Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.

397

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan
Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered
as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the
pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final
conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service
Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE; RIGHT OF ESTATE OF

DECEDENT TO PROSECUTE APPLICATION; CASE AT BAR. If P. O. F. had not died, there can be no question that he
would have had the right to prosecute his application for a certificate of public convenience to its final conclusion. No one would
have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P35,000,
and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able
to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 monthly.
He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the
evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid light of P. O. F. to
prosecute said application to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it
constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission
might have denied the application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the
financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (p.
3) that a certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset." Such certificate
would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to
the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTATE OF DECEDENT, A PERSON; CASE AT BAR. Within the philosophy of the present legal
system and within the framework of the constitution, the estate of P. O. F. should be considered an artificial or juridical person
for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those
rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in
the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. An injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CITIZENSHIP OF DECEDENT EXTENDED TO HIS ESTATE; CASE AT BAR. If by legal fiction
the personality of P. O. F. is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and
any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, there is no sound and cogent
reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the
purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if
successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors, and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not
allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if F. had lived longer and obtained the desired
certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same
reason, as the fiction of the extension of his personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his
estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he already
made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service
Commission to this court.
D E C I S I O N HILADO, J p:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibaez, rendered
its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public
interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of
another ice plant of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro 0. Fragante
was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section
15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one half
tons (2-1/2) in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and
in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's
brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
"1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
"2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
"3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased
demand.
"4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its
announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant." (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the
commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P35,000, and from what the commission said regarding
his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not
died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 monthly. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be
such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially
able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its final
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate,
for such a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied the application, although
under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and
operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that a certificate of public convenience
once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to
acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to
his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he
died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person,
there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal
representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or
legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragante's undoubted right to
apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience the evidence established that the public needed the ice
plant was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the
service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its
objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that
of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for
the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or
defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or
to the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367), the present Chief Justice of this
Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
"Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights (underscoring supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were
alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death
extinguishes the right . . .".
It is true that a proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service
Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their
nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the
control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for
the benefit of the creditors, devisees, or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the
deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in
behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively,
consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited
volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all
incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things, "an
option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same
volume we read:
"However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include
every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or
executed." (Italics supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragante is a "person" within the
meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p. 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of
Indiana:
"As the estate of a decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of
the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud
the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77."
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the death
of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the
forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
". . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate
of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of a decedent is a person in
legal contemplation. 'The word "person", says Mr. Abbot, 'in its legal signification, is a generic term, and
includes artificial as well as natural persons,' 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc., Co., 4 Cal. 304;
Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port (Ala.) 404. It is said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds:
natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or
succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes
the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited
extent in our law. Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.' 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954.
Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we
have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate
the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we
accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is
committed after the death of the person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can be
done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems
reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law
for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as
heirs, devisees, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity.
The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and
one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be
regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having
diverse interests in it, since he cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the
nature of their respective interests. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, the estate, and
not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interests in it." (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragante is considered a
"person", for the quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his
investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which the
 proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In
this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal
personality independent of the heirs. Among the most recent cases maybe mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion,
56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in
favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
". . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion
and Whitaker are indebted to the plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . .."
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased
person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of
the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so
held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661
of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13 22. In that case, as well as in many
others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of
deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they
might not be even of his flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that
the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations
as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were
not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those
rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same
in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L.
Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragante can be considered a "citizen
of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof
expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of
public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, co-partnerships,
associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that
sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the
United States.

Within the philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of a deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death
unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State
of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
". . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It
is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . .."
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems
clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in
section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the
constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural,
persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure
estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of
course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of
his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public
Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated
above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors
and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship,
and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public
Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors
and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have
done if Fragante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of his personality. The
fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the
loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he had already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses
occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission to this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the Constitution (Article IV), its provisions on
Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges
the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for
the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would
have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and
that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and
maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the
simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public
Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragante must be deemed
extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so
adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.: I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.
Separate Opinions PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public convenience to
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution which
provides.
 "No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws
of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it
shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires."
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragante fulfills the citizenship requirement. To our
mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O. Fragante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the
law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device by which the law
gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They inherit and replace the deceased at the
very moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and determination that need time for their
compliance, a legal fiction has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of
solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, as a matter of fact, intended to
designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of the heirs of Fragante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragante. If they are Filipino
citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are not, it should be reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship constitutional
provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.
We are of opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragante should be determined by the Commission upon
evidence that the party should present. It should also determine the dummy question raised by petitioner.
We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946, be set aside and
that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence on the above factual questions and render a new decision accordingly.

TITLE: Dumlao v Quality Plastics

CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976

FACTS:

Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay
solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics
is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September
24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond.

Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of
complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his
co-defendants.

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc
on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD:

Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in
their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void
for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to
be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.

The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys
fees against the corporation.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void

