Initially,
the said date has elapsed without any compliance having been submitted by Atty.
Velasco.

However, based on the pleadings/communications previously filed, including the

one recently made, i.e. Letter, dated 9 January 2006, with appended lacking monthly
reports and semestral docket inventories, it appears that both Judge Layague and Atty.
Velasco have complied with the following portions of the Supreme Court En
Banc Resolution, dated 20 September 2005 in A. M. NO. 05-1-37-RTC, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

 With respect, in particular, to the portion thereof directing the submission of the
lacking monthly reports and semestral docket inventories, the same have been submitted,
as shown by original copies thereof attached to the Letter, dated 9 January 2006, which
was filed (i)n compliance with Sub-par III, Par. (a) of the Resolution En Banc of the
Supreme Court dated 20 September 2005 issued in the above administrative matter.
Besides, during the judicial audit recently conducted, from 16 to 30 November
2006, in the RTC, Br. 14, Davao City, it has been observed that the Monthly Reports and
the Semestral Docket Inventory are already up to date and the records are already well
kept and each and every expediente are already well-arranged in chronological order,
among others.

While respondent judges claims to have fully complied with the Courts en banc Resolutions dated
January 25, 2005 and September 20, 2005 in Administrative Order No. 05-1-37-RTC, the recent
judicial audit conducted in the RTC, Branch 14, Davao City on November 16 to 30, 2006, revealed that
he had left behind 41 cases (19 criminal casesand 22 civil cases), submitted for decision; and 12 cases
(3 criminal cases and 9 civil cases) with incidents submitted for resolution, or a total of 53 cases, all of
which were already beyond the reglementary period to resolve. It was also observed that these cases were
not included in the said Resolutions.[32]

In view of the foregoing, the OCA recommended that:[33]

(a) Regarding the HON. WILLIAM M. LAYAGUE, formerly the Presiding

Judge, RTC, Br. 14, Davao City, the report of the judicial audit team be treated as an
administrative complaint and that the instant matter be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter against respondent judge. He be adjudged liable for gross
inefficiency for undue delay in deciding and resolving an exceptionally huge number of
cases. There being full compliance by him of the Resolutions of the Supreme Court En
Banc, dated 25 January 2005 and 20 September 2005 in A.M. NO. 05-1-37-RTC (Re:
Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 14, Davao City, Presided Over By Judge
William M. Layague), plus his claimed illness, which serves to mitigate his liability
hereunder, but aggravated by his previous penalties in other administrative cases, one of
which is an exact replica of the present one, coupled with leaving behind still quite a
huge number of undecided and unresolved cases, he be meted
a FINE of EIGHTY THOUSAND (P80,000), the amount to be deducted from his
retirement benefits;

(b) the HON. MARIVIC T. DARAY, Presiding Judge RTC, Br.

18, Digos City and Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 14, Davao City, be DIRECTED:
(1) to TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the following remaining
unacted cases, mentioned in par. (a), subpar. 1 (c) of the En Banc Resolution of the
Court, dated 25 January 2005 in A.M. No. 05-1-37-RTC, to wit: Criminal Case Nos.
33,438; 33,439; 33,440; 33,441; 33,657; 33,658; 33,659; 45,179; 45,694; 46,489;
46,728; 48,892; 48,906; 49,165; 49,836; 52,996; and Civil Case Nos. 5926; 10,790;
16,269; 20,973; 22,397; 23,467; 25,159; 25,222; 25,274; 25,358, 25,698; 25,866;
26,704; 26,786; 26,920; 27,027; 27,449; 27,499; 27,534; 27,709; 27,715; 27,776;
27,982; 28,224; 28,343; 28,383; 28,674; 28,768; 28,773; 28,901; 28,660; 29,017;
29,076; 29,079; 29,111; 29,150; 29,250; 29,285; 29,392; 29,629; 29,746; 29,792;
29,812; 30,007; SP 3451; SP 4284; SP 7159, 24,342; 24,343; 24,344; 24,529;
25,110; 26,635; 26,890; 27,375; 28,481;
 (2) to DECIDE the following cases, submitted for decision, which are
already beyond the reglementary period to decide left behind by Judge W. M.
Layague, former Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 14, Davao City, who already retired
without deciding them, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 35,995; 45,225; 47,069; 54,223;
54,224; 54,225; 54,226; 54,227; 54,228; 54,229; 54,230; 54,976; 54,977; 54,978;
54,979; 55,980; 55,981; 55,982; 55,983; Civil Case Nos. SP 3595; SP 7106;
15,852; 15,853; 15,854; 15,855; 15,856; 20,871; 22,075; 25,274; 27,628; 27,711;
27,819; 27,984; 28,762; 28,773; 29,006; 29,746; 29,912; 30,127; 30,302;
30,779; (3) to RESOLVE the incident(s) in the following cases, which were already
beyond the reglementary period to resolve, also left behind by Judge Layague, who
already retired without resolving them, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 34,537; 38,553;
38,554; and Civil Case Nos. 250; 24,342; 24,343; 24,344; 27,982; 29,064; 29,324;
29,654; 29,738.
c) Regarding ATTY. RAY USON VELASCO, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br.
14, Davao City, in connection with the matter under consideration, insofar as he is
concerned, the same be considered as CLOSED and TERMINATED, inasmuch as he
has already complied with what he was required to do under the Resolution, dated 20
September 2005, in A. M. NO. 05-1-37-RTC.

Hence, in our Resolution dated March 6, 2007, the Memorandum Report of the OCA was re-docketed as
a regular administrative matter against respondent judge for gross inefficiency; that is, for undue delay in
deciding and resolving an exceptionally huge number of cases.

The Court shares the position taken by the OCA.

The Court has always impressed upon all members of the judiciary the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied.[34] The Constitution
itself, under Section 15, Article VIII, mandates that lower courts have three (3) months from the date of
submission within which to decide the cases or matters pending before them. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods." Finally, Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics exhort judges to be
prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their court, to
wit:

6. PROMPTNESS

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that

justice delayed is often justice denied.

7. PUNCTUALITY

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time
of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his
 habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.

To ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of judicial business are complied with, this Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 26, 1988 requiring all magistrates to act promptly on
all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. This was emphasized in Administrative
Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999which requires judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribed by Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution in the adjudication and resolution of all cases or
matters submitted to their courts.

However, these rules are not rigid. An extension of the period may be granted by this Court upon
request by the judge concerned on account of heavy case load, age, poor health or any other reasonable
excuse.

Here, however, respondent judge clearly transgressed the applicable rules relating to the proper
and speedy disposition and resolution of cases within the reglementary period provided by law. The
records show that as of audit date (October 4 to 15, 2004), the following facts were established: (1) 83
cases were not decided within the reglementary period; (2) pending incidents in 230 other cases remained
unresolved even beyond the prescribed period to resolve; and (3) no appropriate action was made on 221
others (193 cases with no further action, 19 cases with no further settings and 9 cases with no action taken
yet since the filing thereof), despite the lapse of considerable time.Worse, after his retirement, it was
found out that he had left behind 53 cases (not included in those cases stated in the courts resolution dated
January 25, 2006 and September 20, 2006), all of which were beyond the reglementary period to
decide/resolve. We have stated in Cadauan v. Judge Alivia:[35]
Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial duty of a member of the
bench. The speedy disposition of cases in our courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so
the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its
commitment of providing all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial and
to a speedy disposition of cases.

While it may be true that the delays incurred by respondent judge can be attributed in part to his
failing health, nonetheless, his illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the corresponding
decisions or resolutions within the prescribed period. It was incumbent upon him to inform this Court of
his inability to seasonably decide the cases and he could have sought an extension of the reglementary
period within which to decide his cases if he thought that he could not comply with his judicial duty. Poor
health may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not his failure to
request an extension of time within which to decide cases on time. We note that respondent judge made
no such request long before an audit was conducted in his sala. The fact that he was burdened with failing
health, which adversely affected his work efficiency, serves only to mitigate the penalty, not to exonerate
him.

Under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision
is classified as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. In Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City,[36] the Court observed the factors considered in
the determination of the proper penalty for failure to decide a case on time:

We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within ninety
(90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service
without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the
number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances- the damage suffered by the parties
as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc. The fines imposed vary in
each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases or matters undecided or unresolved,
respectively, within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances the damage suffered by the parties as a result of
the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc.

Thus, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Madronio, we held:

In a number of cases, the fines were set at ten thousand pesos (P10,000), for the
judge failed to decide one (1) case within the reglementary period, without offering an
explanation for such delay; for one (1) motion left unresolved within the prescriptive
period; and for eight (8) cases left unresolved beyond the extended period of time granted
to the judge, taking into consideration that the judge was understaffed, burdened with
heavy caseload, and hospitalized for more than a month. xxx In other cases, the fine was
set at eleven thousand pesos (P11,000) for the judge failed to resolve a motion for
reconsideration and other pending incidents relative thereto, alleging lack of manpower in
his sala as an excuse; decided a case for forcible entry only after one year (1) and more
than seven (7) months from the time it was submitted for resolution, considering that
respondent judge was grieving due to the untimely demise of his daughter; xxxIn another
case, the judge was fined twelve thousand pesos (P12,000) for his failure to decide one
(1) criminal case on time, without explaining the reason for the delay. Still in other
cases, the maximum fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) was imposed on the judges
for delay in rendering decisions in nine (9) criminal cases and failing altogether to render
decisions in eighteen (18) cases, taking note that the judge also promulgated his decisions
in seventeen (17) cases even after he already retired; failure to decide forty-eight (48)
cases on time and failing to resolve pending incidents in forty-nine (49) cases despite the
lapse of considerable length of time; xxx There were other cases in which the Court did
not strictly apply the Rules as when it only imposed a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) for a delay of nine (9) months in resolving complainant's Amended Formal
Offer of Exhibits, after finding that there was no malice in the delay and that the delay
was caused by the complainant himself. In two cases, we imposed a fine of five thousand
 pesos (P5,000) on a judge who was suffering from cancer, for failing to decide five (5)
cases within the reglementary period and failing to decide pending incidents in nine (9)
cases; xxx In other cases, the fines were variably set at more than the maximum amount
when the undue delay was coupled with other offenses. In one case, the judge was fined
twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000) for undue delay in rendering a ruling and for
making a grossly and patently erroneous decision. In another case, the judge was fined
forty thousand pesos (P40,000) for deciding a case only after an undue delay of one (1)
year and six (6) months and for simple misconduct and gross ignorance of the law,
considering also that said undue delay was his second offense. Finally, the fine of forty
thousand pesos (P40,000) was also imposed in a case for the judge's failure to resolve one
(1) motion, considering that he was already previously penalized in two cases for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for Gross Ignorance of Procedural Law and
Unreasonable Delay.[37]

We note that this is not the first time that an administrative case of the same nature has been filed
against respondent judge. In 1996, in Re: Report of the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Cases
Conducted in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,[38] the Court imposed a fine in the amount
of P25,000.00 on respondent judge for his failure to decide/resolve, within the reglementary period, 147
cases submitted for decision/resolution. Again, in De Vera v. Layague,[39] respondent was fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 for undue delay in deciding cases pending before his sala. Still, one (1) case is
pending investigation with the OCA. Under the circumstances, we agree with the OCA that respondent
judge should be fined in the amount of eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00).

Also, we would like to point out that in our en banc Resolution dated January 30, 2007, amending
our earlier Resolution dated January 25, 2005, we designated Judge Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and Judge Marivic T. Daray, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, as Acting Presiding Judge and Assisting Judge, respectively of RTC,
Branch 14, Davao City. We also directed Judge Daray to take appropriate actions on the remaining
unacted cases mentioned in par. (a) subpar. 1(c) of the Courts en banc Resolution dated January 25,
2005. Likewise, we considered the administrative matter insofar as Atty. Ray Uson Velasco, Branch
Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, is concerned, as closed and terminated, inasmuch as he
already complied with the resolution of September 20, 2005.

ACCORDINGLY, retired JUDGE WILLIAM M. LAYAGUE is hereby found GUILTY of

gross inefficiency for his undue delay in rendering decisions or orders and is hereby FINED in the
amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits, considering
that he compulsorily retired from the service onAugust 7, 2006.

SO ORDERED.
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ and ATTY.

A.M. No. P-06-2249
LYN L. LLAMASARES,
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2351-P]
Petitioners,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus
CARPIO,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

LUCILA C. PACARIEM, Stenographer,
Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, Manila,Respondent.

Promulgated:

October 8, 2008

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO - DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is the administrative complaint filed by petitioners Judge Placido C. Marquez (Judge
Marquez) and Atty. Lyn L. Llamasares (Atty. Llamasares), former Presiding Judge and former Branch
Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Manila charging respondent
Lucila C. Pacariem, former Stenographer III of the said RTC and now Stenographer detailed at RTC,
Branch 23, Manila, with gross neglect of duty, gross inefficiency, gross insubordination, and gross
misconduct.

This controversy arose from petitioners voluminous Complaint[1] dated November 14, 2005 with
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) detailing the numerous infractions that respondent allegedly
committed while working as a court stenographer under the control and supervision of herein
petitioners. Petitioners insist that respondents actions constitute gross acts inimical to her continued
employment in the government, particularly in the judicial department.

Petitioners assert that respondent repeatedly committed numerous grammatical and

typographical errors in her typewritten work despite constant reminders. Furthermore, she constantly
failed to follow corrections in the drafts which usually required three to five revisions before they are
finalized. In support of these allegations, petitioners attached to their Complaint two hundred fifty-four
(254) pages worth of error-filled output allegedly made by respondent.[2]

Petitioners also complain that respondent failed to submit the transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) of forty-five cases[3] within twenty (20) days from the time the notes were taken as required under
Administrative Circular No. 24-90, which became effective on August 1, 1990. The pertinent portion of
the said circular states:

2. (a) All stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes and to
attach the transcripts to the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the
time the notes are taken. (Italics supplied)

In five (5) cases, respondent purportedly did not submit to petitioner Atty. Llamasares the
stenographic notes she had taken immediately at the close of the particular sessions when they were
taken, as required under Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:

It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a court
to either in the morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately
at the close of such morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be
attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise be the duty of the clerk to
demand that the stenographer comply with said duty. xxx (Italics supplied)
It is also alleged that respondent misled Atty. Llamasares to sign certifications dated January 6 and July
2, 2004 which declared that respondent had no pending stenographic notes to be transcribed as of said
dates. Furthermore, for failure to timely file her application for sick leave on July 5, 2004 and special
leave on August 10, 2004, respondent is also accused of violating Sections 21, 53, and 54 of Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No.41 (Series of 1998), to wit:

Section 21. The special leave privileges are subject to the following conditions:

2.5.2.1. That the official/employee may be granted a maximum of three (3) days within a
calendar year of any or combination of special leave privileges of his choice which he
would opt to avail;

2.5.2.2. That such privileges shall be non-cumulative and non-commutative;

2.5.2.3. That the official/employee shall submit the application for the said leave
privileges for at least one (1) week prior to availment except on emergency cases; and

2.5.2.4. Special leave privilege may be availed of by the official/employee when the
occasion is personal to him and that of his immediate family.
xxx

Section 53. All applications for sick leave of absence for one (1) full day or more shall be made
on the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon employees return from such
leave. Notice of absence, however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or the
agency head. Application for sick leave in excess of five (5) successive days shall be
accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

Sick leave may be applied for in advance in cases where the official or employee will undergo
medical examination or operation or advised to rest in view of ill health duly supported
by a medical certificate.

In ordinary application for sick leave already taken not exceeding five (5) days, the head of
department or agency concerned may duly determine whether or not granting of sick
leave is proper under the circumstances. In case of doubt, a medical certificate may be
required.
Section 54. Sick leave shall be granted only on account of sickness or disability on the part of the
employee concerned or of any member of his immediate family.
Approval of sick leave, whether with pay or without pay, is mandatory provided
proof of sickness or disability is attached to the application in accordance with the
applicable requirements. Unreasonable delay in the approval thereof or non-approval
without justifiable reason shall be a ground for appropriate sanction against the official
concerned.[4] (Italics supplied)

In addition to the foregoing, petitioners accuse respondent of loafing, or spending an unseemly

amount of time outside of the office during office hours, as revealed in the courts Logbook of
Permission Slips covering the period August 27, 2003 to March 28, 2005. From the said Logbook, it can
be gleaned that respondent often left the office purportedly to go to the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), the Supreme Court (SC), the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and other government
offices.Petitioners allege that she falsified entries in the said Logbook. In some instances, she did not
indicate in the same Logbook her purpose for leaving the office during office hours and, in ten (10)
instances, she registered in the Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel a time of arrival that is
different from the one noted by the courts Officer-in-Charge. The same document also discloses that
she allegedly went to this Court on July 9, September 28, October 25, December 14, 2004, February 11
& 14, and March 2 & 28, 2005 but an inquiry with the SC Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division revealed
that her name did not appear in the SC Logbook on the said dates.[5]

Petitioners also allege that respondent obtained a rating of Unsatisfactory for her work performance
during the periods of January 1 June 30, 2004, July 1 December 31, 2004, and January 1 April 5,
2005.[6] The last rating period was abbreviated because respondent was transferred to Branch 23
pursuant to the Order of the Executive Judge of ManilaRTC dated April 1, 2005. Respondent was
informed in writing of her Unsatisfactory performance rating for the period January 1-June 30, 2004
and was sufficiently warned that a subsequent Unsatisfactory rating would result in her separation
from service pursuant to OCA Circular No. 37-2002 dated 31 July 2002 in connection with Section 2.2
(a), Rule XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998. In connection with the said CSC
Memorandum, respondent was sufficiently warned that her failure to improve performance within the
remaining period shall warrant her separation from service. Respondent filed a protest of her
Unsatisfactory performance rating for January 1 June 30, 2004 and for July 1 December 31, 2004 with
the OCA-Performance Evaluation Review Committee (PERC). However, petitioners point out that a
previous Joint Protest co-filed by herein respondent with regard to her Unsatisfactory performance
ratings from January-June 2002 also given by petitioner Judge Marquez was dismissed per OCA-PERC
Resolution dated September 12, 2003.[7]

Lastly, petitioners aver that respondent had a pending administrative case for gross misconduct filed by
her former officemate at Branch 40, Rey C. Mutia. This case was subsequently resolved by this Courts
Third Division in a Resolution[8] promulgated on July 11, 2006, the dispositive portion of which declared:

WHEREFORE, we find Lucila C. Pacariem GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a court

employee and impose on her a FINE of P2,000, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.[9]

Respondent filed a Comment[10] dated February 7, 2006 wherein she alleges that petitioners Complaint
was filed in reaction to the Joint Protest which she co-filed with reference to
the Unsatisfactory performance ratings she received in 2002 from Judge Marquez and to the Reply she
made in response to the series of Memoranda issued to her by petitioner Atty. Llamasares. In both
documents, she claims that she had been discriminated against in her performance ratings. She also
asserts the fact that she had obtained consistent Very Satisfactory performance ratings when she was in
the service of previous judges, namely, Judges Felicidad Varangdang-Villalon, Felipe G. Pacquing, and
Herminia Pasamba. Even Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., to whose court she was transferred from her
previous position in Judge Marquezs court, allegedly gave her a Very Satisfactory rating.

