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CrimPro Week 2 Digests
People v. Andan (Joan)
March 3, 1997 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y
HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime
of rape with homicide.
Prosecution facts: Feb 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Baliuag, Bulacan,
Marianne Guevarra, 21, and a second-year student at the Fatima School of
Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside
his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as
the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was
inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to
the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious
girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night
came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their
backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high
concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench
beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to
transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of
concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence
reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a
shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
At 11:00 A.M. next day the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked
from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck.
Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.Marianne died of "traumatic
injuries.
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for
the criminal.
The search:
Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen
recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what
appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a
pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's.
Andan's nearby house was also searched by the police who found
bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They
interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano
Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also
lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word.
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan.
A police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents'
house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the
police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant
denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police
confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the
bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his
neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that
he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and
Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police took
appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier,
were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old
toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved
from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as
belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of
appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags.
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police
headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical examination
was conducted on the suspects: Appellant was found to sustain
multiple scratches on the neck
Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing
the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk
privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there,
appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the
truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession.
The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the
presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's
own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed
Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He
asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying
he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil
entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read
almost everyday.
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days,
February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor
and reenacted the crime.
Arraignment: appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the
afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay
Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. When he was picked up by
the police, he was brought to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the
rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him
repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed
Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and
injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to
the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of
his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old
toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.
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Trial court ruling: Convicted sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from
No. 7659; pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as appellant's house.
actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus: 2. The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the
Automatic Review of SC in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.
7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. 3. Confession before the mayor admissible: It is true that
Andan claims that his testimonies were made during custodial investigation a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
without the assistance of counsel. police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's
ISSUE: Whether or not the following are admissible in evidence confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
1. Andans testimony latter.
2. The bags found In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant
3. Andans confession to the mayor to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
4. Andans confession to the media voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as
HELD: a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did
1. Inadmissible, because under custodial investigation, but Miranda rights not not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional
administered procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
2. Inadmissible, because fruit of the prior testimony not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
3. Admissible, because it is a spontaneous statement manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
4. Admissible, because questions were made not by a police officer. Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
RATIO state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
First, the rule: Any person under investigation for the commission of an and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor
offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and was correctly admitted by the trial court.
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed 4. Confessions to the media admissible: The confessions were made in response
of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the to questions by news reporters (e.g. Alex Marcelino for Eye to Eye, Orlan Mauricio for
presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation Tell the People, Berteni Causing for Peoples Journal Tonite, Rey Domingo of Bandera),
of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence.
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical Confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from
and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they
of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police.
determination of what really transpired. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force
Investigation, scope: An investigation begins when it is no longer a general appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact,
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. As intended guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed
police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of
police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." appellant by the news reporters.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
1. No longer a general inquiry, thus inadmissible: When the police arrested individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual
appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any
him at his parents' house. He was already under custodial investigation when he governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that
confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is

Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
On absence of spermatozoa: We have also ruled in the past that the absence of
spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of rape nor does the lack of
complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. What is essential is that there be
penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. Dr. Aguda testified that the
fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The
lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of
the special complex crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the
penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and
P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
People v Endino (Mel)
February 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
October 16, 1991 (PM): On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City, Gerry
Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning
lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis
girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack,
pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to
free himself from his attacker.
Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled
when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As
Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the
airport.
Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where
he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara
with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired
even before he could receive medical attention. Autopsy report: Cause of
death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock
secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the heart.
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Information: Filed against Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin for the murder
of Dennis Aquino and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both
accused remained at large, the trial court issued an order putting the case in
the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
November 19, 1992: Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts
of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio,
Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the
Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from
the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin
Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried
accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station
where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the
interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his
nephew Edward Endino as the gunman.
According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas,
Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was
waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They
took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and
proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for
Antipolo.
Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
Prosecution:
Clara Agagas, Dennis girlfriend, testified that she was with the victim Dennis
Aquino standing outside the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by
him, when Galgarin suddenly approached them and without any prior warning
stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who
harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized
Edward and Gerry because the street was sufficiently lighted
Corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door neighbor of Dennis, who testified that a
little past 6:00 PM of 16 October 1991, Gerry Galgarin together with a
companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to
proceed to the Soundlab Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. A
few minutes later she heard a gunshot and told her daughters to duck but was
worried because 1 daughter is outside . Soon enough she heard her 7-year old
daughter Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying because she said
her Kuya Dennis had been shot and stabbed.
Josephine confirmed her mothers testimony, said that she had seen Gerry
Galgarin stab her Kuya Dennis and she could remember Gerry very well
because of the mole below his nose.
Defense:
Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of Dennis and
asserted that he was in Antipolo from October 14-16 to help his common-law
wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born until she was discharged from
the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.

