FORGIVENESS AND INTERPRETATION

Glen Pettigrove

ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between our interpretations of an-
others actions and our readiness to forgive. It begins by articulating an
account of forgiveness drawn from the New Testament. It then employs
the work of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Gadamer to investigate ways in
which our interpretations of an act or agent can promote or prevent such
forgiveness. It concludes with a discussion of some ethical restrictions that
may pertain to the interpretation of actions or agents as opposed to utter-
ances and a look at the significance of these restrictions for forgiveness-
promoting interpretation.
KEY WORDS: Christian forgiveness, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Gadamer,
hermeneutics, understanding

IN AN IDEAL HUSBAND, OSCAR WILDE EXPLORES the idea that the inability to
forgive others often stems from a failure to understand them. Lord Gor-
ing at several points suggests that if Lady Chiltern could understand
Robert, she could forgive him. Lord Goring, of course, is not alone in
thinking that there is an important connection between understanding
and forgiving. However, the nature of this link is not entirely clear. As
Jerome Neu points out, understanding is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for forgiveness (Neu 2002, 2528). We can forgive those we fail to
understand and fail to forgive those we do. Pamela Hieronymi goes one
step further, arguing that understanding the wrongdoer is likelier to in-
crease resentment than encourage forgiveness because it will involve see-
ing how truly despicable the wrongdoers actions were (Hieronymi 2001,
554). In spite of Neus and Hieronymis observations, there is something
plausible about the idea Wilde is playing with in An Ideal Husband.
My aim will be to shed light on the connection between forgiving and
understanding.
I begin by sketching an account of human forgiveness drawn from the
Synoptic Gospels and the Pauline Epistles. I work through an example
and a parable that suggest the possibility of a link between forgiving
and understanding. Then I turn to the hermeneutic tradition, tracing
significant developments in the understanding of understanding in or-
der to locate a way in which understanding can aid forgiveness. I con-
clude with a discussion of some ethical restrictions that may pertain to

JRE 35.3:429452.

C 2007 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.
430 Journal of Religious Ethics

the interpretation of actions or agents (as opposed to utterances) and a

look at the significance of these restrictions for forgiveness-promoting
understanding.

1. Christian Forgiveness1
One of the first things likely to strike a contemporary western reader
who investigates New Testament discussions of forgiveness is how little
it appears to have to do with feelings and how much it has to do with
actions and relationships. This differs markedly from the widespread as-
sumption that forgiveness is primarily a matter of how I feel about you
(not how I treat you) (Murphy 1988a, 21). In the New Testament, for-
giving is principally something one does and only derivatively something
one feels.
There are three words used in the New Testament for forgiving. The
,
most common of the three () is typically used in the sense of per-
mitting someone to do something (to which one may object),2 letting go
of something,3 or leaving a person, place, or object.4 The most frequent
,
use of the second (o) is similar to that of the first: it is generally
used in the sense of releasing (for example, from jail) or dismissing (for
example, from a meeting). The third verb (o) occurs more often
in the writings of Paul than in the Gospels. Its most frequent usage in
the New Testament is in contexts where someone is giving something to
another.5

1 By this section title I do not mean to suggest that this is the only properly Christian
account of forgiveness. It is simply my reconstruction from the New Testament texts of what
the early Christian community took human forgiveness to involve. It should be noted that
I am limiting my discussion to forgiveness offered by one human agent to another, leaving
aside the discussion of the forgiveness offered by a divine agent to a human transgressor.
Readers interested in other Christian accounts of forgiveness, many of which do not limit
their purview to humanhuman contexts, are encouraged to consult Augustine of Hippo
421/1961, sections 7275; Benedict of Nursia 547/1982, chapters 7, 2329, 44, and 46;
Anselm of Canterbury 1098/1998, 260356; Aquinas 12651272/1981 Pt III, QQ 8490;
Butler 1729/1993, 92113; Schleiermacher 1830/1999, 496505; Niebuhr 1935/1979; Tillich
1955; Martin Luther King, Jr. 1963/1981; Lauritzen 1987; Swinburne 1989; McCord Adams
1991; Brakenhielm 1993; Jones 1995; Shriver 1995; Hare 1996; Volf 1996; Marty 1998; Tutu
1999; Wetzel 1999; Davis 2001; McFadyen and Sarot 2001; Dulles 2002; Milbank 2003; and
Ely 2004.
2 For example, permit me to take the speck out of your eye. . . (Matthew 7:4).
3 If anyone would sue you to take your coat, let him have your cloak as well (Matthew

5:40).
4 If you are offering something at the altar and remember your brother has something
, ,
against you, leave your gift ( o o o) at the altar and go be reconciled
,
with your brother (

o) (Matthew 5:2324). Leaving the crowds
, ,
( o oo), Jesus went into the house (Matthew 13:36).
5 For example, I Corinthians 2:12 (that we might understand the gifts given us by

God); Galatians 3:18 (God gave Abraham an inheritance).

 Forgiveness and Interpretation 431

, ,
Some of the flavor of these more common uses of , o,
and o lingers even when they are being employed to designate
forgiving. Forgiveness is often spoken of in terms of letting go of ones
claim against another and of releasing debtors from the requirement to
repay (Matthew 6:1214; 15:14; 18:27, 32, 35; Luke 6:37; 7:4243). It is
also seen as a gift that is bestowed upon the one forgiven (II Corinthians
2:710; Ephesians 4:32). These nuances reflect two aspects of forgiving.
First, forgiving involves foregoing the pursuit of a legitimate complaint
that one has against another.6 We might call this the negative aspect of
forgiving insofar as the forgiver refrains from acting in a particular way
toward the wrongdoer. The positive aspect of forgiving is highlighted by
the imagery of the gift. Forgiveness is a gift that is offered by the one
wronged, rather than something earned or deserved by the wrongdoer.
That which is given is ordinarily described as love: the one who forgives
loves.7 In the context of the New Testament, love, like forgiveness, is
primarily active and only secondarily emotive. It is a devotedness to
what is in the best interests of the other. Thus, Christian forgiveness
involves a foregoing and a giving8 whose aim is reconciliation between
the wrongdoer and the wronged.9
While actions are central to the New Testament conception of forgive-
ness, the emotions involved in being wronged and then reconciled are
not left out of the account. The one who forgives not only lets go of her
claim against the wrongdoer; she also lets go of her anger (see Matthew
5:2126; 15:1220; and Luke 6:4345). Perhaps the best discussion of