Respondent admits that she does commit mistakes in the performance of her job but she
protests that petitioners magnified even her trivial errors. She argues that the drafts presented as
evidence were really meant for correction and that corrections are normal because of the courts heavy
workload and due to petitioner Judge Marquezs work method where, for instance, he allegedly
sometimes changes the contents of what he dictated in open court after it is reduced into writing. She
maintains that she never neglected her duties and that she has no pending stenographic notes as
indicated by the Certification issued by petitioner Atty. Llamasares herself.

Furthermore, respondent denies that she ever engaged in loafing. Whenever she went out during office
hours, these travels were made to the SC, GSIS, Court of Appeals (CA) and the LBP for important
matters like filing a loan, transmitting a TSN to the CA, or to encash checks. In explaining her non-
registration in the SC Logbook, she avers that she usually goes to the SC through the CA, where her
kumare would accompany her to the SC which results in her entry without being asked to register by
the SC guards. She takes issue with the fact that petitioners seem to be monitoring her every move
which included the time of her arrival and departure from the office. She also insists that the alleged
difference of a few minutes between her actual time of arrival and her logbook entry which petitioners
attribute to bad faith on her part is merely the result of non-synchronicity of watches used by the
parties.

Respondent also points to the fact that several other employees of RTC, Branch 40, Manila had
transferred or resigned under petitioners term.

In response to the supposed violations of the 20-day period for transcription of stenographic notes, she
refers to her Answer[11] dated March 14, 2005 to the Memorandum of petitioner Atty. Llamasares dated
February 28, 2005 involving the same issue, wherein she admits not being able to submit TSNs within
the 20-day period due to heavy workload. However, respondent claims that no party or lawyer ever
complained that she was not able to submit any transcript when requested and that there was never an
instance when Judge Marquez was not able to decide a case due to non-transcription or delayed
transcription of stenographic notes on her part.
 In its Report dated July 28, 2006,[12] the OCA noted that respondent was rated Unsatisfactory
for two consecutive rating periods covering January 1 June 30 and July 1December 31, 2004 based
mostly on the same acts enumerated in petitioners Complaint. Furthermore, the OCA foresees a similar
rating for the first semester of 2005 had it been not for her transfer to another court on April 1,
2005. At the time the report was released, respondents Protest regarding her performance ratings has
not yet been resolved by the PERC of RTC Manila. In the same report, the OCA found meritorious the
allegations of loafing and falsification of the court attendance logbook against respondent but found no
merit in the other charges. Thus, the OCA made the following recommendations:

1. That the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case;

2. That respondent stenographer, Lucila C. Pacariem, be found GUILTY of inefficiency,

loafing and inaccuracies in her entries on the logbook as to time of arrival, for which
she should be penalized with SUSPENSION FROM SERVICE for a period of ONE
YEAR without pay;

3. The rest of the charges be DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Underscoring supplied)

Thereafter, the Court, through its Second Division, issued a Resolution[13] dated September 25,
2006, ordering the redocketing of the present case as a regular administrative matter and requiring the
parties to manifest to the Court whether they are willing to submit the matter for decision/resolution on
the basis of the pleadings filed, within ten days from notice.

Petitioner Atty. Llamasares, for herself and petitioner Judge Marquez, filed a
Manifestation[14] dated November 7, 2006 expressing their willingness to submit to a decision/resolution
based on the pleadings. Respondent in turn filed her Manifestation[15] dated November 6, 2006 asking
instead for a hearing on the matter and calling the attention of the Court to her Protest of the
performance ratings that she received in 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 pending before the PERC
of RTC Manila and to her Motion for Reconsideration to this Courts Second Division Resolution, finding
her guilty of conduct unbecoming of a court employee.

In a Resolution[16] dated March 7, 2007, the Courts First Division ordered Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, RTC,
Branch 8, Manila to submit a report on the status of respondents Protest within thirty (30) days from
notice. Judge Olalia responded in a Letter[17] dated May 15, 2007 that the records of respondents Protest
were indorsed on March 8, 2007 to the Office of the Executive Judge, RTC Manila which referred the
same to Judge Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, 1st Vice-Executive Judge, RTC Manila.

In an Order dated November 20, 2007, the RTC Manilas Office of the 1st Vice Executive Judge denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing her protest of the two consecutive
Unsatisfactory performance ratings for the periods January June 2004 and July December 2004 given to
her by Judge Marquez. In the November 20, 2007 Order, it was held that (1) respondent [protestant]
failed to prove her allegations of bad faith or prejudice on the part of Judge Marquez in giving her the
Unsatisfactory ratings complained of and (2) Judge Marquezs ratings of respondent enjoyed the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.[18]

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that this case can already be decided based on
the pleadings filed by the parties.

The issue to be resolved here is whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges alleged in the
Complaint. In this regard, we find the recommendations of the OCA well-taken.

With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty, the Complaint essentially
relies on the same acts upon which petitioner Judge Marquezs Unsatisfactory performance ratings of
respondent for 2004 were based. Petitioners have adequately shown that such low performance
ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output that respondent appear to have consistently
produced during said period. While it may be true that respondent is only human and may commit
mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly in her drafts despite her
superiors constantly calling her attention to correct them.

This Court cannot turn a blind eye to respondents well-documented lapses in typing/encoding
decisions and orders of petitioner Judge Marquez despite the apparent leniency of other judges in
rating respondents past performance. Judge Marquez was not bound by the performance ratings given
to respondent by her previous superiors and had the discretion to give the rating that he believed she
deserved.

We do not find credence in respondents assertion that petitioners were merely magnifying her
errors and were motivated by ill-will or prejudice in filing the Complaint against her. As the Office of the
1st Vice Executive Judge of the RTC Manila correctly found in its November 20, 2007 Order, respondent
failed to prove that her low performance ratings were due to evident bad faith on the part of Judge
Marquez or were arbitrarily given to her.
 Quite apart from the poor quality of her work, respondent admits that she has not been able to
faithfully follow the twenty-day period for completion and submission of theTSN provided under
Administrative Circular No. 24-90. She claims that the delay is due to heavy workload and further
asserts in her defense that her delay in submission of transcripts has not caused any prejudice to Judge
Marquez, the counsels or the litigants.

This Court has repeatedly ruled that failure to submit TSNs within the period prescribed under
Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty.[19] As a stenographer, respondent
should bear in mind that the performance of her duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice,
and her inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary.[20] In her defense,
respondent cites the certification issued by petitioner Atty. Llamasares on January 6 and July 2, 2004 that she
(respondent) had no pending stenographic notes as of the said dates. Atty. Llamasares, on the other hand, claims
that she was misled by respondent to issue such certification. Notwithstanding the contradicting claims of the
parties, it is undisputed that respondent indeed repeatedly failed to submit TSNs within the period prescribed. The
circumstances that (a) respondent appears to have submitted all the transcripts enumerated in the Complaint, albeit
beyond the period mandated, and (b) there appears to be no proof that any party or counsel has complained about
the delay in respondents submission of transcripts do not exonerate respondent for her non-compliance
with Administrative Circular No. 24-90. This Court need not wait for respondents laxity in her duties to
in fact impede the administration of justice before we impose sanctions for her admitted violation of
said circular.

We likewise find merit in the charge of loafing, which is defined under the Civil Service Rules as
frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular hours[21] and, in the case at bar, is closely
connected with the charge of dishonesty, as presented in sufficient and painstaking detail by
petitioners. Petitioners presented the Logbook of Permission Slips that reflected the numerous times
that respondent was out of the office during work hours for the period August 27, 2003 to March 28,
2005.

The same documents, among others, showed that she went out of the office on July 9,
September 28, October 25, and December 14, 2004, February 11 & 14, and March 2 & 28, 2005,
purportedly to go to this Court. However, an inquiry made by petitioners with the SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer, Security Division, revealed that respondents name did not appear in the Logbook of the Court
on these dates. We are unconvinced by respondents explanation that her name was not reflected in the
Courts Logbook because she usually entered through the CA where she would be accompanied to this
Court by her kumare, a CA employee, thereby excusing respondent from registering with the Courts
security personnel. The Courts security personnel maintain a strict policy of inspecting outsiders going
into its premises, which respondent could not have escaped. In fact, such an explanation would only
compound her predicament as she did not disclose such fact in her permission slips and, if true, she
would then likewise be admitting to flouting the security policies of this Court. An inference of loafing on
the part of her kumare can also be logically deduced from respondents explanation.

Moreover, petitioners pointed out that in some instances respondent did not even state in the
Logbook of Permission Slips her purpose for leaving the office during regular hours. She also entered
false information in the Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel as can be gleaned from the
substantial discrepancies between respondents Logbook entries and those noted by the Officer-In-
Charge as to respondents time of arrival in the office on November 12 & 19, 2003, December 28, 2004,
and March 8, 2005, which cannot be deemed as inconsequential as respondent sees them.

It must be stressed that all judicial employees must devote their official time to government
service. They must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service in
the judiciary is not only a duty; it is a mission.[22] To inspire public respect for the justice system, court
officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time.[23] Strict observance of
official time is mandatory lest the dignity of the justice system be compromised.[24] Thus, Section 1,
Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that the same shall commit themselves
exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.[25]

In the case at bar, we find that respondent has failed to live up to the standard of efficiency and
professionalism that the judiciary demands from its court personnel.Furthermore, by writing false and
inaccurate entries in her former offices Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily Attendance of
Court Personnel, respondent likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.

In the Complaint, respondent is also accused of delayed filing of her application for sick leave
on July 5, 2004 and special leave on August 10, 2004, in violation of Sections 21, 53, and 54 of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 41 (Series of 1998). In denying this, respondent claims to have notified
petitioner Clerk of Court by phone of her absences on those two occasions and that she in fact filed her
applications therefore but both petitioners did not approve and sign them.[26] On this matter, we adopt
the finding of the OCA that although respondents leave applications appear to have been filed after the
period prescribed in the rules, there might have been an attempt on respondents part to file her leave
applications immediately but she was prevented by petitioners in view of the apparent strained
relations among them. We agree with the OCA that respondent is not liable for this charge and the
other remaining charges in the Complaint.

Having determined the liabilities of respondent, we come now to the imposition of the
appropriate penalty for her acts.
It is on record that petitioner Judge Marquez had given respondent two (2) consecutive Unsatisfactory
performance ratings in 2004. Under OCA Circular No. 37-2002, quoting Section 2.2(a), Rule XII of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40 (s.1998):

An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive UNSATISFACTORY ratings

may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or
employee concerned is informed in writing of his/her unsatisfactory performance for a
semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall
warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30
days from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall
enable the employee to prepare an explanation. (Italics supplied)

Furthermore, Section 5, Rule IX, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, provides that an employee who
expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal through the established Grievance
Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his
performance rating.

In its Report, the OCA appears to have refrained from recommending the highest penalty of dismissal
considering that respondents Protest of her performance ratings for 2004 was still pending. It is
undisputed that respondent has already availed of the grievance procedure prescribed and was
undoubtedly provided with due process and consideration albeit with an undesired result, since
respondents Protest was dismissed.

In this regard, the law on the matter gives us the option of meting out the penalty of dismissal
on the respondent. In fact, in the past, this Court has dropped from the rolls a stenographer who was
likewise given two (2) consecutive Unsatisfactory ratings by her superior for delay in transcribing
stenographic notes and her failure to transcribe notes properly.[27]

However, this Court, in other cases, has mitigated the imposable penalty for humanitarian
reasons. In such cases, we also considered length of service in the judiciary; the respondents
acknowledgement of his/her infractions and feelings of remorse; and family circumstances, among
others, in determining the proper penalty. We have also ruled that where the penalty less punitive
would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not be visited with a consequence
so severe. It is not only because of the laws concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his family
to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage-
earner.[28] In the present case, apart from respondents long service in the government (since 1975), it
appears on record that she was given a Very Satisfactory rating by Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., to
whose court she was transferred after her stint in Judge Marquezs court.[29] We are inclined to give
respondent the benefit of the doubt and construe her subsequent favorable performance rating as an
indication of improvement in the discharge of her duties.

Having said the foregoing, we are accepting the OCAs recommendation of imposing a penalty
of one (1) year suspension without pay on respondent for inefficiency/neglect of duty, loafing and
making false/inaccurate entries in the office Logbook.

On a final note, the Court sternly reminds respondent that her long years in public service
should not be used as a justification for laxity nor a cover for mediocrity but rather the same entails the
expectation that she will continually adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and
efficiency in the discharge of her official duties.

WHEREFORE, we find that Ms. Lucila C. Pacariem is guilty of inefficiency/neglect of duty, loafing and
making false/inaccurate entries in the office Logbook for which we impose the penalty of SUSPENSION
FROM SERVICE for a period of ONE (1) YEAR without pay, with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.

The other charges in the Complaint are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

EN BANC
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREO, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2144
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2417-RTJ)
Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

JUDGE IRENEO L. GAKO, JR., November 3, 2008

Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 5, Cebu City,
and
MANUEL G. NOLLORA,
Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 5, CebuCity,
Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case against Judge Ireneo L. Gako, Jr. and Clerk of Court
Manuel G. Nollora, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Cebu City,
stemmed from a complaint[1] filed by Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo charging Judge Gako
with (a) violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3, in relation to Rule 1.02, Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct for his delay in resolving a Motion for Reconsideration
filed in Special Proceedings No. 916-R entitled Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo,
(b) violation of Canon 2 of the said Code for acting on the said case after he had
recused himself from the case, and (c) incompetence, together with Clerk of Court
Nollora.

The complainant alleged that on June 27, 2003, he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order[2] dated June 2, 2003 in Special Proceedings No. 916-
R which was considered submitted for resolution per the Order dated July 4,
2003. According to the complainant, respondent Judge Gako deliberately failed to
resolve the motion within the ninety (90)-day period prescribed by the
Constitution, and in clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
particularly Rule 3.05, Canon 3, mandating a judge to dispose of the courts
business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods, and Rule 1.02,
Canon 2, requiring judges to administer justice without delay.

The complainant further alleged that on April 26, 2004, respondent judge
issued an Order inhibiting himself from handling Special Proceedings No. 916-
R. However, almost five (5) months after such inhibition, respondent judge still
continued to act on the said case by issuing an Order dated September 3, 2004
granting the Motion for Clarification/ Reconsideration filed by the heirs of
Patrocino Borromeo Herrera. This, according to the complainant, violated Canon
2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requiring a judge to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Complainant also charged respondent judge and his Clerk of Court of
incompetence for failure to keep all the records of the case intact and for
proceeding to resolve the case with incomplete records. Complainant asserted
that respondents incompetency is evident from the fact that when they turned
over the records of the case to the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 9, only 16 out of the 72
volumes were accounted for as shown by the receipts signed by Clerk of Court
Christine Doller on June 17, 2005[3] and August 11, 2005.[4]

In his 1st Indorsement dated January 19, 2006, Court Administrator

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.[5] referred the letter-complaint to respondent judge for
his comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the same. Respondent judge
was likewise directed to comment on why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for violation of his professional responsibility as a lawyer pursuant to
the resolution dated September 17, 2002 of the Court En Banc in A.M. 02-9-02-
SC.[6] Said letter-complaint was also referred to Clerk of Court Nollora who filed
his comment on March 20, 2006.[7]

When respondent judge failed to comply with the 1st Indorsement, then
Court Administrator Velasco sent a 1st Tracer dated March 30, 2006 to respondent
judge reiterating the directive for him to file his comment within five (5) days
from receipt thereof, otherwise, the matter will be submitted to the Court
without his comment.[8] Again, respondent judge failed to comply.

For refusing to submit his comment despite the two (2) directives of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the Court issued a Resolution[9] directing
respondent judge to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with
and to submit the required comment both within five (5) days from receipt
thereof, with warning that in case of failure to comply, the Court shall take the
necessary action against him and decide the administrative complaint on the basis
of the record on hand.
 On March 15, 2007, respondent judge finally filed his Compliance[10] with an
opening statement that he compulsorily retired from the service on September
20, 2006 and while working on his retirement papers, he suffered a mild stroke
which necessitated his rehabilitation in his home.

Respondent judge explained that the instant administrative matter

stemmed from his issuance of the Order dated June 2, 2003 denying Virginia Lim
Sesbreos claim for attorneys fees from the estate of Vito Borromeo. From the
denial of his claim, complainant, Atty. Raul Sesbreo, filed a motion for
reconsideration. According to respondent judge, he did not act on the said motion
because he believed that Virginia Lim Sesbreo should be the person who should
have filed the motion for reconsideration and not herein
complainant. Subsequently, respondent judge issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from the case because complainant had already filed the instant
administrative complaint against him.

