THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000]

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA
MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners, vs. HONORATA
MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. J lexj
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of
ownership or possession of the property for which such
taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, they may become the basis of a
claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession
in the concept of owner -- public, adverse, peaceful and
uninterrupted -- may be converted to ownership. On the
other hand, mere possession and occupation of land cannot
ripen into ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March
19, 1999 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The assailed

Decision disposed as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial
court appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring x x x Honorata Mendoza
Bolante the rightful owner and possessor of the
parcel of land which is the subject of this
appeal." Lexj uris
The Facts
The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal, having an
area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 26-0027.
The undisputed antecedents of this case are narrated by the
Court of Appeals as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
"The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land
was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of
[respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado.
Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the
daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis
of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name
of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was
cancelled and subsequently declared in the
name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and
Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the
present occupant of the land. Earlier, on
October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel
Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners],
during the cadastral survey had a dispute on
[the] ownership of the land. Juri smis
"During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the
following facts:
1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in
the name of Margarito Mendoza.
2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject
of instant case.
3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza
while the [respondent] is the only daughter of
Sinforoso Mendoza.
'4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were]
brothers, now deceased.
5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15,
1979 there was already a dispute between
Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza,
brother of [petitioners].
6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner
and possessor of the land subject
of the case.
"After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of
[petitioners], the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered for the
[petitioners] and against the
[respondent]:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad,
Binangonan, Rizal covered by tax declaration
no. 26-0027 in the name of Margarito Mendoza
belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] herein;
2. Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject of
the case and deliver possession thereof to the
heirs of Margarito Mendoza. Jjj uris
3. Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the [petitioners] in
the sum of P10,000.00, as actual damages.
4. Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the
genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit allegedly
signed by the respondent and her mother had not been
sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else
who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not
presented. No expert testimony or competent witness ever
attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to
overcome the denial of respondent and her mother. The
former testified that the latter, never having attended school,
could neither read nor write. Respondent also said that she
had never been called "Leonor," which was how she was
referred to in the affidavit.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of
petitioners tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison
with respondents proof of ownership of the disputed parcel.
Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by
respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under
Article 538 of the Civil Code. lex
Hence, this Petition.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Issues
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed
land, the petitioners allege that the CA committed these
reversible errors:[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
"1. xxx [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to
the general rule that an affidavit is classified as
hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed
on the witness stand; and Jksm
"2. xxx [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and
physical possession, coupled with xxx
exclusive and continuous possession of the
land since 1985, which are evidence of the
best kind of circumstance proving the claim of
the title of ownership and enjoys the
presumption of preferred possessor."
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Affidavit
Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not
the best evidence of their father's ownership of the disputed
land, because the "affiant was not placed on the witness
stand." They contend that it was unnecessary to present a
witness to establish the authenticity of the affidavit because
it was a declaration against respondent's interest and was an
ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it was
an exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and
trustworthy document, it was admissible in evidence. And
because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-
authenticating ancient document. Chief
We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's
ruling:[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
"While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed
before a notary public, the general rule is that
affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence,
unless affiants are placed on the witness stand
(People's Bank and Trust Company vs.
Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not
considered the best evidence, if affiants are
available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of
Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution
of the affidavit was not sufficiently established.
The notary public or others who saw that the
document was signed or at least [could]
confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There
was no expert testimony or competent witness
who attested to the genuineness of the
questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent]
denied the genuineness of her signature and
that of her mother xxx. [Respondent] testified
that her mother was an illiterate and as far as
she knew her mother could not write because
she had not attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her
testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales
Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's]
mother was illiterate."
The petitioners allegations are untenable. Before a private
document offered as authentic can be received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved first.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] And before a document is admitted as an

exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute,

the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane
or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact
cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the
declaration was made, he was aware that the same was
contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render
improbable the existence of any motive to falsify.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]Esmsc

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the

respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the
signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against
interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to
testify as a witness.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] Such declarant should
be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior
inconsistent statement.
The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document
either. An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30
years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] It must on its face appear to be
genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain
how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have
been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the
witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any
formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its
authenticity.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically
become a public document just because it contains a
notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not
state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred
from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an
affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Second Issue: Preference of PossessionEsmmis
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred
possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code because she
was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous
possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this
ruling. They contend that she came into possession through
force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the
petitioners did not lose legal possession because
possession cannot be acquired through force or violence.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] To all intents and purposes, a possessor,

even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal

possessor.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Indeed, anyone who can prove
prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover
such possession.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over
that of the respondent. Possession by the former before
1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before
1985. The records show that the petitioners father and
brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. Es-mso
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated
by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother
of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 26425.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] When Sinforoso died
in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated
it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her
mother continued residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes
for the years 1932-1948.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Margarito declared
the lot for taxation in his name in 1953[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] and
paid its realty taxes beginning 1952.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] When
he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by
the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the
land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he
was physically ousted by the respondent.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the
preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax
declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in
possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952. Ms-
esm
Third Issue: Possession of Better Right
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual
and physical coupled with the exclusive and continuous
possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985" proved
her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent argues
that she was legally presumed to possess the subject land
with a just title since she possessed it in the concept of
owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be
obliged to show or prove such title.
The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption
in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it
prevails until the contrary is proven.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] That is,
one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this
provision, be restored thereto by the means established by
law.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Article 538 settles only the question of
possession, and possession is different from ownership.
Ownership in this case should be established in one of the
ways provided by law. E-xsm
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who
between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.[if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif]

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary

prescription through possession for ten years.[if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif] Being the sole heir of her father, respondent

showed through his tax receipt that she had been in

possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932.
When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there
with her mother. When she got married, she and her
husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their
livelihood.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when
the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her
possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public,
peaceful, and uninterrupted[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] -- had already
ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her
father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the
disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]Ky-le
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of
farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is
settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
occupation.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] Unless coupled with the element
of hostility toward the true owner,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] occupation
and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or
adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim
that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Although their father and brother arguably acquired
ownership through extraordinary prescription because of
their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985),[if
!supportFootnotes][29][endif] this supposed ownership cannot extend to the

entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that

they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their
ownership of the disputed land was established before the
trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts
issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents
prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title
thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against
the state and other interested parties.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]Ky-calr
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession
of the property for which taxes have been paid.[if
!supportFootnotes][32][endif] In the absence of actual public and adverse

possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does

not prove ownership.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] In sum, the petitioners'
claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

RUBEN S. SIA, G.R. No. 152921

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ERLINDA M. VILLANUEVA,
Respondent. October 9, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari assailing the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of
the Court of Appeals dated January 7, 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63642.

The instant controversy is an offshoot of this Courts

Decision dated April 12, 2000 in Villanueva v.
Malaya,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] which became final and
executory on October 16, 2000. Its factual antecedents,
as drawn from the ponencia of Justice Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes, are as follows:

Don Macario Mariano died on November 2, 1971. He

left behind several real properties, including a parcel of
land consisting of 2,154 square meters located in Naga
City. Constructed thereon were an ancestral house and a
commercial building.

After Macarios demise, his surviving spouse, Irene,

entered into a joint venture with Francisco Bautista for
the development of a memorial park. The joint venture
failed. Hence, Irene filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 22, Naga City, a complaint for rescission
of contract against Francisco, docketed as Civil Case
No. R-570. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision
ordering the rescission of the contract. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the RTC Decision was affirmed with
modification in the sense that Irene was also ordered to
reimburse Francisco the sum of P395,639.84 for
development costs and P155,553.81 for cash advances
to the Sto. Nio Memorial Park, Inc., with 12% interest
from the date of the judgment until fully paid.

For Irenes failure to comply with her obligation, the trial

court issued a writ of execution. On November 24,
1986, the 2,154 square meter lot, including the house
and building constructed thereon, was levied on
execution.

It appears that as early as April 15, 1975, Irene sold the

lot to one Raul Santos, as shown by a Deed of Sale of
the same date. Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 7261 in the name of Irene was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 17745 was issued in the name of Raul
Santos.

On June 26, 1988, Irene passed away.

On July 18, 1988, Jose and Erlinda, the legally adopted

children of Macario and Irene, filed with the RTC,
Branch 21, Naga City, a complaint for annulment of the
deed of sale executed by and between Irene and Raul
Santos, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-1506.

Going back to Civil Case No. R-570 for rescission of

contract filed by Irene against Francisco, the subject lot
was sold by the sheriff in public auction to Ruben Sia,
herein petitioner, being the highest bidder. On
December 12, 1988, the sheriff issued to him a
Provisional Deed of Sale.

Erlinda tried to redeem the property, but Ruben refused

to accept her payment. So Erlinda, through her lawyer,
consigned the redemption price to the trial court. Later,
she sold the lot and its improvements to the lessees and
both parties agreed that the sale shall be effective after
she has redeemed the said lot and its improvements
from Ruben.

Meanwhile, on December 2, 1989, Jose died leaving his

adoptive sister Erlinda as the sole surviving heir of
Macario and Irene.

On December 11, 1989, the sheriff issued a Final Deed

of Sale of the lot in Rubens favor. The following day,
Ruben filed an Ex-Parte Motion for cancellation of TCT
No. 17745 in the name of Raul Santos and the issuance,
in lieu thereof, of a title in his name. On December 14,
1989, the trial court issued an Order canceling TCT No.
17745 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Naga City
to issue a new TCT in Rubens name. Pursuant to this
Order, TCT No. 20201 was registered in his name.

On December 11, 1989, Erlinda filed a

"Manifestation for Perfection of Consignation" in Civil
Case No. R-570. The following day, she also filed with
the RTC, Branch 24, Camarines Sur, a petition for
mandamus, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. MC 89-1945,
praying that the sheriff and Ruben be ordered to accept
her proferred redemption money.

On December 14, 1989, the trial court treated

Erlindas "Manifestation for Perfection of Consignation"
as a motion for consignation, but denied the same on the
ground that a Final Deed of Sale had already been
signed by the sheriff in favor of Ruben. Erlinda then
moved for the cancellation of the Final Deed of Sale. In
two separate Orders, both dated December 18, 1989, the
trial court denied her motion, declaring that the
cancellation of the Final Deed of Sale is a matter that
should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
Likewise, the trial court denied her motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated December 18, 1989.

Erlinda then filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order.

On August 13, 1990, the Court of Appeals

rendered a Decision dismissing her petition, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is

 hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
correspondingly, the preliminary injunction issued
on January 23, 1990 is hereby lifted and dissolved.

Private respondent Sia is hereby declared

the rightful and registered owner of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20201
of the Register of Deeds of Naga City and is
hereby entitled to the immediate possession
thereof. Without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Erlinda filed a motion for reconsideration, but it

was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated September 13, 1990.
Erlinda filed with this Court two separate
petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281,
respectively, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 13, 1990.
In G.R. No. 94617, Erlinda and the lessees of the
commercial building assailed the Decision of the Court
of Appeals for upholding the writ of possession issued
by the trial court in Rubens favor. The lessees claimed
that the writ is void as against them for it was issued in
an ejectment case in which they were not impleaded.
 In G.R. No. 95281, Erlinda submitted that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that she has no right
to redeem the subject lot from Ruben Sia; and in
authorizing him to take immediate possession of the lot
in controversy.
On February 18, 1991, G.R. Nos. 94617 and
95281 were consolidated considering that they arose
from the same Decision of the Court of Appeals and that
there is no material inconsistency between the issues
raised therein by the parties.
On April 12, 2000, this Court, through Justice
Minerva P, Gonzaga-Reyes, rendered a Decision in G.R.
Nos. 94617 and 95281, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 19533 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, a new
one entered ORDERING the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur
to accept payment of redemption money for the property levied in
Civil Case No. R-570 from petitioner Erlinda Mariano, computed
as of November 22, 1989, and upon receipt thereof, to execute and
deliver to Erlinda Mariano a duly accomplished certificate of
redemption of said property. The Definite Deed of Sale issued in
favor of private respondent Ruben Sia and the alias writ of
execution issued pursuant to the Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22 of Camarines Sur dated August 28, 1990 are
NULLIFIED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

As earlier stated, on October 16, 2000, this Courts

Decision in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281 became final
and executory. Erlinda then filed with the trial court a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
 On February 28, 2001, the trial court issued an
Order granting the writ prayed for, thus:
It appearing that a Decision, dated April 12, 2000, has been
rendered by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 94617, entitled Erlinda
M. Villanueva v. Hon. Angel Malaya, et al., and G.R. No. 95281,
entitled Erlinda M. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, which decision
has become final and executory on October 16, 2000, as provided
in the Entry of Judgment, issued by said Court, the Motion for
Issuance of Execution, dated February 5, 2001, by Atty. Manuel
M. Rosales, as substantiated by the Compliance dated February 26,
2001 and after consideration of the pleadings filed by Ruben S.
Sia, is GRANTED.
Let the corresponding writ of execution issue for the strict
execution of the Decision dated April 12, 2000, rendered by the
Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281.
SO ORDERED.

Ruben then filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Order dated
February 28, 2001 of the trial court directing the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of Erlinda. On
January 7, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision dismissing his petition.
Ruben filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
Court of Appeals denied it in a Resolution dated April 9,
2002.
Hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing Rubens petition for
certiorari.
 Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
failed to pass upon the sole issue being raised before it,
i.e., whether Erlindas right to redeem pertains to the
entire lot or only to a portion of it.
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that
petitioner pursued the wrong remedy. A special civil
action for certiorari may be availed of only if the lower
court or tribunal acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] In Angara
v. Fedman Development Corporation,[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
we explained that:
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of
jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a
tribunal, board, or officer, is not authorized and invalid with
respect to the particular proceeding because the conditions which
alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it
are wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal
power, right, or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular
matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. Grave abuse
of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words,
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

In the early case of Philippine Trust Co. v.

Santamaria,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] we ruled that after a
final judgment has been rendered by the Supreme Court,
or even by a trial court for that matter, it is the duty of
the court to enforce the judgment according to its terms.
In other words, where the judgment of an appellate court
has become final and executory and is returned to the
lower court, the only function of the latter is the
ministerial act of carrying out the decision and issuing
the writ of execution. The Philippine Trust doctrine has
been reaffirmed in Buenaventura v. Garcia and
Garcia,[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Luna v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] and Tropical
Homes, Inc. v. Fortun.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
In this case, the trial court did not act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the order of execution in
G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281. It was merely performing
its ministerial duty. It could not do otherwise
considering that its Decision has become final and
executory.
We note that the dispositive portion of the
Decision in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281 does not state
that Erlindas right to redeem was limited only to a
portion of the subject lot. If petitioner indeed felt that
the dispositive portion is so vague as to leave doubt on
how it shall be executed, then his proper remedy is not
to file a petition for certiorari, but a motion for
clarification. This is a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the contemplation of the law. Verily, his
resort to certiorari under Rule 65 is misplaced.
More than three decades have passed since this
legal wrangling began. It is time to write finis to this
case. In our Decision in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281, we
directed the provincial sheriff of Camarines Sur to
accept the payment of redemption money for the
property levied in Civil Case No. R-570 from petitioner
Erlinda Mariano. What is the area of the property
levied? Resort to the record shows that what was levied
upon in Civil Case No. R-570 consists of a 2,154 square
meter prime land and the ancestral house and
commercial building standing thereon. Clearly, Erlindas
right of redemption in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281
applies to the said "2,154 square meter prime land and
the ancestral house and commercial building standing
thereon. No more, no less.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals dated January 7, 2002 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63642 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996]
ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS,
respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO,J.:
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where
the way is shortest and will cause least prejudice shall be
chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not concur in
a single tenement, the way where damage will be least shall
be used even if not the shortest route.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] This is
so because least prejudice prevails over shortest distance.
This means that the court is not bound to establish what is
the shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid
injury to the servient estate, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round
about way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner,
such as when the shortest distance would place the way on
a dangerous decline.
Thus we conclude from the succeeding facts: Petitioner
Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero,
Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of
property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to
subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they
did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and
Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia,
located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-
B- 1. It is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero
designated as Lot. No. 1448-B-2. Adjoining Soteros property
on the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally
owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were
later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located directly
behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their
brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the
latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-
6-A and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters.
Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacias Lot No.
1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the property of
Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A
from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was
then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda,
when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was
hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But
Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the
assurance that she would give her a right of way on her
adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she
bought using as her passageway to the public highway a
portion of Anastacia s property. But when Yolanda finally
offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused
to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by
Anastacia from passing through her property.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio
Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the
property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et
amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19)
meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of
Sotero, and Anastacias perimeter fence. The store is made
of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot
measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long.
Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not
adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot
be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the
path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and
the facade of the store to reach the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the
proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia s
property. An ocular inspection upon instruction of the
presiding judge was conducted by the branch clerk of court.
The report was that the proposed right of way was at the
extreme right of Anastacias property facing the public
highway, starting from the back of Soteros sari-sari store and
extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and
turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store of
Sotero in order to reach the municipal road[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
and the way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree
standing in the middle.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
But on 5 September 1991 the trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right
of way through Soteros property was a straight path and to
allow a detour by cutting through Anastacias property would
no longer make the path straight. Hence the trial court
concluded that it was more practical to extend the existing
pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the
store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the
public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned
than passing through Anastacias property.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court and held that she was entitled to a
right of way on petitioners property and that the way
proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and
detriment to the servient estate.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] The appellate
court however did not award damages to private respondent
as petitioner did not act in bad faith in resisting the claim.
Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent
Court of Appeals: (a) in disregarding the agreement of the
parties; (b) in considering petitioners property as a servient
estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the
property of private respondent; and, (c) in holding that the
one-meter by five-meter passage way proposed by private
respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest distance
to the public road.
Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private
respondent a right of way. She claims that her agreement
with private respondent was to provide the latter with a right
of way on the other lot of Antonio Quimen under her
administration when it was not yet sold to private
respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through the
property of Yolandas parents is more accessible to the
public road than to make a detour to her property and cut
down the avocado tree standing thereon.
Petitioner further argues that when Yolanda purchased Lot
No. 1448-B-6-B in 1986 the easement of right of way she
provided her (petitioner) was ipso jure extinguished as a
result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the
servient estates in one person so that there was no longer
any compelling reason to provide private respondent with a
right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for
the purpose. Petitioner strongly maintains that the proposed
right of way is not the shortest access to the public road
because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to
suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of
P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado
tree, and considering that an avocado has an average life
span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial
earning from it.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of
respondent appellate court granting a right of way to private
respondent through petitioners property. In fact, as between
petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their
agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it
concerns the determination of the principal issue herein
presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private
respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court
is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or
an easement by necessity constituted by law.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property,
corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] It is jus in re
aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless
extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in
particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by
law[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] to a person or class of persons to pass
over anothers property when his tenement is surrounded by
realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the
public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can
demand a right of way through the servient estate provided
he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his
property.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement
of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the
dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at
a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent
Yolanda for a right of way[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] readily shows that
[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff
was reluctant to purchase the same for they are enclosed with
permanent improvements like a concrete fence and store and have
(sic) no egress leading to the road but because of the assurance of
the defendant that plaintiff will be provided one (1) meter wide and
five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per square
meter to be taken from Anastacias lot at the side of a concrete store
until plaintiff reach(es) her fathers land, plaintiff was induced to
buy the aforesaid parcels of land x x x. That the aforesaid right of
way is the shortest, most convenient and the least onerous leading
to the road and being used by the plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest
from the very inception x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private
respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons
including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00
per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her
and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the
servient estate.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] These facts are confirmed in
the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that
the trial court itself declared that [t]he said properties of
Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda
Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public
highway and there appears an imperative need for an
easement of right of way to the public highway.[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]

Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously

concluded that the right of way proposed by private
respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot
agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that
the easement of right of way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is
a matter ofjudicial appreciation. While shortest distance may
ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when
there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest
distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may
be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to
pass through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as
elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the
least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] This is the test.
In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted -
Q. You testified during your direct examination about this plan,
kindly go over this and please point to us in what portion of this
plan is the house or store of the father of the (plaintiff)?
A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located near the
proposed right of way).
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you will agree with me x x x that this portion is the front
portion of the lot owned by the father of the plaintiff and which
was (sic) occupied by a store made up of strong materials?
A. It is not true, sir.
Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the plaintiff
made of?
A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of the lot in
question, what right of way does (sic) he use in reaching the
public road, kindly point to this sketch that he is (sic) using in
reaching the public road?
A. In my property, sir.
Q. Now you will agree with me x x x the main reason why your
brother is (sic) using this property is because there was a store
located near this portion?
A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no other
way than this, sir.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
The trial court found that Yolandas property was situated at
the back of her fathers property and held that there existed
an available space of about nineteen (19) meters long which
could conveniently serve as a right of way between the
boundary line and the house of Yolanda s father; that the
vacant space ended at the left back of Soteros store which
was made of strong materials; that this explained why
Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut
an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to
serve as her right of way to the public highway. But
notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court
concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not
entitled to a right of way on petitioners property since a
detour through it would not make the line straight and would
not be the route shortest to the public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court
of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of
Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters
long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause
the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of Yolanda s father
which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of
strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings and
conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or
are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts
them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store
of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway,
and another right of way which although longer will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not the main
function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence
presented all over again where the petition would
necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence
considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other, and the probabilities of the situation.[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] In sum, this Court finds that the decision of

respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law

and the evidence.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been
committed by respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is
DENIED and the decision subject of review is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127549. January 28, 1998]
SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA
and FLORCERFIDA STA. MARIA,
 petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and
SPOUSES ARSENIO and ROSLYNN
FAJARDO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of 18 December 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48473, which affirmed
with modification the 30 June 1994 Decision[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 77-M-92 granting the private respondents a right of
way through the property of the petitioners.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the
registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124 of the
Obando Cadastre, containing an area of 1,043 square
meters, located at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, and covered by
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-147729 (M) of the
Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan (Exhibit B, p.
153 Orig. Rec.). They acquired said lot under a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated February 6, 1992 executed by the
vendors Pedro M. Sanchez, et al. (Annex A, Complaint; pp.
7-8 ibid.).
Plaintiffs aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1 (Psd
45412), a fishpond (Exh. C-5; p. 154, ibid.), on the northeast
portion thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the
southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b (both
Psd-297786) owned respectively by Spouses Cesar and
Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria (Exhs. C-2 and
C-3, ibid.), on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the
Jacinto family, on the northwest.
On February 17, 1992, plaintiff spouses Fajardo filed a
complaint against defendants Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria
or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an
easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot
124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other persons,
including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs have
no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a
right of way passing through either of the alternative
defendants properties which are directly abutting the
provincial road would be plaintiffs only convenient, direct and
shortest access to and from the provincial road; that plaintiffs
predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the
properties of defendants in going to and from their lot; that
defendants mother even promised plaintiffs predecessors-in-
interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she
acknowledged the absence of an access from their property
to the road; and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs
request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the
barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus,
plaintiffs prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots
of defendants be established in their favor. They also prayed
for damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Defendants, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to
dismiss (pp. 41-45, ibid.) on the ground that the lower court
has no jurisdiction to hear the case since plaintiffs failed to
refer the matter to the barangay lupon in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 1508. The lower court, however, in
its Order dated May 18, 1992, denied said motion on the
premise that there was substantial compliance with the law.
On May 25, 1992, defendants filed a Notice of Appeal to the
Supreme Court of the questioned order of the lower court
denying their motion to dismiss, under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court (p. 54, ibid.). On June 24, 1992, the lower court
denied the notice of appeal for lack of merit (p. 86, ibid.).
In the meantime, defendants filed a petition for review on
certiorari of the lower courts Order dated May 18, 1992 (pp.
64-84, ibid.). In an Order dated July 8, 1992, the Third
Division of the Supreme Court denied said petition for failure
to comply with Revised Circular Nos. 1-88 and Circular No.
28-01 (p. 97, ibid.). Defendants motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied with finality on July 20, 1992 (p. 96,
ibid.).
Consequently, defendants filed their answer to the court
below where they alleged that the granting of an easement
in favor of plaintiffs would cause them great damage and
inconvenience; and that there is another access route from
plaintiffs lot to the main road through the property of
Florentino Cruz which was likewise abutting the provincial
road and was being offered for sale. By way of counterclaim,
defendants prayed for damages and attorneys fees.
The parties not having settled their dispute during the pre-
trial (p.120, Orig. Record), the court directed that an ocular
inspection be conducted of the subject property, designating
the branch clerk of court as its commissioner. In time, an
Ocular Inspection Report dated December 3, 1992 (Exhs. J
and J-1) was submitted. After trial on the merits, the lower
court rendered the assailed decision granting plaintiffs
prayer for an easement of right of way on defendants
properties.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
The trial court found that based on the Ocular Inspection
Report there was no other way through which the private
respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach
the provincial road except by traversing directly the property
of the petitioners. It further found that (a) no significant
structure, save for a wall or fence about three feet high,
would be adversely affected; (b) there was sufficient vacant
space of approximately 11 meters between petitioners
houses; and (c) petitioners property could provide the
shortest route from the provincial road to the private
respondents property. Consequently, the trial court granted
the easement prayed for by the private respondents in a
decision dated 30 June 1994,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] whose decretal
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Court orders that a
right-of-way be constructed on the defendants property
covered by TCT No. 0-6244 of about 75 sq. meters, 25 sq.
meters shall be taken from the lot of Florcerfida Sta. Maria
and 50 sq. meters from the property of Cesar Sta. Maria to
be established along lines 1-2 of lot 6-c and along lines 3-4
of lot 6-b and to indemnify the owners thereof in the total
amount of P3, 750.00 (P1, 250.00 goes to Florcerfida Sta.
Maria and P2,500.00 to Cesar Sta. Maria) and to reconstruct
the fence to be destroyed in the manner it was at the time of
the filing of this action.
The petitioners seasonably appealed from the
aforementioned decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 48473.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the
private respondents had sufficiently established the
existence of the four requisites for compulsory easement of
right of way on petitioners property, to wit: (1) private
respondents property was, as revealed by the Ocular
Inspection Report, surrounded by other immovables owned
by different individuals and was without an adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) the isolation of private respondents
property was not due to their own acts, as it was already
surrounded by other immovables when they purchased it; (3)
petitioners property would provide the shortest way from
private respondents property to the provincial road, and this
way would cause the least prejudice because no significant
structure would be injured thereby; and (4) the private
respondents were willing to pay the corresponding damages
provided for by law if the right of way would be granted.
Accordingly, in its decision[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] of 18
December 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts decision, but modified the property valuation by
increasing it from P50 to P2,000 per square meter.
 The petitioners forthwith filed this petition for review on
certiorari based on the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF
RIGHT OF WAY CAN BE ESTABLISHED IN THE
LIGHT OF THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THE HON.
SUPREME COURT IN COSTABELLA CORPORATION
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 193 SCRA 333, 341 WHICH
HELD THAT [FOR] THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO SHOW THAT THE ISOLATION OF
THEIR PROPERTY WAS NOT DUE TO THEIR
PERSONAL OR THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-
INTERESTS OWN ACTS, THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPULSORY RIGHT OF WAY
CAN BE GRANTED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
WHO HAVE TWO OTHER EXISTING PASSAGE WAYS
OTHER THAN THAT OF PETITIONERS AND AN
ALTERNATIVE VACANT LOT FRONTING THE
PROVINCIAL ROAD ALSO ADJACENT TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS PROPERTY, WHICH CAN BE USED
IN GOING TO AND FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PROPERTY.
III.
RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN MAKING A PORTION OF ITS STATEMENT
OF FACTS FROM ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
AND NOT FROM THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
IV.
RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAVE NO ADEQUATE OUTLET TO A PUBLIC
HIGHWAY WHICH INFERENCE DRAWN FROM
FACTS WAS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN.[if
 !supportFootnotes][6][endif]

The first, second, and fourth assigned errors involve

questions of fact. Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of
this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are
conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
A perusal of the pleadings and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals, as well as of the decision of the trial
court, yields no ground for the application of any of the
foregoing exceptions. All told, the findings of fact of both
courts satisfied the following requirements for an estate to be
entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the
Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway
(Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
 dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]

As to such requisites, the Court of Appeals made the

following disquisitions:
Anent the first requisite, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs-
appellees property is surrounded by other immovables
owned by different individuals. The ocular inspection report
submitted to the lower court reveals that:
The property of the plaintiffs, spouses Arsenio and Roslynn
Fajardo, is completely surrounded with adobe fence without
any point of egress and ingress to the national road. Said
plaintiffs property containing an area of 1,043 square meters
and covered by OCT No. 0-6244 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan was situated directly behind defendants property
which abuts the national road. Defendants, spouses Cesar
and Racquel Sta. Maria, are the absolute owners of the
parcel of land with an area of 537 square meters and
embraced under TCT No. T-37.763(M) situated on the left
side abutting the national road with their house thereon
made of wood and hollow blocks, while defendant
Florcerfida Sta. Maria is the absolute owner of a parcel of
land with a similar area of 537 square meters and covered
by TCT No. T-37.762(M) situated on the right side and
likewise abutting the national road with an impressive house
thereon of modern vintage made of strong materials. As
depicted in the rough sketch hereto attached, plaintiffs have
absolutely no means of ingress and egress to their property
as the same is completely isolated by properties owned by
other persons. On the left side is the property of Florentino
Cruz, on the right side is the property reportedly owned by
the Jacintos; and on the front portion are properties owned
by defendants. x x x
(Ocular Inspection Report, p. 135, Orig. Rec.)
Plaintiffs-appellees property is likewise without adequate
outlet to a public highway. The existing passage way for
people (daang tao) at the back of plaintiffs-appellees
property leading to the provincial road (TSN, May 17, 1993,
p. 12) cannot be considered an adequate outlet for purposes
of establishing an easement. Article 651 of the Code
provides that (t)he width of the easement of right of way shall
be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant
estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.
Thus in the case of Larracas vs. Del Rio (37 Official Gazette
287), this Court had occasion to rule that it is not necessary
for a person, like his neighbors, to content himself with a
footpath and deny himself the use of an automobile. So in an
age when motor cars are a vital necessity, the dominant
proprietor has a right to demand a driveway for his
automobile, and not a mere lane or pathway (Cited in
Tolentino, ibid., p. 391).
The second requisite for the establishment of an easement
of right way, i.e., payment of indemnity, is likewise present in
this case. Plaintiff-appellee spouse Roslynn Fajardo testified
on direct examination that they are willing to pay the
corresponding damages provided for by law if granted the
right of way (TSN, November 5, 1992, p. 11).
The third requisite is that the isolation of plaintiffs-appellees
property should not have been due to their own acts. In the
case under consideration, the isolation of their lot is not due
to plaintiffs acts. The property they purchased was already
surrounded by other immovables leaving them no adequate
ingress or egress to a public highway.
Going now to the fourth requisite of least prejudice and
shortest distance, We agree with the lower court that this
twin elements have been complied with in establishing the
easement of right of way on defendants-appellants
properties.
It has been commented upon that where there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the
easement may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the
least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest. And if the conditions of the various tenements are
the same, all the adjoining owners should be cited and
experts utilized to determine where the easement shall be
established (Tolentino, ibid., pp. 108-109, citing Casals
Colldecarrera).
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there
are three options open to the plaintiffs-appellees as a route
to reach the national road, to wit:
(1) To traverse directly through defendants property which is
the shortest route of approximately 20 to 25 meters away
from the national road;
(2) To purchase a right of way from the adjoining property of
Florentino Cruz on the left side of their property; and
(3) To negotiate with Jacinto family on the right side of their
property.
In all instances, no significant structures would be adversely
affected. There is sufficient vacant space between
defendants houses of approximately 11 meters. The
distance of defendant Florcerfidas house with the adjoining
adobe wall separating that of the property of defendants
Cesar and Racquel Sta. Maria is about 4 meters, while the
space between the adobe wall and that of the latters house
is about 7 meters or a total of 11 meters vacant space for
purposes of a right of way. On the other hand, plaintiffs may
negotiate with a right of way with Florentino Cruz on the left
side of their property although the same is quite circuitous.
Lastly, the option through the property of the Jacinto on the
right side is very circuitous and longer. The route involves a
total of about 50 yards as it has to go straight to the right of
about 35 yards and turn left of about another 15 yards before
reaching the common right of way.
(Ocular Inspection report, pp. 135-136, ibis.)
Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that
defendants-appellants property would afford the shortest
distance from plaintiffs-appellees property to the provincial
road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by
the lower court, (i)t appears that there would be no
significant structures to be injured in the defendants property
and the right-of-way to be constructed thereon would be the
shortest of all the alternative routes pointed to by the
defendants (p. 4, RTC, Decision; p. 223, ibid.).
Petitioners reliance on Costabella Corporation v. Court
of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] to support their first assigned error
is misplaced. In said case we reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting a compulsory easement of a right
of way to the private respondents therein because of the
absence of any showing that the private respondents had
established the existence of the four requisites mandated by
law. As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus:
Neither have the private respondents been able to show that
the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or
their predecessors-in-interest's own acts. In the instant case,
the Court of Appeals have found the existence of the
requisites. The petitioners, however, insist that private
respondents predecessors-in-interest have, through their
own acts of constructing concrete fences at the back and on
the right side of the property, isolated their property from the
public highway. The contention does not impress because
even without the fences private respondents property
remains landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to
different owners.
Under the second and fourth assigned errors, the
petitioners try to convince us that there are two other existing
passage ways over the property of Cruz and over that of
Jacinto, as well as a daang tao, for private respondents use.
Our examination of the records yields otherwise. Said lots of
Cruz and Jacinto do not have existing passage ways for the
private respondents to use. Moreover, the Ocular Inspection
Report[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] reveals that the suggested alternative
ways through Cruzs or Jacintos properties are longer and
circuitous than that through petitioners property. This is also
clear from the Sketch Plan[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] submitted by the
private respondents wherein it is readily seen that the lots of
Cruz and Jacinto are only adjacent to that of private
respondents unlike that of petitioners which is directly in front
of private respondents property in relation to the public
highway.
Under Article 650 of the Civil Code, the easement of
right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. Where there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the
easement may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The conditions of least
damage and shortest distance are both established in one
tenement -- petitioners property.
As to the daang tao at the back of private respondents
property, it must be stressed that under Article 651 the width
of the easement of right of way shall be that which is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time. Therefore, the
needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the
easement.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] The needs of private respondents
property could hardly be served by this daang tao located at
the back and which is bordered by a fishpond.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]

The third assigned error is without basis and is nothing

but a misreading of the challenged decision. The Court of
Appeals did not declare as established facts the allegations
of the complaint referred to by the petitioner. It merely made
a brief summary of what were alleged in the complaint as
part of its narration of the antecedents of the case on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and
the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125339. June 22, 1998]
CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO
MAKIMKIM, DAMASO MAKIMKIM,
SPOUSES SALVADOR HERMALINO and
PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS
MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM,
SPOUSES FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and
FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA
MAKIMKIM, JOSE MAKIMKIM and GINA
MAKIMKIM, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC.,
SPOUSES JESUS C. PACIONE and
LERMA B. PACIONE, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals of 16 January 1996 in CA-
G.R. CV Case No. 37273, "Cresencia Cristobal, et al. v.
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., et al.,"[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] which affirmed
in toto the decision of the RTC-Br. 81, Quezon City,[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
dismissing herein petitioners complaint for
easement of right of way, and the Resolution of 14 June
1996 denying their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10
Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City, where they have
been residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar
Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of a
subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which
once included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2,
with areas of 164 square meters and 52 square meters,
respectively, located adjacent to petitioners property. Lots 1
and 2 were originally part of a private road known as Road
Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. Petitioners
were using Road Lot 2 in going to and from the nearest
public road. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a
national road in 1979, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition
before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert
Road Lot 2 into residential lots.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] The petition
was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into
residential lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot 2. Subsequently,
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., sold both lots to Macario Pacione in
whose favor Transfer Certificates of Title were
correspondingly issued. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed
the lots to his son and daughter-in-law, respondent spouses
Jesus and Lerma Pacione.
When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a
house on Lot 1, visited the property in 1987, they found out
that the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita
Geronimo and a portion was being used as a passageway
by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the
spouses complained about the intrusion into their property to
the Barangay Office. At the barangay conciliation
proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion
of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses rejected
the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a
concrete fence.
Petitioners protested the enclosure alleging that their
property was bounded on all sides by residential houses
belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet
and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property of
the Paciones. As their protests went unheeded, petitioners
instituted an action for easement of right of way with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On 3 June 1987 the trial court issued a TRO directing
the Pacione spouses to cease and desist from fencing the
disputed property. The Paciones objected arguing that
petitioners were not entitled to a TRO since they showed no
valid basis for its issuance, and that petitioners had no cause
of action against respondents because there were actually
two (2) accessible outlets and inlets - a pathway right in front
of their gate leading towards an asphalted 5-meter road to
the left, and across an open space to the right adjacent to
respondents lot likewise leading to Visayas Avenue.
At the instance of the parties, the trial court ordered an
ocular inspection of the property. A Board of Commissioners
was constituted for that purpose composed of
representatives chosen by the parties, with Deputy Sheriff
Florencio D. Dela Cruz, Jr., as representative of the court.
On 3 January 1990 Deputy Sheriff Dela Cruz, Jr.,
submitted his Report[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] relative to the ocular
inspection on the litigated lots -
x x x there is another way from the Visayas Ave. to the
plaintiffs lot existing at the time of the ocular inspection.
Plaintiffs can use the street originating from Visayas Avenue,
identified as Ma. Elena St., which is about 2.5 m. in width
and about 150 m. in length up to an intersection, meeting a
private road, which is about 100 meters in length, that ends
at the lower portion of the right side of the adjacent vacant
lot previously identified, and at the back of a lot with concrete
fence located at the back of the plaintiffs property. From that
point the plaintiff must enter the adjacent vacant lot (entry to
the said lot is still possible during the ocular inspection
because the barbed wires were not properly placed) to reach
a gate at the side of the plaintiffs lot, about 16 m. from the
end of the private road, allegedly used by the plaintiffs
before the adjacent lot was enclosed by barbed wires.
According to Atty. Mendoza, counsel for the defendants, that
gate no longer exist(ed) at the time of the ocular inspection.
As may be observed from the above report, only one
outlet was indicated by Sheriff Dela Cruz, Jr. The other outlet
across an open space to the right referred to by the Pacione
spouses was not reflected thereon. However, on the basis of
the report as well as the testimonial and documentary
evidence of the parties, the trial court dismissed the
complaint holding that one essential requisite of a legal
easement of right of way was not proved, i.e., the absence of
an alternative adequate way or outlet to a public highway, in
this case, Visayas Avenue.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that
the trial court erred in finding that they failed to sufficiently
establish the essential fact that from their property no
adequate outlet or access to a public highway existed; and,
that the conversion of the Road Lot into two (2) residential
lots by Cesar Ledesma, Inc., was violative of PD No. 957,
hence illegal, and the titles issued as a consequence of the
conversion were null and void.
On 16 January 1996 the Court of Appeals rendered its
assailed decision affirming the findings of the trial court -
The burden of proving the existence of the requisites of
easement of right of way lies on the owner of the dominant
estate. In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellants failed to prove
that there is no adequate outlet from their property to a
public highway. Convenience of the dominant estate is not a
gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true
standard for the grant of the legal right is adequacy. Hence,
when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even if
the outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the
need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. To
justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there
must be real, not fictitious or artificial necessity for it. A right
of way is legally demandable, but the owner of the dominant
estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary
choice. Art. 650 of the Civil Code provides for the criteria in
the establishment of such easement but it has been settled
that the criterion of least prejudicial prevails over shortest
distance. Each case must be weighed according to its
individual merits and judged according to the sound
discretion of the court (Costabella Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, 193 SCRA 333 [1991]).
The second assigned error has no legal leg to stand on
since plaintiff-appellants cannot just introduce a new issue to
an already settled one, especially for the first time on appeal.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioners now come to us with the following assignment of
errors: First, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
doctrine in Costabella, considering that in the instant case
the four (4) requisites that must be complied with by an
owner of the dominant estate in order to validly claim a
compulsory right of way have been clearly established by
petitioners, contrary to the Decision appealed from, and that
the facts in Costabella are not the same as in the present
case. Second, the Court of Appeals seriously erred in
holding that the question of legality or illegality of the
conversion of Road Lot 2 into two (2) residential lots by the
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., is a new issue raised for the first time
on appeal, because such issue appeared in the complaint
filed before the trial court.
Quite noticeably, petitioners first assigned error is
essentially factual in nature, i.e., it merely assails the factual
findings of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law, the findings of
fact of the appellate court being conclusive.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
We have emphatically declared that it is not the function of
this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again,
its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower court.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]

Petitioners insist that their petition raises a question of

law, that is, the correctness of the appellate courts ruling that
one who has an existing passageway, however inconvenient
that passageway may be, is no longer entitled to an
easement of right of way.
We do not agree. Questions of law are those that do not
call for any examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] In the
instant case, petitioners' assignment of errors would have
this Court go over the facts because it necessarily entails an
examination of the evidence and its subsequent re-
evaluation to determine whether petitioners indeed have no
sufficient outlet to the highway.
Petitioners next claim that the findings of the appellate
court are based on misapprehension of facts, which
circumstance warrants a review of the appellate courts
decision. Yet, they failed to sufficiently demonstrate this
allegation in their pleadings. Absent a clear showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the
record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must
stand.
At any rate, even assuming that the first assignment of
error may be properly raised before this Court, we find no
reversible error in the assailed decision. To be entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions
provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be
established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid;
(3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]

In the present case, the first element is clearly absent.

As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an
outlet already exists, which is a path walk located at the left
side of petitioners property and which is connected to a
private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The
private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is
about 2.5 meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This
outlet was determined by the court a quo to be sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate, hence petitioners have no
cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to
Visayas Avenue.
Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to
prove that the easement they seek to impose on private
respondents property is to be established at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is only
164 square meters and an improvident imposition of the
easement on the lot may unjustly deprive private
respondents of the optimum use and enjoyment of their
property, considering that its already small area will be
reduced further by the easement. Worse, it may even render
the property useless for the purpose for which private
respondents purchased the same.
It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and
when considered with reference to the obligations imposed
on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal
restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient
estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant
estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
presence of all the preconditions before his claim for
easement of right of way may be granted. Petitioners
miserably failed in this regard.
On the question of adequacy of the existing outlet,
petitioners allege that the path walk is much longer,
circuitous and inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one
has to pass by Ma. Elena St., turn right to a private road,
then enter a vacant lot, and turn right again to exit from the
vacant lot until one reaches petitioners property.
We find petitioners concept of what is "adequate outlet"
a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in
order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way
there must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be
imposed.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Thus, in Ramos v. Gatchalian,[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] this
Court disallowed the easement prayed for - even if petitioner
therein "had to pass through lots belonging to other owners,
as temporary ingress and egress, which lots were grassy,
cogonal and greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud" -
because it would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence
that mere convenience for the dominant estate does not
suffice to serve as basis for the easement.
Also, in Floro v. Llenado,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] we refused to
impose an easement of right of way over petitioners
property, although private respondents alternative route was
admittedly inconvenient because he had to traverse several
rice lands and rice paddies belonging to different persons,
not to mention that said passage, as found by the trial court,
was impassable during rainy season.
Admittedly, the proposed right of way over private
respondents property is the most convenient, being the
shorter and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue.
However, it is not enough that the easement be where the
way is shortest. It is more important that it be where it will
cause the least prejudice to the servient estate.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
As discussed elsewhere, petitioners failed to
sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed right of way shall
be at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The second assignment of error was likewise properly
rejected by the appellate court. Primarily, the issue of legality
or illegality of the conversion of the road lot in question has
long been laid to rest in LRC Case No. Q-1614[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
which declared with finality the legality of the
segregation subdivision survey plan of the disputed road lot.
Consequently, it is now too late for petitioners to question
the validity of the conversion of the road lot.
Finally, questions relating to non-compliance with the
requisites for conversion of subdivision lots are properly
cognizable by the National Housing Authority (NHA), now
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] and not by
the regular courts. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction,[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] where jurisdiction
is vested upon an administrative body, no resort to the
courts may be made before such administrative body shall
have acted upon the matter.
WHEREFORE, Petition is DENIED. The 16 January
1996 Decision and the 14 June 1996 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals denying reconsideration thereof are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109338. November 20, 2000]
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO),
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte,
EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO
CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA,
CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls
within the purview of the power of eminent domain.
We have before the Court for consideration a petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] and its resolution,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] which denied

petitioners motion for reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]

The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte, a complaint[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] for collection of a sum of money and
foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
Corporation (PSC).
For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial
court declared PSC in default and allowed plaintiff Leviste to
present evidence ex-parte.
On November 23, 1989, the trial court rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter
1. to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,798,750.00 with interest
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from November, 1989
until the whole amount shall have been fully paid;
2. to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,500.00 as attorneys
fees;
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as expenses
incidental to this litigation; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
When the decision became final and executory, the trial
court issued a writ of execution and respondent sheriff
Eduardo R. Moreno levied upon two (2) parcels of land
covered TCT Nos. T-13505 and T-13514 issued by the
Registrar of Deeds in the name of PSC. On April 24, 1990,
the parcels of land were sold at public auction in favor of
Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty). On April 25, 1990,
the Clerk of Court, as ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, issued a
Certificate of Sale,[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] which Judge Luis D.
Dictado, in his capacity as executive judge, approved.
On June 23, 1992, Vines Realty moved for the issuance
of a writ of possession over said property. On June 25, 1992,
the trial court granted the motion.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
On August 7, 1992, copy of the writ of possession was
served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing on
certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12,
1992, Vines Realty filed an amended motion for an order of
demolition and removal[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] of improvements on
the subject land.
Among the improvements for removal were the power
lines and electric posts belonging to petitioner.
Petitioner opposed the motion[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]on the
ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party
to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the
trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements
over said property.
The trial court[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] set the hearing on the
amended motion on September 29, 1992 but the hearing
was re-scheduled on October 28, 1992, and then again on
November 10, 1992.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] On all these dates, no
hearing was conducted.
Then the case was re-raffled to Branch 39 of the
regional trial court presided over by respondent judge.
On November 27, 1992, the trial court[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
set the hearing on the amended motion for demolition.
However, instead of adducing evidence for petitioner, its
counsel[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] manifested that he was withdrawing
his appearance since the authority given him by petitioner
was only for the filing of the opposition to the amended
motion. The trial court proceeded with the hearing despite
the fact that petitioner had no counsel present. Thus, only
Vines Realty presented its evidence.
On the same date, November 27, 1992, the trial court
ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition directing and
deputizing Lt. Col. Rufino Chavez, Jr. and Capt. Alfredo
Borja to constitute an augmentation force for the immediate
implementation of the writ.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
On December 7, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for prohibition with restraining order and
preliminary injunction.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Petitioner argued that
the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated
November 27. 1992.
On December 10, 1992, the Court of Appeals sent
telegrams to respondents informing them of the issuance of
a restraining order. On the same day, however, the trial court
issued a writ of demolition.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] The court
addressed the writ to sheriff Eduardo de los Reyes,[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif] who was not a respondent in the petition

before the Court of Appeals, so that the latter can implement

the writ on the pretext that he was not covered by the
restraining order.
On December 11, 1992, the trial court issued another
order directing the National Power Corporation sub-unit in
Camarines Norte to shut off the power lines energizing the
New Lucena Oil Products Corporation, one of the consumers
serviced by petitioner, as shown by the radiogram[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] of Simeon P. Zao III, OIC Labo, NPC. Mr. Zao

filed a manifestation[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] with the trial court that if