6 For example, my brother has wronged me, or someone is failing to repay a debt she
owes me, or someone is persecuting and/or trying to kill me.
7 See Luke 6:2737; II Corinthians 2:78; Colossians 3:1214; and I John 2:914. This

connection is what encouraged Augustine to describe forgiveness as the act of loving the
one who has wronged us (Augustine 421/1961, 86).
8 Luke 6:3738 reflects this dual nature in an especially vivid way. There o ,

serves as the transitional link between the negative and the positive commands pertaining
to forgiveness: judge not . . . , condemn not . . . , forgive . . . , give . . . . See also Tillich 1956,
3132.
9 See Matthew 5:2326; II Corinthians 2:78; Colossians 3:1214; Tillich 1955, 78,

10; King 1963/1981, 5051; Roberts 1995, 294, 299300; Hare 1996, 22326; Marty 1998,
11; and Milbank 2003, 4647. Reconciliation, which involves the restoration of a disrupted
relationship, is closely related to forgiveness, but neither entails the other. One may forgive
persons with whom one is unable to be reconciled. For example, one can forgive someone
who has died but one cannot be reconciled with the deceased because their death prevents
the relationship from being restored. Similarly, one may be reconciled with someone one
has not forgiven. For example, two parties may be estranged because each mistakenly
thinks the other has done her wrong. Discovering their mistake can lead to the restoration
of their relationship. In this case we would quite naturally speak of their reconciliation,
but we would not speak of them forgiving one another, because forgiveness presupposes
wrongdoing. For more on the nature of reconciliation and how it differs from forgiveness
see Murphy 2003, 1415; van Deusen Hunsinger 2001, 9697; Pettigrove 2004a, 18991;
and Matthew 7:6.
432 Journal of Religious Ethics

the emotions involved in forgiving is offered in the Epistle to the Eph-

esians. Let all bitterness and wrath and anger and clamor and slander
be put away from you, with all malice, and be kind to one another, tender-
hearted, forgiving one another, as God in Christ forgave you (Ephesians
4:3132). Here, forgiveness may just be part of a list of related phenom-
ena; however, I think the more plausible reading sees forgiveness, not on
par with the lists other entries, but as encompassing them all. On this
reading, the passage says, Put away bitterness, anger, malice, and the
like, and be kind and tenderhearted. That is to say, forgive.
Thus, on the reading I have offered, forgiveness has two aspects. The
negative aspect involves letting go of a claim against the wrongdoer and
putting away the hostile emotions the wrongdoing may have evoked. The
positive involves giving love, kindness, and an offer of reconciliation (or
openness thereto).10

2. An Example and a Parable

The link between understanding and the account of forgiveness
sketched above is suggested both by a rather mundane example and
a first-century parable. I will begin with the example and then use the
parable to make sense of it. Together they shed some light on the rela-
tionship between understanding and forgiving, but, as we will see, they
raise as many questions as they answer.
Kaila is walking down the corridor at work when she passes her friend
Lisas office and overhears mention of her name. She pauses for a minute,
listening long enough to realize that Lisa is speaking critically about
something Kaila has recently done. Kaila hurries on her way feeling hurt.
For the rest of the day her mind keeps returning to the conversation she
overheard. As she does, the hurt that she originally felt is supplanted by
anger. At dinner, as she recounts the scene to Craig, her anger is obvious,
not blazing out in a full-blown rant, but clearly present just below the
surface. Craig listens, and then calmy responds, Should you really be as
upset as you are about what Lisa has done? It seems to me that you, of

10 I have not addressed two contentious issues that often arise in discussions of for-

giveness. The first is whether forgiving takes place at a single moment in time or is a
process that extends in time. I think either may be the case, although the latter probably
characterizes our experiences of forgiving more often than the former. However, nothing
in what follows depends on a commitment to an account of forgiveness as process. The
second issue concerns whether there are normative constraints on whom one may forgive
and under what conditions. For example, must the wrongdoer have a change of heart or
attempt to restore the wronged before the latter may forgive? Are there certain wrongs
that are unforgivable? Since I have addressed these questions at length elsewhere, I will
not take them up here (see Pettigrove 2004a, 2006, and 2007). Nothing in the following
account depends upon either a positive or a negative answer to these questions.
 Forgiveness and Interpretation 433

all people, should understand. After all, havent you just done the same
thing? Werent you just speaking critically about her?
At this point there are two responses Kaila might give. She might grow
defensive and attempt to point out ways in which her actions differ from
Lisas such that her behavior is appropriate and Lisas inappropriate.
On the other hand, she might take Craigs comment to heart, in which
case her anger dissipates and she finds herself forgiving Lisa. The latter
response seems much less common than the former, but I suspect that
most of us have experienced something like it at one time or another.11 We
are angry at someone, a friend points out that we have done something
similar to the act that angered us, and we suddenly find that our anger
is defused. Why do we respond this way? Why might Craigs comment
provide Kaila with a reason to forgive? Why is he not just changing the
subject, encouraging forgetting rather than forgiving?
One place to look for an answer to this question is in a parable that
appears in Matthews Sermon on the Mount and Lukes Sermon on the
Plain, where we encounter a similar change of subject.
Why do you see the speck in your brothers eye, but do not notice the log
in your own eye? Or how can you say to your brother, Brother, let me take
out the speck in your eye, when you yourself do not see the log in your own
eye? You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will
see clearly to take the speck out of your brothers eye [Luke 6:4142].

