Civil Procedure 27 August 2017 Assignment

CIVIL PROCEDURE: 2:00 PM 6:00 PM
JUDGE RAMON MAKASIAR
ASSIGNMENT: 27 AUGUST 2017
TOPIC: Jurisdiction and first five (5) rules of Rules of Court

Difference between cause of action and right of action
Read the following cases:
A. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF RULES OF COURT
1. G.R. No. 164436 January 15, 2010
LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LYNN SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LOUELLA JEANNE A. AGDEPPA, and LALAINE
LILIBETH A. AGDEPPA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE, represented by DOROTEA BONETE, HIPOLITO BONETE, MILAGROS BONETE,
MAURICIO BONETE, FERNANDO BONETE, and OPHELIA BONETE, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision,2dated December
27, 2002,
which reversed and set aside the Order,3 dated May 21, 1990, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, of Midsayap,
Cotabato.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
In 1979, respondent Dorotea Bonete (Dorotea), widow of the late Ignacio Bonete and mother of respondents Hipolito Bonete,
Milagros Bonete, Mauricio Bonete, Fernando Bonete, and Ophelia Bonete (respondents), obtained a loan in the amount of
55,000.00 from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Cotabato City Branch, in order to buy farm implements. A parcel of
agricultural land, known as Lot No. (1144) H-207865 with an area of 18.00 hectares, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-56923,4 issued in the name of Dorotea and situated in Demapaco, Libungan, Cotabato (subject property), was used as collateral
to secure the said loan.
In 1982, respondents, through Dorotea, received a notice of collection from DBP. Respondents alleged that herein petitioner and
counsel, Atty. Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa (Littie Sarah), expressed deep concern and sympathy for them. Consequently, Littie Sarah
accompanied Dorotea to DBP and obligated herself to pay the loan. Thereafter, Dorotea was allegedly made to sign a document as
Littie Sarahs security for the amount which the latter paid to DBP in connection with the said loan. Further, respondents alleged
that, since 1982, Littie Sarah and her representatives had been gradually easing them out of the subject property and that they were
ordered to stop the cultivation of their respective ricefields. Eventually, respondents were forcibly ejected from the subject property.
Further, Littie Sarah planted corn and put up duck-raising projects on the subject property.
On this account, respondents inquired from the Register of Deeds and found that the title to the subject property, which was in the
name of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, the late Ignacio Bonete, had already been canceled and transferred to Littie Sarah under
TCT No. T-75454 by virtue of a purported deed of sale. According to Dorotea, Littie Sarah took advantage of her by letting her sign
a contract, ostensibly as security for the loan from DBP, which later turned out to be a deed of sale. Thus, respondents filed a
Complaint5 for Recovery of Ownership and Possession and/or Annulment of Deed of Sale of the Subject Property with Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 484 before the RTC.
Littie Sarah filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the Complaint based on the following grounds: 1) that respondents had no legal capacity to
sue; 2) that respondents were not the real parties in interest; 3) that the Complaint stated no cause of action; and 4) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint had already been waived and extinguished.
Later, the Complaint was amended, impleading herein petitioners Lynn Sarah Agdeppa, Louella Jeanne Agdeppa, and Lalaine
Lilibeth Agdeppa, together with Littie Sarah, as defendants (petitioners).7 Respondents also filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss. 8
On May 21, 1990, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the Amended Complaint with costs against respondents. It held that the
Amended Complaint did not show the character and representation that respondents claimed to have. TCT No. T-56923, covering
the subject property, was not in the name of the late Ignacio Bonete but in Dorotea's name. Thus, the RTC held that respondents
were not real parties in interest. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 which the RTC denied in its Order10 dated January
12, 1991. Therein, the RTC held that respondents lacked the personality to sue; thus, a valid basis to grant the motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
Civil Procedure NEU-COL
Assignment 27 August 2017
Re: Rules 1 to 5, ROC
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Aggrieved, respondents went to the CA.11 On December 27, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Order, and remanded the
case to the RTC for further proceedings because Dorotea, being the former owner of the subject property, was a real party in interest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,12 which the CA denied in its Resolution13 dated April 28, 2004.
Hence, this Petition assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE; DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION; AND LAID DOWN A VERY BAD PRECEDENT, AS FOLLOWS:
A. BY VIOLATING SPECIFICALLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT, PARTICULARLY SECS. 2

