Rodil vs.
Benedicto
January 22, 1980
No. L-28616
Facts
Spouses Tomas and Catalina Rodil are the adjudicatee of a prior cadastral case in
1958. On February 1959, heirs of one Alejandro Abes filed a petition for review of the
registration decree, alleging that they are the true owners and actual legal possessors of the
land, and that the award to the Spouses Rodil was secured through fraud. The cadastral court
denied the petition for failure to overcome the evidence of the spouses. No appeal was taken
by the heirs.
On 1961, the heirs instituted an action for reconveyance of title against the
spouses. They invoked the same grounds as above. The case was dismissed because of res
judicata. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Upon the return of the records to the lower court, the spouses filed a petition for
issuance of a writ of possession. The judge, respondent herein, issued an order granting the
petition only against the heirs and denied the same with respect to the other respondents
stating that he is completely at a loss as to who, aside from the heirs, were parties to the
original cadastral proceeding or as to who were at least occupants of the properties in
question prior to the issuance of the decree of registration.
The heirs filed a motion for reconsideration upon the grounds that: (a) the petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession was filed out of time; and (b) there is no allegation in the
petition, and neither had it been proved, that the heirs were defeated in a registration
proceeding, or that they were adversely occupying the land during the proceedings or at any
time up to the issuance of the final decree, or that they were one against those against whom
a writ of possession may be made. Respondent judge granted the heirs motion for
reconsideration and ordered the dissolution of the writ. The spouses filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied.
The spouses now filed this petition for mandamus to compel respondent judge to issue a writ
of possession.
Issue
Whether or not respondent judge erred in dissolving the writ on the grounds relied
upon and whether or not the issuance of another is in order.
Held
a) The right of the applicant (or a subsequent purchaser) to ask for the issuance of a
writ of possession of the land never prescribes (Manlapas and Tolentino vs. Lorente). The
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgement may be enforced within five years
by motion, and after five years but within ten years by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil
action and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as land registration cases.
In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
b) A cadastral proceeding is a proceeding in rem and against everybody, including the
respondent heirs herein.
Besides, the heirs have filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration, thereby
becoming a direct party in the registration proceedings by their voluntary appearance. As to
their alleged unproved adverse possession of the land, the records of the case in their suit for
reconveyance offers numerous instances of their admission of possession of the land before,
during and after the registration proceeding.
Abella vs. Rodriguez, 6 SCRA 987
REGALA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari directly filed with this Court.
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, acting as a cadastral court, respondent Necitacion
Estrera filed in Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC Rec. No. 9468, a petition for cancellation of title
dated November 17, 1959. The petition alleged that in consideration of P1,000.00, said
Necitacion Estrera bought a parcel of land (Lot No. 6002) situated at Guadalupe, Cebu City,
from Gregorio Cavan and Pascual Cavan, heirs of Fernando Cavan, one of the registered
owners of said lot; that the original certificate of title of the lot was lost during the last global
war and the same was judicially reconstituted by her in accordance with Republic Act No. 26;
that the Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1963 covering the aforementioned lot is in her
possession. The prayer was for an order to the Register of Deeds of the province of Cebu to
cancel the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title in the name of Fernando Cavan and to
issue a transfer certificate of title solely in her name.
On November 20, 1959, respondent Judge, sitting as a cadastral Judge, issued an order for the
hearing of the petition on December 5, 1959 and the publication of said order requiring all
persons interested to appear on that date to show cause why the petition for cancellation
should not be granted.
When the case was called for hearing on December 5, 1959, petitioners herein, thru counsel,
appeared before the court and registered their opposition to the petition. The judge, in open
court, consequently issued an order on that date giving oppositors ten days time from receipt
thereof within which to file a written opposition to the petition.
Accordingly, petitioners filed a written answer and opposition dated December 9, 1960,
asserting that they are the heirs of some of the registered owners of the land and that the
deed of sale allegedly signed by the heirs of Fernando Cavan is unenforceable against the
registered rights, interests, participations and ownerships of the owners. They questioned
Necitacion Estrera's authority to cancel these registered rights in a summary
proceedings.lawphi1
Upon notice issued by the deputy clerk of court dated December 16, 1959, the petition was
set for hearing on February 12, 1960, but it was letter postponed to March 16, 1960. On this
latter date, the hearing was again postponed. On July 20 of that same year, another notice of
hearing was issued by the deputy clerk setting the case for trial on September 13, 1960 at

8:00 a.m. On this date however, nobody appeared for
petitioners. According to counsel, he was then indisposed and
confined in bed, but he believed that another counsel for one
of petitioners' co-heirs who used to appear in court in previous
meetings would make proper representations in court on
September 13, 1960 because he never received any notice of
trial supposed to be had that day.
On September 13, 1960, respondent judge issued an order
declaring herein petitioners in default and that the latter's
opposition be considered withdrawn. The cadastral deputy
clerk was then commissioned to receive evidence that may be
adduced by respondent Necitacion Estrera.
On September 16, 1960, the Judge issued an order directing
the Register of Deeds of Cebu to cancel Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-1963 covering Lot No. 6002, Cebu Cadastre, and
once cancelled, to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in
favor of Necitacion Estera.
On September 29, 1960, herein petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the orders of September 13 and 16, 1960.
On October 1, 1960, they also filed an urgent motion with the
cadastral court to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21957
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on September 19,
1960 in the name of Necitacion Estera.
On November 12, 1960, respondent Judge issued two orders:
One denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and the
other denying their urgent motion dated October 1, 1960.
The present proceedings seek to annul these two last
mentioned orders on the main ground that the respondent
Judge had no jurisdiction to issue the same.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is well settled that while, under section 112 of the
Land Registration Act, any registered owner of land or other
person in interest may, on certain grounds, apply by petition to
the cadastral court for a new certificate or the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum thereon, such relief can only be
granted if there is no adverse claim or a serious objection on
the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or
in the case where the incident properly belongs (Jimenez v. de
Castro, 40 O.G. No. 3, 1st Supp., p. 8; Tangunan, et al v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-5545, December 29, 1953). As well stated
by this court in the case of Jimenez v. de Castro, supra
lawphil.net
It is not proper to cancel an original certificate of Torrens title
issued exclusively in the name of a deceased person, and to
issue a new certificate in the name of his heirs under the
provisions of section 112 of Act No. 496 when the surviving
spouse claims rights of ownership over the lands covered by
said certificate.
2
In other words, relief under section 112 of Act No. 496 can only
be granted if there is unanimity among the parties. "Unanimity
among the parties" is meant the absence of serious
controversy between the parties in interest as to the title of
the party seeking relief under said section (Enriquez at al., v.
Atienza, et al., G.R. No. L-9986, March 29, 1957).
Apparently, the petition filed by Nacitacion Estrera is for the
mere cancellation of an original title and for the issuance of a
new transfer certificate of title. But the record shows that the
ownership of the land covered by said title sought to be
cancelled is under controversy. Thus, while herein respondent
Necitacion Estrera claims that she bought Lot No. 6002 of the
Cebu Cadastre from the heirs of the registered owner
Fernando Cavan, herein petitioners, on the other hand, claim
that the said lot is registered owners, so that respondent has
no right of authority whatsoever to cancel their registered
interests and participations in said lot. This is a serious
question that should be passed upon by a regular court. It is
not a mere incidental or routinary matter that could summarily
be disposed of by the limited jurisdiction as a land registration
court. As was said in the case of Castillo, et al. v. Ramos, et al.,
45 O.G. p. 17, the remedy provided from section 112 of Act 496
is summary and not adequate for the litigation of issues
pertaining to an ordinary civil action (Miraflor v. Leono, et al.,
G.R. No. L-6097, July 13, 1953).
Respondent Estrera contends that since the opposition to the
petition for cancellation is not under oath, respondent Judge
did not commit a mistake in declaring oppositors (petitioners)
in default and in considering their opposition as withdrawn on
September 13, 1960. Suffice it to state here that the provisions
of Act 496 do not require that answer or opposition to a
petition or motion filed under section 112 of that Act be under
oath. It is worthy to note that Estrera's petition itself was not
under oath, and there is no reason for her to expect that the
answer thereto should be verified.
The court below as a cadastral court having no jurisdiction to
pass upon the petition for cancellation of title filed by
necitacion Estrera, the said petition is hereby dismissed,
without prejudice to the filing of a new one with the proper
court. Costs against respondent..
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
City of Baguio vs. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342
Facts: On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of cadastral
proceedings (a land registration/ titling proceeding) Civil Case
No.1. A decision on November 13, 1922 was rendered; the land
involved (Baguio Townsite) was among those declared public
lands.
On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral court to
reopen said civil case. He claims that the land (Baguio
Townsite) be registered in his name upon the grounds that 1.)
he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession

and cultivation of the land since Spanish times 2.) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus were not able to file
their claim to the land in question. On the other hand,
Francisco G. Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Teresita J.
Buchholz, as tree farm lessees of the land in question, opposed
the reopening. Their contentions are as follows: 1.) The
reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period
provided by R.A. 931 2.) Petition to reopen the case was not
published 3.) as lessees of the land, they have a standing to
appear in the reopening proceedings. ISSUE/S: Statcon issue
here is whether the reopening petition was filed outside the
40-year period provided by R.A. 931 (enacted June 20, 1953).
Joaquins group contests that the title of the said act is in
conflict with section 1 of the same act, thus invalidating the
petition of Lutes to reopen the civil case. Title of the act reads:
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER
COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN
CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE
BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY
YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 of the act provides:
SECTION 1. in case such parcels of land, on account
of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act,
are hereby granted
HELD: The court allowed the reopening of the case since the
case was filed within the 40-year period imposed by the act.
Joaquins group believes that the difference between the title
(BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED and in section 1
(by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted), is material. If the
title is to be followed, the date November 13, 1922 should be
the date used in reckoning the period (which is still within the
40-year period; counted from the date of the enactment of
R.A. 931 which is June 20, 1953). But if the wordings of the title
are to be followed, the date April 12, 1912, which is the date
the Director of lands instituted the reopening of the case,
would render the petition invalid since it is already outside the
40-year period. The rule on statutory construction provides
that laws should be construed liberally. The spirit or the intent
of the law should be looked upon and should prevail over its
letter. In this case, R.A. 931 clearly gives an opportunity to any
person who has any interest in any parcel of land which has
been declared as public land to present his claim within the
time prescribed. This act is a piece of remedial legislation; its
intent provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the
act had no legal means of perfecting titles. Therefore, the court
cannot see an inconsistency between the title and its section.
The title of the act is indisputably clear, as it expresses the very
substance of the law itself. The constitutional jurisdiction that
the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title,
breathes the spirit of command because the constitution does
not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill. Therefore, by the
statute, the petition of Lutes to reopen the case, decision on
3
which was rendered on Nov. 13, 1922, comes within the 40-
year period.
Director vs. CA, 106 SCRA 426
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of
the Decision 1 rendered by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 56788-B, dated March 7, 1977, affirming the Decision
2 of the then Court of First Instance of Bataan, dated April 6,
1974, in Land Registration Case No. N-235, adjudicating in favor
of herein private respondents the subject two (2) parcels of
land.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On January 29, 1973, spouses Silvestre Manlapaz and Natividad
Pizarro (herein private respondents) filed an application before
the Court of First Instance of Bataan, seeking the registration
and confirmation of titles to two (2) parcels of land, under Act
496 in relation to Sec. 48 (B) of C.A. No. 141, designated as Lot
No. 2855 and Lot No. 2856. The parcels of land applied for are
portions of Lot 2749 of Orion Cadastre covered by plans Sgs-
4600-D and Sgs-4601-D, situated at Barrio Damulog,
Municipality of Orion, Province of Bataan, containing an area
of 49,954 sq. meters and 54,052 sq. meters, respectively.3
Prior to the initial hearing of the case, the trial court in its
Order dated April 5, 1973, directed the Land Registration
Commissioner to submit his report on whether or not the
parcels of land in question had been issued patents or whether
the same are subject of pending decrees. 4 In compliance with
this directive, Acting Geodetic Engineer (Chief Surveyor)
Amado Masicampo, on behalf of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, filed a manifestation dated April 26, 1973 stating
that the subject parcels of land described on Plans Sgs-4600-D
and Sgs-4601-D are portions of Lot 2749, Cad. 241, Orion
Cadastre and that the same have been the subject of
registration proceedings in Court Cadastral Case No. 15, LRC
(GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 1021 wherein a decision has been
rendered although there is no existing record of the same on
file because it was among those records lost or destroyed due
to the ravages of the last global war. The record also disclosed
that Plans Sgs-4600-D and Sgs-4601-D, when plotted in the
Municipal Index Map through their respective lines conflict
with Lot 1, Sgs-2806 which has been issued Sales Patent No.
5819. 5
The Director of Lands seasonably filed an opposition on the
ground that neither the applicants nor their predecessor-in-
interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee
simple of the parcels of land applied for; that they have not
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question for at least thirthy (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the present
application; and that these parcels of land are portions of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, and
therefore, not subject to appropriation. 6

At the hearing on August 21, 1973, the Court issued an order of
special default with the exception of the Director of Lands. 7 As
prayed for by private respondents' counsel, the parties were
allowed to present evidence before the Clerk of Court who was
commissioned to receive the same and to submit his findings
after the termination of the reception of evidence. 8
In order to establish thirty (30) years of open and continuous
possession over the subject property, private respondents
presented Crisanto Angeles and Monico Balila, Crisanto
Angeles claimed that he first took possession of these two (2)
parcels of land in the year 1931 while he was still twenty (20)
years old. He cleared the land and planted different kinds of
fruit-bearing trees such as mango, star apple and bananas, as
well as seasonal crops thereon. He likewise converted 5,000 sq.
meters thereof into a ricefield which was enlarged to one
hectare. 9 These parcels of land were declared for taxation
purposes only in 1966. 10 Meanwhile, in the year 1938, he sold
the parcel containing an area of about five (5) hectares to
Pablito Punay, who immediately took possession of the same,
cultivated it and introduced several improvements thereon. 11
In September 1972, after he had already cleared the whole
tract of the second parcel of land, he sold the same to private
respondents. 12 Pablito Punay also sold the first parcel of land
he acquired from Crisanto to them. 13 Angeles further stated
that he knew all the owners of the adjoining parcels of land
but, on cross-examination, was unable to remember their
names. 14 Witness Monico Balila testified that he is the owner
of the parcel of land adjoining private respondent's property.
He had seen Angeles clear the same and plant different fruit
trees. On cross-examination, he said that he was twelve (12)
years old when he first lived at Bilolo, Orion, Bataan in 1938.
His land holding was five kilometers away from private
respondents' land and it was his uncle who was then in
possession of the land he presently owns. 15
Private respondent Silvestre Manlapaz also testified that upon
their acquisition of the two (2) parcels of land designated as
Lots 2855 and 2856, they immediately took possession of the
same, planted coconuts, camotes and other vegetables and
expanded the portion planted to palay. Some portions were
converted into two (2) residential lots, one with an area of 276
sq. meters and the other, 105 sq. meters. They then declared
those properties in their names and paid the corresponding
land taxes. 16
The Director of Lands, on the other hand, did not present any
evidence to support his opposition.
On April 6, 1974, the lower court rendered its decision, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the title to two parcels of land Identified and
shown in plans Sgs-4600-D and 4601-D, situated at Barrio
Damulog, Municipality of Orion, Province of Bataan, containing
an area of 49,954 square meters and 54,052 square meters,
respectively, is ordered confirmed in the name of the spouses
Silvestre Manlapaz and Natividad Pizarro, both of legal age,
Filipino citizens and residents of Pilar, Bataan.
4
After this decision shall have become final, let an order issue
for a decree of registration in favor of the applicants.
SO ORDERED. 17
From said judgment, the Director of Lands interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals which promulgated its decision
18 on May 7, 1977, affirming the decision of the lower court. It
found that the defense of res judicata was belatedly raised on
appeal. The omission to include the same in the answer as one
of the affirmative defenses constitutes a waiver of said
defense. The manifestation of Mr. Masicampo stating that the
two (2) parcels of land have been the subject of registration
proceedings was not enough to support res judicata. It
concluded that the 30-year period of continuous possession of
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest has been
satisfactorily proved, the Director of Lands not having
presented any evidence to contradict, impugn or impeach the
facts established by private respondents.
Hence, this petition which assigns the following errors:
I
Respondent Court erred in ruling that petitioner failed to raise
the defense of res judicata in the trial court and, hence, waived
the same.
II
Respondent Court erred in ruling that petitioner failed to prove
res judicata by competent evidence.
III
Respondent Court erred in ruling that after the cadastral
proceedings and the declaration of the subject parcels of land
as public land therein, the same may be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or claim based on adverse and
continuous possession of at least thirty (30) years, citing the
case of Mindanao v. Director of Lands, et al., G.R. No. L-19535,
July 10, 1967. 19
The Court of Appeals committed no error in disregarding res
judicata. In the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 20
this Court had addressed a similar contention in this manner:
WE find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions of
Petitioner. It is clear from the evidence on record that in the
proceedings had before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
acting as a land registration court, the oppositor Director of
Lands. petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor
set up the defense of res judicata with respect to the lots in
question. Such failure on the part of oppositor Director of
Lands. to OUR mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be
cured on appeal. Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of
1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:

SEC. 2. Defenses and obligations not pleaded deemed
waived. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; . . .
All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to dismiss or
in an answer are deemed waived. (Santiago, et al. v. Ramirez,
et al.; L-15237, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 157, 162; Torrada v.
Bonearos, L-39832, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 247, 253).
Thus, the defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a
motion to dismiss or in answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be
pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal. (Phil. Coal
Miners' Union v. CEPOC, et al., L-19007, April 30, 1964, 10
SCRA 784, 789). (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, petitioner advanced the view that it is the
intendment of the law that a person who fails to prove his title
to a parcel of land which is the object of cadastral proceedings
or one who does not file his claim therein is forever barred
from doing so in a subsequent proceeding. Judgment in a
cadastral proceeding which is a proceeding in rem constitutes
res judicata even against a person who did not take part in the
proceedings as claimant.
We disagree. The above-cited case likewise settled this
contention. It said:
But granting for a moment, that the defenses of res adjudicata
was properly raised by petitioner herein, WE still hold that,
factually, there is no prior final judgment all to speak of. The
decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to
the application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a
decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is
not the final decree contemplated in Section 38 and 40 of the
Land Registration Act.
A Judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions. of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said
public land remains alienable and disposable (now section 3
and 4, PD No. 1073,) 21 (Emphasis supplied)
As a rule, the Court respects the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, imparting to them a certain measure of finality.
However, the rule is not without clearly defined exceptions,
among which are: ". . . (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; . . . (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; . . . and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record." 22
It must be emphasized that the burden is on applicant to prove
his positive averments and not for the government or the
private oppositors to establish a negative proposition insofar as
the applicants' specific lots are concerned. 23 Applying this
rule to the instant case, the conclusions reached by the court a
quo and respondent Court of Appeals that the private
5
respondents through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject land under a bonafide claim of ownership are not
persuasive for the following reasons.
First, the testimony of Crisanto Angeles as to his possession
and ownership of the two (2) parcels of land fails to inspire
belief. He claimed that he was in possession of the land way
back in 1930. Yet he declared the same for taxation purposes
only in 1966. Although tax receipts are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property. 24 He stated that
he knew the owners of the adjoining properties, but during the
cross-examination, he was unable to give their names. Nor was
he able to explain how he came into possession of the parcel of
land and there is no showing of any title, perfect or imperfect,
granted by the state to him or his predecessors.
Second, the attempt of Monico Balila to corroborate Angeles'
length of possession over the subject property is less than
credible. Having been an adjoining owner only in 1953 by his
own admission, he could not have known how long Crisanto
Angeles owned and possessed the parcels of land.
Third, Pablito Punay, the second predecessor-in-interest of Lot
No. 2855 of the private respondents was not made to testify.
No reason was disclosed for his failure to appear before the
court.
Lastly, the documents introduced by the applicants merely
evidenced the fact that the parcels of land applied for were
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,25 but no
document has been presented that would clearly establish the
length of time of the possession of their predecessors-in-
interest. That the private respondents have paid the
corresponding taxes since 1972 26 when they possessed the
same is of no moment because what is vital to consider is their
predecessors-in-interest's compliance with the 30-year period.
Undoubtedly, the private respondents have failed to submit
convincing proof of their predecessors-in-interest's actual,
peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner of
the lots in question during the period required, by law. This is
of utmost significance in view of the basic presumption that
lands of whatever classification belong to the State and
evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible."
27
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 7, 1977 decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
judgment is rendered DISMISSING the application for
registration and confirmation of titles of Lots No. 2855 and
2656. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Cayanan vs. de los Santos, 21 SCRA 1348
G.R. No. L-21150 December 26, 1967
FERNANDO, J.:
The question decisive of this appeal is whether or not in a
petition for the review of a decree filed within the one-year
period on the ground of actual fraud, the cadastral court acting
as such could likewise inquire into an allegation that the lot
subject of the decree was transferred in a simulated sale
intended to avoid such a review. We hold that it can and
accordingly reverse the appealed order of February 9, 1959.
The relevant facts follow: On May 30, 1958, the title of
appellee De los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre was
confirmed by the Hon. Arsenio Santos, then Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga.1 On December 16, 1958, a
petition for review was filed in the same proceeding alleging
that the said lot was registered in the name of appellee De los
Santos "through actual fraud, through deceit and through
intentional omission of facts" as a result of which the aforesaid
decision was rendered and a decree of registration obtained on
August 8, 1958. Moreover, it was stated further that a
simulated Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of the
other respondent, appellee Felix L. Camaya, on October 26,
1958, covering the said lot.lawphil.net The prayer was for the
opening of the decree of registration, the cancellation of the
Original Certificate of Title, as well as the Transfer Certificate of
Title and the adjudication of said lot in favor of petitioners,
now appellant Cayanan and others.2
This petition was denied in the order of February 9, 1959,
which is on appeal. It was the view of the lower court: "Such
being the case, as admitted by the petitioners, even [if] the
petition has been filed within one (1) year after entry of final
decree, the same cannot be favorably acted upon for the
reason that the questioned lot has already been transferred to
Felix L. [Camaya] in accordance with section 38 of the Land
Registration Act. While it is true that the petition states that
such transfer is fictitious and, therefore, not for value and that
Felix L. [Camaya] is not an innocent purchaser, this question
can be properly threshed out in an ordinary civil action and not
in a simple petition, like the one at bar."3
The dispositive part of such order read: ". . . the court hereby
overrules the petitioners' petition dated December 16, 1958,
without prejudice to the filing of an ordinary civil action by
them. With this order, their omnibus motion dated January 14,
1959 becomes academic."4
As stated at the outset, it was error for the lower court to deny
the above petition and to require the filing of ordinary civil
action by petitioners-appellants in order to test the validity of
such transfer to one allegedly not an innocent purchaser for
value.itc-alf
That such should not be the case is the intimation that the
cases yield from Guzman v. Ortiz,5 promulgated the opinion
being penned by the then Chief Justice Arellano. A more
6
explicit pronouncement is supplied by Director of Lands v.
Busuego,6 a 1964 decision. There this court, through Justice
Barrera, stated that there was no dispute that within the one-
year period, the petitioners in that case alleged that the person
obtained the decree through actual fraud and
misinterpretation.lawphil.net The only question then,
according to Justice Barrera, was "which court should take
cognizance of the proceeding, the cadastral court that had
issued the decree or the competent Court of First Instance in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction."
This was the answer: "It may be stated that we find had no
case squarely ruling on this particular point. The mere mention
by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496 may
be sought in 'the competent Court of First Instance' is no
sufficient indication that the petition must be filed in the Court
of First Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction, considering
the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts on
land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held
that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case
does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration
of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as
the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within
which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision
remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set
aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to
another."
Then came the concluding portion of the opinion: "In the
present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from
the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38
of Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that
rendered the decision and granted the said decree."
As a matter of fact, even earlier, in a 1959 decision, Santos v.
Ichon 7 this Court through Justice J. B. L. Reyes stated: "It is
true that under previous rulings of this court, appellee could
have moved for the reopening of the case in the cadastral
court so that he could be given an opportunity to prove his
right to the land in question and get a decree in his favor, since
the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does
not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of
one year after the entry of the final decree, and until then the
court rendering the decree may, after hearing, set aside the
decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another person. .
. ."
In support of the above doctrine the opinion cited Afalla v.
Rosauro,8 where it was held: "As long as the final decree is not
issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in
accordance with the law, and the period of one year fixed for
the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
it." Valmonte v. Nable9 was likewise referred to. In the
language of that decision: "It should be borne in mind that the
adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one

