O jibwa Taxonomy and Percept Ambiguity May B, Brack INTRODUCTION ‘A. I. Hallowell was one of the anthropologists in America who showed an early interest in cognitive culture and what he called in 1942 “‘the amazingly variable belief systems of mankind.” (Black 1974:519-521 places his work in this line of development.) From his teachers among the Ojibwa Indians (chiefly the Berens River Saulteaux in the 1980s)* Hallowell set out to absorb, comprehend, Many B, DLAck i afiisted as reiareh asodate with the Royal Ontario DMutcum in ‘Toronto, and has divided her time since 168 between that lea tion and eld residence in an Ojibwa community in Subarele Ontario. She ko has taught in California (UCLA and California State Universit. North ridge), taking Der PhD. degiee from Stanford University ia 1907 with ‘oncenration in cognitive anthropology. nial reearch and wring for One paper was carried out under predoc tora fellowship and eld grant frm MIMI constant contact with Ojibwa fiends and teachers over the yeas ince 196 has never fled addin ‘rements of leaning and valued experiences nal analy and writing, wat Sided by research facies of the Royal Ontario Museum incuding. dose ‘onmutation with Dr. Edward 8. Roger. 1 Hallowell (1960) atributer the evidence adduced for this clssication “chiely to my own fedwork seth a branch of the Northern Ojibwa" re ferring the render to chapter 5 of Culture and Experience wheve the Sa scuffs of he eens River aca (2 of Take Winnipeg In Manitoba and Ontario) are described historially. geographical, and. sodoculturally He elt they had ‘etsined their calttl omcervaien becuse of native elation and continuation of hunting, fishing, and trapping and thus ofOJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY = 91 and respect their particular system of interpreting and dealing with the phenomenal world. As ethnographer, he undertook to commu nicate this understanding to his own colleagues and countrymen, always a difficult task, Hallowell’s descriptive material often ap- pears as a string of annotated anecdotes from his field data, some- times illustrative of one or another current theory or special inter- ext in the behavioral sciences. In his reports on Ojibwa “world view," however (especially 1960 and sections of 1951, 1954, 1958, and 1963), one can also discern an incipient systematic design, one idiades and bails about the tature of salma and man relation them" He satey “The pestence of hunting cannot be teparatet in Oibva Cottee fom belies about the nature of the world. «= Hunting» -» was Sot a seclar ocupation, -. Sucese depended. af much upon 2. mas ‘Sttacoryselationn wid the superman "aes ofthe diferent spec game aod furbearing aioe upon hs techn ile = These Endics were among the gre vers who texlowed extraordinary” powers Spon mon, ace a thet "guardian spina’ and without whove Mleingy Nia hte tattactry Buta Ie wae thoweht tobe imposible” (136 120, "Betoe the Twety of 1875, he goes on, "there were no chit inthe ‘odetn sme, nor any jr!’ procadors «no one was responsible for Pruning cine or sting caper The major soca sanction was the fear Ermine aod dae | Efecve Wadenhip teed in the sole Stic men} thow wit Were nputel to have ined the mow power, “inom thts, fom sowie. gece (le one8) Atle the Beli complor vomuios “Wohi day” he” addy, though, technological ‘ange and contact with Eavo-Canadian eultre have seeertedrapiy ia the are, in 95 in northern Minncots 1 also found the Blit complex about the ratorat wok to be lane Tetained ant we by the Sve ora ely Indian who worted on the danifcatons ttythowgh ther ving. wat ‘nly minimally by fishing and bunting a tat tine: (Al were over 6 aed ‘iad agsh au a toond language fst all) ‘The Bele sytem yielded by an snaysis of the alfcaons had much Jn common wit that dscibed. by Halowal, according great importance to Teatve degiee of power and £0 2 man's relationship with tho who were Sn a poston to helplor hart hin {ice ack 197, 17). "This paper dea primarily with the. percep aspect SF spem, indiidus of tech groupe of Ojova. diplyed the peal tendency to ape ooly for shemale sed of the thingy thy had own through experience. Fhe expencnct of each individual being deren, nt sho ‘private they expicny andGpated tat ether? seenens would ‘lifer fom thelr own, even‘on fatal sd cognitive tater. Tite wat fefere to athe “Ojibwa phenomenaogy” tn now? oe ako Blade 1373 En 119, This tendency, coupled wid eet about the cbjecine realty fof certain private semory experience, yields an expectation of invided Aivesty of pereption 2 miter pertinent tothe: present analy Enon more fundamental for an undentinding’of the tatonomietndsterainaey tuiined in this paper, i thatthe whole Hving worl i seen potently ‘Gangerous, its members variouly and predictably powerful beneath that tha the whole world (wi siall exception) een. ay potently “ving” wat suggested in ‘lack 157-901 thatthe Ofibva word for the {otal domain, lowed living thing, might be eps Intnl ana as ‘Shore beings wth power)92" ETHos that consists of taxonomic classes and their defining properties— in short, a folk taxonomy. Here, Hallowell gives the “Ojibwa world view categories” within this basically ethnosemantic frame- work, although without identifying his work with that developing field or employing its more formal means for recording and analyz- ing this type of data. I believe that certain of his stated theoretical goals, and the underlying design of these ethnographic reports, re- veal him to have been, among many other things, an early ethno- scientist. In this paper I document this claim from his own writ- ings, and after presenting a formalization of his reported data offer an analysis (based on my own Minnesota Ojibwa study of 1965— see note 1) that accounts for certain aspects of the Ojibwa classifica- tions. HALLOWELL'S ETHNOSCIENCE; ‘THEORY AND APPLICATION ‘TreoRETIcat. Goats By 1940, and consistently thereafter, Hallowell sought means for describing a culture in terms of its cognitive organization of ex- perience. His theoretical position regarding the aims of ethnogra- phy was very lose to that of the ethnoscience or ethnosemantic development of the 1950s and 1960s, Selected passages from his writings published between 1940 and 1963 (see Appendix 1, be- low) document his conviction that the ethnographer should strive for an “inside view” of a people's phenomenal world, their “blue- print for a meaningful interpretation of objects and events,” which affects their perception of the physical environment and thereupon their “concepts, discriminations, and classificatory pat- terns.” By 1960 he was presenting Ojibwa culture as a particular “cognitive orientation in a cosmos” and he labeled it an “ethno- metaphysics.” But back in 1940 he had written, “Whereas we might attribute such inevitable hazards of life as illness, misfortune or death to chance . . . the [Ojibwa] individual [does not]... because of the character and limits of the explanation of phenomena his culture offers him as alternatives” (italics mine). It seems clear that from the start he considered one task of ethnography to be the discovering and reporting of a culture's cognitive “alternatives,” their “character and limits.” ‘Thus the importance of the basic ingredient, ontology (an in- ventory of the things people perceive to exist in the world) as aOJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY ™ 93 starting point for a cultural description. In his description, “it is necessary to avoid, as far as possible, the imposition of categories of thought, classifications of phenomena, and terminology . . . [of] Western culture,” Hallowell appears here to have solved the phenomenological dilemma in a manner similar to the ethnosci- centists: he avoided imposing Western categories ("as far as possi- ble”) by imposing the structure of taxonomic categorization that his Western preconceptions assumed to be universal, The Ojibwa’s own phenomenology (more advanced than in Western society) is, indeed, one of the clements that played havoc with the taxonomic ‘results, as will be seen? Apruication: Hattows1's Oyiwa FoLx ‘Taxonomy (See note 1 for cultural notes and belief system summary.) In the papers cited, Hallowell’s cognitive ethnography of the Ojibwa has a folk taxonomic framework; he provides the hierarchy of categor- ies in which Ojibwa has a folk taxonomic framework; he provides the hierarchy of categories in which Ojibwa people perceive some portion of the physical world (in this instance, all “living things"), and the attributes or properties by which they define these cate- gories and distinguish one from another. Though the material is presented in a deceptively anecdotal manner, itis possible for the reader to extract and reorder the relevant information, and to chart formally the structure of the whole. This is what I have done. The classes are charted in tables 1 and 2. Where the taxonomy appears incomplete, please note that there is no missing category across any important level of contrast. Membership in some categories is ob- 2. The phenomenological dilemma of attempting to look at phenomena without prejudging, without applying one's own categorizations or precon- xptions, seems 10 have ben recognized. by Hallowell as the logit im. possibility that i i. (is argement was, ater all, that the Ojibwa ike al People, perceive the world through their cultural preconceptions)” And a ‘hough at fst glance his papers sometines read Ue entended, fed notes, fhe ultimately aid not rely om the Ojibwa peoples words and act "speaking for themicives” to readers {who would of course “hear” through ther own concep, categories, and_ preconceptions). He rescnbled the. ethnoscientiat in his going ditecly after the Ojibwa categories and ways of ondeing the Phenomena” of their world—within a Wesicm, taxonomfe snuctare The Fequirement for some Kind of order vem indeed a human waives, ss doce that for generic inclusion cases in human languages, That the Ojibwa date, and response to “tuxonomizing.” dt not exactly fit Western lr sess pardy because of thee accrediting only “that which x eveated though [thers yp) experiences dition of phenomenaogy given by Maca (594." ETHOS “TABLE 1 ‘Wosta Virw Carecomses oF raz Tenviovst 3x Osawa SocaETY {rom Hallowell 1964, 1858, 1960, 1968) Objects Say ‘Objects other than slp “Living. things Nenliving things Fanon “aimais—) Fane] ead ‘Other ‘objens than. Human | human beings | persons TABLE 2 ‘Taxowowae Unive oF Ojmwa “Live Tunos” (ALL (ith taxa numbers for crowteerence to Appendixes 1 and 2) tt Eiving Things 12 Pesos wae Animals | Planes 1 Oiherdhamhuman penons [es a9 Bears | Tree Ed diioRanak C2T ediga E15 manine 125 Whekedjak IG pedgenak £26 Teahdbee eu? sun 12 Mining Ghosts [18 moon 19 winds £20 Fline {21 Thunderbirds 22 “masters” of pede 23 High God viously skimpy and could be supplemented. But that is the point: the relationship of those members to all other parts of the system will be known, once they are added. The description is thus ex- pandable, as well as replicable and testable. The completeness is in fact rather remarkable, considering that Hallowell did not draw up the structure in one place as is done here.® Table 2 provides detail for the center portion of table 1, with “living things” as the head term. 3. I¢ i Interesting that Profesor Hallowells widow, Maude Hallowell, now repors that “he wat addicted to diagrams and chart as an aid a thik Ing and teaching, bute didnot use them in his published work,OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY ™ 95, Supporting evidence for these chartings, cited direetly from Hallowell’s text, is systematized in appendixes 2 and 3. Appendix 2 gives his references to “classes” or “categories” with remarks in- dicating their inclusion and contrast relations; appendix 3 gives the “attributes” or properties that characterize each class. His ‘words speak for themselves as evidence that he viewed the Ojibwa categories within a framework of what we would call semantic structuring. ‘The class that Hallowell calls “persons” is of special interest because ofits structural position in his analysis, as well as its im- portance in his interpretation of Ojibwa world view. He states, “"in this paper I have assembled evidence . . . which supports the inference that . . . the action of persons provides the major key to their world view” (1960:50). “Persons” tums out to be what ethnosciemtists would term a “covert category” (Berlin, Breedlove, and Raven 1968), for according to Hallowell the Ojibwa do not recognize this class as such, but the belief system structure is more truly represented by inferring it from his data. He has stated, “It is not necessary that the individual be aware of the underlying . principles involved, any more than it is necessary that he be aware ‘of the grammatical principles of the language that he speaks. But the former are as open to investigation as are the latter” (1955:91). In the table of properties, then, appear several of what are termed “person attributes” that define this class as contrasted with other classes at the same level. Hallowell appropriately extended the taxonomic universe to all “living things” (table 2) 30 the con- tasting categories are provided. In fact, he initially extended it to all objects of the individual's cognitive orientation, including self, thus placing “persons” within the total ontological world of the individual (table 1), Note that each class has been subdivided only within the categories relevant to the “persons” argument. So the tables show how the “persons” entities relate to the members of other categories, although all such members are not given. Hallowell’ need for the “persons” class could be explained struc- turally a5 follows: In table 2 the “other-than-human” subclass of “persons” includes various spiritual beings and mythological char- acters, and elements such as sun and moon and winds. These are all entities that would ordinarily be labeled “supernaturals.” But Hallowell did not find a natural supernatural dichotomy in Ojibwa world view. One of his continuing arguments was that the Ojibwa96 * Eros do not necessarily share our Western dichotomies of natural and supernatural, human and other-than-human, dreams and waking expetience—dichotomies that we sometimes mistakenly extend to cour ethnographic descriptions. If the Ojibwa recognize a clas of beings who are not “human beings” but are closer to human beings than to other classes of the animate world, this calls for the union cof the “human beings” class and the entities who are close to hhuman beings. Hallowell therefore introduced a superordinate class “persons,” allowing this unlabeled group of entities to be simply “other-than-human