The midwife who delivered his son, supported his alibi. However, she admitted
that when she registered the childs birth more than 2 years after the delivery,
she informed the civil registrar that the childs father was "unknown."
Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-workers at the Kainan sa Kubo
Sing Along Restaurant, testified that he was fetched by a neighbor from the
restaurant in the early PM of 14 October with the news that his wife was having
labor pains.
Cornelio Tejero Jr of the Philippine Airlines Load Controller of the Puerto
Princesa City testified that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their
passenger manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight.
Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed
that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted
that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution
RTC: Gerry Galgarin GUILTY of MURDER qualified by treachery and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the
police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-
appellant and upon a finding that his confession was made before a
group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of
hostility towards him.
Gave credence to the arresting officers assertion that it was Galgarin was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly,
who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part
television for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed
convincing evidence to support his allegation that he was not at the
locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991.
In his Appellants Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his
alibi and admitting his videotaped confession as evidence against him.
ISSUES:
a. Whether his alibi should be appreciated? (NO)
b. Whether the killing is murder as qualified by treachery? (YES)
c. Whether the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirm and inadmissible under
the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution? (NO)
HELD: RTC Decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
further ordered to compensate the decedents heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for
their emotional and mental anguish.
RATIO:
a. The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16
October 1991 as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the 14th of
that month, is not persuasive.
Alibi is a weak defense. With accused-appellant having been positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one who stabbed Dennis, his
bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leongs identification of
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accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous manner
having identified the mole below his nose.
It is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to implicate accused-appellant, a
complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As for
Clara, her naming of accused-appellant as her boyfriends assailant was not
done out of spite, but was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
His immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak reveal a guilty
conscience, hence, his persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
The testimonies of accused-appellants co-workers that he was in Antipolo on
14 October 1991 did not fortify his defense either since these witnesses did not
categorically state that they saw him in Antipolo in the evening of 16 October
1991. The Phil. Airline Controllers testimony could not be relied upon inasmuch
as he himself admitted that they could not be sure of their passengers real
identities.
b. Yes, the crime committed is one of murder qualified by treachery considering that the
victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend
waiting for a ride, oblivious of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the
assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had
no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.
c.The admission of accused-appellants videotaped confession is proper. The interview
of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in
been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who,
in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him.
He freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino
had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused
was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of
his statements therein.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium
for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several
cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be
taken in further admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and
place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an
offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed
rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an
accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques
and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it
is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was
given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.

