People vs. Pomar
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO POMAR, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22008
November 3, 1924
Facts:
The accused being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la
Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business and the
petitioner Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave which began on
the 16th d,y of July, 1923, by reason of her pregnancy, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to said woman the
sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to which she was entitled as
her regular wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after
her delivery and confinement which took place on the 12th day of August,
1923, despite and over the demands made by her, the said Macaria Fajardo,
upon said accused, to do so.
To said complaint, the defendant contended that the provisions of said Act
No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based were illegal, unconstitutional
and void.
The lower court, found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described
in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50, in accordance with
the provisions of section 15 of said Act, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed, and now makes the following
assignments of error: That the court erred in overruling the demurrer; in
convicting him of the crime charged in the information; and in not declaring
section 13 of Act No. 3071, unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a
reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state
Held:
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in
the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of
safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or
place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery.
The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it
authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract
including within the guarantees of the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment. That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the
liberty of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the decision of
this court, and is no longer open to question. The law takes account of the
necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the necessities of the
employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum, not only
whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of
his business to sustain the burden, generously leaving him, of course, the
privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a loss.
Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and,
consequently, the right to contract to labor or for labor, and to terminate such
contracts, and to refuse to make such contracts.. Hence, we are of the
opinion that this Act contravenes those provisions of the state and Federal
constitutions, which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.
Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation
owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description
within the Philippine Islands, of his right to enter into contracts of employment
upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates
a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such
persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of
the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his
liberties is the liberty to contract. It has been decided in a long line of
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the right to contract
about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the
"due process of law" clause of the constitution. The rule in this jurisdiction is,
that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals or public policy. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and
the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine
Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are
contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of
Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. (Vol. 12, Public Laws, p.
238
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28
JUN 1988]
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the
following:American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72.
Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders
to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended
petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew
Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was
found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the
after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been
under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives
and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well
as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the
child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were
apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the
CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-
deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for
pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were
instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation
of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative
Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date.
Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April
1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID
agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it
violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners
was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3
months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of
arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule.
1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.)
Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done
was incidental to the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its
validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is
or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in
accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in
relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides
that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed
as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is
essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended
to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the
authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to
the public good and tranquility of the people.
Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29,
1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is
a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
.
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as
a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.