persons,” that is, all members of the ‘person’ class that are not “human beings.” ‘This makes complete sense, taxonomically, with the inferred category validated by its presumed possession of common attributes that distinguish it from other classes of “living things.” (Black 1969a validates an un- labeled category in similar manner. My analysis, however, did not support the introduction of a class such as Hallowell's “persons.”) ‘Thus we see how far Hallowell went in following the structural requisites of ethnoscience, albeit embedded and almost disguised in his reports and lacking methodological specification. He did not carry it further than this, nor did he present it in a format that ‘would allow a critical inspection and analysis such as we can now extend, ANALYSIS OF OJIBWA FOLK TAXONOMY, 1965 Portions of my formal semantic study of Ojibwa clasifications (Black 1967), carried out in 1963 in northern Minnesota, coincide with Hallowell’ embedded taxonomy outlined above. Especially, results ofthe 1965 elicitation of taxonomic categories show a simi. larity that is notable (though not total), probably attesting to a basic constancy of cognitive culture among Ojibwa Indians across ‘geographical areas, and to the genuineness and conscientiousness of our Ojibwa teachers. (See note 1 regarding the two Ojibwa groups) Therefore, itis now possible to apply to both sets of data an analysis of certain inconsistencies in Ojibwa taxonomizing, taking up the data as they stand at the stage of description where Hallowell left them. (The Minnesota work can even be considered 3s a replication and extension of Hallowel’s ethnography, given the latter's folk classification structure.) Critical examination of Hallowell’s own statements within their systematized framework (and adding related material from the extended Minnesota study)‘OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY #97 yields the discovery of a particular type of indeterminacy present in the taxonomies. I propose that this indeterminacy may be in- herent in the Ojibwa belief system or world view. The following. critique was originally applied to the Minnesota results only (sce Black 1967:492-200, and other page numbers below). A Carmicat Loox ar tHe Oyiswa Carecoris AND PROPERTIES Had Hallowell pursued the implications of his reported world view categories and their defining properties, he would have found an instability not altogether becoming a proper taxonomy. (He would no doubt, however, have penetrated through to the real “auth” in his Ojibwa lessons, rather than label his teachers dis- orderly.) The careful reader now is able, from a close inspection of the classes and the statements about their properties, to draw his own conclusions, Offered here are some ideas and guidelines from another longtime pupil of Ojibwa teachers ‘The clues disclosing taxonomic instability and ultimate indeter- ‘minacy that in turn is rooted in Ojibwa cognitive culture are to be found in tables 1 and 2 and appendixes 2 and 3. We should expect that classes in table 2 would exhibit more or less mutually exclu- sive membership, in a reasonably stable manner from one moment to the next, with substantial though not necessarily total agreement among culture members.* And we should expect that appendix 3's attributes would “unify” within classes and distinguish definitively or contrastively between those classes that occur at the same tax- ‘onomic level, The data show that violations occur on both scores especially surrounding the “persons” category and its subdivi- sions. For example, category 7 in table 2 (“other-than-human persons") includes “some stones,” “some animals,” “some trees.” For appendix 2 documentation, see under “t.3, t4, 5 (included in t1)," “t.10, 11 (included in t.5),” and “t14 through £32 (in- dluded in t7)." These are entities whose original homes are in classes that are supposed to contrast with “persons.” (One wants to know, of course, which stones, which animals, etc., but the case is not so simple. The Minnesota data, especially, stressed that these are also sometimes in the t.7 class, giving them a sort of “visitor” 4 This allows for shits owing to change of context (for example when ‘silying the same items for purpose other than generic clas position), and for eategory-finge varlablty among individuals, See Black INT or di ‘sion of intraculturasemante variability.98 "ETHOS status and the class a shifting membership. And more complexities arise, as will be seen. See Black 1967:104-106, fig. 4.C, where category t.9 corresponds to Hallowell’s 7.) ‘Thus there is overlapping membership in classes that should contrast, and also a sort of movement in and out. On this fact all informants agree, though they do not share the exact inventory of entities who are visitors versus those who are hosts. Table 2 shows also three members of 7 (other-than-human persons) with Ojibwa language labels: ftiso'kanak, pawdganak, manitu. While there are slight differences conceptually, each of these terms can, at times, refer to the whole class. Appendix 2 entries under “t.12, t13 (in- luded in t.6)" and “14, £15, 1.16, (included in or standing for 7)" document this from Hallowell’s writings. Thus the three terms ate partial synonyms, referentially. Referential synonyms should not occupy separate quarters in a proper taxonomy. It also emerges that any of the living entities (except people) may con- ceivably or potentially be a member of this category—and even some humans cross over for periods of time or straddle the line. And finally, itis said that there are members of this class who are there only for some individual Indian (and likely only he would now of it, as these are the spirits who choose to appear privately to individuals and give them blessings). ‘Thus the class is actually constituted differently for each individual, though there is a core (on which all would agree, and it is constituted differently at each ‘moment in time, (Some of these unstable facts are not reflected in table 2; Black’s fg, 4.C mentioned above does, however, take them into account; and text 4.292(2) discusses all types of instabil some detail: Black 1967:112, 115-116.) Appendix 3's citations about defining properties support most of these violations, and especially show “person attributes" distributed widely and seemingly capriciously here and there throughout the range of “living things,” infiltrating as far as the “plant” category and even that of “material objects.” Now this is surely a strange kind of disorder to be tolerated by a scholar like Hallowell, and even stranger for the Ojibwa people themselves, who presumably—no matter how respectful of one another's differences—exist on the basis of some kind of cognitive ‘organization and concensus (including concensus about comple- mentarity, if you will). The instabilities just summarized all seem to occur owing to inclusion in the taxonomy of the “other-than-‘OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY ™ 99 hhuman persons,” and to the inference of the “persons” class. Yet, as Hallowell frequently insisted, the Ojibwa do include and classify these entities right along with all the less “imaginary” creatures in their environment (Hallowell 1951:179). ‘The crux seems to be that they also clothe them in certain types of defining properties that are in essence logically