NPC would shut off said power supply before the sub-station
of petitioner, it would deprive Benguet Mining Corporation of
electricity and endanger the lives of its miners.
On the same day, December 11, 1992, respondent
Vines Realty cut down petitioners electric posts professedly
using a chainsaw[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] and resulting in a loud
blast affecting the area. Philippine National Police desk
officer Bianito Cobacha[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] of Barangay Jose
Panganiban Police Station entered in the police blotter that
on December 11, 1992, at about 2 p.m., men led by the
provincial sheriff felled petitioners electric posts along the
cemetery of Bagumbayan.
Even the members of the Sangguniang Bayan at San
Jose appealed to respondent Sheriff to desist from
proceeding with the demolition due to a restraining order but
to no avail.
 On January 4, 1993, Vines Realty filed with the trial court
a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of demolition.[if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif] The hearing was scheduled on January 12,

1993, at 8:30 a. m. but petitioners lawyer, Atty. Jose

Maacop, received a copy only on January 11, 1994.
Atty. Bienvenido A. Paita made a special appearance for
petitioner through a manifestation with motion for
reconsideration[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] dated January 21, 1993.
Atty. Paita declared it was impossible for him to appear and
file an opposition to the motion on very short notice. He said
that petitioner was not a party to the case, that the
restraining order of the Court of Appeals was good until
further orders, and the writ of execution was executed on
December 11, 1992. Petitioner manifested that it was denied
its day in court.
On January 25, 1993,[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] the trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
appearance of Atty. Paita was irregular and that Atty.
Maacop as the counsel in the appellate court must first make
an entry of appearance with the trial court.
On January 26, 1993, the trial court issued an alias writ
of demolition.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif]
The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished
the remaining electric posts resulting in the cutting off of
power supply to various business establishments and
barangays.
Meantime, on January 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals,
promulgated a decision[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]dismissing the
petition for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Let it be stated that the temporary restraining order which
was issued by this Court on December 9, 1992 has a limited
life of twenty (20) days from date of issue (Carbungco vs.
CA, 181 SCRA 313) and has therefore become void at the
expiration of the said twenty (20) days (Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586).
SO ORDERED.
On February 19, 1993, petitioners new counsel,
Gancayco Law Offices, filed with the Court of Appeals an
Urgent Appearance And Motion To Admit Supplemental
Petition.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] This was a new petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
On March 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration as well as the admission of the
supplemental petition on the ground that the petition had
been decided.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif]
Meanwhile, in response to the publics urgent basic need,
petitioner re-constructed its power lines along the provincial
road leading to the Port of Osmea upon authority of the
District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and
Highways [DPWH].
On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter
dated April 10, 1993, stating that Vines Realty was the
owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct
power lines therein without its permission. Petitioner
promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within
the right of way of the provincial road leading to the port of
Osmea as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH.
Hence, this petition.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif]
At issue is whether petitioner is entitled to retain
possession of the power lines located in the land sold at
public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be
heard.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] A court denies a party due process if
it renders its orders without giving such party an opportunity
to present its evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif]
We find that petitioner was denied due process.
Petitioner could have negated private respondents claims by
showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor if only
the trial court in the exercise of justice and equity reset the
hearing instead of proceeding with the trial and issuing an
order of demolition on the same day.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence
on petitioners right over the property to be demolished.
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[if
!supportFootnotes][33][endif] Due process is equally applicable in a case

involving public utilities, where a strict application of the rules

would bring about catastrophic inconveniences to the public.
Hence, the act would do more harm than good to the public,
which the government seeks to protect. Damages and
losses of a considerable amount of time (about 8 years)
could have been prevented if the trial court did not gravely
abuse its discretion on the matter.
Well aware that the counsel was not authorized, the trial
court could have stretched its liberality a little to ensure that
it would serve the ends of justice well for the people of
Camarines Norte. Petitioner must be given the chance to
prove its position.
We cannot conceive how, knowing fully well that
destroying the power lines and electric posts would cause
overwhelming losses to a lot of business establishments and
a great inconvenience to a lot of people, the trial court still
ordered the demolition of the property. Their personal
motives aside, the Court finds that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in hastily ordering the removal of the
electric posts.
We are not a trier of facts. We cannot determine whether
petitioners Agreements of Right of Way[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] or
that of the authorization[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] of the OIC District
Engineer to construct electric posts within the limits of the
road right of way were genuine instruments. We can,
however, determine the legality of the acts of the trial court in
issuing the writs of demolition over the property.
The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric
cooperatives as public utilities.
Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] are:
Section 16 Powers-
(j) To construct, maintain and operate electric transmission
and distribution lines along, upon, under and across publicly
owned lands and public thoroughfares, including, without
limitation, all roads, highways, streets, alleys, bridges and
causeways; Provided, that such shall not prevent or unduly
impair the primary public uses to which such lands and
thoroughfares are otherwise devoted;
(k) To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner
provided by law for the exercise of such power by other
corporations constructing or operating electric generating
plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or
systems.
Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with
the power of eminent domain.
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls
within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such
conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where
the Supreme Court sustained the award of just
compensation for private property condemned for public
use.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] The Supreme Court, in Republic vs.
PLDT[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] thus held that:
"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-
of-way."
However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no
rights, except the easement.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] Vines Realty
retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use
of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the
land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not
gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation
power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary
use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment
of just compensation,[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif] which must be neither
more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.
Just compensation has been understood to be the just
and complete equivalent of the loss, which the owner of the
res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation.[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] The value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the Government are the
criteria for determining just compensation.[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just
and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and
full equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity.[if !supportFootnotes][43][endif]
Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of
the exercise of its right-of-way easement and not ownership
over the land. Public utilities power of eminent domain may
be exercised although title is not transferred to the
expropriator.[if !supportFootnotes][44][endif]
Consequently, we rule that a courts writ of demolition
can not prevail over the easement of a right-of-way which
falls within the power of eminent domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 19,
1993, and the resolution adopted on March 15, 1993, in CA-
G. R. SP No. 29624, are SET ASIDE. The orders of the trial
court dated November 27, 1992, December 10, 1992,
January 18, 1993, and January 25, 1993 and the writs of
demolition issued on December 11, 1992, and January 26,
1993, are ANNULLED.
Private respondents are ordered to restore or restitute
petitioners electric posts and power lines or otherwise
indemnify petitioner for the cost of the restoration thereof.
Finally, private respondents are permanently enjoined or
prohibited from disturbing or interfering with the operation
and maintenance of the business of petitioner.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 130845. November 27, 2000]
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON.
TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N.
SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA,
respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails (1) the decision[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated December 27, 1996 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, dismissing petitioners

petition for review under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance
of a cease and desist order and/or temporary restraining
order, and (2) the resolution[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]dated August 14,
1997 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought
it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said
property. The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo
and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on March 19, 1983.
When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small
house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of
the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel
spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest
of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of
Way. The pertinent portion of the contract dated November
28, 1979, states:
. . . in order to have an access to and from their
aforementioned land where their houses are constructed and
to have an outlet to Tandang Sora Ave. which is the nearest
public road and the least burdensome to the servient estate
and to third persons, it would be necessary for them to pass
through spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL and JUSTINA
CAPUNOs land and for this purpose, a path or passageway
of not less than two (2) meters wide of said spouses property
is necessary for the use of ROMEO, RODOLFO, NENITA
and AURORA ESPINOLA and for all their needs in entering
their property.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the fact that the property of the
ESPINOLA had been bought by them from MAXIMO
CAPUNO, father of MAXIMO GABRIEL, spouses MAXIMO
GABRIEL and JUSTINA CAPUNO hereby agree and permit
RODOLFO, ROMEO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA
and their families to have a permanent easement of right of
way over the aforementioned property of said spouses
limited to not more than two meters wide, throughout the
whole length of the southeast side of said property and as
specifically indicated in the attached plan which is made an
integral part of this Contract as Annex A;
This Agreement shall be binding between the parties and
upon their heirs, successors, assigns, without prejudice in
cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the
circumstances.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land,
the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small
house that encroached upon the two-meter easement.
Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio
Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil
Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages and with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order against the spouses Gabriel.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] As
successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to
enforce the contract of easement.
On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. On August 13, 1991, it issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to
provide the right of way and to demolish the small house
encroaching on the easement. On August 15, 1991, the
Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.
On March 26, 1992, the Eighth Division of the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the RTCs
issuances. The decision became final and executory on July
31, 1992.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in
Quezon City, Branch 88, issued an Alias Writ of Demolition.
On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small
house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party
Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He
maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his
property since he was not a party to the civil case. His Third
Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition was
denied for lack of merit on August 16, 1995.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration dated September 12, 1995 were
denied on October 19, 1995.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39166,
asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way
was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to
Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, hence the contract of easement
executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas could not
be enforced against him. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit and denied the reconsideration,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed by
this court for lack of merit.
No costs considering the failure of private respondents to file
their comment, despite notice.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Hence, this instant petition.
Petitioner now avers that the appellate court erred in
declaring,
(1) THAT FOLLOWING THE ESSENCE OF INHERENCE
AND INTRANSMISSIBILITY OF AN EASEMENT, A RIGHT
OF WAY CAN EXIST EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT
EXPRESSLY STATED OR ANNOTATED ON THE
TORRENS TITLE;
(2) THAT PETITIONER, AS PROSPECTIVE BUYER,
SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ORDINARY PRUDENCE BY
TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO DETERMINE THAT AN
EASEMENT HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED ON THE
PROPERTY HE INTENDS TO BUY; AND,
(3) THAT IN AS MUCH AS THE HEREIN PETITIONER IS
NOT A PARTY TO CIVIL CASE NO. Q-91-8703, HE
CANNOT BE BOUND BY ANY JUDGMENT OR ORDER
RENDERED THEREIN.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
 Primarily, the issue is whether the easement on the
property binds petitioner.
Petitioner argues it could not be enforced against him.
First, he says that a right of way cannot exist when it is not
expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title. According
to him, even if an easement is inherent and inseparable from
the estate to which it actively belongs as provided in Art. 617
of the Civil Code,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] the same is extinguished
when the servient estate is registered and the easement was
not annotated in said title conformably with Section 39 of the
Land Registration Law. Second, petitioner points out that the
trial court erred when it faulted him for relying solely on the
clean title of the property he bought, as it is well-settled that
a person dealing with registered land is not required to go
beyond what is recorded in the title. He adds that it is private
respondents who should have made sure their right of way
was safeguarded by having the same annotated on the title
with the Register of Deeds. He adds that Section 76 of P.D.
No. 1529[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] also requires that when a case is
commenced involving any right to registered land under the
Land Registration Law (now the Property Registration
Decree), any decision on it will only be effectual between or
among the parties thereto, unless a notice of lis pendens of
such action is filed and registered in the registry office where
the land is recorded. There was no such annotation in the
title of the disputed land, according to petitioner. Lastly,
since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703,
petitioner argues that he cannot be bound by the writ of
demolition and be forcibly divested of a portion of his land
without having his day in court.
Private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla, for their part,
adopted the disquisition of the appellate court as their
Comment and asked for the dismissal of the petition and
P100,000.00 in damages. In its decision the appellate court,
citing the decision of the lower court, stressed that unlike
other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like
a right of way can exist even if they are not expressly stated
or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because
servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they
actively or passively belong. Moreover, Villanueva was
bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement. A legal easement is
mandated by law, and continues to exists unless its removal
is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the
easement is removed before the execution of the
conveyance conformably with Article 649[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]in
accordance with Article 617[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] of the Civil
Code.
At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of
way) originally was voluntarily constituted by agreement
between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the
instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a
voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or a
legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and
becomes a continuing property right.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] As a
compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to
which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the
Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be
compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] The trial court and the Court of
Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right
of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is
conclusive on this Court,[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] hence we see no
need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The
small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide
easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement
mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the
needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs
of the dominant estate determine the width of the
easement.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Conformably then, petitioner
ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement
in view of the needs of private respondents estate.
Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by
the contract of easement because the same was not
annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the
complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with
the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As
already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that
the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide
the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case)
ingress from and egress to the public highway.
Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil
Case No. Q-91-8703 and that he had not been given his day
in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec. 47, of the
Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific
thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (Emphasis ours).
Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and
binding upon the parties to said case and those who are
their successor in interest by title after said case has been
commenced or filed in court.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] In this case,
private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla,
initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991,[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif] against the original owners, the spouses

Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner

was entered in the Register of Deeds[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] on
March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank
which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision
in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For, although
not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991
COSTABELLA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., AURORA
BUSTOS LOPEZ, MANUEL S. SATORRE, JR., JOSEFA C.
REVILLES, FELIX TIUKINHOY, JR., PERFECTA L. CHUANGCO,
and CESAR T. ESPINA, respondents.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan & Migallos for petitioner. Albano, Garcia &
Diaz Law Offices for Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. Zosa & Quijano
Law Offices for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The principal issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the
decision 1 dated May 30, 1986 of the Court of Appeals, 2 which
modified the decision 3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-
Lapu City in Cebu, is whether or not the private respondents had
acquired an easement of right of way, in the form of a passageway,
on the petitioner's property.
It is admitted that the petitioner owns the real estate properties
designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre,
situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had
constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other
hand, are the owners of adjoining properties more particularly known
as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre.
Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the
private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties
and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which
traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the
aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its
hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property
through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed
to pass. (Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the
construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner
fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and
preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it.)
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction
with damages was filed against the petitioner by the private
respondents on September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu. 4
In their complaint, the private respondents assailed the petitioner's
closure of the original passageway which they (private respondents)
claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" that had been existing
before World War II and since then had been used by them, the
community, and the general public, either as pedestrians or by means
of vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu City and other
parts of the country. The private respondents averred that by closing
the alleged road right of way in question, the petitioner had deprived
them access to their properties and caused them damages.
In the same complainant, the private respondents likewise alleged
that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the
latter's property without the necessary permit, obstructing the
passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris
and flotsam on the beach. They also claimed that the debris and
flotsam that had accumulated prevented them from using their
properties for the purpose for which they had acquired them. The
complaint this prayed for the trial court to order the re-opening of the
original passageway across the petitioner's property as well as the
destruction of the dike. 5
In its answer, 6 the petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road
through its property and counter-averred, among others, that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary, intermittent,
and gratuitous use of, or passage through, its property by the private
respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as an act of
neighborliness. It justified the walling in of its property in view of the
need to insure the safety and security of its hotel and beach resort,
and for the protection of the privacy and convenience of its hotel
patrons and guests. At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the private
respondents were not entirely dependent on the subject passageway
as they (private respondents) had another existing and adequate
access to the public road through other properties. With respect to
the dike it allegedly constructed, the petitioner stated that what it built
was a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property and not a
dike as claimed by the private respondents. Moreover, contrary to the
private respondents' accusation, the said construction had benefitted
the community especially the fishermen who used the same as
mooring for their boats during low tide. The quantity of flotsam and
debris which had formed on the private respondents' beach front on
the other hand were but the natural and unavoidable accumulations
on beaches by the action of the tides and movement of the waves of
the sea. The petitioner's answer then assailed the private
respondents' complaint for its failure to implead as defendants the
owners of the other properties supposedly traversed by the alleged
ancient road right way, indispensable parties without whom no final
adjudication of the controversy could be rendered. 7
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984
finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over
the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its
continued use and enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but
also by the community at large. The petitioner in so closing the said
passageway, had accordingly violated the private respondents'
vested right. Thus, the trial court ordered the petitioner:
1. To open and make available the road in question to the plaintiffs
and the general public at all times free of any obstacle thereof, unless
the defendant, shall provide another road equally accessible and
convenient as the road or passage closed by the defendant;
2. To pay the plaintiff Katipunan Lumber Company, Inc. the amount of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) a month beginning January,
1983, and the plaintiff Perfecto Guangco the sum of TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P200.00) a month beginning September, 1982, representing
their respective expenditures they had incurred in other beach resorts
after the road was closed, until the passageway claimed by them is
opened and made available to them, or if the defendant chooses to
provide another road, until such road is made available and
conveniently passable to the plaintiffs and the general public; and
3. To pay the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00)
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. 8
Both parties elevated the trial court's decision to the Court of
Appeals, with the petitioner questioning the alleged "vested right" of
the private respondents over the subject passageway, and the private
respondents assailing the dismissal of their complaint insofar as their
prayer for the demolition of the petitioner's "dike" is concerned.
In its decision, the respondent Appellate Court held as without basis
the trial court's finding that the private respondents had acquired a
vested right over the passageway in question by virtue of
prescription. 9 The appellate court pointed out that an easement of
right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the
New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by
prescription. 10 That notwithstanding, the appellate court went on to
rule that ". . . in the interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court
of its equity jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in not treating the
easement here sought by appellees Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and
Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent upon the claims of
the parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the
owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate."
11 Thus the appellate court: (1) granted the private respondents the

right to an easement of way on the petitioner's property using the

passageway in question, unless the petitioner should provide another
passageway equally accessible and convenient as the one it closed;
(2) remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of the
just and proper indemnity to be paid to the petitioner by the private
respondents for the said easement; and (3) set aside the trial court's
award of actual damages and attorney's fees. 12
On petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration, the respondent
court issued on October 27, 1987 a resolution 13 denying the said
motion. The Appellate Court however in denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration stated that:
. . . While it is true that there is another outlet for the plaintiff to the
main road, yet such outlet is a new road constructed in 1979, while
the road closed by defendant existed since over 30 years before.
Legally, the old road could be closed; but since the existing outlet is
inconvenient to the plaintiff, equitably the plaintiff should be given a
chance to pay for a more convenient outlet through the land of the
defendant at a point least prejudicial to the latter. In any event, the
plaintiff shall pay for all damages that defendant corporation may
sustain and the defendant regulates the manner of use of the right of
way to protect defendant's property and its customers. This is the gist
of Our decision. 14
Now before us, the petitioner contends that the decision of the
respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous and not in accord
with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on
easements and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
The petition is meritorious.
It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is
involved here, is discontinuous 15 and as such can not be acquired by
prescription. 16 Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the
foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the
correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order
the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the
complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted
over the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to
commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as
a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of
the "dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter
being the owner of the "servient" estate.
It is provided under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code that:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use
may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of
its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is
due to the proprietor's own acts.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.
Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may validly
claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the
existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-
requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. 17
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had
established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. For
one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged
by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the
appellate court, "there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private
respondents) to the main road." 18 Thus, the respondent Court of
Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed."
19 Yet, it ordered the re- opening of the old passageway on the