The parable and its surrounding context suggest four reasons for seeing
a comment like Craigs as relevant to Kailas relationship with Lisa.
One reason for seeing Craigs comment as relevant to Kailas attitude
is suggested by the words of the Lords Prayer that come shortly before
the parable of the mote and the plank in Matthews gospel. In this prayer,
the speaker asks the divine agent, among other things, to forgive her as
she has forgiven others and, by implication, to refrain from forgiving her
unless she has forgiven others (Matthew 6:1215).12 Therefore, one rea-
son to forgive others that may be made salient by attending to ones own
faults is that one must forgive if one hopes to be forgiven by God. Never-
theless, I think it is not very explanatory in our case, because (1) we can
see Craigs comment having its effect independently of whether Kaila
believes in a divine agent; (2) the appeal to the divine seems out of pro-
portion to the significance of the deedtalking about a friend behind her
back is not the kind of infraction that one takes to the highest court; and
most importantly, (3) it strikes us as tangential to the real issue, which
is a tear in the fabric of this relationship.

11For one account of why it is less common, see Zillmann and Cantor 1976.
12Similarly, in the Lukan passage we are told that we shall be forgiven as we forgive
and judged as we judge, measure for measure.
434 Journal of Religious Ethics

How, then, might attending to our failings promote forgiving others

from the inside, that is, apart from an appeal to the judgment of some-
one external to this relationship? One answer could be that we assume
a moral principle of reciprocity, a principle like that exemplified in the
Golden Rule, Do unto others as you would have them do unto you, which
in Lukes gospel falls between the injunction to love ones enemies and the
parable of the mote and the plank (Luke 6:31).13 Interpreted as a princi-
ple of reciprocity, the Golden Rule stipulates that one ought not exempt
oneself from the moral standards one applies to others. If we interpret
it after the fashion of Kants notion of self-legislation, this principle may
be internal to the relationship in a way that an appeal to divine censure
is not. On this conception, the principle of reciprocity could be one whose
conditions arise out of a persons own nature as an agent who acts from
reasons under the concept of freedom.14 Within the Kantian framework,
the appeal to a principle of reciprocity is not an appeal to something out-
side the relationship, but is grounded in the rational nature of each of
the parties to the relationship.
The third way in which a comment like Jesuss or Craigs might be
relevant to Kailas relation to Lisa points to the matter of whether one
has the proper standing to judge. On this reading, the parable and Craigs
comment amount to the rhetorical question, Who are you to judge?
After all, such a question implies, Kaila lacks the proper credentials to
judge Lisa. First, Kaila has not been appointed as judge by anyone whose
authority Lisa would recognize as binding. Second, it suggests only the
guiltless may judge someone to be guilty.15 Anyone less than perfect is
acting outside her proper domain.
In its present form, the preceding argument is misleading. Part of what
it means to be in community is to hold one another to acceptable stan-
dards of conduct. If the Lukan and Matthean Sermons suggest something
to the contrary, then they are sharply at odds with both moral philosophy
and moral theology. However, there is good reason to think this is not the
point. Notice that the parable does not tell us not to notice the speck in
the others eye. Rather, we are told to deal with our own shortcomings
first. Nonetheless, there is something correct about reading the parable

13 In Matthew, In everything do to others as you would have them do to you; for this

is the law and the prophets, follows Matthews treatment of the mote and the plank,
providing a summary of the preceding eleven verses (Matthew 7:12).
14 For more on this articulation of Kants categorical imperative, see Korsgaard 1996,

chapter 6. In point of fact, Kant does claim that the Golden Rule is a principle that arises
from lawgiving practical reason, and thus is a principle that has its source in ones own
nature (Kant 1991, AK VI:45051).
15 Such a reading makes the parable of the mote and the plank the Synoptic parallel of

John 8:111, where Jesus tells the angry crowd that the person without sin could cast the
first stone at a woman caught in adultery.
 Forgiveness and Interpretation 435

of the mote and the plank as connected to the question of ones standing
to judge. To see this, we need to distinguish between two differing senses
of judgment.
Sometimes judgment is treated as an ability to discriminate between
things and events and to determine whether and in what ways two things
are similar or different. To judge not, on what we might call a cognitivist
reading, would be to refrain from training this eye of judgment on our
fellows, with particular attention to the ways in which their actions ex-
emplified or failed to conform to various norms and practices. At other
times to judge is taken to mean something like to sentence. The defin-
ing context for this interpretation is juridical. It highlights the assumed
connection between the ruling of the judge and the act of the jailor or
executioner.
The prohibition against judgment in Luke 6 that precedes the parable
of the mote and the plank is best read as a prohibition against judgment
in the juridical sense (Albright and Mann 1971, 84; Calvin 1979b, 346
48; Gundry 1994, 121; Tillich 1955, 5; see also Craddock 1990, 9193). It
is not a call to refrain from discriminating and evaluating, but a call to
refrain from sentencing.16 Sometimes anger or self-righteousness tempts
us into thinking we have the authority to engage in juridical condemna-
tion (Niebuhr 1935/1979, 13841; Gundry 1994, 121; and Roberts 1995,
29091, 29798). However, with the exception of a very few instances,
such as when we occupy the role of parent or of judge in a court of law, we
do not have the proper standing to sentence others when they have acted
immorally. We may withhold our affections from those who wrong us, or
choose not to keep company with them, but for most of us in most of our
social relations, we do not have the standing to sentence or punish.17
There are contexts in which friends may remind us that it is not our
place to sentence and punish, but this is not what Craig is doing in the
example with which we began. Thus, the third way in which one might
read Craigs comment, namely, as a combination of the quips Youre not
so perfect yourself and Who are you to judge?, proves less illuminating
than the popularity of such statements might suggest. To the extent that
the former statement might produce the same effect in us that Craigs
comment does, it appears to do so either by appeal to the principle of
reciprocity or by virtue of the consideration to which we will now turn.