and empirically antitaxonomic. ‘The instability is built into the system by the stated qualifications for membership in this class. The solution that is now offered for consideration focuses attention on two aspects: (1) the type of attributes that the Ojibwa teachers thought most important for defining the classes; and (2) that part of the folk taxonomy that is usually seen as the very base or starting point—namely, the iden- tification of perceived phenomena. Goodenough (1963:chap. 7) dissected “belief systems” in such a way that their rootings in the physical world consisted of percepts and percept categories—our sense perception of phenomena and events, Immediately upon perception of an event, human beings categorize it in accordance with their assumptions about the nature of the universe, and then they behave accordingly. In effect, we may not “see” the same phenomena, though we are observing “the same” event. If Hallowell was particularly sensitive to “cultural factors in the structuralization of perception” (1951), it may result partly from his Ojibwa experience. For to make sense of much of their behavior, one must come to know the categories of objects and events they are “seeing” at a given moment (plus the possible events judged to be not present, as Hallowell provided in ventory of Ojibwa ontology). While this must be true in general, and not just of the Ojibwa, there are special factors in the Ojibwa system that make a difference; these have to do with concepts about perceptions and with ambiguity in percept identification. Returning to appendix 3, the “properties that distinguish per- sons from other living things” contain passages that reveal an Ojibwa preoccupation with appearance, form, and perceptibility itself, especially those citations summarized under the headings HUMAN ATTRIBUTES BUT NOT NECESSARILY HUMAN FORM . . . UN: STABLE OUTWARD APPEARANCE, CONSTANT INNER ESSENCE » » » CA PACITY FOR METAMORPHOSIS... . and DEGREE or rowER (eg. to appear or manifest oneself in chosen forms). All citations under these headings should be consulted; one, for example, from 1960:65: “Outward appearance is only an incidental attribute of100. * ETHOS being. . .. In outward manifestation neither animal nor human characteristics define categorical differences”; and two from other sections of the appendixes—from 1955:98: Mémengwéctwak are not “perceptually intangible beings” but can be seen, and from 1955:177: the Ojibwa “take for granted that multiform appearance isan inherent potential ofall animate beings. What is uniform, con- stant, visually imperceptible and vital is the soul. A sorcerer being 4 person of unusual power is able to leave his human body in one place and appear in another perceptible manifestation elsewhere.” It is proposed that Hallowell’ data items from this section of the appendixes 2 and 3 contain information for understanding the instability of the taxonomic categories as shown in table 2. They center on the operations of defining what one sees or otherwise senses at any given moment—that is, on physically identifying and ‘categorizing the entities one is encountering. By focusing on the format of “classes and properties” that Hallowell's writings reveal, the results (like those from Minnesota) point to a particular facet ‘of Ojibwa cognitive orientation that, by its very resistance to our ways of thinking and classifying, unveils something of its nature, Perhaps the taxonomic “failure” can now be turned into ethno- ‘graphic learning. Prcepr Asmicurry, OymwaSrvte ‘As mentioned above, at the percept level people “see” (or hear, smell, etc.) different things, depending partly on the concept struc- ture of their belief systems. Goodenough (1963:155) defined per- ception as “the decision as to what is there” when one’s senses en- counter an event. The making of this decision determines (reveals) the percept category; thus we are already classifying, the moment wwe name or otherwise decide about “what is there.” This is basic to classic ethnoscience studies, particularly those of folk biology, which focus on minimal defining features that yield physical or ostensive identification of specimens as members of denotative classes—those qualities by which we “would know one if we saw one.” ‘The Ojibwa taxonomy, when it comes to physical identification features, not only demonstrates the inseparability of percept deci- sions and cultural concepts, but it was rendered disorderly by some peculiarly indigenous ideas—ideas about the unreliability of ap-OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY 101, pearances and the power to control them. Its very indeterminacy brought to our attention the type of attributes that were salient in its construction. That is, the results show that our teachers were classifying on the basis of such attributes as the ability to change form, the power to appear to someone in a dream or vision, the ability to cause things to happen from a distance, or to control Weather events or illness events or life and death. These are im- portant discriminators throughout the domain of living things— (and they add up to an assessment of relative power; see Black 197). They are not, however, immediately perceivable attributes, in most instances, and that should be kept in mind, Let us assume that it is a legitimate indeterminacy, Note that there is stability in the class concepts themselves. The defining properties are consistent—it is the membership that shifts—by fiat, as it were. For the distribution of some of these properties is not only variable among living things, it is capable of constant reallocation among them. That is one of the basic tenets of the Delief system, and to force the entities into a rigid mold would violate that system. Consequently one never knows in advance the current power-balance situation, In fact, the outcome of the present encounter uiy be expected to reveal or to alter it, when known, For, although there is general agreement about a core of entities that are most likely to have great power, there is always the possi ity that a seemingly powerless one may at some time exert the very ability to perform some special good or harm. This is dogma, and leads back to the other dogma; the unreliability of outward ap- pearance or of “face-value” interpretation of sense data. ‘The indigenous ideas that play havoc with Ojibwa texonomizing start right at the percept level of the belief structure, (They seem almost capriciously and knowingly to confuse the perceptual and conceptual.) Concrete physical objects are perceived, in everyday ‘experience, in terms of characteristics that define them as unstable, changing, and inconsistent. The belief system allows the expecta- tion that different individuals will “see” different objects in the same landscape, will “hear” different sounds; it also allows the expectation that the same entity may appear in different forms from one time to another; and it respects the individual's privacy and veracity as to what he has seen or heard and as to which of the entities has appeared to his senses alone and is thus in a certaintos = Ertos class for him. The Ojibwa way of dealing with perception and of defining what they perceive has put our neat systematics in a shambles. ‘What about those qualities by which we would know one if we saw one—the physical identification