Aparri v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

L-30057 January 31, 1984

- On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby
appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on
January 116, 1960. On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which
stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of
office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of
RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general manager until march 31,
1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The
petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board, to allow petitioner to
continue in office as General Manager until he vacates said office in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, took effect on
1963. The said law abolished the NARRA (Sec. 73, R.A. 3844) and transferred its functions and
powers to the Land Authority.

- CA: Considering that the term of office of the General Manager of the NARRA is not fixed by law
nor has it been fixed by the Board of Directors at the time of his appointment although it had
the power to do so, it is obvious that the term of office of herein petitioner Bruno O. Aparri
expired on March 31, 1962 and his right to hold the said office was thereby extinguished. In
other words, Bruno O. Aparri cessation from office invokes no removal but merely the
expiration of the term of office which was within the power of the Board of Directors to fix.

- SC: A PUBLIC OFFICE is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The
right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists,
when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in
an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office or its salary

- Section 8 of Republic Act 1160 expressly gives to the Board of Directors of the NARRA the power
"to appoint and fix the term of office of the general manager ... subject to the recommendation
of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines

- SC: By "APPOINTMENT" is meant the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body,
to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office (Mechem op. cit., Sec. 102). When the power of appointment is absolute, and the
appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the
formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once.
- SC: THE TERM of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon the expiration of
the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties and authority as
a pubic officer must ipso facto cease

- SC DECISION: The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term.
Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to
hold such office.

GSIS v. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218. May 31, 2011

- The respondent is the Accounts Management Specialist of the GSIS Fund Management
Accounting Department (FMAD), responsible for the preparation of financial statements, from
October 2, 2000 until his dismissal on August 31, 2007.

- Liscano reported to Sta. Romana (both Infotech Officer) about a network conflict in his personal
computer. It was discovered that Mayordomos PC within the GSIS computer network was also
using the internet protocol (IP) address of Liscanos computer. After a year, Mayordomos IP
address was encountered to the range of the GSIS Remote Access Server (RAS). Thereafter,
Mayordomos PC was pulled out since, according to GSIS, it might gave freedom to respondent
to exploit the GSIS network system and gain access to other restricted network resources,
including the internet.

- HR Officer enjoined Mayordomo "not to repeat such actuations, and to follow standard office
procedures or exercise prudent judgment and obtain the necessary clearance before engaging in
any extraordinary measure.

- Respondent admitted that he changed his IP address because the one given to him by the ITSG
was in conflict with some other IP addresses. General Mgr filed formal administrative charges
again respondent.

- GSIS alleged that in the instances when the respondent simulated the IP address of the RAS, he
not only jeopardized the accessibility of the GSIS network to outside users, he also gained
access to the entire GSIS network and its other resources, including the internet, which would
have otherwise been prohibited to him. the GSIS rendered its Decision17 finding Mayordomo
guilty of Grave Misconduct.

- Filed a MTR to CSC but denied for lack of merit

- CA: Partially granted. GSIS failed to prove that Mayordomo acted out of a sinister motive in
resorting to such acts or in order to gain a personal benefit therefrom but CA rejected
Mayordomos prayer for payment of backwages corresponding to the period of his preventive
suspension.
 - In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and
convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition
of any disciplinary action upon the employee. Mayordomos act of having repeatedly changed
his IP address without authority, despite previous warnings, shows that he did not exercise
prudence in dealing with officework and his officemates. Mayordomo likewise fails to convince
the Court to adhere to his position that the lack of official policy and guidelines at the time of
commission makes the act of unauthorized alteration of IP addresses exempt from punishment.
While official policy and guidelines apprise covered employees of offenses carrying specific
penalties, the Court may not close its eyes from the fact that actual notice of the dangers of
changing his IP address was made known to Mayordomo, right after the first incident. The CSC
was correct in holding that subsequent to the first warning, Mayordomo was fully aware that
changing his IP address without acquiescence from the ITSG, was inherently wrong.

- In order to be considered as "misconduct," the act must have a "direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his official duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office.

- The respondent is reminded that "the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust
and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere
rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in
the public service."