AND 3 OF RULE 3 OF THE RULES OF COURT, ON PARTIES-PLAINTIFFS TO CIVIL ACTIONS AND REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST;
B. BY UPHOLDING THE LEGAL CAPACITY OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE TO SUE AND
TO FILE THIS CASE WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF EVEN RIGHTFULLY FOUND
THAT TCT NO. T-56923 WAS ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF DOROTEA BONETE, WHEN IT WAS
SOLD TO HEREIN DEFENDANTS, SUCH THAT IGNACIO BONETE OR THE HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE
[HAD] NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SAID PROPERTY- THUS[,] NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND
[HAD] NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE AND LIKEWISE [HAD] NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANTS (PETITIONERS HEREIN);
C. THAT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS ISSUED CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AND CONTRARY TO THE TRUE, ACTUAL AND EXISTING FACTS OF THIS CASE AND
EVEN TO THE VERY FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF, BECAUSE WHILE THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT DOROTEA BONETE AS REGISTERED OWNER IS A PARTY
IN INTEREST, THIS CASE IS NOT PROSECUTED IN THE NAME OF DOROTEA BONETE, BUT IN THE NAME
OF THE HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE, AND IF EVER THE NAME OF DOROTEA BONETE IS MENTIONED IT
WAS MERELY [AND] ALLEGEDLY IN REPRESENTATION OF THE HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE AND NOT IN
HER OWN PERSONAL CAPACITY; BUT WHICH REPRESENTATION IS NOT EVEN ALLEGED IN THE
COMPLAINT, THUS STILL A VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT;
D. THAT THE REMANDING OF THIS CASE TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
WITH THE PARTY PLAINTIFF "HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE" NOT BEING A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
VIOLATES THE WELL ESTABLISHED "GENERAL RULE [THAT] ONE HAVING NO RIGHT OR INTEREST TO
PROTECT CANNOT INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF IN AN ACTION.
(Ralla v. Ralla, 199 SCRA 495 [1991])" AND "THE GENERAL RULE OF x x x COMMON LAW x x x THAT EVERY
ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT IN THE NAME OF THE PARTY WHOSE LEGAL RIGHT HAS BEEN INVADED
OR INFRINGED";
E. IT WILL CREATE A VERY BAD AND IMPROPER PRECEDENT NOT WARRANTED UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT; [AND]
F. WILL UNNECESSARILY CAUSE THE PARTIES UNDUE DELAY AND EXPENSES FOR AFTER ALL THE
PARTIES-PLAINTIFFS THEREIN ARE NOT THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST[.] 14
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that respondents committed a procedural infraction before the RTC, such infraction does not justify the dismissal of
the case.
Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.15 Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court clearly provides:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
It bears stressing that TCT No. T-56923, covering the subject property, was issued in the name of Dorotea. This is established by
the record, and petitioners themselves admit this fact. However, because TCT No. T-75454, allegedly issued in favor of Littie Sarah,
and the purported deed of sale, allegedly executed by Dorotea in favor of Littie Sarah, are not on record. Considering the allegations
in the pleadings, it is best that a trial on the merits be conducted.1avvphi1
We fully agree with the apt and judicious ruling of the CA, when it said:
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As the former owner of the subject property, the same having been titled in her name under TCT No. T-56923, Dorotea Cariaga
Bonete, being the real party [in] interest, has the legal capacity to file the instant case for reconveyance and annulment of deed of
sale. The complaint was filed by the [respondents] precisely to question the issuance of TCT No. T-75454 in the name of Littie
Sarah Agdeppa as the transaction allegedly contemplated was only to secure Doroteas loan.
Why the property became the subject of the deed of sale which is being disputed by Dorotea should be threshed out in a full-blown
trial on the merits in order to afford the contending parties their respective days in
court. As held in Del Bros. Hotel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 33, the complaint is not supposed to contain
evidentiary matters as this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.
A final note.
A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in situations involving excusable formal errors in a pleading, as long as the same do not
subvert the essence of the proceeding, and they connote at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. 16 The Court is
not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment, if blind and stubborn adherence to procedure would result in the sacrifice of
substantial justice for technicality. To deprive respondents, particularly Dorotea, of their claims over the subject property on the
strength of sheer technicality would be a travesty of justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Midsayap, Cotabato, is hereby directed to resolve this case on the merits with deliberate dispatch. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 168726 March 5, 2010
PIO DELOS REYES (Deceased), represented by heirs FIDEL DELOS REYES, MAURO DELOS REYES and IRENE BONGCO
(Deceased), represented by surviving spouse RODOLFO BONGCO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, HONORABLE
RENE C. VILLA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Land Reform (formerly Department of Agrarian Reform), THE
PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (PARO) OF DINALUPIHAN BATAAN, THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN
REFORM OFFICER (MARO) OF HERMOSA AND ORANI, BATAAN, and FORTUNATO QUIAMBAO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 7 January 2005 and 17 June 2005 Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 87584.
In its 7 January 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari3 of Pio delos Reyes, represented by
surviving heirs Fidel delos Reyes, Mauro delos Reyes, and Irene delos Reyes Bongco, who was represented by her surviving spouse,
Rodolfo Bongco (collectively referred to as "petitioners"). In its 17 June 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
The Facts
In 1985, Pio delos Reyes applied for exclusion from the coverage of operation land transfer, under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
274 and Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474,5 parcels of land situated in Hermosa and Ornani, Bataan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-2058 on Lots 2 and 3, T-4581, and T-2057 on Lots 1156 and 1159. Alternatively, he applied for the right
of retention of seven hectares if the properties mentioned would be subject of operation land transfer. He claimed that the properties
remained undivided and were still under co-ownership pending the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his late wife, Margarita
Manalili.6
In 1988, Pio and his children, Fidel, Mauro, and Irene, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition,7 which included the properties
subject of the application for exclusion or retention. Under the extrajudicial partition, Pio became the owner of 11.4842 hectares of
tenanted rice and corn land, Fidel of 4.5212 hectares, Mauro of 4.5212 hectares, and Irene of 4.3740 hectares. Aside from their
shares in the extrajudicial partition, Fidel co-owned 2.5212 hectares of rice land and Mauro co-owned 2.5273 hectares.8 However,
in the proceedings for his application for exclusion or retention, Pio failed to submit vital documents such as the deed of extrajudicial
partition. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject landholdings within the coverage of P.D. No. 27 and
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LOI No. 474. The DAR wasted no time effecting operation land transfer and issuing emancipation permits in favor of farmer
beneficiaries.9
In April 1989, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer recommended approval of Pios application for (i) retention of not more than
seven hectares of his tenanted land planted to rice and corn, (ii) exclusion of his childrens properties from the coverage of operation
land transfer, (iii) cancellation of certificates of land transfer covering the properties of his children issued in favor of farmer
beneficiaries, and (iv) cancellation of certificates of land transfer covering his retention area.10 The Legal Officer and the Regional
Director of the DAR approved the recommendation.11
Fortunato Quiambao, a tenant-farmer in Pios landholdings, appealed to the DAR Secretary. He claimed that Pio was guilty of
misrepresentation amounting to fraud for not stating the totality of his landholdings. He averred Pio and his children owned lands
used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes from which they derived adequate income to support themselves
and their families. He further alleged that during the pendency of the petition for exclusion or retention, Pio converted portions of
their landholdings into residential lands.12
After examining the records of the case and the evidence submitted by the parties, the DAR Secretary concluded that the subject
landholdings fell under the governments operation land transfer program. In its order,13 the DAR Secretary ruled that Pio and his
children actually owned landholdings used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes from which they derived
adequate income, as evidenced by certifications issued by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Bataan and the various certificates
of title submitted on record. Pio and his children moved for reconsideration, which the DAR Secretary dismissed.14
Meanwhile, Pio died and was substituted by his surviving heirs, Fidel delos Reyes, Mauro delos Reyes, and Irene delos Reyes
Bongco, represented by her surviving spouse, Rodolfo Bongco.1avvphi1
Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President.15 In its 20 June 2003 Resolution,16 the Office of the President dismissed
petitioners appeal for being filed out of time. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.17Petitioners then filed a petition
for relief from denial of appeal arguing that the failure of their so-called provisional lawyer to advise them of the receipt of the 20
June 2003 resolution was justifiable. The Office of the President dismissed the same in its 30 September 2004 order, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The finality of the Resolution dated June 20, 2003,
pursuant to Sec. 7 of Presidential A.O. No. 18, S. 1987, is hereby reiterated. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed
to implement the said resolution. No further pleadings shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.18
Instead of filing in the Office of the President a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order, petitioners filed in the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 7 January 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed for prematurity the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
petitioners. The appellate court found that petitioners failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available from the dismissal of
their petition for relief. According to the appellate court, petitioners failed to file in the Office of the President a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order. In its 17 June 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The sole issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed for prematurity the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
by petitioners.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners contend the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus despite sufficient
allegation in the petition why the motion for reconsideration would be useless, one of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Petitioners claim they no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order because
it was already final and executory on its face as the order itself stated that no further pleadings would be entertained. Petitioners
submit that a disposition of controversies through resolution on the merits is preferred over a peremptory dismissal by reason of a
technicality.
Respondents maintain that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari,
being the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondents argue that a petition for
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certiorari will not prosper unless the administrative agency has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct
the errors imputed to it. Respondents insist the law intends to afford the administrative agency an opportunity to rectify the errors it
may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.
At the outset, we must point out that petitioners arguments are a mere rehash of their arguments in the petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed in the Court of Appeals. We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners ignored the procedural requirement of
filing a motion for reconsideration and simply went ahead with the filing of a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The appellate
court correctly dismissed the same for prematurity.
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration. The writ of certiorari
does not lie where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.19 Likewise, mandamus is granted only in
cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress because generally, a writ of mandamus will not lie
from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.20 However,
there are several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h. where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.21 (Emphasis supplied)
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. To this end, administrative
agencies are afforded a chance to correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity, and
convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.22
In this case, a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners should
have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order of the Office of the President. They cannot prematurely
resort to a petition for certiorari on the wrong assumption that a plain reading of the 30 September 2004 order hinted that it was
already final and executory. The parties are presumed to know the hornbook rule that judgments become final and executory only
upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration without any appeal or motion for
reconsideration having been made.1avvphi1
Petitioners submit they no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order because it would have been
useless. Petitioners point out that the 30 September 2004 order warned that no further pleadings would be entertained. We are not
convinced that this constitutes an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners may not arrogate to
themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.23 The language of the order
notwithstanding, petitioners are bound by procedural rules and may not disregard the same on a wrong assumption that a motion for
reconsideration might no longer be entertained. Even so, they should have awaited the denial of their motion for reconsideration
before filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for certiorari.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by
the rules. While the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, but it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration
of justice.24
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The procedural shortcut taken by petitioners finds no justification either in law or in jurisprudence. It is fatal to their cause of action.
Accordingly, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing for prematurity the petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by petitioners.
As to the merits of the case, the question of whether petitioners owned landholdings used for residential, commercial, industrial, or
other urban purposes from which they derived adequate income is a question of fact. In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law, not of fact, may be raised before this Court. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts. It is not this Courts function to re-examine the respective sets of evidence submitted by the parties.25 As this case
involves the application of P.D. No. 27 and LOI No. 474, the DAR Secretary, owing to his agrarian expertise, is in a better position
to make a final determination whether petitioners landholdings may be subject of exclusion from operation land transfer or retention.
This Court need not weigh anew the evidence submitted by the parties and supplant the findings of fact by the DAR Secretary,
especially when such findings are fully supported by evidence consisting of certifications issued by the Office of the Provincial
Assessor of Bataan and the various certificates of title on record.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the 7 January 2005 and 17 June 2005 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 87584.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
B. CAUSE OF ACTION
1.
2. G.R. No. 140892. September 21, 2005
Dr. Ibarra S. Santos and Josefina M. Rivera, Petitioners,