features for percept decisions? It is true that the attributes reported do not tell what a “bear” looks like, or a “man” (or better, what a bear should look like—it is the “ideal form” of bear and man that is not reported here and admittedly has to be assumed). They do tell important informa- tion about bears and men, though, in their classficatory relation- ship with other creatures, and it is information that also impinges upon knowing one if we saw one. In the case of bears, it might be expected that we would know (the proper form of) one upon encounter. In the case of memeng- wesiwak, however, there is no counterpart experience for non- members of the culture. It appears that to identify an encounter with a memengwesi one should know that they are generally smaller than men (not always), they have hair all over (in some versions), snub noses (or no nose), and they paddle strange canoes fon the lake (especially in the mist). But, would this help, if these creatures are able to change form? It seems one should know the distribution of that power before depending on physical identifica. tion features to “decide what is there.” If memengwesiwak have this attribute, their hairiness is not criterial for identification. Bears may be able to change form, Or turtles. One really ought to know. How then does an Indian know that he has encountered a ‘memengwesi? Well, if fish are missing from his net, he can be pretty sure he has encountered a memengwesi. That is as much of fan encounter as most people have, these days, except sometimes ‘maybe to glimpse them paddling through the mist. Of course, “someone else might have been blessed by them, and they would know more about that” it might be said. (But even in the “blessing” scene, while fasting or dreaming, the signs by which the faster 1A technical consideration of taxonomic levels was not deemed necessary sn 'this paper. The identftion rteria that are not reported here are these for dies ai the most speditic level of the taxonomy (beats v1 wolves, mémenguwéchoah vs. windifo, ee). ‘Thew criteria ae not without ethnogta Die interest and would of course be Sncladed in a complete folk ‘exon For present purposes, out focus on characteristics of phenomena a memes ff midletevel ‘cases happens to reveal some pervasive cultral concepts that ate relevant to Hallowells world view description,OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY "103 knows that he has had a visitor are nearly always something other than its full materialization in a standard ideal form.) ‘What then are the rules for recognizing encountered phenomena and assigning them class membership? IF some ghosts have ap- peared in the form of birds, and some birds appear in the form of people, and some people can appear in the form of bears, and no cone has really described the form of a windigo (they are most often heard or felt, not seen) —how does a man validate the essence of what he has encountered? ‘The rule that seems to emerge from many accounts of such ex- periences might be termed a “consequences validation.” He knows he has encountered a Thunderbird not by its form, which is con stantly changing, but by what happened afterward: a pelican killed and hung in a tree out at the Narrows was known to have been a Thunderbird when a big storm followed, as a consequence. The proof it was a windigo old N grappled with last winter (he never did see it, but people heard the fighting) is that old N died this spring, and windigo victims usually die the following spring. Te ‘was not an ordinary bear that K saw five nights ago, but the medi- cine man Giwedon; this is now confirmed since K felt ill the follow- ing morning and died today. ‘hese examples all contain a con- stant and curious feature of the rule for validating one’s decision a8 to what is there: it seems we should have asked not only “how does the Indian decide what itis he encountered?” but also "when does he decide?” For the essence (the only stable aspect) of the objects one is encountering at a given moment is often not expected to be known until some later moment—sometimes after a consider- able period of time. It is quite satisfactory, and the better part of caution, to leave the matter ambiguous until then, (During the period of percept ambiguity one must take care, of course, that one’s actions do not offend any of the identification possibilities that arise to mind in the present context—or even that may arise in some future unknown context. The tolerance for withholding categorization of others has its tollas was nicely shown some years ago by Erving Goffman [1963]) This Ojibwa tolerance for ambi- guity, and the use of such ambiguity in social relations, as sug- gested parenthetically above, is an interesting feature of the culture that deserves more specific study. (For another facet of it, see Black 1973.) Tt can now be seen that the type of defining property previouslytog * Eros pointed out from appendix 3 and described as “antitaxonomic, distinctive in containing a “waitand-see” component, especially when placed in an action context—a context that Hallowell stressed! and that Ojibwa people habitually insist on, Their prag- ‘matic, after-the-fact manner of identifying class membership is part of this vein, and should have a place in the Ojibwa cognitive eth- nography. Hallowell’s anecdotes illustrate it often enough. But how to deal with it formally? That it enters into the instability of clicited taxonomic classes is demonstrated. Whether it can substi tute for denotative perceptcategory criteria may be open to ques- , but at least the attributes that users must know for identifica- ion purposes include concepts about percepts, as well as percep- tual distinctions themselves. The attempt at a folk taxonomy of “world view" proportion did teach us something nontyivial about Ojibwa cognitive subjective culture. CONCLUDING REMARKS Professor Hallowell would probably concur in these ideas about Ojibwa percept decisions. In 1951 he wrote of the tural factors on variability in perception, giving Oj of “the perceptual resolution of ambiguous stimuli.” In these ‘eases, percept decisions, based on beliefs, called for immediate ac- tion. He did not, however, refer to the other type of Ojibwa per- ceptual resolution where prolonged ambiguity of identification what the “action calls for. Iam convinced that in a comprehensive cognitive ethnography, Ojibwa use of ambiguity would occupy an important and an integrative position. Hallowell’s ethnographic writings over the years took many forms, and displayed in all a deep appreciation of Ojibwa culture. If his steps toward a folk taxonomy show that form to have been an awkard vehicle for these particular data, I have tried to show how it can also precipitate a journey in learning. APPENDIXES: PASSAGES CITED FROM HALLOWELL, 1940-1963 APPENDIX 1. STATEMENTS OF ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 1940; (1955:282). The type of knowledge accesible to the Saulteaux is primarily a function of their culturally constituted attitudes towards the nature of the phenomenal world. It is impossible for them to think in terms of our category of causation, ... Whereas we might attributeOJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY = 105 such inevitable hazards of life as illness, misfortune or death to chance the individual