With regard to his action on the motion filed by the heirs of Patrocino
Borromeo Herrera despite his Order inhibiting himself from proceeding with the
said case, respondent judge reasoned out that since the inhibition was voluntary
on his part as the presiding judge, he felt then that it was also his discretion to
disregard his Order.

Explaining on how he was able to resolve the motion/s filed in Special

Proceedings No. 916-R, despite the incomplete records of the said case,
respondent judge maintained that his resolutions were based on the pertinent
records of the case that were forwarded to him.

On his part, respondent Clerk of Court Nollora admitted in his

Comment[11] dated February 6, 2006 that only 16 volumes of the records of the
case were turned over by their sala (Branch 5) to Branch 9. However, he hastened
to add that only 16 volumes were received by them from the Office of the Clerk of
Court. According to Nollora, he did not ask for the other volumes because there
was no order from the court and that the motions and incidents submitted for
resolution can be resolved even without reference to the other records of the
case. He added that the remaining volumes would only congest their already filled
mini-bodega and steel cabinets.

Upon evaluation of the case, the OCA, in its Memorandum

Report[12] dated June 12, 2008, made the following recommendations:

(a) The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

(b) Clerk of Court Manuel G. Nollora, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City be (a) found guilty of simple
neglect of duty, (b) FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary, and (C) STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely, and

(c) Former Presiding Judge Ireneo G. Gako, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City be (a) found guilty of
undue delay in rendering a decision or order and of violating a Supreme Court Circular, (b) FINED in the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). Considering that respondent judge has already returned from the judicial service, let the
same amount be DEDUCTED from his retirement benefits.

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA.

The Constitution mandates all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or

matters within three (3) months from their date of submission. Accordingly, Rules
1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct direct judges
to administer justice impartially and without delay and to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

In line with the foregoing, the Court has laid down administrative guidelines
to ensure the prompt disposition of judicial business. Thus, SC Administrative
Circular No. 13-87 provides:

3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for
the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be
decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower
courts are given a period of three months to do so. x x x.

Furthermore, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 states:

 6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending
before their courts. x x x.

Indisputably, respondent judge failed to act on the Motion for

Reconsideration within three (3) months from the time said motion was
submitted for resolution on July 4, 2003. His claim that the motion was not filed
by the proper party is not a valid excuse to simply ignore said motion. Instead, he
should have accordingly formally disposed of such motion. While it is true that
respondent judge issued an Order voluntarily inhibiting himself from handling
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, however, it does not appear on record that the
Executive Judge was furnished with a copy of the said order for appropriate
action. Respondent judge cannot also justify his inaction by his inhibition since if it
was really his intention to refrain from handling the case, he should not have
acted on the subsequent Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration filed by the
heirs of Patrocino Borromeo Herrera.

All told, the unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the
motion submitted for his resolution clearly constituted a violation of
complainants constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. Having failed
to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration within the prescribed period of time,
respondent judge is liable for undue delay in resolving a decision or order which is
considered a less serious offense.

Regarding the charge of incompetency, it should be stressed that the duties

and responsibilities of a judge are not strictly confined to judicial functions. He is
also an administrator who must organize his court with a view to prompt and
convenient dispatch of its business. As administrative officer of the Court,
respondent judge should have required his clerk of court or any other court
personnel to secure all the records of the case and keep the same intact although
some of the volumes thereof would not be used in deciding the case. A judge is
duty-bound to motivate his subordinates for the effective performance of the
functions and duties of his office. In fact, the imperative and sacred duty of each
and everyone in the court is to maintain its good name and standing as a temple
of justice. Hence, any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in
the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in
the judiciary, shall be condemned and cannot be countenanced.[13]

Finally, respondent judge should also be held liable for failure to obey
directives from the OCA. As borne by the records, the two directives of the OCA,
namely the 1stIndorsement dated January 19, 2006 and the 1st Tracer
dated March 30, 2006, were received by respondent judge on February 9,
2006 and April 17, 2006, respectively. Still, he contumaciously refused to submit
his comment. It was only upon the issuance by this Court of a Resolution
dated January 24, 2007 directing him to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for refusing to submit his comment that respondent
judge finally complied.

We find the explanation of respondent judge that he suffered a mild stroke

to be insufficient to exonerate him, although it may mitigate his liability. While he
may have been suffering from some ailment, he failed to show that it totally
incapacitated him from complying with the lawful orders of the OCA. The failure
of respondent judge to comply with the OCAs directives to file comment to the
letter-complaint against him manifested his indifference to the lawful directives
of the Court. In Martinez v. Judge Zoleta,[14] we held:

Again, we find the need and occasion to rule that a resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an
administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from
the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents in administrative complaints
should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the administrative complaints because it is their duty to
preserve the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of
respondents to administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints.

A judges (1) delay in rendering a decision or order and (2) failure to comply
with this Courts rules, directives and circulars constitute less serious offenses
under Rule 140, Section 9 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:

1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;

xxx xxx xxx

4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars;

 Section 11(B) of said Rule 140 provides the following sanctions for less
serious offenses:

SEC. 11. Sanctions.

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

For his part, respondent Clerk of Court Nollora, as an officer of the court, is
duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in completing the record of the
case even without any order from his presiding judge, as he is aware whether the
record is complete or incomplete when he receives them. Under the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court, the branch clerk of court as the administrative officer
of the court, among others, controls and supervises the safekeeping of court
records. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates
the clerk of court to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and public
property committed to his charge. As custodian of judicial records, it is incumbent
upon him to ensure an orderly and efficient record management system in the
court and to supervise the personnel under his office to function effectively. A
clerk of court plays a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be
permitted to slacken on his job under one pretext or another. He must be
assiduous in performing his official duties and in supervising and managing court
dockets and records.[15] In this case, he fell short of his duty. Thus, we find him
administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a

task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or
indifference. Under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service in correlation with Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292, the penalty for simple neglect of duty, a less grave offense, is suspension for
a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense
and dismissal for the 2nd offense.
 As it appears it was respondent clerk of courts first infraction, we find the
penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay to be
sufficient.Furthermore, to prevent any undue adverse effect on the public service
which would ensue should work be left unattended by reason of respondents
suspension, we deem it wise to convert his penalty to the payment of a fine. Thus,
in line with jurisprudence,[16] we impose a fine instead of suspension, so that he
can continue to discharge his assigned tasks.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) Finding Judge IRENEO L. GAKO, JR. GUILTY for two less serious
offenses: (1) undue delay in rendering a decision/resolution and (2) violation of
Court directives for which he is hereby FINED in the total amount of P30,000.00 to
be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.
2) Finding Clerk of Court MANUEL G. NOLLORA GUILTY for simple neglect
of duty and is FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary and sternly
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

SERGIO & GRACELDA N. ANDRES, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762

Complainants, [formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1422-

RTJ]

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, Regional
AZCUNA,
Trial Court, Branch 23, ELMER D.
LASTIMOSA, Clerk of Court and Ex- CHICO-NAZARIO*, and
Officio Provincial Sheriff, RTC-OCC, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
NASIL S. PALATI, Sheriff IV, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos
 City,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

December 17, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit[1] dated February 21,
2002 of Sergio N. Andres, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres charging respondents Judge
Jose S. Majaducon, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos
City, and Presiding Judge, Branch 23, with violation of Supreme Court Circular No.
7, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct, and both Elmer D.
Lastimosa, Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of South Cotabato, and Nasil S. Palati,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, with Abuse of
Authority, Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct.

The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition[2] issued by Judge
Majaducon on August 22, 2001 in connection with the consolidated Civil Case
Nos. 1291[3]and 4647,[4] an action for declaration of nullity of documents and
recovery of possession of real property with writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages. The said order directed the provincial sheriff
of General Santos City to demolish the improvements erected by the heirs of John
Sycip and Yard Urban Homeowners Association on the land belonging to spouses
Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga. Pursuant to the Order of Demolition, a
Notice to Vacate[5] dated September 12, 2001 was issued by Sheriff Palati and
noted by Provincial Sheriff Lastimosa. The said notice was addressed to the heirs
of John Sycip, all members of Yard Urban Homeowners Association, and all
adverse claimants and actual occupants of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, the land subject
of Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647.

To forestall the demolition of their houses, complainants, who claimed an interest

over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, filed a Special Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation[6]informing the court of the pending protest between them and the
heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), docketed as RED Claim No. 3735.[7] In
the Ex-Parte Manifestation, complainants alleged that they and their predecessor-
in-interest Concepcion Non Andres introduced improvements and authorized the
construction of several improvements on Lot No. 2, Psu-135740. They also
averred that they are not bound by the judgment rendered in Civil Case Nos. 1291
and 4647 because neither they nor their predecessor-in-interest were impleaded
as parties therein. They prayed that the provincial sheriff or any of his deputies be
enjoined from implementing the special order of demolition on the
improvements they made. They also wrote a letter[8] addressed to respondents
Lastimosa and Palati enjoining them from executing the order of demolition
under pain of administrative sanction.

On February 6, 2002, notwithstanding complainants manifestation and letter,

Lastimosa and Palati proceeded with the demolition of the improvements erected
by the complainants and their predecessor-in-interest.

Thus, on February 18, 2002, complainants instituted, with the RTC of

General Santos City, Civil Case No. 7066, an action for Specific Performance,
Reconveyance and Damages against the heirs of Melencio Yu and impleaded
Judge Majaducon, Lastimosa and Palati as co-defendants. The complaint alleged
that complainants title over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740 was valid, that they had been
occupying the property since 1957 and that the reckless and arbitrary demolition
of their improvements had unlawfully disturbed their peaceful occupation of the
property.[9] Complainants also filed an Urgent Motion for Special Raffle of said
Civil Case No. 7066.

In an Order[10] dated February 18, 2002, Judge Majaducon, acting as the Executive
Judge of RTC, General Santos City, denied the Urgent Motion for Special Raffle
and dismissed outright Civil Case No. 7066. On the same day, respondent judge
issued another Order[11] declaring complainants in direct contempt of court for
allegedly filing a complaint based on a quitclaim that had already been
pronounced null and void by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, complainants were
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
ten (10) days.

This prompted complainants to file the instant administrative complaint. They

averred that the actions of herein respondents constitute bad faith, malicious
motive, serious partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. They
also alleged that prior to his appointment in the judiciary, Judge Majaducon was
the former counsel of Melencio Yu and his mother Dominga Pinagawang.

In his Comment[12] dated April 16, 2002, respondent judge vehemently denied the
accusations hurled against him. He explained that he issued the special order of
demolition in the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 after a
decision[13] was rendered and a resolution[14] was issued by the Supreme Court
affirming the judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA) declaring
spouses Melencio Uy and Talinanap Matualaga as the rightful owners of Lot No. 2,
Psu-135740 and ordering all occupants to vacate the premises. This was also the
reason why he ordered the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 filed by
herein complainants. He believed that complainants had no cause of action
because the courts had already decided that the quitclaim upon which
complainants based their action was null and void. Thus, to entertain the
complaint would be just a waste of time on the part of the court. Anent the
contempt order, he maintained that the same was justified because complainants
had instituted an unfounded suit based on a falsified document, thereby
demonstrating an obvious defiance and disrespect of the authority and dignity of
the court.

As to the charge of partiality, respondent judge denied being the former counsel
of Melencio Yus mother, Dominga Pinagawang. He explained that his real client
was Cesar Baas who requested him to write a letter demanding the squatters to
vacate the lot owned by Dominga. He asserted that after writing the letter,
another counsel took over the case.

Respondents Lastimosa and Palati filed their own Comment[15] on April 9,

2002 and averred that they faithfully observed the correct procedure in the
implementation of the order of demolition, including the twin requirements of
notice and hearing. According to them, they were extra careful in implementing
the same especially because it was, by far, the biggest demolition undertaken by
their office as it involved a 12-hectare property and about 1,500 persons. It also
generated interest among the media, thus they made sure that they consulted
with respondent judge all issues and questions relative to its implementation.

In the Agenda Report[16] dated December 12, 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount
of P10,000.00 for violation of the rules governing the raffle of cases, and that the
administrative case against him be redocketed as a regular administrative
matter. The OCA, however, found that respondents Lastimosa and Palati did not
abuse their authority in the implementation of the order of demolition and
accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint against them.

In the Resolution dated March 5, 2003, the Court required the parties to manifest
their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings
filed.[17] Pursuant to respondents manifestation,[18] they filed their memorandum
with additional exhibits on April 22, 2003.[19] Complainants, on the other hand,
manifested that they would no longer file a memorandum and that they were
submitting the case for resolution.
Complainants assailed the respondent judges issuance of a special order of
dismissal in connection with Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 despite their pending
protest before the DENR. To complainants, the issuance of said order of
demolition constituted gross ignorance of the law.

We are not persuaded. The evidence on hand shows that respondent judge issued
the special order of demolition only after carefully determining that there was no
more hindrance to issue the same. For one, the trial court, in Civil Case Nos. 1291
and 4647, had already adjudged that the land in question belonged to spouses Yu
and Matualaga and even nullified the quitclaim and all documents of conveyance
of sale in favor of complainants predecessor-in-interest.[20] In fact, the records of
the case disclosed that the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA in
CA-G.R. No. 69000[21] and CA-G.R. CV No. 54003[22] and ultimately by this
Court via its decision dated November 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 76487[23] and resolution
dated July 19, 1999 in G.R. No. 138132.[24]

It is thus beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 had
already attained finality. The special order of demolition was issued by
respondent judge so that the final judgment could be fully implemented and
executed, in accordance with the principle that the execution of a final judgment
is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party, and mandatory and
ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.[25] To be sure,
it is essential to the effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict.[26]

However, respondent judge abused his authority in dealing with Civil Case No.
7066 which cast serious doubt as to his impartiality. Respondent judges outright
dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 entitled Heirs of Concepcion Non Andres, namely
Sergio, Sergio Jr., and Sofronio and Gracelda, all surnamed Andres v. Heirs of
Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, namely Eduardo, Leonora, Virgilio, Vilma,
Cynthia, Imelda and Nancy, all surnamed Yu, and represented by Virgilio Yu and
Cynthia Yu Abo, Atty. Elmer Lastimosa, in his capacity as Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of South Cotobato, Mr. Nasil Palati, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, and Hon. Jose S. Majaducon,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City was
irregular. As correctly found by the OCA, respondent judge completely ignored
the procedure for the raffling of cases mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 7
dated September 23, 1974, which we reproduce hereunder:

I. RAFFLING OF CASES

All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are
two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different
branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without
being raffled. The raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at the
hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive Judge. Only
the maximum number of cases, according to their dates of filing, as can
be equally distributed to all branches in the particular station or
grouping shall be included in the raffle. x x x

Clearly, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he
took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two
defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite
raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling of cases, held in the
case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello[27]:

The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular
No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is
 intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the
cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases to
predetermined judges is obviated. A violation or disregard of the Courts
circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be
countenanced.

Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by
dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext that
it would be just a waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain the case. As
Executive Judge, he ought to know that raffling of cases is his personal duty and
responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be conversant with Supreme
Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and strictly
comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the
wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should
therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of
law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but
judges under the sanction of law.[28]

By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them to

pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10)
days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants.

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a

judge acting judicially, or such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court
and the administration of justice into disrepute or disrespect.[29] Here, respondent
judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a complaint (Civil
Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been declared null
and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants,
raffled to the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to
punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, still, judges must be slow
to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used judiciously and
sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.[30]

The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on
the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt
for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[31]

It has time and again been stressed that besides the basic equipment of
possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be
perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain.[32]

Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity.

Respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct

contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon
him by law.

Respondent judge also took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 despite the fact
that prior to his appointment as judge, respondent served as counsel for Melencio
Yu and his mother, Dominga Pinagawang.
 Respondents explanation that it was Cesar Baas who was his client and not
Melencio and Dominga was belied by the demand letter[33] dated June 20, 1980,
which was signed by him.
Respondent judge clearly acted as counsel not only for Cesar Baas but for
Melencio and Dominga as well. Section 2 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct specifically provides that judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both
in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary. Section 5 of the same Canon further states that judges shall disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to
decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include,
but are not limited to, instances where (b) the judge previously served as lawyer in
the matter in controversy.

Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the raffle
and took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its outright
dismissal and cited the complainants in contempt of court. He thus created the
impression that he intended to favor his former clients, Melencio and
Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his impartiality and
objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a just decision and
the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to its integrity.[34] Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not
only be impartial but should also appear impartial. A critical component of due
process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, for all the
other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if
the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.[35]

We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must at all
times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court's
impartiality. When he exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to
perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice
but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will
induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either
party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in
the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to
disqualify himself.[36]

Respondent judge was a party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was enough
reason not to act on the same and just leave the matter to the Vice-Executive
Judge. His reluctance to let go of the case all the more induced doubts and
suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity and objectivity. Evidently,
respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the aforecited Canon
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Be that as it may, we rule that there is no merit in complainants charge of gross
ignorance of the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be
established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption.[37] Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person
who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for
the accusation.

The violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 by respondent judge is

classified as a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court. Section 11(B) of the same Rule provides the following sanctions for less
serious offenses:

Sec. 11. Sanctions.

 B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for

not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Finally, as regards the charge against Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff Elmer Lastimosa
and Sheriff IV Palati, complainants maintain that they abused their authority
when they enforced the order of demolition against complainants even though
they were not impleaded as parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 where the
order of demolition was issued.