vs.
Spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon and Virginia Enales, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57868, entitled "Dr. Ibarra S.
Santos and Josefina M. Rivera versus Spouses Nieves de Leon, Virginia Enales and Deputy Sheriff Pericles Telan."
Records show that on September 25, 1995, spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon, herein respondents, filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC), Branch 77, Paraaque City a complaint for forcible entry against Josefina Rivera, petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
No. 9500. In her answer, petitioner Rivera claimed that the real owner of the subject property is Dr. Ibarra Santos, also a petitioner.
The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent spouses de Leon. Upon appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the
MTC Decision. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, but it was denied.
Subsequently, or on July 3, 1996, petitioners Dr. Ibarra Santos and Josefina Rivera filed with the RTC, Branch 260, Paraaque City,
Civil Case No. 96-0285 for declaration of nullity of a Deed of Sale with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Impleaded as defendants were spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon (herein respondents), Virginia Enales and Pericles
Telan, deputy sheriff IV of the said MTC.
The complaint alleges that petitioner, Dr. Ibarra Santos, is the registered owner of a parcel of land and its improvements thereon
situated in 1264 Interior Quirino Ave., San Dionisio Paraaque City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69150 of the
Registry of Deeds, same city; that Virginia Enales and Rosendo Rivera (deceased husband of petitioner Josefina Rivera) sold Dr.
Santos property to respondent spouses de Leon; and that in Civil Case No. 9500 for forcible entry filed by said respondent spouses
with the MTC of Paraaque City involving the same property, a writ of execution was issued evicting from the premises petitioner
Josefina Rivera, the lessee of Dr. Santos. Petitioners Dr. Santos and Rivera thus prayed that the Deed of Sale between Virginia
Enales and Rosendo Rivera, as vendors, and respondent spouses de Leon, as vendees, be declared void; and that a temporary
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restraining order and/or preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the sheriff from implementing the Decision of the MTC in Civil
Case No. 9500.
On August 1, 1996, respondent spouses de Leon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of
action. The motion was granted.
Hence, both petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review.
On September 22, 1999, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision denying the petition, holding that the complaint does not state a
cause of action considering that while it alleges that the Deed of Sale is null and void, however, petitioner Dr. Santos failed to specify
the grounds why the said document is a nullity and should, therefore, be annulled.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners Dr. Santos and Rivera contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the complaint states no cause of action. They
insist that the allegations therein "are sufficient for rendering a valid judgment in accordance with their prayer." Their complaint
states only the ultimate facts since the details can be proven during the trial.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that:
"6. That plaintiff SANTOS is the absolute owner in fee simple of that parcel of land and improvements thereon disputed in Civil
Case No. 9500 entitled SPS. PABLO AND NIEVES DE LEON versus JOSEFINA RIVERA before Branch 77 of the
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT of PARAAQUE, METRO MANILA, as shown by copy of TCT No. 69150 (ANNEX A);
7. That in said MTC Civil Case No. 9500, defendant ENALES and the late ROSENDO RIVERA (deceased husband of plaintiff
RIVERA) allegedly sold plaintiff SANTOS real estate property covered by TCT No. 69150 (ANNEX A) to herein defendant
spouses DE LEON as shown by the DEED OF SALE WITH WAIVER OF RIGHTS (ANNEX B), WAIVER WITH SPECIAL
POWER OF ATTORNEY (ANNEX C) and RECEIPT AND COMMITMENT (ANNEX D)."
The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists
if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.1
The above allegations quoted above sufficiently establish a cause of action. They specify that petitioners Dr. Ibarra Santos is the
absolute owner of the disputed parcel of land and the improvements thereon. His claim of ownership is evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 4569216 of the Registry of Deeds for Paraaque City. Definitely, as the registered owner of the subject
property, he has a cause of action against spouses de Leon who claim to have purchased the same from Virginia Enales and Rosendo
Rivera who are not the true owners thereof.
On the part of petitioner Josefina Rivera, she alleged in the same complaint that she has been in possession, as a lessee, of the same
property since 1983 as shown by a Contract of Lease between her and Dr. Ibarra Santos; and that her right as a lessee has been
prejudiced when the property, belonging to Dr. Santos, was sold by persons who are not its real owners to spouses de Leon.
In determining whether the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case.2 A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations may be vague and
indefinite.3 To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. 4 The determination of the issue of
ownership of a property requires proofs which can be threshed out, not in a motion to dismiss, but in a full-blown trial on the merits.
In fine, we rule that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 96-0285 does not state a cause
of action and that in filing the said complaint, petitioners did not violate the Rule on forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 57868 are REVERSED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Paraaque
City for trial on the merits with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
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C. PARTIES
1. G.R. No. 143870 September 30, 2005
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioners,