year after the entry of the final decree. Within this period of
one year the decree may be reopened on the ground of fraud
and the decree may be set aside and the land adjudicated to
another party. As long as the final decree is not issued and the
period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not
elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it."itc-alf
Then mention was made of Capio v. Capio,10 the ruling being
to the effect "that the adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until
the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree;
that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of
one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the
decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set
aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another
party."
WHEREFORE, the order of February 9, 1959 is set aside and the
case remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for a
hearing on the merits of the petition of appellants for the
reopening of the decree of registration in favor of appellee
Leon de los Santos.itc-alf With costs against appellees.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Calse vs. Pinkisan Yadno, 12 SCRA 745
Dela Cruz vs. Reano, 34 SCRA 585
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
decision of Judge Florendo P. Aquino and the orders of Judge
Virgilio D. Pobre of the respondent Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija sitting as a Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case No. 67
LRC CAD. REC. NO. 1556 entitled "In Re: Petition for
Continuation of Cadastral Proceedings, Potenciano Reao,
petitioner."
The instant petition for review is factually related to another
petition in Dela Cruz v. Reao (34 SCRA 585) decided on August
31, 1970 bearing on the same issue and subject matter and
decided against herein private respondent.
The facts as set forth in Dela Cruz v. Reao docketed as G.R.
No. L-29792, and which are reiterated in the present petition
are: t.hqw pursuant to said decision, the decree of registration as well as
Pursuant to Homestead Patent No. V-31853 issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, by authority of
the President of the Philippines, on July 28, 1954, in
accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870 was issued in the name
of Simeon Gutierrez by the Office of the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Nueva Ecija on August 18, 1956. It covered Lots
7
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of plan H-105846 (hereinafter referred to
simply as Lots 1, 2 and 3) Identical in technical description and
in area to Lots 1896, 1914 and 1913, respectively, of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (certificate issued by
the Acting District Land Officer of Nueva Ecija on July 11, 1968
marked as Annex A-1 and appearing at p. 12 of the record).
In the course of time Lots 1 and 2 were acquired by petitioner
Arsenio dela Cruz in whose name Transfer Certificate of Title
No. NT-69521 was issued. Dela Cruz also acquired Lot 3-A of
subdivision plan (LRC Psd-69137, with an area of 12,482 square
meters, the same being a portion of Lot 3 (which corresponds
to Lot No. 1913 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre), Transfer Certificate
of Title No. NT-70380 having been issued in his name.
On the other hand, petitioner Pedro Sangabol acquired Lot No.
3-C of the aforesaid subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69137, the
same being a portion of 30.003 sq. m. of Lot No. 3, and as a
result Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-69551 was issued in
his name and that of his wife, Francisco del Rosario.
It further appears that by virtue of a partition agreement
inscribed on June 16, 1967, Lot 3-B of same subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-69137 the remaining portion of Lot 3 was
acquired by the other petitioner, Lucia Gutierrez, to whom
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-70251 was issued.
On May 16, 1966 more than ten years after the issuance of
Homestead Patent No. V-31853 and a little less than ten years
after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870
private respondent Potenciano Reao filed in Cadastral Case
No. 67 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a verified
'Petition for Continuation of Cadastral Proceedings' (Emphasis
supplied), alleging, substantially, that he was the owner of a
parcel of land covered by Plan Psu-66102 approved by the
Director of Lands on November 15, 1929, having acquired it
from the previous owner, Pedro Padilla, who subsequently
allowed it to be subdivided into 30 cadastral lots with an
aggregate area Identical to that of the land described in the
aforesaid plan; that he had sufficient evidence to prove his title
thereto and, on the strength of said allegations, prayed for the
lifting of the order of general default entered in said Cadastral
Case No. 67, and that, after the proper proceedings, decision
be rendered adjudicating the aforesaid lots in his favor.
On November 16 of the same year, Judge Serafin R. Cuevas,
then presiding the lower court, rendered judgment
adjudicating a number of lots in favor of Potenciano Reao,
among them being Lots 1896, 1913 and 1914 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. On June 6, 1968, alleging that,
the corresponding original certificates of title No. 3187 (for
Cadastral Lot No. 1896); No. 3178 (for Id. Lot No. 1913), and
No. 3176 (for Id. Lot No. 1914) had been issued in his name,
said respondent filed an ex-parte motion with the lower court
praying for the issuance of a writ of possession directing any
officer of the law to place him in physical possession of the
lands covered by said titles. This petition was heard and
subsequently granted ex-parte. It was only when the writ of

possession issued on the 11th of the same month was served
upon petitioners that they learned of the proceedings
instituted by Reao and discovered that Cadastral Lots Nos.
1896, 1913 and 1914 which were already covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870 issued since August 18,
1956 in the name of their predecessor in interest, Simeon
Gutierrez were among those adjudicated to Reao.
Consequently, they filed with the lower court a verified motion
to set aside the writ of possession, but the same was denied by
the respondent judge in his order of October 4, 1968. Their
motion for reconsideration filed thereafter having been
likewise denied by His Honor in an order of October 29, of the
same year, petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari ....
From the above orders in L-29792, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with this
Court on November 12, 1968 praying for annulment of the
write of possession and the questioned orders.
As earlier stated, a decision was promulgated on August 31,
1970 in Dela Cruz v. Reao granting the writ of certiorari and
declaring as of no legal effect whatsoever and setting aside the
writs of possession issued by the respondent Judge in Cadastral
Case No. 67, GLRO Record No. 1556 in relation to Lots Nos.
1896, 1913 and 1914 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija.
However, Reao continued the cadastral proceedings before
Judge Lorenzo Aquino who issued another decision in the same
cadastral proceedings earlier raised to the Supreme Court,
again adjudicating the same properties, Lots Nos. 1896, 1913
and 1914, to respondent Potenciano Reao. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, after affirming the order of general default
heretofore entered, the Court hereby adjudicates Lots Nos.
1836, 1837, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852,
1867, 2427, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2503, 2519, and 2521 of
the Sta. Rosa Cadastre with all the improvements thereon, in
favor of ROSALINA Z. TIONGCO, Filipino citizen, single, and
resident of 1635 Taft Avenue, Manila; and Lots Nos. 1788,
1789, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1876, 2223,
2482, 1044, 1259, 1843, 1857, 1858, 1859, 1863, 1877, 1888,
1890, 1892. 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915,
1916, 2224, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, and 2317 also of
the Sta. Rosa Cadastre with all the improvements thereon in
favor of the spouses POTENCIANO REAO and SALUD DE
CASTRO, Filipinos, and residents of 9 Chico Street, United
Paraaque Subdivision, Paraaque. Rizal.
The Court further orders the spouses Potenciano Reao and
Salud de Castro to pay and reimburse the 25 hectares, more or
less and One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos for
every hectare of the 14 hectares, more or less, respectively,
which they occupied and improved, within a period of one (1)
year from the date this decision shall have become final and
executory.
8
All homestead patents or free patents covering areas in the
premises in question issued by the Director of Lands after
January 18, 1934 are hereby declared null and void.
The writ of possession heretofore issued in favor of Rosalina
'Tiongco is hereby ordered dissolved.
After this decision shall have become final and upon
submission to this Court proof of payment of all the real estate
taxes due on the land, let the corresponding decrees be issued
in their favor.
The petitioners filed a motion to set aside the decision alleging
inter alia that (1) the question of the validity of the titles of
petitioners had already been detemined in Dela Cruz v. Reao
(34 SCRA 585) and (2) consequently the said court had no
jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership of titled
properties especially in this case where the Supreme Court had
already made a ruling adverse to the claim of Potenciano
Reao.
The lower court denied the motion to set aside the decision.
The dispositive portion of the order reads:t.hqw
THE FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds no
sufficient reason for disturbing the Decision rendered in this
case, except to modify it as to remove the Lots covered by
Original Certificate of Title Nos. P-275, P-241 and P-695 in the
names of Mariano Juan (or Heirs of Mariano Juan), Simeon
Juan and Agustin Fiesta respectively, from those to be
adjudicated to Potenciano Reao, and denies the Motions for
Reconsideration and to Set Aside the Decision, in all other
respects.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the respondent court as follows:t.hqw
WHEREFORE, counsel for Pontenciano Reao is invited to come
to this Court to locate and Identify the decisions referred to in
his Manifestation, or, if he deems it more convenient, to
forward to this Court certified true copies of said decisions,
underdog pertinent parts.
On the Manifestation on Approval of Record on Appeal having
reference to (1) the objections to the Record on Appeal dated
16 January 1972, and (2) Manifestation dated 15 February
1972 containing list of pleadings, orders and decisions, sought
to be incorporated into the Record on Appeal this Court
DENIES the, motions contained in those Manifestations.
On the Motion for Reconsideration filed for petitioners Arsenio
de la Cruz, Pedro Sangabol and Lucia Gutierrez dated 2 January
1973, which sought to have this Court reverse its earthen
ruling denying a Motion to Set Aside Decision filed by the same
petitioner and dated 25 January 1972,
this Court hereby DENIES said motion for Jack of sufficient
grounds for granting the same. The opinion of this Court on the
matter has been fully expressed in its Order dated 26 October

1972, wherein it refused to change or set aside the Decision of
the Judge who heard and received the evidence in full except
with respect to three lots mentioned in said order.
The petitioners raised the denials to us praying that judgment
be entered annulling the respondent court's decision insofar as
Lots Nos. 1896, 1913, and 1914 are concerned.
The petitioners contend that the decision of the lower court is
null and void because:t.hqw corresponding certificates of title were issued in favor of
1. The decision of this Honorable, Court in G.R. No. L-
29792 is res adjudicate and constitutes a bar to another
decision on the same matter;
2. The cadastral court cannot validly readjudicate a
property which is already registered in the name of another;
3. The Torrens System of Registration protects parties
who deal with registered properties;
4. The procedure taken by the lower court violates all
known procedures and derogates on the due process clause.
On the other hand, private respondent Reao submits that
when the petition in cadastral Case No. 67 was filed by the
Director of Lands before the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija on January 14, 1934, the cadastral court acquired original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter in rem to
determine the nature and character of those lots, and until
such time as the cadastral proceedings are terminated and a
determination of the character of the lots in question are
pronounced by final judgment, no disposition of the lots or
land in question may be entertained, much more approved,
granted or amended in favor of any individual. Reao states
that to do so would violate the jurisdiction of the cadastral
court.
The private respondent disputes the res judicata argument and
contends that while there is Identity of parties and Identity of
subject matter as between L-29792 and the present petition,
there is a great difference insofar as their respective causes of
action are concerned. According to respondent Reao, the
petition in L-29792 sought to nullify the writ of possession
based on the November 16, 1966 decision of the respondent
court while the instant petition in L-39899 challenges the latter
decision which adjudicated the disputed lots to the
respondent.
We grant the petition.
It is quite clear that the issues raised in this petition had
already been resolved by this Court when we granted the
petition in L-29792. What the respondent court is trying to
accomplish is to render inutile our decision in L-29792 and to
promulgate a judgment on the same facts and issues in the
case now before us, contrary to our earlier findings.
9
The private respondent questions the title issued pursuant to a
homestead patent by stating that the cadastral court had
earlier acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lots and no
other office or tribunal may entertain, much less approve a
disposition of the lots until the cadastral proceedings are
terminated. This was the exact issue resolved by time Court in
L-29792. The then Presiding Judge Serafin R. Cuevas
adjudicated Lots 1896, 1913, and 1914 to Reao. Pursuant to
the court's decision, the decree of registration and
Reao. When Reao sought to enforce writs of possession
granted ex parte to him, the petitioners in the instant petition
filed a motion to set aside the write. A denial of this motion
and of a subsequent motion for reconsideration led to L-29792.
We ruled in L-29792: t.hqw
The issue arising from the above facts may be briefly stated as
follows:
May a parcel of land already titled for more than ten years in
the name of a party by virtue of a Homestead Patent issued by
the Government in the ordinary course of administrative
proceedings, be registered again in the name of another party
as a result of subsequent cadastral proceedings?
The answer, We behave, must be in the negative.
In Manalo v. Lukban, et al., Vol. 48, Phil. p. 973, We held that
land granted by the Government to a private individual who
applied for it as a home read, is considered no longer
registerable within the meaning of the Land Registration Act
after the issuance of the homestead patent and the original
certificate of title issued in accordance therewith.
In Pamintuan v. San Agustin, et al., 43 Phil. 558, as well as in El
Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil., p. 17, We likewise held that in
a cadastral proceeding the Court has no jurisdiction to decree
again the registration of land already decreed and registered in
an earlier registration case, and that the second decree
entered for the same land is null and void.
Moreover, considering that the petitioners in both cases before
Us and their predecessors had been in possession of the land,
first as homesteaders and later, as absolute owners, for more
than ten years before respondent Reao filed his application
for registration; that, as a result of the proceedings had in
connection with their Homestead application, the homestead
patents and original certificates of title mentioned heretofore
were issued in their names, no further argument is needed to
show that said petitioners and their predecessors had acquired
title to the land by prescription.
It being clear from the foregoing that the registration decreed
in the name of private respondent Reao of Lots 1896, 1916,
1913 and 1863 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija
is null and void, the certificates of title covering the same
issued in his name must also be deemed null and void. From
ten the inevitable conclusion is that he had no right to the
issuance of the writs of possession complained of.

As a matter of fact, the cases filed with the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija in L-29792 and in the instant petition,
L-39899 are both petitions for the continuation of one and the
same cadastral proceeding.
When the respondent Judge in toes petition ruled that "all
homestead patents and free patents covering areas in the
premises in question issued by the Director of Lands after
January 18, 1934 are hereby declared null and void", he was
overruling the following findings of the Supreme Court in L-
29792: t.hqw and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(1) Pursuant to Homestead Patent No. V-31853 granted
on July 28, 19.54, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1870 was
issued in the name of Simeon Gutierrez on August 18, 1956,
the same covering Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Plan H-105846 which,
beyond question, correspond to Lots 1896, 1914 and 1913 of
the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, respectively.
As official duty is presumed to have been duly performed and
the Homestead Patent and Original Certificate of Title
abovementioned are entitled to full credit in the absence of
clear proof that they were issued illegally or through fraud, it
can be safely said that prior to the issuance of the aforesaid
Homestead Patent, Simeon Gutierrez had filed the
corresponding homestead application; that, after the
necessary survey had been made and proper notice was
served, the required investigation was conducted by the State;
that applicant Gutierrez was found to have been in possession
of the property applied for and to have made thereon the
required cultivation. That Gutierrez had really been in
possession of said land from the time of the filing of his
homestead application, and that his successors in interest had
continued such possession and are still enjoying the same, is
further demonstrated by these facts: firstly, respondent Reao
had to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to
oust them and, in turn, to obtain possession of Lots 1896, 1940
(should be 1914 and 1913; secondly, on May 16, 1966, Reao
filed in Cadastral Case No. 67, a 'Petition for Continuation of
Cadastral Proceedings' and for the setting aside of the order of
general default already entered therein; all of which
necessarily means that Pedro Padilla, his alleged predecessors
in interest, had not claimed Lots 1896, 1914 and 1913 when
the proceedings were started.
(2) It was only on May 16, 1966 or more than ten years
after the issuance of the Homestead Patent in favor of Simeon
Gutierrez, and nearly ten years after the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1870 that private respondent Reao
filed a petition to register in his name the same cadastral lots.
The decision in L-29792 has long been final. The dispositive
portion of our decision in said petition cannot be any clearer
t.hqw
WHEREFORE the writs of certiorari prayed for in the above
entitled cases are granted and, as a consequence, the writs of
possession issued by the respondent judge in Cadastral Case
10
No. 67, GLRO Record No. 1556 in relation to Lots Nos. 1896,
1914, 1913 and 1863 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija, are hereby set aside and rendered of no legal
effect whatsoever. With costs against the private respondent.
The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are:
t.hqw
The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are: (1)
the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions: (a)
Identity of parties; (b) Identity of subject matter; and (c)
Identity of cause of action. Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v.
Court of Tax Appeals, 9 SCRA 72; Philippine Farming
Corporation Ltd. v. Llanos, 14 SCRA 949; Abes v. Rodil, 17 SCRA
822; Cruz v. Mossesgeld, 24 SCRA 1006.
All of the above requisites are present in this action.
We reiterate what we stated in Feasting v. Faderanga (111
SCRA 1):t.hqw
... The law as to this particular controversy has thus been
enunciated. To repeat, the parties, now petitioners and now
respondents, who litigated the same matter in Faderanga, must
abide by such judgment. As categorically stated in Kabigting v.
Acting Director of Prisons (116 Phil. 589 1962]): 'It need not be
stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is
the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it
and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of
that particular case.' (Ibid, 594) This Court has likewise noted
the amplitude of its coverage. What is express as well as what
is implied in a decision is included, to be implemented
faithfully, no circumvention or evasion being allowed. (Cf.
Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, 27 SCRA 490. The
Sanchez opinion cited People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494. The
Olarte opinion in turn finds support in Fernando v. Crisostomo,
90 Phil. 595 [1951]) Padilla v. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884 (1953);
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. v. Chua Guam 96 PM. 974 [1955];
People v. Penuila 103 Phil. 992 [1958], and Pomeroy v. Director
of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50 1960}) Recently, in Bueno Industrial and
Development Corporation v. R.C. Aquino Timber and Plywood
Co., Inc., (99 SCRA 209) it was noted how steadfast this Court
has been in relying on such concept. (Cf. Libudan v. Gil, 45
SCRA 17; Palad v. Governor of Quezon Province, 46 SCRA 354;
Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, 47 SCRA 153; Mangayao v. De
Guzman, 55 SCRA 540; National Shipyard and Steel Corporation
v. CIR, 57 SCRA 642; Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union v. Lo
Bu 63 SCRA 313; National Mines and Allied Workers Union v.
Luna, 83 SCRA 607; Villanueva v. WCC, 84 SCRA 423;
Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 89 SCRA
336.)
In Tugade v. Court of Appeals (95 SCRA 226), we had occasion
to remind all lower courts and, in fact, all practitioners that
when the Supreme Court has rendered a decision, it is this