The dispositive portion of the order of demolition issued by respondent judge

reads:
NOW THEREFORE, we command you to demolish the improvements erected
by the defendants HEIRS OF JOHN SYCIP (namely: NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP,
JOSE SYCIP, JR., ALFONSO SYCIP II, ROSE MARIE SYCIP, JAMES SYCIP &
GRACE SYCIP), Represented by NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, in Civil Case No.
1291 and the plaintiffs YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
ET AL. in Civil Case No. 4647, on that portion of land belonging to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1291 and defendants in Civil Case No. 4647,
MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. (V-14496) (P-2331) P-523, located in
Apopong, General Santos City.

This Special Order of Demolition shall be returned by you to this Court within
ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof, together with your
proceedings indorsed hereon.[38]
Clearly, respondent judge neither ordered the eviction of any other person
occupying the property of spouses Yu and Matualaga other than the parties in
Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, nor directed the Ex-Officio Sheriff to demolish the
houses or structures of any person other than the said parties. However, the
notice to vacate issued by Palati and noted by Lastimosa was addressed not just
to the parties but to all adverse claimants and actual occupants of the land
subject of the case. It directed that the houses and improvements of the parties,
as well as those of adverse claimants including complainants who were not
parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, would be demolished.

Worth quoting here is the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 54003, which
decided the appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. 4647, viz:
Finally, the appellants assertion that they are not bound by the decision
in Civil Case No. 1291 because they are not parties therein and that the
appellees should first institute an action for ejectment in order to
acquire possession of the property is without merit. The appellants
failure to establish a vested and better right, either derivative or
personal, to the land in question as against the appellees, forecloses
any posturing of exemption from the legal force and effect of the writ
of execution issued by the trial court to enforce a final judgment under
the guise of denial of due process. A judgment pertaining to ownership
and/or possession of real property is binding upon the defendants and
all persons claiming right of possession or ownership from the said
defendant and the prevailing party need not file a separate action for
ejectment to evict the said privies from the premises.(Emphasis
supplied)[39]

Evidently, the decision in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, which had long become
final and executory, can be enforced against herein complainants although they
were not parties thereto. There is no question that complainants merely relied on
the title of their predecessor-in-interest who was privy to John Sycip, the
defendant in Civil Case No. 1291. As such, complainants and their predecessor-in-
interest can be reached by the order of demolition.[40]
Respondent sheriffs cannot be faulted with grave misconduct and abuse of
authority in implementing the order of demolition. The records before us are
simply bereft of any indication supportive of the allegation. Quite the contrary,
we find Lastimosa and Palati to have faithfully observed the correct procedure in
the implementation of respondent judges order. In fact, they were extra careful in
the enforcement of the same knowing that a lot of attention was given to it by
the media, involving as it did a 12-hectare property and about 1,500
persons. Despite the controversy, they were able to carry out the demolition
peacefully and successfully.

It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his

ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in
accordance with its mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments
and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed that a judgment,
if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. It is
said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly called the
life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any
proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with this
delicate task must act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the
administration of justice, otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of
the courts of justice would be futile.[41]

We take note of the fact that respondent judge had compulsorily retired from the
service on February 24, 2001.[42]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Jose Majaducon GUILTY of
abuse of his authority for which he is meted a fine of P20,000.00 to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.

For lack of merit, the charge of grave abuse of authority against Elmer
Lastimosa and Nasil Palati is hereby DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

EN BANC

DOMINGA C. MENOR, A.M. No. P-08-2587

Complainant, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-678-P)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,*
 CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES,

TEODORA P. GUILLERMO, Court LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

Stenographer III,
BRION, JJ.
Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela,

Respondents. Promulgated:

December 18, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO - DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is the administrative complaint filed by Dominga C. Menor against

Teodora Palting Guillermo, now retired Stenographer III of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela, charging the latter with Grave
Misconduct.
This case was commenced by a Complaint[1] dated July 9, 1999 filed by Dominga C.
Menor with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Complainant averred
that she is the widow of the late Pedro Menor who, she claimed, owned a parcel
of land situated in Tallungan, Reina Mercedes, Isabela. Complainant further
averred that she and her late husband had been occupying said land since 1946
and that sometime in 1998, she discovered that respondent was able to secure
title over the same through a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Lot
whereby her husband, with her consent, purportedly sold their land to herein
respondent and her spouse Eduardo Guillermo.

According to complainant, the said document was fabricated. Further, the

signature appearing in the said document purporting to be the signature of her
late husband was very different from his true signature. She also denied that she
ever signed said Deed of Sale as she does not know how to read and write and
uses only her thumbprint as her signature.Lastly, she surmised that the fraudulent
document was prepared by respondent while she was employed with the RTC.

In her Comment[2] dated September 8, 2000, respondent denied all the material
allegations in the Complaint. She cited the fact that complainant previously filed
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Naguilan-Reina Mercedes, Isabela
a criminal complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 3624, against her and her late
husband for Falsification involving the same property and the same
document. The case was dismissed due to prescription as stated in the Order[3] of
the said MCTC dated October 22, 1998.Complainant later filed an Action for
Declaration of Nullity and Annulment/Cancellation of Title with the RTC, Branch
18, Ilagan, Isabela which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1080[4].

Respondent claimed that the Deed of Sale executed by the late Pedro Menor
covering the parcel of land sold to her was lawful and valid. She also interposed as
defense that being a mere stenographer, she did not have the power or influence
to use her office in order to commit the crime imputed to her. Furthermore, she
averred that the sale of the land was made in her private capacity.

Upon verification, the OCA found that Civil Case No. 1080, entitled Heirs of Pedro
Menor v. Sps. Eduardo Guillermo and Teodora Palting, et al. for Declaration of
Nullity and Annulment/Cancellation of Title was dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to the Order[5] of the RTC, Branch 18, Ilagan, Isabela on February 4,
2000. The said case was refiled on March 3, 2000 and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1134. On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 3124 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Sps. Eduardo Guillermo and Teodora Palting for Falsification by
Private Individual was dismissed by the MCTC, Naguilan-Reina Mercedes, Isabela
on the ground of prescription in its Order[6] datedOctober 22, 1999.

Considering that the issues raised in this administrative complaint were similar
with those raised in the then pending Civil Case No. 1134, entitled Heirs of Pedro
Menor et al. v. Sps. Eduardo Guillermo and Teodora Palting, the Courts Third
Division, through a Resolution[7] dated February 21, 2001, resolved to hold in
abeyance action on the administrative complaint and to await the outcome of the
said civil case.
In response to the inquiry[8] of the OCA, Atty. Radden Y. Llana, Clerk of Court V,
RTC, Branch 18, Ilagan, Isabela reported[9] that Civil Case No. 1134 was transferred
to Branch 16 due to the inhibition of the then Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch
18, Hon. Juan A. Bigornia, Jr. The case was later dismissed through an
Order[10] dated August 6, 2007, the pertinent portion of which is quoted
hereunder:

Under the foregoing factual observations, it is clear that the complaint failed to squarely and categorically invoke the
jurisdiction of this court to try and decide the instant case for failure to allege the assessed value or estimate of the land
in suit. So also bearing in mind that the question of jurisdiction of courts to try and decide a particular case may be
raise(d) at anytime and at any stage of the case.

WHEREFORE, conformably, with the foregoing, the motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby granted. x x x[11]
The complainants Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied
by the trial court on September 18, 2007,[12] for failure to give proper notice of
the said motion to the defendants in the case, as required by Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The Petition for Relief from Judgment which was
later on filed by complainant was also denied by the trial court for lack of merit
on December 11, 2007.[13]

In a Resolution[14] dated January 29, 2008, the Court En Banc resolved to lift the
February 21, 2003 [February 21, 2001] Resolution[15], which held in abeyance any
action on the instant case, considering the time that had elapsed and respondents
retirement from the service on September 17, 2003. The Court further resolved to
have the present case evaluated on the basis of its merits.

The OCA, in its Memorandum[16] dated July 16, 2008, made the following
recommendation anent the instant case:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter and that the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS retained from respondent Teodora Guillermos
retirement benefits be applied as the imposable FINE.[17]

We find no reason to deviate from the afore-quoted recommendation of

the OCA in the case at bar.

The criminal case and the two (2) civil cases filed by complainant against herein
respondent were dismissed by the trial courts on the ground of technicality. For
this reason, the issues relevant to the instant administrative case remain
unanswered. Hence, the merits of this administrative case should be resolved on
the basis of evidence on record in accordance with the quantum of evidence
required in administrative proceedings.

Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence

rule. Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to
be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the
respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint.[18] Substantial evidence is
such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[19] The standard of substantial evidence is
justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant.[20]

In order to support her claim that respondent falsified her signature and her
husbands signature in the absolute deed of sale that transferred the ownership of
the 12,143 sq.m. lot to respondent and her husband, complainant submitted the
disputed deed of sale, her marriage contract[21] dated July 6, 1968, a
verification[22] of a pleading done in April 1972 and an undated letter[23] to the
Commissioner of Public Highways, purportedly signed by complainants husband.

The disputed deed of absolute sale[24] is dated February 6, 1975. Pedro Menor,
complainants husband, died on March 3, 1976. However, the Original Certificate
of Title No. P-4082 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Isabela was issued pursuant to a free patent granted to
respondents husband Eduardo Guillermo on August 7, 1981.The subject property
was later on transferred by respondent and her husband to their sons through a
donation dated January 28, 1988 which was inscribed in the original certificate of
title only on October 2, 1995.[25] The transfer certificate of title in the name of the
donees was issued on the same date.

Complainant contends that she does not know how to sign her name and only
affixes her thumbmark to documents to signify her consent, while the signature
of her husband appearing on the document is very different from his customary
signature. The copy of the Marriage Contract[26] between complainant and Pedro
Menor supports complainants contention, as it bears not her signature but her
right thumbmark. Pedro Menors signature appearing thereon is similar to his
signature in the two other papers[27] submitted by complainant along with her
complaint. According to complainant, these signatures of Pedro Menor are the
genuine signatures of her late husband.

There are perceivable differences between the said three signatures of Pedro
Menor and the one appearing on the disputed deed of sale. Although the
handwriting experts opinion is not available in this case to establish with certainty
the alleged falsification of the signature of Pedro Menor, respondent failed to
sufficiently rebut the complainants assertion that her signature in the deed of sale
is forged, as complainant does not know how to read and write and instead of
signing documents, she merely affixes her thumbmark. It is logical to conclude
that respondent perpetrated or is responsible for the falsification of the deed of
sale imputed to complainant, since respondent and her husband were benefited
by it.

There exists substantial evidence, under the circumstances obtaining in the

instant case, to hold respondent liable for Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, which is classified as a grave offense and is punishable
with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.[28]

In a Resolution[29] dated February 22, 2005, this Court directed the Financial
Management Office, OCA to release the retirement benefits of respondent and to
withhold the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), subject to the
outcome of this case.

Considering that respondent has already retired from the service and the
penalty of suspension can no longer be imposed, the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) retained by the Court should be applied as fine for
respondents administrative liability.
 WHEREFORE, Teodora Palting Guillermo, Stenographer III (ret.) of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela is hereby found GUILTY of
Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Since she has
already retired from the service, respondent Guillermo is ordered to pay a FINE of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) instead of serving out suspension, chargeable
to the amount retained by this Court from her retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

EN BANC

LETTER OF JUDGE JOSEFINA D. A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC

FARRALES, ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BR.72, OLONGAPO CITY RE:
30 CASES AND 84 MOTIONS
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION/
RESOLUTION IN THE SAID COURT
AUDIT REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT
CONDUCTED AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (RTC), BR. 72,OLONGAPO CITY.

A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

 BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 24, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a Memorandum dated October 23, 2007 in A.M. No. 06-7-416-

RTC (Audit Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Br. 72, Olongapo City), of then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock,
which recommended the following:

1. that A.M. 06-3-196-RT[C] (Letter of Judge Josefina D. Farrales, Acting Presiding

Judge, RTC, Br. 72, Olongapo City [Re: 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for
decision/resolution in the said Court]) be CONSOLIDATED with this instant
administrative matter;
2. that Judge Eliodoro [G]. Ubiadas be held administratively liable for GROSS
MISCONDUCT, GROSS INEFFICIENCY and VIOLATIONS OF SC CIRCULAR and he
be FINED in an amount equivalent to his six (6) months salary;

3. that Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe be held administratively liable for GROSS
INEFFICIENCY and VIOLATIONS OF SC CIRCULAR and that he be FINED in the
amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely;

4. that Misses Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the Docket
Books, same Court, to SUBMIT a quarterly report until the updating of aforesaid
docket books are completed with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
shall be dealt with more severely;

5. the Documentation Division-Legal OCA to COLLECT from Pacific Union Insurance

Company Incorporated its liability for forfeited bonds in the following cases:

CERTIFICATION NO. ISSUED TOTAL AMOUNT OF

THE BOND

Atty. John V. Aquino

488-0, Series of 2005 Office of the Clerk of Php256,000.00

Court

Branch Case Numbers Amount of Remarks

Bond

72 CR No. 435-02 Php 12,000.00 Bond of accused

Cecilia Asuncion
amounting to
Php80,000.00 which
was reduced to 15%
included in the
Php530,000.00
reduced bond.
 74 CR Nos. 321-02- 64,000.00
and 270-02
Not paid yet paid to
75 CR Nos. 662-03, 180,000.00
the OCC
134-03 and 743-
03

It is likewise recommended that the Office of the Court Administrator

be DIRECTED to make a REPORT and RECOMMENDATION that will be used as guidelines
for the reduction of the liability of the bondsmen in forfeited bonds within sixty (60)
days from notice hereof.

The present consolidated administrative matters have the following

antecedent facts:

A.M. 06-3-196-RTC

The Court, through the First Division, issued Resolution dated February 7,
2005 in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1902 (PAGCOR, etc. v. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, etc.),
preventively suspending Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas (Judge Ubiadas), Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 72, Olongapo City, effective immediately pending resolution
of the said administrative case. Judge Ubiadas received the said Resolution
on March 11, 2005.

Subsequently, several judges were designated[1] to preside over Branch 72,

namely: Hon. Renato J. Dilag, RTC, Br. 73, Olongapo City from April 18 to June 10,
2005; Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, RTC, Br. 74, Olongapo City, from June 10, 2005 to
January 25, 2006; and Hon. Josefina D. Farrales, RTC, Br. 69, Iba, Zambales, from
January 30, 2006 until the present.
Upon her assumption, Judge Farrales immediately conducted an inventory of the
pending cases in Branch 72. In her letter dated February 15, 2006, Judge Farrales
reported that there are still 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for decision and
resolution and that she requested for sixty (60) days extension to resolve the
same. Of the cases, 15 cases and33 motions were already beyond the
reglementary period to decide/resolve even before Judge Ubiadas was
suspended. The other 15 cases and 51 motions were submitted for
decision/resolution when Judge Caguioa took over as presiding judge of Branch
72, of which 6 cases and 30 motions were already beyond the reglementary
period.

The Court[2] noted Judge Farrales letter, directed her to resolve the
cases/motions within six (6) months and to submit a copy of each of her
decisions/resolutions within 10 days from rendition/promulgation thereof. The
Court likewise required Judge Ubiadas and Judge Caguioa to explain within 10
days from notice, their failure to decide/resolve the subject cases/motions within
the reglementary periods and to make the necessary request for extension of
time within which to decide/resolve the same.

In a series of compliances, Judge Farrales informed the Court through the OCA
that she had decided/resolved all the 30 pending cases and 84 motions. The Court
noted said compliances and considered the same as full compliance in the present
administrative matter.

In the meantime, Judge Caguioa, in a letter dated April 19, 2007, explained
that upon his designation as the Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 72, he immediately
heard all the cases already set and calendared thereat in order to prevent a
disruption of the court calendar and settings already made during the
incumbency of Judge Ubiadas. Thus, together with the equally heavy docket of his
own station in Branch 74, he heard all pending incidents calendared and
conducted trial of scheduled cases in Branch 72 in order not to cause any further
delay in the proceedings. Judge Caguioa further explained that he inherited all the
unresolved cases and motions as acting judge of said branch. During his
incumbency therein, they were not brought to his attention even at the time the
Semestral Docket Inventory of Branch 72 was prepared. He was therefore
unaware that he had to address the matter or at the very least ask for an
extension of time to decide all of them.

On June 20, 2007, the Court noted Judge Caguioas letter and referred the
same to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation within 30 days from
receipt of the records.

A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC

On May 17-26, 2006, a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was
conducted at Branch 72, RTC, Olongapo City due to Judge Ubiadas indefinite
suspension and his forthcoming compulsory retirement on July 3, 2006.

The Report dated June 29, 2006 revealed that Branch 72 has a total caseload of
1,114 cases, consisting of 880 criminal cases and 234 civil cases.

Apart from the 30 cases and 84 motions submitted for decision/resolution

mentioned in A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC, the audit team noted that there were still
other cases submitted for decision/resolution and matters which were not acted
upon for a considerable length of time, to wit:

Status Criminal Civil

SFD* beyond the reglementary period 1 3

SFD* still within the reglementary period 7 7

SFR** beyond the reglementary period 4 6

SFR** still within the reglementary period 2 13

Cases in different stages of proceedings

without further action for a considerable length
of time 3 5

Warrants of Arrest

1. No Return/Unacted 39 -
 2. For issuance of alias warrant of arrest 32

Summons - 2

No further action/setting 4 17

For compliance of the parties 4 23

For compliance of the Bondsmen 51 -

Total

* SFD-Submitted for Decision

** SFR-Submitted for Resolution

Consequently, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated July 26, 2006,
reiterating the directive to Judge Farrales to decide/resolve the 114 cases subject
matter of A.M. 06-3-196-RTC until July 31, 2006. As regards the other cases
submitted for decision/resolution which were not acted upon for a considerable
length of time, the Court gave Judge Farrales a period of three (3) months from
notice to decide/resolve/take appropriate action thereon.