vs.
RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated August 23, 2000 filed by the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA), assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000 which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from their dwellings.
The antecedents, culled from the petition and the assailed Decision, are as follows:
The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with the administration, operation, management, control,
maintenance and development of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Among its
powers was the power to enter into, make and execute concessions and concession rights for purposes essential to the operation of
the airport.
On May 25, 1965, the CAA, through its Director, Capt. Vicente C. Rivera, entered into individual lease contracts with its employees
(lessees) for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot situated in what is now known as Rivera Village located in Barangay 199
and 200 in Pasay City. The leases were for a twenty-five (25)-year period to commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at
20.003 per annum as rental.
On May 4, 1982, Executive Order No. (EO) 778 was issued (later amended by EO 903 on July 21, 1983), creating petitioner MIAA,
transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and vesting the latter with the power to administer and operate the MIA.
Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees. As a
result, respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc. (homeowners association), purportedly representing the
lessees, requested MIAA to sell the subject property to its members, invoking the provisions of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1517
or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016.
The MIAA, on February 14, 1996, denied the request, claiming that the subject property is included in its Conceptual Development
Plan intended for airport-related activities.
Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction4 against
MIAA and the National Housing Authority (NHA). The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1598 in the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 109, sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village
is concerned. It also sought to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the Conceptual Development Plan and
the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the property in favor of the members of the homeowners association.
MIAA filed an answer5 alleging that the petition fails to state a cause of action in view of the expiration of the lease contracts and
the lack of personality to sue of the homeowners association. MIAA also claimed that the homeowners association is not entitled to
a writ of mandamus because it does not have a clear legal right to possess the subject property and MIAA does not have a
corresponding duty to segregate Rivera Village from its Conceptual Development Plan.
A preliminary hearing on MIAAs affirmative defenses was conducted, after which the trial court issued an Order6dated October
12, 1998, denying the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby denied for lack of merit and the above-entitled petition is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court held that PD 1818 bars the issuance of a restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
in any case, dispute or controversy involving infrastructure projects of the government or any public utility operated by the
government. It also ruled that the petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as petitioner therein (respondent homeowners
association) is not the real party-in-interest, the individual members of the association being the ones who have possessory rights
over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease contracts have already expired.
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As regards the contention that the lessees are entitled to possess the subject property by virtue of PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967
and PD 2016, which respectively identify parcels of urban land as part of the Urban Land Reform Zone, specify certain areas in
Metro Manila, including Rivera Village, as areas for priority development or urban land reform zones, and prohibit the eviction of
occupant families from such lands, the trial court declared that the subject property has been reserved by MIAA for airport-related
activities and, as such, is exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program
under Republic Act No. (RA) 7279.
Respondent filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, interposing essentially the same arguments raised before the trial court. The
appellate court annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the assailed October 12, 1998 Order is annulled, set aside and reversed. The case is remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued restraining and preventing respondent MIAA from evicting the members of petitioner
Rivera Village Association from their respective lots in the Rivera Village. Petitioner is ordered to post a bond in the amount of
500,000.00 with the condition that petitioner will pay to respondent MIAA all damages it may sustain by reason of the injunction
if the court should finally decided that petitioner is not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the bond, the writ of preliminary injunction
shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.8
The appellate court foremost ruled that the case can be construed as a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees. The
homeowners association, considered as the representative of the lessees, merely instituted the suit for the benefit of its members. It
does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees, nor seek the registration of the titles to the land in its
name.
On the issue of the expiration of the lease contracts and the application of PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016, the Court
of Appeals held that the expiration of the lease contracts cannot adversely affect the rights acquired by the lessees under the foregoing
laws. Besides, the lease contracts were impliedly renewed by virtue of MIAAs acceptance of rental payments from May 25, 1990
up to December 1994. This resulted in an implied new lease under Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the appellate court construed Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279 to mean that if the government lot has not been utilized during the ten
(10)-year period for the purpose for which it has been reserved prior to 1983, then said lot is encompassed by the law and is subject
to distribution to the legitimate and qualified residents of the area after appropriate proceedings have been undertaken.
As to whether PD 1818 bars the issuance of an injunctive writ in this case, the appellate court ruled that PD 1818 is a general law
on the issuance of restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. On the other hand, PD 2016 is a special law specifically
prohibiting the eviction of tenants from lands identified as areas for priority development. Thus, the trial court can issue an injunctive
writ if the act sought to be restrained will enforce the eviction of tenants from urban land reform zones.
The court, however, declared that it cannot make a definitive ruling on the rights of the members of the homeowners association vis-
-vis the MIAA Conceptual Development Plan, considering the need for a full-blown trial to ferret out whether the claimed rights
under the pertinent laws have ripened to actual legal and vested rights in their favor.
MIAA now seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. In the instant petition, MIAA contends that the appellate court
erred in ruling that PD 2016, which prohibits the eviction of occupant families from real property identified as areas for priority
development or urban land reform zones, has modified PD 1818, which bars the issuance of injunctive writ in cases involving
infrastructure projects of the government, including public utilities for the transport of goods and commodities.
It argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the
homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the Board Resolution presented by respondent shows
that it was only the board of directors of the association, as distinguished from the members thereof, which authorized respondent
to act as its representative in the suit.
MIAA also stresses that the subject property has recently been reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such, Sec.
5(c) of RA 7279 applies. Under the said law, lands which are used, reserved or otherwise set aside for government offices, facilities
and other installations are exempt from the coverage of the law.
Moreover, MIAA avers that the Court of Appeals should not have granted injunctive relief to respondent, considering that the grant
of an injunction would inflict greater damage to petitioner and to the public.
Respondent filed a Comment9 dated November 20, 2000, arguing that MIAA is mandated by law to dispose of Rivera Village to the
homeowners thereof. Under existing laws, the homeowners have the right to possess and enjoy the property. To accept MIAAs
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pretense that the property has been recently reserved for airport-related activities and therefor exempt from the coverage of RA 7279
will allegedly violate the right of the homeowners as bona fide tenants to socialized housing.
Respondent further argues that PD 1818 is inapplicable to this case because it has established a clear and unmistakable right to an
injunction. Besides, PD 2016 which protects from eviction tenants of lands identified for priority development, is a later enactment
which should be deemed to prevail over PD 1818.
In the Resolution10 dated January 24, 2001, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda.
Accordingly, MIAA submitted its Memorandum11 dated March 20, 2001, while respondent filed its Memorandum12dated April 20,
2001. For its part, NHA manifested that it is adopting the memorandum of MIAA as its own insofar as the same is germane and
material to NHAs stand.13
As presented and discussed by the parties, the issues are the following:
1. Has PD 2016 modified PD 1818?
2. Did the petition filed by respondent with the trial court state a cause of action against petitioner?
3. Is petitioner obliged to dispose of the subject properties in favor of the members of respondent association after appropriate
proceedings?
4. Is respondent entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction? 14
We first resolve the threshold question of whether respondent has personality to sue.
MIAA contends that the real parties-in-interest in the petition filed with the trial court are the individual members of the homeowners
association. Not having been brought in the name of the real parties-in-interest, the suit was correctly dismissed by the trial court for
failure to state a cause of action.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.15 A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.16
The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners association, represented by its President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr.,
upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file "[A]ll necessary action to the Court of Justice and other related
acts necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to the members of the Association."
Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 3 17 of the Rules of Court, the requisites therefor not
being present in the case, notably because the petition does not allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, i.e., that
the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, and because it was brought only by one party.
In Board of Optometry v. Colet,18 we held that courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception
to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the
plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed
representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.
There is, however, merit in the appellate courts pronouncement that the petition should be construed as a suit brought by the
homeowners association as the representative of the members thereof under Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting
in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law
or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries shall, likewise, be included in the
complaint.19
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Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the authority
of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of
justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity
as either a natural or an artificial person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative
character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized
to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that
an unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. 20
In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the homeowners association, through its President, is suing
in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of the individual
members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the
title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals
and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly.
Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to protect
against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties
in the consideration of a case. This rule, however, is not to be narrowly and restrictively construed, and its application should be
neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and practicalities. 21 As correctly noted by the
Court of Appeals, the dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the
filing of multiple suits by the individual members of the association.
What is more decisive to the resolution of the present controversy, however, is a matter not addressed by the parties in the case
before this Court, that is, the fact that the petition filed before the trial court is for mandamus to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera
Village from the scope of its Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the subject
property in favor of the members of the homeowners association.
Parenthetically, while the procedural rule is that a party is required to indicate in his brief an assignment of errors and only those
assigned shall be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case, it is equally settled that appellate courts have ample authority
to rule on matters not assigned as errors in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded
issues.22
For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not raised or assigned as errors specifically in the following
instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice
or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. 23
In this case, although the propriety of the filing of a petition for mandamus was no longer raised as an issue before this Court, MIAA
asserted in its answer24 to the original petition that the homeowners association is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because it has
not shown any legal right to possess the subject property and a correlative obligation on the part of MIAA to segregate the property
from its Conceptual Development Plan. MIAA averred:
28. Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that petitioner has
a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. The legal right of
petitioner to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The corresponding duty of respondent to perform the
required act must also be clear and specific (Cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210 [1968]).
29. Petitioner, in view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its individual members, has failed to show that it has the legal right
to possess the subject property.
30. There is therefore no corresponding duty on the part of respondent MIAA to segregate the property from the scope of its
Conceptual Development Plan.25
The question of whether the homeowners association is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus was again raised in the
memorandum26 filed by MIAA with the Court of Appeals. MIAA alleged:
Appellant is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that the appellant has
a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. The legal right of
appellant to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The corresponding duty of respondent to perform the
required act must also be clear and specific (cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210 [1968]).
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In view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its individual members, appellant has failed to show that it has the legal right to
possess the subject property. There is therefore no corresponding duty on the part of the MIAA to segregate the property from the
scope of its conceptual development plan.27
The question of whether mandamus is the proper remedy was clearly raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals although it
was largely ignored by both courts. This issue being indispensable to the resolution of this case, we shall rule on the matter.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.28
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim
that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus
will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with
a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command
and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to
implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
In this case, the Court of Appeals itself conceded that no definitive ruling as regards the rights of the individual members of the
homeowners association could yet be made considering the need for a full determination of whether their claimed rights under the
pertinent laws have ripened into actual legal and vested rights. The appellate court even outlined the requisites under PD 1517 which
have yet to be complied with, namely: (1) the submission to the NHA of a proposal to acquire the subject property as required under
Sec. 929 of PD 1517;
and (2) proof that the members of the homeowners association are qualified to avail of the benefits under PD 1517 as mandated by
Sec. 630 of the same law.
Resort to mandamus is evidently premature because there is no showing that the members of the homeowners association have
already filed an application or proposal with the NHA to acquire their respective lots. There is still an administrative remedy open
to the members of the homeowners association which they should have first pursued, failing which they cannot invoke judicial
action.31
We note that while respondent alleges that its members enlisted themselves with the NHA in order to avail of the benefits of the law,
the NHA, in its answer32 to the petition, denied this allegation for being self-serving. Whatever rights the members of the
homeowners association may have under the relevant laws are still in substantial doubt or dispute. Hence, the petition for mandamus
was appropriately dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
So, too, should the prayer for the issuance of a writ of prohibition contained in the same petition be denied. Writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are prerogative writs of equity and their granting is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts
to be exercised on equitable principles. Said writs should only be issued when the right to the relief is clear. 33 As our findings in this
case confirm, the homeowners association failed to establish a clear legal right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus and
prohibition prayed for.
There is, moreover, another ground for the dismissal of the petition filed before the trial court which appears to have been overlooked
by the parties in this case.
In the original petition filed before the trial court, the homeowners association averred that although EO 903 transferred to MIAA
the properties and assets of MIA, such transfer was made subject to what the homeowners association claims to be the existing rights
of its members.34 MIAA dismissed this allegation as an erroneous conclusion of law. 35
We cite the complete text of the relevant provision of EO 903 to fully understand the import thereof and its effect on the present
controversy. Section 3 thereof states:
Sec. 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority.There is hereby established a body corporate to be known as the
Manila International Airport Authority which shall be attached to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The principal
office of the Authority shall be located at the New Manila International Airport. The Authority may establish such offices, branches,
agencies or subsidiaries as it may deem proper and necessary; Provided, That any subsidiary that may be organized shall have the
prior approval of the President.
The land where the Airport is presently located as well as the surrounding land area of approximately six hundred hectares,
are hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Authority,
subject to existing rights, if any. The Bureau of Lands and other appropriate government agencies shall undertake an actual survey
of the area transferred within one year from the promulgation of this Executive Order and the corresponding title to be issued in the
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name of the authority. Any portion thereof shall not be disposed through sale or through any other mode unless specifically
approved by the President of the Philippines. [Emphasis supplied.]
As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision, while it is true that the ownership and administration of the airport and its
surrounding land was assigned to MIAA subject to existing rights, which we may here understand to be the rights granted under PD
1517, EO 903 specifically requires the approval of the President of the Philippines before any disposition by sale or any other mode
may be made concerning the property transferred to MIAA.
The Executive Secretary as representative of the President of the Philippines is, therefore, an indispensable party in actions seeking
to compel the sale or disposition of properties of the MIAA. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that parties-in-interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Thus, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. The plaintiff is mandated to implead all indispensable
parties, and the absence of one renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties, but even as to those present. One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court; otherwise, he
will be deprived of his right to due process.36
For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction must perforce be denied. Preliminary
injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the main case. Having declared
that the petition filed before the trial court was correctly dismissed, the determination of the homeowners associations entitlement
to a writ of preliminary injunction is already moot and academic. 37
Besides, as earlier noted, the right of the members of the homeowners association to possess and purchase the subject property is
still uncertain considering that they have not completed the process for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in PD 1517.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ of preliminary injunction is issued
by the court to prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ is issued upon the
satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed
to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility
of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. 38
With this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-1598 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 182645 December 15, 2010
In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, Antonio Rodriguez, Macario J.
Rodriguez, Delfin Rodriguez, and Consuelo M. Rodriguez and Settlement of their Estates,
RENE B. PASCUAL, Petitioner,