SYNOPSIS
To satisfy the judgment debt in favor of appellees, the trial court ordered the foreclosure of the bond and auction sale of the real
properties given as security. It turned out that Pedro Oria, one of the bondsmen whose land was sold had already died long before
the filing of the case, and that summons and copy of the complaint were not served on him but on the principal in the bond who
acknowledged the service for himself and his co-defendants.
Oria's heirs, appellants herein, sued appellee to annul the judgment against Oria on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Appellee
claimed that appellants were estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the person of deceased because they were
aware of the action against the principal in the bond and his sureties. The trial court ruled that it had acquired jurisdiction over the
deceased.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that summons cannot be served upon a deceased litigant since a person's juridical capacity,
which is his fitness to be the subject of legal relations is lost through death; that since no valid service of summons can be effected,
jurisdiction over him cannot be acquired; and that the principle of estoppel has no application to this case.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION NULL AND VOID. A judgment rendered
against a against a deceased defendant who, being already in the other world, was never served with a summons is a patent nullity
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT CANNOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER A DEAD LITIGANT. A court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
the person of a party-litigant who is already dead because he no longer has a civil personality. A man's juridical capacity which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations is lost through death; hence, no valid service of summons can be effected upon him which
will vest jurisdiction upon the court over his person.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SURVIVING DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL CANNOT VALIDLY APPEAR FOR A DEAD CO-DEFENDANT. The lower
court's ruling that since the surviving defendant's counsel also appeared for the defendant, there was in effect a voluntary
appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over said deceased defendant was contemplated in Section 234, Rule 14
of the Revised Rules of the Court is erroneous, because the surviving defendant's counsel cannot validly appear for a dead co-
defendant.
AQUINO, J p:
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants
Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarily Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants
failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose
the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment." (Under that bond the four sureties bound
themselves to answer solidarily for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were
"given as security for" their undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of
Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria
which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an
area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was
confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court
Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 had been personally served on June 24,
1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original
summons in his behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated
will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution
against his land (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T-873). It was only when
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time
the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that
the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by
reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria
was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him.
From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the validity of the lower court's judgment
against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was never served with summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity
(Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical
capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance
which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead codefendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it
does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of
facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted
in good faith in joining Oria as a codefendant.
WHEREFORE, the lower court' decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is
declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Quimiguing vs Icao CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the
fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent.
As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for
support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack
of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no
amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it,
as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear
violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

REYES, J p:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos,
presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of
the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred that the
parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded
in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at
P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had
been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby
girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no
cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a
conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored
by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code)
"ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already born."
"ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
"If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation."
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for ail purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived
child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.)
to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
"Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica, sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente llamados 'derechos en
estado de pendencia'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento
de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos.
(1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
(as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.'
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21 , 26, 27, 28 . . ."
Thus, independently of the right to support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under
the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Geluz vs CA CITATION: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita
became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters
daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of
Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against
Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the
beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ABORTION; CONSENT OF WOMAN OR HUSBAND DOES NOT EXCUSE CRIMINAL ACT. Abortion, without
medical necessity to warrant it, is a criminal act, and neither the consent of the woman nor that of the husband would excuse it.
2. DAMAGES; UNBORN FOETUS: WITHOUT PERSONALITY; AWARD FOR DEATH OF A PERSON DOES NOT COVER
UNBORN FOETUS. The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.
3. ID.; ID.; PARENTS OF UNBORN FOETUS CANNOT SUE FOR DAMAGES ON ITS BEHALF. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to
the parents or heirs of an unborn child.
4. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY PARENTS OF UNBORN CHILD. The damages which the parents of an
unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account
of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil Code).
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review the question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva,
against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz ordering the latter to pay P3,000 as damages, P700 as
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
 "Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again
repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the
defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty
pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent to, the abortion."
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiffs basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the
defendant Geluz, we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial
paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum
award of P3,000 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under
the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consecuencia es un ser no nacido
a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado" Vol. 1, p. 49). being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see
that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality
of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally held that recovery can not be had for the death of an
unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northhampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases
collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly
upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because
the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages
for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e. on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code, Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages,
if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have
not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his
wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee
was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious
repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment
of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor
a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
"It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which
his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be high-minded rather than mercenary;
and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy
member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the
administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action
for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries."
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was
a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her
husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damages that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and
such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Eighth Congress Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE
ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen
years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references
and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989

De Jesus vs Syquia TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia CITATION: 58 Phil 866

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza.
Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said
barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on
June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that
the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding
her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph
Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When
Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name
Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of
paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the
conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child
carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long
enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry
since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael
Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.

1. PARENT AND CHILD; NATURAL CHILD; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY. The acknowledgment of

paternity required in No. 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code is satisfied by the production of more than one document of
indubitable authenticity, containing, all together, the admission of the father recognizing a particular child as of his paternity, the
admission of one writing being supplement by those of another.
DECISION
STREET, J p:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by
her mother, Pilar Marque, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named
plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages
resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita
as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos
per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court entered a decree
requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty
pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs
from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision
which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years,
and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His
brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for
tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as
cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a
consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a
constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her
hands a note directed to the padre who was expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
"Saturday, 1.30 p. m.
"February 14, 1931
"REV. FATHER,
"The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
"CESAR SYQUIA"
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and
Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that
had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia,
jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary
anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this end he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend
at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where
she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonia was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551
Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including
gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia
began to show signs of a second pregnancy, the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that
should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangements
for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of
subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus
show is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights
and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is as yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights.
The problem here presented of the recognition of an unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case
of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name
used.
It is contended, however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not
legally sufficient to identify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The
words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then
conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came,
and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, jr., its identity as the child which the
defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibits F, G, H,
and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were
 addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be
vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good
care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of the acknowledgment is whether
the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may
be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the
opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing
the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of
paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being
carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular
individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had
been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article
135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this
point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had acknowledged this
child in the writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is
undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with
the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enceinte a second time, when the idea
entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to
concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is
unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for
supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of
promise to marry has not standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff
upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore,
there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the
trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First
Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.

The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

MO YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION NATURALIZATION / DENATURALIZATION

FACTS:
This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from causing the arrest and deportation of the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen Yueng.

Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in Kowloon, Hongking and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a period of one month.

When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake among others that Lau Yuen Yueng would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion
the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb. 13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.

During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write either English or Tagalog. Except a few words she could not speak either
English or Tagalog. She could not even name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads.

Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.

Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who might herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a class or race who might be
lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.

Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalised," what should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified
under Section 4 but she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity
to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.

In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who i subsequently naturalised here follows the Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organised governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only
to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that
that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high
school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now
Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter.
When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo
Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition
for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought
to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners
claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for
the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same
thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of
Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers
house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.