Tribunal, not the trial court or the appellate court, that speaks
authoritatively. We stated:t.hqw parcel of land. Each of the heirs, therefore, had a pro
... Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice
at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal
question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to
obey. It is as simple as that, There is relevance to this excerpt
from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98). 'The delicate task of
ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a
municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus
discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the
other two confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so
with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial
organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in
the judicial heirarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (The
opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]
was cited) The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera
further emphasizes the point: 'Such a thought was reiterated in
an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in
these words: 'Judge Gaudenio Cloribel need not be reminded
that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of
judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it
is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only
one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings,' (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in
Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila [Br VI], 23 SCRA 948,
961).
We agree with the petitioners that under the circumstances of
this petition, the payment of lawyer's fees are justified and
which fees we award in the amount of P3,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the questioned
decision and orders of the respondent court are hereby
nullified and set aside insofar as Lots Nos. 1896, 1914 and 1913
are concerned. The private respondent is also ordered to pay
P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Delos Angeles vs. Santos, 12 SCRA 622
Bayoca vs. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154
FACTS: Before us is a petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals. In essence, the petition poses a challenge against
the appellate courts conclusion that the first sale of a parcel of
land to respondent Gaudioso Nogales prevails over the second
sale of the said property to petitioners Francisco Bayoca,
Nonito Dichoso and spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso. As such,
there is no dispute as to the following facts found by the Court
of Appeals: When the Spouses Juan Canino and Brigida
Domasig died intestate, before 1947, they were survived by
their legitimate children, namely, Preciosa Canino, married to
Emilio Deocareza, Consolacion Canino, Dolores Canino, Isidra
11
Canino and Tomas Canino who inherited, from their father, a
indiviso share of the property. Preciosa Canino executed
an unnotarized Deed of Sale of Real Property with Right of
Repurchase over a portion of the above property, with an area
of 5,000 square meters, in favor of her sister-in-law, Julia
Deocareza, the sister of her husband, Emilio Deocareza, for the
price of P200.00. On August 29, 1948, Preciosa Canino
executed another unnotarized Deed of Sale of Real Property
with Right to Repurchase over the entirety of the property, in
favor of Julia Deocareza, for the price of P270.00, with a right
to repurchase the said lot for the same price. However,
Preciosa Canino failed to repurchase the property. In the
meantime, Gaudioso Nogales, the Appellee in the present
recourse, acquired the property abutting the property of
Preciosa Canino and her siblings, on the east, and installed a
tenant thereon. Julia Deocareza executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Realty Property in favor of the Appellee over the
aforesaid parcel of land for the price of P3,000.00. However,
the Appelleediscovered that Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso
and the Spouses Pio Dichoso and Dolores Dichoso, the
Appellants in the present recourse, claimed ownership of
portion of the said property. The Appellant Nonito Dichoso had
constructed a nipa hut on a portion of the property. The
Appellant Francisco Bayoca likewise constructed his house
thereon. Appellee filed a complaint against the Appellants
Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso and the Spouses Pio Dichoso
and Dolores Dichoso for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages,
with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. The Appellee
alleged, in his complaint, that he purchased the said property,
with an area of 21,000 square meters, from Julia Deocareza,
under the deed and thus acquired ownership thereof and that
the Appellants respectively purchased portions of said
property, in bad faith and through fraud. The Appellants, in
their Answer to the complaint, alleged, inter alia that Preciosa
Canino and her siblings acquired just title over the property
when they executed their Deed of Partitition of Real
Property and conveyed titles to the vendees, the Appellants in
the present recourse, as buyers in good faith. The trial court
found and declared, under its Decision dated March 12, 1996,
that Gaudioso Nogales had acquired ownership over the
property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners claim of ownership by
virtue of their title issued and/or registration will prevail over
that of respondent.
RULING: Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential
rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain
to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;

and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Following the above-quoted law, in the double sales
of immovables, ownership is transferred in the order
hereunder stated to (a) the first registrant in good faith; (b) the
first in possession in good faith; and (c) the buyer who presents
the oldest title in good faith. Verily, there is absence of prior
registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in
their favor. As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the
first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his
right as such buyer, On account of the undisputed fact of
registration under Act No. 3344 by respondent Nogales as the
first buyer, necessarily, there is absent good faith in the
registration of the sale by the petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the
spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso for which they had been
issued certificates of title in their names. It follows that their
title to the land cannot be upheld. As for petitioners Francisco
Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to register the portions
of the property sold to them, and merely rely on the fact that
they declared the same in their name for taxation
purposes. Suffice it to state that such fact does not, by itself,
constitute evidence of ownership, and cannot likewise prevail
over the title of respondent Nogales. It is worth mentioning
that while the certificates of title in the names of Erwin Bayoca
and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso are indefeasible,
unassailable and binding against the whole world, including the
government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot
be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they
be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do
they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. The
Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but it cannot be
used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the
registered land. Indeed, registration with the Register of Deeds
of a parcel of land divests the government of title to the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
DECISION of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Panimdim vs. Director of Lands, 11 SCRA 628
FACTS: Here the free patent covering Parcel A was issued to
Estanislao Panimdim on July 8, 1957 for which Original
Certificate of Title No. 9040 was issued in his name by the
register of deeds of Camarines Sur, but on August 24, 1959 the
Director of Lands, acting on a protest interposed by Mariano
De la Rosa, rendered a decision declaring the issuance of the
patent erroneous and ordering that an administrative action be
taken in order to amend the same and issue another reducing
the patent to merely four hectares, This the Director of Lands
can no longer do, considering that more than two years had
elapsed since the registration of the patent As such, the same
had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
ISSUE: Whether or not a registered free patent covering a
parcel of land along with its certificate of title is still under the
control and jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.
12
RULING: No. Although the Director of Lands is the official who
exercises the power to dispose public lands, his view is correct
only as long as the land remains a part of the public domain
and still continues to be under his exclusive and executive
control. But once the patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes private property
over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, petition is granted. The decision of respondent
Director of Lands of August 24, 1959 is hereby set aside. No
costs.
Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358
FACTS:
The Director of Lands in his complaint alleged that Abanilla
had, through fraudulent means, secured a free patent and an
OCT over a public land situated in Roxas, Isabela; that the said
free patent and OCT included portions of land occupied by
Esquivel and Nuesa; and that the portion occupied by Nuesa
was sold to him by Cullanan who also earlier bought the same
from Abanilla herself (by virtue of a public document)
Abanilla in her answer alleged that her application for a free
patent over the parcel of public land was lawful since the
occupancy of Esquivel of the portion claimed by him was
merely tolerated by her and was never adverse, and Nuesas
occupancy never her right over the portion he claims, because
the sale made by her to Cullanan was void ab initio because
the lot she sold to him is public land.
Maria Abanilla filed an action with the trial court against
Esquivel and Nuesa and three other for the recovery of
possession of the portions of land involved in the
administrative case between them in the land department. The
trial court entered a judgment, declaring the Free Patent null
and void, ordering the Director of Lands to cancel said patent
and issue another patent in favor of Abanilla excluding the
respective portions of land by Esquivel and Nuesa and ordering
Abanilla to surrender to the RD of Isabela the OCT who was
thereby ordered to cancel the same.
ISSUE: WON the patent and original certificate of title issued by
virtue of the said patent can still be cancelled despite the lapse
of six (6) years and six (6) months from their is issuance.
HELD:
1. YES. Defendant-appellant clings to the legal fiction of
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. She claimed that the lower
court erred in not dismissing the action considering that a
period of six years and six months had already elapsed when
the present action was instituted, in view of the line of
decisions of this Court sustaining the indefeasibility of a
certificate of title issued in pursuance of a public land patent.
The doctrine regarding the indefeasibility of title issued
pursuant to a free patent one year after its issuance does not
apply to a grant tainted with fraud and secured through
misrepresentation, such as the free patent invoked in this case,
since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
Abanilla cannot use her title as a shield to perpetuate fraud.
No amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid

foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et jus
numquam co-habitant
Furthermore, appellant Maria Abanilla cannot pretend that
her title has become indefeasible because no petition for
review thereof was filed within one year from its issuance,
since proceedings for the review of her patent was actually
pending before and after the issuance of appellants torrens
title.
It should be noted that, pursuant to explicit and repeated
averments in the complaint Abanilla had acted in bad faith,
with full knowledge of the factual background of the case,
particularly of the public, continuous and adverse possession
of Esquivel at the time she applied for patent over the land in
question, and up to the time she secured the issuance of an
OCT over the said land. The fact that Abanilla acted
fraudulently in securing the patent and OCT was clearly and
definitely established in the decision of the Director of Lands.
While an administrative case was pending investigation by the
Fact Finding Commitee composed of representatives of the
Bureau of Lands and the Land Settlement and Development
Corporation (LASEDECO) Abanillasecured the issuance of Free
Patent in her name covering the entire Lot; that by virtue of
the said patent, an OCT was issued in her name] This Court
held in the case of Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin that
the factual findings of the Director of Lands, approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, are conclusive
in the absence of proof of fraud, imposition, error or abuse of
discretion.
We do not believe that appellant has any lawful claim against
appellee Nuesa. The Portion of land here involved was sold by
appellant herself as her own private property. She cannot now
turn back and say that said portion is public land. Here, the
matter is exclusively between her and Wilson Nuesa, her
vendees successor-in interest. The government is not involved.
As against appellee Wilson Nuesa, therefore, appellant is in
estoppel.
Also, this Court held that prescription of action to review a title
after the lapse of one year from its issuance under Section 38
of Act 496, cannot be invoked against the State, since under
paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code, prescription does
not run against the State.
Furthermore, Abanilla is now estopped from claiming that this
action had already prescribed for the simple reason that she
can be considered an instrumental party in the delay in the
flung of the instant action.
Bernales vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 764
Facts: Henry Siagan is the father of both Elpidio whose mother
is Cagaoay and Augusto whose mother is Dagaoan. Augusto
has a son named Constante, one of the petitioners in this case.
Both sons of Henry Siagan and their successors-in-interest are
the contending parties in this case, claiming ownership of the
land in question.
Petitioners claim that Dagaoan acquired ownership over
subject land by means of continuous, adverse and peaceful
possession thereof since time immemorial or since 1908; that
she brought said property to the marriage. Dagaoan declared
Lot 1494 under T.D. 4187 (Petition, Rollo, p. 19).
13
Dagaoan died and Augusto inherited Lot 1494 but his son
Constante alleging in a Deed of Absolute Sale that he inherited
the same from his late grandmother, sold the lot in question to
the Pasimio spouses and registered said instrument under Act
3344. The Pasimio spouses in turn sold the same lot to the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. who bought the same
for the sole purpose of disposing the same at cost to the actual
occupants-tenants thereon in the furtherance of the Land
Reform Program of the government.
Petitioners allege that they have been in possession and have
tilled Lot 1494 as tenants of Dagaoan Sawadan.The Roman
Catholic Bishop of Bangued confirmed such in his complaint
and that said petitioners tilled the aforesaid parcel of land from
1968 to the present, openly, publicly, adversely and
continuously in the concept of owners.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that Lot 1494
was originally owned by Henry Siagan who died intestate. That
previously, Augusto and Elpidio executed a Memorandum of
Agreement in which they mutually recognize that only the legal
heirs of Henry are entitled to his properties and that Augusto
quitclaimed any interest and right he had over three lots
among which is Lot No. 1494 in favor of Elpidio Siagan, while
the latter in turn quitclaimed, waived, ceded and conveyed any
interest and right he had over 14 other parcels of land of the
decedent in favor of Augusto Siagan in exchange for said Lot
1494.
Elpidio Siagan applied for Free Patent of the Lot 1494 and
subesexquently, and OCT was issued in his favour. After 5 years,
he sold the same to spouses Cadiam. Following their purchase,
said spouses took possession of the land, fenced it and planted
it with rice but herein petitioners forcibly dispossessed them
therefrom, uprooting the plants of said couple.
In turn, Constante and his co-petitioners instituted a case for
the annulment and cancellation of certificate of title claiming
that the OCT was fraudulently secured.
RTC = ruled in favor of petitioners
C.A. = reversed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam are entitled to the
land?
HELD: Yes.
In the case at bar, the Free Patent was granted to Elpidio
Siagan, the very person who as successor-in-interest of
Augusto Siagan with a claim of continuous and adverse
possession in the concept of owner since time immemorial or
since 1908 through the latters predecessors-in-interest, is
entitled to subject land. An Original Certificate of Title was
issued in favor of Elpidio Siagan. As held by this Court, once a
homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land
Act is registered under the Torrens System, the certificate of
title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a
Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act. Corollary
thereto, the Director of Patents, being a public officer, has in
his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing the
questioned homestead patent.
As aforestated, the Cadiam spouses to whom a Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued after the purchase of the lot from
Elpidio Siagan for a valuable consideration as stated in the

Deed and who had no knowledge of any flaw or defect of the
title at the time of the purchase, are evidently as ruled by the
Court of Appeals, innocent purchasers for value and above all
considerations, are entitled to the protection of the law.
Cadiam spouses who were found by the Court of Appeals as
innocent purchasers for value with a Transfer Certificate of Title
under the Torrens System in their names, have evidently a
better right than herein petitioners.
Lopez vs. CA, 169 SCRA 271
FACTS
The deceased spouses Tiburcio Pinohermoso and Casiana
Flores had three children, namely Hermogenes, Felicidad and
Pedro, all surnamed Pinohermoso. The plaintiffs in this case are
the heirs of the children of spouses Tiburcio Pinohermoso and
Casiana Flores.It appears that on July 19, 1913, Tiburcio
Pinohermoso filed Homestead Application No. 19478 (E-12596)
and it was approved on October 26, 1914.
The applicant had paid the required homestead fees
amounting to P20.00 and submitted his final proof on June 29,
1922. On April 5, 1924, Casiana Flores died. Under date of
March 20, 1925, an order for the issuance of patent to
'Tiburcio Pinohermoso was issued by Bureau of Lands. Original
Certificate of Title No. 1406 was issued on April 22, 1926 over
the parcel of land in controversy unto the said Tiburcio
Pinohermoso "to have and to hold the said tract of land, with
the appurtenances thereto of right belonging unto the said
Tiburcio Pinohermoso and to his heirs and assigns forever
subject to the provisions of sections 116, 119, 120 and 122 of
Act. No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, as amended, which
provides that the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable and
shall not be subject to incumbrance for a period of five (5)
years from the date of this patent". . . . . In consideration of the
sum of P550.00. Tiburcio Pinohermoso sold this land to
defendants Bonifacio B. Lopez and Roberta Llaneras on May 20,
1939 who took possession of the property and its
improvements upon their purchase thereof. By virtue of the
said sale, OCT No. 1406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 15186 was issued on February 3, 1940 in the name
of Bonifacio B. Lopez married to Roberta Llaneras. Tax
Declaration No. 1279 was thereafter issued to Bonifacio Lopez
and said defendant has been paying the realty taxes on the
land since 1948 up to the filing of this case in 1958.
In this complaint dated March 19, 1958, plaintiffs pray among
others that judgment be rendered declaring that the property
in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Tiburcio Pinohermoso and Casiana Flores and that as heirs of
Casiana Flores, they became the owners of one-half (1/2)
thereof from the time of her death.
ISSUES
Whether or not buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of
may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title ? will
theoblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property?
RULING
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The land in question
is a homestead titled under the Land Registration Act. In the
14
case of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, this Court citing the case
of Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, held that once a homestead
patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is
registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of
title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a
Torrens' title issued under the Land Registration Act.
Under the established principles of land registration law, the
presumption is that the transferee of registered land is not
aware of any defect in the title of the property he purchased.
Moreover, the person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will
in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine
the condition of the property.
No strong considerations of public policy have been presented
which would lead us to reverse the established and sound
doctrine that the buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of
land does not have to look beyond the Torrens Title and search
for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may later
invalidate or diminish his right to what he purchased.
There is nothing in the questioned decision which indicates
why Bonifacio Lopez should have looked beyond the title and
why he should have taken notice of the fact that the sole
registered owner had a legitimate wife who died in 1924 or 16
years before the land was offered to him by the sole registered
owner in 1940.
If the court were to accept the respondents' contentions, a
buyer of registered land would have to look beyond the title
for any unregistered owner, any earlier buyer who failed to
register his purchase, all possible actual owners who used the
registered buyer as a dummy, and so many other defects or
vices of the title, ad infinitum. The ruling of the respondent
court is contrary to the reasons behind the indefeasibility of a
Torrens Title.
Whether the action is one for the annulment of a deed of sale
executed by means of fraud, or for reconveyance based on
implied trust is, however, of no moment. Both causes of action
had prescribed, applying the law of the old Civil Code and the
Code of Civil Procedure which governed the contract of sale
executed in 1939.
The reasons alleged by the respondents for the long delay in
filing the action-that they were poor and had to save for the
expenses of litigation and that the Japanese occupation
prevented them from filing the case immediately are not
meritorious.
Whatever right the respondents had over one half of the
registered property had already prescribed through lapse of
time by reason of their negligence and abandonment.
Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Sec. of Natural Resources, 73
SCRA 507
FACTS:
Municipality of Hagonoy alleges that it is the lawful and
absolute owner of a fishpond situated at, Barrio San Roque and
that from time immemorial, plaintiff has been in actual, open,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession
thereof, and has exercised acts of ownership thereon. It further
alleges that defendant Jose B. Santos, notwithstanding
common knowledge that said fishpond is owned by the

municipality, applied for a sales patent covering the same with
the Bureau of Lands; to which the Director of Lands sold said
fishpond to Jose B. Santos despite the fact that the same is
patrimonial property of the municipality and, therefore, not
disposable by sales patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The Director of Lands, however, denies the allegation of
ownership over the parcel of land (fishpond) in question,
claiming that the same was owned by the Republic of the
Philippines and had been administered by the Bureau of
Fisheries which had leased said fishpond to defendant Santos
under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 872 (renewal), and
Santos, by virtue thereof, was in continuous possession of said
fishpond as lessee from 1923 to 1962; (2) that the land was
awarded to Santos on February 18, 1963, pursuant to Sales
Application No. V40308, said land being a part of the public
domain, belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and
disposable under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended.
The Director further alleges: (1) that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; (2) that
the cause of action is barred by prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations; and (3) that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, the land in question
being a part of the public domain and subject only to the
authority and discretion of the defendant Secretary insofar as
its administration, management and disposition are concerned,
in accordance with law.
Jose B. Santos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because
the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he
did not appeal the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President; that the cause of action
has been barred by the statute of limitations under Section 38
of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which provides that
when a decree of registration has been fraudulently issued, the
aggrieved party has one (1) year within which to attack the
validity thereof, and in the instant case, the complaint was filed
more than three (3) years from the time title to the property
was issued; that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by prior
judgment because plaintiff had already filed a case for
annulment of the same title, which case was dismissed by the
court and ruled in favor of Santos.
Lower court dismissed the case, CA also dismissed. Hence, the
case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the lower court dismissing the
petition constitute res judicata or bar to herein appeal?
RULING:
The court ruled that the Order of the Bulacan Court of First
Instance dismissing the "Petition for Cancellation of Title, the
Original Certificate of Title No. P-746" against Santos does not
constitute a bar to the present action.
The principle of bar by prior judgment or res judicata is based
upon the fundamental principle that a matter once adjudicated
shall not again be drawn in issue while the former adjudication
remains in force. If the judgment is not on the merits, it cannot
be considered as a conclusive adjudication of the controversy.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that "the
15
proper remedy for petitioner under the circumstances seems
to be that contemplated in section 38 of the Land Registration
Act and not the present petition for cancellation of the
aforesaid title."
This Order did not settle the question of title over the property
but left the question whether or not the title was unlawfully
procured for future determination. SC noted that the
appropriate remedy of the Municipality of Hagonoy under the
attendant facts is not one for the reopening of the decree
under section 38 of the Land Registration Act, as suggested by
the trial court, but an action for reconveyance.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of
title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain
and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands
has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when
registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable
Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens title upon
the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance
thereof. Said title is, like one issued pursuant to a judicial
decree, subject to review within one (1) year from the date of
the issuance of the patent. Beyond said period, the action for
the annulment of the certificate of title issued upon the land
grant can no longer be entertained.
However, where it is claimed that the land awarded by virtue
of patent was not part of the public domain but was private
property, the owner who has been wrongfully deprived of such
land may, notwithstanding the lapse of the one-year period,
bring an action for the recovery thereof, and "the court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the
cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may
direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the
parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the
true owner thereof."
Since the main issue raised by appellant therein is the
ownership of said property there can be no question that a
final decision on the merits in Civil Case No. 2186 would,
regardless of who is successful, amount to a res adjudicata in
the case at bar, because all questions on the validity of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-746 could be definitely settled therein,
thus precluding the relitigation of the same issues.
The appeal was DISMISSED, without prejudice to appellants
pursuing its remedy in Civil Case No. 2186.
Omandam vs. CA, 301 SCRA 450
Facts: On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a
homestead patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in
Sagrada, Tambuling, Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds
also issued an Original Title Certificate in his name. On April 28,
1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores
Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas
discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito
Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987,
Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent before the
Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the OCT.
Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from
Lasola, who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24,
1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer
Certificate of Title. On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and
Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession

and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners
of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the
land from one Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for
almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heared, the
RTC issued a decision on November 15, 1993, declaring that
neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their predecessor-in-interest
were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the
Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the
name of the petitioners. The decision was appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the DENR dismissed
Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands.
It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola committed
fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence
there is no ground for the revocation and cancellation of its
title. On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to
vacate the subject land and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and
Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals declared that the
collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private
respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law;
that the patent had already become indefeasible since April 28,
1977; and that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the
nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and
counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of
possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
Issue: WON the trial courts decision will affect the order of the
Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and
decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?
Held: Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the
Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR
ultimately the authority to dispose public lands. In this regard,
the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the
decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the
Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree.
Thus, reversal of the RTC of the award given by the Director of
Land to Lasola was in error.
DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the
authority of the courts of justice to resolve questions of
possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the
DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land
claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the
grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then
TCT later, its decision prevails.
Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
Baguio vs. Republic, 301 SCRA 450
FACTS:
The patent and certificate of title cover a parcel of land
(Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823) consisting of 5,870 sq.m., in
Catarman, Liloan, Cebu was declared by the government public
land in 1963.
16
On August 2, 1963, private respondent Ricardo Michael,
predecessor-in-interest of William Michael, filed with the
Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of land. The
application was recommended for approval by the land for one
year from October 4, 1963 to October 3, 1964.
On October 8, 1963, William Michael made some
reclamation on the land, built a fence around the premises,
and constructed a bridge over a portion which was under
water. Upon expiration of the permit, the Highway District
Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that the land
be leased to Michael. The land investigator recommended
granting Michael the authority to survey the foreshore land in
view of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the
premises.
On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the
Bureau of Lands for a free patent covering the same land. In his
application, petitioner stated that the land was agricultural
land and not claimed or occupied by any other person and that
he had been in actual and continuous possession and
cultivation of the same. A free patent was issued to him and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name
by the Register of Deeds of Cebu.
Petitioner demanded payment of rentals from William
Michael for the use of the land occupied by Michael Slipways,
Inc. William, in turn, protested the issuance of a free patent
and claimed that he had been in actual possession of the land
since 1963 and that he had introduced substantial
improvements.
On February 16, 1989, the government, represented by
the Director of Lands, filed a petition for cancellation of title
and/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and the
Register of Deeds. This granted private respondent Ricardo
Michael leave to intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of
William and as president of Michael Slipways, Inc.
The RTC rendered a decision cancelling the free patent
and the certificate of title of petitioner Baguio, ordering the
reversion of the land to the public domain, and declaring
private respondent Michael the true and lawful occupant of
the land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. WON the RTC erred in finding that petitioner acted in
bad faith and procured the issuance of the Free
Patent (VII-I)-7757 and the OCT No. 0-15457 through
fraud and misrepresentation.
2. WON the RTC erred in declaring intervenor (private
respondent) as the true and lawful possessor and
occupant of the land subject of the intervention.
RULING:
The Court held that the contentions are without merit.
On the first issue, once a patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by
them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the
patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of issuance of such patent. Indeed, the
indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one
who procured the tile by means of fraud.
Petitioner declared under oath that the land in question was an
agricultural land not claimed or occupied by any other person;

that it had introduced improvements thereon. These
declarations constitute fraud and misrepresentation. The
government proved that as early as September 2, 1963, 13
years before the alleged entry of petitioner on the land,
William Michael; had already filed a foreshore lease application
over the same; filed a miscellaneous sales application over the
land; that he has been continuously in possession of the land
on which he has been operating a drydocking service and that
he had made improvements thereon. It was also established
that the land is foreshore land, not agricultural.
Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his application
for a free patent justifying the annulment of his title under
Section 91 of C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act).
On the second issue, it was clearly proven that William Michael
had already been in possession of the land under a provisional
permit to occupy the same in 1963. Also, William had filed a
sales application covering the land in 1968, 8 years before the
petitioner filed his free patent application. The RTC held
correctly that William and private respondent Ricardo to be the
true and rightful possessors of the land in question. The fact
that private respondent Michael is merely the successor of the
original foreshore lease and sales applicant, William Michael,
does not make him any less entitled to the possession of the
land. Section 105 of the Public Land Act provides that, in case
of his death, the original applicant shall be succeeded I his
rights and obligations by his legal heirs with respect to the land
applied for or leased.
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, 333 SCRA 628
This is a petition for review of the amended decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1998 in CA G.R. CV No. 48443
granting respondent's motion for reconsideration of its
decision dated November 7, 1996, and of the resolution dated
December 21, 1998 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a
complaint2 for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership
Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira
Castillo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656 at
the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner
and respondent, both married and with children, but separated
from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship
sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still
subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president
and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as
vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and
petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in respondent's name.
In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple
separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in
the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that
said properties had been registered solely in her name.
17
In her Amended Answer,3 respondent admitted that she
engaged in the customs brokerage business with petitioner but
alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation
was organized with other individuals and duly registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She denied
that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the
fact was that they were still legally married to their respective
spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real
personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition
on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own
money and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment,4 in accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court.5 She contended that summary judgment was proper,
because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham and not
genuine, to wit:
A.
The main issue is Can plaintiff validly claim the partition
and/or payment of co-ownership share, accounting and
damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are
admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still
valid and subsisting marriages, even assuming as claimed by
plaintiff, that they lived together as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties be
considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law,
considering the present status of the parties as both married
and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they
lived together as husband and wife (?)
B.
As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be considered as an
unregistered co-owner of the real properties under the
Transfer Certificates of Title duly registered solely in the name
of defendant Ma. Elvira Castillo? This issue is also true as far as
the motor vehicles in question are concerned which are also
registered in the name of defendant.6
On the first point, respondent contended that even if she and
petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim
a part of the subject real and personal properties because Art.
144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules on co-
ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or
under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the
parties are not in any way incapacitated to contract marriage.7
In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal impediment
of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being
raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as
husband and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could
exist between them.
As to the second issue, respondent maintained that petitioner
cannot be considered an unregistered co-owner of the subject
properties on the ground that, since titles to the land are solely

in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer would be to allow a
collateral attack on the validity of such titles.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment.8 He contended that the case presented genuine
factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been
repealed by the Family Code which now allows, under Art. 148,
a limited co-ownership even though a man and a woman living
together are not capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner
also asserted that an implied trust was constituted when he
and respondent agreed to register the properties solely in the
latter's name although the same were acquired out of the
profits made from their brokerage business. Petitioner invoked
the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property
and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of
one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of
law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.
Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in
reliance upon his declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it
to another grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the
person whose benefit is contemplated.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision9
granting respondent's motion for summary judgment. It ruled
that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues
involved were purely legal. The trial court also sustained
respondent's contention that petitioner's action for partition
amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the
certificates of title covering the subject properties. It held that
even if the parties really had cohabited, the action for partition
could not be allowed because an action for partition among co-
owners ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the
defendant, as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership
of the properties in question. For these reasons, the trial court
dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996,
ordered the case remanded to the court of origin for trial on
the merits. It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate
Appellate Court 10 to the effect that an action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over
the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed.
Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is
unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court
should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was
availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the
defendant to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether
petitioner's action for partition was a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held
that since petitioner sought to compel respondent to execute
documents necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was
his share, petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of
the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the
18
appellate court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the
Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court
of Appeals. On May 7, 1998, nearly two years after its first
decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion
and reconsidered its prior decision. In its decision now
challenged in the present petition, it held
Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy on whether
this suit is a collateral attack on the titles in issue, it must be
underscored that plaintiff-appellant alleged in his complaint
that all the nine (9) titles are registered in the name of
defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, except one which
appears in the name of Eloisa Castillo (see par. 9, Complaint).
However, a verification of the annexes of such initiatory
pleading shows some discrepancies, to wit:
1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) = Elvira T. Castillo, single
2. TCT No. 168208 (Annex B) = do
3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) = do
4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = do
5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) = do
6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) = Steelhaus Realty & Dev. Corp.
7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) = do
8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) = do
9. TCT No. (92323) 67881 (Annex I) = Eloisa Castillo
In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be declared as 1/2 co-
owner of the real properties covered by the above listed titles
and eventually for their partition [par. (a), Prayer; p. 4 Records].
Notably, in order to achieve such prayer for a joint co-
ownership declaration, it is unavoidable that the individual
titles involved be altered, changed, cancelled or modified to
include therein the name of the appellee as a registered 1/2
co-owner. Yet, no cause of action or even a prayer is contained
filed. Manifestly, absent any cause or prayer for the alteration,
cancellation, modification or changing of the titles involved,
the desired declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition
will utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on the subject
titled in this suit.
It is here that We fell into error, such that, if not rectified will
surely lead to a procedural lapse and a possible injustice. Well
settled is the rules that a certificate of title cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another name is, after one year from the date of the decree,

not to set aside the decree, but respecting it as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
action for reconveyance or, if the property had passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Verily,
plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such remedy or
any other relief directly attacking the subject titles before
instituting the present partition suit. Apropos, the case at
bench appears to have been prematurely filed.
Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the appellant will in
effect rule and decide against the properties registered in the
names of Steelhouse Realty and Development Corporation and
Eloisa Castillo, who are not parties in the case. To allow this to
happen will surely result to injustice and denial of due process
of law. . . . 11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first
decision of November 7, 1996, was correct in applying the
Roque ruling and in rejecting respondent's claim that she was
the sole owner of the subject properties and that the partition
suit was a collateral attack on the titles; (2) the Court of
Appeals correctly rules in its first decision that Art. 148 of the
Family Code governs the co-ownership between the parties,
hence, the complaint for partition is proper; (3) with respect to
the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty,
respondent admitted ownership thereof and, at the very least,
these properties could simply be excluded and the partition
limited to the remaining real and personal properties; and (4)
the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that under the Civil
Code, there is an implied trust in his favor. 12
The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in
accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, is proper. We
rule in the negative.
First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary
judgment is proper only when, based on the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, and after summary
hearing, it is shown that except as to the amount of damages,
there is no veritable issue regarding any material fact in the
action and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. 1 Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue,
i.e., an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which
is sham, fictitious, contrived, set-up in bad faith, or patently
unsubstantial, summary judgment is not proper. 14
In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist.
Petitioner anchors his claim of co-ownership on two factual
grounds: first, that said properties were acquired by him and
respondent during their union from 1979 to 1992 from profits
derived from their brokerage business; and second, that said
properties were registered solely in respondent's name only
because they agreed to that arrangement, thereby giving rise
to an implied trust in accordance with Art. 1452 and Art. 1453
19
of the Civil Code. These allegations are denied by respondent.
She denies that she and petitioner lived together as husband
and wife. She also claims that the properties in question were
acquired solely by her with her own money and resources.
With such conflicting positions, the only way to ascertain the
truth is obviously through the presentation of evidence by the
parties.
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties
actually lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of
the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as they were
both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was
impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them.
We disagree.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a
man and a woman live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or
are without impediment to marry each other, 15 or in which
the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art.
144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous
relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now
provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties
in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article,
16 only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties
in this case were not capacitated to marry each other at the
time that they were alleged to have been living together, they
could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code,
in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a
man and a woman who live together as husband and wife

without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus
co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to
marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties
herein. Consequently, whether petitioner and respondent
cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are
part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine and material. All
but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been
acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code
took effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under the
regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:
Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of
plaintiff assisted by defendant, their customs brokerage
business grew and out of the profits therefrom, the parties
acquired real and personal properties which were, upon
agreement of the parties, listed and registered in defendant's
name with plaintiff as the unregistered co-owner of all said
properties. 17
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed
pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code which provides that "(I)f
two or more persons agree to purchase property and by
common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of
them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in
favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each." We
do not think this is correct. The legal relation of the parties is
already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code
under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of
their actual joint contributions of money, property or industry
shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust
and every co-owner is a trustee for the other. 18 The provisions
of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer
material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-
ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil
Code.
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioner's action on
the ground that the same amounted to a collateral attack on
the certificates of title involved. As already noted, at first, the
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's action does not
challenge the validity of respondent's titles. However, on
reconsideration, it reversed itself and affirmed the trial court. It
noted that petitioner's complaint failed to include a prayer for
the alteration, cancellation, modification, or changing of the
titles involved. Absent such prayer, the appellate court ruled
that a declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition
would involve an indirect or collateral attack on the titles. We
disagree.
20
A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible.
Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, 19 48 provides that a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and
can not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding. When is an action an attack on a title? It is when
the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and
thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or
proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof. 20
In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in
Roque regarding the nature of an action for partition,
petitioner seeks first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the
subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares. He does not attack respondent's titles. Petitioner
alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that would
justify a review of the registration decree in respondent's favor.
His theory is that although the subject properties were
registered solely in respondent's name, but since by agreement
between them as well as under the Family Code, he is co-
owner of these properties and as such is entitled to the
conveyance of his shares. On the premise that he is a co-
owner, he can validly seek the partition of the properties in co-
ownership and the conveyance to him of his share.
Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, 21 in which a parcel of land
bequeathed in a last will and testament was registered in the
name of only one of the heirs, with the understanding that he
would deliver to the others their shares after the debts of the
original owner had been paid, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the registration of the land in the name of
only one of the heirs, the other heirs can claim their shares in
"such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to
partition the estate of the testator." 22
Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on
the ground that to order partition will, in effect, rule and
decide against Steelhouse Realty Development Corporation
and Eloisa Castillo, both strangers to the present case, as to the
properties registered in their names. This reasoning, however,
ignores the fact that the majority of the properties involved in
the present case are registered in respondent's name, over
which petitioner claims rights as a co-owner. Besides, other
than the real properties, petitioner also seeks partition of a
substantial amount of personal properties consisting of motor
vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing
petitioner's complaint for partition on grounds of due process
and equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied petitioner
his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and personal
properties. The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is unjustified
since both ends may be amply served by simply excluding from
the action for partition the properties registered in the name
of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.

WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further
proceedings on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Francisco vs. CA, 299 SCRA 188
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision[2]
rendered by Branch 168 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in
Civil Case No. 35231 in favor of private respondents.
The controversy before this Court finds its origins in a Land
Development and Construction Contract which was entered
into on June 23, 1977 by A. Francisco Realty & Development
Corporation (AFRDC), of which petitioner Adalia Francisco
(Francisco) is the president, and private respondent Herby
Commercial & Construction Corporation (HCCC), represented
by its President and General Manager private respondent
Jaime C. Ong (Ong), pursuant to a housing project of AFRDC at
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, financed by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). Under the contract, HCCC
agreed to undertake the construction of 35 housing units and
the development of 35 hectares of land. The payment of HCCC
for its services was on a turn-key basis, that is, HCCC was to be
paid on the basis of the completed houses and developed
lands delivered to and accepted by AFRDC and the GSIS. To
facilitate payment, AFRDC executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of HCCC to enable the latter to collect payments directly
from the GSIS. Furthermore, the GSIS and AFRDC put up an
Executive Committee Account with the Insular Bank of Asia &
America (IBAA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 from which
checks would be issued and co-signed by petitioner Francisco
and the GSIS Vice-President Armando Diaz (Diaz).
On February 10, 1978, HCCC filed a complaint[3] with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Francisco, AFRDC
and the GSIS for the collection of the unpaid balance under the
Land Development and Construction Contract in the amount of
P515,493.89 for completed and delivered housing units and
land development. However, the parties eventually arrived at
an amicable settlement of their differences, which was
embodied in a Memorandum Agreement executed by HCCC
and AFRDC on July 21, 1978. Under the agreement, the parties
stipulated that HCCC had turned over 83 housing units which
have been accepted and paid for by the GSIS. The GSIS
acknowledged that it still owed HCCC P520,177.50
representing incomplete construction of housing units,
incomplete land development and 5% retention, which amount
will be discharged when the defects and deficiencies are finally
completed by HCCC. It was also provided that HCCC was
indebted to AFRDC in the amount of P180,234.91 which the
former agreed would be paid out of the proceeds from the 40
housing units still to be turned over by HCCC or from any
amount due to HCCC from the GSIS. Consequently, the trial
court dismissed the case upon the filing by the parties of a
joint motion to dismiss.
21
Sometime in 1979, after an examination of the records of the
GSIS, Ong discovered that Diaz and Francisco had executed and
signed seven checks[4], of various dates and amounts, drawn
against the IBAA and payable to HCCC for completed and
delivered work under the contract. Ong, however, claims that
these checks were never delivered to HCCC. Upon inquiry with
Diaz, Ong learned that the GSIS gave Francisco custody of the
checks since she promised that she would deliver the same to
HCCC. Instead, Francisco forged the signature of Ong, without
his knowledge or consent, at the dorsal portion of the said
checks to make it appear that HCCC had indorsed the checks;
Francisco then indorsed the checks for a second time by
signing her name at the back of the checks and deposited the
checks in her IBAA savings account. IBAA credited Franciscos
account with the amount of the checks and the latter withdrew
the amount so credited.
On June 7, 1979, Ong filed complaints with the office of the
city fiscal of Quezon City, charging Francisco with estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents. Francisco denied having
forged Ongs signature on the checks, claiming that Ong himself
indorsed the seven checks in behalf of HCCC and delivered the
same to Francisco in payment of the loans extended by
Francisco to HCCC. According to Francisco, she agreed to grant
HCCC the loans in the total amount of P585,000.00 and
covered by eighteen promissory notes in order to obviate the
risk of the non-completion of the project. As a means of
repayment, Ong allegedly issued a Certification authorizing
Francisco to collect HCCCs receivables from the GSIS. Assistant
City Fiscal Ramon M. Gerona gave credence to Franciscos
claims and accordingly, dismissed the complaints, which
dismissal was affirmed by the Minister of Justice in a resolution
issued on June 5, 1981.
The present case was brought by private respondents on
November 19, 1979 against Francisco and IBAA for the
recovery of P370,475.00, representing the total value of the
seven checks, and for damages, attorneys fees, expenses of
litigation and costs. After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of private respondents, the
dispositive portion of which provides -
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
INSULAR BANK OF ASIA & AMERICA and ATTY. ADALIA
FRANCISCO, to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the
amount of P370.475.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint
until the full amount is paid; moral damages to plaintiff Jaime
Ong in the sum of P50,000.00; exemplary damages of
P50,000.00; litigation expenses of P5,000.00; and attorneys
fees of P50,000.00.
With respect to the cross-claim of the defendant IBAA against
its co-defendant Atty. Adalia Francisco, the latter is ordered to
reimburse the former for the sums that the Bank shall pay to
the plaintiff on the forged checks including the interests paid
thereon.

Further, the defendants are ordered to pay the costs.
Based upon the findings of handwriting experts from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the trial court held that
Francisco had indeed forged the signature of Ong to make it
appear that he had indorsed the checks. Also, the court ruled
that there were no loans extended, reasoning that it was
unbelievable that HCCC was experiencing financial difficulties
so as to compel it to obtain the loans from AFRDC in view of
the fact that the GSIS had issued checks in favor of HCCC at
about the same time that the alleged advances were made.
The trial court stated that it was plausible that Francisco
concealed the fact of issuance of the checks from private
respondents in order to make it appear as if she were
accommodating private respondents, when in truth she was
lending HCCC its own money.
With regards to the Memorandum Agreement entered into
between AFRDC and HCCC in Civil Case No. Q-24628, the trial
court held that the same did not make any mention of the
forged checks since private respondents were as of yet
unaware of their existence, that fact having been effectively
concealed by Francisco, until private respondents acquired
knowledge of Franciscos misdeeds in 1979.
IBAA was held liable to private respondents for having honored
the checks despite such obvious irregularities as the lack of
initials to validate the alterations made on the check, the
absence of the signature of a co-signatory in the corporate
checks of HCCC and the deposit of the checks on a second
indorsement in the savings account of Francisco. However, the
trial court allowed IBAA recourse against Francisco, who was
ordered to reimburse the IBAA for any sums it shall have to pay
to private respondents.[5]
Both Francisco and IBAA appealed the trial courts decision, but
the Court of Appeals dismissed IBAAs appeal for its failure to
file its brief within the 45-day extension granted by the
appellate court. IBAAs motion for reconsideration and petition
for review on certiorari filed with this Court were also similarly
denied. On November 21, 1989, IBAA and HCCC entered into a
Compromise Agreement which was approved by the trial court,
wherein HCCC acknowledged receipt of the amount of
P370,475.00 in full satisfaction of its claims against IBAA,
without prejudice to the right of the latter to pursue its claims
against Francisco.
On June 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts ruling, hence this petition for review on certiorari filed
by petitioner, assigning the following errors to the appealed
decision
1. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
private respondents did not owe Petitioner the sum covered by
the Promissory Notes Exh.2-2-A-2-P (FRANCISCO). Such
conclusion was based mainly on conjectures, surmises and
speculation contrary to the unrebutted pleadings and evidence
presented by petitioner.
22
2. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Petitioner falsified the signature of private respondent ONG on
the checks in question without any authority therefor which is
patently contradictory to the unrebutted pleading and
evidence that petitioner was expressly authorized by
respondent HERBY thru ONG to collect all receivables of HERBY
from GSIS to pay the loans extended to them. (Exhibit 3).
3. That respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
seven checks in question were not taken up in the liquidation
and reconciliation of all outstanding account between AFRDC
and HERBY as acknowledged by the parties in Memorandum
Agreement (Exh. 5) is a pure conjecture, surmise and
speculation contrary to the unrebutted evidence presented by
petitioners. It is an inference made which is manifestly
mistaken.
4. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal.[6]
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not Francisco forged
the signature of Ong on the seven checks. In this connection,
we uphold the lower courts finding that the subject matter of
the present case, specifically the seven checks, drawn by GSIS
and AFRDC, dated between October to November 1977, in the
total amount of P370,475.00 and payable to HCCC, was not
included in the Memorandum Agreement executed by HCCC
and AFRDC in Civil Case No. Q-24628. As observed by the trial
court, aside from there being absolutely no mention of the
checks in the said agreement, the amounts represented by said
checks could not have been included in the Memorandum
Agreement executed in 1978 because private respondents only
discovered Franciscos acts of forgery in 1979. The lower courts
found that Francisco was able to easily conceal from private
respondents even the fact of the issuance of the checks since
she was a co-signatory thereof.[7] We also note that Francisco
had custody of the checks, as proven by the check vouchers
bearing her uncontested signature,[8] by which she, in effect,
acknowledged having received the checks intended for HCCC.
This contradicts Franciscos claims that the checks were issued
to Ong who delivered them to Francisco already indorsed.[9]
As regards the forgery, we concur with the lower courts finding
that Francisco forged the signature of Ong on the checks to
make it appear as if Ong had indorsed said checks and that,
after indorsing the checks for a second time by signing her
name at the back of the checks, Francisco deposited said
checks in her savings account with IBAA. The forgery was
satisfactorily established in the trial court upon the strength of
the findings of the NBI handwriting expert.[10] Other than
petitioners self-serving denials, there is nothing in the records
to rebut the NBIs findings. Well-entrenched is the rule that
findings of trial courts which are factual in nature, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve to be
respected and affirmed by the Supreme Court, provided it is
supported by substantial evidence on record,[11] as it is in the
case at bench.