in Saulteaux society does not . . . because of the character and limits of the explanation of phenomena his culture offers him as alternatives, 1942: (1, 5, 6). Human beings live in a meaningful universe, not in a world of bare physical objects and events, These meanings . . . are derived from the amazingly variable belief systems of mankind. . ‘The world is always perceived and derives its meaning and significance from the beliefs and presuppositions of a particular culture. the geographical locale of these Indians is on the Berens River in a subarctic physical environment .. . (but) their native belief system . efines the environment in which they live, and no purely objective account . . . would be suficient to account for their behavior in rela tion to this physical environment, ‘Thunder Birds and monster snakes. . are important items in the be- havioral environment of these Indians. Since from our point of view thunder is part of their physical environment and monster snakes are not, we might be inclined to make a distinction between them, But if we do this we are making our categories a point of departure. 1954: (1955:79-80, 84, 88, 91). What I wish to develop is a frame of reference by means of which it may be possible to view the individual in another society in terms of the psychological perspective which his culture constitutes for him . . . rather than to content ourselves with the perspective of an outside observer who may even pride himself on his “objectivity.” . .. The concept of behavioral environment enables us to... approximate more closely to an “inside” view of a culture, ‘The world of human awareness is mediated by various symbolic devices which ... establish the concepts, discriminations, clasificatory patterns, and attitudes, . .. In this way assumptions about the nature of the universe become, as it were, 2 priori constituents in the perceptual process itself [A] function of all cultures is the orientation of the self to a diversified world of objects in its behavioral environment, discriminated, classified, and conceptualized with respect to attributes which are culturally con- stituted. Object orientation .. . provides the ground for an intelligible interpretation of events . . . on the basis of traditional assumptions re- garding the nature and attributes of the objects involved. ... It is not necessary, of course, that the individual be aware of the underlying .106 * ETHos principles involved, any more than it is necessary that he be aware of the grammatical principles of the language that he speaks. But the former are as open to investigation as are the latter. 1960: (50, 61). Human beings in whatever culture are provided with cognitive orientation in a cosmos; there is “order” and “reason rather than chaos. .. . If we pursue the problem deeply enough we soon come face to face with a relatively unexplored territory—ethnometaphysics, Can we penetrate this realm in other cultures? What kind of evidence is at our disposal? . .. And what order of reliability can our inferences have? The problem is a complex one but this should not preclude its exploration, a thoroughgoing “objective” approach to the study of cultures cannot bbe achieved solely by projecting upon those cultures categorical abstrac- tions derived from Western thought. ... A higher order of objectivity ‘may be sought by adopting a perspective which includes an analysis of the outlook of the people themselves. 1963: (258, 266). All cultures provide a cognitive orientation toward a world in which man is compelled to act. A culturally constituted ‘world view . . . by means of beliefs, available knowledge and language, ‘mediates personal adjustment to the world through such psychological processes as perceiving, recognizing, conceiving, judging and reasoning. Ic is a blueprint for a meaningful interpretation of objects and events. “World view" ... involves a different perspective than the one assumed ‘when we look at culture and behavior from the outside. . . . It is necessary t0 avoid, as far as possible, the imposition of categories of thought, classifications of phenomena, and terminology . .. closely as- sociated with... Western culture. APPENDIX 2; TAXONOMIC CLASSES PASSAGES FROM HALLOWELL INDICATING (CLASS INCLUSION EXCLUSION RELATIONS (OF OJIBWA WORLD VIEW PHENOMENA 11 Living things (sometimes referred to as animate beings) 1968:268. While the Ojibwa recognize a category of living things, the classes of objects which fall into this eategory do not all fit our categorization,OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY # 107 122 Persons (included in t.1) 1968:268. One particular class of animate, living beings—persons— is of paramount importance in the Ojibwa world view, 1960:51 (and 1958:68). In all cultures “persons” comprise one of the ‘major subclasses of objects to which the self must become oriented, 43 Animals, t4 plants, £5 material objects (included in t.1) 1960:60, Persons may be set off . .. from animate beings such as ordinary animals . . . and objects belonging to the inanimate gram- matical category. 1968:271. The persons of the Ojibwa universe do not include animals and plants, as such . .. [With] possible exceptions, 1960:54. The kind of vital functions attributed to them in the belief system . . . accounts for the fact that what we view as material, in- animate objects—such as shells and stones—are placed in an “ani- ‘mate” category along with “persons.” Note: Hallowell’s rather questionable use of noun gender as evi= dence for t.1 and 7 indicates a category such as £5, See Black 1967, note 8 on page 165, and appendix A.4, for discussion of use of linguistic evidence (latter somewhat revised far Black 19608) 1958265 (also 1960:54-55). I once said to an old man: “Are all the stones we sce about us here alive?" He reflected a long while and then replied, “Not but some are.” ... the Ojibwa recognize, a priori, potentialities for animation in certain classes of objects under certain circumstances. 4.6 Human beings (included in 2) 1963:272. Human beings (dnishandbeR) i. Ojibwa Indians, are only cone class of persons £7 Other-than-human persons (included in t.2) 1968:272. The other class of persons, I believe, it is preferable to characterize as “other-than-human beings,” rather than supernatural beings, 1960:51. This category of being [persons] is by no means limited to human beings . . . “persons” as a class include entities other than human beings. 1968:274. The Ojibwa world then is populated with persons, human108 = ETHos and other-than-human, who occupy it along with plants, animals and. inanimate objects. 1.8 Bears (included in 18), £9 trees (included in t4) (See citations under Pexsox Arramures in appendix 3) 1960:66. Interaction of the Ojibwa with certain kinds of plants and animals... as if they were dealing wi 110 Some stones, t.11 shells (included in t.5) 1960:55. It is asserted . . . that stones have been seen to move, that some stones manifest other animate properties... . Associated with the Midewiwin in the past there were other types of large boulders with animate properties. 1960:54. The shells . . . called migis, on account of the manner in which they function in the Midewiwin, could not be . .. categorized as “inanimate.” 