II Requisites for Exercise

a) Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY,
respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private
respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged
that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that
she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.

The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976,
the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's
authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the
crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed,
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused
thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information
without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.

Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362
and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant
City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment.
Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having
been previously consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had
jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course.

After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed
reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of
city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions,
in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not
exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty
imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the
offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.

At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.

It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the
time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1
Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of
First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court
could impose.

The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant
case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule
against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have
retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.

In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to
impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information.
In People v. Purisima, 2 the Court stressed that:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab
origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of
the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which
the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the
facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to
show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must
assume jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)

The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be

meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result
of the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co Hick 62 Phil. 503)
but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal
obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is
acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether
the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v.
Mision, 48 O.G. 1330) 5 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper
under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be
imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to)
even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court.

In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal

case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a
crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would
warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting
 without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than
six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to
fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court. 7
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by
P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the
same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to
prision correccional in its minimum period).

Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that
court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the
evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial Court
would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled) case even though the
penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower
penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is
otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In other words, the
circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional
Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2
December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149995 September 28, 2007

ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September
17, 2001,1 affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with
violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information
which reads as follows:

That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on
account or for the value the check described below:

Check No. : 326317PR

Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check when presented
for payment within (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make
arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.2

On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners non-apprehension despite the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest.3 On June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set
aside4 after petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5

Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his
wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the
loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant.6
However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for
insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the
said dishonored check.7

Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by
the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check was not issued in
September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only
on December 1, 1987.8 He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his
favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the
necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in February
1988,9 complainant knew that the same was not funded.10
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a Decision11
finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as charged and sentences
him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the sum of
P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
decision in toto.12

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a guaranty for
the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners "investment theory". In ruling against the existence of a
partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas
General Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner.13
The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily amount to an
investment of capital.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE

LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS
OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE
PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE

LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED
WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WAS ALREADY IN
EFFECT.14

The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and
2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action15 and not during the arraignment of the accused. The
Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At
that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides:

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.

xxxx

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more
than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17 at the discretion
of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial
Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.18 The Metropolitan Trial Court could not
acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses
punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.

The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court"19
on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case.
Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its
enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to
civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by
implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of the
RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the
Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in
nature.21

After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners conviction for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the
accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused
knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.

Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the
time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not
comply with it.22

In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals upheld private complainants claim that the check was issued as a guaranty for
the loan and rejected petitioners "investment theory". The issue as to whether the amount of the
subject check represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to petitioner or
as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving the credibility of
witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not generally disturb the
findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had
the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, which
circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no
reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the
amount of the subject check was a loan and not an investment.23

Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same
was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side.
Since it was established that petitioner received money from private complainant in various
amounts,24 petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued for value.25

The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers is not a valid
defense. In Cueme v. People,26 the Court held thus:

The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective
investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense
punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad
check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is
whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal
intent are unavailing.

The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank,
produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber
check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as well as the
terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in
the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to the
kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made by
means of interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that petitioner deliberately
issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of the petitioner.27

The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is likewise
immaterial.1wphi1 Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first
delivery of the check.28 In the case at bar, the Information alleged that the check was postdated
February 15, 1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified
that the Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued
sometime in February 1988.

The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during
trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so
that it affects his substantial rights.29 In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the
issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense
that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot
be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show
that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the
bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the
same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.

Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private complainant knew that the
check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the subject check
was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for
value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when
presented for payment.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative

Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment
considering that the prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time
offender.30 Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon
petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated
September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay
private complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six
(6%) percent interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision, the
amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from
finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine
of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

b) Jurisdiction over the property

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 164938. August 22, 2005

VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3; ANTHONY DE LEON and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner
Victor C. Agustin which, in turn, assailed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City, Branch 3, denying the motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to
17895-R, for libel.