Petitioner claims that she was, in any event, authorized to sign
Ongs name on the checks by virtue of the Certification
executed by Ong in her favor giving her the authority to collect
all the receivables of HCCC from the GSIS, including the
questioned checks.[12] Petitioners alternative defense must
similarly fail. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that
where any person is under obligation to indorse in a
representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to
negative personal liability.[13] An agent, when so signing,
should indicate that he is merely signing in behalf of the
principal and must disclose the name of his principal;
otherwise he shall be held personally liable.[14] Even assuming
that Francisco was authorized by HCCC to sign Ongs name, still,
Francisco did not indorse the instrument in accordance with
law. Instead of signing Ongs name, Francisco should have
signed her own name and expressly indicated that she was
signing as an agent of HCCC. Thus, the Certification cannot be
used by Francisco to validate her act of forgery.
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.[15] Due to her forgery of Ongs signature which enabled
her to deposit the checks in her own account, Francisco
deprived HCCC of the money due it from the GSIS pursuant to
the Land Development and Construction Contract. Thus, we
affirm respondent courts award of compensatory damages in
the amount of P370,475.00, but with a modification as to the
interest rate which shall be six percent (6%) per annum, to be
computed from the date of the filing of the complaint since the
amount of damages was alleged in the complaint;[16]
however, the rate of interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the time the judgment in this case becomes final
and executory until its satisfaction and the basis for the
computation of this twelve percent (12%) rate of interest shall
be the amount of P370,475.00. This is in accordance with the
doctrine enunciated in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[17] which was reiterated in Philippine National
Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[18] Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals[19]and in Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals,[20] which provides that -
1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of
Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum. No interest, however, shall
be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when
or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the
23
time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169,
Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall
begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base
for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
We also sustain the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Considering
petitioners fraudulent act, we hold that an award of
P50,000.00 would be adequate, fair and reasonable. The grant
of exemplary damages justifies the award of attorneys fees in
the amount of P50,000.00, and the award of P5,000.00 for
litigation expenses.[21]
The appellate courts award of P50,000.00 in moral damages is
warranted. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be granted upon proof of physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injury.[22] Ong testitified that he suffered sleepless nights,
embarrassment, humiliation and anxiety upon discovering that
the checks due his company were forged by petitioner and that
petitioner had filed baseless criminal complaints against him
before the fiscals office of Quezon City which disrupted HCCCs
business operations.[23]
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the respondent courts decision
promulgated on June 29, 1992, upholding the February 16,
1988 decision of the trial court in favor of private respondents,
with the modification that the interest upon the actual
damages awarded shall be at six percent (6%) per annum,
which interest rate shall be computed from the time of the
filing of the complaint on November 19, 1979. However, the
interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from the
time the judgment in this case becomes final and executory
and until such amount is fully paid. The basis for computation
of the six percent and twelve percent rates of interest shall be
the amount of P370,475.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Jocson vs. CA, 170 SCRA 333
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. No. 63474, promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled
"MOISES JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, versus AGUSTINA
JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ, defendant-
appellants," upholding the validity of three (3) documents
questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which
declared them as null and void; and of its resolution, dated
September 30, 1980, denying therein appellee's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto
Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete
predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being
settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April
1, 1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the
validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by
sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers
almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these
documents and prays that they be declared null and void and
the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between
him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
The documents, which were presented as evidence not by
Moises Jocson, as the party assailing its validity, but rather by
herein respondents, are the following:
1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit 3
(pp. 12-13, Records) for the defendant in the court a quo,
dated July 27, 1968. By this document Emilio Jocson sold to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six (6) parcels of land, all located at
Naic, Cavite, for the sum of ten thousand P10,000.00 pesos. On
the same document Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the
purchase price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO
(P10,000) salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong
kasiyahan loob at ang pagkakatanggap ay aking hayagang
inaamin sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, sa aking anak na si
Agustina Jocson, na may sapat na gulang, mamamayang
Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto Vasquez, at naninirahan sa
Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking ipinagbile ng lubusan at kagyat
at walang ano mang pasubali ang nabanggit na anim na
pirasong lupa na nasa unang dahon ng dokumentong ito, sa
nabanggit na Agustina Jocson, at sa kaniyang tagapagmana o
makakahalili at gayon din nais kong banggitin na kahit na may
kamurahan ang ginawa kong pagbibile ay dahilan sa ang
nakabile ay aking anak na sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin
at ma-alalahanin, na tulad din ng isa ko pang anak na lalaki.
Ang kuartang tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay gagamitin ko sa
aking katandaan at mga huling araw at sa aking mga ibang
mahahalagang pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]
24
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay hindi labag
sa ano mang batas o kautusan, sapagkat ang aking pinagbile ay
akin at nasa aking pangalan. Ang mga lupang nasa pangalan ng
aking nasirang asawa ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni pinakikialaman
at iyon ay dapat na hatiin ng dalawa kong anak alinsunod sa
umiiral na batas (p. 13, Records.)
2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July 27,1968, marked
as Exhibit 4 (p. 14, Records). On the face of this document,
Emilio Jocson purportedly sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, for
the sum of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice mills
and a camarin (camalig) located at Naic, Cavite. As in the first
document, Moises Jocson acknowledged receipt of the
purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P5,000.00)
salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob
sa aking anak na Agustina Jocson .... Na ang halagang ibinayad
sa akin ay may kamurahan ng kaunti ngunit dahil sa malaking
pagtingin ko sa kaniya ... kaya at pinagbile ko sa kaniya ang mga
nabanggit na pagaari kahit na hindi malaking halaga ... (p. 14,
Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication
with Sale, "dated March 9, 1969, marked as Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11,
Records), whereby Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,
without the participation and intervention of Moises Jocson,
extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled estate of Alejandra
Poblete, dividing the same into three parts, one-third (1/3)
each for the heirs of Alejandra Poblete, namely: Emilio Jocson,
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same
instrument, Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share to Agustin for
the sum of EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS. As in the
preceding documents, Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of
the purchase price:
Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight thousand
(P8,000.00) pesos, which I, the herein Emilio Jocson had
received from my daughter Agustina Jocson, do hereby sell,
cede, convey and transfer, unto the said Agustina Jocson, her
heirs and assigns, administrators and successors in interests, in
the nature of absolute and irrevocable sale, all my rights,
interest, shares and participation, which is equivalent to one
third (1/3) share in the properties herein mentioned and
described the one third being adjudicated unto Agustina
Jocson and the other third (1/3) portion being the share of
Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public.
Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered with the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Cavite on July 29, 1968 and the transfer certificates
of title covering the properties therein in the name of Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were cancelled and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on
Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of

First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM-
531), and which was twice amended. In his Second Amended
Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner
assailed the above documents, as aforementioned, for being
null and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his
complaint for the reason that the nature of his causes of action
is at issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that] the defendants,
through fraud, deceit, undue pressure and influence and other
illegal machinations, were able to induce, led, and procured
their father ... to sign [the] contract of sale ..., for the simulated
price of P10,000.00, which is a consideration that is shocking to
the conscience of ordinary man and despite the fact that said
defendants have no work or livelihood of their own ...; that the
sale is null and void, also, because it is fictitious, simulated and
fabricated contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record on Appeal).
[Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
12. [With regards the second and third document, that
they] are null and void because the consent of the father,
Emilio Jocson, was obtained with fraud, deceit, undue
pressure, misrepresentation and unlawful machinations and
trickeries committed by the defendant on him; and that the
said contracts are simulated, fabricated and fictitious, having
been made deliberately to exclude the plaintiff from
participating and with the dishonest and selfish motive on the
part of the defendants to defraud him of his legitimate share
on said properties [subject matter thereof]; and that without
any other business or employment or any other source of
income, defendants who were just employed in the
management and administration of the business of their
parents, would not have the sufficient and ample means to
purchase the said properties except by getting the earnings of
the business or by simulated consideration ... (pp. 54-55,
Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a
father and daughter who are living under the same roof,
especially so when the father has no need of money as the
properties supposedly sold were all income-producing. Further,
petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3
and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson
and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot
validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal). As far as Exhibit 2 is
concerned, petitioner questions not the extrajudicial partition
but only the sale by his father to Agustina of the former's 1/3
share (p. 13, Rollo).
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of
petitioner (pp. 59-81, Record on Appeal). It declared that the
considerations mentioned in the documents were merely
simulated and fictitious because: 1) there was no showing that
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the prices
were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of
25
consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the sale
between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking
into consideration the circumstances obtaining between the
parties; and that the real intention of the parties were
donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from
participating in the estate of his parents. It further declared the
properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties
of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" and ordered that the properties subject matter of all
the documents be registered in the name of herein petitioners
and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R
rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the
trial court's and ruled that:
1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the appellee's
complaint for annulment, which is indisputably based on fraud,
and undue influence, is now barred by prescription, pursuant
to the settled rule that an action for annulment of a contract
based on fraud must be filed within four (4) years, from the
discovery of the fraud, ... which in legal contemplation is
deemed to be the date of the registration of said document
with the Register of Deeds ... and the records admittedly show
that both Exhibits 3 and 4, were all registered on July 29, 1968,
while on the other hand, the appellee's complaint was filed on
June 20, 1973, clearly beyond the aforesaid four-year
prescriptive period provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are
decisively not simulated or fictitious contracts, since Emilio
Jocson actually and really intended them to be effective and
binding against him, as to divest him of the full dominion and
ownership over the properties subject of said assailed
contracts, as in fact all his titles over the same were all
cancelled and new ones issued to appellant Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez ...;
3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and subsisting,
and the partition with sale therein made by and between
Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, affecting the 2/3
portion of the subject properties described therein have all
been made in accordance with Article 996 of the New Civil
Code on intestate succession, and the appellee's (herein
petitioner) remaining 1/3 has not been prejudiced (pp. 41-42,
Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following
assignments of errors:
1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF
CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS
"BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE AND
NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR
WHOSE CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD
CUSTOMS?

II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER IN
THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING AS INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID THE
CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND IN REVERSING THE DECLARING
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall
be jointly discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of
action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil
Code, a contract tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent
was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and the action for
annulment must be brought within four years from the time of
the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code),
otherwise the contract may no longer be contested. Under
present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to have
taken place at the time the convenant was registered with the
Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May
29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered
on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his complaint only on
June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these
documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had
prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in
assailing the questioned documents, We would have sustained
the above pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by
petitioner, he further assailed the deeds of conveyance on the
ground that they were without consideration since the
amounts appearing thereon as paid were in fact merely
simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without
cause produce no effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a
simulated price is void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and
an action for the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe
(Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castillo v. Galvan, No. L-
27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons
saction, therefore, being for the judicial declaration of nullity of
Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is
imprescriptible.
II.
For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely
academic. The burden of proof in showing that contracts lack
consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof
becomes more stringent where the documents themselves
show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and
more so where the documents were notarized, as in the case
at bar. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are
of the opinion that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that
the questioned documents are without consideration.
26
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had
no other source of income other than what she derives from
helping in the management of the family business (ricefields
and ricemills), and which was insufficient to pay for the
purchase price, was contradicted by his own witness, Isaac
Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her husband were
engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p. 10, t.s.n.,
January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife
testified that they did not know whether or not Agustina was
involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p.
36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in
the business of buying and selling palay and rice even before
her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and
continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976).
Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a contract
is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is clear that
petitioner miserably failed to prove his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of
alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no
showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the
total purchase price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above
the total assessed value of the properties alleged by petitioner.
In his Second Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that the
total assessed value of the properties mentioned in Exhibit 3
was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while
the purchase price paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000,
respectively, the latter for the 1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from
the paraphernal properties of his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And
any difference between the market value and the purchase
price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight, may
not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by
a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken
into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-
46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a
contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some
other act or contract (Article 1470, Civil Code) and there is
nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in Emilio
Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale
between a father and his daughter is purely speculative which
has no relevance to a contract where all the essential requisites
of consent, object and cause are clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing
Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties subject matter therein are
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is
the position of petitioner that since the properties sold to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the
name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the
certificates of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J',
pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show that the

properties covered therein were acquired during the marriage
of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil
Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22,
1968, 23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal
assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of evidence,
although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil
Code which provides that ... . As interpreted by this Court, the
party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In
other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes
de Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it was held that "according to law
and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the Property
was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may
be deemed conjugal property." In the recent case of Maramba
vs. Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474], this
Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to
property acquired during the marriage," and then concluded
that since "there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired...the fact that the title is in the wife's
name alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar,
since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were
acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the
husband alone is an indication that the shares belong
exclusively to said spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de
Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L-24571,
December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs. Torela,
No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the
presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that
the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,
however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of
"Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that
the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela,
supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were
acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but
were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete,
which explains why he was described in the certificates of title
as married to the latter.
27
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show,
on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio
Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words
"married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera,
100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4
SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December
16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the
properties, the same having been registered in his name alone,
and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently
held that registration of the property in the name of only one
spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See
Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248).
But this ruling is not inconsistent with the above
pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse,
were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been
acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore,
presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having
presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs-
Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented
sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties were
acquired during his parents' coverture. We would have ruled
that the properties, though registered in the name of Emilio
Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in view of the
presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof, the
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption
does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under
Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two
ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal
properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete,
they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties
of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Siasoco vs. Narvaja-Bolog, 315 SCRA 144
Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by one
defendant, the complaint may still be amended once, as a
matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect to claims against the
non-answering defendant(s). The Court also reiterates that
certiorari is not the proper remedy to contest a lower courts
final adjudication, since appeal is available as a recourse.
Statement of the Case

Petitioners assail the February 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR SP No. 45451, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] foregoing considered, the present petition
for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on December 17, 1997 is
hereby lifted. Petitioners are given six (6) days from receipt of
this decision within which to file their answer. The motion for
oral argument filed by respondent is rendered moot.
Respondent court is ordered to proceed and resolve the case
with deliberate speed.[3]
The foregoing disposition affirmed two Orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215, dated August 11,
1997 and September 11, 1997 in Civil Case No. Q-97-29960.[4]
The first Order (1) admitted the Amended Complaint; (2)
dropped Defendant Carissa Homes Development and
Properties, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Carissa) from the
Complaint; and (3) denied the Motion to Declare Defendants
Siasoco et al. (herein petitioners) in Default. The second Order
denied the Motion for Suspension filed by defendants and
directed them to file their answer to plaintiffs Amended
Complaint.
Undaunted, petitioners seek recourse in this Court.[5]
The Facts
Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land
located in Montalban, Rizal. In December 1994, they began to
offer the subject properties for sale. Subsequently, Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC) negotiated with the petitioners, but the parties
failed to agree on the terms of the purchase. More than a year
later, both parties revived their discussions. In a letter dated
December 16, 1996, petitioners made a final offer to the INC.
The latters counsel sent a reply received by Petitioner Mario
Siasoco on December 24, 1996, stating that the offer was
accepted, but that the INC was not amenable to your proposal
to an undervaluation of the total consideration. In their letter
dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the INC had
not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt
of the aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had
already contracted with Carissa for the sale of the said
properties due to the absence of any response to their offer
from INC.
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC
demanded that the corresponding deed be executed in its
favor. Petitioners refused. The ensuing events were narrated by
the Court of Appeals, as follows:
On January 14, 1997, private respondent filed a civil suit for
[s]pecific [p]erformance and [d]amages against petitioners and
Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc. docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-97-29960.
Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
improper venue and lack of capacity to sue.
28
Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint on February
24, 1997.
Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, private
respondent negotiated with Carissa Homes which culminated
in the purchase of the subject properties of Carissa Homes by
private respondent.
On April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an [A]mended
[C]omplaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of the defendants
and changing the nature of the case to a mere case for
damages.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint,
contending that the complaint cannot be amended without
leave of court, since a responsive pleading has been filed.
On August 11, 1997, the first assailed order denying petitioners
Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint was rendered.
On August 31, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension
of Proceeding pending the resolution [by] the respondent
court of the Motion to Dismiss earlier filed.
On September 11, 1997, the second assailed order denying
petitioners Motion to Suspend Proceeding was rendered[;] the
Order reads:
Filed also last September 1, 1997 [was] a Motion for
Suspension by the defendant Siasoco thru their counsel Atty.
Clara Dumandang-Singh. Although the court could not consider
the motion filed because it violates the new rules on personal
service, in the interest of justice, the court will resolve the
motion. In the resolution of this court dated August 11, 1997, it
state[d] that defendants [were being] given a period of five (5)
days within which to file [an] answer to the Amended
Complaint. The defendants here obviously refer to the
defendants Mario Siasoco, et. al. In the Motion for Suspension
filed by the defendants Siasoco, et al., the latter insist on the
court resolving the motion to dismiss. As stated in the
resolution, the motion to dismiss is now moot and academic
because of the Amended Complaint from Specific Performance
with Damages to just Damages. For this court to resolve the
Motion to Dismiss xxx the first complaint, would be an exercise
in futility. The main complaint now is damages and no longer
Specific Performance with damages which [was] actually what
the Resolution dated August 11, 1997 [was] all about. Be that
as it may, the court gives defendants Siasoco, et al. fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Order to file their respective Answers
to the Amended Complaint, not from the receipt of the
resolution of the Motion to Dismiss which will not be
forthcoming.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that although private
respondent could no longer amend its original Complaint as a
matter of right, it was not precluded from doing so with leave

of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted
with grave abuse of discretion in admitting private respondents
Amended Complaint.
Petitioners argued that the trial court where the original
Complaint for specific performance had been filed was not the
proper venue. Debunking petitioners argument, the CA
explained that the RTC nevertheless had jurisdiction over the
said Complaint. The CA also held that the Amended Complaint
did not substantially alter private respondents cause of action,
since petitioners were not being asked to answer a legal
obligation different from that stated in the original Complaint.
Assignment of Errors
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit, for the
consideration of this Court, the following issues:[6]
A.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred
in holding that the respondent Judges admission of INCs
Amended Complaint was proper.
B.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred
in affirming respondent Judges denial of petitioners Motion for
Suspension.
C.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred
in refusing to hear petitioners application for a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Simply stated, the question is: did the CA err in affirming the
two Orders of the RTC which had allowed the Amended
Complaint?
The Courts Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit. We sustain the Court of
Appeals, but for reasons different from those given in the
assailed Decision.
Preliminary Issue: Propriety of Certiorari
In their Petition and Memorandum, Mario Siasoco et al.
emphasize that the instant suit was commenced pursuant to
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure and allege that
Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the challenged Decision dated February
25, 1998 xxx. This is a procedural error. For the writ of
certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, the petitioner must show not
only that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion,
but also that there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[7] Since the
questioned CA Decision was a disposition on the merits, and
29
since said Court has no remaining issue to resolve, the proper
remedy available to petitioners was a petition for review under
Rule 45, not Rule 65. Furthermore, as a general rule, certiorari
under Rule 65 cannot issue unless the lower court, through a
motion for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to
correct the imputed error.[8] Although there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, petitioners do not claim that this case is
one of them. For this procedural lapse, the instant petition
should be dismissed outright.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as the Petition was filed within the 15-
day period provided under Rule 45, and considering the
importance of the issue raised and the fact that private
respondent did not question the propriety of the instant
Petition, the Court treated the action as a petition for review
(not certiorari) under Rule 45 in order to accord substantial
justice to the parties. We will thus proceed to discuss the
substantive issue.
Main Issue: Admission of Amended Complaint
Petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in admitting the
Amended Complaint. Under the Rules, a party may amend his
pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served xxx.[9] When private respondent
filed its Amended Complaint, Carissa, the other party-
defendant in the original Complaint, had already filed its
Answer. Because a responsive pleading had been submitted,
petitioners contend that private respondent should have first
obtained leave of court before filing its Amended Complaint.
This it failed to do. In any event, such leave could not have
been granted, allegedly because the amendment had
substantially altered the cause of action.
This argument is not persuasive. It is clear that plaintiff (herein
private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a matter
of right, before a responsive pleading is filed.[10] Contrary to
the petitioners contention, the fact that Carissa had already
filed its Answer did not bar private respondent from amending
its original Complaint once, as a matter of right, against herein
petitioners. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants
have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as
a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against
the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted
against the other defendants.[11]
The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court, which provides that after a responsive
pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when
the defense is substantially altered.[12] Such amendment does
not only prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays
the action. In the first place, where a party has not yet filed a
responsive pleading, there are no defenses that can be altered.
Furthermore, the Court has held that [a]mendments to
pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed
in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts and in order to speed
the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as

inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise
or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.[13]
In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were
prejudiced by private respondents Amended Complaint. True,
Carissa had already filed its own Answer. Petitioners, however,
have not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege that their
defense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private
respondents claims against the latter and against petitioners
are different. Against petitioners, whose offer to sell the
subject parcels of land had allegedly been accepted by private
respondent, the latter is suing for specific performance and
damages for breach of contract. Although private respondent
could no longer amend, as a matter of right, its Complaint
against Carissa, it could do so against petitioners who, at the
time, had not yet filed an answer.
The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the
action. Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended to
expedite its disposition. The Amended Complaint became
simply an action for damages, since the claims for specific
performance and declaration of nullity of the sale have been
deleted.
RTC Had Jurisdiction
Petitioners also insist that the RTC of Quezon City did not have
jurisdiction over the original Complaint; hence, it did not have
any authority to allow the amendment. They maintain that the
original action for specific performance involving parcels of
land in Montalban, Rizal should have been filed in the RTC of
that area. Thus, they chide the CA for allegedly
misunderstanding the distinction between territorial
jurisdiction and venue, thereby erroneously holding that the
RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint, although the
venue was improperly laid.
We disagree. True, an amendment cannot be allowed when
the court has no jurisdiction over the original Complaint and
the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the
court.[14] In the present case, however, the RTC had
jurisdiction because the original Complaint involved specific
performance with damages. In La Tondea Distillers v.
Ponferrada,[15] this Court ruled that a complaint for specific
performance with damages is a personal action and may be
filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside, viz.:
Finally, [w]e are not also persuaded by petitioners argument
that venue should be lodged in Bago City where the lot is
situated. The complaint is one for specific performance with
damages. Private respondents do not claim ownership of the
lot but in fact [recognize the] title of defendants by annotating
a notice of lis pendens. In one case, a similar complaint for
specific performance with damages involving real property,
was held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the
proper court where the party resides. Not being an action
involving title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this
30
case, was not improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.
[16]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
Benin v. Tuason 57 SCRA 531
Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described
in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La
Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of
land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who inturn inherited the
same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their
predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of
land openly, adversely,and peacefully, cultivated the same and
exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that
Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land
surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral
survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in
1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over
said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation
purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after
the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other
places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs,
constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to
plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually
served with summons. The other defendants were ordered
summoned by publication in accordance with Sections 16 and
17 of the Rules of Court. Onlydefendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
HELD:
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base
their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described
in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest
of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of
land described in their complaint ontheir being the heirs and
successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In
Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership
of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their
being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who
died in 1931. It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of
land described in the complaint on their being heirs or
successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In
CivilCase No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership
over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on
their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso
Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs
base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land
described in their complaint on their beingthe heirs and
successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the
complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along
with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the
heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual

Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623,
respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in
thosecases. We find that the plaintiffs do not claim a right
which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin. Likewise,
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right
different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No
Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not
claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili. The
court sited the Santiago case which states that, (T)he mere fact
that appellants herein were not personally notified of the
registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of
registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not
constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the
decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem,
operate as against the whole world and the decree issued
therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands
registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such
proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by
publication but did not appear. The registration by the
appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims
and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands
prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those
noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Riveraand Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited
therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the
registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants
at theregistration proceedings, and very much more than one
year having elapsed from theissuance of the decree of
registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor
adecree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.The joint
decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Balbin vs. Register of Ilocos Sur, 28 SCRA 12
FACTS: Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the
Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered
owners certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos,
requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. The
registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated
inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds
denied the requested annotation for being legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously
annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT
are three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in
favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana
Gabayan, who each received their co-owners duplicate CTs.
Mainly because these 3 co-owners copies of CTs had not been
presented by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make
the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to
the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the action
of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the
annotation is proper
HELD:
31
YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence,
their integrity may be affected if an encumbrance, or an
outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others. If different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed
conjugal, that is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased
wife Nemesia Mina, there should first be a liquidation of the
partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance. Assuming the conjugal nature of the property,
the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the
denial of registration, namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the
property which Cornelio donated was more than his share,
not to say more than what remained of such share after he had
sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelios
civil status, character of land and validity of conveyances are in
issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and
parties may protect their rights by filing the proper notices of
lis pendens.
Uraca vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 702
Facts:
The Velezes were the owners of the lot and commercial
building in Cebu while the petitioners were lessees of the said
building. The Velezes through Ting wrote a letter offering to sell
the subject property for P1,050,000.00 and at the same time
requesting the petitioners to reply in three days. Such sale was
accepted.
Uraca went to see Ting about the offer to sell but she was told
by the latter that the price was P1,400,000.00 in cash or
managers check and not P1,050,000.00 as erroneously stated
in their letter-offer after some haggling. Emilia Uraca agreed to
the price of P1,400,000.00 but counter- proposed that
payment be paid in installments with a down payment of
P1,000,000.00 and the balance of P400,000 to be paid in 30
days. Carmen Velez Ting did not accept the said counter offer
of Emilia Uraca although this fact is disputed by Uraca.
However, no payment was made.
The Velezes sold the lot and commercial building to the Avenue
Group for P1,050,000.00 net of taxes, registration fees, and
expenses of the sale. At the time the Avenue Group purchased
the subject property on July 13, 1985 from the Velezes, the
certificate of title of the said property was clean and free of
any annotation of adverse claims or lis pendens.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the contract of sale was perfected; and
II. Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that
petitioners have better rights to buy and own the
Velezes property for registering their notice of lis
pendens ahead of the Avenue Groups registration of
their deeds of sale.

Held:
Novation is never presumed; it must be sufficiently established
that a valid new agreement or obligation has extinguished or
changed an existing one. The registration of a later sale must
be done in good faith to entitle the registrant to priority in
ownership over the vendee in an earlier sale.
On the first issue: no extinctive novation.
The lynchpin of the assailed Decision is the public respondents
conclusion that the sale of the real property in controversy. The
Court noted that the petitioners accepted in writing and
without qualification the Velezes written offer to sell at
P1,050,000.00 within the three-day period stipulated therein.
Hence, from the moment of acceptance on July 10, 1985, a
contract of sale was perfected since undisputedly the
contractual elements of consent, object certain and cause
concurred.
Article 1600 of the Civil Code provides that (s)ales are
extinguished by the same causes as all other obligations, x x x.
Article 1231 of the same Code states that novation is one of
the ways to wipe out an obligation. Extinctive novation
requires: (1) the existence of a previous valid obligation; (2) the
agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the
extinguishment of the old obligation or contract; and (4) the
validity of the new one.
On the second issue: double sale of an immovable.
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer
ownership or a better right over the property.Article 1544
requires that such registration must be coupled with good
faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle is
primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot
defeat the first buyers rights except where the second buyer
registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as
provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer
does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law,
among them, to register first her purchase as against the
second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second
buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior
registration with bad faith This is the price exacted by Article
1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to
displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can
obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in
good faith throughout.
Millena vs. CA, 324 SCRA 126
This case involves a 3,934-square meter parcel of land in far-
flung Bgy. Balinad, Daraga, Albay. It was originally a part of Lot
1874, a 14,284-square meter land that was subject of a
cadastral proceeding during the 1920s before the Court of First
Instance of Albay. Among the claimants in the cadastral case
were Gregoria Listana and her sister-in-law Potenciana
Maramba, together with the latters seven (7) children, namely,
Felix, Marcela, Ruperta, Emeteria, Florencio, Gaspar and
Nicomedes, all surnamed Listana.
32
On 17 August 1926 the claimants reached a compromise
agreement to divide Lot 1874 among themselves.
Approximately one-fourth (1/4) of the lot went to Gregoria
Listana while the remaining three-fourths (3/4) portion, to
Potenciana Maramba and her seven (7) children.[1] The
compromise agreement was submitted to the cadastral court
on 17 August 1926 and on even date adjudication was
rendered in accordance with the terms of the agreement.[2]
Thus the northern portion of Lot 1874 with an area of
approximately 3,934 square meters was awarded to Gregoria
Listana.
Gregoria Listana was at that time seriously ill of tuberculosis.
To her death was inevitable. Gregoria executed on 9 October
1926 a power of attorney in favor of her cousin Antonio Lipato
which authorized the attorney-in-fact to sell the portion of Lot
1874 belonging to his principal. Conformably with Gregoria's
instruction, the proceeds of the sale would be used for her
interment.
On 23 October 1926 Antonio Lipato in his capacity as attorney-
in-fact sold the portion of Gregoria Listana to Gaudencio Jacob.
Incidentally, Gregoria died on the same day the land was sold.
Thereafter Gaudencio entered the portion of Lot 1874 that was
sold to him and started harvesting the coconuts found therein.
When Potenciana Maramba learned about Gaudencio's
entering the land and harvesting the coconuts she confronted
him. But Gaudencio explained that he had every right to do
whatever he pleased with the land since he had lawfully
bought it from Gregoria Listana.
Potenciana Maramba filed an ejectment case against
Gaudencio Jacob before the Justice of the Peace in Legazpi,
Albay. However, on 31 December 1926 the court ruled that
Gaudencio entered the land in question without force and
intimidation since he had with him a document of sale over the
land which authorized him to take possession thereof.[3] Thus,
the Justice of the Peace dismissed the case.
After the dismissal of the case, Gaudencio Jacob continued
with his possession of the one-fourth (1/4) portion of Lot 1874.
His continuous, actual and peaceful possession lasted for
almost forty (40) years until 4 April 1966, when he and his
children executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
his deceased wife Brigida Jacob. The extrajudicial settlement
adjudicated to respondent Felisa Jacob, daughter of Gaudencio
Jacob, the 3,934-square meter portion of Lot 1874.[4]
Thereafter, respondent Felisa Jacob had the land annually
declared as her property and paid the corresponding real
property taxes.
However, sometime in November 1981 respondent Felisa
Jacob discovered that Florencio Listana, son of Potenciana
Maramba, acquired from the Bureau of Lands in Legazpi City
Free Patent Certificate of Title No. VH-23536 dated 28 August
1980 covering the entire 14,284-square meter area of Lot 1874
which included the portion adjudicated to Felisa Jacob in 1966.
[5]

On 6 November 1981 respondent Felisa Jacob immediately
filed a protest before the Bureau of Lands in Legazpi City
alleging that she was the absolute owner of a one-fourth (1/4)
portion of Lot 1874 having acquired it through an extrajudicial
partition in 1966, and that through misrepresentation and
deceit Florencio Listana was able to secure title for the whole
of Lot 1874. Felisa Jacob prayed that an investigation be
conducted and that the Free Patent issued in the name of
Florencio Listana covering Lot 1874 be annulled and set aside.
After the death of Florencio Listana and notwithstanding the
protest filed by Felisa Jacob, the heirs of Florencio Listana sold
the entire Lot 1874 including the portion sold by Gregoria
Listana to Gaudencio Jacob to petitioner Alejandro Millena on
30 September 1986 for P6,000.00. Alejandro Millena, a
nephew of Florencio Listana and grandson of Potenciana
Maramba, was eventually issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-71657 covering the whole of Lot 1874.
Thus on 17 March 1992 respondent Felisa Jacob through her
attorney-in-fact Jaime Llaguno filed a complaint against
petitioner Alejandro Millena for annulment of title with
preliminary injunction and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City which she subsequently amended on 19
March 1992 by including a claim for reconveyance with
preliminary injunction and damages. She prayed for judgment
(a) declaring her the lawful and absolute owner of the one-
fourth (1/4) northern portion of Lot 1874; (b) ordering
Alejandro Millena to reconvey the aforesaid portion of Lot
1874 to her; (c) enjoining the construction of a house on said
lot by Alejandro Millena and, after trial, making the injunction
permanent; and, (d) ordering Alejandro Millena to pay
damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
On 3 October 1994 Judge Wenceslao R. Villanueva Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Br. 3, rendered a decision
ordering petitioner Alejandro Millena to reconvey by proper
document the portion of 3,934 square meters in question from
Lot 1874 to respondent Felisa Jacob and awarded to her
P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.
Petitioner Alejandro Millena appealed to the Court of Appeals
which on 12 August 1996 affirmed the trial court but deleted
the award of P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.[6] After the
appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
he filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner raises the following issues: (a) whether prescription
has now barred the action for reconveyance; (b) whether the
documents and pieces of evidence used by respondent Court
of Appeals as basis in its assailed Decision were duly
authenticated and proved by private respondent, Felisa Jacob;
and, (c) whether respondent appellate court correctly affirmed
the order of reconveyance by the trial court.
We resolve.
33
First. An action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by
prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on
fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of
the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the issuance of the original certificate of title.[7] On the
other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of
the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer
certificate of title. For the rule is that the registration of an
instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes
constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the
discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the
time of registration.[8]
In his petition Alejandro Millena argues that both the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals failed to pass upon the
issue of prescription. According to him, the issue of
prescription is pivotal considering that title to the property was
procured in 1980 while the action for reconveyance was filed
only in 1992. This interim period, he submits, had a span of
more than twelve (12) years; thus, the action for reconveyance
had clearly prescribed.
But, nonetheless, it must be stressed that prescription cannot
be invoked in an action for reconveyance when the plaintiff is
in possession of the land to be reconveyed.[9] In view of this,
can it be said that Felisa Jacob was in possession of the
contested portion of Lot 1874? Article 523 of the Civil Code
states that possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. In order to possess, one must first have
control of the thing and, second, a deliberate intention to
possess it. These are the elements of possession.
The records of the case show that respondent Felisa Jacob had
exercised dominion over the contested parcel of land.
Immediately after acquiring the property through an
extrajudicial settlement in 1966, she instructed her nephew
Jaime Llaguno to continue working as caretaker of the land.
Felisa made improvements on the land and paid its property
taxes. In fact the municipal treasurer of Daraga, Albay, issued a
certification dated 10 March 1992 that respondent Felisa Jacob
was the declared owner of Lot 1874-P - the litigated portion -
and that she had been paying its real property taxes since
1967.[10]
Apparently Felisa Jacob met the requisite elements of
possession. She exercised control over the parcel of land in
litigation through her caretaker, her nephew, Jaime Llaguno.
Moreover, her declaration that the land was her property and
the payment of real property taxes manifested clearly that she
was in possession of the land. Consequently, petitioner may
not validly invoke prescription as defense against respondent
Feliza Jacob.
Second. Petitioner Alejandro Millena questioned the very
existence and authenticity of several documents which
according to him the Court of Appeals used as basis for its
assailed Decision. These documents were (a) the compromise
agreement dated 17 August 1926 between Gregoria Listana

and Potenciana Maramba over Lot 1874; (b) the Justice of the
Peace decision dated 31 December 1926 dismissing the
ejectment suit filed by Potenciana Maramba against Gaudencio
Jacob; (c) the power of attorney executed by Gregoria Listana
authorizing her cousin Antonio Lipato to sell her one-fourth
portion of Lot 1874; and, (d) the deed of sale executed by
Antonio Lipato in favor of Gaudencio Jacob.
Alejandro Millena assailed the authenticity and even the
existence of the decision of the Justice of the Peace of Legazpi
dated 31 December 1926 in which the court dismissed the suit
filed by Potenciana Maramba against Gaudencio Jacob,
predecessor-in-interest of Felisa Jacob. The court decided in
favor of Gaudencio Jacob and held that he had the right to
possess the contested one-fourth (1/4) portion of Lot 1874.
Likewise, Alejandro Millena questioned the genuineness of the
compromise agreement dated 17 August 1926 among the
claimants of Lot 1874. Petitioner Millena averred that the
alleged compromise agreement did not bear the signatures of
the contracting parties except for the thumb mark of Gregoria
Listana from whom Gaudencio Jacob bought the property.
As to the special power of attorney and the deed of sale,
Alejandro Millena insisted that respondent Felisa Jacob never
proved the existence of these documents. Thus, according to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals erred in assuming their
existence and using them to support its assailed Decision.
Questions of authenticity of documents being one of fact, this
Court will not ordinarily disturb the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals on this matter.[11] However for the sake of substantial
justice we shall thoroughly discuss the points raised by
petitioner.
The focal issue that needs to be answered and which would
ultimately resolve the other issues raised by petitioner is the
genuineness of the decision of the Justice of the Peace dated
31 December 1926. Being a public document the decision is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its due
execution or genuineness. Such decision may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record or by his deputy.
[12]
We have examined the copy of the decision and found it to be
genuine.[13] The decision, which was penned in Spanish, was
duly signed by Justice of the Peace Manuel M. Calleja. It also
bore the seal of the court and an attestation that such was a
true copy.[14] Moreover, petitioner Alejandro Millena failed to
adduce any evidence demonstrating the spurious character of
the decision.
Having resolved the issue of genuineness, it can therefore be
said that the facts enumerated by the Justice of the Peace in its
decision are likewise correct. This is because a judgment is
conclusive as to the facts admitted by the pleadings or
assumed by the decision, where they were essential to the
judgment, and were such that the judgment could not legally
34
have been rendered without them.[15] The Justice of the
Peace found that -
[Plaintiff Potenciana Maramba and Gregoria Listana x x x were
co-owners [of Lot 1874]. The land [subject matter of this suit
for unlawful detainer] was claimed by one and the other, finally
they arrived at a compromise agreement whereby Potenciana
Maramba ceded to Gregoria Listana one-fourth (1/4) portion of
the land referred to. This compromise agreement was
submitted to the Cadastral Court x x x and an adjudication was
rendered in accordance with the tenor of the compromise
agreement x x x x [T]he land was surveyed and x x x the
northern portion equivalent to one-fourth part was delivered
to Gregoria Listana. The latter was seriously sick of
tuberculosis. And foreseeing that someday she would die x x x
she executed a power-of-attorney (Exh "1") in favor of her
cousin Antonio Lipato in order that in case of her death he
would sell the land and the proceeds thereof be paid for the
expenses of her interment x x x x In fact on October 23, 1926
on which date Gregoria Listana died, Antonio Lipato executed a
document of sale over the land in favor of defendant herein
[Gaudencio Jacob].[16]
The foregoing pronouncements of the Justice of the Peace
confirmed the existence of the compromise agreement, the
power of attorney and the deed of sale. And since no appeal
was made, the 31 December 1926 decision of the Justice of the
Peace had long become final and the findings of fact therein
conclusive.
Third. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year from
entry, a decree of registration is no longer open for review or
attack, even though the issuance thereof may have been
attended by fraud and that the title may be inherently
defective. The law nevertheless safeguards the rightful partys
or the aggrieved partys interest in the titled land from fraud
and improper technicalities by allowing such party to bring an
action for reconveyance to him of whatever he has been
deprived as long as the property has not been transferred or
conveyed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action, while
respecting the decree as incontrovertible, seeks to transfer or
reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful
owner.
In an action for reconveyance the issue involved is one of
ownership, and for this purpose, evidence of title may be
introduced. In fact, respondent Felisa Jacob had submitted
evidence showing a strong claim of ownership over the
contested parcel of land. She testified before the trial court
that she had been in actual possession of the land since 1966.
Moreover, proof was adduced showing that her predecessor-
in-interest, her father Gaudencio Jacob, had lawfully possessed
the property from 1926. She likewise offered as evidence a
certification from the municipal treasurer that she had been
declaring the land as her property for tax purposes since 1967.
The evidence on record without doubt tilts in favor of
respondent Felisa Jacob. Although petitioner Alejandro Millena
holds a certificate of title covering the contested parcel of land,