16 It is probably also best read as proverbial injunctions are read, namely, as counsel

that is generally applicable even if there are instances where it ought not be applied (for
example, if one is serving in the legal office of judge). One reason the distinction between the
two senses of judging is important is that forgiveness seems to depend upon the cognitive
evaluation that the act was wrong (see Colossians 3:13; Butler 1993, 1023, 10811; Downie
1965, 12832; Roberts 1995, 289; Dulles 2002, 6; Murphy 2003, 13; and Pettigrove 2004b,
37578) at the same time that one puts aside juridical condemnation.
17 I am grateful to Judith Lichtenberg for encouraging me to consider this point.
436 Journal of Religious Ethics

The fourth way in which one might see Jesuss parable and Craigs
comment as something other than a change of subject has to do with un-
derstanding. Attending to our failings often helps us come to understand
the other person better. The person who has cleaned out her own eye is in
a much better position to clean someone elses, because she knows what
it involves.
At this point, the parable and our example cease to run parallel to one
another. The parable still has in view the eventual encounter between
oneself and ones brother. Unless we assume our nature is such that
we are incapable of correcting our own faults, the encounter with our
brother has merely been delayed until we are in a better position to offer
aid. Craigs comment, by contrast, does not imply any such encounter.
It is not that he is recommending that Kaila work on her own tendency
to criticize friends in their absence before she speaks to Lisa about her
having done so. If after six months of careful conversation Kaila came to
Lisa and said, Do you remember that day in December when you were
talking about me to so-and-so in your office? she has missed the point.18
A person who responds in this fashion is also not likely to have really
forgiven. She has not let go of her complaint so much as tabled it until a
later meeting.
Observing the parallel between Craigs remark and the parable of the
mote and the plank draws our attention to the way in which Craigs com-
ment appealed to something internal to the relationship between Kaila
and Lisa rather than to an external judge. It also hints at the nature
of the relation between forgiving and understanding. The remainder of
this paper will take up the issue of understanding, with an eye to illu-
minating the curious connection between understanding and forgiving.
In particular, we will need to consider more carefully what is entailed
in understanding. In what follows I will draw on the work of Schleier-
macher, Dilthey, and Gadamer to provide a notion of understanding that
can further disclose the relationship between it and forgiving.

3. Understanding in the Hermeneutic Tradition

3.1 Friedrich Schleiermacher
The hermeneutic task, according to Friedrich Schleiermacher, is to
avoid misunderstanding at every point (1838/1998, 29). The misunder-
standing the interpreter seeks to avoid includes a simple lack of under-
standing where one has formed no interpretation whatever, as well as

18 Such a person would also have missed the point of the parable, since their actions

would not have been motivated by the well-being of the other. The proper motivation is to
improve the others vision.
 Forgiveness and Interpretation 437

erroneous interpretation. The interpreter achieves her end when her own
thoughts mirror the thoughts of the author she is interpreting. Herein
lies understanding: Thinking and connection of thoughts is one and the
same in each. . .[and] the language is the same (101).
If the interpreter is to mirror the thoughts of the author, Schleierma-
cher suggests, she must put herself in the place of the author on the
objective and subjective side (24).

Objectively historical means realising how the utterance relates to the to-
tality of the language and the knowledge enclosed within it as a product
of language. Objectively divinatory means to conjecture how the utterance
itself will become a point of development for the language. Without both[,]
qualitative and quantitative misunderstanding cannot be avoided. Subjec-
tively historical means knowing how the utterance is given as a fact in the
mind, subjectively divinatory means to conjecture how the thoughts con-
tained in the mind will continue to have an effect on the utterer. Without
both[,] misunderstanding is equally unavoidable [23].

If the one I believe has wronged me has not, in fact, done something
wrong, then Schleiermachers suggestions for acquiring understanding
would promote reconciliation by clearing up misunderstanding. In fact,
such reevaluation is explicitly encouraged: Only in the case of insignif-
icant texts are we satisfied with what we understand on first reading
(24). To return to our prior example, Kaila may discover that she was
mistaken about the nature of Lisas remarks. She may find out that Lisa
was repeating a criticism someone else had voiced in order to defend
Kaila against it. Or she may find out that Lisas remarks did not reflect
how little she valued Kailas friendship but rather how much: perhaps
she was talking with a mutual friend in order to gain a better idea of how
to talk about such a difficult subject with Kaila herself. The kind of un-
derstanding generated by clearing up misunderstanding may reduce ill
will and promote good will. However, in each of the cases we have imag-
ined, Lisa is not really guilty, which means that Kaila does not really
forgive her. Rather, she learns there is nothing to forgive.
If the wrongdoer is truly guilty, on the other hand, the understanding
generated by Schleiermachers method is likely to increase our hostility.
The analogue of objectively historical understanding would place the ac-
tion within the context of social relations and their norms. Doing so would
highlight the extent to which the action deviated from the norm. Such a
comparison, as Hieronymi observes, is likely to add to our resentment,
rather than reduce it (Hieronymi 2001, 554).
The analog of objective divination would note how this type of action
would influence the actions of others by modifying current social norms.
Actions that violate current norms challenge the validity of those norms
and implicitly offer an alternative norm for social action. This, too, would
438 Journal of Religious Ethics

seem to add to our resentment. Not only has the wrongdoer disregarded
our moral claims upon her, but by so doing, she sets an example for
others to treat us in a similar fashion (or to treat others more generally
according to that norm).
Subjective historical understanding would help us see what the perpe-
trator intended to do when she wronged us. This will highlight the lack
of respect she accorded us. Once again, our anger and resentment are re-
inforced. Finally, subjective divination will reflect on the ways in which
this action is likely to affect her future habits and behaviors. If I were not
opposed to forgiving the wrongdoer prior to this point, subjective divina-
tion should guarantee my unwillingness to forgive. If her past action is
going to encourage her to continue treating me or others in this fashion,
then I ought to act in ways that will discourage future transgressions.19
Thus, in the case of genuine wrongdoing, understanding would seem to
promote anger and resentment rather than forgiveness.