On June 13, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, filed four separate
Informations2 charging the petitioner, a Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist, with libel. The
inculpatory portion of that in Criminal Case No. 17892-R is quoted infra, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and malicious intent
and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and
reputation of one Anthony De Leon the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club, and
as a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community and with malicious intent
of exposing the (sic) Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and
dishonor, without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, maliciously and criminally
prepare or cause to prepare, write in his column "Cocktails" and publish in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and in the entire Philippines,
wherein in said column the said accused did then and there defame the complainant Anthony De
Leon by branding and imputing upon him the following defamatory and libelous statements, to
wit:

"The trysting place between the President Marcos and Hollywood actress Dovie Beams is not the
subject of a high level tax evasion investigation ordered by no less than the new BIR
Commissioner, Dakila Fonacier.

That bungalow on Northwestern Street had hastily changed hands in the last two years, and had
supposedly been sold to, first Anthony De Leon, the acting general manager of the exclusive
Baguio Country Club, who in turn disposed of it to an unwitting Chinoy couple.

According to preliminary BIR findings, the transfer to Mr. De Leon is already spurious since the
cook De Leon had been missing and had gone TNT in New York more than eight years ago.
The spurious sale to the male De Leon who is not related to the cook, was necessary to make it
appear that it had been an intra-family transfer.

Second, the Baguio Country Club manager made it appear that he and his family had been using
the house himself, but the BIR had now gotten a certification from the Greenhills homeowners
association that the said bungalow has all these years been rented to third parties, the last of
which was an ADB executive.

The most damaging of the findings was the supposed transfer price of the bungalow between the
De Leons and how much the bungalow was later palmed off to the Chinese-Filipino couple.

We will leave those details for the BIR Commissioner to announce himself, that, if he could
overcome the tremendous and well-oiled lobbying efforts by De Leons principals.

Tip: One of the principals is a lawyer and self-proclaimed best friend of Lenny Dragon Lady de
Jesus."

which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous words and statements have been read by the
personnel of the Baguio Country Club, by the residents of the City of Baguio, and by the public
in the other parts of the country, and that those libelous and defamatory words and statements
aforementioned are untrue, false and malicious tending to impeach the character, integrity, virtue
and reputation of the said Anthony De Leon as Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country
Club, thus, placing and causing said Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, dishonor,
discredit and ridicule which acts are serious and insulting in nature, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Anthony De Leon.3

Except for the alleged libelous articles, as well as the dates of the commission of the crimes
charged therein, the three other Informations are similarly worded.

Agustin was arraigned on September 10, 2001, and pleaded not guilty to all the charges.4

Agustin then filed a Motion to Quash the Informations, on the sole ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out that the said Informations did not contain
any allegation that the offended party, Anthony de Leon, was actually residing in Baguio City, or
that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of general
circulation in Baguio City.

Private complainant De Leon, through counsel, opposed the motion, alleging that he was a bona
fide resident of the Baguio Country Club located at the Country Club Road, Baguio City; he was
also the acting general manager of the club at the time the alleged libelous article was published.
He emphasized that the Informations alleged that he was of good standing and reputation in the
community, and that the word "community" meant Baguio City, where he was residing.
Moreover, Agustin was estopped from assailing the courts lack of jurisdiction since he was
arraigned before he filed his motion to quash the Information. Even if it may be assumed that
there was some ambiguity in the Informations as to whether he was an actual resident of Baguio
City, amending them would suffice; based on the entirety of the context and applying the
doctrine of necessary implication, there can be no other conclusion than that he was a resident of
Baguio City.

By way of Reply, Agustin averred that the allegations in the Informations (that the private
complainant was the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club and was a private
citizen of good standing and reputation in the community) do not constitute an allegation that the
private complainant was an actual resident of Baguio City. He insisted that to construe the word
"community" in the Informations to mean the community in Baguio City would be to unduly
strain the limits of a fair interpretation; there must be clear and positive allegations in the
Informations that the private complainant actually resided in Baguio City. He argued that he was
not estopped from assailing the courts jurisdiction over the crimes charged even after his
arraignment because lack of jurisdiction is a matter which can be dealt with at any time.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court issued an Order5 denying the motion to quash, holding that
in the light of the petitioners admission that the private complainant was the General Manager
of the Baguio Country Club, "it was reasonable to infer therefrom that the private complainant
was actually a resident of Baguio City at the time the alleged libelous articles were published."

Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, insisting that the mere fact that the
private complainant was the General Manager of the Baguio Country Club did not necessarily
mean that the latter was actually residing in Baguio City, as it was also possible that he was
actually residing in a place nearby. The trial court, however, denied the motion on April 1, 2002.
Agustin forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a plea for an injunctive
relief before the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his Motion to Quash.