In the same resolution, the Court directed Judge Farrales and Branch Clerk
of Court, Atty. Gerry R. Gruspe, to take appropriate action on the lapses in records
management,[3] as well as on the observation of the Audit Team concerning the
archiving of cases.[4] They were also required to submit a report on the action
taken and the present status of all the cases mentioned in the audit report, with
instruction to attach to the report the copies of the orders/decisions/resolutions
for reference as well as the measures taken with regard to the records
management issues.

The latter part of the said resolution is quoted as follows:

(c) DIRECT Presiding Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas to

(i) EXPLAIN within thirty (30) days from notice hereof his failure to
decide/resolve the cases enumerated in Exhibits A-A-1 and B-B-4 of the subject
OCA Memorandum, which cases are already beyond the reglementary period to
decide/resolve, and FILE a request for extension of time to decide/resolve the
same;
 (ii) EXPLAIN within thirty (30) days from notice hereof why he granted
the reduction of the liability of the bondsmen in the following cases, to wit:

AMOUNT OF THE
CASE NUMBER PARTIES
BOND

CR NO. 383-02 Pp vs. Joel Llanilo Php 10,000.00

CR NO. 356-02 20,000.00 each

Pp vs. Rey dela Cruz
CR NO. 357-02 Accused

CR NO. 642-03 Pp vs. Renato Silva 200,000.00

CR NO. 22-02 Pp vs. David Dengwas 10,000.00 each

Total Amount of the Bond Php340,000.00

REMARKS

1. In a joint Motion to Reduce Bondsman Liability dated August 31, 2004,

Commonwealth Insurance Company, thru its authorized representative,
Dolores K. Millora, moved that the liability of the bonding company be reduced
from Php340,000.00 to Php17,000.00 or equivalent to five (5%) of the total
forfeited bond. She averred that bondsman has already exerted earnest effort
to locate them and had already spent much more than the premium of the
bonds received from them.

2. Order dated September 23, 2004, Judge Ubiadas approved the said motion
and reduced bondsman liability to Php17,000.00.

3. Order dated April 27, 2005, considering the payment of Commonwealth

Insurance paid the reduced amount of Php17,000.00 per OR No. 21257141
dated January 31/ February 1, 2005 said Bondsman was absolved of its liability
in the aforesaid cases. The said Order was signed by Pairing Judge Dilag as
Judge Ubiadas was already suspended at that time.

AMOUNT OF THE
CASE NUMBER PARTIES
BOND

CR NO. 18-01 Pp vs. Sernan Patero

 CR NO. 675-01 Pp vs. Beth Mendoza, et al. Total Amount of the
Bond
CR NO. 672-99 Pp vs. Edgar Natividad

CR NO. 95-01 Pp vs. Pedro Sarmiento

Php530,000.00
CR NO. 435-02 Pp vs. Cecilia Asuncion

CR NO. 397-01 Pp vs. Joel Santos

CR NO. 289-99 Pp vs. Remedios De Dios

CR NO. 30-02 Pp vs. Michael Garon

REMARKS

1. In the Order dated February 16, 2005, Judge Ubiadas approved the Motion
for Mitigation of Suretys Liability of Pacific Union Insurance Company from the
above-mentioned cases from the total amount of Php540,000.00 to 15% of the
aforesaid amount (Php81,000.00) and accordingly the writs of execution issued
by the Court in connection with the bonds posted was amended (Annex F).

2. Per confirmation with the Office of the Clerk of Court, said amount was not
paid by the bonding company.

(d) DIRECT Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe, same court,

to EXPLAIN within thirty (30) days from notice hereof:

(i) why the Monthly Report of Cases for the months of May 2005 up to
February 2006 were only submitted to the Court on April 17, 2006;

(ii) his failure to execute the judgments on the bond in the following
cases as well as those cases enumerated in paragraph 2.d (B), to wit:

Case No. Name of Bondsman Amount of Date of

Accused Bond Judgment

1. 124-03 B. Sangco P 24,000.00

Plaridel
2. 296-03 I. Baula Surety 24,000.00 October 21, 2004
Company
3. 297-03 I. Baula 24,000.00
 4. 501-03 A. Naga 80,000.00

(iii) the non-submission of the stenographic notes of the cases

submitted for decision/resolution that further causes the delay in the
disposition of the cases;

(e) DIRECT Ms. Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of the
Docket Books, same court, to UPDATE the entries in the docket books assigned to them
from year 2005 to 2006, and SUBMIT COMPLIANCE herewith within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof; and

(f) REQUIRE Ms. Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito to SUBMIT a quarterly
report until the updating of the aforesaid docket books is completed.

The Court further resolved to:

(a) REFER the Orders dated September 23, 2004 and February 16, 2005
of Judge Ubiadas, reducing the liabilities of the Commonwealth and Pacific
Union Insurance Company, respectively, as well as the Certification No. 488-0,
Series of 2005, issued by Clerk of Court John V. Aquino, RTC, Olongapo City, to
the COMMITTEE ON BONDS-OCA andDOCUMENTATION-LEGAL DIVISION, OCA,
for study, report, recommendation and appropriate action, including Judge
Ubiadas liability, if there is any, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof; and

(b) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator

to WITHHOLD the retirement benefits of Judge Ubiadas pending the
submission of the recommendation of the Committee on Bonds-OCA.

In a Resolution dated November 27, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate

A.M. No. 06-7-416-RTC with A.M. No. 06-3-196-RTC and to note the OCA
Memorandum dated October 23, 2007.

With regard to the status of the pending cases and incidents subject of these
consolidated administrative cases, records show that Judge Farrales had already
resolved and acted upon all the cases and unresolved motions pending in Branch
72. She also informed the Court that new measures/procedures are being
implemented in order to correct the lapses in records management and that regular
counter-checking is being done to avoid recurrence of similar incidents.

We now come to the OCAs recommendations with respect to Judge

Ubiadas. Two (2) issues must be addressed herein: first, whether Judge Ubiadas is
guilty of gross ignorance and/or gross misconduct in reducing the liability of
Commonwealth Insurance Company (Commonwealth) and Pacific Union
Insurance Company, Incorporated (Pacific Union); and second, whether he is
guilty of gross inefficiency in the conduct of court business and violations of
existing SC circulars.

On the first issue, the Audit Team reported that Commonwealth filed a motion to
reduce bondsman liability from P340,000.00 to P17,000.00 or equivalent to 5% of
the total forfeited bond in Criminal Case Nos. 383-02, 356-02 to 357-02, 642-03
and 224-02. In said motion, Commonwealth averred that it exerted earnest
efforts to locate and apprehend the accused and has already spent much more
than the premium of the bonds it had received from the accused.

In an Order dated September 23, 2004, Judge Ubiadas granted the

motion. Accordingly, Commonwealth paid the amount of P17,000.00.[5] Later,
then acting presiding Judge Dilag issued an Order dated April 27, 2005 absolving
Commonwealth of its liability.

Pacific Union, on the other hand, filed a motion for mitigation of suretys liability
in Criminal Case Nos. 18-01, 675-01, 672-99, 95-01, 435-02, 397-01, 289-99 and
30-02 in the total amount of P 530,000.00. Pacific Union claimed that it had
already spent nearly the amount of the bond posted in the said cases and that it
spared no time and effort to comply with the court orders but was, however,
hampered by unavoidable circumstances. It also claimed that should it be held
liable to the full amount of the confiscated bonds, it will suffer tremendous losses
in its business. Hence, it prayed that the court reconsider its order of execution
and that it be allowed to pay 10% of the P530,000.00.
Judge Ubiadas, in an Order dated February 16, 2005, reduced Pacific Unions
liability to 15% of the P 530,000.00 or to P 79,500.00. The writs of execution
previously issued were thus amended. From the records, it would appear that
Pacific Union did not pay even this greatly reduced amount, among other unpaid
liabilities as found by the Audit Team.

On this matter, the OCA further informed the Court that there is no existing
Committee on Bonds which could appropriately act on Judge Ubiadas Orders
dated September 23, 2004 and February 16, 2005. Although the Court created
three (3) committees which will handle the property bonds, cash bonds and
recognizance, their creation was however solely for the purpose of drafting the
guidelines thereon[6] and that the said committees have been inactive for a
considerable length of time. The OCA, thus, believed that the instant
administrative matter is beyond the competence of the said committees.[7]

As a defense to charge of misconduct with respect to the reduction of the

liabilities of the aforementioned bondsmen, Judge Ubiadas explained that he was
guided in good faith by the ruling[8] of this Court which were cited by
Commonwealth and Pacific Union.

The rule governing forfeitures of bail bonds is found in Section 21, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 21. Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the
court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on
a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall
be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce
the principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for
the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondmen must:

a. produce the body of the principal or give the reason for his non-production;
and

b. explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required
to do so.
 Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the
bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The Court shall not reduce
or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted.

Significantly, OCA Circular No. 100-2006 (Re: Guidelines on the Reduction of

Bond Liability) provides:

1. REDUCTION OF BOND LIABILITY Following an Order of Forfeiture, the Court

may reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, PROVIDED, the accused
has been surrendered or is acquitted. Only in these two instances may Judges reduce or
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen. (RULE 114, SEC. 21)

The OCAs assessment of Judge Ubiadas mitigation of the liabilities of

Commonwealth and Pacific Union follows:

In the case at bar, Judge Ubiadas not only failed to perform his duties in
accordance with the Rules, but he also acted willfully and in gross disregard of the law
and controlling jurisprudence. As noted, the case of Pp vs. Sanchez is one of the cases
cited by Judge Ubiadas in explaining his grant of the motion for reduction/mitigating the
liabilities of bondsmen. Hence, he is fully aware that the surrender of the accused is
the common consideration in the reduction of liability of the surety. It can be said,
therefore, that the said oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of judicial authority.

However, other issues should be clarified. In this particular instance, the said
orders were not questioned by the accused nor the surety company as the same were
not adverse to them. It was only discovered during the audit of the records. There is no
way by which the abuse of discretion/propriety, if there is any, in granting reduction
of the liability maybe counter-checked. It is necessary, therefore, that specific
guidelines be used as basis for the reduction of the liability of the bondsmen in order to
prevent appearance of impropriety and/or impropriety in the grant if the reduction of
the liability of the surety. (emphasis supplied)

We agree with the OCA that Judge Ubiadas failed to strictly comply with the
rules pertaining to forfeitures of bail bonds, in particular the prescription that the
bondsmans liability can only be mitigated when the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. However, Judge Ubiadas conduct on this matter
cannot be readily characterized as gross ignorance or gross misconduct in the
absence of specific guidelines which the OCA itself stated in its report as
necessary as a standard to measure the propriety or impropriety of mitigation of
a bondsmans liability.

Anent the second issue, We hold that Judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross
inefficiency in the conduct of court business and of violations of existing SC
circulars.

The Constitution provides that lower courts have three (3) months within
which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for
resolution. [9] Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of
their business promptly and decide cases within the required period.[10] In
addition, this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13
which provides, inter alia, that [j]udges shall observe scrupulously the periods
prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or
matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a
period of three months to do so. We have reiterated this admonition in SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe
the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to
comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of
the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.

In his letter, Judge Ubiadas cited his health conditions as an explanation for
the delay in deciding/resolving the cases/other matters submitted for
decision/resolution in Branch 72. Judge Ubiadas averred that on August 2, 1997,
he suffered a heart attack, diagnosed as myocardial infraction, and was confined
in the intensive care unit (ICU) of theUST Hospital. He had a second heart attack
on January 2, 1998, this time it was diagnosed as cardiac arrest. Again, he was
confined in the ICU of the same hospital. Then a third heart attack occurred in July
1998, which, although not as serious as the first and second attacks, nevertheless,
required his confinement at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital.
 Judge Ubiadas further explained that he was confined since March 19,
1999 and subjected to a triple by-pass operation on April 13, 1999. It was only
on June 1, 1999 that he was able to return to work. Notwithstanding his failing
health then, he still acted as the judge of the four (4) RTCs for two (2) months as:
(1) presiding judge of Br. 72; (2) pairing judge of Br. 73;[11] (2) acting presiding
judge of Br. 75;[12] and (3) pairing judge of Br. 74.[13]

Indeed, Judge Ubiadas illness could have adversely affected the

performance of his duties. Despite having just been subjected to a triple by-pass
operation, he knew fully well that he still had to act as the judge of four
(4) RTC branches for two (2) months. If his illness had indeed seriously hampered
him in the discharge of his duties, Judge Ubiadas could have requested this Court
for additional time to decide/resolve pending cases and incidents. His illness
cannot be an excuse for his failure to render decisions or resolutions within the
constitutionally prescribed period, considering that he could have requested an
extension or other relief from this Court but he did not. It is incumbent upon
him to dispose the cases assigned to him without undue delay.

This Court has incessantly admonished members of the bench to administer

justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. The present
clogged dockets in all levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared unless every
magistrate earnestly, painstakingly and faithfully complies with the mandate of
the law. Undue delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice
which, in turn, brings the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and
confidence of the public in the judiciary.[14]

On this point, our ruling in another case is instructive:

The Court finds deserving of due consideration, the explanation of respondent

Judge for leaving ten (10) undecided cases before his retirement from the
service. Serious illness may justify the inability of a judge to perform his official duties
and functions. But then, the Court has to enforce what is required by law and to impose
a reasonable punishment for violation thereof. The members of the judiciary have the
sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. Failure to decide cases within the
period fixed by law constitutes a neglect of duty, which warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions. When he was hindered by a grave malignancy, it was
 incumbent upon the respondent Judge to request this Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator, for additional time to decide the cases which he could not
seasonably act upon and decide. For failing to do so, respondent Judge has to suffer
the consequences of his omission.[15] (emphasis supplied)

Aware of the caseload of judges, this Court has viewed with understanding
requests for extension made by judges. Hence, should a judge find himself unable
to decide cases within the 90-day period for doing so, he can ask for an extension
of time for deciding the same. Such requests are generally granted.[16]

In his letter, Judge Ubiadas acknowledged that it would have been better
had he requested for an extension of time to decide the cases. Yet, he hoped that
this Court would understand his failure by explaining that, [t]o my mind, the
measure of a judges efficiency and hard work should be viewed more in the light
of the total work accomplished rather than ask for a prior excuse to decide the
case beyond the period allowed by the Rules.

Judge Ubiadas position is untenable. This Court wishes to remind him that
as an official of the Judiciary, he is expected to follow the rules laid down by this
Court for the prompt and speedy disposition of cases. Failure to decide cases and
other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction. If a judge can not comply with
this Courts directives on the matter of disposition of cases, he may seek
extensions from this Court to avoid administrative liability.

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the OCA that Judge Ubiadas should
be held administratively liable. Records show that prior to these consolidated
cases, he had been held administratively liable four (4) times.[17] Had he not
compulsorily retired on July 3, 2006, the OCA opined that the appropriate penalty
would have been dismissal from service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits
except his earned leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporation.
 Instead, the OCA recommended that Judge Ubiadas be meted the penalty
of a fine equivalent to six (6) months of his salary. We approve the recommended
penalty. In one case,[18] We explained, thus:

We have always considered the failure of judge to decide a case within ninety
(90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service
without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the
number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit:
the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstancesthe damage suffered by the
parties as a result of delay, the health and age of the judge, etc. Thus, in one case, we
set the fine at ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for failure of a judge to decide 82 cases
within the reglementary period, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance
that it was the judges first offense. In another case, the fine imposed was sixty thousand
pesos (P60,000.00), for the judge had not decided about 25 or 27 cases. Still in other
cases, the fines were variably set at fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), for nineteen
(19) cases left undecided, taking into consideration that it was the judges first offense;
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for three (3) undecided criminal cases; eight
thousand pesos (P8,000.00), for not deciding a criminal case for three (3) years; forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00), for not deciding 278 cases within the prescribed period,
taking note of the judges failing health and age; and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00),
for belatedly rendering a judgment of acquittal in a murder case, after one-half years
from the date the case was submitted for decision. In another case, suspension without
pay for a period of six (6) months was imposed since, besides the judges failure to timely
decide an election protest for eight (8) months, the judge submitted false certificates of
services and was found guilty of habitual absenteeism. (emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

Here, Judge Ubiadas failed to decide 15 cases and 33 motions which were beyond
the reglementary period to decide/resolve. Here were also other matters that were
not acted upon. In affirming the OCA recommended penalty, we took into
consideration Judge Ubiadas health. We also noted that his caseload then
was 1,300 more or less and that during his tenure, as in his letter, he has done [his]
best and in utmost good faith to serve the ends of justice and perform [his] duties
as a judge. However, previous administrative sanctions imposed upon him must
likewise to given appropriate weight.
 With respect to Judge Caguioa, records show that his letter was referred to
the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. At the time of the
consolidation of these two administrative matters, the OCA has yet to submit its
report.

We shall dispense with the report and rule on Judge Caguioas liability, if
any. In gist, Judge Caguioa explained that the unresolved cases and motions were
not brought to his attention; hence, he was unaware that there are still matters
that he had to address or he could have asked from the Court an extension of
time to decide on them.

The Court takes this opportunity to again remind judges, clerks of court, and all
other court employees that they share the same duty and obligation to dispense
justice promptly.They should strive to work together and mutually assist each
other to achieve this goal. Nonetheless, judges have the primary responsibility of
maintaining the professional competence of their staff. Judges should organize
and supervise their court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.[19]

Although Judge Caguioa was merely the acting presiding Judge of Branch 72, he
ought to have been vigilant and probing in the management of the said court. His
proffered excuse, that the undecided cases and unresolved motions were not
brought to his attention, is untenable. Accordingly, Judge Caguioa is hereby
reminded to be more circumspect in performing his functions as a judge, whether
in his own court or in other courts where he is just in an acting capacity.