3.2 Wilhelm Dilthey

Building on what he found instructive in Schleiermacher, Wilhelm
Dilthey introduces a distinction that is suggestive for our inquiry. It is
the distinction between understanding and explaining. Dilthey uses ex-
planation and understanding to pick out the difference between events
and actions, happenings and doings. Regarding all other objects there
is an interest to explain; regarding human beings, an interest to under-
stand (Dilthey 1868/1996, 229). Elsewhere, drawing the same distinc-
tion, he insists, we explain nature, we understand psychic life (Dilthey
1894/1977, 27). Explaining is concerned with fitting causes to effects in
order to provide an account of how a particular event transpired. Un-
derstanding, on the other hand, is concerned with an agents reasons for
action, her sense of its significance, her interpretation of the contexts of
meaning within which it was situated. To understand involves reliv[ing]
the state of the other in myself (Dilthey 1868/1996, 229).
It is possible to engage in useful studies aimed at explaining human
events. But such an explanation, Dilthey argues, overlooks what we care
about most deeply. It leaves out the agents reasons for acting and the
meaning they took their actionsand the environments in which they
actedto have. One might succeed in explaining what caused a particu-
lar event but in so doing one fails to see the event from the inside, from
the point of view of a participant. That is to say, from the point of view
of the explaining observer, the meaning of the events, the reasons for

19 I discuss the relationship between forgiveness and deterrence more fully in Pettigrove

2004a. See also Butler 1729/1993; Londey 1986; Murphy 1988b and 2003; and Milbank
2003. See also Hampton 1988a and 1988b.
 Forgiveness and Interpretation 439

acting, and the significance of the event for those involved, are inacces-
sible (Habermas 1990, 2627).
Diltheys distinction can help us notice one way that coming to under-
stand an action might lead to a reduction in hostile attitudes. One might
come to see the act as determined by the events of the others childhood,
or by the effects of her last romantic relationship, or the like. But this
sort of understanding, namely, the kind that explains, ends up leading
to something other than forgiveness. Unlike the examples considered
in connection with Schleiermacher, an explanation of the transgression
does not so much excuse as exempt the deed from normative evaluation.
In explaining, one steps outside the moral frame altogether. An expla-
nation treats wrongdoing as a mere event, and from its point of view,
questions of responsibility, wrongdoing, guilt, and blame do not arise,
although pain and anger might. As a result, the reduction in ones anger
that may be promoted by explaining the others behavior in this way
cannot amount to forgiving her any more than a reduction in the anger
caused by a flat tire amounts to forgiving the tire (or the car or the road,
depending on how I have defined the cause of my injury). In order to
forgive, one must view the act for which the agent is being forgiven as
wrong, which requires occupying a moral point of view precluded by the
explanatory standpoint.20
To forgive, then, we will have to approach the other from within
the framework of understanding. Diltheys description of understanding
hints at why an appeal to ones own failings might be relevant.

When something external is given to me, I must supplement it with an inner

thought process. Such a task I can fulfill only by means of analogous cases.
I thus need (1) to have experienced a series of similar cases, where similar
exteriors are found to have such and such inner states as their ground.
Given this initial analogy, (2) an inference from analogy is then applied to
one such case. (3) Thus, I obtain a reconstruction [Dilthey 1868/1996, 230
(GS XX, 101)].

Dilthey believes that interpretive reconstructions are possible because

of what we share in common with others.21 If understanding is based

20 See Niebuhr 1935/1979, 14041. For further discussion of conditions that might en-

courage one to adopt the exempting attitude of explanation, see Strawson 1962 and Watson
1987. Watson notes that our adoption of the explanatory standpoint need be neither total
nor fixed. That is, we need not see the other wholly from this standpoint, and we may
also shift back and forth between the explanatory standpoint and the moral point of view,
which can account for some of the ambivalence we may feel toward a particular wrong or
wrongdoer.
21 Every word, every sentence, every gesture or polite formula, every work of art and

every historical deed is intelligible because the people who express themselves through
them and those who understand them have something in common; the individual always
440 Journal of Religious Ethics

on having something in common with the other, then we cannot see the
other as wholly other, but must see her as being to some degree like
us.22 This is why Craig, Lord Goring, and Jesus, by inviting us to attend
to features of our own experience, are not simply changing the subject.
They are putting us in a better position to understand the actions of the
other.
How might seeing the other as like us shed light on how understanding
could promote forgiving? At first glance, it appears it cannot. If the other
is wholly other, I can fear or hate her and this does not seem to change
when I recognize that she is like me. It may open up new categories of
action and attitude that can become definitive for our relations. But it
is not clear that this will encourage forgiveness. Moral hatred similarly
presupposes the recognition that the other is like me to the extent that
she is a moral agent.
Diltheys discussion of understanding may even strengthen the case
against seeing understanding as promoting forgiving. Dilthey suggests
there are some things we cannot understand and others we should not.
It has been noted that a person who can transpose himself into anything
is not a moral person (Dilthey 1868/1996, 230 [GS XX, 101]). If there are
states that are bad to live, then it would seem there are states that are
bad to relive. We might hope that there are states that the person with
a well-formed character is not able to relive. Even if she is able, perhaps
she ought not to try.
As we will see, Diltheys insight that understanding depends on having
something in common with the other will prove important for our search.
However, at present, like Schleiermacher, Dilthey seems to have given
us further reasons to despair of finding a positive connection between
understanding and forgiving. To see the importance of Diltheys thought
and to move beyond our current impasse, it will be useful to introduce
one more voice to the conversation.