City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA, G.R. No. 80270 February 27, 1990

- Female employees of the chief veterinarian of Zamboanga City filed an administrative complaint
against him for Dishonesty, Oppression and Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct (insisting private
proposals, trying to convince one to establish an illicit relation with him, promising that her
husband will never know about it anyway, inviting one on several occasions to go with him to
discreet eateries, and for offering one the amount of P50.00 to convince her to submit to his
amorous intentions). Mayor of Zamboanga City, Hon. Cesar Climaco, rendered a Decision,
finding private respondent guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and penalizing him with
"forced resignation from service with prejudice to reinstatement.
- Priv res appealed to CSC, found private respondent guilty only of Improper Conduct with a
penalty of "reprimand and warning."
- CA: CSC decision set aside; MODIFYING THE PENALTY thereof to "six-months suspension
without pay with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely." reinstatement of private respondent with full backwages
 - City mayor filed this petition for review praying that the said Decision be set aside and that the
Decision of the Civil Service Commission penalizing respondent with forced resignation, be
reinstated.
- SC: this Court reiterated the principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or
employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is
found and declared to be ILLEGAL. to allow private respondent to receive full back salaries
would amount to rewarding him for his misdeeds and compensating him for services that were
never rendered.
- SC: In determining what penalty must be imposed on private respondent, the Court took into
consideration the fact that there is here not only one but three complainants, all married at
that. It projects the abnormality of private respondent's behavior consisting of a libidinous
desire for women and the propensity to sexually harass members of the opposite sex working
with him.
- NATURE OF PUBLIC OFFICE: Being the chief of office, it was incumbent upon private respondent
to set an example to the others as to how they should conduct themselves in public office, to
see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, and to provide them with a healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat
each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be
benefited.
- DECISION: a public office must be held by a person who is both mentally and morally fit, the
Court finds private respondent guilty of "Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct" and "Grave
Misconduct" in office and he is hereby imposed the penalty of dismissal pursuant to the
provisions of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989.

Caasi v. CA, G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

- This is a case of the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan,
to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
- Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he
denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there.
- He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
- ISSUES: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the
United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent
resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
- SC: in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration which Miguel filled up in his
own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the
United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of
 intended stay" Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." the green card that was subsequently
issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to
the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN.
Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines.
- In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their
lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is
that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to
the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they
must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in
order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.
- The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which
provides: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
- To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States

Gupilan-Aguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307. February 26, 2014

- conducted an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged nefarious activities of certain
personnel of the Bureau of Customs, among them petitioners Flor Gupilan-Aguilar (Aguilar),
then Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and Honore Hernandez (Hernandez), Customs Officer
III. SALNs for the years aforementioned do not reflect any income source other than her
employment.

- Virgilio Pablico, investigating team of PNP-CIDG, indicated "Blk 21 Lot 8 Percentage St. BIR Vill,
Fairview, QC" as her home address, as owning properties not declared or properly identified in
her SALNs, also took 13 unofficial trips abroad accompanied by daughter. Charged her with
grave misconduct and dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the same offenses

- Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio placed Aguilar under preventive suspension

- The modification of Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo relates to the liability of Hernandez whom the
Ombudsman found to be Aguilars dummy and equally guilty of grave misconduct and
 dishonesty deserving too of the penalty of dismissal from the service. Also dismissed Aguilar
from service, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification for re-employment
in the government service.

- CA: affirmed the decision of the ombudsman

- SC: Owning properties disproportionate to ones salary and not declaring them in the
corresponding SALNs cannot, without more, be classified as grave misconduct. Even if these
allegations were true, we cannot see our way clear how the fact of non-declarations would have
a bearing on the performance of functions by petitioner Aguilar, as Customs Chief of the
Miscellaneous Division, and by petitioner Hernandez, as Customs Operations Officer. It is non-
sequitur to assume that the omission to declare has served, in some way, to hinder the
rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation or connection between the two.
Without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave
misconduct shall necessarily fail. The aforequoted Section 8 speaks of unlawful acquisition of
wealth and excessive expenditure, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7,
which directs full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is
aimed particularly at minimizing if not altogether curtailing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. By the SALN, the public is
able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check and
balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.