ground that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconvenient to the
plaintiff." 20 On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost
sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate has
never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. 21 To
be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
"adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet
from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet,
for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up
another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of
an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial necessity for it." 22
Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or
even to manifest during the trial of the case that they were willing to
indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be established
over its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to
show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal
or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private
respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that
the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least
prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a
hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a
strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the
convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be
compromised. That indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It
is therefore of great importance that the claimed light of way over the
petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial to its
business.
Hence, the Private respondents' properties can not be said to be
isolated, for which a compulsory easement is demandable. Insofar
therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper as a
controversy for a compulsory right of way, this Court is constrained to
hold that it was in error.
Servitudes of right of way are an ancient concept, which date back to
the iter, actus, and via of the Romans. 23 They are demanded by
necessity, that is, to enable owners of isolated estates to make full
use of their properties, which lack of access to public roads has
denied them. 24 Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are
compulsory and hence, legally demandable, subject to indemnity and
the concurrence of the other conditions above-referred to.
As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and
not mere convenience for the dominant estate. Hence, if there is an
existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the "dominant"
estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be
convenient. Of course, the question of when a particular passage
may be said to be "adequate" depends on the circumstances of each
case. Manresa, however, says: "In truth, not only the estate which
absolutely does not possess it should be considered in this condition,
but also that which does not have one sufficiently safe or serviceable;
an estate bordering a public road through an inaccessible slope or
precipice, is in fact isolated for all the effects of the easement
requested by its owner. On the other hand, an estate which for any
reason has necessarily lost its access to a public road during certain
periods of the year is in the same condition. . . . There are some who
propound the query as to whether the fact that a river flows between
the estate and the public road should be considered as having the
effect of isolating the estate. . . . If the river may be crossed
conveniently at all times without the least danger, it cannot be said
that the estate is isolated; in any other case, the answer is in the
affirmative." 25
The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the
particular need of the dominant owner, and the estate itself need not
be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or not
a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the
owner. 26 Thus, as Manresa had pointed out, if the passageway
consists of an "inaccessible slope or precipice," 27 it is as if there is no
passageway, that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the dominant
owner's necessities, although by the existence of that passageway
the property can not be truly said that the property is isolated. So
also, while an existing right of way may have proved adequate at the
start, the dominant owner's need may have changed since then, for
which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to width. 28
But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the
dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary
choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon
two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient state; and
(2) where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest.
According, however, to one commentator, "least prejudice" prevails
over "shortest distance." 29 Yet, each case must be weighed
according to its individual merits, and judged according to the sound
discretion of the court. "The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to
establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to
avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are
constuctions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way, or
to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the
shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline." 30
It is based on these settled principles that we have resolved this
case.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 30, 1986, and the resolution
dated October 27, 1987, of the respondent Court of Appeals are SET
ASIDE and the private respondents' complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991
TOMAS ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE SAGUN,* respondents.
Esteban M. Mendoza for petitioner. Oscar Gozos for private
respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Presented for resolution in the instant petition for review is the not-so-
usual question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of
an already existing easement of right-of-way. Both the trial court and
the Appellate Court ruled that petitioner is not so entitled, hence the
recourse to this Court. We reverse.
The facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the
late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent
estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. ** Petitioner owns the
dominant estate which has an area of 2,590 square meters and
bounded on the North by Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Magsino,
on the south by Taal Lake, on the East by Felino Matienzo and on the
West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents co-own the 405-
square-meter servient estate which is bounded on the North by the
National Highway (Laurel-Talisay Highway), on the South by Tomas
Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto Magsino and on the West by
Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the servient estate stands between
the dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a
concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed
the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when
private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a
roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was
constituted to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width of
the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half
meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto
Magsino. No compensation was asked and non was given for the
portions constituting the pathway. 1
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery
business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use said
pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his
customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work
flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for
petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery
and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984,
petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for
transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the
roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta
Vda. de Sagun and Elena Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested
that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property
to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his
jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down by
the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas, Branch 6 (Tanauan) to seek the issuance of a writ of
easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2)
meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land. 2
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the
existence of another exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters
away from the dominant estate. On December 2, 1985, the lower
court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint. It ruled:
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff at present has two outlets to the
highway: one, through the defendants' land on a one meter wide
passageway, which is bounded on both sides by concrete walls and
second, through the dried river bed eighty meters away. The plaintiff
has an adequate outlet to the highway through the dried river bed
where his jeep could pass.
The reasons given for his claim that the one-meter passageway
through defendants' land be widened to two and one-half meters to
allow the passage of his jeep, destroying in the process one of the
concrete fences and decreasing defendants' already small parcel to
only about 332.5 square meters, just because it is nearer to the
highway by 25 meters compared to the second access of 80 meters
or a difference of only 65 meters and that passage through
defendants' land is more convenient for his (plaintiffs) business and
family use are not among the conditions specified by Article 649 of
the Civil Code to entitle the plaintiff to a right of way for the passage
of his jeep through defendant's land. 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court on January 28, 1987 and rejected petitioner's claim for an
additional easement.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals opined that the
necessity interposed by petitioner was not compelling enough to
justify interference with the property rights of private respondents.
The Appellate Court took into consideration the presence of a dried
river bed only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate and
conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven his jeep through
the river bed in order to get to the highway, and that the only reason
why he wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's estate was
that it was more convenient for his business and family needs.
After evaluating the evidence presented in the case, the Court finds
that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional
easement of right of way, contrary to the conclusions of the courts a
quo.
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the
dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate.1wphi1
Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is
absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there
is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In
the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete
bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the
jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to
five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is
impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain
times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed
which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no
outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the
right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. 4
With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route
to the highway, we transfer our attention to the existing pathway
which straddles the adjoining properties of the De Sagun heirs and
Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against petitioner his candid admission
in open court that he needed a wider pathway for the convenience of
his business and family. (TSN, August 2, 1985, pp. 24-26). We
cannot begrudge petitioner for wanting that which is convenient. But
certainly that should not detract from the more pressing consideration
that there is a real and compelling need for such servitude in his
favor.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the
easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs
of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to
time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the
dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the
passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When
petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family
could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the
national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the
use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of
plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely
cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his
jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of
theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised
pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate
and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
aspect of the plant nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters
in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient estate to only
about 342.5 square meters. But petitioner has expressed willingness
to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to compensate private
respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well for respondents
to take the offer of petitioner seriously. 5 But unless and until that
option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify
the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from
whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path
several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of
petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the
Civil Code which states in part:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use
may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in conformity with the foregoing discussion, the
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1987 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion is
hereby declared entitled to an additional easement of right of way of
twenty-five (25) meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2) meters wide
over the servient estate or a total area of 62.5 square meters after
payment of the proper indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 95738 December 10, 1991
ADRIANA DIONISIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 89 AND PABLO TAN GONZAGA, et al.,
respondents.
Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for petitioners.
Sergio Ortiz for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The controversy in the instant case arose from the private
respondents' act of opening a new gate along Howmart Road
claiming an easement of right of way in their favor.
The facts are as follows:
The petitioners are co-owners of lots contiguous to each other
situated in the Sitio of Kangkong, District of Balintawak, Quezon City.
The private respondents are also co-owners of lots which are
adjacent to the lots owned by the petitioners. Lot 272-B has an area
of 1,427 sq. m. which was later subdivided into two lots where Lot
272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong pursuant to a
memorandum agreement executed by and between them. They are
also owners of another lot at the upper portion of Lot 272-B with an
area of 914 sq. m.
By virtue of an agreement entered intobetween the owners of the
contiguous lots and the members of the Quezon City Industrial
Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way was granted over
Howmart Road which is a private road traversing the contiguous lots
owned by the petitioners, among others, in favor of the QCIEA
members. In return for its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the
petitioners for this right of way. The private respondents are bona fide
members of the QCIEA.
In order to have access to Howmart Road, there is a gate in private
respondents' 914 sq. m. lot fronting Howmart Road and another gate
in Lot 272-A. As a result of the subdivision of Lot 272, the private
respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B also fronting Howmart
Road which is now the gate in question.
On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio,
certain persons commenced the digging of four holes in a parallel line
and afterwards put up steel posts wielded to a steel plate in front of
the newly constructed gate of private respondents amidst the latter's
protestations.The petitioners claim that the surreptitiously constructed
gate opened directly into the house of Maxima Dionisio, exposing
them to air and noise pollution arising from the respondents' delivery
trucks and service vehicles.
On November 7, 1989, the private respondents instituted a civil action
for damages against the petitioners. The complaint sought the
immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the
petitioner to remove the barricade erected by them in front of the iron
gate.
On January 8, 1990, respondent Judge Ortiz issued an Order
granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The dispositive
portion of the order reads:
ACCORDINGLY, plaintiffs' prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is GRANTED, and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction shall issue ordering the defendants
to remove the barricade erected by them in front of the iron gate of
the plaintiffs at their Lot 272-B, within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt of the writ, and in case of their failure to do so, the plaintiffs
are authorized to remove the said barricade by themselves, the
expenses for which is chargeable to the defendants, upon plaintiffs'
putting up of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00, approved by this
Court, and conditioned as provided in the Rules, within five (5) days
from receipt of this order. (Rollo, p. 34)
The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the Order of Judge Ortiz.
Fifteen days later, the petitionersremoved the barricade in front of the
gate of the private respondents after they failed to obtain a temporary
restraining order (TRO) from the Court of Appeals enjoining the lower
court from implementing its order.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the
issue has already become moot and academic since the petitioners
have already complied with the Order of the lower court.
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONERS' COMPLIANCE WITH THE ORDER DATED 8
JANUARY 1990 GRANTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION RENDERS THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI MOOT AND ACADEMIC CONSIDERING THAT:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CAN STILL GRANT
PRACTICAL RELIEF TO THE PARTIES BY RECALLING OR
LIFTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION.
2. THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT PREEMPT THE RESOLUTION OF
THE PETITION ON THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER
GRANTING THE WRIT. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
The real issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the private
respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road.
Afterwhich it can be determined whether or not the private
respondents are entitled to the injunctive relief.
The private respondents' claim that they have every right to use
Howmart Road as passageway to EDSA by reason of the fact that
public respondents are bonafide members of the QCIEA which has a
standing oral contract of easement of right of way with the petitioners.
The contract is still subsisting even after its alleged expiration in
December, 1988 as evidenced by the two (2) letters signed by
Maxima Dionisio and Atty. Telesforo Poblete, counsel for the Dionisio
Family addressed to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in the
compensation for said right of way. In such a case, it is alleged that
the petitioners did not have the right to put the barricade in question
in front of the private respondents' gate and stop them from using
said gate as passageway to Howmart Road.
There is no question that a right of way was granted in favor of the
private respondents over Howmart Road but the records disclose that
such right of way expired in December, 1988. The continued use of
the easement enjoyed by QCIEAincluding the private respondents is
by the mere tolerance of the owners pending the renegotiation of the
terms and conditions of said right of way. This is precisely shown by
the two letters to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in
compensation for the use of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of
the parties as to the consideration, among others, no contract of
easement of right of way has been validly entered into by the
petitioners and QCIEA (see Robleza v. Court of Appeals, (74 SCRA
354 [1989]). Thus, the private respondents' claim of an easement of
right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis.
Not having any right, the private respondents arenot entitled to the
injunctive relief granted by the lower court.
We have held in several cases that in order to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, one must show an unquestionable right over the
premises and that such right has been violated. (Rivera v. IAC, 169
SCRA 307 [1989]; Viray v. CA, 191 SCRA 308 [1990]; Buayan Cattle
Co. Inc. v. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276 [1984])
The party applying for preliminary injunction must show that (a) the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. (Director of Forest Administration v.
Fernandez, 192 SCRA 121 [1990]; Phil. Virginia Tobacco
Administration v. Delos Angeles, 164 SCRA 543 [1988])
In the case at bar, the private respondents have not shown that there
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ.
The records show that there are two (2) gates through which the
private respondents may pass to have direct access to EDSA: (1) the
northern gate which opens directly to EDSA; and (2) the southern
gate along Howmart Road. The records also disclose that the
petitioners and the other lot owners previously prohibited and
prevented members of QCIEA from opening new gates. The claim
that they were forced to open a new gate by reason of the subdivision
of Lot 272 where a wall was constructed between these 2 lots is
untenable. The private respondents can not assert a right of way
when by their own or voluntary act, they themselves have caused the
isolation of their property from the access road. Article 649 of Civil
Code justifies petitioners' claim, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neigboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use
may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of
its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is
due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a) (Emphasis supplied)
The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small
passageway between them is an act imputable to the private
respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way. The
opening of the new gate would definitely be very convenient to the
private respondents but mere convenience is not enough to serve as
basis for the assertion of a right of way. (see Ramos, Sr. v.
Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 154 SCRA 703 [1987])
It was therefore inaccurate for the lower court to state that the private
respondents have shown a clear right to justify the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction when the facts and circumstances of the
case do not warrant it. In such a case, certiorari will lie to correct the
abuse of discretion committed by the lower court. (Maguan v. Court of
Appeals, 146 SCRA 107 [1986]). Such task was incumbent upon the
Court of Appeals when the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari
before it questioning the propriety of the Order of the lower court. The
respondent Court, however, dismissed the petition on the ground that
the issue was already moot and academic upon the petitioners'
compliance with the Order of the respondent Judge.
The fact that the barricade constructed by the petitioners was already
removed upon the issuance of the questioned preliminary injunction
does not make the petition moot and academic as ruled by the Court
of Appeals. The granting of the writ and the subsequent compliance
should not preempt the determination of the issue brought before it.
The validity of the Order was precisely the subject of the petition for
certiorari. As aptly explained in the case of Anglo-Fil Trading
Corporation v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 [1983]:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners' contention that the lifting of the restraining order had
rendered moot and academic the injunction case in the trial court is
likewise untenable. A restraining order is dstinguished from an
injunction in that it is intended as a restraint on the defendant until the
propriety of granting an injunction pendente lite can be determined,
and it goes no further than to preserve the status quo until such
determination. Therefore, the grant, denial, or lifting of a restraining
order does not in anyway pre-empt the court's power to decide the
issue in the main action which in the case at bar, is the injunction suit.
In fact, the records will show that the trial court proceeded with the
main suit for injunction after the lifting of the restraining orders. (At p.
512)
The Court of Appeals has the power to recallor lift the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction so issued if it finds that the party is
not so entitled. However, in dismissing the petition the court, in effect
affirmed the lower court's finding that the private respondents were
indeed entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction. But as we have
earlier found, the private respondents are not entitled to the injunctive
relief considering that they have no clear right over Howmart Road.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals and the Order of the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3949 are SET ASIDE. The writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002]
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS
CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN,
petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON
CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA
M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES
M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF
GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C.
NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE
NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD
NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE
NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and
ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE
TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and
JESUSA C. NAVADA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for
review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the sole issue of whether the donations made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or mortis causa.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor
of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a Deed of
Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot
covering one-half () portion of the formers house and lot located at
Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Four (4) other deeds of
donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on
January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C.
Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in Cogon, Cebu
(307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate
(50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a
parcel of land located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c)
petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property
(80,000 sq. m.).[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] These deeds of donation contain
similar provisions, to wit:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these
presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all
improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the
present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and
of no further force and effect; x x x[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] (Emphasis
Ours)
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
 Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue,
Branch 55, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity
of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN-2599, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of
donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents allege, inter
alia, that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and
strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingans fragile
condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that
the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of
the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments,
considering that these are donations mortis causa.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to
preserve the disputed properties, and, that they be declared as co-
owners of the properties in equal shares, together with petitioner
Nicolas Cabatingan.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents
allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly
and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. [if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]

On respondents motion, the court a quo rendered a partial

judgment on the pleadings on December 2, 1997 in favor of
respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendant and unwilling co-plaintiff with regards (sic) to the
four Deeds of Donation Annexes A, A-1, B and Annex C which is
the subject of this partial decision by:
Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio for
being a donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with
formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code;
b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as unwilling co-
plaintiff as the heirs of the deceased Conchita
Cabatingan and therefore hereditary co-owners of the
properties subject of this partial decision, as mandated
 under Art. 777 of the New Civil Code;
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis
causa and therefore the four (4) deeds in question executed on
January 14, 1995 are null and void for failure to comply with the
requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills
and testaments.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quos
decision to this Court,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] alleging that:
THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE
LONG-AND-WELL-ESTABLISHED RULINGS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE
CHARACTERIZATION OF DONATIONS AS INTER VIVOS
OR MORTIS CAUSA AND, INSTEAD, PROCEEDED TO
INTERPRET THE DONATIONS IN QUESTION IN A
MANNER CONTRARY THERETO.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as
these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan in consideration
of the love and affection of the donor for the donee, and there is
nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made
in consideration of Cabatingans death.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] In
addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in
case petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition
that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]
In determining whether a donation is one of mortis
causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed;
and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa
is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior
to Cabatingans death.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] The phrase to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis
causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses,
uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis
causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail
herself of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the
kindness and generosity of the DONOR.
xxx
SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of
this Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2)
pages x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
That the donations were made in consideration of the love and
affection of the donor does not qualify the donations as inter vivos
because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same
reason. [if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Well in point is National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda. de
Meimban. [if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] In said case, the questioned donation
contained the provision:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the
DONOR has for the DONEE, the said Donor by these presents
does hereby give, transfer, and convey unto the DONEE, her heirs
and assigns a portion of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (100,000)
SQUARE METERS, on the southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the
above described property. (The portion herein donated is within
Lot 2-B of the proposed amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos.
1 and 2, Psu-109393), with all the buildings and improvements
thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR. (italics
supplied.)" [if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in the
donation executed by Cabatingan. We held in Meimban case that
the donation is a mortis causa donation, and that the above quoted
provision establishes the donors intention to transfer the ownership
and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the
formers death. Further:
As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the
formalities of a will should have been complied with under Article
728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would
produce no effect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78
SCRA 245,253), If the donation is made in contemplation of the
donors death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the
donated properties will pass to the donee because of the donors
death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is
a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will
and testament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif]

We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein

subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As
stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] one of the decisive
characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should
be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is
exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she
really intended that the donation should take effect during her
lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be
transferrred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of
her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the
subject deeds.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis
causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions[if
!supportFootnotes][21][endif]
and as such, said deeds must be executed in
accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testators name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin,
and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court. (n)
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary
public of the donor and the donee, the documents were not
executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted
provisions of law.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in
declaring the subject deeds of donation null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110335. June 18, 2001]
IGNACIO GONZALES, LILIA R. GONZALES,
GUSTAVO R. GONZALES, WIGBERTO R.
GONZALES, GILDA GONZALES-SALUTA,
FERNANDO RAMIREZ, OCTAVIO RAMIREZ,
JR., IGNACIO RAMIREZ, ESMIRNA RAMIREZ,
MERCEDES GONZALES-FAVIZ, JAIME
GONZALES, FEDERICO GONZALES, ROSARIO
GONZALES, PATRICIA GONZALES, DANIEL
GONZALES, ALDO GONZALES, CLAUDIA
GONZALES and AMANDA GONZALES,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ESTANISLAO SALVADOR, MATEO
SALVADOR, ALBERTO SARMIENTO, MAXIMO
ESGUERRA, MAMERTO ANTONIO, VIRGILIO
DE GUZMAN, ANGEL FAJARDO, ABAD DELA
CRUZ, PEDRO FAJARDO, JUANITO DE LARA,
ELIGIO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR MARTINEZ,
EDUARDO DELA CRUZ, JOSE MATIAS,
SOLEDAD ESTRELLA, ROMAN GUINGON,
CIRILO SALVADOR, CATALINA DELA CRUZ,
BERNARDO ESGUERRA, JR., GLORIA
CABANA, PAQUITO CHAVEZ, RENATO
GARCIA, FRANCISCO PASCUAL, WALDO
SALVADOR, MARIO SALVADOR, PEDRO
GARCIA, ALBINO SALVADOR, ANTONIO DE
GUZMAN, AMBROCIO SALVADOR, TERESITA
CAPATE, EDUARDO TALENS, BENIGNO
CARAIG, ERNESTO BERNABE, SERGIO
CARLOS, SIMEON BALINGAY, ANTONIO
NANGEL, TEOFILO BINUYA and WILFREDO
DELA CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Per A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001, this case
which could have been acted upon earlier, was raffled to
undersigned ponente. Essentially, petitioners seek to annul and set
aside the decision dated March 15, 1993 of the Court of Appeals in
its CA-G.R. SP No.26416 which reversed the ruling of then
Secretary of Agrarian Reform Benjamin T. Leong, as well as the
order dated May 17, 1993 denying reconsideration thereof.
The factual antecedents of the instant case may be chronicled
as follows:
The now deceased spouses Ignacio Gonzales and Marina
Gonzales were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural
Land situated at Barrio Fortaleza, Cabanatuan City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2742 and denominated as Lot 551-
C and Lot 552-A. Lot 551-C contains an area of 46.97 hectares
while Lot 552-A contains an area of 37.5735 hectares. Herein
petitioners are the successors-in-interest or the children and
grandchildren of said Gonzales spouses. On the other hand, private
respondents are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have
been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II
either personally or through their predecessors-in-interest.
On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales died intestate and
appointed as administratrix of her estate was petitioner Lilia
Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales
executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share
of the property, specifically Lot No. 551-C, in favor of his 14
grandchildren. The said donation was not registered. Thus, when
Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) took effect on October
21, 1972, the landholdings of the spouses Gonzales were placed
under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and
private respondents were accordingly issued the corresponding
Certificates of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patents. On March
5, 1974, the administratrix Lilia Gonzales filed an application for
retention with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, requesting
that their property be excluded from the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer. After initial investigation, Hearing Officer Melchor
Pagsolingan recommended the denial of said application for
retention and this action was affirmed by Assistant Secretary of
Agrarian Reform Benjamin Labayen, in an order dated September
12, 1977. Apparently, however, a reinvestigation was conducted,
resulting in the present Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
resolution dated February 23, 1983 recommending that the land
subject of the deed of donation, or Lot No. 551-C, be exempt from
Operation Land Transfer. On September 3, 1991, DAR Secretary
Benjamin Leong issued an order declaring that the subject
landholdings covered by the deed of donation are exempt from
Operation Land Transfer, and cancelling the Certificates of Land
Transfer issued in favor of private respondents. In so ruling, the
DAR Secretary reasoned:
As the donation had been duly accepted by the donees who were
already of legal age on the date of the donation and by the legal
guardians of the donees who were still minors at that time, and the
donor having known of said acceptance, the donation had therefore
been perfected in accordance with the law, and the donees had
acquired a valid title to the portion donated on the date the
instrument was executed.
(p. 4, DAR Order.)
Aggrieved by this ruling, private respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which rendered its decision
on March 15, 1993, reversing the action of the DAR and upholding
the certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the above decision
but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated May 17, 1993.
Thus, the instant petition anchored on the following grounds:
A. the CA failed to reconsider that the land subject of this case does not
fall within the purview of P.D. 27;
B. the CA should have found that the evidence clearly shows that the
tenants (private respondents herein) were aware that the land had been
donated by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 27; and
C. the effect of non-registration under the land registration laws are
inapplicable to the present case.
The first and third assigned errors, being interrelated, shall be
jointly discussed.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the property subject of
the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27
took effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
Petitioners insist that the deed of donation executed by Ignacio
Gonzales validly transferred the ownership and possession of Lot
551-C which comprises an area of 46.97 hectares to his 14
grandchildren. They further assert that inasmuch as Lot 551-C had
already been donated, the same can no longer fall within the
purview of P.D. No. 27, since each donee shall have a share of
about three hectares only which is within the exemption limit of
seven hectares for each landowner provided under P.D. No. 27.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order
that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made
in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily,
Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of
ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not
duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not
prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be
inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable
property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in
a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be
considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of
Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds). Although the
non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity,
the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of
third persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey
registered land or affect title thereto. Thus, Section 50 of Act No.
496 (Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 51 of P.D.
No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), provides:
SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner - .
. . But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only
as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned, . . .
Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that
registration in a public registry creates constructive notice to the
whole world (Olizon vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148 [1994]).
Thus, Section 51 of Act No.496, as amended by Section 52 of P.D.
No. 1529, provides:
SEC. 52. Constructive notice upon registration - Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,
filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing or entering.
It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by
Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although in writing
and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law.
For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents
who did not participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge
thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the
donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the
tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. As
previously enunciated by this Court, non-registration of a deed of
donation does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous
transaction (Sales vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992]). So
it is of no moment that the right of the tenants-farmers in this case
was created by virtue of a decree or law. They are still considered
"third persons" contemplated in our laws on registration, for the
fact remains that these tenants-farmers had no actual knowledge of
the deed of donation.
From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that
the unregistered deed of donation cannot operate to exclude the
subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer of
P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule
otherwise would render ineffectual the rights and interests that the
tenants-farmers immediately acquired upon the promulgation of
P.D. No. 27, especially so because in the case at bar, they have
been cultivating the land even before World War II. Accordingly,
the Certificates of Land Transfer and the Emancipation Patents
respectively issued to private respondents over the land in question
cannot be cancelled. It should be noted that one of the recognized
modes of acquiring title to land is by emancipation patent which
aims to ameliorate the sad plight of tenants-farmers. By virtue of
P.D. No. 27, tenants-farmers are deemed owners of the land they
till. This policy is intended to be given effect by a provision of the
law which declares that, "the tenant-farmer, whether in land
classified as landed estate or not, shall be DEEMED OWNER of a
portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not
irritated and three (3) hectares if irrigated" (P.D. No. 27, third
paragraph). It may, therefore, be said that with respect to Lot 551-
C, private respondents became owners thereof on October 27,
1972, the day P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The second error assigned deals with a question of fact. We
have consistently ruled that it is not the function of this Court to
assess and evaluate the evidence all over again, its jurisdiction
being generally limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed by the lower court. Nevertheless, since the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of an
administrative agency such as the Department of Agrarian Reform,
we are compelled to review the records presented both in the Court
of Appeals and the said Department (Deiparine vs. Court of
Appeals, 299 SCRA 668 [1998]). Moreover, in the exercise of
sound discretion and considering the fact that the parties have
relentlessly pursued this case since 1974 or for a period of 27 years
already, this Court has opted to look into the factual bases of the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners maintain that private respondents knew of the
donation as evidenced by the affidavit and testimony of Francisco
Villanueva and Abad Dela Cruz. This contention is unacceptable.
Villanueva testified that as the overseer of Ignacio Gonzales, he
was tasked to inform his co-tenants about the donation. However,
the records show that Villanueva has transferred his right to
cultivate the land to a certain Bemardo Esguerra as early as 1965
(p. 203, Rollo), leading one to logically conclude that Villanueva
was no longer a tenant, much more an overseer, when the donation
was executed in 1972. On the other hand, Dela Cruz, in an
Affidavit executed on May 28, 1992, denied testifying before Atty.
Romeo Bello at the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
to the effect that he and his co-tenants were aware of the donation.
He declared that he had no knowledge of the donation made by
Ignacio Gonzales, nor did he have any idea that an investigation
was conducted by DAR on said matter (pp. 204-205, Rollo).
Likewise, petitioners claim that private respondents had been
sharing their produce with the donees or the grandchildren of
Ignacio Gonzales, suggesting thereby that private respondents have
recognized the donees as the new owners of the land. Again, we
find this argument to be unfounded. The evidence on record
reveals that the tenants-farmers paid their rentals to Ignacio
Gonzales and not to the grandchildren (pp. 150-194, Rollo).
Petitioners contend that the deed of donation was not
registered because of the pendency of the intestate proceedings.
This argument was correctly rejected by the Court of Appeals, in
this wise:
We do not agree with respondents that the failure to register the
deed of donation was due to the pendency of the intestate
proceedings and the fact that the property had been mortgaged to
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), because the pendency of the
intestate proceedings and the real estate mortgaged to the PNB, do
not preclude the registration annotation of the donation at the back
of the certificate of title covering the land.
(p. 4, Court of Appeals Decision.)
Thus, we affirm the conclusion of the appellate court that the
land subject of the donation is covered by Operation Land
Transfer. The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court even if contrary to
these of the trial court or the administrative agency, so long as such
findings are supported by the records or based on substantial
evidence (Tabaco vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 485 [1994]).
While the foregoing doctrine is not absolute, petitioners have not
sufficiently proved that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.
As a final note, our laws on agrarian reform were enacted
primarily because of the realization that there is an urgent need to
alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our
country. Yet, despite such laws, the majority of these farmers still
live on a hand-to-mouth existence. This can be attributed to the
fact that these agrarian laws have never really been effectively
implemented. Certain individuals have continued to prey on the
disadvantaged, and as a result, the farmers who are intended to be
protected and uplifted by the said laws find themselves back in
their previous plight or even in a more distressing situation. This
Court ought to be an instrument in achieving a dignified existence
for these farmers free from pernicious restraints and practices, and
theres no better time to do it than now.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 26416
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT,
respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 43840, entitled Leon Silim, et al. vs. Wilfredo Palma, et
al., which declared null and void the donation made by
respondents of a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public
Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim
and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of
land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of
Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said property should be
used exclusively and forever for school purposes only.[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]
This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia,
the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance
and/or Confirmation of Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-
Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building
was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong
Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the
donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be
released since the government required that it be built upon a one
(1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant
School Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to
officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old
school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable
location which would fit the specifications of the government.
Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma
entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was
exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently,
the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new
school site and the school building previously erected on the
donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated
land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on the
property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied
that he is already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon
Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the
donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to
just file a case in court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for
Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment
of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership
of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo
Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS
before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 21. In its
Decision dated 20 August 1993, the trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] The pertinent portion
of the decision reads:
Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that there was no
breach or violation of the condition imposed in the subject Deed of
Donation by the donee. The exchange is proper since it is still for
the exclusive use for school purposes and for the expansion and
improvement of the school facilities within the community. The
Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of the
donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
In sum, it may be safely stated that the aforesaid transaction of
exchange is a (sic) exception to the law invoked by the plaintiffs
(Art. 764, Civil Code). The donee, being the State had the greater
reciprocity of interest in the gratuitous and onerous contract of
donation. It would be illogical and selfish for the donor to
technically preclude the donee from expanding its school site and
improvement of its school facilities, a paramount objective of the
donee in promoting the general welfare and interests of the people
of Barangay Kauswagan. But it is a well-settled rule that if the
contract is onerous, such as the Deed of Donation in question, the
doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests, which in the instant case, is the donee.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgement is hereby
rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
2. Dismissing the counterclaim for the sake of harmony and
reconciliation between the parties;
3. With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 22
October 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds
that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition
imposed on the donation was violated.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following
issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN INVALID
ACCEPTANCE BY THE DONEE.
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A CONDITION IN THE DONATION.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]