3.3 Hans-Georg Gadamer

Hans-Georg Gadamer employs the term Verstehen (understanding)
in a number of different ways. Sometimes for Gadamer understanding
is a matter of intellectually grasping something. Sometimes it is less
theoretical or purely cognitive than an intellectual grasp, and is instead

experiences, thinks and acts in a common sphere and only there does he understand.
Everything that is understood carries, as it were, the hallmark of familiarity derived from
such common features (Dilthey 1926/1961, 123 [GS VII, 147]).
22 On the basis of experience and self-understanding and the constant interaction be-

tween them, understanding of other people and their expressions of life is developed
(Dilthey 1926/1961, 116 [GS VII, 205]).
 Forgiveness and Interpretation 441

more like a kind of practical know-how (Grondin 2002, 37). Even

more fundamental than either of the preceding is a third sense of
Verstehen: Understanding is, primarily, agreement (Gadamer
1960/1989, 180).23
Unlike Schleiermachers mirroring of the mind of the author or
Diltheys reliving the state of the other in myself, Gadamer argues that
understanding is concerned first and foremost with the truth claims of
the subject about which the other is speaking.24 When we try to under-
stand a text, we do not try to transpose ourselves into the authors mind
but, if one wants to use this terminology, we try to transpose ourselves
into the perspective within which he has formed his views. But this sim-
ply means that we try to understand how what he is saying could be
right (Gadamer 1960/1989, 292). As with Schleiermacher and Dilthey,
for Gadamer, understanding involves being at one with the author. The
crucial difference for Gadamer is that the unity understanding involves
is an agreement about the truth of what the author has said.25
In Truth and Method, Gadamer limits his discussion to claims about
truth. However, truth claims are only one of several types of claims that
can be made in a speech act. In addition to making truth claims about
the objective world, we can also make claims about subjective emotional
or intellectual states. Such expressive self-presentations are evaluated
in terms of the sincerity of the speaker. A third type of claim concerns the
intersubjective social world, and is evaluated in terms of the rightness
of the action being endorsed or proscribed (Habermas 1984, 1416).
In a situation where someone has been wronged, that which is being
interpreted is an action. Even if the wrongdoing involved speech, as in
the case of slander or hate speech, what is being interpreted when we
are engaged in moral evaluation is the speech as action. But through
interpretation the action, in certain respects, comes to be understood as
speech (Gadamer 1960/1989, 389). Gadamers picture of the interpretive
process involves the interpreter giving voice to what is interpreted. She
articulates the claims made by the object of interpretation. When she is
interpreting an action, many of the claims with which she will be con-
cerned are claims about the intersubjective social world. Such claims are

23 Gadamer considers an openness to the truth claims of the other, which makes pos-

sible understanding-as-agreement, to be the highest type of hermeneutical experience

(1960/1989, 361).
24 The goal of all attempts to reach an understanding is agreement concerning the

subject matter. Hence the task of hermeneutics has always been to establish agreement
where there was none or where it had been disturbed in some way (Gadamer 1960/1989,
292). See also Warnke 1987, 79.
25 Not only does the reader assume an immanent unity of meaning, but his understand-

ing is likewise guided by the constant transcendent expectations of meaning that proceed
from the relation to the truth of what is being said (Gadamer 1960/1989, 294).
442 Journal of Religious Ethics

claims about rightness. If understanding is agreement and that about

which we are agreeing is the rightness of the claims made through the
action, then to understand the wrongdoers act is to agree with its right-
ness. However, in the case of genuinely wrongful action, such agreement
is precluded. Thus, within Gadamers framework, it appears we cannot
understand wrongdoing.
At times we might be willing to embrace this conclusion. Sometimes we
respond to wrongdoing with a bewildered, I just dont understand. But
more often than not, we understand quite well the desires, interests, and
inclinations that led to the transgression, because we have felt the pull
of similar motives. The Hebrew Sage draws attention to this familiarity
when he warns, Do not give heed to everything that people say, or you
may hear your servant cursing you; your heart knows that many times
you have yourself cursed others (Ecclesiastes 7:2122; see also Feinberg
1970, 28485).
In spite of the priority placed on agreeing with the text, Gadamers ac-
count of interpretation leaves room for the interpreter to disagree with
and even criticize the claims of the interpreted. It is just that such ac-
tivities are secondary from the point of view of interpretation. It is only
when the attempt to accept what is said as true fails that we try to un-
derstand the text, psychologically or historically, as anothers opinion
(Gadamer 1960/1989, 294). In such a case, the anticipation of complete-
ness may be divorced from the anticipation of truth.
The fore-conception of completeness. . . states that only what really con-
stitutes a unity of meaning is intelligible. So when we read a text we
always assume its completeness, and only when this assumption proves
mistakeni.e., the text is not intelligibledo we begin to suspect the text
and try to discover how it can be remedied [Gadamer 1960/1989, 294].

When we approach an action, text, or utterance with the purpose of inter-

preting it, we are operating under the assumption that the thing being
interpreted is intelligible. Sometimes our anticipation is readily satisfied
by the text. At other times finding the text intelligible requires our filling
in missing pieces and correcting passages where the text may have been
corrupted.
If we apply the principle of charity embodied in the anticipation of
truth and the fore-conception of completeness to the case of wrongdo-
ing, we find an approach to understanding that could promote forgiving.
When we find that the text is defective, we look for ways to remedy it. We
attempt to correct its argument where it has gone astray, or we construct
new arguments that better support its conclusions. When what we are
interpreting is an action, on this method, we would not just search for
the deficient reasons we thought had led the agent to act as she did. We
would search for the best (available) reasons for the action, attempting
 Forgiveness and Interpretation 443