- The failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and would normally
amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration in the SALN
does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to
conceal the truth or to make false statements; otherwise, the government employee may only
liable for negligence, not for dishonesty.47 In addition, only when the accumulated wealth
becomes manifestly disproportionate to the income of the public officer/employee and income
from other sources, and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain these
sources of income and acquisitions, does he or she become susceptible to dishonesty.

- In the case at bar, the required evidence sufficient to justify holding petitioner Aguilar
administratively liable has been, to us, as to the CA, satisfied. Not only did she fail to declare in
her SALN the residential lot located at Panicuason, Naga City, she likewise failed to satisfactorily
explain her beneficial ownership of the Antel Seaview Towers four-bedroom condominium unit
and her use of the two BMWs registered in the name of different corporations, which, as the
records show, are both based in Olongapo City.

- Relevant to this determination is Sec. 2 of RA 1379,60 in relation to Sec. 8 of RA 3019, which

states that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
 said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. When the
presumption holds, the burden of evidence then shifts to the respondent, in this instance
petitioner Aguilar, to show that the financial resources used to acquire the undeclared assets
and her expenditures came from lawful income. To be sure, petitioner Aguilar has failed to
discharge this burden, as the CA, and the OMB before it, have determined. The explanation she
offered when confronted with her undeclared acquisitions and travel splurge is too flimsy
compared to her own admissions as to her beneficial ownership over the properties. Her SALNs
during the years in question clearly indicated she was a pure compensation income earner. With
an annual salary of PhP 249,876, it is incomprehensible how she could have acquired her
undeclared assets on top of paying for her annual travels and living expenses. The discrepancy in
the total valuation of her declared and undeclared assets is also too glaring for petitioner
Aguilars omission to be written off as mere negligence or carelessness. As a result, no error can
be attributed to the CA and the Ombudsman adjudging her guilty of dishonesty.

Punzalan vs. Ascano

- Cirilo Punzalan, the owner of a property situated at 120-124 Lopez Jaena, Paco, Manila, assessed
at P834,00, instituted this case on June 29, 1949, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil
Case No. 8858), to annul the sale of said property at public auction made by the Treasurer of the
City of Manila in favor of Alfredo S. Ascua for P18.21, which was the amount of real estate
taxes in arrears, and for damages.

- The sale was made in accordance with Sec. 2498 of the Revised Administrative Code; that after
the sale, a certificate was issued in the name of the purchaser; that on May 28, 1949, a final
and absolute deed of sale was executed by the same officer in favor of the purchaser in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 2500 of said Code; that on May 31, 1948, the City
Treasurer wrote a letter to Cirilo Punzalan advising him of the sale of his property; that on
January 20, 1949, the City Treasurer again wrote another letter to Cirilo Punzalan, which two
letters did not reach the addressee and were returned to the sender; that after the expiration of
the period of one year, Punzalan came to learn of the sale of his property because the buyer
went to see it personally; and that upon being informed thereof he took the necessary steps
to redeem it but to no avail.

- The lower court declared the sale null and void because: (1) The "Bagong Balita Ng Bayan",
through which the corresponding notice of sale at public auction was published, could not be
considered as a newspaper of general circulation in a city like Manila (2) The buyer Alfredo S.
Ascao being at the time of the sale an officer of the Government of the Philippine Islands in
charge of the Division of Foreign Fund Control of the Bureau of Treasury, was prohibited from
making said purchase in accordance with the provision of Section 579 of the same Code which
reads: (3) On the ground of equity.
 - Alfredo S. Ascao appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the only question of fact involved in the
appeal, is "Whether the newspaper "Bagong Balita Ng Bayan" was of general circulation or not".
It is held that the "Bagong Balita Ng-Bayan" is or was a daily publication of general circulation.

- Yes. Defendant Alfredo S. Ascao is an employee of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
now Government of the Republic of the Philippines. He admits in his answer to the
supplementary complaint, that on May 21, 1948, the date of sale, he was an employee of said
Government. By expressed provision of Section 579 of the Revised Administrative Code said sale
in his favor made by defendant Treasurer is null and without value and the Court has no other
alternative than to comply with the mandate of the law. It is to be pointed out the City of Manila
is a political subdivision of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or better said, it is but a
part of said Government.