vs.
JAIME M. ROBLES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is the Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Jaime M. Robles (Robles) seeking to set aside this Court's
Decision dated December 4, 2009 which nullified the April 16, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
57417 and the February 27, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 34 in SP No. IR-1110 and reinstated
the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the same RTC in the same case.
Robles' Motion is based on the following arguments:
A.) THE HEREIN MOVANT JAIME M. ROBLES, BEING A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST WAS NEVER
IMPLEADED AS RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (WITH PRAYER TO CLARIFY
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JUDGMENT) DATED MAY 10, 2008 WHICH WAS FILED BEFORE THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON
MAY 13, 2008 - - - BY PETITIONER-RENE B. PASCUAL;
B.) THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER 04, 2009 ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN G.R.
NO. 182645 WAS RENDERED BASED ON A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MEMORANDUM DATED APRIL
7, 2009, WHOSE COPIES THEREOF WERE NEVER SERVED UPON THE HEREIN MOVANT;
C.) THE NAME OF HEREIN MOVANT-JAIME M. ROBLES APPEARS AS RESPONDENT IN THE TITLE OF THIS
CASE AS CAPTIONED IN THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT'S ASSAILED DECISION DATED DECEMBER
04, 2009. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO FILE COMMENT NOR ANSWER TO THE PETITION, A
CLEAR VIOLATION TO (sic) THE RULES OF COURT AND TO (sic) THE CONSTITUTION.
D.) THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PRESENTED THE SALIENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY THE RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON THE PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL AND THE RULE
THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST APPEAL. THE DECISION ISSUED BY THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DATED APRIL 16, 2002 HAS ALREADY ATTAINED
FINALITY BY WAY OF AN ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT ON NOVEMBER
10, 2005, IN G.R. NO. 168648 ENTITLED JAIME M. ROBLES PETITIONER, VS. HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, ET. AL.,
AS RESPONDENTS.1
Robles prays for the reversal of the presently assailed Decision and the entry of a new judgment requiring him to file his comment
and memorandum to the petition. Robles also seeks the reinstatement of the December 15, 1994 Order of the RTC declaring him as
the only forced heir and next of kin of Hermogenes Rodriguez.
For a clearer discussion and resolution of the instant Motion, it bears to restate the relevant antecedent facts as stated in the assailed
Decision of this Court, to wit:
On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of
the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the RTC [of Iriga City]. The
petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza),
and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the
late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following
genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while
Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez
(Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960
leaving Macario as her sole heir.
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina's claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former gobernadorcillo, is based on
the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his
sole heir.
At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors to the petition, the
RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of the Philippines. After presentation of proof of
compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a
commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and
Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged
fraternal relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes.
Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry,
Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular
administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.
Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates.
Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely:
(1) The group of Judith Rodriguez;
(2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos;
(3) Jaime Robles;
(4) Florencia Rodriguez;
(5) Victoria Rodriguez; and