With respect to Branch Clerk of Court Gerry R. Gruspe, the OCA

recommended that he should be held administratively liable for gross inefficiency
and violations of SC circular and that he be fined in the amount of P2,000.00.
The OCAs findings are quoted below:

As mentioned, at the end of each month the branch clerk of court shall be responsible
for the preparation of the monthly report of cases and shall be certified under oath as true and
correct by the branch clerk of court and must be also be certified by the presiding judge to the
correctness of the report (A.C. No. 4-2004 dated February 4, 2004).

Notably, the reports for the months of January to April 2005 were solely signed by
Branch Clerk of Court Gruspe and filed only on June 15, 2005 (Annexes E, F, G). Also, a
comparison of the List of Cases submitted for decision contained in the aforesaid monthly
reports and in the letter-request of Judge Farrales reveals that there are cases in the request
which were not included in the reports as submitted for decision to wit:

Date
Case No. Case Title
Submitted

1. CV No. 354-0-94 G. Dela Llana vs. City of Olongapo 03-21-95

2. CV No. 28-0-00 L. Viacrusis vs. J. Asada, etc. 07-12-00

3. CV No.652-0-00 E. Stewart vs. Fely Baldos 06-04-04

4. CV No. 456-0-02 E. Stewart vs. Fely Baldos 06-14-04

5. CR No. 55-01 Pp vs. Wang Chan Chun 03-24-04

6. CR No. 626-02 Pp vs. Judith Villatema 10-20-04

Under the foregoing circumstances, it appears that the negligence of Branch Clerk of
Court Gerry Gruspe in the performance of his duties and responsibilities compounded the delay
in the disposition of cases and his lackadaisical attitude in the supervision of court personnel
aggravated the mismanagement of the courts business. If he is only assiduous in the
performance of his official duties and in supervising the court personnel and managing the courts
dockets, the prompt disposition of the courts business will be attained, despite the failure of
Judge Ubiadas to adopt an efficient system of court management.

A Clerk of Court who is lax in the supervision of court personnel is subject to disciplinary
action.

However, considering that this is the first time that the said Clerk of Court has
committed the said infraction and in order to avoid repetition of similar offense, a fine in the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (Php2,000.00) with a stern warning that his failure to submit the
reportorial requirements on time and similar lapses in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
 In his letter, Atty. Gruspe informed the Court that he personally prepared the
data in the Monthly Report of Cases Form and that he had already issued writs of
executions in Criminal Cases Nos. 124-03 (B. Sangco), 296-03 and 297-03 (I-
Baula) and 501-03. He apologized for the delay in its submission due to heavy
workload. Also, Atty. Gruspe averred that he has been a Clerk of Court V in
Branch 72 and legal researcher at the same time since September 1, 2000. In the
early part of 2005, he assumed the duties of the interpreter in addition to his
functions and other duties assigned by his judge. His duty as interpreter lasted for
several months until the appointment of a regular interpreter.

After consideration of the foregoing, We agree with the OCAs findings and
recommendation. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City,[20] we held that a
branch clerk of courts administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt and
proper administration of justice. A branch clerk of court is charged with the
efficient recording, filing and management of court records, besides having
supervision over court personnel. Having been assigned a key role in the
complement of the court, one cannot be permitted to slacken on ones job under
one pretext or another. The clerk of court in this case was advised to be assiduous
in performing official duties and in supervising and managing court dockets and
records.

In another case,[21] We held:

Clerks of Court Caparros and Pulgar-Navarro should be reminded that they are
ranking officers in our judicial system. It is their basic responsibilities to conduct docket
inventory and to ensure that the records of each case are constantly accounted for. The
volume of work cannot be an excuse for their being remiss in the performance of these
functions, and it may not be underscored enough that the office of a clerk of court
involves the performance of delicate administrative duties essential to the prompt and
proper administration of justice. (citations omitted)
 Thus, under Section 52 (B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that this is Atty.
Gruspes first offense, he should be imposed a fine of P2,000.00.

As regards the docket books, the OCA did not receive any updates from
Misses Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito from the time that the
Memorandum datedOctober 23, 2007 was submitted to the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:

1. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, retired Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch

72, Olongapo City, is GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violations of SC
circular and herebyFINED an amount equivalent to his six (6) months
salary;

2. Judge Ramon S. Caguio, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch

74, Olongapo City, is REMINDED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties;

3. Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Gerry R. Gruspe RTC, Branch 72,

Olongapo City, is GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and
hereby FINED the amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future shall be dealt with more severely;

4. Misses Catalina A. Atienza and Rizanilla R. Vito, Clerks-in-Charge of

the Docket Books, same Court, are DIRECTED to submit quarterly
reports until the updating of the docket books are completed with
 a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same lapses shall be dealt
with more severely;

5. The Documentation Division-Legal OCA is DIRECTED to collect from

Pacific Union Insurance Company Incorporated its liability for
forfeited bonds in the following cases:

CERTIFICATION NO. ISSUED TOTAL AMOUNT OF

THE BOND

Atty. John V. Aquino

488-0, Series of 2005 Office of the Clerk of Php256,000.00

Court

Branch Case Numbers Amount of Remarks

Bond

72 CR No. 435-02 Php 12,000.00 Bond of accused

Cecilia Asuncion
amounting to
Php80,000.00 which
was reduced to 15%
included in the
Php530,000.00
reduced bond.

74 CR Nos. 321-02- 64,000.00

and 270-02
Not paid yet paid to
75 CR Nos. 662-03, 180,000.00
the OCC
134-03 and 743-
03

6. the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to report on and

recommend guidelines for the reduction of the liability of the
 bondsmen in forfeited bonds within sixty (60) days from notice
hereof.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

EN BANC

OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952

ADMINISTRATOR,

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, former CORONA,
Clerk of Court LUIS C. BUCAYON II,
Court Stenographers THELMA A. CARPIO MORALES,
MANGILIT, CECILIO B. ARGAME, AZCUNA,
MARICAR N. EUGENIO, and
TINGA,
RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN and Interpreter
PAUL M. RESURRECCION, all of the CHICO-NAZARIO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 276,
VELASCO, JR.,
Muntinlupa City,
NACHURA,

REYES,
Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ

Promulgated:

December 24, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The instant case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) in all seven (7) branches of the Regional Trial Court
in MuntinlupaCity, including Branch 276 then presided by herein respondent
Judge Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was prompted by reports of
perceived irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court.
In its Memorandum[1] dated January 25, 2004 and submitted to the OCA, the
audit team reported that for the period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions
for habeas corpus were assigned to Branch 276, the subject matters of which are
classified into (a) hospitalization; (b) custody of minors; (c) illegal possession of
firearms; and (d) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records for 22 of these cases were not
presented to the audit team, while the case folders of about a hundred cases did
not contain copies of the decisions of conviction. The audit team also noted a
huge disparity in the number of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in Branch 276
as against those raffled in the other branches, which led the team to doubt if the
raffle had been conducted with strict regularity considering the fact that Judge
Perello was the Executive Judge that time.

The audit team likewise reported several substantive and procedural lapses
relative to the disposition of habeas corpus cases in Branch 276, such as (a) failure
of the branch clerk of court to present to the audit team the case folders of 22
petitions and to send notices/summons to the Office of the Solicitor General or
the Office of the City Prosecutor; (b) lack of return of the writs issued to the
officials of the Bureau of Corrections; (c) absence of certificate of
detention/confinement from the Bureau of Corrections; (d) absence of copies of
the judgment of conviction; (e) failure of the court stenographer to transcribe the
stenographic notes and attach the transcript to the records of each case; and (f)
failure on the part of the court interpreter to prepare the Minutes of the court
sessions or hearings.

Finally, the audit team observed that in some of the petitions for habeas corpus,
respondent Judge Perello erred in ordering the release of the prisoners before
they have served the full term of their sentence.

Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial
audit report as an administrative complaint against (a) Judge Perello and Clerk of
Court Atty. Luis Bucayon II for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and grave misconduct; and (b) Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit,
Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter
Paul Resurreccion for gross inefficiency.

In its Resolution dated March 2, 2005, the Court adopted the aforesaid
recommendation.[2]

The OCA, through its 1st Indorsement dated September 9, 2005, directed the
herein respondents to comment on the audit teams recommendations.[3]

In her Comment[4] dated October 10, 2005, Judge Perello opined that the Audit
Team that evaluated these Habeas Corpus cases filed with this Court are probably
not lawyers, hence, are not conversant with the Constitution, with jurisprudence,
and the Rules on the grant of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the retroactivity of
laws. She insisted that her decisions ordering the release of the prisoners who
were serving their sentence for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act were in accordance with law and jurisprudence. For those
convicted of illegal possession of firearms under the old law (Presidential Decree
No. 1866), she applied retroactively the provisions of the amendatory law or R.A.
No. 8294,[5] pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for
the retroactive application of laws that are favorable to the accused even to those
already convicted and serving sentence. Inasmuch as R.A. No. 8294 imposed the
penalty of six (6) years only, it was incumbent upon her to grant the writs to those
prisoners who have been imprisoned for eight (8) years already. For those
convicted for violation of R.A. No. 6425, she applied the said law and not the
amendatory law or R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, mainly because it aggravated the penalty and is
therefore not favorable to them.

To refute the accusations against her, Judge Perello enumerated her credentials
and qualifications and alleged that most of her decisions were upheld by the
Court attesting to her competence in applying the law. She claimed that in all the
petitions she granted, the prisoners therein were all cleared by the National
Bureau of Investigation to have no pending cases. The Bureau of Corrections was
always directed to produce the records and reason for the confinement of the
concerned prisoners. If from the records, the prisoner was found to have already
served more than the maximum of the imposable penalty, then she would order
the release of the prisoner in open court, without fear or favor. Judge Perello
asserted that she had served with utmost dedication and honesty in all her more
than 40 years of government service.

For his part, Atty. Luis Bucayon II, Branch Clerk of Court, explained in his
Comment[6] that while he failed to present the case folders and records of 22
petitions to the audit team at the time the audit was conducted at their branch,
there was an agreement between him and the audit team that the latter could
pick up these folders and records before the end of their audit. However, the
audit team failed to return to get these case records. He claimed to be baffled as
to how his alleged failure to make the records available to the audit team could
constitute gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and grave
misconduct. Atty. Bucayon likewise manifested that he had transferred to the
Public Attorneys Office of the Department of Justice as of July 26, 2004 and was
issued a clearance by the OCA.
On the other hand, Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion averred in his
Comment[7] that all petitions for habeas corpus have their corresponding Minutes
but these were not attached to the records because the Branch Clerk of Court
refused to put his remarks and findings thereon. He further claims that he always
made it a point to prepare the Minutes and his co-employees could attest to this
fact.

Finally, Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman,
all Stenographers of Branch 276, submitted their Joint Comment[8] dated October
12, 2005and Joint Supplemental Comment[9] dated October 19, 2005. According
to them, Branch 276 had the heaviest case load among all the branches
in Muntinlupa City. Despite this, they allegedly religiously attended the hearings
and transcribed their notes thereafter. With respect to the petitions for habeas
corpus, they saw no need to transcribe their stenographic notes as the
proceedings therein were non-adversarial in nature. They prioritized those cases
which were adversarial and on appeal.

In the Agenda Report[10] dated March 9, 2006, then Court Administrator

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. submitted the following recommendations:
1. respondent Judge Norma C. Perello be FOUND GUILTY of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE and be meted the penalty
of SUSPENSION for three (3) months without salary and benefit;

2. the complaint against Atty. Luis Bucayon be DISMISSED for being moot
and academic;

3. respondents Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame,

Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman and respondent Court Interpreter
Paul Resurreccion be FOUND GUILTY ofSIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and be
FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).[11]

The Court thereafter referred the administrative matter to Justice Conrado

Molina, Consultant of OCA, for investigation, report and recommendation.[12]

On August 1, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest their willingness to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.[13] All the
respondents manifested that they were submitting the case for decision.

On November 21, 2007, Justice Molina submitted his report and adopted entirely
the recommendations of the Court Administrator.[14]
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator as adopted by the
Investigating Justice, but modify the recommendation in regard to the penalty
imposed upon Judge Perello.

It is the contention of Judge Perello that the prisoners she released were all
convicted under the old law, R.A. No. 6425, and not under the new law, R.A. No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which
imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death regardless of the quantity of
the drug involved.[15] She maintains that the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
given retroactive effect insofar as these prisoners are concerned for the main
reason that it would not be favorable to them. Thus, according to Judge Perello,
the provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as interpreted in the case of People v.
Simon,[16] must be applied to the released prisoners. Citing theSimon case, she
insisted that the maximum imposable penalty for violation of R.A. No. 6425 where
the quantity involved is 750 grams or less is six (6) months only, which was the
reason why she ordered the immediate release of the prisoners because they had
already served two (2) years of imprisonment.

While we agree with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
retroactively applied to the prisoners involved in the cases audited, we, however,
are not impressed with Judge Perellos justification in granting the writs. Such
ratiocination on her part betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on graduation
of penalties. Nowhere in the cited case of Simon does it state that the maximum
penalty shall be six (6) months where the quantity is less than 750
grams. The Simon case clarified the penalty to be imposed vis--visthe quantity of
the drug involved, such that prision correccional shall be imposed if the drug is
below 250 grams; prision mayor if the quantity is from 250 to 499 grams;
andreclusion temporal if the drug is from 500 to 750 grams.[17] The same case
likewise declared that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional.[18]
The penalty of prision correccional is composed of three periods
the minimum which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months,
the medium which is from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months,
and the maximum which ranges from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. As
found by the audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period
of prision correccional in granting the writs for habeas corpus such that when the
prisoners had served imprisonment for a period of two (2) years, she immediately
ordered their release. This is clearly erroneous because the petition for habeas
corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of his
sentence as he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term.[19] The maximum
range of prision correccional is from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. This is
the period which the prisoners must have served before their applications for
writs of habeas corpus may be granted.
In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted
prisoners had only served the minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello
displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on graduation of penalties as well as
settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. As a trial judge,
respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is expected to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. Judges are expected to keep abreast of
developments in law and jurisprudence.[20] He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification
of justice and the Rule of Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it
to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of
the law.[21]Judge Perello must thereby have more than a cursory knowledge of the
law on graduation of penalties and the imposable penalty for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.Indeed, the facts obtaining in this case speak of other
dubious circumstances affecting Judge Perellos integrity and competence too
glaring to ignore.

Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas
corpus even without the pertinent copies of detention and judgment of
conviction.[22] This is contrary to the provisions of Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
 Sec. 3. Requisites of application therefor. Application for the writ shall be by
petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, of
by some person in his behalf, and shall set forth:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be
procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; xxx.

The Rules clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of

detention must accompany the application for the writ of habeas corpus.
Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the guidelines laid down in Section 3(d) of
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure
have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the
wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should
therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of
law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but
judges under the sanction of law.[23] Indeed, Judge Perellos stubborn
unwillingness to act in accordance with the rules and settled jurisprudence shows
her refusal to reform herself and to correct a wrong, tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion.

Be that as it may, however, we agree with the Court Administrator that there is
no merit in the charge of grave misconduct leveled against Judge Perello. For
grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known
legal rules.[24] Here, it appears thatshe was not motivated by any corrupt or
vicious motive. As the Court Administrator puts it:
xxx. Except for the insinuation that there has been connivance among
all court staff in railroading the process of handling these cases, there
was no showing that in releasing the petitioners prematurely,
respondent was motivated by corrupt motives. On the contrary,
respondent vehemently denies this accusation. In her comment, she
stated that she protests with pain that she has always been viewed and
 unjustly condemned as a wrongdoer on an erroneous impression that
she had benefited and had reaped riches for doing her job which she
did with compassion, fairness and justice as the law and jurisprudence
dictates. Indeed, if respondent judge or a court employee should be
disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and derived from direct knowledge. Charges based on mere
suspicion should not be given credence.[25]

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Judge Perello had been previously
charged with and found guilty of committing several administrative infractions,
namely: (1) gross ignorance of the law for which she was suspended for six (6)
months;[26] (2) undue delay in transmitting to the Court of Appeals the records of
a case for which she was finedP20,000.00;[27] (3) dereliction of duty for which she
was fined P5,000.00;[28] (4) conduct unbecoming a judge for which she was
admonished;[29] and most recently (5) grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of
authority, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law
and/or procedure for which she was fined in the amount ofP10,000.00.[30] It is
therefore evident that Judge Perello had a penchant for committing infractions
during her tenure.

In sum, we find Judge Perello liable for ignorance of the law and jurisprudence
and for abuse of discretion. These are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140
of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 11 of the same Rule provides that any of
the following sanctions may be imposed upon Judge Perello:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge,

any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the

benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
 government-owned and controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for

more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The OCA imposed the penalty of suspension for three (3) months on Judge
Perello. In view, however, of Judge Perellos compulsory retirement[31] which
makes suspension impossible to impose, the proper action is to impose a fine on
her in the maximum amount of P40,000.00, deductible from her retirement pay.

With regard to Atty. Bucayons liability, the charges against him all pertained to his
duties as Branch Clerk of Court. It must be noted that during the pendency of this
administrative case against him, Atty. Bucayon had transferred to the Public
Attorneys Office of the Department of Justice on July 26, 2004 and was
accordingly issued a clearance by the OCA. Thus, we accept the OCAs
recommendation to dismiss the charges against him for being moot.