The Court gives DUE COURSE to the petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring the donation null and void for the reason that the
acceptance was not allegedly done in accordance with Articles
745[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] and 749[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] of the New Civil
Code.
We agree.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be
categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or
compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure
or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain
gratuity.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] This is donation in its truest form. On the
other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made
for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which
services do not amount to a demandable debt.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] A
conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in
consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain
conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of
which is inferior than that of the donation given.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee
a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of
donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is
equal to or more than the thing donated.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous
type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms
of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the
parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not
by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard,
Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
 The donation involved in the present controversy is one which
is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build
a school on the donated property.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance
of the donation because:
xxx
Under the law the donation is void if there is no acceptance. The
acceptance may either be in the same document as the deed of
donation or in a separate public instrument. If the acceptance is in
a separate instrument, "the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and his step shall be noted in both instruments.
"Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been
accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly noticed thereof.
(Abellera vs. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85; Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78
SCRA 245). If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not
necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept, But in
this case, it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the
donor and the fact that due notice has been given it must be noted
in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate and that
showing acceptance). Then and only then is the donation perfected.
(11 Manresa 155-11, cited in Vol. II, Civil Code of the Philippines
by Tolentino.)."
This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as
exhibit "A" and "1" to determine whether there was acceptance of
the donation. This Court found none. We further examined the
record if there is another document which embodies the
acceptance, we found one. Although the Court found that in the
offer of exhibits of the defendants, a supposed affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as exhibit
"8" appears to have been offered.
However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by
the defendants have been admitted nor such exhibits appear on
record.
Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed
acceptance was not noted in the Deed of Donation as required
under Art. 749 of the Civil Code. And according to Manresa,
supra, a noted civilist, the notation is one of the requirements of
perfecting a donation. In other words, without such a notation, the
contract is not perfected contract. Since the donation is not
perfected, the contract is therefore not valid.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
xxx
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or
through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose,
or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall
be void.
ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be laid,
it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charge which the donee must
satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be
noted in both instruments.
Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of
exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit
"8," was offered in evidence. However, private respondents now
question this exhibit because, according to them "there is nothing
in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants have been
admitted nor such exhibit appear on record."
Respondents' stance does not persuade. The written
acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial
court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that this
exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
 Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals.
Nowhere in their brief did respondents question the validity of the
donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the acceptance
thereof. If there was such a defect, why did it take respondents
more than ten (10) years from the date of the donation to question
its validity? In the very least, they are guilty of estoppel.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]

Respondents further argue that assuming there was a valid

acceptance of the donation, the acceptance was not noted in the
Deed of Donation as required in Article 749 of the Civil Code,
hence, the donation is void.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a
donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to
the donor. Thus, in Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
the Court held:
There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate
public instrument and that it was duly communicated to the donors.
Even the petitioners cannot deny this. But what they do contend is
that such acceptance was not "noted in both instruments," meaning
the extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance,
as required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two
instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the acceptance was
made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first instrument
contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept this
donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness
and liberality of the donor," the only signatories thereof were
Felipe Balane and Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the
reason for the separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a
month later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other
conclusion that the annulment of the donation for being defective
in form as urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with
the unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision.
However, we find that under the circumstances of the present case,
a literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in
justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions.
It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such as interpretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the
acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In
the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of
the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that
the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud.
Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience
declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the
extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be
placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also
disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as
manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as
later acknowledged by Juan.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately
constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had
knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the
donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association
of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was
being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated
property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange.
The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and
existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that
the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to
the donor.
On respondents' claim, which was upheld by the Court of
Appeals, that the acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio
Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of
a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines, it
is undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the Bureau of
Public Schools. Such being the case, his acceptance was authorized
under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances
may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of
its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever
demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long
as the same are not prohibited by law.
Finally, it is respondents' submission that the donee, in
exchanging the donated lot with a bigger lot, violated the condition
in the donation that the lot be exclusively used for school purposes
only.
What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes"
convey? "School" is simply an institution or place of education.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif]
"Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets
before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim,
object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with the ends sought, an
object to be attained, an intention, etc."[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
"Exclusive" means "excluding or having power to exclude (as by
preventing entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or
use); limiting or limited to possession, control or use.[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif]

Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was
not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with
another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which
is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose
was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a
much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the
purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the
way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong
Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the
limited area of the donated lot.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 132681. December 3, 2001]
RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner, vs. GLICERIA
ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES
REYES and JOSE REYES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a Donation
of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Violeta Quilala over a
parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of
94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila.
The Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos consists of two
pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is
signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta
Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states
merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary
public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of
the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the
witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta
Quilala and the other witness.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] The
Acknowledgment reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon,
Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared
CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No. 19055265
issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to me and to
me known to be the same person who executed the foregoing
instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is her own free
and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages,
including the page on which this acknowledgement is written, has
been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental
witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand margin of page 2
and both pages have been sealed with my notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of
Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.
(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT
No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges
that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalinas
only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-
described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against
petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of
Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter
vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 143015 in the name of
Violeta Quilala. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-
26603 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17.
Subsequently, respondents withdrew their complaint as against
Guillermo T. San Pedro and he was dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although
signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a
notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was
no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument,
thus rendering the donation null and void. Furthermore, the trial
court held that nowhere in Catalinas SSS records does it appear
that Violeta was Catalinas daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred
to therein as an adopted child, but there was no positive evidence
that the adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court found
that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However,
since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court
ruled that respondents deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be
registered. The trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan
Reyes and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property
inter vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina Quilala in
favor of Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala and
to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Estate of
Catalina Quilala;
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration of
the deed of extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1.) and the
issuance by the Register of Deeds of Manila of a transfer
certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the
complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing
of probate proceedings of Catalinas alleged last will and
testament.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATION:
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action without
prejudice to the filing of the necessary probate proceedings by the
interested parties so as not to render nugatory the right of the
lawful heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
of Appeals denied on February 11, 1998.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Hence,
this petition for review, raising the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE DEED OF DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY
INTER-VIVOS IS NOT REGISTRABLE.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE

LOWER COURTS RULING THAT VIOLETA
QUILALA IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA
QUILALA.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]

The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation

executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the
Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a
public instrument in order to be valid,[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] and is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited
by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted,
it is generally considered irrevocable,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] and the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of
both the donor and the donee.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] It may be made in
the same deed or in a separate public document,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
 In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number
of the certificate of title as well as the technical description as the
real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for
and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity. [if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
This was sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed,
donation is legally defined as an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
The donees acceptance of the donation was explicitly
manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which reads:
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation
made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses her
appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of
the DONOR.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,
donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the
Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only
the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for
Violetas failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary
public, the same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e.,
the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of
attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in
the form of public instruments shall be registrable: Provided, that,
every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons
executing the same in the presence of at least two witnesses who
shall likewise sign thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the
free act and deed of the person or persons executing the same
before a notary public or other public officer authorized by law to
take acknowledgment. Where the instrument so acknowledged
consists of two or more pages including the page whereon
acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy which is to be
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is
not contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary
public, except the page where the signatures already appear at the
foot of the instrument, shall be signed on the left margin thereof by
the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses,
and all the pages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well
as the number of pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment.
Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer,
mortgage or encumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the
number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment.
(underscoring ours).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on
which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and
one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the
other witness on the right-hand margin. Surely, the requirement
that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the
left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment
of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is
designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same
has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting
party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify
that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time
of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is
merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate the document. The
purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement
in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied
with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee
before the notary public does not also render the donation null and
void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public
instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure,
it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which
is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of
donation, was made in a public instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts,
can not make a determination of whether Violeta was the daughter
of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These
issues should be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement
proceedings affecting the respective estates of Catalina and
Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation, which we declare
herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its
inofficiousness under Article 771,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] in relation to
Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code. Moreover, property
donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the donors death,[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif]
whether the donation was made to a compulsory
heir or a stranger,[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] unless there is an express
prohibition if that had been the donors intention.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered
dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED
SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA
RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED
SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA
RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of
Imus, Cavite. Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps.
Ignao. Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari1 seek to overturn the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 054562 which
reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84, as well as the order of said
respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration
of its aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a
complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract
and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners
Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84 therein.3
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23,
1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both
deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot
No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite,
containing an area of 964 square meters, more or less. The deed of
donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell
the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the
execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such
condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation
and the property would revert to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still
within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of
Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed
of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the
sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its
assailed decision.4
On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C.
Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein
private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal capacity to
sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus
also filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2)
grounds of which were identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed
by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the cause of
action has prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
likewise filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is not a real
party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does not state a cause
of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said
motions to dismiss and the petitioners had countered with their
respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private respondents, the
trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.5
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals
raising the issues on (a) whether or not the action for rescission of
contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed; and (b)
whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts
(deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription
carries with it the dismissal of the main action for reconveyance of
real property.6
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that
the action has not yet prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants'
complaint is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is hereby ordered
REINSTATED and REMANDED to the lower court for further
proceedings. No Costs.7
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed
their separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by
respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated February 6,
1987,8 hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein
private respondents has already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of
the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at
the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of
the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that
"(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance
with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action
for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same
is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved
herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property
donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial
declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by
the Court of Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the
violation of the condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void
the deed of donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be no
legal necessity anymore to have the donation judicially declared null
and void for the reason that the very deed of donation itself declares
it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the donee
contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of
donation to have the donation judicially rescinded or declared null
and void should the condition be violated, then the phrase reading
"would render ipso facto null and void" would not appear in the deed
of donation.9
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule
that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary
where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for
violation of any of its terms and conditions.10 It called attention to the
holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from
entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract
would cause its cancellation even without court intervention, and that
it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for
rescission of the contract.11 It reiterated the doctrine that a judicial
action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision
granting the power of cancellation.12
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts
involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not
apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil
Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the
general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does
not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a
resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision that
the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of
said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case
of the deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the
foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently
justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for
the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon
non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the recent case of De
Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.13 It was held therein that said stipulation
is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a
contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court,
and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-
compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is
automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that
effect. While what was the subject of that case was an onerous
donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the
rules on contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also
subject to the same rules because of its provision on automatic
revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from parity of
reasons said pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for
automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.14
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for
automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules
on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and
not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code
authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at
the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic
revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the
rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of
the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in
itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no
error in holding that the cause of action of herein private respondents
has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract
prescribes in ten (10) years.15 It is our view that Article 764 was
intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and
when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of
such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated
therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private
respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the
same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents
have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged
breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of
donation that the property donated should not be sold within a period
of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the deed of
donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue
restriction on the rights arising from ownership of petitioners and is,
therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions
in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The condition
imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a
patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee
to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable
attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order
to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of
time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy
may be considered applicable by analogy.1wphi1 Under the third
paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition for
a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its
part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part
of the estate inalienable for more than twenty (20) years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also
necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of property by
gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being an
act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of
prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed anathema to
the basic and actual intent of either the donor or testator. For that
reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed to
prevent an unreasonable departure from the normative policy
expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation
against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition
within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such
condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may
accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of
donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of
sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification
of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for
lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the
deed of donation was not specifically put in issue in the pleadings of
the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or inaction does not
prevent this Court from passing upon and resolving the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation
against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the
very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At the same
time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion to
dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court
and set aside by respondent court, both on the issue of prescription.
That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was
assigned as an error in the present petition. While the issue of the
validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably
related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues
are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if
they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case:16
Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related to an
error properly assigned,17 or upon which the determination of the
question properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the
appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error. 18
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case
to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest
and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions
on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be
subserved by the remand of the case.19 The aforestated
considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with respect to
the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and
another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No.
095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105630. February 23, 2000]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
ENRIQUE P. DE GUZMAN, Spouses RIO RIVERA
and CAROLINA R. DE GUZMAN, THE CITY
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS
CITY and HOECHST PHILS., INC., respondents.
RIO RIVERA and CAROLINA DE GUZMAN,
respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] reversing and setting aside
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, General Santos
City,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] and dismissing the complaint for
reversion of lot 5249, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas.
General Santos City and cancellation of titles, for lack of
merit.
The facts are as follows:
After public bidding held on March 18, 1950, the Board of
Liquidators,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] awarded Lot 5249 Ts-217, a 450
square meter land situated in Dadiangas, General Santos
City, to Eusebio Diones of Takurong, Bubon, Cotabato. On
March 11, 1955, Eusebio Diono transferred his rights over
the lot to Enrique P. de Guzman (de Guzman, for brevity) for
P700.00, evidenced by an Agreement of Transfer of Right.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] On November 12, 1956, the Board of

Liquidators cancelled the award previously given to Eusebio

Diones.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
From the time he purchased the lot, de Guzman did not
occupy it. In 1963, Lucena Ong Ante, another claimant of Lot
5249 Ts-217, authorized Carmen Ty to occupy the land. Ong
Ante paid the corresponding real estate taxes from 1963
until 1980. Carmen Ty remained the occupant of the land
until this time.
On August 12, 1967, de Guzman filed with the Board of
Liquidators, Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 00222-E,[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif] and submitted supporting documents.
On August 29, 1967, the Director of Lands ordered the
award and issuance of a patent in favor of de Guzman.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif] On September 5, 1967, the Department of

Agriculture and Natural Resources approved and issued

Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 814 to de Guzman.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] On September 26, 1967, the Register of

Deeds, General Santos, issued Original Certificate of Title

No. P-29712 in the name of de Guzman.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Sometime in 1973, de Guzman sold the lot to his married
daughter and her husband, Carolina R. de Guzman and Rio
Rivera for P5,000.00. The covering deed of sale could not be
located[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] and Rio Rivera admitted that his
father-in-law Enrique P. de Guzman was not in occupation of
the lot in question.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] On September 4, 1973,
the Register of Deeds of General Santos City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No.T-7203 to spouses Rio Rivera
and Carolina R. de Guzman.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] On March 21,
1974, Lucena Ong-Antes adverse claim was annotated on
the title of the lot.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Meanwhile, on February 13, 1974, spouses Rivera and
Hoeschst, Phils., Inc., as mortgagor and mortgagee,
respectively, executed a deed of real estate mortgage
involving the lot. For failure to settle their obligation, on
October 29, 1977, mortgagee Hoechst Phils., Inc.,
foreclosed on the mortgage and acquired the lot at the
foreclosure sale. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of
Hoechst Phils., Inc. However, for unknown reasons, the real
estate mortgage and certificate of sale were not registered
with the Register of Deeds. Thus, the transfer certificate of
title remained in the name of spouses Rivera.
On January 14, 1981, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
filed with the Court of First Instance, 16th Judicial District,
General Santos City re-amended complaint[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
for reversion of Lot 5249 Ts-217 and cancellation of titles
against Enrique P. de Guzman, spouses Rio Rivera and
Carolina R. de Guzman, the City Registrar of Deeds,
General Santos City and Hoechst Phils., Inc.
In its re-amended complaint,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] petitioner
Republic of the Philippines averred that Enrique P. de
Guzman obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-29712
through fraudulent means. Petitioner contended since Lot
5249 Ts-217 was awarded to Eusebio Diones, hence,
Eusebio Diono had no right to execute a deed of transfer in
favor of Enrique de Guzman. Petitioner maintained that the
documents presented by de Guzman to support his
miscellaneous sales application were either issued by
fictitious persons who were not employees of the Board of
Liquidators, or contained inconsistencies that cast doubt on
their authenticity.
De Guzman was neither in actual possession of the land, nor
made improvements thereto, as he alleged in his sales
application. Actual possession of the land by the applicant
and making improvements thereto were among the legal
requirements to be complied with by an applicant. Thus,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 814 and Original Certificate
of Title No. P-29712 issued to de Guzman pursuant thereto
were null and void. Also, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
2703 in the name of spouses Rivera was null and void for
they were not innocent purchasers for value. Admittedly,
they knew that their vendor de Guzman was not in
possession of the lot. Petitioner asserted that Lot 5249 Ts-
217 must be reverted back to the mass of public domain.
On July 9, 1987, the trial court rendered decision in favor of
petitioner.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] It held that the supporting
documents submitted by de Guzman were falsified, hence,
OCT No. P-29712 issued in his name was obtained through
fraudulent means. Furthermore, the fact that de Guzman
was not in possession of the property disqualified him from
being awarded the sales patent. The trial court ruled that Rio
Rivera and Carolina R. de Guzman were not innocent
purchasers for value since their close relationship with
Enrique P. de Guzman put them on notice of knowledge of a
defect in the acquisition of title to the land. The trial court
ordered the reversion of the land to the mass of public
domain.
The dispositive portion decreed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
plaintiff having preponderantly proven the
allegations of the complaint, judgment is
hereby rendered:
"1. Declaring the Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 814 and
OCT No. P-29712 in the name of Enrique de
Guzman covering Lot 5249, Ts-217, situated at
Dadiangas, General Santos City, and TCT No.
T-7203 in the name of Rio Rivera and Carolina
de Guzman and the Certificate of Sale
executed by the City Sheriff, General Santos
City, dated October 29, 1977, in favor (sic)
Hoechst Philippines, Inc., null and void;
"2. Ordering Rio Rivera and Carolina de Guzman and/or
Hoechst Philippines, Inc., to Surrender to the
Register of Deeds, General Santos City, the
Owners Duplicate of said TCT No. T-7203 or
any subsequent transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of Hoechst Philippines, Inc.
if any, and once surrendered, ordering the
Register of Deeds, General Santos City, to
cancel the owners duplicate original of said
Title No. P-29712 in the name of Enrique de
Guzman and owners duplicate of TCT No. T-
2703 in the name of Rio Rivera and Carolina
de Guzman on file with this (Register of Deeds)
Office;
"3. Ordering the Register of Deeds, General Santos City, to
cancel OCT No. P-29712 and TCT No. T-7203
 in the name of Enrique de Guzman and Rio
Rivera, respectively, and all other subsequent
transfer certificate of titles derived therefrom
should said defendants Enrique P. de Guzman,
Rio Rivera and Carolina de Guzman or
Hoechst Philippines, Inc fail to surrender their
respective certificate of titles over Lot No.
5249, Ts-217;
"4. Ordering the reversion of Lot No. 5249, Ts-217 situated
at Dadiangas, General Santos City, to the
mass of public domain, subject to the
administration and disposition of the Director of
Lands or the Board of Liquidators as the case
maybe, giving preference to qualified and
actual occupant; and
"5. Dismissing the counterclaim with costs against the
defendants.
"SO ORDERED.
"General Santos City, July 9, 1987.
"(s/t) ABEDNEGO O. ADRE
"Judge"[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
On November 10, 1988, spouses Rivera appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
On May 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
reversing the decision of the trial court.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] The
Court of Appeals ruled that when Enrique P. de Guzman
obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-29712, the land
ceased to be part of the public domain. The land became
registered under the Torrens system, converted into a
private registered land, and governed by the Property
Registration Decree (P.D. 1529). Being a private land, the
Director of Lands had neither control nor jurisdiction over the
land. Furthermore, the title became indefeasible after the
expiration of one (1) year from issuance thereof.
The Court of Appeals found that no fraud attended the
issuance of the patent and Original Certificate of Title to de
Guzman. It stated that the discrepancy in the name Diono
and Diones appearing in the records was a mere
typographical error.
The appellate court gave little credit to the investigation
report relied upon by the trial court. It held that no other
evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, was
presented to prove that the documents presented by de
Guzman were issued by fictitious persons or entirely
fabricated.
However, the Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the
trial court that Enrique P. de Guzman and spouses Rivera
were not in possession of the property. The Court of Appeals
concluded that de Guzman misrepresented facts in his
application since he was not the possessor at the time he
applied for the sales patent. Nonetheless, the Court of
Appeals ruled that title founded on fraud or
misrepresentation could not be assailed since more than one
year had lapsed from the issuance of the public land patent.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals held that the land has
passed to innocent purchasers for value, namely, spouses
Rivera. The Court of Appeals argued that mere relationship
to de Guzman, without any other proof of bad faith on the
part of spouses Rivera, did not dispute the presumption that
they were innocent purchasers for value.
On August 19, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines filed
with this Court, a petition for review on certiorari of the Court
of Appeals decision.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
On February 17, 1993, we gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.[if
!supportFootnotes][21][endif] The parties have complied.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines contends that Enrique

de Guzman obtained the Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
814 and OCT No. P-29712 through fraudulent means.
Petitioner avers that the supporting documents submitted by
de Guzman together with his sales application, were either
fabricated or issued by fictitious persons. Thus, both the
sales application and original certificate of title issued in
favor of Enrique P. de Guzman were null and void. Petitioner
avers that respondent spouses Rivera being related by
consanguinity and affinity to de Guzman were not innocent
purchasers for value.
We grant the petition.
Initially, we resolve the question of whether or not the
Director of Lands loses authority over the land the moment
an original certificate of title is issued covering the same.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the issuance of the original
certificate of title converted the lot into a private land, thereby
placing it beyond the authority of the Director of Lands.
We disagree. The authority of the Director of Lands to
investigate conflicts over public lands is derived from Section
91 of the Public Land Act. In fact, it is not merely his right but
his specific duty to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in
securing patents and the corresponding titles thereto. While
title issued on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one
judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title
had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to
determine whether or not fraud had been committed in
securing such title, in order that the appropriate action for
reversion may be filed by the Government.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
The next issue to determine is whether or not Enrique P. de
Guzman validly obtained the sales patent and the original
certificate of title.
We rule in the negative. There is no question that de
Guzman was not in possession of the property. Hence, de
Guzman misrepresented facts in his application for sales
patent. Even the Court of Appeals sustained the factual
finding of the trial court on this point. However, the Court of
Appeals held that an action for cancellation of patent or title
could not be maintained after the lapse of one year from the
date of issuance thereof. As heretofore stated, the ruling is
erroneous.
The next issue is whether or not the validity of the patent and
the original certificate of title can still be assailed after the
lapse of one year from the issuance of the disputed title.
We rule that the State can assail a patent fraudulently issued
by the Director of Lands. "Where public land is acquired by
an applicant through fraud and misrepresentation, the State
may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of
one year."[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] "The indefeasibility of a title does
not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation."[if
!supportFootnotes][24][endif]