- Yes. The Court holds that Defendant Ascao is liable for damages because, knowing that he was
prohibited by law to make the purchase in said auction, he acted in bad faith in concealing this
fact and failing to inform the defendant Treasurer of his status as employee of the Government
of the Philippine Islands. We have no doubt that the Treasurer of the City of Manila would not
have knowingly sold the land in question in contravention of the legal provision aforesaid.

Suarez v. COA, G.R. No. 131077 August 7, 1998

- On June 19, 1990, the Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) of the Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) conducted a public bidding for the supply and installation of
an Electrical Distribution System, Phases I and II, Stage II in the Cavite Export Processing Zone
(CEPZ). only two (2) participated in the aforesaid public bidding by submitting their respective
bids. The third bidder Andrada Construction did not submit any bid but submitted instead a
letter of regret. Project awarded to PELCO.

Comelec v. Cruz, G.R. No. 186616. November 20, 2009

- Before the SK Elections in 2007, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of
Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years. No barangay elective
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided,
however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
- RTC agreed with the respondents
- this Court agrees with the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code specifically
exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3) consecutive term limit
rule considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials was
significantly separated from the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof
- RA 9164: expressly stated (the legislators expressly declared that no barangay elective official
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position)
- The providing for the reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit of barangay elective
officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections is being attacked on its constitutionality;
RTC: violates the equal protection of laws coz retroactive effect
- True, no person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property within the
contemplation of constitutional guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the petition would
show that the petitioners are not claiming vested right to their office but their right to be voted
upon by the electorate without being burdened by the assailed provision of the law that, in
effect, rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions.
- The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160,
and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws which
are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it
does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an
elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No.
9164.
- The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws
retroactive application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in
an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may
arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these
are the ones that may be considered protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
- In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming
that they did, the respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public
office.17 As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post
in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises.
- Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right to be voted
upon by the electorate without being burdened by a law that effectively rendered them
ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this contention.
- We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this
claimed right is merely a restatement of a claim of vested right to a public office. What the
Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective
local posts;18 thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress,
not for the courts, to decide. We dealt with a strikingly similar issue in Montesclaros v.
Commission on Elections19 where we ruled that SK membership which was claimed as a
property right within the meaning of the Constitution is a mere statutory right conferred by
law.
- Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that
no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio
member of a local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a
proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils.
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE vs. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES G.R. No. 185740

TOPIC: THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECURITY OF TENURE Both career and non-career service
employees have a right to security of tenure they cannot be removed from office except for cause
provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, operates
under a different rule for primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a primarily
confidential position.

Furthermore, security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not
be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be
expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held.

FACTS:

Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then-
Governor Roy Padilla on April 1991, with her appointment on a permanent capacity. After almost 8
years, on March 1999, the then-Governor Jess Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum to explain why
administrative charges should not be filed against her for gross insubordination/discourtesy in the
course of official duties and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. After
Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges
against her. Therefore, on September 1999, Gov. Pimentel dismissed Gonzales.

This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which
issued a Resolution, which modified the earlier decision, found Gonzales guilty of insubordination and
suspended Gonzales for 6 months. A subsequent appeal from Gov. Pimentel was denied by the CSC.
Upon motion for execution, CSC through a Resolution directed the reinstatement of Gonzales upon
clarification of service of the 6-month suspension. Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales, however she was
dismissed the next day for lack of confidence. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the CSC of his compliance
to the CSCs order and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee, citing an earlier CSC
Resolution where the CSC held that the position of provincial administrator was highly confidential and
coterminous in nature.

The CSC responded with another Resolution which directed Gonzales reinstatement, stating that while
the LGC (RA 7160) made the position of provincial administrator coterminous and highly confidential in
nature, the conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent
appointments as administrators prior to the effectivity of the LGC. Gonzales had acquired a vested right
to her permanent appointment and is entitled to continue holding the office despite its subsequent
classification. The conversion should not jeopardize Gonzales security of tenure guaranteed to her by
the Constitution. Therefore, as a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after
due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent
appointees dismissal or discipline under existing laws.