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(6) Bienvenido Rodriguez
Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed opposing claims to the estate
of Hermogenes.
In his opposition, Jamie Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes
and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio
Manggahan, Pasig, Rizal.
After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December
1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly,
the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property
covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig Rizal.
On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct descending
line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The
decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their
failure to substantiate their respective claims of heirship to the late Hermogenes.
On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-Santos. This time, the
RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza
and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles,
Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez. 2
Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal, but the same was denied by the trial
court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles' failure to file a record on appeal.
Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits
on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that no special and important reason was cited for
this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance.
On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.
Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated January 21, 2004. Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. On August 1, 2005, this Court
issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, on November 10, 2005, the said Resolution became final and executory.
On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.
On December 4, 2009, this Court rendered the presently assailed Decision which held as follows:
In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order
rendered therein is 30 days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. x x x
xxxx
The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires
without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order becomes final, x x x
xxxx
In the case under consideration, it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended Decision. On 12 October 1999, Jaime
Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal. The RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999,
denied this for his failure to file a record on appeal as required by the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements
of the rule; hence, the 13 August 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. It was, therefore, an error for the Court
of Appeals to entertain the case knowing that Jaime Robles' appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality.
This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to
appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The right to appeal is not a natural
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right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. x x x Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any
appeal. There are exceptions to this rule, unfortunately respondents did not present any circumstances that would justify the
relaxation of said rule.3
The basic contention of Robles in the instant Motion is that he is a party-in-interest who stands to be adversely affected or injured
or benefited by the judgment in the instant case. He also argues that the failure of service upon him of a copy of the instant petition
as well as petitioner's memorandum, and the fact that he was not required or given the opportunity to file his comment or answer to
the said petition nor served with any order, resolution or any other process issued by this Court in the instant petition, is a clear
denial of his right to due process.
In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner contends that Robles has no legal standing to participate in the instant petition. Petitioner
argues that in an original action for certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower court and the prevailing party.
Petitioner claims, however, that Robles was never impleaded, because he was not the prevailing party in the assailed Decision of the
CA as well as the questioned Order of the RTC. Petitioner further avers that the inclusion of Robles' name as respondent in the
caption of the instant petition was a result of a clerical error which was probably brought about by numerous cases filed with this
Court involving Robles and the subject estate.
The Court finds partial merit in the instant motion.
Petitioner admitted in his Comment and Opposition to Robles' Motion that in the instant petition he filed, only the CA and the RTC
were impleaded as respondents.
Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-
judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join as private respondent or respondents
with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and
it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the
public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file
an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not
appear or participate in the proceedings therein.4
In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz,5 this Court ruled as follows:
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus,
without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.6
In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an
interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed without his
presence.7 Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in
sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render
the petition for certiorari defective.8
Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. 9 The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.10 Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. 11 If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.12
Based on the foregoing, and in the interest of fair play, the Court finds it proper to set aside its decision and allow Robles to file his
comment on the petition.1avvphi1
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WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 4, 2009 is SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is ORDERED to furnish Robles a copy of his petition for certiorari within a period of five (5) days from receipt of this
Resolution. Thereafter, Robles is DIRECTED to file his comment on the petition within a period of ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
D. VENUE
1. G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
vs.
LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 19 April 2000 that affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, in Civil Case No.
98-2288, dated 19 April 1999, admitting respondent Lucio Tans Amended Complaint for Damages for the alleged malicious and
defamatory imputations against him in two (2) articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and its Resolution 2 dated 15 September 2000
denying petitioners Armand Nocum and The Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals.
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer, dated October 27, 1998, wherein they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to
state a cause of action; (2) the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual premises;
(3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and
therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiffs or
PALs side of the dispute with the pilots union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October 31, 1998, and alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no
cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the
complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where
the libelous article was printed and first published.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February 10, 1999, dismissing the complaint without prejudice on
the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking
reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1of the amended complaint, it is alleged
that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 53, Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192), and in par. 2.04.1,
that "This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 55, id.).
The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the
previous order of dismissal, supra, stating, inter alia, that:
"The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be
properly admitted, pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final.
Besides, there is no substantial amendment in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants defenses and their
Answers. The Amendment is merely formal, contrary to the contention of the defendants that it is substantial."
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Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55192, and the other by defendants Umali and ALPAP which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
54894. The two petitions were consolidated.
On 19 April 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order
of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and by defendants Umali and ALPAP were likewise denied in a resolution dated
15 September 2000.
Both petitioners and defendants Umali and ALPAP appealed to this Court. Under consideration is the petition for review filed by
petitioners.
On 11 December 2000, the Court required respondent Tan to comment on the petition filed by petitioners. 3
Respondent filed his comment on 22 January 20014 to which petitioners filed a reply on 26 April 2001. 5
In a Manifestation filed on 19 February 2001, respondent stated that the petition6 filed by defendants Umali and ALPAP has already
been denied by the Court in a resolution dated 17 January 2001.7
On 20 August 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. 8 Both petitioners and respondent complied.9
Petitioners assigned the following as errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING (1) THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
(ON THE BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD
EARLIER DISMISSED THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THJE
COURT; AND (2) THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED OR ADMITTED BECAUSE THE
LOWER COURT WAS "NEVER DIVESTED" OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS
AMENDED PURPOSELY TO CONFER UPON THE LOWER COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. 10
Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the
RTC of the place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the complainant, if a private person,
resides; or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office. They argue that since the original complaint only contained
the office address of respondent and not the latters actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were
printed and first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the
lower court.
The question to be resolved is: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint
for damages?
We rule in the affirmative.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.11 In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint,
we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents
cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance12 that is specifically designated to try a libel case.13
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, 14differentiated jurisdiction and
venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or
tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the
court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is
fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and first
published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither
confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondents failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court
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of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondents failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a
party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar,15 this Court construed the term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the
place where actions for libel shall be filed or "venue."
In Escribano v. Avila,16 pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363,17 we laid down the following rules on the venue of the criminal and
civil actions in written defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the
city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue is the province or the city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has always
the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or first published.
We further restated18 the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where
originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue
has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action
was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.
Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently,
the herein petitioners recognized this jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint, albeit, questioning the propriety of venue,
instead of a motion to dismiss.
...
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed
to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended as in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in
view of the court a quos jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any grave
abuse of discretion.19
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question
of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the
person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. 20 It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It
relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of
the court.21 It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial.22 In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.23
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Petitioners argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the
libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the
original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
The cases24 cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases involve amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction on
courts over which they originally had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As discussed above, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter upon the filing of the original complaint. It did not lose jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on
the ground of improper venue. The amendment merely laid down the proper venue of the case.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 151037 June 23, 2005
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
TROY FRANCIS L. MONASTERIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal by certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the D E C I S I O N1 dated July 16, 2001, and the Resolution2 dated
November 27, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52622. The Court of Appeals dismissed the special civil action
for certiorari filed by San Miguel Corporation (SMC)3 assailing the Orders4 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20,
which denied its Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration in Civil Case
No. RTC98-4150.
The facts are as follows:
On August 1, 1993, petitioner SMC entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement 5 (hereafter EWA for brevity) with SMB
Warehousing Services (SMB), represented by its manager, respondent Troy Francis L. Monasterio. SMB undertook to provide land,
physical structures, equipment and personnel for storage, warehousing and related services such as, but not limited to, segregation
of empty bottles, stock handling, and receiving SMC products for its route operations at Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Daet, Camarines
Norte.
The agreement likewise contained a stipulation on venue of actions, to wit:
26. GENERAL PROVISIONS
...
b. Should it be necessary that an action be brought in court to enforce the terms of this Agreement or the duties or rights of the parties
herein, it is agreed that the proper court should be in the courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila, to the exclusion of the other courts
at the option of the COMPANY.6[Underscoring supplied.]
...
On November 3, 1998, respondent Monasterio, a resident of Naga City, filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. RTC98-4150
for collection of sum of money against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20.
In his Complaint,7 Monasterio claimed 900,600 for unpaid cashiering fees. He alleged that from September 1993 to September
1997 and May 1995 to November 1997, aside from rendering service as warehouseman, he was given the additional task of
cashiering in SMCs Sorsogon and Camarines Norte sales offices for which he was promised a separate fee. He claims that of
approximately 290 million pesos in cash and checks of the sales office and the risks of pilferage, theft, robbery and hold-up, he had
assumed what amounted to approximately 35 million pesos per annum for Sorsogon, Sorsogon, and 60 million pesos for Daet,
Camarines Norte. He also said that he hired personnel for the job. Respondent added that it was only on December 1, 1997, that
petitioner SMC started paying him 11,400 per month for his cashiering services.
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Monasterio demanded 82,959.32 for warehousing fees, 11,400 for cashiering fees for the month of September, 1998, as well as
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees in the amount of 500,000 and 300,000, respectively.8
On November 19, 1998, SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss9 on the ground of improper venue. SMC contended that respondents money
claim for alleged unpaid cashiering services arose from respondents function as warehouse contractor thus the EWA should be
followed and thus, the exclusive venue of courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila is the proper venue as provided under paragraph
26(b) of the Exclusive Warehouse Agreement. SMC cites in its favor Section 4(b) in relation to Section 2 of Rule 4 10 of the Rules
of Court allowing agreement of parties on exclusive venue of actions.
Respondent filed an Opposition11 contending that the cashiering service he rendered for the petitioner was separate and distinct from
the services under the EWA. Hence, the provision on venue in the EWA was not applicable to said services. Hence, respondent
insists that in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court the venue should be in Naga City, his place of residence.
On February 22, 1999, the Regional Trial Court, of Naga City, Branch 20 issued an Order12 denying petitioners motion to dismiss.
The court held that the services agreed upon in said contract is limited to warehousing services and the claim of plaintiff in his suit
pertains to the cashiering services rendered to the defendant, a relationship which was not documented, and is certainly a contract
separate and independent from the exclusive warehousing agreements. 13
SMCs subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.14 While the motion was pending, the respondent filed an
Amended Complaint15 deleting his claim for unpaid warehousing and cashiering fees but increasing the exemplary damages from
500,000 to 1,500,000.16
Petitioner elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC
Naga City for denying its motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On June 11, 1999, during the pendency of the certiorari petition SMC filed before the trial court an answer ex abundanti
cautela17 with a compulsory counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. SMC averred lack of cause of
action, payment, waiver, abandonment and extinguishment.
In its decision dated July 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals found respondents claim for cashiering services inseparable from his claim
for warehousing services, thus, the venue stipulated in the EWA is the proper venue. However, the Court of Appeals noted that prior
to the filing of SMCs petition, respondent Monasterio filed an amended complaint to which SMC filed an answer. Thus, the Court
of Appeals dismissed San Miguels petition for certiorari, stating that the case was already moot and academic.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition wherein petitioner raises
the following as issues:18
1. Whether or not this Honorable Court may review the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Complaint and Amended
Complaint were filed in the wrong venue.
2. Assuming arguendo that this Honorable Court may review the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Complaint and
Amended Complaint were filed in the wrong venue, whether or not such finding should be reversed.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that SMCs Petition For Certiorari has become moot and
academic in view of the filing of Monasterios Amended Complaint and SMCs Answer (Ex Abundanti Cautela).19
In our view, two issues only require resolution: (1) Did the RTC of Naga City err in denying the motion to dismiss filed by SMC
alleging improper venue? (2) Did the CA gravely err in ruling that SMCs petition for certiorari has become moot?
On disputes relating to the enforcement of the rights and duties of the contracting parties, the venue stipulation in the EWA should
be construed as mandatory. Nothing therein being contrary to law, morals, good custom or public policy, this provision is binding
upon the parties.20 The EWA stipulation on venue is clear and unequivocal, thus it ought to be respected.
However, we note that the cause of action in the complaint filed by the respondent before the RTC of Naga was not based on the
EWA, but concern services not enumerated in the EWA. Records show also that previously, respondent received a separate
consideration of 11,400 for the cashiering service he rendered to SMC. Moreover, in the amended complaint, the respondents
cause of action was specifically limited to the collection of the sum owing to him for his cashiering service in favor of SMC. He
already omitted petitioners non-payment of warehousing fees. As previously ruled, allegations in the complaint determines the
cause of action or the nature of the case.21Thus, given the circumstances of this case now before us, we are constrained to hold that
it would be erroneous to rule, as the CA did, that the collection suit of the respondent did not pertain solely to the unpaid cashiering
services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services.22
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to breach of the said
contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the
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enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly
confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles of freedom to contract might work to the great
disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice.
Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising
from or in relation to their agreements. 23 Thus, the restriction should be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for
which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will create
unwarranted restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.
Moreover, since convenience is the raison detre of the rules on venue,24 venue stipulation should be deemed merely permissive,
and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties convenience.25Contrawise, the rules mandated by the Rules
of Court should govern.26 Accordingly, since the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is a
personal action,27 we find no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where plaintiff
resides.
Having settled the issue on venue, we need not belabor the issue of whether SMCs petition has become moot.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ruled that no reversible error was committed by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in
denying petitioners motion to dismiss. Said RTC is the proper venue of the amended complaint for a sum of money filed by
respondent against petitioner San Miguel Corporation, in connection with his cashiering services. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 20, for further proceedings on respondents amended complaint, without further delay.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the
Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution 2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first
issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in
particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 4 a
criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are
officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja,
Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and
Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John
Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned
subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had
previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder
after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by
which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under
the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot6 under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Page 23 of 28
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Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2,
2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused]
containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly,
Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because
it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much
from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.
Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us
start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince
friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after
knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen
(13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they
hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation
of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and
for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and
defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x
xxxxx
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they
will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the
complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as
trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of
the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by
Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations
for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not
be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC. 14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash 16the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the
Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally
defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the
alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing
Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati
Page 24 of 28
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at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in
Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, 20 insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban 21 which held that the Information need not allege verbatim
that the libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office
in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it
merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal
cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered
the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,24 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they
hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the
complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and
defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent
because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient
in form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they
filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE

DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
With the filing of Gimenezs Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of
courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission
of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, 29 as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made
to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. 30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter
should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely
legal questions.32
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to
abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under
Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Page 25 of 28
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Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous
article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that
Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such
cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo 35 which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases,
viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in
the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed
and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was
printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places,
namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second.
Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words,
it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an
examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals 36 explained the nature
of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep.
Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province
wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.
Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints
for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous
article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule,
the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the
criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal
and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93
Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action
so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel
Page 26 of 28
x------------------------------------x
suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,
Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in
libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The
disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or
possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or
serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as
there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first
access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos
that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued
for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the
pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.1avvphi1
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts
pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the
complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also
have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no
convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly
onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in
which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first
published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended
Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information
in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
1. MIA vs. Rivera Village
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION,INC.
00 SCRA 00
Tinga, September 30, 2005
NATURE
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the MIAA assailing the Decision of the CA which directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from their dwellings.
FACTS
Page 27 of 28
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-The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with the administration, operation, management, control,
maintenance and development of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the NAIA. The CAA entered into individual lease
contracts with its employees for the lease of portions of a 4-hectare lot situated in Rivera Village, Barangay 199 and 200 in Pasay
City. The leases were for a 25-year period to commence on May 25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at P20 per annum as rental.
- Thereafter, EO 778 was issued (later amended by EO 903), creating MIAA, transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and
vesting the latter with the power to administer and operate the MIA.
- MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees. As a result, respondent
homeowners association, purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell the subject property to its members, invoking
the provisions of PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016. The MIAA denied the request, claiming that the subject
property is included in its Conceptual Development Plan intended for airport-related activities.
- Respondent filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against MIAA
and the National Housing Authority (NHA) with the RTC of Pasay. The petition sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing
its Conceptual Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned and to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the
scope of the Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the property in favor of
the members of the homeowners association.
- After the preliminary, the RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The trial court held, among others, that the petition failed to state a cause of
action inasmuch as respondent homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest, the individual members of the association
being the ones who have possessory rights over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease contracts have already expired.
- Upon appeal, the CA annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. A writ of
preliminary injunction was issued restraining and preventing respondent MIAA from evicting the members of Rivera Village
Association from their respective lots in the Rivera Village. The CA ruled that the case can be construed as a class suit instituted by
the Rivera Village lessees. The homeowners association, considered as the representative of the lessees, merely instituted the suit
for the benefit of its members. It does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees, nor seek the
registration of the titles to the land in its name.
- MIAA argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the
homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the Board Resolution presented by respondent shows
that it was only the board of directors of the association, as distinguished from the members thereof, which authorized respondent
to act as its representative in the suit.
ISSUE
WON the petition filed by respondent with the trial court states a cause of action against petitioner/ WON respondent has personality
to sue
HELD
YES
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A case
is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to
state a cause of action.
The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners association, represented by its President, Panfilo R. Chiutena, Sr.,
upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file "All necessary action to the Court of Justice and other related
acts necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to the members of the Association."
Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the requisites therefor not being
present in the case, notably because the petition does not allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, i.e., that the
subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, and because it was brought only by one party.
In Board of Optometry v. Colet, it was held that courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the
exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is
favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their
self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.
There is, however, merit in the appellate courts pronouncement that the petition should be construed as a suit brought by the
homeowners association as the representative of the members thereof under Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting
in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries shall, likewise, be included in the
complaint.
Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the authority
of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court
of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal
entity as either a natural or an artificial person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative
character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized
Page 28 of 28
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to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that
an unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the homeowners association, through its President, is suing
in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of the individual
members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the
title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals
and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly.
Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to protect
against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties
in the consideration of a case. This rule, however, is not to be narrowly and restrictively construed, and its application should be
neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and practicalities. As correctly noted by the
CA, the dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple
suits by the individual members of the association.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE: 2:00 PM 6:00 PM