The last issue to resolve is whether the spouses Rivera are

innocent purchasers for value.
We agree with the trial court that spouses Rivera are not
innocent purchasers for value. Spouses Rivera are related
by consanguinity and affinity to Enrique P. de Guzman knew
that de Guzman was not in possession of the land. In fact,
Rio Rivera testified that his father-in-law was not in
possession of the lot in question. Carmen Ty was in
possession of the land since 1963 and paid the real estate
taxes thereon. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals
that the presumption of a buyer in good faith must prevail.
"The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good
faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that status. In
discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the
ordinary presumption of good faith."[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] "The
rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the
possession of persons other than the seller must be wary
and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be
regarded as buyer in good faith."[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
"A purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor.
His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his
willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of
a defect in the vendors or mortgagor's title, will not make him
an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value, if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defects as would
have led to its discovery had he acted with the measure of
precaution which may be required of a prudent man in a like
situation."[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
decision of the Court of Appeals. We declare Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. 814 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-
29712 in the name of Enrique P. de Guzman, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-7203 in the name of spouses Rio
Rivera and Carolina R. de Guzman, and all subsequent
transfer certificates of title derived therefrom, as null and
void. We order the reversion to the mass of public domain of
Lot 5249, Ts-217, located in Dadiangas, General Santos
City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111904. October 5, 2000]
SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL
SILARIO GESTOPA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL,
respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review,[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assails the decision[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]of the
Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No.
38266, which reversed the judgment[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of
six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three
deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which are dated
March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor
of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 with
Tax Declaration Nos. 11345 and 11347, respectively. The
second deed pertained to parcel 3, with TD No. 018613. The
last deed pertained to parcel 4 with TD No. 016821. All
deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors
(1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their
lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the
properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed
necessary.
On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of
his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter
vivos[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] covering the aforementioned parcels of
land plus two other parcels with TD Nos. 11351 and 11343,
respectively, again in favor of private respondent Mercedes.
This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlag spouses
shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their
lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell or dispose of the
land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their
prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of
the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes
on them.
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and
Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners,
Mr. and Mrs. Agripino Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the
Danlags executed a deed of revocation[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
recovering the six parcels of land subject of
the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.
On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private
respondent) filed with the RTC a petition against the
Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
over the above parcels of land. She alleged
that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; that
she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to
Diego and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was
still alive. In recognition of the services she rendered, Diego
executed a Deed of Donation on March 20, 1973, conveying
to her the six (6) parcels of land. She accepted the donation
in the same instrument, openly and publicly exercised rights
of ownership over the donated properties, and caused the
transfer of the tax declarations to her name. Through
machination, intimidation and undue influence, Diego
persuaded the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil, to buy
two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said
donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and,
according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had
complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any
act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal
basis in revoking the subject donation and then in selling the
two parcels of land to the Gestopas.
In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags
averred that the deed of donation dated January 16, 1973
was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes
through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming
it was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to
take effect upon the death of the donor. Further, the
donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without
any property at all.
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its
decision, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff:
1. Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivos as
revoked, and, therefore, has (sic) no legal effect and force of law.
2. Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and exclusive owner of
the six (6) parcels of land mentioned in the Deed of revocation
(Exh. P-plaintiff, Exh. 6-defendant Diego Danlag).
3. Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in
favor of spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Gestopa dated
June 28, 1979 (Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh. 18-defendant); Deed of Sale
dated December 18, 1979 (Exh. T plaintiff; Exh. 9-defendant);
Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of Sale
dated June 30, 1975 (Exh. U); Deed of Sale dated March 13,
1978 (Exh. X) as valid and enforceable duly executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law.
4. Ordering all tax declaration issued in the name of Mercedes
Danlag Y Pilapil covering the parcel of land donated cancelled
and further restoring all the tax declarations previously cancelled,
except parcels nos. 1 and 5 described, in the Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos (Exh. "1") and Deed of Sale (Exh. "2") executed by
defendant in favor of plaintiff and her husband.
[5.] With respect to the contract of sale of abovestated parcels of
land, vendor Diego Danlag and spouse or their estate have the
alternative remedies of demanding the balance of the agreed
price with legal interest, or rescission of the contract of sale.
SO ORDERED."[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
In rendering the above decision, the trial court found that
the reservation clause in all the deeds of donation indicated
that Diego Danlag did not make any donation; that the
purchase by Mercedes of the two parcels of land covered by
the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion;
that Mercedes failed to rebut the allegations of ingratitude
she committed against Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes
committed fraud and machination in preparing all the deeds
of donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their
contents.
 Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued
that the trial court erred in (1) declaring the donation dated
January 16, 1973 as mortis causa and that the same was
already revoked on the ground of ingratitude; (2) finding that
Mercedes purchased from Diego Danlag the two parcels of
land already covered by the above donation and that she
was only able to pay three thousand pesos, out of the total
amount of twenty thousand pesos; (3) failing to declare that
Mercedes was an acknowledged natural child of Diego
Danlag.
On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the
trial court. It ruled:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
REVERSED and a new judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the deed of donation inter vivos dated January 16,
1973 as not having been revoked and consequently the same
remains in full force and effect;
2. Declaring the Revocation of Donation dated June 4, 1979 to be
null and void and therefore of no force and effect;
3. Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute and exclusive
owner of the six (6) parcels of land specified in the above-cited
deed of donation inter vivos;
4. Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by Diego Danlag in favor
of spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa dated June 28, 1979
(Exhibits S and 18), Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979
(Exhibits T and 19), Deed of Sale dated September 14, 1979
(Exhibit 8), Deed of Sale dated June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of
Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exhibit X) as well as the Deed of Sale
in favor of Eulalio Danlag dated December 27, 1978 (Exhibit 2)
not to have been validly executed;
5. Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of sale to be null and void
and therefore of no force and effect;
6. Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Silerio Gestopa
to reconvey within thirty (30) days from the finality of the instant
judgment to Mercedes Danlag Pilapil the parcels of land above-
specified, regarding which titles have been subsequently
fraudulently secured, namely those covered by O.C.T. T-17836
and O.C.T. No. 17523.
7. Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch V) at Cebu City to effect such
reconveyance of the parcels of land covered by O.C.T. T-17836
and 17523.
SO ORDERED."[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the
donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to
Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that
the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right
referred to that of merely giving consent; that the donor
changed his intention by donating inter vivos properties
already donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes'
name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated
properties implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that
Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land
donated to her.
Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the
Gestopa spouses, asserting that:
"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH
DIVISION, HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO."[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court
overlooked the fact that the donor did not only reserve the
right to enjoy the fruits of the properties, but also prohibited
the donee from selling or disposing the land without the
consent and approval of the Danlag spouses. This implied
that the donor still had control and ownership over the
donated properties. Hence, the donation was post mortem.
Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos
or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon
the execution of the deed.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
 In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the
deed's provisions must be read together.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
The deed of donation dated January 16, 1973, in favor of
Mercedes contained the following:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the
Donor inspires in the Donee and as an act of liberality and
generosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveys
by way of donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns and
successors, the above-described parcels of land;
That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shall
continue to enjoy all the fruits of the land during his lifetime and
that of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise,
dispose of the lands without the prior consent and approval by the
Donor and her spouse during their lifetime.
xxx
That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further
states that he has reserved for himself sufficient properties in full
ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of a decent
livelihood in consonance with his standing in society.
That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her
thanks and gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the
Donor."[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated
the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is
a mark of a donation inter vivos.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Second,
the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the
properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what
was the need for such reservation if the donor and his
spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, the
donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the
donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. In
the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we
said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is
inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter
vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are
not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in
concluding that the right to dispose of the properties
belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent
was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In
Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during
the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the
donees and donation was already effective during the
donors' lifetime.
The attending circumstances in the execution of the
subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of the
donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties
upon its execution.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Prior to the execution of
donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed
three donations mortis causa. As correctly observed by the
Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the
difference between the two donations. If they did not intend
to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four
lots already donated mortis causa. Petitioners' counter
argument that this proposition was erroneous because six
years after, the spouses changed their intention with the
deed of revocation, is not only disingenious but also
fallacious. Petitioners cannot use the deed of revocation to
show the spouses' intent because its validity is one of the
issues in this case.
Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her
name can not be a basis in determining the donor's intent.
They claim that it is easy to get tax declarations from the
government offices such that tax declarations are not
considered proofs of ownership. However, unless proven
otherwise, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] We find that
petitioners did not overcome this presumption of regularity in
the issuance of the tax declarations. We also note that the
Court of Appeals did not refer to the tax declarations as
proofs of ownership but only as evidence of the intent by the
donor to transfer ownership.
Petitioners assert that since private respondent
purchased two of the six parcels of land from the donor, she
herself did not believe the donation was inter vivos. As aptly
noted by the Court of Appeals, however, it was private
respondent's husband who purchased the two parcels of
land.
As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court,
especially when it is supported by evidence on record, is
binding on us.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] On the alleged purchase by
her husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the
purchase was without private respondent's consent.
Purchase by her husband would make the properties
conjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is
against her self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor and
gives credence to her claim that her husband was
manipulated and unduly influenced to make the purchase, in
the first place.
Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once
accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the
charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif]
The donor-spouses did not invoke any of
these reasons in the deed of revocation. The deed merely
stated:
"WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter Vivos,
our intention thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as we could be sure
that in case of our death, the above-described properties will be
inherited and/or succeeded by Mercedes Danlag de Pilapil; and
that said intention is clearly shown in paragraph 3 of said donation
to the effect that the Donee cannot dispose and/or sell the
properties donated during our life-time, and that we are the one
enjoying all the fruits thereof."[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting the
donor to gather coconut trees and her filing of instant petition
for quieting of title. There is nothing on record, however,
showing that private respondent prohibited the donors from
gathering coconuts. Even assuming that Mercedes
prevented the donor from gathering coconuts, this could
hardly be considered an act covered by Article 765 of the
Civil Code.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Nor does this Article cover
respondent's filing of the petition for quieting of title, where
she merely asserted what she believed was her right under
the law.
Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses
instituted any action to revoke the donation in accordance
with Article 769 of the Civil Code.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
Consequently, the supposed revocation on September 29,
1979, had no legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated August
31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 119730 September 2, 1999

RODOLFO NOCEDA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO,
respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse the decision dated March 31, 1995 of the
respondent Court of Appeals 1 in CA GR CV No. 38126, affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba,
Zambales, 2 in an action by private respondent against petitioner for
recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of
donation.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent Court are as
follows: 3
On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda,
and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively,
of the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956, extrajudicially settled a
parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan,
Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters.
Plaintiff Directo's share was 11,426 square meters, defendant
Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square
meters went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit G). On the same date, plaintiff
Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant
Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister,
Carolina (Exhibit D). However, on August 17, 1981, another
extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff
Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said
land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant
Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-
partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in
the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was
said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters (Exhibit C).
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the
land donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the
portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the
donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985,
defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff
Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of
plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from
defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence,
plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation,
against defendant Noceda before the lower court. During the trial, the
lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be conducted
by Engr. Edilberto Quejada of the Bureau of Lands. After the survey
of Lot 1121 in the presence of both parties, Engr. Edilberto Quejada
reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial
settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 was smaller than the actual
area of Lot 1121 which is 127,298 square meters. Engr. Quejada
subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied by third
persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the road lot, on the
basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August
17, 1981. The portion denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957
square meters was the share of defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the
same area as that of Lot A, was the share of plaintiff Directo, a
portion of which was donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with
an area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit E).
On November 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba,
Zambales rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as
follows: 4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby renders judgment:
(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19,
1981, valid;
(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked;
(c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated
portion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June
1, 1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns;
(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside the
donated portion at the defendant's expense or pay a monthly rental of
P300.00 Philippine Currency;
(e) Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00; and
(f) To pay the cost.
Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the
trial court as follows: 5
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING defendant
Rodolfo Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot "C" of Lot 1121
per Exhibit E, which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo Directo.
Except for this modification, the Decision, dated November 6, 1991,
of the RTC-Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Costs against defendant
Rodolfo Noceda.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with the
following assignment of errors: 6
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IDENTIFIED AS LOT 1121 CONTAINS AN
AREA IN EXCESS OF THAT STATED IN ITS TAX DECLARATION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT 1121
SHOULD BE PARTITIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRA-
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT DATED 17 AUGUST 1981.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADJUDICATING AND
ALLOTING LOT "C" AS APPEARING IN THE SURVEY PLAN
PREPARED BY GEODETIC ENGINEER EDILBERTO QUEJADA TO
THE RESPONDENT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONER USURPED AN AREA ADJUDICATED TO THE
RESPONDENT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVOKING THE DEED OF
DONATION DATED 1 JUNE 1981.
The first issue raised refers to the actual area of the subject lot known
as Lot 1121, which was registered under Tax Declaration No. 16-
0032 under the name of the late Celestino Arbizo. Petitioner claims
that Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 contains only an area of 29,845 sq.
meter; thus the respondent Court exceeded its judicial authority when
it sustained the lower court's findings that the subject property
actually contains an area of 127,289 square meters.
We find the argument unmeritorious. The records disclose that the
trial court in an Order dated June 8, 1987 gave both parties to this
case the chance to have the subject property re-surveyed by a
licensed surveyor to determine the actual area of Lot 1121. 7 Plaintiff
Aurora Directo filed a motion/compliance where she suggested that
Geodetic Engineer Edilberto V. Quejada of the Bureau of Lands, Iba,
Zambales be commissioned to undertake the survey 8 said motion was
also sent to defendant's counsel, Atty. Eufracio Pagunuran for Comment, 9
but Atty. Pagunuran however failed to file his Comment within the given
period. Thus the trial court designated Engineer Quejada to undertake the
survey of Lot 1121. 10 Petitioner Noceda through counsel belatedly filed his
Comment without any opposition to the appointment of Engineer Quejada
but proposed that the latter be tasked to solely (a) re-survey, determine
and identify the metes and bounds of the lot covered by Tax Declaration
No. 16-0032; (b) to identify the areas occupied by the parties therein; and
(c) to conduct the re-survey with notice and in the presence of the parties
therein and their respective counsels. 11 The Comment was not, however,
acted upon by the trial court in view of its earlier Order directing Engineer
Quejada to undertake the survey of the land. 12 Engr. Quejada conducted
the survey with the conformity and in the presence of both parties, taking
into consideration the extrajudicial partition dated August 17, 1981, deed of
donation dated June 1, 1981 executed by plaintiff Aurora Directo in favor of
defendant Rodolfo Noceda and the actual area occupied by the parties, 13
as well as the sketch plan 14 and the technical description of Lot 1121
taken from the Records Section of the Bureau of Lands, Manila. 15 The
report and the survey plan submitted by Engr. Quejada were approved by
the Trial Court in an Order dated December 7, 1987. 16 These
circumstances show that the lower court ordered the re-survey of the lot to
determine the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey was done with the
conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual land area based
on the survey plan which was conducted in the presence of both parties,
showed a much bigger area than the area declared in the tax declaration
but such differences are not uncommon as early tax declarations are, more
often than not, based on approximation or estimation rather than on
computation. 17 We hold that the respondent court did not err in sustaining
the trial court's findings that the actual area of Lot 1121 is 127,289 square
meters.
Petitioner also contends that said judicial determination improperly
encroaches on the rights and claims of third persons who were never
impleaded below; that the subject lot was also declared in the name
of one Cecilia Obispo and a Free Patent over the said lot was also
issued in her name and that there are several residential houses
constructed and existing on Lot 8 of lot 112l, thus these
possessors/occupants of Lot 8 should be joined as defendants for
their non-inclusion would be fatal to respondent's cause of action.
We find no merit in this argument. The respondent Court correctly
ratiocinated on this issue as follows: 18
The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name over
Lot 1121 and several persons occupied a portion thereof did not
make them indispensable parties in the present case. Defendant
Noceda merely presented the tax declarations in the name of Cecilia
Obispo without the alleged free patent in her name. Moreover, no
evidence was presented showing that Cecilia Obispo possessed or
claimed possession of Lot 1121. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for tax purposes are not conclusive evidence of ownership
of property (Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 224 SCRA
285).1wphi1.nt
It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion of Lot 1121,
designated as Lot 8, be impleaded in the present case. Lot 8, though
part of Lot 1121, was excluded by Engr. Quejada in determining the
respective portions of Lot 1121 occupied by plaintiff Directo,
defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo pursuant to the extrajudicial
settlement which they executed on August 17, 1981. The result of the
present suit shall not in any way affect the occupants of Lot 8, since
the issues involved in the present case are the usurpation by
defendant Noceda of the land adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the
propriety of the cancellation of the deed of donation in favor of
defendant Noceda due to his ingratitude to plaintiff Directo.
Notably, defendant's counsel requested for the appearance of Cecilia
Obispo and despite notice to her to appear in court and bring with her
the alleged free patent in her name, 19 she failed to appear and even
failed to intervene to protect whatever interest and right she has over the
subject lot. As to the other possessors of residential houses in Lot 8 of Lot
1121, they are not considered as indispensable parties to this case. A
party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or
subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties
and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete
justice to the parties in court. 20 Private respondent is not claiming the
entire area of Lot 1121 but only a portion thereof which was adjudicated to
her based on the August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement and which was
denominated in the survey plan as Lot C of Lot 1121; thus there was no
need to implead the occupants of Lot 8.
Petitioner further claims that the subject property could not be
partitioned based on the extrajudicial settlement-partition dated
August 17, 1981, since the distributive share of the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo and the area of Lot 1121 stated therein were
different from the extrajudicial settlement executed on June 1, 1981;
that the discrepancies between the two deeds of partition with respect
to the area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of the parties therein
indicated that they never intended that any of the deeds to be the
final determination of the portions of Lot 1121 allotted to them; that
the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 could not
effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned only 29,845
square meters, and not its actual area of 127,298 square meters.
We see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent
Court as follows: 21
The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by
plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981
and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to
supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda in the
extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity
to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the
portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the
donated portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his
knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121
allotted to him. Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement
of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was
29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was found out,
after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the
parties therein occupied an area larger than what they were
supposed to possess per the extrajudicial settlement-partition of
August 17, 1981.
Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the
heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to
conform with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the
heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of
which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by
Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his report submitted to the trial court
where he stated among other things: 22
7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic) that the
area dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement-partition in the name
of Celestino Arbizo was smaller than the computed lots of their actual
occupancy as per survey on the ground;
8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on prepared plan for
ready reference was subdivided, base (sic) on stated sharing as per
EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-PARTITION base (sic) on actual
occupancy.
The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the
actual areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the
percentage proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their
August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of
a third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property
notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing that she is an
heir of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never
impleaded as a party in this case and her interest over Lot 1121 was
not established.
Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling
basis to disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as
follows: 23
In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff that Maria
Arbizo was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half
sister with a common father. On this point, the Court believes the
version of the plaintiff. The Court observes that in the "Extra-Judicial
Settlement-Partition" (Exhibit "C"), Maria Arbizo is named one of the
co-heirs of the defendant, being the widow of his grandfather,
Celestino Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and Agripina do not also
appear in the Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition because
according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares to Maria Arbizo.
And the defendant is one of the signatories to the said Deed of Extra-
judicial Settlement-Partition acknowledged before Notary Public
Artemio Maranon. Under the circumstances, the Court is convinced
that the defendant knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino
Arbizo and he knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his
share, as well as that of Agripina. When the defendant signed the
Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was already an adult since when he
testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50 years old. So that in 1981, he
was already 41 years old. If he did not know all of these, the
defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and signed this
document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. And who
could have a better knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and
Maria Arbizo to Celestino Arbizo than the latter's daughter? Besides,
at the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition
by the plaintiff and defendant, they were still in good terms. There
was no reason for the plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and Agripina
Arbizo over the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant had failed to
support his allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife
and child.
We likewise find unmeritorious petitioner's claim that there exist no
factual and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to
private respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the relocation
survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was based on
the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual
possession by the parties and the technical description of Lot 1121. It
was established by the survey plan that based on the actual
possession of the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement among the
heirs the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of the survey plan
was being occupied by private respondent Aurora Directo and it was
also shown that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter area
donated by private respondent Directo to petitioner is located. There
is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful
share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent
Directo since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left
by their predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still
undetermined since no final determination as to the exact areas
properly pertaining to the parties herein; hence they are still
considered as co-owners thereof.
We do not agree.
In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was
intestate succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by
such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. 24
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing
held in common among those to whom it may belong. 25 The purpose of
partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interest of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in
specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other. 26 And one way of effecting a
partition of the decedent's estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially.
The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A.
Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to
adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-
interest in the following manner:
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion
containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters;
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion; and To
Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion. 27
In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions
indicated by red lines and numbered alphabetically were based on
the percentage proportion in the extrajudicial settlement and the
actual occupancy of each heir which resulted to these divisions as
follows: 28
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m. goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5)
Lot B; 38,872 sq.m. Maria Arbizo (3/5)
Lot C; 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5)
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in
the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is
concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically
described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the
same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable
or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.
29A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership
of the property adjudicated to him. 30
We also find unmeritorious petitioner's argument that since there was
no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis
for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for
finding ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner
Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private
respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area
of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's
act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo
without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered
as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. 31 The law does
not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved
in the action for revocation. 32
Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the
right to enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted
by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first
week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed
on September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed
from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondent's
share in Lot 1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court
rejected such argument in this wise:
Art. 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted to the
donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This
action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the
donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring
the action." As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to
revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge
of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was
possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same
period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by
defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant
Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period
from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff
Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time
the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant
Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired
knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to
institute an action for revocation of her donation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one
(1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of
the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It
is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of
these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing
the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent
proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil
Cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by preponderance of evidence. 33 He who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. 34
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial
evidence on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry
even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual
findings of the trial
court; 35 for it is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again
the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence
on record or the judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. 36 The
jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless
there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion. 37 We find no such showing in this
case.
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had
carefully considered the questions of fact raised below and the
respondent Court's conclusions are based on the evidence on record.
No cogent reason exists for disturbing such findings. 38 We also note
that petitioner in this petition merely rehashed the same issues and
arguments raised in the respondent Court in whose decision we find no
reversible error. Clearly, petitioner failed to present any substantial
argument to justify a reversal of the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs
against appellant.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999]
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR.,
TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON,
AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON,
RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON,
respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif], affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
, which rendered inofficious the donation made by
Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it
impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner to
convey to herein private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial,
that portion of the donated land proportionate to Victor Imperials
legitime.
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square
meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On
July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his
acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired
title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots.
Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contracts
designation as one of Absolute Sale, the transaction was in fact a
donation.
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation,
Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court
of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner herein into signing the said document. The dispute,
however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November 3,
1961[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif], under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized
the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land
donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square
meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds
thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case
of Leoncios death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will
be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above
judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs --- the herein
petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted
son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in
place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who
moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion
for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single
and without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo
Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four
years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as
his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa
filed a complaint for annulment of the donation with the Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by
virtue of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended
complaint in the same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession with the
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on
grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended
complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute
the donation by taking undue advantage of the latters physical
weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said
property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor
Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]