However, in a letter dated February 2005, Gonzales wrote to the CSC alleging that the then incumbent
Governor, Jesus Typoco, Jr., refused to reinstate her. Hence, the CSC made another Resolution which
ordered Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position.

As a result, the Province, through Gov. Typoco, filed a petition for review with the CA. However, the CA
sided with CSC and Gonzales, citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, which stated that an appointee
acquires a legal right to his position once he assumes a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute and the Constitution, and he cannot be
removed from office without cause and previous notice and hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at
the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. The CA then
enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officers removal under Section 46, Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A of the Revised Administrative Code, and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. The
CA concluded that Gonzales dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of
tenure, and that she has the right to be reinstated with payment of backwages. Hence, the petition for
review on certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE/S:

WON Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte.

HELD:

NO. Decision of the CA reversed and set aside.

RATIO:

A. The Court supported the CAs conclusion that the position of provincial administrator has been re-
classified into a primarily confidential, non-career position upon the passage of RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC) which took effect in January 1992. In making the position mandatory for all
provinces, the LGC also amended the qualifications for the position. Further to this, the LGC made the
provincial administrator position co-terminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-
career service position that is primarily confidential. Upon this, the Court took note of the argument that
Gonzales has acquired a vested legal right over the position of provincial administrator the moment she
assumed her duties in April 1991, hence the argument that she cannot be removed from office except
for cause and after due hearing.

According to the SC, the arguments reflect a conceptual confusion between the nature of the position
and an employees right to hold a position. The nature of a position may change by law according to the
dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional
and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the position. Congress has the
power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator position and to
reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. When done in good faith, these acts
would not violate a public officers security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or
the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening
of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.

B. The Court also pointed out that Gonzales reliance on the case of Gabriel v. Domingos dissenting
opinion (which stated that a permanent employee remains a permanent employee unless he is validly
terminated) was misplaced. First of all, the factual differences were pointed out to be dissimilar to the
case of Gonzales, and even granting that they were the same, the cited case (in Gabriel) of Civil Service
Commission v. Javier actually proposes that corporate secretaries in GOCCs cannot expect protection for
their tenure and appointments upon the reclassification of their position to a primarily confidential
position. These officers cannot rely on the statutes providing for their permanent appointments, if and
when the Court determines these to be primarily confidential.

Further to this, said dissenting opinion in Gabriel cited EO 503, which provided safeguards against
termination of government employees affected by RA 7160s implementation. According to the
dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the executive departments intent to protect and
uphold both the national government and the local government employees security of tenure.
However, the Court emphasized that EO 503, however, does not apply to employees of the local
government affected by RA 7160s enactment, as it only applies to National Government Agencies
whose functions are to be devolved to LGUs.

C. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of
tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to
the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from
office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of security of
tenure, however, operates under a different rule for primarily confidential employees due to the nature
of a primarily confidential position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily
confidential employees term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the
employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not removed or dismissed from office.
The term merely expires and the loss of trust and confidence is the just cause provided by law that
results in the termination of employment. In the case of Gonzales, where the trust and confidence has
been irretrievably eroded, Gov. Pimentel only exercised his discretion when he decided that he could
no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.

Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended
or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant
a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held. The CSC might have been legally
correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of tenure when she was
removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been changed.
In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the
law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service. She was then already occupying a position
that was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and
confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful.
She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other
comparable position. This, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to retirement
benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.

PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 16418 July 23, 2008

FACTS:

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapandos wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.

On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged for violation
of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against
Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando
filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted him of the crime
charged.

The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:

Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Although this Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed
in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in
any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that
except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within
one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it
ruled that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by law and
that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year prohibition
imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee
possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction,
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding
temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.

FUNA vs. AGRA

- Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the
Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the
Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary
Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel
and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.
- Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent
designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple
offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so
that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
- Issue 1: W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
- No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the
1987 Constitution.
- It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly
indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being
held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
 permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
- Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the hold-over principle
- No. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by
which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the
holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.
- Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in
his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his
designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor
General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was
allowed by law or the primary functions of his position. To claim the exemption of his
concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he
needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
- Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex officio
capacity in relation to the other
- No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary
functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the
DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that
the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General
is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the Court of
Appeals.