JUDGE RAMON MAKASIAR

ASSIGNMENT: 27 AUGUST 2017

TOPIC: Jurisdiction and first five (5) rules of Rules of Court

A. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF RULES OF COURT

1. G.R. No. 164436 January 15, 2010

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Hence, this Petition assigning the following errors:

A. BY VIOLATING SPECIFICALLY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT, PARTICULARLY SECS. 2

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

2. G.R. No. 168726 March 5, 2010

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

Costs against petitioners.

2. G.R. No. 140892. September 21, 2005

Dr. Ibarra S. Santos and Josefina M. Rivera, Petitioners,

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that:

1. G.R. No. 143870 September 30, 2005

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioners,

1. Has PD 2016 modified PD 1818?

4. Is respondent entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction? 14

2. G.R. No. 182645 December 15, 2010

RENE B. PASCUAL, Petitioner,

Robles' Motion is based on the following arguments:

(1) The group of Judith Rodriguez;

(2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos;

(3) Jaime Robles;

(4) Florencia Rodriguez;

(5) Victoria Rodriguez; and

(6) Bienvenido Rodriguez

On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.

The Court finds partial merit in the instant motion.

Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.

1. G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005

ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners,

The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners assigned the following as errors:

We rule in the affirmative.

We further restated18 the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:

We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:

2. G.R. No. 151037 June 23, 2005

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

The facts are as follows:

The agreement likewise contained a stipulation on venue of actions, to wit:

26. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Costs against petitioner.

3. G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)

2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

1. MIA vs. Rivera Village

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS

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