In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had

conveyed sufficient property to Victor to cover his legitime,
consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito, Albay;
(2) reiterated the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised the
additional defenses of prescription and laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the
case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, and was substituted
in this action by his sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto,
Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed Villalon, and his widow,
Esther H. Villalon.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the
legitime of Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of
Leoncios death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square
meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC
went on further to state that petitioners allegation that other
properties existed and were inherited by Victor was not
substantiated by the evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this
manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one
half of that or 16,418 square meters becomes the free portion of
Leoncio which could be absorbed in the donation to defendant.
The other half, which is also 16,418 square meters is where the
legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the
adopted child) in relation to the acknowledged natural child
(defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with the acknowledged natural child
getting of the legitime of the legitimate (adopted) child, in
accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil Code which provides:
The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and
each of the natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-
half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
descendants.
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been
taken) plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 10,940 square meters
while defendant gets 5,420 square meters.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive
period is 30 years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code [if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
, reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the writ of
execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was
issued, and that the original complaint having been filed in 1986,
the action has not yet prescribed. In addition, the trial court
regarded the defense of prescription as having been waived, this
not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTCs Decision of
December 13, 1990 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale
otherwise known as Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series
of 1951 of the Notarial file of Pompeyo B. Calleja which is
considered a donation, is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as
it affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial, which share is
inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are
ordered to be given by defendant a portion of 10,940 square meters
thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to
plaintiffs should include the portion which they are presently
occupying, by virtue of the extended lease to their father Ricardo
Villalon, where the bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any
other portion that may be agreed upon by the parties, otherwise,
this court will appoint a commissioner to undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part
of his legitime and by virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently
proved.
SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of
respondent court: (1) that there was no res judicata, there being no
identity of parties and cause of action between the instant case and
Civil Case No. 1177; (2) that private respondents had a right to
question the donation; (3) that private respondents action is barred
by prescription, laches and estoppel; and (4) that the donation was
inofficious and should be reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be,
between the first and second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] A perusal of the
records leads us to conclude that there is no identity of parties and
of cause of action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil Case
No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his
capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it is true that
upon his death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action,
such does not alter the fact that Victors participation in the case
was in representation of the interests of the original plaintiff,
Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is
to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of the estate[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif], or his heir, as in this
case, for which no court appointment is required.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Petitioners argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity
between Leoncio and private respondents, being heirs and
successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncios cause of action as donor of the property
was fraud, purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the
execution of the donation. While the same circumstances of fraud
and deceit are alleged in private respondents complaint, it also
raises the additional ground of inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioners contentions, inofficiousness of
donation does not, and could not, form part of Leoncios cause of
action in Civil Case No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a cause of action
may arise only upon the death of the donor, as the value of the
donation will then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of
the donor-deceased.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought
the revocation in full of the donation on ground of fraud, the
instant case actually has two alternative causes of action. First, for
fraud and deceit, under the same circumstances as alleged in
Leoncios complaint, which seeks the annulment in full of the
donation, and which the trial court correctly dismissed because the
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served as a
ratification and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects
in voluntariness and consent may have been attendant in the
making of the donation. The second cause of action is the alleged
inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of
Victors legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire
donation, but only of that portion diminishing the legitime.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]
It is on the basis of this second cause of action that
private respondents prevailed in the lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to
contest the donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article
772 of the Civil Code, thus:
Only those who at the time of the donors death have a right to the
legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the
reduction of inofficious donations. xxx
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8,
1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation.
However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor
asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even
moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the
foregoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the
substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement
has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the
execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the
compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not
countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an
express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of
Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or
authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court having
jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177
upon the latters death, his act of moving for execution of the
compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation
of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from
subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article
772. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing
so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772,
and also in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioners other assignment
of errors. Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an
inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive
period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The
sense of both courts that this case is a real action over an
immovable allots undue credence to private respondents
description of their complaint, as one for Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of
Property, which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action
enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime
does not amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde
vs. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif], we declared that what is
brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value
of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is
that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership
upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for
reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the
following instances of reduction or revocation of donations: (1)
four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or
adoption of a child;[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] (2) four years, for non-
compliance with conditions of the donation;[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] and
(3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives
entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for
his or their support.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Interestingly, donations as in
the instant case,[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] the reduction of which hinges
upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled
by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort
to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive
period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations,
required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they
impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of
Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for
inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the
cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the
donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate
may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be
determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio
to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial courts holding that the defense of prescription
had been waived, it not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-
trial, suffice it to say that while the terms of the pre-trial order bind
the parties as to the matters to be taken up in trial, it would be the
height of injustice for us to adhere to this technicality when the fact
of prescription is manifest in the pleadings of the parties, as well as
the findings of fact of the lower courts.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has
prescription set in, private respondents are also guilty of estoppel
by laches. It may be recalled that Leoncio died on January 8, 1962.
Fifteen years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo
Villalon, who also died four years later. While Victor was alive, he
gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation of his
deceased father. As we have discussed earlier, the fact that he
actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did not amount to a
renunciation of his inheritance and does not preclude him from
bringing an action to claim his legitime. These are matters that
Victor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that he is a
lawyer[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]. Ricardo Villalon was even a lessee of a
portion of the donated property, and could have instituted the
action as sole heir of his natural son, or at the very least, raised the
matter of legitime by way of counterclaim in an ejectment case [if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif]
filed against him by petitioner in 1979. Neither
does it help private respondents cause that five years have elapsed
since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they filed their complaint
with the RTC.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a
presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to
assert it.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] We find the necessity for the application
of the principle of estoppel by laches in this case, in order to avoid
an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after
finding the donation to be inofficious because Leoncio had no
other property at the time of his death, the RTC computed the
legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property.
Hence, in its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the
property to private respondents as Victors legitime. This was
upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as
to the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the
following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at
the time of his death; (2) the value of all donations subject to
collation would be added to it.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated,
and not the property itself, which is brought to collation.
Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and
reduced to the extent that it impaired Victors legitime, private
respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the property
donated. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an
immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much as
possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality; [if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif]
(2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of
the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities;[if
!supportFootnotes][26][endif]
or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the
estate, so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be
sold in public auction.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif]
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the
petition on grounds of prescription and laches.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. CV No. 31976, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105944. February 9, 1996]
SPOUSES ROMULO AND SALLY EDUARTE,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and PEDRO CALAPINE (substituted
by ALEXANDER CALAPINE and ARTEMIS
CALAPINE, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] On the part of the donor, it is an
exercise of ones generosity. However, on several occasions,
instead of being accorded recognition and appreciation for
this act of beneficence, the donor ends up as a victim of
greed and ingratitude. This was the fate that befell Pedro
Calapine (herein original plaintiff) constraining him to cause
the revocation of the donation that he made to his niece in
1984. The instant petition for certiorari is interposed by the
spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte, assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29175 which
affirmed the revocation of the donation made by Pedro
Calapine to his niece, Helen Doria, and at the same time
declared petitioners as purchasers in bad faith of the
property donated.
As set out in the appealed decision, the undisputed facts are
as follows:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in San Cristobal, San Pablo City, with an area of 12,199
square meters, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
2129 (Exhibits A and 1). On April 26, 1984, he executed a deed
entitled Pagbibigay-Pala (Donacion Inter-Vivos) ceding one-half
portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria (Exhibit B).
On July 26, 1984, another deed identically entitled was purportedly
executed by Pedro Calapine ceding unto Helen S. Doria the whole
of the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-2129 (Exhibits C and
D), on the basis of which said original certificate was cancelled
and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23205 was
issued in her name (Exhibits G and 2).
On February 26, 1986, Helen S. Doria donated a portion of 157
square meters of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-23205
to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. (Exhibit H), on the
basis of which said transfer certificate of title was cancelled and
TCT No. T-24444 was issued in its name covering 157 square
meters (Exhibit 2-A) and TCT No. T-24445, in the name of Helen
S. Doria covering the remaining portion of 12,042 square meters
(Exhibit 3).
On March 25, 1988, Helen S. Doria sold, transferred and conveyed
unto the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-24445, save the portion of 700 square
meters on which the vendors house had been erected (Exhibits I
and 3-F), on the basis of which TCT No. 24445 was cancelled and
in lieu thereof TCT No. T-27434, issued in the name of the
vendees (Exhibit 4).
Claiming that his signature to the deed of donation (Exhibits C and
D) was a forgery and that, she was unworthy of his liberality,
Pedro Calapine brought suit against Helen S. Doria, the Calauan
Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and
Sally Eduarte to revoke the donation made in favor of Helen S.
Doria (Exhibit B), to declare null and void the deeds of donation
and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian
Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte
(Exhibits H, I and 3-F) and to cancel TCT Nos. T-24444, 24445
and T-27434.
Answering the complaint, the defendants spouses denied
knowledge of the first deed of donation and alleged that after a part
of the property was donated to the defendant Calauan Christian
Reformed Church, Inc., the remaining portion thereof was sold to
them by the defendant Helen S. Doria; and that the plaintiffs
purported signature in the second deed of donation was his own,
hence genuine. They prayed that the complaint against them be
dismissed; that upon their counterclaim, the plaintiff be ordered to
pay them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees; and
that upon their cross-claim the defendant Helen S. Doria be
ordered to reimburse them the purchase price of P110,000 and to
pay them moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees (pp.
23-31, rec.).
The defendant Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc.
manifested in its answer the willingness to reconvey to the plaintiff
that part of the property donated to it by Helen S. Doria (pp. 36-38,
rec.). And having executed the corresponding deed of
reconveyance, the case as against it was dismissed(pp. 81-83; 84,
rec.).
The defendants Helen S. Doria and the City Assessor and the
Registrar of Deeds of San Pablo City did not file answers to the
plaintiffs complaint.
After the plaintiffs death on August 27, 1989, on motion, he was
substituted by his nephews Alexander and Artemis Calapine upon
order of the Court (pp. 147-152; 250, rec.).
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 30, San Pablo City rendered judgment, the dispositive part
of which provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
by the Court in the instant case in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant Eduartes to wit:
1. DECLARING as it is hereby declared, the revocation of the
Deed of Donation dated April 26,1984;
2. ANNULLING, voiding, setting aside and declaring of no force
and effect the Deed of Donation dated July 26, 1984, the deed of
absolute sale executed on March 25, 1988 by and between spouses
Eduartes and Helen Doria, and the Transfer Certificate of Title No-
T-27434 issued under the name of spouses Romulo and Sally
Eduarte;
3. ORDERING the office of the Register of Deeds, San Pablo City,
to cancel TCT No. T-27434 or any other adverse title emanating
from OCT No. P-2129 and in lieu thereof, to issue a new transfer
certificate of title covering the subject property under the names of
the substitute-plaintiffs Alexander and Artemis both surnamed
Calapine, after payment of the corresponding fees and taxes
therefor; and
4. ORDERING defendant Helen Doria to pay substitute-plaintiffs
the sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
Judgment on the cross-claim of defendant Eduartes against Helen
Doria is further rendered by ordering the latter to pay the former
the sum of P110,000.00 with legal interest thereon starting from
March 25, 1988 until full payment, and the further sum of
P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
The counterclaim of defendant Eduartes against plaintiff is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against defendant Helen Doria in both the complaint and the
cross-claim (pp. 11-12, decision, pp. 264-265, rec.).
Only the defendants Eduarte spouses took an appeal (p. 266, rec.),
claiming that the trial court erred -
1. In annulling, voiding, setting aside, and declaring of no force
and effect -
(a) the deed of donation (Exhibits C and 1-A), dated July
26,1984;
(b) the deed of absolute sale (Exhibits 1 and 3-E) executed on
March 25, 1988 by and between Spouses Eduartes and Helen
Doria;
(c) TCT No. T-27434 (Exhibit 4) issued in the name of spouses
Romulo Eduarte and Sally Eduarte; and
in revoking the deed of donation (Exhibit B) dated April 26,1984;
2. In declaring the appellants Eduartes buyers in bad faith;
3. In not finding the plaintiffs guilty of estoppel by silence and/or
guilty of suppression of evidence instead of finding the
appellants Eduartes guilty of suppression of evidence; and
4. In finding that the signature of Pedro Calapine in the deed of
donation (Exhibits C and 1-A) dated July 26,1984 a forgery
based on the opposite findings of the handwriting experts
presented by each party and in the absence of the testimony of
Pedro Calapine who was then still alive (pp. 1-2, appellants
brief.)[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
In its decision dated April 22, 1992,[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal
and affirmed the decision of the trial court. Respondent court
was in complete accord with the trial court in giving more
credence to the testimony of private respondents expert
witness, NBJ document examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who
found Pedro Calapines signature in the second deed of
donation to be a forgery. It also ruled that by falsifying Pedro
Calapines signature, Helen Doria committed an act of
ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the
donation made in her favor in accordance with Article 765 of
the Civil Code. Furthermore, respondent court upheld the
trial courts finding that petitioners are not buyers in good
faith of the donated property as they failed to exercise due
diligence in verifying the true ownership of the property
despite the existence of circumstances that should have
aroused their suspicions.
Petitioners are now before us taking exception to the
foregoing findings of respondent Court of Appeals and
contending that the same are not in accord with the law and
evidence on record.
Anent the revocation of the first deed of donation, petitioners
submit that paragraph (1) of Article 765 of the Civil Code
does not apply in this case because the acts of ingratitude
referred to thereih pertain to offenses committed by the
donee against the person or property of the donor.
Petitioners argue that as the offense imputed to herein
donee Helen Doria - falsification of a public document - is
neither a crime against the person nor property of the donor
but is a crime against public interest under the Revised
Penal Code, the same is not a ground for revocation.
In support of this contention, petitioners cite the following
portions found in Tolentinos Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code:
Offense against Donor - x x x. The crimes against the person of the
donor would include not only homicide and physical injuries, but
also illegal detention, threats and coercion; and those against honor
include offenses against chastity and those against the property,
include robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, arson, damages, etc.
(5 Manresa 175-176).[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]
This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. The
full text of the very same commentary cited by petitioners
belies their claim that falsification of the deed of donation is
not an act of ingratitude, to wit:
Offense Against Donor. All crimes which offend the donor show
ingratitude and are causes for revocation. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the donee who commits adultery with the wife of the
donor, gives cause for revocation by reason of ingratitude. The
crimes against the person of the donor would include not only
homicide and physical injuries, but also illegal detention, threats,
and coercion; those against honor include offenses against chastity;
and those against the property, include robbery, theft, usurpation,
swindling, arson, damages, etc. [Manresa 175-176].[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]
(Italics supplied).
Obviously, the first sentence was deleted by petitioners
because it totally controverts their contention. As noted in
the aforecited opinion all crimes which offend the donor
show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. Petitioners
attempt to categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore
unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and
coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the
donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes
against personal liberty and security under the Revised
Penal Code.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
Petitioners also impute grave error to respondent Court of
Appeals in finding that the second deed of donation dated
July 26, 1984 was falsified. Petitioners deplore the fact that
more credence was given to the testimony of the NBI
handwriting expert who found Pedro Calapines signature in
the second deed of donation to be a forgery despite the
existence of controverting testimony by PC-INP Crime
Laboratory (PCCL) Chief Document Examiner which
petitioners adduced as evidence on their part.
We are not persuaded. Respondent Court of Appeals and
the trial court cannot be faulted for giving more weight and
credence to the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert
considering that the examination of the said witness proved
to be complete, thorough and scientific.
In gauging the relative weight to be given to the opinion of
handwriting experts, we adhere to the following standards:
We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the
formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general
character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary
and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent
course, and is, therefore itself permanent.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
Confronted with contradicting testimonies from two
handwriting experts, the trial court and respondent Court of
Appeals were convinced by the opinion of the NB!
handwriting expert as it was more exhaustive, in contrast
with the testimony of petitioners witness from the PCCL
which was discarded on account of the following flaws:
The Court is not convinced with Cruzs explanations. Apart from
the visual inconsistencies, i.e., the strokes with which some letters
were made, the variety in the sizes of the letters, the depth, the
difference in the slant which the Court itself observed in its own
examination of both the questioned signatures and those standard
specimen signatures, there is evidence showing that Cruz did not
make a thorough examination of all the signatures involved in this
particular issue. Thus even in the report submitted by the PCCL it
was admitted that they omitted or overlooked the examination of at
least three (3) standard specimen signatures of Pedro Calapine
which were previously subject of the NBI examination marked as
Exhibits S-9, S-10 and S-il. When questioned regarding this
oversight, Cruz testified that in his opinion, the inclusion or non-
inclusion of said exhibits in their examination will not affect the
same and they would have arrived at the same conclusion anyway.
Again, when asked why they did not bother to have the original
copies of the documents being questioned (Exhs. Q-1 through Q-3)
for their examination, Cruz replied that they are using a special
film so it will not matter whether the documents being examined
are the original or a mere photocopy (TSN 8, 10, 12 and 26,
Hearing of Nov. 23, 1989).
The Court will not attempt to make its own conclusion or
resolution on such a technical issue as the matter at hand in the
light of the cavalier attitude of Cruz. In fine, between the
examinations made by the two witnesses, that of Albaceas proved
to be complete, thorough and scientific and is worthy of credence
and belief.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The afore-quoted findings confirm beyond doubt the failure of
petitioners expert witness to satisfy the above-mentioned criteria
for evaluating the opinion of handwriting experts. At the same
time, petitioners witness failed to rebut the convincing testimony
of the NB! handwriting expert presented by private respondents.
We therefore find no reason to deviate from the assailed
conclusions as the same are amply supported by the evidence on
record.
Finally, proceeding to the crucial issue that directly affects herein
petitioners, it is reiterated that petitioners are buyers in good faith
of the donated property, and therefore, it was grave error to annul
and set aside the deed of sale executed between petitioners and
donee Helen Doria.
In adjudging petitioners as buyers in bad faith, respondent
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding that the
attendant circumstances, that is, the presence of other
occupants as well as houses built of strong materials and
fruit bearing trees in the subject land, should have aroused
the suspicion of petitioners and impelled them to exercise
due diligence in verifying the true ownership of the property
being sold. Petitioners dispute the tower courts conclusion
and argue that although there were other occupants in the
subject property, no adverse claim was made by the latter as
they were mere tenants therein, thus, petitioners were not
obliged to make any further inquiry because the property
being sold was covered by a certificate of title under Helen
Dorias name.
We agree with petitioners. The rule is well-settled that mere
possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a registered
torrens title to real property.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Moreover,
reliance on the doctrine that a forged deed can legally be the
root of a valid title is squarely in point in this case:
Although generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and
conveys no title, however there are instances when such a
fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One
such instance is where the certificate of title was already
transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and
while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon
what appeared in the certificate.
Where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what
the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness
of the certificate of title which the Torrens System seeks to insure
would entirely be futile and nugatory.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
When herein petitioners purchased the subject property from
Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T-
23205 under the latters name. And although Helen Dorias
title was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the
rights of herein petitioners absent any showing that they had
any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus,
they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title
which appeared to be valid on its face and sans any
annotation or notice of private respondents adverse claim.
Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court,
petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value as they
bought the disputed property without notice that some other
person has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full
price for the same at the time of the purchase or before they
had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in
the property.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Respondent Court therefore committed a reversible error
when it affirmed the ruling of the trial court annulling and
setting aside the deed of absolute sale dated March 25,
1988 between petitioners and Helen
Doria, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434
issued under petitioners name, the established rule being
that the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be
respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed
by the seller in securing his title.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
!n this regard, it has been held that the proper recourse of
the true owner of the property who was prejudiced and
fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action
for damages against those who caused or employed the
fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the
Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of
damages against the Assurance Fund.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Conformably with the foregoing, having established beyond
doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the
disputed property which she subsequently sold to
petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be adjudged liable to
private respondents, and not to petitioners as declared by
the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the
resulting damages to the true owner and original plaintiff,
Pedro Calapine.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the
appealed decision is hereby MODIF!ED. The portions of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
Branch 30, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 29175 which ordered the following:
xxx xxx xxx;
2. ANNULLING, voiding, setting aside and declaring of no force
and effect x x x , the deed of absolute sale executed on March 25,
1988 by and between spouses Eduartes and Helen Doria, and the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434 issued under the name of
spouses Romulo and Sally Eduarte;
3. ORDERING the office of the Register of Deeds, San Pablo City,
to cancel TCT No. T-27434 or any other adverse title emanating
from OCT No. P-2129 and in lieu thereof, to issue a new transfer
certificate of title covering the subject property under the names of
the substitute-plaintiffs Alexander and Artemi s both surnamed
Calapine, after payment of the corresponding fees and taxes
therefor: and
4 xxx . xxx xxx
Judgnient on the cross-claim of defendant Eduartes against Helen
Doria is further rendered by ordering the latter to pay the former
the sum of P110,000.00 with legal interest thereon starting from
March 25, 1988 until full payment, x x x.
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Instead, Helen Doria is hereby ordered to pay herein private
respondents the sum of P110,000.00 with legal interest
counted from March 25, 1988 until full payment, as damages
for the resulting loss to original plaintiff Pedro Calapine.
In all other respects, the appealed decision is hereby
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97882. August 28, 1996]
THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon. ANTONIO ABAD
SANTOS, in his capacity as MAYOR of Angeles
City, and the SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
OF THE CITY OF ANGELES, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TIMOG SILANGAN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving this petition, the Court addressed the questions
of whether a donor of open spaces in a residential
subdivision can validly impose conditions on the said
donation; whether the city government as donee can build
and operate a drug rehabilitation center on the donated land
intended for open space; and whether the said donation may
be validly rescinded by the donor.
Petitioners claim they have the right to construct and operate
a drug rehabilitation center on the donated land in question,
contrary to the provisions stated in the amended Deed of
Donation.
On the other hand, private respondent, owner/developer of
the Timog Park residential subdivision in Angeles City,
opposed the construction and now, the operation of the said
center on the donated land, which is located within said
residential subdivision.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] dated October 31, 1990, which affirmed the

decision[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] of the Regional Trial Court of

