MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No.
The rule
128448; 1 Feb 2001]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing
scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage
on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The
Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's
sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to
it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing
Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated
for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals
from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle
their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed
to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an
unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their
outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific
performance, and damages against PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the
parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial
Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to
enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention
in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To
deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to
petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies.
itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just
actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in
the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree,
order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances
are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise
of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question
before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge.
Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the
earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 112099.
February 21,1995)
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and
MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents
Ponente: QUIASON
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases
against respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision
suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the
President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of
execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code
(LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed stay
of execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary
injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been
issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC
(1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed. Stay of execution applied.
RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an appeal shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. As worded, there is
room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials
to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer
therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a
stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6
of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language
expressive of such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy
exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952) withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner. The

FACTS: said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City

Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under
RA 304, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a Motion to Withdraw
certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA
Information.
304, which provides that investment funds or banks or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to
availability of loanable funds accept or discount at not more than two per
centum per annum for ten years such certificate for certain specified
purposes. Respondent company contended however that the word shall Respondent Abalos thereafter filed a motion for
used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. The lower court reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that
sustained Respondent company.
the DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates
Respondent company.
that when an accused has already been arraigned and the
HELD:
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall is aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ,
imperative. However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as may
when required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The modifier, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take
at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years., the interest to
be charged, that the verb phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses cognizance of the petition, or even give due course
at not more but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of
the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent claimed
same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the
discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the
context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before
discount of the certificate is to be subject to the condition of the availability
of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the the DOJ.
acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are available
loanable funds. In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted
only if there are loanable funds.
In another resolution, the DOJ denied the Motion for

Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation

Adasa vs. Abalos
to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of
Bernadette Adasa vs. Cecille Abalos
Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal
G.R. No. 168617 February 19, 2007
taken to him even where the accused has already been
Chico-Nazario, J.:
arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language
Facts: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the
may utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has
complaints-affidavits that petitioner Bernadette Adasa,
the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution
through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued
notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been
in the name of respondent without respondents
arraigned.
knowledge and consent and that despite repeated

demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay

the proceeds of the checks. A resolution was issued by the Issue: Is the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of

Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable Department Circular No. 70 permissive and directory such

cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal

separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned?

Commercial Document by a Private Individual, under Held: No. When an accused has already been arraigned,

Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review

Revised Penal Code, as amended. due course and must dismiss the same. If the intent of

Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of

Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner later filed a Petition for Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a

Review before the DOJ. In a Resolution, the DOJ reversed petition for review despite its being out rightly dismissible,

and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City such as when the accused has already been arraigned, or

Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to where the crime the accused is being charged with has
already prescribed, or there is no reversible error that has

been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds

warranting dismissal, the result would not only be

incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then,

the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course

to the petition would serve no purpose and would only

allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give the second

sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a

directory application would not only subvert the avowed

objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and

efficient administration of justice, but would also render its

other mandatory provisions Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7,

nugatory.