On February 24, 2004, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It disagreed with
Agustin, and held that the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in so ruling. According to the CA, while the Informations filed by
the prosecution did not contain allegations that the complainant was actually a resident of Baguio
City at the time the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published, and that the alleged
libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City, such defects were merely of
form and not of substance. Thus, there is no need to quash the Informations, as they may merely
be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides that "an amendment, either of form or substance, may be made at any time before the
accused enters a plea to the charge, and thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court."6
The CA further ruled that any amendment that would be made to conform to the private
complainants residency requirements would not place the accused at a disadvantage.

Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court denied for
lack of merit.7

Agustin, now the petitioner, insists that the CA erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari and
prohibition, it appearing that the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in denying
his Motion to Quash the Informations, as well as his motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts order denying the same.

The petitioner maintains that in the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the private
respondent was actually residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed
and first published in Baguio City as mandated by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He asserts that the amendments of the
Informations would likewise be improper, considering that the defects of the Informations were
not merely of form but of substance. The petitioner posits that venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional and mandatory; hence, conformably with the decisions of the Court in Lopez v.
City Judge,8 and Agbayani v. Sayo,9 the Informations must be quashed.

In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the
failure of the Informations to allege that the private respondent is a resident of Baguio City
(where the Informations were filed) is not a jurisdictional defect. It asserts that the averment in
the Informations that the crimes charged were committed within the jurisdiction of the trial court
in Baguio City, taken in conjunction with the other allegations therein, are sufficient to vest
jurisdiction over the subject cases in the RTC of Baguio City.

For his part, the private complainant reiterated his arguments in the RTC and in the CA in his
Comment on the Petition.

The threshold issues in the present petition are (1) whether or not the RTC of Baguio City has
jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the four Informations on the premise that the
Informations are defective; and (2) whether the Informations may be amended to cure the said
defects.

The petition is meritorious.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.10 The jurisdiction of a court over
the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the
offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.11

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides

ART. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible
for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance or the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided,
further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and
vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And provided,
finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or
criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.

Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the
chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the
municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in
accordance with the provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed
by the offended party.

Thus, the rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.12

Experience has shown that under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused in a
libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant places.13 To obviate
controversies as to the venue of the criminal action from written defamation, the complaint or
Information should contain allegations as to whether the offended party was a public officer or a
private individual at the time the offense was committed, and where he was actually residing at
that time; whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged.14

In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing in
Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous articles
were printed and first published in Baguio City. It cannot even be inferred from the allegation
"the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good
standing and reputation in the community" that the private respondent (complainant) was
actually residing in Baguio City.

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or
place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length
of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary.15 The
term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a
resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein.16 To create a residence in a
particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place,
combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite
time.17 While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the
petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he
was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that
the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts
business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident
therein.18 Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within
the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for
purposes of venue.19

We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal.
Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually
residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial
defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be
allowed.20

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 3, is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Informations and DISMISS the
cases against petitioner Victor C. Agustin in Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to 17895-R.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989

SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX,
Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.

Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.

Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.

PARAS, J.:

Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and
set aside the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds
(a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in
nature.

It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was
authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding
premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency
agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her
transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent
located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account
which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged
with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in
his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this
order of denial was also denied.

These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the
contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction
because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly
misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.

Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature
because the fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931
involving the same alleged misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject
transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action.

The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the
denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be
questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or
order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed
in such a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).

The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason
is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is
not the court of proper venue.

Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take
cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the
crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-
21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).

In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that
in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must
be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and
the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the
complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make
after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).

The information in the case at reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as

follows:

That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in

the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez
duly organized and earth under the laws of the Philippine
with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M.
Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following manner, to wit.
the said having been authorized to act as insurance agent of
said corporation, among whose duties were to remit
collections due from customers thereat and to account for
and turn over the same to the said Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez, as soon
as possible or immediately upon demand, collected and
received the amount of P368,850.00 representing payments
of insurance premiums from customers, but herein accused,
once in possession of said amount, far from complying with
her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so and with
intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount
of P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine
Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)

Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof
took place.