Angeles City Branch 56,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] dated February 15,
1989.
The Antecedents
In a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1984, subsequently
superseded by a Deed of Donation dated September 27,
1984, which in turn was superseded by an Amended Deed
of Donation dated November 26, 1984, private respondent
donated to the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated in
Barrio Pampang, City of Angeles, with an aggregate area of
50,676 square meters, more or less, part of a bigger area
also belonging to private respondent. The amended deed[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]provided, among others, that:

2. The properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for

the site of the Angeles City Sports Center (which excludes
cockfighting) pursuant to the plans to be submitted within six (6)
months by the DONEE to the DONOR for the latters approval,
which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld as long as
entire properties donated are developed as a Sports Complex. Any
change or modification in the basic design or concept of said
Sports Center must have the prior written consent of the DONOR.
3. No commercial building, commercial complex, market or any
other similar complex, mass or tenament (sic) housing/buildings(s)
shall be constructed in the properties donated nor shall
cockfighting, be allowed in the premises.
4. The construction of the Sports Center shall commence within a
period of one (1) year from 09 March 1984 and shall be completed
within a period of five (5) years from 09 March 1984.
xxx xxx xxx
6. The properties donated (which is more than five (5) percent of
the total land area of the DONORs subdivision) shall constitute the
entire open space for DONORs subdivision and all other lands or
areas previously reserved or designated, including Lot 1 and Lot
2A of Block 72 and the whole Block 29 are dispensed with, and
rendered free, as open spaces, and the DONEE hereby agrees to
execute and deliver all necessary consents, approvals,
endorsements, and authorizations to effect the foregoing.
7. The properties donated are devoted and described as open
spaces of the DONORs subdivision, and to this effect, the
DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation, releases the DONOR
and/or assumes any and all obligations and liabilities appertaining
to the properties donated.
8. Any substantial breach of the foregoing provisos shall entitle the
DONOR to revoke or rescind this Deed of Donation, and in such
eventuality, the DONEE agrees to vacate and return the premises,
together with all improvements, to the DONOR peacefully without
necessity of judicial action.
On July 19, 1988, petitioners started the construction of a
drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land.
Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested such
action for being violative of the terms and conditions of the
amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of
its clients and residents. Private respondent also offered
another site for the rehabilitation center. However,
petitioners ignored the protest, maintaining that the
construction was not violative of the terms of the donation.
The alternative site was rejected because, according to
petitioners, the site was too isolated and had no electric and
water facilities.
On August 8, 1988, private respondent filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, in Angeles City against
the petitioners, alleging breach of the conditions imposed in
the amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation of
the donation and damages, with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order to halt the construction of the
said center.
On August 10, 1988, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from further
proceeding with the construction of the center, which at that
time was already 40% complete.
However, the trial court denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction based on the prohibition in Presidential Decree
No. 1818.
In their Answer with counterclaim, petitioners admitted the
commencement of the construction but alleged inter alia that
the conditions imposed in the amended deed were contrary
to Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise
known as the Subdivision Ordinance of the Municipality of
Angeles.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
On October 15, 1988, private respondent filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the ground that the main
defense of the petitioners was anchored on a pure question
of law and that their legal position was untenable.
The petitioners opposed, contending that they had a
meritorious defense as (1) private respondents had no right
to dictate upon petitioners what to do with the donated land
and how to do it so long as the purpose remains for public
use; and (2) the cause of action of the private respondent
became moot and academic when the Angeles City Council
repealed the resolution providing for the construction of said
drug rehabilitation center and adopted a new resolution
changing the purpose and usage of said center to a sports
development and youth center in order to conform with the
sports complex project constructed on the donated land.
On February 15, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, in
relevant part reading as follows:
x x x the Court finds no inconsistency between the conditions
imposed in the Deeds of Donation and the provision of the
Subdivision Ordinance of the City of Angeles requiring
subdivisions in Angeles City to reserve at least one (1) hectare in
the subdivision as suitable sites known as open spaces for parks,
playgrounds, playlots and/or other areas to be dedicated to public
use. On the contrary, the condition requiring the defendant city of
Angeles to devote and utilize the properties donated to it by the
plaintiff for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center conforms
with the requirement in the Subdivision Ordinance that the
subdivision of the plaintiff shall be provided with a playground or
playlot, among others.
On the other hand the term public use in the Subdivision
Ordinance should not be construed to include a Drug
Rehabilitation Center as that would be contrary to the primary
purpose of the Subdivision Ordinance requiring the setting aside of
a portion known as Open Space for park, playground and playlots,
since these are intended primarily for the benefit of the residents of
the subdivision. While laudable to the general public, a Drug
Rehabilitation Center in a subdivision will be a cause of concern
and constant worry to its residents.
As to the third issue in paragraph (3), the passage of the Ordinance
changing the purpose of the building constructed in the donated
properties from a Drug Rehabilitation Center to a Sports Center
comes too late. It should have been passed upon the demand of the
plaintiff to the defendant City of Angeles to stop the construction
of the Drug Rehabilitation Center, not after the complaint was
filed.
Besides, in seeking the revocation of the Amended Deed of
Donation, plaintiff also relies on the failure of the defendant City
of Angeles to submit the plan of the proposed Sports Center within
six (6) months and construction of the same within five years from
March 9, 1984, which are substantial violations of the conditions
imposed in the Amended Deed of Donation.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Enjoining defendants, its officers, employees and all persons
acting on their behalf to perpetually cease and desist from
constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center or any other building or
improvement on the Donated Land.
(2) Declaring the amended Deed of Donation revoked and
rescinded and ordering defendants to peacefully vacate and return
the Donated Land to plaintiff, together with all the improvements
existing thereon. And,
(3) Denying the award of compensatory or actual and exemplary
damages including attorneys fees.
NO PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COST.
In March 1989, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal. On
April 15, 1989, while the appeal was pending, petitioners
inaugurated the Drug Rehabilitation Center.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
On April 26, 1991, the respondent Court rendered the
assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the trial court.
Subsequently, the petitioners motion for reconsideration was
also denied for lack of merit.
Consequently, this Petition for Review.
The Issues
The key issues [if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] raised by petitioners may be
restated as follows:
I. Whether a subdivision owner/developer is legally bound under
Presidential Decree No. 1216 to donate to the city or municipality
the open space allocated exclusively for parks, playground and
recreational use.
II. Whether the percentage of the open space allocated exclusively
for parks, playgrounds and recreational use is to be based on the
gross area of the subdivision or on the total area reserved for open
space.
III. Whether private respondent as subdivision owner/developer
may validly impose conditions in the Amended Deed of Donation
regarding the use of the open space allocated exclusively for parks
and playgrounds.
IV. Whether or not the construction of the Drug Rehabilitation
Center on the donated open space may be enjoined.
V. Whether the donation by respondent as subdivision
owner/developer of the open space of its subdivision in favor of
petitioner City of Angeles may be revoked for alleged violation of
the Amended Deed of Donation.
Central to this entire controversy is the question of whether
the donation of the open space may be revoked at all.
First Issue: Developer Legally Bound to Donate Open
Space
The law involved in the instant case is Presidential Decree
No. 1216, dated October 14, 1977,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] which
reads:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1216
Defining Open Space In Residential Subdivisions And Amending
Section 31 Of Presidential Decree No. 957 Requiring Subdivision
Owners To Provide Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks And Reserve Open
Space For Parks Or Recreational Use.
WHEREAS, there is a compelling need to create and maintain a
healthy environment in human settlements by providing open
spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks as may be deemed suitable to
enhance the quality of life of the residents therein;
WHEREAS, such open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in
residential subdivisions are for public use and are, therefore,
beyond the commerce of men;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 953 at least thirty
per cent (30%) of the total area of a subdivision must be reserved,
developed and maintained as open space for parks and recreational
areas, the cost of which will ultimately be borne by the lot buyers
which thereby increase the acquisition price of subdivision lots
beyond the reach of the common mass;
WHEREAS, thirty percent (30%) required open space can be
reduced to a level that will make the subdivision industry viable
and the price of residential lots within the means of the low income
group at the same time preserve the environmental and ecological
balance through rational control of land use and proper design of
space and facilities;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757, government
efforts in housing, including resources, functions and activities to
maximize results have been concentrated into one single agency,
namely, the National Housing Authority;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and decree:
SECTION 1. For purposes of this Decree, the term open space
shall mean an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds,
recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals,
health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and
amenities.
SECTION 2. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open Spaces The owner
as developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate roads, alleys
and sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more,
the owner or developer shall reserve thirty per cent (30%) of the
gross area for open space. Such open space shall have the
following standards allocated exclusively for parks, playgrounds
and recreational use:
a. 9% of gross area for high density or social housing (66 to 100
family lots per gross hectare).
b. 7% of gross area for medium-density or economic housing (21
to 65 family lots per gross hectare).
c. 3.5% of gross area for low-density or open market housing (20
family lots and below per gross hectare).
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use
shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable. The plans
of the subdivision project shall include tree planting on such parts
of the subdivision as may be designated by the Authority.
Upon their completion certified to by the Authority, the roads,
alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or
developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for
the local governments to accept provided, however, that the parks
and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association
of the project with the consent of the city or municipality
concerned. No portion of the parks and playgrounds donated
thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or purposes.
SECTION 3. Sections 2 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 953 are
hereby repealed and other laws, decrees, executive orders,
institutions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
these provisions are also repealed or amended accordingly.
SECTION 4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Pursuant to the wording of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957 as above
amended by the aforequoted P.D. No. 1216, private
respondent is under legal obligation to donate the open
space exclusively allocated for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use to the petitioner.
This can be clearly established by referring to the original
provision of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957, which reads as follows:
SECTION 31. Donation of roads and open spaces to local
government. The registered owner or developer of the subdivision
or condominium project, upon completion of the development of
said project may, at his option, convey by way of donation the
roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or
municipality wherein the project is located. Upon acceptance of the
donation by the city or municipality concerned, no portion of the
area donated shall thereafter be converted to any other purpose or
purposes unless after hearing, the proposed conversion is approved
by the Authority. (Italics supplied)
It will be noted that under the aforequoted original provision,
it was optional on the part of the owner or developer to
donate the roads and open spaces found within the project
to the city or municipality where the project is located.
Elsewise stated, there was no legal obligation to make the
donation.
However, said Sec. 31 as amended now states in its last
paragraph:
Upon their completion x x x, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and
playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or developer to the city
or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local government
to accept; provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may
be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with the
consent of the city or municipality concerned. x x x.
It is clear from the aforequoted amendment that it is no
longer optional on the part of the subdivision
owner/developer to donate the open space for parks and
playgrounds; rather there is now a legal obligation to donate
the same. Although there is a proviso that the donation of
the parks and playgrounds may be made to the homeowners
association of the project with the consent of the city of
municipality concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is
still obligated under the law to donate. Such option does not
change the mandatory character of the provision. The
donation has to be made regardless of which donee is
picked by the owner/developer. The consent requirement
before the same can be donated to the homeowners
association emphasizes this point.
Second Issue: Percentage of Area for Parks and
Playgrounds
Petitioners contend that the 3.5% to 9% allotted by Sec. 31
for parks, playgrounds and recreational uses should be
based on the gross area of the entire subdivision, and not
merely on the area of the open space alone, as contended
by private respondent and as decided by the respondent
Court.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]
The petitioners are correct. The language of Section 31 of
P.D. 957 as amended by Section 2 of P.D. 1216 is wanting
in clarity and exactitude, but it can be easily inferred that the
phrase gross area refers to the entire subdivision area. The
said phrase was used four times in the same section in two
sentences, the first of which reads:
x x x For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner
or developer shall reserve thirty per cent (30%) of the gross area
for open space. x x x.
Here, the phrase 30% of the gross area refers to the total
area of the subdivision, not of the open space. Otherwise,
the definition of open space would be circular. Thus, logic
dictates that the same basis be applied in the succeeding
instances where the phrase open space is used, i.e., 9% of
gross area . . . 7% of gross area . . . 3.5% of gross area . . .
Moreover, we agree with petitioners that construing the 3.5%
to 9% as applying to the totality of the open space would
result in far too small an area being devoted for parks,
playgrounds, etc., thus rendering meaningless and defeating
the purpose of the statute. This becomes clear when viewed
in the light of the original requirement of P.D. 953 (Requiring
the Planting of Trees in Certain Places, etc.), Section 2 of
which reads:
Sec. 2. Every owner of land subdivided into
residential/commercial/industrial lots after the effectivity of this
Decree shall reserve, develop and maintain not less than thirty
percent (30%) of the total area of the subdivision, exclusive of
roads, service streets and alleys, as open space for parks and
recreational areas.
No plan for a subdivision shall be approved by the Land
Registration Commission or any office or agency of the
government unless at least thirty percent (30%) of the total area of
the subdivision, exclusive of roads, service streets and alleys, is
reserved as open space for parks and recreational areas x x x.
To our mind, it is clear that P.D. 1216 was an attempt to
achieve a happy compromise and a realistic balance
between the imperatives of environmental planning and the
need to maintain economic feasibility in subdivision and
housing development, by reducing the required area for
parks, playgrounds and recreational uses from thirty percent
(30%) to only 3.5% - 9% of the entire area of the subdivision.
Third Issue: Imposition of Conditions in Donation of
Open Space
Petitioners argue that since the private respondent is
required by law to donate the parks and playgrounds, it has
no right to impose the condition in the Amended Deed of
Donation that the properties donated shall be devoted and
utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center.
It cannot prescribe any condition as to the use of the area
donated because the use of the open spaces is already
governed by P.D. 1216. In other words, the donation should
be absolute. Consequently, the conditions in the amended
deed which were allegedly violated are deemed not written.
Such being the case, petitioners cannot be considered to
have committed any violation of the terms and conditions of
the said amended deed, as the donation is deemed
unconditional, and it follows that there is no basis for
revocation of the donation.
However, the general law on donations does not prohibit the
imposition of conditions on a donation so long as the
conditions are not illegal or impossible.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]
In regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself
requires among other things that the recreational areas to be
donated be based, as aforementioned, on a percentage
(3.5%, 7%, or 9%) of the total area of the subdivision
depending on whether the subdivision is low -, medium -, or
high-density. It further declares that such open space
devoted to parks, playgrounds and recreational areas are
non-alienable public land and non-buildable. However, there
is no prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against
imposing conditions on such donation.
We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation,
so long as the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The contention of
petitioners that the donation should be unconditional
because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does
not provide that the donation of the open space for parks
and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it
should be so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding the
provisions of the decree.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in the
Amended Deed of Donation is that the donee should build a
sports complex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly
requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross area allotted for
parks and playgrounds is non-buildable, then the obvious
question arises whether or not such condition was validly
imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that the non-
buildable character applies only to the 3.5% to 9% area set
by law. If there is any excess land over and above the 3.5%
to 9% required by the decree, which is also used or allocated
for parks, playgrounds and recreational purposes, it is
obvious that such excess area is not covered by the non-
buildability restriction. In the instant case, if there be an
excess, then the donee would not be barred from developing
and operating a sports complex thereon, and the condition in
the amended deed would then be considered valid and
binding.
To determine if the over 50,000 square meter area donated
pursuant to the amended deed would yield an excess over
the area required by the decree, it is necessary to determine
under which density category the Timog Park subdivision
falls.
If the subdivision falls under the low density or open market
housing category, with 20 family lots or below per gross
hectare, the developer will need to allot only 3.5% of gross
area for parks and playgrounds, and since the donated land
constitutes more than five (5) percent of the total land area
of the subdivision,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] there would therefore be
an excess of over 1.5% of gross area which would not be
non-buildable. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged (and
private respondent did not controvert) that the subdivision in
question is a medium-density or economic housing
subdivision based on the sizes of the family lots donated in
the amended deed,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] for which category the
decree mandates that not less than 7% of gross area be set
aside. Since the donated land constitutes only a little more
than 5% of the gross area of the subdivision, which is less
than the area required to be allocated for non-buildable open
space, therefore there is no excess land to speak of. This
then means that the condition to build a sports complex on
the donated land is contrary to law and should be considered
as not imposed.
 Fourth Issue: Injunction vs. Construction of the Drug
Rehabilitation Center
Petitioners argue that the court cannot enjoin the
construction of the drug rehabilitation center because the
decision of the trial court came only after the construction of
the center was completed and, based on jurisprudence,
there can be no injunction of events that have already
transpired.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Private respondent, on the other hand, counters that the
operation of the center is a continuing act which would
clearly cause injury to private respondent, its clients, and
residents of the subdivision, and thus, a proper subject of
injunction.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Equity should move in to warrant
the granting of the injunctive relief if persistent repetition of
the wrong is threatened.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
In light of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957, as amended, declaring the
open space for parks, playgrounds and recreational area as
non-buildable, it appears indubitable that the construction
and operation of a drug rehabilitation center on the land in
question is a continuing violation of the law and thus should
be enjoined.
Furthermore, the factual background of this case warrants
that this Court rule against petitioners on this issue. We
agree with and affirm the respondent Courts finding that
petitioners committed acts mocking the judicial system.[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif]

x x x When a writ of preliminary injunction was sought for by the

appellee [private respondent] to enjoin the appellants [petitioners
herein] from further continuing with the construction of the said
center, the latter resisted and took refuge under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1818 (which prohibits writs of preliminary
injunction) to continue with the construction of the building. Yet,
the appellants also presented City Council Resolution No. 227
which allegedly repealed the previous Resolution authorizing the
City Government to construct a Drug Rehabilitation Center on the
donated property, by changing the purpose and usage of the Drug
Rehabilitation Center to Sports Development and Youth Center to
make it conform to the Sports Complex Project therein. Under this
Resolution No. 227, the appellants claimed that they have
abandoned all plans for the construction of the Drug Rehabilitation
Center. Nonetheless, when judgment was finally rendered on
February 15, 1989, the appellants were quick to state that they
have not after all abandoned their plans for the center as they have
in fact inaugurated the same on April 15, 1989. In plain and simple
terms, this act is a mockery of our judicial system perpetrated by
the appellants. For them to argue that the court cannot deal on their
Drug Rehabilitation Center is not only preposterous but also
ridiculous.
It is interesting to observe that under the appealed decision the
appellants and their officers, employees and all other persons
acting on their behalf were perpetually enjoined to cease and desist
from constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center on the donated
property. Under Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is
provided that:
Section 4 A judgment in an action for injunction shall not be
stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal.
Accordingly, a judgment restraining a party from doing a certain
act is enforceable and shall remain in full force and effect even
pending appeal. In the case at bar, the cease and desist order
therefore still stands. Appellants persistence and continued
construction and, subsequent, operation of the Drug Rehabilitation
Center violate the express terms of the writ of injunction lawfully
issued by the lower court.
This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the above
mentioned findings of the respondent court. The allegation of
the petitioners that the construction of the center was
finished before the judgment of the trial court was rendered
deserves scant consideration because it is self-serving and
is completely unsupported by other evidence.
The fact remains that the trial court rendered judgment
enjoining the construction of the drug rehabilitation center,
revoking the donation and ordering the return of the donated
land. In spite of such injunction, petitioners publicly flaunted
their disregard thereof with the subsequent inauguration of
the center on August 15, 1989. The operation of the center,
after inauguration, is even more censurable.
Fifth Issue: Revocation of a Mandatory Donation
Because of Non-compliance With an Illegal Condition
The private respondent contends that the building of said
drug rehabilitation center is violative of the Amended Deed
of Donation. Therefore, under Article 764 of the New Civil
Code and stipulation no. 8 of the amended deed, private
respondent is empowered to revoke the donation when the
donee has failed to comply with any of the conditions
imposed in the deed.
We disagree. Article 1412 of the Civil Code which provides
that:
If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does
not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither
may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or
demand the performance of the others undertaking;
comes into play here. Both petitioners and private
respondents are in violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for
donating and accepting a donation of open space less than
that required by law, and for agreeing to build and operate a
sports complex on the non-buildable open space so
donated; and petitioners, for constructing a drug
rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area.
Moreover, since the condition to construct a sports complex
on the donated land has previously been shown to be
contrary to law, therefore, stipulation No. 8 of the amended
deed cannot be implemented because (1) no valid stipulation
of the amended deed had been breached, and (2) it is highly
improbable that the decree would have allowed the return of
the donated land for open space under any circumstance,
considering the non-alienable character of such open space,
in the light of the second Whereas clause of P.D. 1216 which
declares that xxx such open spaces, roads, alleys and
sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public use and
are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men.
Further, as a matter of public policy, private respondent
cannot be allowed to evade its statutory obligation to donate
the required open space through the expediency of invoking
petitioners breach of the aforesaid condition. It is a familiar
principle that the courts will not aid either party to enforce an
illegal contract, but will leave them both where they find
them. Neither party can recover damages from the other
arising from the act contrary to law, or plead the same as a
cause of action or as a defense. Each must bear the
consequences of his own acts.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
There is therefore no legal basis whatsoever to revoke the
donation of the subject open space and to return the
donated land to private respondent. The donated land
should remain with the donee as the law clearly intended
such open spaces to be perpetually part of the public
domain, non-alienable and permanently devoted to public
use as such parks, playgrounds or recreation areas.
Removal/Demolition of Drug Rehabilitation Center
Inasmuch as the construction and operation of the drug
rehabilitation center has been established to be contrary to
law, the said center should be removed or demolished. At
this juncture, we hasten to add that this Court is and has
always been four-square behind the governments efforts to
eradicate the drug scourge in this country. But the end never
justifies the means, and however laudable the purpose of the
construction in question, this Court cannot and will not
countenance an outright and continuing violation of the laws
of the land, especially when committed by public officials.
In theory, the cost of such demolition, and the
reimbursement of the public funds expended in the
construction thereof, should be borne by the officials of the
City of Angeles who ordered and directed such construction.
This Court has time and again ruled that public officials are
not immune from damages in their personal capacities
arising from acts done in bad faith. Otherwise stated, a
public official may be liable in his personal capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] In the instant case, the public
officials concerned deliberately violated the law and
persisted in their violations, going so far as attempting to
deceive the courts by their pretended change of purpose and
usage for the center, and making a mockery of the judicial
system. Indisputably, said public officials acted beyond the
scope of their authority and jurisdiction and with evident bad
faith. However, as noted by the trial court,[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
the petitioners mayor and members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Angeles City were sued only in their official
capacities, hence, they could not be held personally liable
without first giving them their day in court. Prevailing
jurisprudence[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] holding that public officials are
personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done
in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued
both in their official and personal capacities.
After due consideration of the circumstances, we believe that
the fairest and most equitable solution is to have the City of
Angeles, donee of the subject open space and, ostensibly,
the main beneficiary of the construction and operation of the
proposed drug rehabilitation center, undertake the demolition
and removal of said center, and if feasible, recover the cost
thereof from the city officials concerned.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioners are hereby ENJOINED perpetually from
operating the drug rehabilitation center or any other such
facility on the donated open space.
(2) Petitioner City of Angeles is ORDERED to undertake
the demolition and removal of said drug rehabilitation center
within a period of three (3) months from finality of this
Decision, and thereafter, to devote the said open space for
public use as a park, playground or other recreational use.
(3) The Amended Deed of Donation dated November 26,
1984 is hereby declared valid and subsisting, except that the
stipulations or conditions therein concerning the construction
of the Sports Center or Complex are hereby declared void
and as if not imposed, and therefore of no force and effect.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.