such possession of a certificate of title alone does not
necessarily make the holder thereof the true owner of all the
property described therein. Land registration proceedings
cannot be made a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at
the expense of another. The inclusion of an area in a certificate
of title which the registered owner or successful applicant has
placed no claim on and has never asserted any right of
ownership thereof is void and of no effect.[17] Thus, the
incorporation of the 3,934-square meter northern portion of
Lot 1874 in the Free Patent Certificate Title issued to Florencio
Listana on 28 August 1980 was clearly erroneous and irregular.
Petitioner also avers that he is an innocent purchaser for value
and that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper against
him. He argues that the finding of respondent appellate court
of bad faith was not supported by evidence. A purchaser in
good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such
property at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice
of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
Good faith, or the lack of it, is in the final analysis a question of
intention; but in ascertaining the intention by which one is
actuated on a given occasion, we are necessarily controlled by
the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which
alone the inward motive may, with safety, be determined.
Truly, good faith is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen
or touched, but rather a state or condition of mind which can
only be judged by actual or fancied tokens or signs. Otherwise
stated, good faith is the opposite of fraud and it refers to the
state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned.[18]
Certain pieces of evidence when put together would prove that
petitioner Alejandro Millena had actual knowledge of facts that
would have made an ordinary prudent purchaser of land go
beyond what appears on the face of the certificate of title and
inquire into its genuineness. The first evidence to be
considered is the 3 October 1994 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City wherein it ruled
[D]uring the ocular inspection conducted by this court, it was
noted that only a portion of the defendants [Alejandro
Millenas] kitchen encroached a small portion of the lot in
question and his house merely occupied an abandoned road
adjoining the lot in question which cast doubt to the
defendants claim of possession and ownership of the property
in question.[19]
Prescinding from this pronouncement we can conclude that
petitioner Alejandro Millena lived right beside the contested
portion of Lot 1874. And since he himself insisted that his
house was constructed in 1980,[20] it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, for him not to have noticed Felisa
Jacobs nephew and caretaker Jaime Llaguno planting and
harvesting crops in the disputed land.
In fact Bgy. Secretary Lucio Londonio, who is also a brother-in-
law of petitioner Alejandro Millena, testified in court that he
has been living near the contested parcel of land for thirty-
35
seven (37) years. Londonio told the court that the land was
originally owned by Gaudencio Jacob and that ownership
hereof was later transferred to Felisa Jacob. He further testified
that he would often see Jaime Llaguno, the caretaker of the
land, planting banana and coconut trees on the land.[21]
We are hard-pressed to believe the claim of petitioner that he
purchased Lot 1874 in good faith. Having lived adjacent to the
contested lot six (6) years prior to his purchase of Lot 1874 in
1986, petitioner Alejandro Millena would have seen and
noticed the crops and fruit trees planted by Jaime Llaguno on
the land. Thus, contrary to his asseverations, petitioner was
not a purchaser in good faith since there were circumstances
sufficient to arouse his curiosity and prod him to inquire into
the real status of his sellers title.
Finally, a perusal of the records reveals that petitioner
Alejandro Millena prior to his purchase of the land in 1986 had
knowledge of the protest filed by Feliza Jacob before the
Bureau of Lands against Florencio Listana in 1981. This he
admitted during his cross-examination on 7 February 1994 -
Atty. Ludovico:
......Are you aware of the protest that was filed by Felisa Jacob x
x x before the Bureau of Lands at Legazpi City in connection
with Lot No. 1874, the lot in question?
Alejandro Millena: Yes, sir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 12 August 1996 as well as its
Resolution of 6 December 1996 denying petitioner Alejandro
Millena's motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
Consequently, petitioner is ORDERED to reconvey within thirty
(30) days from the finality of this Decision that northern
portion in question of Lot 1874 consisting of 3,934 square
meters as shown in the location map (Exhs. "L" and "L-1") in
favor of private respondent Felisa Jacob, represented herein by
her attorney-in-fact Jaime Llaguno, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Gatioan vs. Gaffud (PNB), 27 SCRA 706
This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer
certificates of title to different persons for the same lots, or
subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of
title were issued to replace the original title. The factual
background is as follows:
1. On August 9, 1918, a deed of sale for two parcels of
land, E and G (with a total area of more than seven hectares) of
the Hacienda Maysilo, located in Malabon, Rizal and covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in favor of
Ismael Lapus a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed was

executed pursuant to an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Civil Case No. 391, Negao vs. Vidal, a partition
proceeding involving the said hacienda (See Bustamante vs.
Tuason, 47 Phil. 433, 434).
2. The deed of sale was presented for registration at
two-twenty five in the afternoon of January 15, 1920 and was
recorded as Primary Entry No. 7710. That deed of sale itself
contains the following entries showing that it was annotated
on the back of OCT NO. 983:
Presentado en este Registro a las 2:25 de la tarde del dia de
hoy segun el Asiento No. 7710 de tomo 10 del Libro Diario,
Pasig, Rizal, Enero 15, 1920.
Register of Deeds (Exh. B-12)
Inscrito el documento que precede al dorso del certificado de
Titulo Original No. 983 del Tomo A-9, de inscritor en las paginas
113 y 114 ambos del libro T-25 de registro como certificados de
titulo Nos. 4910 y 4911, archivado en el legajo T-#4910. Pasig,
Rizal, Enero 15, 1920.:
Register of Deeds (Exh. B-1).
However, it seemed that, contrary to the foregoing entry and
the official routine or standard operating procedure, the deed
of sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that,
consequently, that title was apparently not cancelled. Why that
annotation did not appear in OCT No. 983 and why there was
no notation of the cancellation of that title, as it appeared in
1962, is a mystifying circumstance in this case.
3. As a result of the registration of that deed of sale,
Transfer Certificate of 'Title No. 4910 was issued to Lapus for
the two parcels of land, E and G, and I Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 4911 was issued for the remaining five lots covered by
OCT No. 983 (which embrace an area of more than two
hundred fifty-eight hectares registered in the names of more
than twenty-six-co-owners). TCT Nos. 4910 and 4911 contain
the following entries: "Transfer from No. 983. Originally
registered on the 29th day of January, in the year 1917 in Book
No. A-9, page 215, of the said Province of Rizal, pursuant to a
decree entered in Case No. 3850."
4. Lapus on different occasions mortgaged the two
parcels of land to secure his obligations to the Philippine
National Bank, the Government and the Philippine Trust
Company. He died in 1951. The two parcels of land were
inherited by his daughter, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon. She became
the registered owner of the two lots. She subdivided them into
fifty-five lots. She sold some of the subdivision lots to her co-
respondents-appellees herein. Lapus and his successors-in-
interest have been in possession of the two parcels even
before 1910 or for more than seventy years.
5. Meanwhile, in 1962, certain. alleged heirs
(collectively known as the Riveras) of the late Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal filed a motion in Land Registration Cases Nos.
36
4429 and 4496 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, alleging
that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda
Maysilo covered by OCT No. 983 and for other titles and that,
since only OCT No. 983 was supposedly unencumbered, all the
land covered by that title should be adjudicated to them. The
court granted the motion. It should be stressed that OCT No.
983 appears to have remained uncancelled notwithstanding
the sale to Lapus of two parcels covered by it and the fact that
it had been replaced by TCT Nos. 4910 and 4911.
6. On June 7, 1963, OCT No. 983 was definitely
cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
112236 was issued to the Riveras. Later, Lots 5 and 7 of the
said title (corresponding to parcels E and G which were sold to
Ismael Lapus in 1918 as stated earlier) were assigned by
Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia and TCT
Nos. 112743 and 112742 were issued to Cruz and Garcia,
respectively. Thus, two sets of transfer certificates of title for
Lots E and G or 5 and 7, originally covered by OCT No. 983,
were issued, one to the heir of Ismael Lapus and another set to
the successors-in-interest of the Riveras.
7. On October 22, 1964, Garcia subdivided Lot 7 (G) into
Lots A and B. Garcia retained Lot A and obtained TCT No.
134958 for it. He assigned Lot B to Antonio Muoz on
November 5, 1964. As a consequence of the assignment, TCT
No. 112742 was cancelled and TCT No. 134957 was issued to
Muoz. In 1965, he mortgaged Lot B to the Associated Banking
Corporation to secure a loan of P200,000.
8. On the other hand, on July 17, 1964 Cruz sold to
Santiago Go Lot 5 (E) covered by TCT No. 112743. TCT No.
131329 was issued to Go on August 25,1964. On December 23,
1964, Go mortgaged Lot 6 to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) to secure a loan of P50,000 which was later increased to
P60,000.
9. Muoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts. The
two banks foreclosed the mortgages. The PNB bought the
mortgaged lot at the auction sale held on May 4. 1967. The
sheriff issued to it a certificate of sale dated May 19, 1967 but
at that time there was already a notice of lis pendens
annotated on the title of the mortgaged lot. TCT Nos. 212163
and 236881 for the mortgaged lots were issued to the
Associated Banking Corporation and the Philippine National
Bank, respectively.
10. The Riveras and their successors-in-interest have
never set foot on the disputed lots.
11. Mrs. Gozon later learned that the Riveras and their
successors-in-interest had acquired the land (more than two
hundred fifty-eight hectares) covered by OCT No. 983. Her
lawyer and a surveyor informed her that parcels E and G, which
she inherited from her father, were identical to Lots 5 and 7
which were conveyed to Cruz and Garcia. She registered
adverse claims on the titles covering Lots 5 and 7. On
December 27, 1965 she and the persons to whom she had
transferred portions of parcels E and G filed with the Court of

First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City against the Riveras, Cruz,
Muoz, Garcia, Associated Banking Corporation, PNB and
others an action to quiet title and for damages.
12. A notice of lis pendens was annotated on January 25,
1966 on the titles of Garcia, Muoz and Go. The notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the title of the PNB when the sale
in its favor was registered on December 13, 1969.
13. The trial court in its decision of July 30, 1975
declared valid TCT Nos. 141802 to 141855 and 143512 issued
to Mrs. Gozon and her co-plaintiffs. It voided TCT No. 112235
issued to the Riveras and all titles and transactions emanating
therefrom insofar as those titles covered the lots embraced in
plaintiffs' titles. The Riveras were ordered to pay the plaintiffs
twenty thousand pesos as attorney's fees.
14. The trial court also ordered Muoz to pay the
Associated Banking Corporation, in the event that the bank
would be evicted from the lot covered by TCT No. 212153, two
hundred sixty-five thousand seventy-two pesos and fifteen
centavos with twelve percent interest per annum from the
date of the eviction plus ten thousand pesos as attorney's fees.
15. Santiago Go was ordered to pay the PNB, should it be
evicted from the lot covered by TCT No. 236881, the sum of
sixty thousand pesos plus nine percent interest per annum
from the date of the eviction and six thousand pesos as
attorney's fees.
16. That judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its decision of May 25, 1978. Garcia and the
PNB appealed from that decision. The Associated Banking
Corporation, now the Associated Citizens Bank, tried to appeal
but it was not able to file its petition for review (L-49010).
Garcia contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding
that his title is valid and that the titles of Ismael Lapus and his
successors-in-interest lost their right to the disputed lots due
to their negligence or inaction.
The issue is whether the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the
titles derived therefrom should prevail over the 1963 title
issued to the Riveras and the subsequent titles derived from it.
Should Lapus' title prevail even if it was not annotated by the
register of deeds on the anterior or parent title which was not
cancelled before 1963? It was that noncancellation which led
to the issuance of the duplicative title to the Riveras and
eventually to the execution of the controversial mortgages and
foreclosure sales to the two banks.
We hold that the two appeals have no merit. The title of Lapus
and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect. The
title of the Riveras and the titles springing from it are void.
There can be no doubt that Lapus was an innocent purchaser
for value. He validly transmitted to his successors-in-interest
his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed lots or
parcels of land. That title could not be nullified or defeated by
37
the issuance forty-three Years later to other persons of another
title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of
deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapuz.
This must be so considering that Lapus and his interest
remained in possession of the disputed successors in lots and
the rival claimants never possessed the same.
"The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevail,
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly,
or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate" (Hogg,
Australian Torrens System 823, citing cases and cited in Legarda
and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595).
"Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations,
where more than once certificate is issued in respect of a party
estate or interest in land, the Person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person
is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder
of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof " (Niblack, Analysis of the Torrens System page
237, cited in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, supra, pages 595-
6).
And the rule that in case of double registration the owner of
the earlier certificate is the owner of the land applies to the
successive vendees of the owners of such certificates. "The
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against
the vendee of the owner of the later certificate" (Legarda and
Prieto vs. Saleeby, supra, pages 597-9).
It is settled that is this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in
tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred
in right) is followed in land registration matters (La Urbana vs.
Bernardo, 62 Phil. 790, 806).
Appellant Garcia invokes the ruling that the mere entry of a
document in the day or entry book without noting it on the
certificate of title is not a sufficient registration (Bass vs. De la
Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685).
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases
of Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made
between voluntary and involuntary registration, such as the
registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of
his pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary registration,
an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all
persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not
presented to the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin vs.
Bass, in case of voluntary registration of documents an
innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a
certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the
day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the

owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold and
pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds is
duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano vs. Dineros, 97 Phil.
196.)
The instant case is not Identical to the Bass cases. Here the
deed of sale in favor of Lapus, which was judicially authorized,
was entered in the entry book and a new title was issued to
him. As already stated, and this point should be underscored,
the deed of sale in favor of Lapus contains the notation that it
was annotated on the back of OCT No. 983 (presumably, the
original and owner's duplicate thereof).
But why in 1962 it appeared that no such annotation was
found on the back of OCT No. 983, contrary to what was stated
in the 1918 deed of sale, is a mystery that the trill court and
the plaintiffs failed to unravel during the trial. Moreover, the
title issued to Lapus contains the usual notation that it was a
transfer from a previous title which in this case was OCT No.
983.
It should be further observed that the deed of sale in favor of
Lapus and the titles issued to him and his successors interest
together with his mortgage in 1929 of the disputed lots to the
PNB itself, are all a matter of public record in the registry of
deeds.
As stressed in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600,
"the record is notice to all the world. All persons are charged
with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing
with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be
charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which the record discloses.
"When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record
is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein." "Under the rule of notice, it is
presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument
of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrefutable. He
is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby,
supra, page 600).
As Justice Johnson says, "this presumption cannot be overcome
by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very
purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of
want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than
one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice
of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law.
The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation" (Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, supra, pp. 600-601).
38
As to the PNB's claim that it was a mortgagee and purchaser in
good faith and for value, the Appellate Court held that the
bank should have made an on-the-spot investigation of the lot
mortgaged by Go to ascertain whether he was in possession of
it or it was claimed by other persons. Its failure to do so
precludes the bank from being considered as a mortgagee in
good faith and for value (Gatioan vs. Gaffud, L-21953, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706).
On the other hand, the trial court held that the PNB was not a
buyer in good faith when it bought Go's lot at the auction sale
because there was already a notice of his pendens annotated
on his title.
In the Gatioan case, it appears that in 1935 Rufina Permison
secured a Torrens title for a parcel of land on the basis of a free
patent. The land was sold to Encarnacion Gatioan and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1212 was issued to her. She mortgaged
the land three times to the PNB
In 1956, the spouses Sixto Gaffud and Villamora Logan were
able to secure a Torrens title for the same lot also on the basis
of a free patent. They mortgaged the land also to the PNB. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on discovering
that two Torrens titles were issued for the same land,
recommended the cancellation of the later title issued to the
Gaffud spouses. As the PNB refused to cancel the mortgaged
executed by Gatioan, in spite of the fact that she had made full
payment of the mortgage debt, she filed against the Gaffud
spouses and the PNB an action to quiet title.
It was held that Gatioan's title should prevail over that of the
Gaffud spouses and that the mortgage executed by them in
favor of the PNB was void. The Gaffud spouse were ordered to
pay damages to Gatioan.
Since the applicable rule in the instant case is that the earlier
certificate of title should be recognized as superior and
controlling there is no justification for relying on the doctrine
laid down by Justice Holmes in Eliason vs. Wilborn 281 U.S.
457, that "as between two innocent persons, one of whom
must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who
made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss."
There was no breach of trust in this case. What is note. worthy
in this case is that after it was recited in the registered deed of
sale that sale was annotated at the back of the title covering
the lots sold, it turned out that the title did not contain such an
annotation and that the title was not cancelled. For that
anomaly, the purchaser, Ismael Lapus, the how" of the earlier
title, was not culpable or blameworthy.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming
the decision of the trial court, should stand. Costs against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Bayoca vs. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154
Facts:
Gaudioso Nogales acquired ownership over the subject
property on the basis of the Compromise Agreement and the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Julia Deocareza who had
acquired of said property from the Canino brothers and sisters.
However, Preciosa Canino subsequently sold at different times
portions of the subject property to herein petiitoners,
Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso, Erwin Bayoca, and spouses
Pio and Dolores Dichoso. The Appellee, filed complaint against
the Appellants for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages. He
alleged in his complaint, that he purchased the said property
from Julia Decareza and thus acquired ownership thereof and
that the Appellants respectively purchased portions of said
property in bad faith and through fraud. The Appellants, in
their Answer to the complaint, alleged that Preciosa Canino
and her siblings acquired just title over the property when they
executed their Deed of Partition of Real Property and
conveyed titles to the vendees, the Appellants in the present
recourse, as buyers in goof faith. The Regional Trial Court ruled
in favor of Nogales and declared that the sales of portions of
said property by Preciosa Canino were null and void. The trial
court further declared further that petitioners were purchasers
in bad faith. On appeal, the court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
ruling. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Who has the superior right to the parcel of land sold to
different buyers at different times by its former owners?
Ruling:
Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed DECISION of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. There is no question from the
records that respondent Nogales was the first to buy the
subject property from Julia, who in turn bought the same from
the Canino brothers and sisters. Petitioners, however, rely on
the fact that they were the first to register the sales of the
different portions of the property resulting in the issuance of
new titles in their names. Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs
the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as
follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property. Should it be immovable property,
the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should
there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
Based on the foregoing, to merit the protection under Article
1544, second paragraph, the second buyer must act in good
faith in registering the deed. Thus, It has been held that in
cases of double sale of immovables, what finds relevance and
materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer
in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers
such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of
any defect in the title of the property. On account of the
39
undisputed fact of registration by respondent Nogales as the
first buyer, necessarily, there is absent good faith in the
registration of the sale by the petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the
spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso for which they had been
issued certificates of title in their names. As for the petitioners
Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to register
the portions of the property sold to them, and merely rely on
the fact that they declared the same in their name for taxation
purposes. Suffice it to state, that such fact, does not, by itself,
constitute evidence of ownership and cannot likewise prevail
over the title of respondent
Cruz vs. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656
FACTS:
Leodegaria Cabana sold his real propery first to Teofilo Legaspi
and Illuminada Cabana and then later to Abelardo Cruz.
Legaspi and Cabana were able to take possession of the
property but they were not able to register the deed of
absolute sale because the property was still mortgaged to PNB.
They however were able to register with the RD the sale with
the right to repurchase.
On the other hand, Cruz succeeded to register the deed of
absolute sale in his favor.
HELD:
Even though Cruz was the first to register the deed of absolute
sale, he cannot be given a better right over the property
because he was a buyer in bad faith.
Cruz knew the prior sale of the property because he was
informed by the RD that Legazpi and Cabana already registered
the sale of the said property.
Knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a
subsequent purchaser makes him a purchaser in bad faith and
his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his title acquired by
virtue of the latter instrument of conveyance which creates no
right as against the first purchaser.
Dagupan Trading Co. vs. Macam, 14 SCRA 179
FACTS: Sammy Maron and his seven brothers and sisters were
pro-indiviso owners of a parcel of unregistered land located in
barrio Parayao, Binmaley, Pangasinan. In 1955, while their
application for registration of said land under Act No. 496 was
pending, they executed, on June 19 and on September 21, two
deeds of sale conveying the property to herein respondent
Rustico Macam who thereafter took possession of the property
and made substantial improvements upon it. On October 14,
1955, OCT No. 6942 covering the land was issued in the name
of the Marons, free from all liens and encumbrances.
On August 4, 1956, however, by virtue of a final judgment of
the Municipal Court of Manila in a civil case in favor of Manila
Trading and Supply Co. (Manila Trading) against Sammy Maron,
levy was made upon whatever interest he had in the subject

property. Thereafter, said interest was sold at public auction to
the judgment creditor Manila Trading. The corresponding
notice of levy, certificate of sale and the sheriff's certificate of
final sale in favor of Manila Trading - because nobody exercised
the right of redemption - were duly registered, and on March
1, 1958, the latter sold all its rights and title in the property to
herein petitioner Dagupan Trading Company (Dagupan
Trading).
On September 4, 1958, Dagupan Trading filed an action against
Macam, praying that it be declared owner of one-eighth
portion of the subject property. The CFI of Pangasinan
dismissed the said complaint, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed its decision.
ISSUE:
Who has the superior right over the one-eight portion of the
subject property?
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed both decisions of the
lower courts. At the time of the levy, Sammy Maron already
had no interest on the one-eight portion of the property he
and his siblings have inherited because for a considerable time
prior to the levy, said interest had already been conveyed upon
Macam "fully and irretrievably" - as the Court of Appeals held.
Consequently, the subsequent levy made on the property for
the purpose of satisfying the judgment rendered against
Sammy Maron in favor of the Manila Trading Company was
void and of no effect.
The unregistered sale and the consequent conveyance of title
and ownership in favor Macam could not have been cancelled
and rendered of no effect upon the subsequent issuance of the
Torrens title over the entire parcel of land. Moreover, upon the
execution of the deed of sale in his favor by Sammy Maron,
Macam had immediately taken possession of the land
conveyed as its new owner and introduced considerable
improvements upon it himself. To deprive him, therefore, of
the same by sheer force of technicality would be against both
justice and equity.
Tomada vs. Tomada, 28 SCRA 1028
Heirs of Claro Laureta vs. IAC, 184 SCRA 157
The instant case is the fourth case that reached this Court
involving the same parties and property.
In this case, the heirs of Marcos Mata (petitioners) seek the
reversal of the decision, dated 31 July 1991, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24434, permanently enjoining the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Tagum, Davao City, from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 2468, an action to enforce
petitioners' right to repurchase the subject lot under Section
40
119 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1940, spouses Marcos and Codidi Mata, members
of a non-christian cultural minority in Davao and predecessors-
in-interest of petitioners, were granted a homestead patent
over a parcel of land situated in Tagum, Davao del Norte
containing an area of 4.5777 hectares. Original Certificate of
Title No. 3019 covering the subject lot issued in their favor.
On 10 June 1945, Marcos Mata (Mata) executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying the ownership of the subject lot in
favor of Claro L. Laureta the predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents. On 10 May 1947, Mata executed another
document selling the same property to Fermin Caram, Jr.
(Caram), who caused the cancellation of OCT No. 3019. In lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in
Caram's name.
On 25 June 1956, Laureta filed before the Court of First
Instance of Tagum (now RTC) an action, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3083, to declare the first sale of the subject lot in his favor
valid and the second sale thereof to Caram void.
On 29 February 1964, the CFI of Tagum rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the deed of sale, Exhibit A, executed
by Marcos Mata in favor of Claro L. Laureta stands and prevails
over the deed of sale, Exhibit F, in favor of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
2. Declaring as null and void the deed of sale, Exhibit F,
in favor of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
3. Directing Marcos Mata to acknowledge the deed of
sale, Exhibit A, in favor of Claro L. Laureta;
4. Directing Claro L. Laureta to secure the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the
deed, Exhibit A, after Marcos Mata shall have acknowledged
the same before a notary public;
5. Directing Claro L. Laureta to surrender to the Register
of Deeds for the City and Province of Davao the Owner's
Duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 3019 and the latter
to cancel the same;
6. Ordering the Register of Deeds for the City and
Province of Davao to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
140 in the name of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
7. Directing the Register of Deeds for the City and
Province of Davao to issue a title in favor of Claro L. Laureta,
Filipino, resident of Quezon City, upon presentation of the
deed executed by Marcos Mata in his favor, Exhibit A, duly