12 Living people, t.13 ghosts or deceased Indians (included in t.6) 1956:178. In addition to living Indians and deceased Indians, there are other classes of animate beings in the behavioral environment. 19555180. ‘The dead, however, have more power than the living; con- sequently they are more like pawdganak [1.7]... but the pawdganak do not die; they never become djibaiak [ghosts 1956:180. [In] the conjuring tent . .. the souls of djibaiak may be present and speak . . . While. . . it is a soul that is present it is always an identifiable self—pawdganak or ghost—that speaks Nore: Pawdganak in the 1955 citations is used to refer to the entire category t 14 atiso'hanak, 1.15 manitu, 16 pawdganak (synonyms, included in or standing for the category 7; see t.14 through t.82 below) 1960:74 (also see 1963:282). The term manitu . . . may be considered as a synonym for a person of the other-than-human class... [also] atiso‘kan, pawdgan. tI through 132 (included in 7) 1968:272. This second class of persons includes the four Winds, Sun and Moon, Thunderbirds, the “owners” or “masters” of the various species of plants and animals, and the characters in myths (itisokénak), 1960:58. The sun is a “person” of the other-than-human class .OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY = 109 [also] Teakabec, a mythical personage. 1960:60, The conceptual reification of Flint, the Winds and the Sun as other-than-human persons exemplifies a world view in which a naturalsupernatural dichotomy has no place. . .. The High God of the Ojibwa . .. is spoken of as a “person” ... [and] Wisekedjak and Teakibec ... extremely prominent characters in the myths. 1960:65. Mikindk, the Great Turtle, marries a human being, 1960:55. If, then, stones . . . in particular cases, have been observed. st animate properties . .. why should they not on occasion. ived as possessing animate properties of a “higher” order? 2. Another .. . clue to the inclusiveness of the “person” cate- gory in Ojibwa thinking is the .. . windigo. 1958:98. Mémengwéciwak are not human beings... nor are they “spiritual” entities in the sense of being perceptually intangible beings. . .. From the Ojibwa point of view they are inhabitants of the same terrestial region as men and belong to the same class of perceptually apprehensible objects as a moose, a tree, or a man. And, like them, they may be “perceived” in dreams as well as in ordinary daily life. ... These beings reputedly have been seen or heard sing. ing in ordinary lite by a number of Indians . . . it is necessary to receive a blessing from mémengwéciwok in a dream first .. . [to] ‘obtain the special kind of medicine [these beings] are famous for. APPENDIX $, GLASS PROPERTIES PASSAGES FROM HIALLOWELL REGARDING CHARACTERISTICS THAT AND THOSE THAT SET IT OFF FROM TTS CO-MEMDERS, 1 Living things (also called “animate beings") Propenries THAT Disnincuisit Livine Tunes Fkoxt Nostavine Toes: AnIMATENESS 1968:268. One particular class of animate, living beings. Note: Nonliving qualities or categories are not described, for contrast, but are implied or assumed. Movemenr 1960:55. It is asserted by informants that stones (presumed have been seen to move, that some stones mani- voluntary) fest other animate properties.110. = ETHos Duaurry oF PEnson 1960:55. There were other types of large bould- crs with animate properties. My friend. . . had cone of these, but it no longer possessed these at- tributes. It had contours that suggested eyes and ‘mouth . .. he used t0 tap this stone . . . it would then open its mouth, 1960:55. Stones . . . have been observed to mani fest animate properties, such as movement in space and opening of a mouth. 1958:174. Djibaiak like @icindbek have souls, and some kind of form. ... This duality holds for all orders of animate beings. 1955:177. Multiform appearance is an inherent potential of all animate beings. What is uniform, constant, visually imperceptible and vital is the soul. A sorcerer being a person of unusual power is able to leave his human body in one place and appear in another perceptible manifestation elsewhere. 1960:69. The power hierarchy of animate being. + Power manifestations vary within the animate lass of being. ... The notion of animate being itself does not presume a capacity for manifesting the highest level of power... in every case 1958:76. At the lower level [of power) the ord nary human being and the ordinary animal are in the same class... . There ate many degrees of power. A mole is not in the same class with a bear. 1960:66. Interaction of the Ojibwa with certain kinds of plants and animals... as if chey were dealing with “perso 195878, Whether it was the specific tees that were being addressed or their spiritual “owner,” conceived as a person, involves a point of refine- ‘ment that it is unnecessary to go into here. TheOJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY 111 ‘main point is that human beings are described as in direct “social” interaction with other persons, not “things.” 1958:73-74. So far as animals are concerned, ‘when bears were sought out in their dens in the spring, they were addressed, asked to come out so that they could be killed, and an apology of- fered because this was necessary. ... Bears, then, are assumed to possess "person attributes. 1958:88. “Person-objects” are _mot necessarily Jimited to the human class in the cognitive ori- entation of all peoples and . . . animals and even inanimate objects may possess person attributes. 42 Persons (vs. t8 animals, t4 plants, 1.5 material objects) Prorremizs THAT DisriNcuist Prasons rao Orne Livine THINGS: Homan armuauTes, aur Nor HUMAN FORM 1960:60, What constant attributes do unify the ‘concept of “person?” 1958:68, [The question arises] whether all enti- ties of the “person” category are conceptually unified by human attributes in form and be- havior and in this way set off from animals or inanimate objects. . . . What is the essence of the Ojibwa... concept of person? 1958:66, Whether human or animal in form or name, they behave like people, so that... they appear to belong in the category of “persons.” 1960:61-68. In the universe of the Ojibwa, ‘Thunder Birds are “persons.” .. . The Thunder Birds are conceived to act like human beings 1960:64. Appearance cannot then be taken as a permanent and distinguishable trait of the ‘Thunder Birds... the human attributes with which they are endowed wanscend a human ‘outward form... in the universe of the Ojibwa the conception of a “person” as a living, func tioning social being . . . transcends a human ap-nig = ETHos Sraverure: [APPEARANCE, Metamonrtiosis Inonraniry pearance as a constant att of being. ace of this category 1958:69 (and 1960:61). Anthropomorphism is not a constant feature of the Ojibwa concept of per- son. . .. Pawdganak . . . are “persons”; whether they have anthropomorphic attributes or not is incidental. Other entities of the person category, Whose anthropomorphic character is undefined for ambiguous, are. . . the “masters” of animal or plant species. . . . Thunder Birds are “p sons.” . .. [They assume] the character of a I ing image which is neither the personification of a natural phenomenon nor an altogether animal or human-like being. 1960:72, We must conclude that all animate be- igs of the person class are unified conceptually. in Ojibwa thinking because they have a similar structure—an inner vital part that is enduring and an outward form which can change. 