On the liability of Court Stenographers Mangilit, Argame, Eugenio and Laman,

Administrative Circular 24-90[32] imposes upon all court stenographers the duty to
transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts of such notes to the
records of each case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes were
taken. The records reveal that respondent stenographers failed to transcribe the
stenographic notes and attach them to the records of each case. By their own
admission, they did not bother to transcribe the notes as the proceedings were
non-adversarial in nature. We find this explanation unacceptable considering that
the requirement under the Circular applies to all proceedings whether adversarial
or not.
 For their shortcomings in the transcription of the stenographic notes,
respondent stenographers have shown their utter lack of dedication to the
functions of their office. As trial court stenographers, they know, or ought to
know, that they perform an important role in running the machinery of our trial
court system and that transcripts of stenographic notes are vital for the speedy
disposition of cases. Their dereliction of duty which may jeopardize public faith
and confidence in our judicial system should not be countenanced.We, thus, find
respondent stenographers guilty of simple neglect of duty. While said offense
carries a penalty of one month and one day to six months suspension under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[33] we deem it
reasonable and sufficient to instead impose a fine of P5,000.00, as recommended
by the OCA, considering that it was their first offense. While this Court is duty-
bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to
weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper
the harshness of its judgment with mercy.[34]

Finally, as to Court Interpreter Resurreccion, the record would show that he had
been remiss in his duty to prepare the Minutes of the sessions or hearings and
attach them to the records of each case. He cannot escape liability by passing on
the blame to the Branch Clerk of Court whom he claimed refused to put his
remarks on the Minutes. Resurreccions explanation is too flimsy to excuse him
from administrative liability. Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare
and sign all Minutes of the session.[35] After every session they must prepare the
Minutes and attach it. The Minutes is a very important document because it gives
a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a
case. It is in fact a capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for
it states the date and time of the session; the names of the judge, clerk of court,
court stenographer, and court interpreter who were present; the names of the
counsel for the parties who appeared; the party presenting evidence; the names
of witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the date of
the next hearing.[36] Failure to prepare the Minutes and attach them to the
records of a case constitutes simple neglect of duty and warrants disciplinary
action. Accordingly, Resurreccion is hereby fined the same amount of P5,000.00
as recommended by the OCA.

We take this occasion once more to impress upon all respondents that the
conduct of every person connected with the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. A public office is a public trust. Since public officers are accountable
to the people at all times, they must strictly perform their duties and
responsibilities. As the administration of justice is a sacred task, this Court
condemns any omission or act that may diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.[37]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Norma C.

Perello GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion, for which
she is meted a fineof P40,000.00 to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and
Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion are found GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty, for which they are each meted a fine of P5,000.00, and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

For being moot, the charges against Atty. Luis Bucayon II are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

AUREO G. BAYACA, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676

Complainant,

Present:

- versus - PUNO, C.J.,*

QUISUMBING,**
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,***
CORONA,****
JUDGE TRANQUILINO V. CARPIO MORALES,*** and
RAMOS, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:

January 29, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In a complaint-affidavit[1] dated September 6, 2006 filed with the Office of the

Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Aureo G. Bayaca charged respondent
Judge Tranquilino V. Ramos of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Dupax
del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya with gross misconduct, dishonesty, gross ignorance of
the law, arbitrary detention, incompetence, grave abuse of discretion, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

As can be gleaned from the complaint and the subsequent documents submitted by
respondent Judge, the antecedent facts of the case, originally docketed as OCA IPI
No. 07-1874-MTJ, are as follows:
Complainant Bayaca was the accused in a criminal case for arson through reckless
imprudence. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2479 at the MCTC of
Dupax del Norte Dupax del Sur A. Casteneda, Nueva Vizcaya, presided by
respondent Judge. After trial, respondent Judge promulgated his Decision dated
April 2, 2004,[2] finding complainant Bayaca guilty as charged and imposing upon
him the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum
and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum with all
the accessory penalties imposed by law and to pay costs and actual damages in the
amount of P100,000.00.

Aggrieved, complainant appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 37 of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, where it was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 1866.

On November 26, 2004, the RTC came out with its decision[3] affirming with
modification the decision of the MCTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar

finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in arson as defined and penalized under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree
No. 1613. However, the penalty therefor is modified, and instead, the
accused Aureo Bayaca is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Seventy-five
pesos (Php75.00) and to pay the costs. The award of P100,000.00 as
actual damages is hereby deleted. Instead, the accused is directed to pay
the offended parties the total sum of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

Despite the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in the RTC decision,

respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment on Final
Sentence[4] which led to complainants incarceration at the Solano District Jail
from August 8 to 28, 2006.[5]

Hence, the instant complaint[6] alleging that respondent Judge acted without legal
basis in ordering his detention, thus displaying bias, manifest partiality,
incompetence in office, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, dishonesty
and grave abuse of authority and discretion. Complainant added that respondents
conduct was unbecoming and inappropriate for a judge which is greatly prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. He, thus, prayed for the suspension of the
respondent Judge citing, among other reasons, the latters chronic drinking habit.

On October 12, 2006, the OCA, through Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock,
referred to respondent Judge the complaint-affidavit for his comment thereon.[7]

In his Counter-Affidavit dated October 16, 2006,[8] respondent Judge clarified that
his issuance of the warrant of arrest against herein complainant was a mistake done
in good faith. He added that for almost sixteen (16) years it was the practice in
his sala that before acting on a motion it passed through his Clerk of Court who
studied the records to determine whether or not to grant it. If it would be granted,
the Clerk of Court would then request the stenographer to type the order and
thereafter, he would affix his initial for respondent Judges signature. This was the
procedure that they followed in the instant case which was unfortunately the only
instance that they committed a mistake.

While he apologized to complainant Bayaca and his parents, the respondent Judge
maintained that the matter was merely a case of simple negligence. He likewise
submitted copies of the Acknowledgement Receipt dated December 3, 2006[9] to
show that complainant and his spouse had already agreed to amicably settle all the
cases that they had previously filed against respondent Judge subject to their
receipt of the amount of P750,000.00.

On February 26, 2007, the OCA received respondent Judges supplemental

comment dated February 3, 2007[10] wherein he narrated that the civil case for
damages previously filed against him by complainant with the RTC, Branch 30 of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya was already dismissed by virtue of an Order dated
January 3, 2007 granting the joint motion to dismiss filed by the
parties. Respondent Judge further informed the OCA that the criminal complaint
for unlawful arrest and serious illegal detention pending before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor was also dismissed after complainant filed an Affidavit of
Desistance[11] therein. Respondent Judge claimed that the instant case was filed
mainly to harass him when complainant discovered that he had filed for optional
retirement as MCTC Judge. Respondent Judge informed the Court that he has been
suffering from severe asthma and arthritis and had been bedridden and very sickly
as he asked for assistance in facilitating the approval of his retirement benefits.

In its Report dated April 23, 2007,[12] the OCA, through Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock, found respondent Judge guilty of Negligence and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. As explained by the OCA in its report
and recommendation:

Negligence may be defined as the failure to observe such care as a

reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar
circumstances; it is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary
prudence would not have done or failure to do what a person of ordinary
prudence would have done under similar circumstances. It is the conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk of harm; a departure from the conduct
expected of a reasonably prudent person under like
th
circumstances.(Blacks Law Dictionary, 930-931, 5 Ed.) At bottom, it is
a test of foreseeability xxx. Likewise, it may be a ground for
administrative liability of a government official or employee. (Re:
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 117, Pasay
City, A.M. No. 96-5-163-RTC, June 22, 1998). The Bill of Rights which
is the very heart of the fundamental law of the land emphasizes the
indispensability of ones liberty because it is considered as the greatest
among the civil and political rights. Extreme care must be practiced by a
magistrate in signing papers relative to disposition of motions, writs,
decisions, and orders especially warrant of arrest because the liberty and
property of an individual is at stake. The records show that complainant
was detained at Solano District Jail for twenty days from August 8
to August 28, 2006 due to respondent Judges mistake in issuing a
warrant of arrest. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge behind the lame
excuse of relying on his staff or the Clerk of Court because the position
of a judge demands personal efficiency and professional
competence. Indeed such excuse is verily an admission of incompetence.

In the discharge of the functions of his office, a judge must strive

to act in a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and
beyond suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed is
laden with a heavy burden of responsibility. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Estacion, Jr., 181 SCRA 33) Hence, a judge is required
to pore over all documents on which he affixes his signature
notwithstanding his heavy caseload.

Moreover, it bears stressing that respondent Judge made a partial

payment of P250,000.00 to the complainant with a promise to pay
another P500,000.00 to be paid within two months from the date when
the Acknowledgment Receipt of Amicable Settlement was executed. The
act of respondent Judge in giving money in exchange for the withdrawal
of civil, criminal and administrative case filed against him is highly
improper. It is a well-settled rule that administrative case cannot be the
subject of amicable settlement. The filing of administrative complaint
does not depend upon the whims and caprices of complainant and it
cannot be rendered naught by the private concessions of the
parties. Hence, the withdrawal of administrative complaint will not
prevent the court from deciding the case since complainants are, in a real
sense, only witnesses therein.
xxx

Anent the charge of the respondent Judges chronic drinking habit,

the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge should
be free from any impropriety in all activities.However, the same cannot
be given credence on account of lack of evidence substantially proving
the charge.

The instant case of negligently signing papers relative to issuance

of Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence despite the
deletion by the appellate court of that portion of judgment imposing the
penalty of imprisonment is analogous to the case of Marietta A. Padilla
vs. Judge Salvador Silerio ( A.M. No. RTJ-98-1421, May 9, 2000). In the
said case, the Supreme Court imposed a fine of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) for respondent Judges negligence when he signed the Order
approving the spurious cash bond of accused Prieto.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the

consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation that (a) the
instant case be RE-DOCKETED as an administrative matter; and (b)
respondent Judge be found GUILTY of Negligence and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service and (c) respondent Judge
be FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with a WARNING that a
repetition of similar acts should be dealt with severely.
By Resolution dated June 27, 2007,[13] the Court required the parties to manifest
whether they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
pleadings filed.

In a Manifestation dated September 6, 2007[14] and Supplemental Manifestation

dated October 4, 2007,[15] respondent Judge interposed no objection to submit the
case for decision based on the pleadings filed.

Complainant, upon the other hand, did not file any manifestation in compliance
with our resolution.

The foregoing premises considered, this Court finds no reason to disturb the
findings of the OCA.

We have repeatedly ruled in a number of cases[16] that mere desistance or

recantation by the complainant does not necessarily result in the dismissal of an
administrative complaint against any member of the bench. The withdrawal of
complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to
determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of
its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot
depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own,
condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral
act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Courts
interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public
interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the
judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving
the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by
private arrangements between the parties as in the instant case.

Respondent Judge should not be allowed to capitalize on the Acknowledgement

Receipt dated December 3, 2006 showing that complainant and his spouse had
already agreed to amicably settle the cases they previously filed against
him. Apparently, respondent Judge made a partial payment of P250,000.00 to the
complainant with a promise to pay another P500,000.00 within two (2) months
from the date when the said Acknowledgment Receipt was executed. This
deplorable act of respondent Judge in giving money in exchange for the
withdrawal of the cases filed against him by the complainant cannot be
countenanced, being considered by law as an obstruction of justice.[17]

Anent respondent Judges assertion that his optional retirement was effective April
30, 2007, it must be stressed that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an
administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent Judge ceases to hold office
during the pendency of his case. In Perez vs. Abiera[18] and as reiterated in Judge
Rolando G. How vs. Teodora A. Ruiz,[19] this Court ruled:

In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. x x x If only for
reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its
jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its
supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical
to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general
public.If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and
a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.

We hold that respondent Judge was inexcusably negligent when he issued a

Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final Sentence despite the deletion by the
appellate court of that portion of the judgment imposing the penalty of
imprisonment. In the performance of his duties, respondent Judge failed to observe
that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition
of any public service. If only respondent Judge had exercised the requisite
thoroughness and caution, he would have noted not only the modification of the
monetary awards by the appellate court, but also the deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment upon which the Warrant of Arrest and Commitment to Final
Sentence that he signed was based.
Respondent Judge cannot pass on the blame to his Clerk of Court and/or
Stenographer. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his very own court personnel. Certainly, a judge is responsible
not only for the dispensation of justice but also for managing his court efficiently
to ensure the prompt delivery of court services.[20] In the discharge of the functions
of his office, respondent Judge must strive to act in a manner that puts him and his
conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. He must act with extreme care for
his office indeed is laden with a heavy burden of responsibility.[21] Surely, a judge
is enjoined to pore over all documents whereon he is required to affix his signature
and give his official imprimatur.[22] The negligence of respondent Judge in this case
simply cannot be countenanced.

Even as we decline to pass upon the alleged chronic and daily alcoholic
drinking sprees of respondent Judge for lack of credible substantiation, we reiterate
here the exacting standards decreed by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Membership in the judiciary circumscribes ones personal conduct and

imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which is the price
one has to pay for holding such a distinguished position. Accordingly, a magistrate
of the law must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a
whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His
conduct must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation
of the peoples faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in the judiciary
would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct of
judges. [23]
To recapitulate, we find respondent Judges act of issuing an order for the arrest of
herein complainant, despite the deletion by the appellate court of that portion of the
judgment imposing the penalty of imprisonment, an act of inexcusable negligence
and conduct which is prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In a letter dated October 23, 2008, Mrs. Marie Rosalind Ramos Delos Reyes,
daughter of respondent Judge, informed the Office of the Chief Justice of the death
of Judge Tranquilino V. Ramos. Attached to the letter was the Certificate of Death
indicating that respondent Judge died on August 27, 2008, of cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to multiple organ failure and septic shock.

In Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon[24], this Court, citing previous
cases, discussed the different implications and effects of the death of a respondent
while an administrative complaint is still pending with the Court; viz:

In Hermosa vs. Paraiso, the respondent, a branch clerk of court of the

then Court of First Instance of Masbate, was charged with irregularities
while in office. The matter was referred to an Investigating Judge
considering that there were persons mentioned in the complaint who had
to be questioned. The Investigating Judge, in his report of 18 August
1973, recommended that the respondent be exonerated of the charges for
lack of sufficient evidence. On 01 August 1974, while the case was
pending before the Court, the respondent died. The Court, nevertheless,
resolved the case so that the respondent's heirs might not be deprived of
any retirement benefits due to them and ordered the dismissal of the case
for lack of substantial evidence.

In Maozca vs. Judge Domagas, the respondent judge, who was charged
with gross ignorance of the law for having erroneously granted a
demurrer to evidence, died while the case was being evaluated by the
OCA for appropriate action. The Court, on the basis of what appeared on
record, no factual matter being in serious dispute that would require a
formal investigation, resolved to impose a fine of P5,000.00 on the
respondent judge, stressing that he had been previously sanctioned by
the Court for gross ignorance of the law.

In Apiag vs. Judge Cantero, the respondent judge was charged with
gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and
falsification of public documents. The case was referred to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City for investigation, report
and recommendation. An investigation was imperative considering that
factual issues, including the circumstances of the respondent's first
marriage to the complainant, were inextricably involved. Upon receipt of
the report of the Investigating Judge, who recommended that the
respondent judge be suspended for one (1) year without pay, the Court
referred the matter to OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. The OCA, in its memorandum, recommended that the
respondent judge be dismissed from the service. The respondent judge
 died while the case was still being deliberated upon by the Court. The
Court there held

However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he

was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his
first marriage -- children whose filiation he did not deny.
He neglected them and refused to support them until they
came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct,
this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of
his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision,
dismissal of the case is now in order.

While the fine recommended by the OCA could have been imposed on respondent
Judge under the circumstances of this case, the case could be dismissed, in view of
his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED and this case
considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION
EMILIA MARIAS, Complainant, A.M. No. P-07-2304
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -
CARPIO,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and
TERENCIO G. FLORENDO,
Sheriff V, Regional Trial Court (RTC), LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Branch 21, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

February 12, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 In a Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated March 7, 2006, Emilia Marias charged
Terencio G. Florendo, Sheriff V, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, Vigan City,
Ilocos Sur, with neglect of duty relative to the implementation of the writ of
execution issued by the RTC, Branch 21, Vigan City, in Civil Case No. 5238-V
entitled Emilia Marias v. Cesar Zaplan.

Complainant alleged that the decision in Civil Case No. 5238-V was
promulgated on November 18, 2002 and the same became final and executory for
failure of defendant therein to file his appeal. Thus, on May 19, 2003, the RTC
issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff was assigned to implement the
same. Respondent assured complainant that the writ would be implemented and
demanded from her seven thousand pesos (P7,000.00) for sheriffs expenses
which she readily gave to the respondent.Complainant repeatedly followed-up
the execution of the writ of execution. However, respondent failed to implement
the writ for about three (3) years at the time of the filing of her complaint. Hence,
complainant was constrained to file this complaint for neglect of duty against
respondent.

In his 1st Indorsement dated September 20, 2005, Court Administrator Jose P.
Perez referred the matter to Executive Judge Alipio V. Flores of the RTC of Vigan
City, Ilocos Sur for appropriate action.[2]

In a Letter[3] dated October 25, 2005, Judge Flores reported that

complainant failed to appear for a confrontation with respondent despite several
invitations. On December 16, 2005, complainant executed an affidavit explaining
that her failure to appear before Judge Flores was due to the fact that she was
never informed nor notified of the same.[4]

In his comment, respondent denied having solicited, much less,

received P7,000.00 from complainant. He, however, admitted that he
received P1,000.00 from complainant, but only because complainant herself
offered the said amount as, pandagdag gastos man lang . . kasi nakakahiya
na! Respondent claims that he asked the assistance of Sheriff Fernando Austria of
the RTC, Lingayen in conducting surveillance on Cesar Zaplans (defendant in Civil
Case No. 5238-V) residence for two (2) days but the latter found nothing to
report. On November 27, 2003, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Alex R.
Raqueno of the RTC, Vigan, officially endorsed the subject writ of execution for
further proceedings to his counterpart, Clerk of Court Alicia Favia of the RTC,
Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to respondent he transmitted, via postal
money order, theP1,000.00 given to him by complainant to the Office of the Clerk
of Court, Dagupan City, for sheriffs operational expenses. In fine, respondent
contended that the referral of the said writ transferred the task of enforcing the
same to the RTC, Dagupan City.