The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period
1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)

Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of
Manila has jurisdiction.

Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be

prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place.
One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party.
The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The
failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused
damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice
it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of
the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102
and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in

Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank
manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private
complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the
transfer of the title in the latters name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the
property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated
December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently,
Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369
for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts
were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used
the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check
No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from
P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the
PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant
case of Estafa was filed against him.3

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was
given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused
to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with
the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount
of P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita
Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of
"Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City,
petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa
under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the
dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas
guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the
aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is
sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen
(17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify
private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate
of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas in the pleadings
and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treas", under which he was accused
in the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the
RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming
that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
on Certiorari12 before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition
for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.

On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with
the following assignment of errors:
 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A

PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that P 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the
evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December
1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on
22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was
actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated
there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable
presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the
check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the
acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to
Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she not Elizabeth who was
the offended party. Thus, the latters demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by
the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been
properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of
P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The
signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioners.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file the latters Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for
Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This
motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG
filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29
September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged.
The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect
to the delivery of P150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence
between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed
in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any.
Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution
witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled
to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which
is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not
raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also
one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof
was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the
demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in
view of his advanced age and failing health.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the
factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as
follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
 (8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which
they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.

The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to
where it was committed:

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth
Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by
taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the
amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the
amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had
complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja
discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.15

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any
specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by
the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present
countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based
on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a
reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was
executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was
delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning
the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying
the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he
did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake
documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecutions
evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he
had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be
given evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to
have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual
findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on
appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on
review.17

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower
courts.

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,18 this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must
also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution
failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial courts
jurisdiction. The Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he

gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject
aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or
anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the
RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside
from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any
of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts
of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991
and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that
the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum
scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by
Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the
elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991,
Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject
aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is
authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed
to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of
P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was
consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely
pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his
money.

xxx

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed
the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in
the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of
appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph
(b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)20
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati.
However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to
where the offense was committed. It provides in part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR

TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR
TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the latter
failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He
also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses.
What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of
Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as
Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a

check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the
sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada
Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason:
ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where
the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also
shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to and she will
work for the Deed of Sale.

Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?

A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

 Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the
capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic)
and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-
trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you
please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt
which you said Atty. Treas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.

Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty.
Treas by you, what happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in
Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of
the RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution
evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati.
The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise.
That jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law.26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is
to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from
that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience
in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.28 This principle echoes more
strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and
failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.

At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly
militates against the petitioners conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and
16.02 of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.1wphi1

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those others kept by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to
the client how the money was spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard
of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand.32 His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics;
it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.34

In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner
has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include
an order to immediately return the amount of P 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of
interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution
dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati
City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to
the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati
City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside
the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of
the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by
Tomas.

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her
reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit:
said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John
Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000,
was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints
showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly,
she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath
in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence
any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what
the other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second
complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case
since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati
City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.5
The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside
the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners
anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which
ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy]
(GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long
standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court
reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of
which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of
the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city
court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of
the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act
of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the
case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the
execution of the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through
the subject documents before the court of Makati City.9 (emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than
Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts
of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper
since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City
subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.10

The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for
perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the
present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the facts in
Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the
essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were
made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In his
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the
petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath
only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the
RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or
Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper
court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and
hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited
to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
committed within its territorial jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of
province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.13

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the
court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be

understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary
for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for
a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made
either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief;
it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both
instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned
notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants
pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.14

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making
a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made
for a legal purpose.15 (emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper
venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum
Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the
second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath
before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in
Makati City:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit:
said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.16

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently
alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of
the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum

of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the
false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati
City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not
true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the
perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between
the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the
Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in
verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of
certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and
sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed
was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear
the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where
the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement
found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Caet18 which ruled:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the
information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted
false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in
Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in
Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary
of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva
that

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of
perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of
how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against
the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a
civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).
Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement
in an affidavit on a material matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in
their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008,
harked back to the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took
effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in
turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is
entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.22

The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation
in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was
rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were
found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6
of General Order No. 5823 for the procedural aspect.