1960-65. Outward appearance is only an inciden tal attribute of being. .. . In outward manifesta: ion neither animal nor human characteristics define categorical differences. 1955:179, In the behavioral world of the Ojibwa, no sharp line can be drawn between animals, pawéganak [17], men, or the spirits of the dead fon the basis of outward bodily aspect or ap- pearance alone [see also 1960:68 and 1963:272, which adds:] . .. because metamorphosis is pos: sible. 1960:69. The capacity for metamorphosis is one of the features which links human beings with otherthanchuman persons in their behavioral environment. 1963:272. Metamorphosis is one of the generic properties manifest by beings of the persons lass, but not manifest by all animate beings 1958279, Human beings and other-than-human‘OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY ™ 113 Srrecut, Vouron Soctat, RELATIONS, sociat extending through persons class persons ate alike in another way. ‘The human self does not die; it continues its existence in another place, after the body is bu the grave. In this way human beings are as immortal as the dtiso‘kanak. 1960:56. Speaking to a stone dramatizes the depth of the categorical difference in cognitive orientation between the Ojibwa and ourselves. ‘Use of speech as a mode of communication raises the animate status of the boulder to the level of social interaction common to human be- ings. . .. The stone was treated as if it were a “person” . . . without inferring that objects of this class are, for the Ojibwa, necessarily con. ceptualized as persons. 1960:66. “My father used to tell me . . . that a bear always understands what you tell him, ‘This Indian was not confronted with an animal with “objective” ursine properties, but rather ‘with an animate being who had ursine attributes and also “person attributes.” 1960:66, Interaction . . . with certain kinds of plants and animals in everyday life is structured as if they were dealing with “persons” who both understand what is being said to them and hhave volitional capacities as well. 1960:52, “Social relations” between human be- ings (@nicindbek) and otherthanhuman “per- sons" are of cardinal significance, These rela- tions are correlative with their more compre- hensive categorization of “persons.” 1968:278. From the Ojibwa point of view, “social interaction” with persons of the other-than-hu- ‘man class is not metaphorical 1968:276. This social web of interpersonal rela- tions is distinctive, because, while analogous t0 the social orders of mankind, for the Ojibwa it includes other-than-human persons, with equiva-ng ‘Vaturs Loct oF ‘causALITY ETHOS lent properties, who play a vital part in their daily lives and in the functioning of a greater social whole. 1960:68-64. Thunder Birds . . . social organiza. tion and kinship terminology are precisely the same as the Ojibwa... . And the fact that they belong to the category of dtiso‘kanak is no bar- rier to their descending to earth and mating ‘with human beings. 1960:76, The same values are implied through: ‘out the entize range of “social interaction” that characterizes the Ojibwa world; the same stan- dards which apply to mutual obligations be- tween human beings are likewise implied in the reciprocal relations between human and otherthanshuman “persons.” 1960:74-75, We are confronted over and over again with the roles of “persons” as loci of causality in the dynamics of their universe, For the Ojibwa make no cardinal use of any concept cof impersonal forces as major determinants of events. . .. The personalistic theory of causation inevitably directs the reasoning of individuals towards an explanation of events in personalis- tic terms. Who did it, who is responsible, is al ways the crucial question to be answered. Per- sonalistic explanation of past events is found in myths. . . . Personalistic explanation is central in theories of disease causation. 1968:270. Various classes of events are connected. in some way with the activities of “persons.” In the Ojibwa universe, events may be said to be the consequence of the behavior of persons. 1958:181. The power ranking of different classes of entities is so important because events only become intelligible in terms of their activities. All the effective agents of events throughout the entire behavioral environment of the Ojibwa are selves—my own self or other selves. Imper-OJIBWA TAXONOMY AND PERCEPT AMBIGUITY = 115 sonal forces are never the causes of events. Some- body is always responsible, Droree oF 1960:70, What looks like an animal, without Powss ‘great power, may be a transformed person with (higher than evil intent, ‘nonpersons) 1958:76, There are many degrees of power. . . . At the lower level, the ordinary human being and the ordinary animal are in the same class. =» Powerful men . . . can make inanimate ob- jects behave as if they were animate. .. . Sorcer- fers can transform themselves . . . because they hhave acquired a high order of power. . . . In ‘these manifestations they are elevated to the same level of power as that displayed by other- thanchuman persons, 47 Otherthan-human persons (¥s, 6 human beings) Proveeries tHar Distinouis OTHER-THANHUMAN PERSONS FROM HUMAN BEINGS: Inmoxraurry, 1955:180, Pawdganak (‘.7) had “bodies” and [ETERNAL “souls” but no “ghosts.” ... The pawdkanak, (no ghosts) who are eternal, do not die; they never become djibaiak (ghosts). Nore: Djidaiok are deceased human beings, the soul in ghost form. See clases 12 and 13, Innere 1960:65. “Persons” of this class are capable of METAMORPHOSIS metamorphosis by their very nature, POWER 196069, It is taken for granted that all the tso’hanak can assume a variety of forms, In the ‘ease of human beings, while the potentiality for ‘metamorphosis exists and may even be experi- enced . . . power of this degree can only be ac- quired by human beings through the help of otherthan-human persons. 1968:272, Metamorphosis is more characteristic of them [1.7] than of human beings because it is an earmark of power.116 # ETHOS Metamonruosis oF sou, Nor Huan mines 17 cass: HUMAN mervos “taux” win cane ARoUr uw 1960:68. A human being consists of a vital part, or soul, which, under certain circumstances may become detached from the body, so that itis not necessary to assume that the body part, in all cases, literally undergoes transformation into an animal form. The body of the sorcerer may re- ‘main in his wigwam while his soul journeys ‘elsewhere and appears to another person in the form of an animal, Nore: This seems to differ from «7, who do not leave a body behind when they take on different forms. Hallowell does not point out this difference. 1968:274. Every special aptitude—all a man’s subsequent success, and the explanation of many ff his failures, hinged upon the aid of other- than-human persons, 1955:104, An attitude of dependence upon these pawéganak [6.7], Human beings are conceived ‘of as intrinsically weak and helpless . . . it is essential that assistance be secured from other- thanchuman selves 1955:182, Since. . . the ultimate source of thi power rests in the hands of the pawdganak, the fundamental relationship of the Ojibwa self to the Pawdganak is clearly defined. It is one of dependence. 1958:67. The dtiso‘hanak . . . are never “talked about" casually by the Ojibwa. 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