Respondent belied complainants allegation that the latter made numerous

follow-ups between 2004 and 2005. According to him, aside from the
complainants visit in January 2004, when he informed the latter that he had not
received any feedback from the RTC, Dagupan City, complainant visited his office
only twice. Respondent also disclosed that on October 4, 2005, the parties were
summoned for a conference with Executive Judge Alipio V. Flores, but the
complainant did not show up for the scheduled dialogue.

Finally, respondent claimed that the search for the vehicle of the defendant
in the case proved futile and budgetary constraints prevented a longer stay
in Dagupan City.

In its Memorandum Report[5] dated February 14, 2007, the Office of the Court
Administrator made the following evaluation:

EVALUATION: Respondent was negligent in the performance of his duty as sheriff.

A review of the records of this case reveals that the Writ of Execution was issued on May 19, 2003 and has not
yet been implemented up to this day, more than three (3) years after the date of issuance. It is the duty of the sheriff to
enforce the writ of execution without delay once it is given to him unless restrained. Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides the manner by which the execution is to be implemented as follows:

Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the
court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty days (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to
the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in
full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the
proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties.

Pursuant to the rule, respondent sheriff should report to the court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
writ of execution dated May 19, 2003, the reasons why the judgment obligation has not been satisfied. Moreover, he
should submit reports every thirty (30) days thereafter until such time that the judgment obligation has been fully
satisfied. It does not appear that respondent rendered these reports. Instead, respondent sought to avoid administrative
liability by commissioning the services of Sheriff Viez A. Hortaleza, RTC, Dagupan City, to conduct surveillance on the
judgment defendants assets. Respondent sheriff cannot rely solely on the surveillance he requested to be conducted by
Sheriff Hortaleza as respondent is tasked to personally implement the writ. It is almost trite to say that execution is the
fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for
the prevailing party. Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the writ, but likewise derelict in
his submission of the returns thereon.

Likewise, respondent grievously failed to comply with the requirements of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

With regard to sheriffs expenses in executing writ issued pursuant to court orders or
decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for
each kilometer of travel, guards fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall
pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon
approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk
of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect
the process, subject to liquidation with the same period for rendering a return on the process. THE
LIQUIDATION SHALL BE APPROVED BY THE COURT. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the
party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his
return, and the sheriffs expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.

Despite the plain meaning of the above-quoted procedure, respondent failed to comply therewith. His act of
receiving an amount for expenses to be incurred in the implementation of the writ of execution, without him having
made an estimate thereof and securing prior approval of the court issuing the writ is clearly proscribed by the
rule. Whether the amount was just given to respondent is beside the point, his mere acceptance of the amount without
the prior approval of the court and without him issuing a receipt thereof is clearly a misconduct in office [Danao vs.
Franco, Jr., 440 Phil. 181, 185-186 (2002); Commendador vs. Canabe, 438 Phil. 99, 107 (2002)].

It is clear that under the rule, the sheriff has to estimate the expenses to be incurred and upon the courts
approval of the estimated expenses the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court. These
expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing sheriff subject to his liquidation. Any unspent amount shall be
refunded to the party who made the deposit.

Clearly, in the implementation of a writ of execution, sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary
payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of
the service because even assuming arguendo such payments are indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone
would not dispel the suspicion that such payments are made for less than noble purposes. In short, sheriffs cannot, as in
this case, receive gratuities or voluntary payments from parties they are ordered to assist.

Indeed the assailed conduct of respondent sheriff cannot be countenanced. He has admitted having received
the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) from complainant. The fact that this money was allegedly used for the
implementation of the writ is of no moment. Respondent Sheriff ignored the procedures set forth in the Rules of
Court. The money was not deposited with the Clerk of Court and there was no showing that this amount was subjected to
courts prior approval. He should have waited for the money to be officially disbursed by him if indeed due or required for
expenses. He should not accept money from a party, much less ask for it. The respondents failure to faithfully comply
with the provisions of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court constitutes dereliction of duty and negligence, which warrants the
imposition of disciplinary measures (Andal vs. Tonga, A.M. No. P-02-1581, 28 October 2003, 414 SCRA 524, citing Tiongco
vs. Molina, 416 Phil. 676).
 xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our
recommendations that:

1. The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and

2. That respondent sheriff be SUSPENDED for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay with a warning that
the commission of a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

As recommended, this complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative

matter pursuant to the Resolution dated March 7, 2007. We shall now resolve this
administrative matter on the basis of the pleadings already filed by the parties.

A review of the record at hand shows that respondent did not comply with
the mandate of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, a
sheriff is mandated to execute and make a return on the writ of execution within
the period provided by the Rules. In addition, he must make periodic reports on
partially satisfied or unsatisfied writs in accordance with the above-cited rule, in
order that the court as well as the litigants may be apprised of the proceedings
undertaken in connection therewith.The periodic reporting on the status of the
writs must be done by the sheriff every 30 days regularly and consistently until
they are returned fully satisfied.[6] Here, no evidence was presented to prove that
respondent complied with the requirements mandated by the rule. Respondent
cannot evade liability by claiming that the duty of enforcing the subject writ was
already transferred to the RTC, Dagupan City when the said writ was officially
endorsed by the RTC, Vigan City Branch Clerk of Court Raqueno to Clerk of Court
Favia of the RTC, Dagupan City. As the sheriff assigned to the case, he should
implement the writ personally. Even if the subject writ is to be executed outside
his territorial jurisdiction, respondent can seek the assistance of the sheriff of the
place where the writ of execution shall take place[7] but the responsibility for its
implementation still remains with respondent.

Respondent disregarded Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Under
the said rule, the sheriff and other persons serving processes are authorized to
collect certain amounts from parties while in the performance of their
functions. However, the Rules also require the Sheriff to estimate his expenses in
the execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said
amount to the Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the Sheriff, subject
to liquidation. Any unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing
party. Thus, any amount received by the Sheriff in excess of the lawful fees
allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for
grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.[8]

In this case, the fact that the P1,000.00 was offered to him by complainant
to defray expenses of execution is of no moment. It makes no difference if the
money, in whole or in part, had indeed been spent in the implementation of the
writ. The sheriff may receive only the court-approved sheriffs fees and the
acceptance of any other amount is improper, even if applied for lawful purposes.

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents

of the law, high standards are expected of them. They are duty-bound to know
and to comply with the very basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of
execution.[9]

It is undisputed that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the

execution of judgment. The officer charged with this delicate task is the
sheriff. The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final
judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his
behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. He is
to execute the directives of the court therein strictly in accordance with the letter
thereof and without any deviation therefrom.[10]

Respondent departed from the directive of the court by failing to make

periodic reports on the implementation of the writ and to fully implement the
said writ. He failed to observe the degree of dedication to the duties and
responsibilities required of him as a sheriff. He breached his sworn duty to uphold
the majesty of the law and the integrity of the justice system. The Court cannot
countenance such dereliction of duty, as it erodes the faith and trust of the
citizenry in the judiciary. Thus, following the prevailing jurisprudence for
dereliction of duty, a one-month suspension must be imposed on respondent.[11]

While the recommended penalty of one-month suspension is reasonable,

the same is not practical at this point, considering that his work would be left
unattended by reason of his absence. Furthermore, he may use his suspension as
another excuse to justify his inaction and inefficiency in other matters pending
before his office. Instead of suspension, we impose a fine equivalent to his one-
month salary, so that he can finally implement the subject writs and perform the
other duties of his office.[12]

WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty of neglect of duty, and

a FINE equivalent to his one-month salary is hereby imposed upon him. Likewise,
upon receipt of this Decision, respondent sheriff is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately implement the subject writ. He is warned that the commission of the
same offense or a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. NO. MTJ-09-1733 : February 24, 2009]

MA. THERESA G. WINTERNITZ and RAQUEL L.

GONZALEZ, Complainants, v. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-
TORRES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the criminal cases filed

against complainants Ma. Theresa G. Winternitz and Raquel L.
Gonzalez, which were raffled to the sala of herein respondent, Judge
Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.

Particularly, these criminal cases were Criminal Case No. 84382

entitled, "People v. Ma Theresa Winternitz" for unjust vexation;
Criminal Case No. 84383 entitled, "People v. Raquel Gonzalez" for
grave coercion; and Criminal Case No. 84384 entitled, "People v.
Ma. Theresa Winternitz, Raquel Gonzalez and Remigio Relente" for
grave slander.

According to complainants Winternitz and Gonzalez, the Department

of Justice (DOJ) issued a resolution dated May 14, 2002 which
directed the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City to cause the
withdrawal of the above-mentioned criminal cases against them. On
May 24, 2002, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informations pursuant to the directive of the DOJ. However, the
respondent judge did not immediately act on said motion but
instead set the same for hearing several times. The motion was
finally submitted for its resolution on January 13, 2004. As of
October 21, 2003, the motion remained unresolved despite the
complainants' prayer for resolution. This prompted herein
complainants to file the instant administrative complaint1 against
respondent judge for malfeasance/ misfeasance. Complainants
contended that the delay or inaction of the respondent on the
motion constituted a violation of Article 7, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution and Canon 3, Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

In his 1st Indorsment2 dated November 7, 2003, then Court

Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.3 ordered respondent to file
her comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the same. In her
letter4 dated January 29, 2004, respondent requested a period of
twenty (20) days to collate all pertinent data and to submit a
detailed comment. Respondent's request was granted by the Court
Administrator in his letter5 dated February 12, 2004. Still,
respondent judge failed to file her comment within the extended
period granted to her. In a letter6 dated August 18, 2004, she again
asked for a period of twenty (20) days to submit her comment
which was again favorably acted upon by the Court
Administrator.7Still unable to file her comment, another twenty
(20)-day extension was prayed for by respondent which was
granted by the Court Administrator on January 26, 2005.8

In a Resolution9 dated September 28, 2005, the Court required

respondent judge to explain her repeated failure to comment on the
administrative complaints against her and to file the same within a
period of ten (10) days. In her letter10 dated November 7, 2005,
respondent judge asked for an additional ten (10) days to submit
her comment which the Court granted in the Resolution11 dated
January 16, 2006.

On February 20, 2006, respondent judge finally filed her comment

on the three (3) administrative complaints, including the instant
complaint (A.M. No. MTJ-05-1611) filed against her. The comment
was attached to her Second Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 15, 2006 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1611.12 Respondent judge
explained that she was unable to immediately act on the City
Prosecutor's motion to withdraw informations despite having set the
same for hearing on several occasions particularly on June 10 and
24, 2002, July 24, 2002 and January 13, 2003 because there was
no proof of service of the notice of hearing upon private
complainant and counsel in the aforesaid criminal cases and she
may be accused of partisanship. She also attributed the delay to the
heavy caseload when she assumed office in 2001 and to the lack of
personnel in her sala. She admitted culpability for her failure to
submit her comment on time and asked for consideration from this
Court.

In his Memorandum13 dated October 9, 2006, then Court

Administrator Christopher Lock recommended that the matter be
referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, in a letter dated March 6, 2007, Executive Judge Maria
Cancino-Erum asked to be allowed to inhibit herself from
investigating the case.14 The case then was referred to Vice-
Executive Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali who also requested
permission to inhibit herself.15Consequently, the instant
administrative case was referred to Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals Romeo Barza for investigation, report and
recommendation.16

In his Report and Recommendation17 dated March 4, 2008, Justice

Barza found respondent to have been remiss in her duty to resolve
the motion to withdraw the criminal cases filed against herein
complainants with dispatch. The pertinent findings of Justice Barza
are quoted hereunder:

From the totality of the evidence adduced by the parties, and after a
judicious evaluation and scrutiny thereof, the undersigned has come
up with a finding that the respondent judge is liable for the charges
thrown against her. Respondent judge failed to present convincing
evidence to disprove the accusation that she is negligent in her duty
to resolve the said motion.

Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge
shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods."

The office of a judge exists for one solemn end - to promote the
ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially.
Regrettably, the respondent judge failed in this aspect.

While from the evidence presented by the respondent judge, it is

undisputed that her sala is burdened with a heavy case load from
the time she assumed judgeship in 2001, and that such case load
continues to increase in the following years, yet, these do not
excuse her from performing her judicial functions with dispatch.
Notably, she has failed to develop or adopt a system of court record
management which is expected of her. Proper and efficient court
management is as much the judge's responsibility for he is the one
directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.

Judicial duties extend to keeping track of each case or matter

brought to her sala for disposition. This is one of the purposes for
which monthly reports and semestral physical inventory of cases in
each court are required to be conducted and reported to the Court
Administrator. These reports serve to guide the court in the
progress of cases pending in their sala. To disregard such reports
would render the inventory worthless, or else we doubt the veracity
of the monthly and semestral reports being submitted by the
respondent judge's court. A judge ought to know the cases
submitted to him for decision or resolution and is expected to keep
his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly. As a
judge, she has the bounden duty to maintain proper monitoring of
cases submitted for her decision or resolution.rbl r l l lb r r

Significantly, during the hearing of the instant case, the respondent

judge offered to prove that she filed a request for extension of time
to resolve the cases pending for resolution or decision in her sala in
the year 2001. This claim though was not sufficiently proven in
respondent judge's Offer/Memorandum of Exhibits.

Taking respondent judge's argument that she did not issue an Order
for the 13 January 2003 setting, which purportedly submitted the
Motion to Withdraw Informations (incident) for resolution, the fact
remains - she has been remissed in her duty. Whether or not the
scheduled hearing was postponed for any reason, and whatever
may have transpired therein, judges are mandated to issue an order
therefor. It is well to note that other than respondent judge's
argument that it appears from the record that the private
complainant therein was not duly notified, no satisfactory
explanation was given as to the absence of a formal order from the
court for the 13 January 2003 setting. The Minutes of the session
held on 13 January 2003 is clear that the "incident is not submitted
for resolution."

As aptly argued by the complainants and as can be easily seen from

the records of the case, the private prosecutor had already filed its
Opposition and Comment (to Urgent Motion to Resolve) as early as
4 December 2002. This renders the 10 December 2002 Order
directing the private prosecutor and/or complainant to submit their
written comment moot and academic. Hence, on 13 January 2003,
the respondent judge should have been placed on notice that the
Motion to Withdraw Informations was already ripe for resolution.

Respondent judge's undue inaction cannot be countenanced.

Complainants' case clearly shows that the respondent judge is guilty
of undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
Moreover, the fact of the late resolution of the Motion for Inhibition
and the Motion for Re-raffle clearly manifests respondent judge's
penchant for delaying resolution of matters brought before her.
Record shows that the Motion for Inhibition filed on 29 July 2004,
was only resolved on 30 May 2006, while the matter prayed for in
the Motion for Re-raffle (filed on 2 March 2007) was only resolved
on 22 January 2008, after the complainants filed on 27 December
2007 the Urgent Motion to Effect Motion for Inhibition.

An efficient court management system would have prevented this

from happening, and would not have left a void in the disposition of
the said cases from 13 January 2003 onwards, and consequently, as
admitted by complainants' counsel Atty. Guevara, Jr., this
administrative complaint would not have been filed.

It bears repeating that the public's faith and confidence in the

judicial system depends, to a large extent, on the judicious and
prompt disposition of cases and other matters pending before the
courts. The failure of a judge to decide a case within the
reglementary period constitutes gross dereliction of duty.18

Hence, Justice Barza recommended that respondent judge be fined

in the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00).

We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice but modify

the recommendation in regard to the penalty.

We find unmeritorious respondent judge's excuse that the reason

for her delay in resolving the motion to withdraw is the lack of
notice of hearing upon the parties. Firstly, she should have realized
that almost one (1) year had already elapsed from the time of filing
of the motion to withdraw on May 24, 2002 up to its submission for
resolution on January 13, 2003. Secondly, she is duty-bound to
comply with Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
providing that a judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly
and decide cases within the prescribed periods. This Canon is in
consonance with the Constitutional mandate that all lower courts
decide or resolve cases or matters within three (3) months from
their date of submission. Accordingly, Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 provide as follows:
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without
delay.

Rule 3.05. A judge should dispose of the court's business promptly

and decide cases within the required periods.

In line with the foregoing, the Court has laid down administrative
guidelines to ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of
judicial business are complied with. Thus, SC Administrative Circular
No. 13-87 states, in pertinent part:

3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by

Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all
cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months
from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other
lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. x x x.

Furthermore, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 dated January 26,

1988 states:

6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all

motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. x x x

Judge Torres failed to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations

within three (3) months from the time it was submitted for
resolution on January 13, 2003. This Court cannot countenance
such undue inaction on the part of respondent judge, especially now
when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate,
the problems of congestion and delay long plaguing our courts. The
requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is
designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, for
obviously, justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition
of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.19

The Court also takes note of the fact that respondent judge
submitted her comment on the instant complaint only after more
than two (2) years from the time the OCA required her to do so. Her
prolonged and repeated refusal to comply with the simple directives
of the OCA to file her comment constitutes a clear and willful
disrespect for lawful orders of the OCA. It bears stress that it is
through the OCA that the Supreme Court exercises supervision over
all lower courts and personnel thereof. At the core of a judge's
esteemed position is obedience to the dictates of the law and
justice. A judge must be the first to exhibit respect for
authority.20 Judge Torres failed in this aspect when she repeatedly
ignored the directives of the OCA to file her comment.

We hold that respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering

a decision or order. Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
classified as a less serious charge punishable by suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but
not exceedingP20,000.00.21

It is worth mentioning that Judge Torres had been twice found

guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision or order in A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1611 entitled, "Del Mundo v. Gutierrez-Torres"22 and in A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1653 entitled, "Gonzalez v. Torres."23 She was
finedP20,000.00 in both cases with the warning that a repetition of
the same will be dealt with more severely. Considering that this is
her third infraction of the same nature, Judge Torres deserves a
more severe sanction than the fine of P11,000.00 recommended by
the Investigating Justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Torres is hereby SUSPENDED

from office without salary and other benefits for one (1) month,
with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same act shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.