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or
certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished
by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years;
and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in
any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 539224 and 539325 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution
of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.27

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the
court of the place where the crime was committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act of
representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the
Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the
act that consummated the crime.

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC29 interestingly
explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage
between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:30

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of
Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old
Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907,
which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of
the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived.
However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised
Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas,
under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of
Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from
American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury
committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697
includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false
testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding
other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to
administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved
perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to
the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual
testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the
oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By
implication, the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC
had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.

In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by
an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to
the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697
was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the
same time separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present
RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while
at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could
not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense
charged in the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions
filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the
cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn
petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay
because it was in the courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood
became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium
Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the Court, "whether the perjurious
statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the
gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement,"32 citing Caet as
authority for its statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its
very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue;
it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material
consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while
Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article
182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil
case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is
used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet because the applicable
law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only
that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as
the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it
is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes
materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in
this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the
time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1,
1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal
actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential
ingredients of the crime took place.1wphi1 This change was followed by the passage of the
1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,34 and the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures
expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place
where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses
Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against
Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the
criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who
"make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is
the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing
a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article
183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through
the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the
crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath
in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under
oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the
place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the
oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of
the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

c) Jurisdiction over the person

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18
December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June
2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the
instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001,
Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing
 the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING
the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Isabela; and

3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith

Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda,
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan,
SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of
the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a
sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for
the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz,
and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001,
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to
the Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued
a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this
Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor
Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and
prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order
dated 22 October 2001.

On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of
Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October
2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring
the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the
previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

Hence, this petition.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside
the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001,
October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-
3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek
any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch
36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal
cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal
issued therein having become final and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals
ruling that:

[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory
process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso
V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be
placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial
reliefs.3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived
of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation;
to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue,
assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their
motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for
bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the
case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized
under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was
dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been
arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold
the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from
the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause.6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction
over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the
law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have
been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of
someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right
to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the
whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail. 13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that,
as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative
relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant
being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is
to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is
the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor. 17

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of
the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative
relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The
following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were
not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction
of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash
an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest:

1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of
lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,
instead, to elevate the records to us.

2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist
from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.

3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance
of the warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail
are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to
persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail
will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to
persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to
liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of
arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of
probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause
after personally examining the records of the case.

Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues
in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any
time of the day and night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken
against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.

In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to
require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference
in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of
liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary
of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge
Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he
quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed
appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause
due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed
the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge
Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is
but proper."24

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan
as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against
petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review
of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of
the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the
adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the
same ground.

The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if
true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:

In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of
the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the
contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated
by Judge Tumaliuan:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to
the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge
Anghad gravely abused his discretion.

According to petitioners:

In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable
cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination
personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since
it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.28

Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he
relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:

Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to
determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]

The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The
supporting documents are the following:

1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;

4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo
de la Cruz;

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355;

7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;

8. Information dated 22 June 2001;

9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and

 10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan
of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive
part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge
Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it
was given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it
was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years;
(3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it
was given during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former
City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the
other."32

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the
findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the
province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well
put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there
was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad
summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:

Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41,
Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind
and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001
Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn
Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said
officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the
defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected
the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel
Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.

xxxx

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001,
praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of
the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the
prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose
Miranda are ordered dismissed.34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different
accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact
that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the
crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly
is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here
an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill
respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of
respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is
now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of
our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the
probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly
meets the criteria of probable cause.

We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from
further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to
issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.

Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to
issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the
Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or
merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a
matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June
2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the
declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of
arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based
on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so.
The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are
also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we
have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable
cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the
finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the
same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause,
also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to
petitioners:

It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent
Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before
the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the
following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:

1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;

3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and

 4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed
Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or
nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals
decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution.
Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001
Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in
filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On
21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous
referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places
the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In
claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001
Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In
said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos
filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15
November 2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to

lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which
require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should
be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40

As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his
motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us
of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People
v. SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to
the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in
the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days
after receipt hereof;

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed
to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these
cases;

3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases
within ten (10) days from the transfer;

4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases
with reasonable dispatch.

6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for
the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon,
and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED.
Costs against Petitioners.

SO ORDERED.