acknowledged by him and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and
8. Dismissing the counterclaim and crossclaim of
Marcos Mata and Codidi Mata, the counterclaim of Caram, Jr.,
the answer in intervention, counterclaim and crossclaim of the
Mansacas. 1
On appeal by the spouses Mata and Caram, the CA affirmed
the aforesaid decision of the CFI. Two (2) separate petitions for
review were then filed by the Matas and Caram with this Court.
The petition filed by the spouses Mata, docketed as G.R. No. L-
29147, was dismissed by the Court for lack of merit on 20 June
1968. Said decision became final and executory on 26 July
1968. Upon the other hand, the petition filed by Caram,
docketed as G.R. No. L-28740, was dismissed by the Court on
24 February 1981. 2 Said decision became final and executory
on 12 February 1982.
Meanwhile, on 23 February 1979, spouses Mata filed with the
Court of First Instance (now RTC), Branch 1 of Tagum, Davao
del Norte, Civil Case No. 1071 against the Lauretas for recovery
of ownership and possession of the subject lot. The spouses
Mata alleged that the deed of sale executed between Mata
and Laureta involving the subject lot is null and void and/or
unenforceable because the same had not been approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required
by law and as directed by the CFI of Davao in its decision of 29
February 1964 in Civil Case No. 3083, and that said decision
could no longer be executed as the same had already
prescribed.
On 12 February 1983, an alias writ of execution was issued by
the CFI enforcing its decision in Civil Case No. 3083. By then,
Mata was already dead while his heirs (petitioners) refused to
acknowledge the deed of sale in accordance with the said
decision. In lieu of the requisite acknowledgment, the officer-
in-charge of the court (now RTC, Branch VIII, Davao City)
certified and affirmed the due execution of the deed of sale
executed between Mata and Laureta. Thereafter, on 21
February 1984, the deed of absolute sale in favor of Laureta
was duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources.
Finally, on 9 May 1985, TCT No. T-46346 covering the subject
lot was issued in the name of Laureta.
On 20 April 1983, the RTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
1071 declaring, among others, that the decision in Civil Case
No. 3083 in favor of private respondents had "become stale
and unenforceable due to prescription." It ordered the return
of the ownership of the subject lot to petitioners.
On appeal by private respondents, the CA affirmed in toto the
CFI decision in Civil Case No. 1071. The case was then elevated
to the Supreme Court which reversed and set aside the
decision of the CA. Speaking through Justice Regalado, the
Court, in its decision 3 in G.R. No. 72194 promulgated on 5
April 1990, ruled that the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 3083 was not time-barred because the ten-year
period for the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 3083
41
commenced to run only on 12 February 1982 when the
decision denying Caram's petition became final and executory.
Upon the belief that they could still exercise their right to
repurchase the subject lot under the Public Land Act, on 22
November 1990, petitioners filed with the RTC, Branch 1 of
Tagum, Davao City, an action against private respondents for
legal redemption, reconveyance and consignation, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2468.
Maintaining that Civil Case No. 2468 would render nugatory
and ineffectual the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 72194,
private respondents instituted with this Court a petition for
injunction and prohibition seeking, among others, to restrain
the trial court from proceeding with said case. On 11 March
1991, this Court referred the same to the CA for resolution.
The CA ruled in favor of private respondents and permanently
enjoined the RTC from further proceeding with Civil Case No.
2468. The CA categorically declared that petitioners' right to
repurchase the subject lot under the Public Land Act had
already prescribed. 4 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its resolution,
dated 12 November 1991.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review
alleging in the main that respondent CA erred in holding that
petitioners' right to repurchase the subject property under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings,
this Court issued a resolution, dated 5 September 1994,
denying the petition for review for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that respondent court committed any
reversible error in rendering the assailed decision.
Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, dated 27
September 1994, however, this Court, in its resolution, dated
24 October 1994, reinstated the instant petition, gave due
course to the same and directed the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
In their petitioner, the fundamental issue raised by petitioners
is whether or not they could still exercise their right to
repurchase the subject lot under the Public Land Act. In their
motion for reconsideration and memorandum, however,
petitioners question the validity of the sale of the subject lot to
Laureta. They contend that said sale was void because the
document evidencing the same was written in English, a
language not understood by the vendor, and that it was not
approved by the Office for the Southern Cultural Communities
(OSCC) in violation of Section 120 of the Public Land Act.
Subsequently, the various pleadings separately filed by
petitioners themselves, on one hand, and Atty. Rodolfo U.
Jimenez, their counsel, and Isidro Sembrano, their purported
attorney-in-fact, on the other hand, have left this Court baffled
as to petitioners' real stand on the matter. Thus:

1. In a Manifestation with Motion, dated 23 November
1995, filed by petitioners themselves without the assistance of
their counsel, they informed the Court that they have agreed
to an amicable settlement of the case with private
respondents. In view thereof, they prayed that they be allowed
to withdraw their petition. Attached to the said Manifestation
with Motion were petitioners' letters, dated 23 November
1995, addressed to their attorney-in-fact (Isidro Sembrano) and
to their counsel-on-record (Attys. Winston F. Garcia and
Rodolfo U. Jimenez), informing them of the termination of
their services. The amicable settlement, of even date,
purportedly signed by all the petitioners and private
respondents' attorney-in-fact, was also attached to the said
Manifestation with Motion.
2. On 15 January 1996, Celestino Mata and Andres
Basaca filed with the Court their respective affidavits, dated 30
December 1995. Celestino Mata, one of petitioners, claimed
that he is the same person referred to as Lucino Mata who was
made to sign the Manifestation with Motion the letters
terminating the services of the attorney-in-fact and the
lawyers, and the amicable settlement, all dated 23 November
1995. Celestino Mata averred that he did not understand the
contents of these documents and that his signatures thereon
were obtained by fraud.
3. For his part, Alfredo Basaca assailed the authority of
Arcadio Mata Pasindo to sign the amicable settlement on
behalf of the heirs of Marcos and Codidi Mata. While Alfredo
Basaca asserted that he is one of the heirs of the spouses
Mata, however, the records show that he is not named as one
of the petitioners in this case.
4. The Court, in its Resolution, dated 26 February 1996,
directed the petitioners and Atty. Jimenez to comment on
and/or confirm the Manifestation with Motion of 23 November
1995. In compliance therewith, Atty. Jimenez filed his
Comment, dated 29 March 1996, informing the Court that he
was not consulted by petitioners when they filed said
Manifestation with Motion. He urged the Court to decide the
case on the merits.
5. Upon the other hand, most of the petitioners,
namely Clarita Mata Pasindo, Julieta Mata Abundo, Engracio
Mata, Dagakan Mata vda. de Cuanas, Marcelo Mata, Severino
Antolihao, Arcadio Mata Pasindo, Lucia Mata Antolihao and
Meliton Mata, filed their Manifestation with Motion (to
Comment and/or Confirm), dated 27 March 1996. They
affirmed their respective signatures on the Manifestation with
Motion of 23 November 1995 and the attachments thereto and
averred that they understood the contents thereof as these
were fully explained to them in the presence of the Provincial
Officer of the OSCC in Tagum, Davao. They reiterated their
prayer that they be allowed to withdraw their petition.
6. On 5 September 1996, Isidro Sembrano submitted to
this Court a Joint Affidavit of petitioners Celestino Mata and
Ricarda Mata, dated 21 February 1996, claiming, among
42
others, that they were deceived into signing the amicable
settlement. On 10 January 1997, Isidro Sembrano submitted a
Joint Affidavit of Rosendo Mata-Pasindo, Carmelita Mata-
Pasindo, Wilfredo Mata and Julieta Mata-Abundio, dated 9
January 1997, again claiming that they were deceived into
signing the amicable settlement. Curiously, however, except for
Julieta Mata-Abundio, the three (3) other affiants, namely,
Rosendo Mata-Pasindo, Carmelita Mata-Pasindo and Wilfredo
Mata, were not signatories to the amicable settlement.
7. On 23 June 1997, petitioners filed with the Court
their Joint Affidavit, dated 26 May 1997, reiterating their
Manifestation with Motion of 23 November 1995. They
manifested in the Joint Affidavit that they voluntarily signed
the amicable settlement and reiterated their prayer that they
be allowed to withdraw their petition. In support of said Joint
Affidavit, petitioners attached thereto the report of Mr.
Romero A. Maing, the Provincial Officer of the OSCC in Tagum,
Davao, dated 10 February, regarding an investigation he
conducted on 3 February 1997 attended by petitioners. Mr.
Maing attested that petitioners categorically denied having
been coerced, forced or intimidated into signing the amicable
settlement. Upon Mr. Maing's query, petitioners expressed
their desire to proceed with the amicable settlement of the
case.
8. Thereafter, Atty. Jimenez filed a motion, dated 25
August 1997, urging this Court to resolve the petition. He also
filed a Motion to Require Personal Appearance of Petitioners
before the OSCC to Verify their Final Stand on the Petition,
dated 29 September 1997. In said motion, Atty. Jimenez
admitted that he had only been in contact with the attorney-in-
fact of petitioners and never with petitioners themselves.
9. Private respondents then filed a Dismiss Petition,
dated 10 September 1997. Petitioners likewise filed an
Opposition to Motion to Resolve Petition Filed by Attorney
Rodolfo U. Jimenez as Counsel for Petitioners, dated 1 October
1997. In said opposition, signed by all the petitioners
themselves, they reiterated that the amicable settlement of 23
November 1995 was their own free and voluntary act. They
explained that although it was written in English, the contents
thereof were translated and fully explained to them in the
dialect known to and understood by them. With regard to their
relationship to Attorney Jimenez, petitioners denied that they
personally engaged him to represent them in this case. It was
allegedly only Isidro Sembrano, acting on his own, who
engaged Atty. Jimenez' legal services. At any rate, having
terminated the same on 23 November 1995, petitioners
claimed that Atty. Jimenez no longer had any authority to
represent them in the case. Petitioners reiterated their prayer
that they be allowed to withdraw their petition. The Provincial
Officer of the OSCC in Tagum, Davao issued a Certification,
dated 3 October 1997, attesting that the contents of said
opposition were fully explained to petitioners in their dialect.
10. In a resolution, dated 10 December 1997, the Court
required Atty. Jimenez to file his comment on said opposition.
In compliance therewith, Atty. Jimenez averred in his comment,

dated 5 February 1998, that he is merely protecting the
interests of petitioners and urged this Court to resolve the case
on the merits. A few months later, said counsel filed the
Motion for Leave to File Attached Joint Affidavit of Some of the
Petitioners, dated 1 June 1998. The Joint Affidavit, dated 20
March 1998, purportedly executed by six (6) affiants, namely,
Arcadio M. Pasindo, Julieta M. Abundio, Celestino Mata, Clarita
M. Pasindo, Marcelo Mata and Ricarda vda. de Ayonan, averred
that they are retracting their statements contained in the
Manifestation with Motion, dated 23 November 1995, and its
attachments, and in the Opposition to Motion to Resolve
Petition Filed by Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez as counsel for
petitioners, dated 1 October 1997.
11. The affiants in said Joint Affidavit claimed that they
were deceived into signing and/or affixing their thumbmarks
on the said pleadings and documents. They stated that they
are no longer withdrawing their petition and urged the Court
to resolve it on the merits. A careful perusal of the said Joint
Affidavit shows that petitioners Marcelo Mata and Ricarda vda.
de Ayonan did not personally affix their respective signatures
thereon. Rather, two (2) other persons signed above their
names although it does not appear that they had been duly
authorized by petitioners Marcelo Mata and Ricarda vda. de
Ayonan to do so.
12. Petitioners thereafter filed their Opposition, dated 4
November 1998, to Atty. Jimenez' Motion to Resolve petition
Attached to the said opposition is a Clarificatory Affidavit,
dated 26 August 1998, executed by the petitioners except
Celestino Mata and Clarita Mata Pasindo, who did not affix
their respective signatures thereon. In said affidavit, affiants
accused Isidro Sembrano and Atty. Manuel Iral, Chief of the
Legal Division of the Central Office of the OSCC of having
conspired with each other and deceived some of the
petitioners into signing the Joint Affidavit, dated 20 March
1998, and retracting their statements in the Manifestation with
Motion, dated 23 November 1995. Affiants affirmed that they
voluntarily signed said Manifestation with Motion and its
attached documents including the amicable settlement. They
likewise maintained that Isidro Sembrano is no longer
authorized to act on their behalf and that Atty. Jimenez no
longer had any authority to represent them in this case.
Petitioners once again sought this Court's approval of their
amicable settlement.
13. On 1 March 1999, Atty. Jimenez submitted to this
Court an Investigation Report, dated 14 January 1999,
purportedly prepared by Atty. Iral in his capacity as Chief of the
Legal Division of the present National Commission on
Indigenous People. Attached to the report were the
Panunumpa, both dated 11 January 1999, of petitioners
Celestino Mata and Clarita Mata-Pasindo. These affiants
affirmed the retraction of their signatures on the Manifestation
with Motion, dated 23 November 1995, claiming that they did
not understand its contents. They likewise affirmed the
appointment of Isidro Sembrano and Atty. Jimenez as their
attorney-in-fact and counsel, respectively.
43
Given the dizzying and seemingly interminable equivocation in
the stance of the petitioners vis-a-vis the proposed amicable
settlement of 23 November 1995, we are constrained to
disregard the same and proceed with the resolution of the case
on the merits.
I
As stated earlier, in their Motion for Reconsideration and
Memorandum, petitioners harp on the alleged nullity of the
deed of sale executed between Mata and Laureta in 1945 on
the ground that it was written in English, a language not
understood by the former, and that it was not approved by the
OSCC in violation of Section 4(n), Republic Act No. 1888, as
amended, in relation to Section 120 of the Public Land Act. The
issue of the validity or nullity of the aforesaid deed of sale,
however, had already been passed upon by this Court in the
case of Caram, Jr. vs. Laureta, 5 the first case decided at length
by this Court involving the subject property. Previously,
another petition filed by Mata questioning the decision of the
CA which upheld the sale of the subject property to Laureta
was dismissed by this Court on 24 February 1981.
In the Caram case, the issue raised was which sale was valid
considering that Mata sold the same property twice: first to
Laureta and later on to Caram. We upheld therein the validity
of the sale in favor of Laureta as we affirmed the findings of the
lower court to the effect that while the sale to Laureta was
voidable, as it was procured by force, the same "was cured
when, after the lapse of four years from the time the
intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an
action for annulment or to set up the nullity of the contract as
a defense in an action to enforce the same." 6 We stated
therein that "the first sale in favor of Laureta prevails over the
sale in favor of Caram." 7 This pronouncement cannot be
construed in any other way but that the Court affirmed the
validity of the sale of the subject property in favor of Laureta as
against the sale of the same to Caram, which we categorically
declared as void.
Then again, in the case of Heirs of Claro L. Laureta vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 8 this Court ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1071 filed by petitioners. It must be
noted that in their complaint therein, petitioners also raised
the issue of the nullity of the deed of sale executed between
Mata and Laureta on the ground that, among others, it had not
been approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as required by law. Thus, by ordering the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1071, we, in effect, upheld anew the
validity of the sale of the subject property in favor of Laureta.
In the said decision, we likewise allowed private respondents
to proceed with the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No.
3083 as the same was not yet time-barred.
The foregoing rulings in the earlier related cases, which had
long attained finality, upholding the validity of the sale of the
subject property in favor of Laureta effectively foreclose any
further inquiry as to its validity. This is in consonance with the

doctrine of res judicata as embodied in Rule 39, Section 47 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order,
may be as follows:
(a) ...
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two (2)
concepts: the first is "bar by prior judgment" under paragraph
(b) of Rule 39, Section 47, and the second is "conclusiveness of
judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof. 9 In the present case,
the second concept conclusiveness of judgment applies.
The said concept is explained in this manner:
[A] fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated
in any future action between such parties or their privies, in
the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been
held that in order that a judgment in one action can be
conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between
the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit . . . . . 10
Although the action instituted by petitioners in the lower court
in this case (action for reconveyance) is different from the
actions they instituted in the earlier cases, the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment still applies because under this
principle "the identity of causes of action is not required but
merely identity of issues." 11
Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
44
same parties on a different claim or cause of action. In Lopez
vs. Reyes, 12 we expounded on the concept of conclusiveness
of judgment as follows:
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts
questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action
are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with
the subject matter of litigation. Thus it extends to questions
"necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated,
or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no
specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and
although such matters were directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under
this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the
judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a
judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are
as conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are
that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are
essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or
decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and
upon which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed
upon as the ultimate question which is solved. 13
There is no question that the issue of the validity or nullity of
the sale of the subject property in favor of Laureta had already
been passed upon by this Court in Caram, where we
categorically pronounced that the sale in favor of Laureta
prevails over that of Caram, which we declared void, and in
Laureta, where we stated that private respondents may still
validly proceed with the execution of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3083. Caram became final and executory on 12 February
1982 while Laureta on 5 July 1990. Applying the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, the matter may no longer be
relitigated in this case.
As held in Legarda vs. Savellano 14
It is a general rule common to all civilized system of
jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the
law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact
or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive
determination of the question litigated, and should forever set
the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this
maxim is more than a mere rule of law, more than an
important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much
to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of
the jural sytem. Public policy and sound practice demand that,
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. 15
II
The next issue is whether or not petitioners can still validly
exercise their right to repurchase the subject property
pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act:
 45

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject
to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within
a period of five (5) years from date of conveyance.
The term "conveyance" imports the transfer of legal title from
one person to another. It usually takes place upon the
execution of the deed purporting to transfer the ownership of
the land as the same is already valid and binding against the
parties thereto even without the act of registration. The
registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of
third parties against subsequent alienations by the vendor, and
is certainly not necessary to give effect, as between the parties,
to their deed of sale. Thus, for the purpose of reckoning the
five-year period to exercise the right to repurchase, the date of
conveyance is construed to refer to the date of the execution
of the deed transferring the ownership of the land to the
buyer. 16
In this case, Mata conveyed the ownership of the subject
property to Laureta by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
10 June 1945. Petitioners, as heirs of Marcos Mata, filed the
action for reconveyance (Civil Case No. 2468) on 24 November
1990. From this date up to the time of the filing of the action
for reconveyance, more than forty-five (45) years had lapsed.
Clearly, petitioners' right to redeem the subject property had
already prescribed by the time they went to court. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, if the five-year period to repurchase
were to be reckoned from 12 February 1982, the date of
finality of our decision in the Caram case 17 where we declared
that the sale in favor of Laureta prevails over that in favor of
Caram, prescription of the right to repurchase had set in.
The same conclusion would obtain even if the running of the
five-year period were to start from 9 May 1985, when Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-46346 covering the subject property
was issued in favor Laureta after the sale in his favor was
approved by the Minister of Natural Resources in accordance
with the decision in Civil Case No. 3083, petitioners' action to
repurchase the subject property would still be time-barred, as
more than five (5) years had already lapsed.
III
With respect to the procedural issue raised by petitioners, i.e.,
whether the CA erred in granting private respondents' petition
for injunction as it had allegedly the effect of disposing the
case without trial on the merits, suffice it to say that since
private respondents' right to injunctive relief was clear, the CA
properly granted the same. The CA, likewise, correctly ordered
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2468 as the records of the case
clearly showed that petitioners' right to repurchase had
already prescribed. A trial on the merits thereon would serve
no other purpose and would only result in needless delay.
Indeed, this controversy has already dragged on for more than
half a century, it is, thus, high time that we write finis to it.
. . . (L)itigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of
justice that once judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any
scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are
to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any
attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand
that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit
litium. . . . 19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners further argue that the five-year period should be

reckoned from September 1990, when the decision of this
Court in Laureta 18 allegedly became final and executory.
Petitioners maintain that prior to the said date, they could not
exercise their right to repurchase since the issue of its
ownership was still then under litigation. This contention is
without merit. As earlier discussed, the act of conveyance
within the meaning within the meaning of the Section 119 of
the Public Land Act had already been made long before the
finality of our decision in Laureta. At any rate, said case
resolved an entirely different issue, i.e., whether or not private
respondents' motion for execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 3083 was time-barred. Accordingly, the CA correctly
ordered the dismissal of petitioners' action for reconveyance
on ground of prescription.