to construe it in the most sensible way. This may lead us to discover

that a better moral agent than the one with whom we think we are deal-
ing could have been led to perform this action in the circumstances. I
might conclude that even someone not generally inclined to talk about
others behind their back could have been enticed to do so by the invi-
tations of this conversation partner of high social standing. To turn to
a more serious example, I may come to realize that even an agent com-
mitted to the peaceful resolution of political conflict might have found
herself, under the circumstances, despairing of such a solution and adopt-
ing violent means to protect her family, her identity group, or her way of
life.
If I am committed to seeking the kind of understanding Gadamers
fore-conceptions of completeness and truth promote, I may also come to
wonderto return to the thought suggested by Diltheywhether in sim-
ilar circumstances I might have done the same. This is exactly the place
to which the Lukan and Matthean Sermons invite the reader. Together,
the Golden Rule and the parable of the mote and plank invite the reader
to imagine being in the place of the other. However, as both the Sermons
and Gadamer advise, the interpreter should not go there directly. If I
begin with the question, Would I have done the same? my response
is likely to be an immediate, No. With this answer I will close off the
possibility of further reflection and deeper understanding. The Gospels
attempt to forestall such a response by redirecting their piercing gaze
to ones own shortcomings. Only then, with a more accurate sense of my
own failings, can I look upon the other with a sympathetic eye (see also
Niebuhr 1935/1979, 13839). Gadamer attempts to forestall the prema-
ture response by directing the interpreters attention to the project of
locating reasons that might correct imperfections in the text. Through
this process, ideally, one comes to fuse ones horizon with that of agents
who might produce this text or text analog. While I may not exactly re-
live the state of the other in myself (Dilthey 1868/1996, 229 [GS XX,
100]), I nonetheless come to see the action from a vantage nearer her
own.
There are two ways in which this kind of understanding might pro-
mote forgiving. The first is by way of the Golden Rule, now understood
as a principle of sympathy rather than of reciprocity.26 The sympathy
engaged in really wondering whether I might have acted similarly in
similar circumstances invites me to treat the other as I would want to be

26 Do unto others as you would have them do unto you invites one to imagine being in

the place of the other with all of the thoughts, feelings, and aspirations that might involve.
But it does not merely invite one to experience these thoughts, feelings, and aspirations. It
encourages one to act in a way that is informed by ones sympathetic identification. That is
to say, the goal is a sympathy that will, in turn, determine ones actions toward the other.
444 Journal of Religious Ethics

treated.27 The second way understanding might work to encourage for-

giveness is by reducing the emotional obstacle the victims forgiveness
must overcome. If I no longer see this as the sort of act only a monster
could perform, it may be easier to forgive (Butler 1729/1993, 10910;
Tutu 1999, 83). If I come to see it as the kind of act even a generally
decent person might have performed, it may reduce the obstacle even
further.
At this point two objections arise. The first is that the interpretive
strategy I have proposed leads to excusing, not forgiving (Hieronymi
2001, 538). However, the effect of this Gadamerian understanding of
wrongdoing would be more accurately described in terms of mitigation.
Excuses attempt, however imperfectly, to remove blame. They aim to
exculpate.28 Mitigation does not. To mitigate an offense is to lessen its
gravity, but it continues to be seen as an offense (Simpson 2006). Even
though mitigating involves altering ones sense of the wrongdoing, it
neither condones the act nor eliminates the blame the agent is thought to
deserve. Nonetheless, mitigating the offense will often (rightly) mitigate
the anger of the offended. If the wrongdoing is less grave than believed,
then ones attitude to that wrong should presumably be less dramatic
(Novitz 1998, 305). Thus, mitigating reduces the emotional obstacle to
forgiving, which makes it easier for the Golden Rule (or some other moral
reason) to motivate the wronged to forgive.
The second objection is that the Gadamerian strategy works by dis-
tracting our attention away from the wrongdoer. In the case of texts,
turning ones attention away from the actual text while one searches for
ways to improve upon it is not problematic. The crucial thing, at least in
many cases, is to understand the position advocated by the text and the
reasons and arguments that could be offered in its support. The author is
of secondary importance and some would go so far as to say that the au-
thor is of no consequence whatsoever. The same is not true when we turn
our attention from texts to actions. Here the agent plays a more central
role, a fact overlooked by the hermeneutic approach advocated above. By
trying to remedy the text, seeking better reasons for performing the
action than the wrongdoer might have had, Gadamerian understanding
encourages us to forgive some possible agent who might have performed
this kind of act. Such an approach will be of no use to us if this agent fails
to be that possible agent. For it is not merely the act that one forgives

27 Concerning morality Schleiermacher has observed that if sympathy is the basis of

all understanding, then the highest understanding requires love. Elsewhere he says that
this understanding is necessary for the highest form of the ethical (Dilthey 1868/1996,
230). See also Roberts 1995, 29799; Davis 2001, 288; and Novitz 1998, 309.
28 Although, as John Austin noted, they seldom succeed (Austin 1979, 177). See also

Roberts 1995, 29495.

 Forgiveness and Interpretation 445

but the agent. In order to do the latter, one needs to determine which of
the possible reasons for acting were her reasons.
However, we need not grant the objector all of her assumptions. In
particular, we need not grant the claim that the forgiver must determine
precisely the nature of the wrong done and the character of the wrongdoer
in order to forgive. A heroic figure within the narratives of the Western
tradition is the exemplar who offers forgiveness without determining
which reasons led those who wronged him to act as they did and without
assessing the moral character of those involved. The story of the mar-
tyr Stephen provides a particularly vivid illustration of this character
type (Acts 67).29 Having been brought before the Sanhedrin, Stephen is
asked to respond to charges of blasphemy that had been lodged against
him. His answer enrages his listeners to the point that they drag him
outside the city and stone him. Yet even as he is being stoned he forgives
his killers. He does so without seeming to concern himself with establish-
ing which reasons led which of his attackers to take his life and whether
it was a fixed aspect of their moral characters that led to their actions or
an aberrant fit of passion.
The example of Stephen draws our attention to the fact that we do
not always stop to sort out which motive among the many possibilities
led the wrongdoer to act as he did before we offer forgiveness. In many
cases we could not, even if we wished to do so. Human motives are
always ambiguous. The divine forgiveness cuts into these ambiguities,
but it does not demand that they become unambiguous before forgive-
ness can be given (Tillich 1955, 9).30 By contrast, if we choose to resent
the wrongdoer, it seems important to come to a more precise sense of
the action, its motives, and the agents character. Not to do so might in-
cline us to respond unjustly, resenting him more than he deserves. The
same does not hold for forgiving. We can see the action as wrong, put
away the anger it might provoke, and treat the wrongdoer with kindness
without first determining which of the possible wrongs she has happened
to commit. This difference between forgiveness and resentment can be
traced to at least two sources. First, the norms of resentment are gov-
erned by the notion of desert in a way that the norms of forgiveness are
not. As noted above, Christian forgiveness is understood as a gift. Gifts,
in contrast to payments, are not governed by issues of desert (Derrida
2001, 3435). This is especially true of forgiveness, where the gift can
only be given when someone has shown herself to be undeserving by

29 Another example of this character type is the cleric who forgives Jean Valjean for

stealing his silver in Victor Hugos Les Miserables. For more on the role such character
types play in the shaping of moral philosophy, see MacIntyre 1984, 2735.
30 Of course, to say they are ambiguous does not imply they cannot be understood in

better and worse ways.

446 Journal of Religious Ethics

doing wrong in the first place. The second difference is tied to the first.
It is always objectionable to treat someone less well than she deserves.
It is not similarly objectionable to treat her more generously than she
deserves (Cottingham 1986; Johnson 1989; and Matthew 20:115). Be-
cause resentment involves doing something that could hurt another and
because it is naturally prone to excess, we have an obligation to ensure
that it is not too great. Imprecision does not pose a similar difficulty for
forgiveness.31
That is not to say that there are no constraints on how we interpret
the wrongdoers actions when we engage in understanding-promoted for-
giving. Obviously, forgiveness cannot be understanding-promoted if it is
based on willed ignorance. Further, if the forgiveness aims at reconcil-
iation, prudence may dictate that the interpretations of the action and
agent not be too far off the mark, or else one opens oneself to future injury.
However, these constraints are less stringent than one might think, for
forgivenesss interpretive vision is not limited to the wrongful action but
also includes the agent. Further, its view of the agent is not restricted to
who she was at the time of the transgression but includes who she might
become in the future.32 This observation brings us to the final feature of
Gadamers account of understanding that we will consider, namely, his
employment of the hermeneutic circle.
Gadamer, following both Schleiermacher and Dilthey, observes, the
movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the part
and back to the whole . . . . The harmony of all the details with the whole
is the criterion of correct understanding (Gadamer 1960/1989, 291). If
we recognize the need to read a particular action in light of the larger
text of the actors life, then we refuse to make this partthis action
on the part of the wrongdoerthe whole of who we take her to be. In
understanding-promoted forgiving, we let go of the interpretation that
sees the wrongdoer only in terms of the misdeed. However, at the same
time that our understanding of this action is connected with the larger
text of the persons life, the meaning of the whole is also altered by this
part. There is a refusal to read this part out of our interpretation of the
whole.33

31 The obvious exception is the case where one is dealing with limited resources such that

by giving X more than he deserves one no longer has sufficient funds to give Y everything
she deserves. The only plausible analog in the case of forgiving is respect. I have argued
elsewhere that extravagantly generous forgiveness is compatible with proper respect, both
for oneself and for others (Pettigrove 2004a).
32 Repentance often moves us to forgive. One of the things this discloses is that forgive-

nesss view of the other is not restricted to the time of his transgression.
33 The forgiver never gives up her opposition to the wrongdoers action, nor does she

even give up her opposition to the wrongdoers bad character traits. Instead, she revises her
judgment of the person himselfwhere that person is understood to be something other
 Forgiveness and Interpretation 447

The hermeneutic circle introduces two further considerations that

might encourage forgiving when the wrongdoer is understood in the light
of Christian doctrine. The first arises out of the doctrine of the Imago Dei.
Taking its inspiration from a line in the creation poem of Genesis 1, the
Christian tradition sees humans as bearers of Gods image.34 As bearers
of the divine image, there is some good to be found in all human beings,
however obscured it might become as a result of wrongdoing.35 Attending
to this good may help one to see the other as still decent despite his ac-
tion and encourage us to forgive (Hampton 1988a, 85; Butler 1729/1993,
10910; Davis 2001, 28990; and Tutu 1999, 8387). When one adds to
this a belief that God is in the business of restoring and perfecting that
image, a second motivation for forgiving comes into focus. One can now
interpret the wrongdoing in the light of how one expects the wrongdoer
to feel about it in the future when the effect of the divine project is more
nearly realized and the wrongdoers character has been improved. One
can recognize the kind of shame she will feel as she looks back from the
moral perspective on her former wrongdoing. Viewing the wrongdoer in
light of her future self can, once again, invoke sympathy and encourage
one to forgive (similarly Roberts 1995, 29697).

4. Conclusion
Our investigation has disclosed four ways in which understanding
might reduce the anger and resentment provoked when one believes one
has been wronged. By clearing up misunderstanding, it might help one
see that the other has not wronged one at all, thereby reducing the anger
evoked by ones previous interpretation of the others action. By adopting
the explanatory point of view, one might suspend ones normative assess-
ment of the act and the concomitant emotions. By identifying mitigating
circumstances, understanding might mitigate ones anger. Finally, by en-
gaging ones sympathy it might encourage one to treat the other as one
would want to be treated oneself. In the first two cases, what results is

than or more than the character traits of which she does not approve. And she reaches
the honest decision that this person does not merit her moral hatred, because he is still
decent despite his action. She does not condone something bad by forgiving him, because
the forgiveness is precisely the decision that he isnt bad (even though his action and
the character trait that precipitated it are) (Hampton 1988a, 8485). See also Gadamer
1960/1989, 291.
34 For a survey of relevant canonical texts and some of the history surrounding the

interpretation of the Imago Dei, see Hoekema 1986.

35 Some theologians argue that human sin has destroyed or obliterated the image of

God (for example, Calvin 1979a; however, Hoekema 1986, 4249 argues that these passages
are not an accurate reflection of Calvins considered view). I adopt the more traditional view
that in spite of human sinfulness the image remains. For more on this dispute see Hoekema
1986, chapter 4.
448 Journal of Religious Ethics

something other than forgiveness: clearing up misunderstanding in the

first way leads to excusing, while explaining steps out of the normative
framework required for forgiving. However, by leading to mitigating in-
terpretations of the deed and by engaging sympathy we have seen how
understanding, on some occasions, might promote forgiveness.36

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