A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all
media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This
type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be
thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is
admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires
persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from
untainted ones.
Caguioa (Chrissa)
People v Hon Eduardo P. Caguioa
Jan 17, 1980
Fernando, CJ
FACTS
Sept 14, 1973, an information for murder was filed against Paquito Yupo. Upon
arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
Trial proceeded, prosecution have presented 6 witnesses including the father of
the deceased, Miguel Tribol and his common-law wife who allegedly received
the ante mortem statement of the Vuctim, Rodolfo Tribol
At the hearing, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the
Meycauayan Police dept before whom a written statement of the accused
his waiver of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of
his own choice was taken. He was questioned on the incriminating answers in
such statement but there was an objection on the part of the defense counsel
on the ground that such statement was inadmissible as evidence as it was
taken by police without any counsel assisting in the investigation. Respondent
judge sustained the objection. He Likewise stated that such right cannot be
waived.
ISSUE: WON the judge erred in holding the confession as inadmissible (No)
RATIO:
Certiorari does not lie. The petition must be dismissed
It was not shown that the alleged waiver was given freely and voluntarily.
A native of samar, the accused was interrogated extensively in Tagalog, not
showing if he was acquainted with the language such that he can fully
understand the import of what was asked him.
On the specific question of WON the right to custodial investigation may be
waived, the court rules that there is no bar to such waiver of made
intelligently and voluntarily, with the full understanding of its
consequences.
Miranda v Arizona emphasized that statements made during the period of
custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has
a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him and that he
has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or appointed.
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.
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By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
The defendant may waive his rights if made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can
be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered
some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.
In an opening statement asked by a certain Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the
Police Force: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang
paglabag sa batas ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw
mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado , magsasalaysay ka
pa rin ba?" Then came the monosyllabic answer Opo. That was it. The date
it was sworn to before the judge was not stated and the certified true copy did
not have a signature. The waiver is clearly inadmissible.
HELD: the petition for certiorari is dismissed. The case is ordered to resume forthwith.
Maqueda (Yesha)
March 22, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused,
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.
Davide, Jr., J.,
FACTS:
Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his
Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza chose to live in the rugged and mountainous
terrain of Tuba, Benguet
early morning of 27 August 91: Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly
battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robberyin their house
sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victimsformer
houseboy, as one of the perpetrators
19 November 1991, information for robbery with homicide and serious
physical injuries filed before RTC La Trinidad, Benguet;
prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in info
22 January 1992: only Richard Malig was arrested
prior to Maligs arraignment, prosecution filed motion to amend
information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol
hearing of the motion the following day, Prosecutor further asked
accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because
further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence
against him

motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of
accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued
4 March 1992, Maqueda arrested
9 April 1992, Maqueda filed application for bail, categorically
stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness
in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty
among the accused in this case
22 April 1992, prosecution filed Amended Informations with only Salvamante
and Maqueda as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
INFORMATION
That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality of
Tuba, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the, above-named accused, Conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and against the will and consent
of the owners thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
house of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE BARKER and with violence
against and intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place and take and carry
away the following articles, to ,it:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]
all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita and William
Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery; both accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William Horace
Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of their body, leading to the death of William
Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries on the former which required
medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have likewise
incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary labor for the same period of
time.
Contrary to Law.
Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial
proceeded
22 April 1992: Maqueda entered a plea of not guilty
31 August 1993, RTC La Trinidad: Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries, penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker-P50k for
death of William Horace Barker, P41,681.00 representing actual expenses,
P100k as moral damages and to pay costs
prosec witnesses:
evidence in chief
Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker
househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva
Mike Tayaban
Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr.,
Francisco Cabotaje
prosecutor Daniel Zarate,
Ray Dean Salvosa,
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Glen Enriquez,
SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and
Policarpio Cambod
rebuttal
Fredesminda Castrence
SP03 Armando Molleno
defense witnesses:
Accused Hector Maqueda
SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief
Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness
version of the prosecution
26 August 1991: Between 10:30 and 11pm, Barker spouses repaired to bedroom after
Teresita had checked main doors
27 August 1991
6am, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who shared a room with her
cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, went to lavatory,
opened the door of the toilet and switched on the light, she saw Rene
Salvamante [Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the
former househelps who acquainted her on her chores]
Salvamante strangled her, so she fought back, turned her face and
saw whom she later identified at the trial as Maqueda
broke free, ran to garage, shouted, and Salvamante chased, pulled
back to house
Julieta Villanueva, awakened by the shouts, went out then saw tall man whom
she later pointed to at trial, accused Maqueda
closed door, held on to doorknob and shouted for help
shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker, left husband still asleep, headed to
dining room
saw Salvante and companion who was stranger to her; two rushed
towards her and beat her up with lead pipes, later loss consciousness
at trial, also pointed to Maqueda as the companion
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe; Norie feel but upon recovery, hid
under car, then rushed to door of garage, called for Julieta who opened the
door; both went to their room & closed the door
braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering
heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's
enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie
and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the
barking of dogs
7am, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed, only a
kilometer away from the house of the Barkers
o saw two men approaching them from a curve
o Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and
a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger

o Speaking in Tagalog, taller man asked them whether road they were
following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did
not.
o Five minutes later, passenger jeepney bound for Baguio arrived and
the two men boarded it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the
defects because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers
to hold on to the bar of the jeepney.
o In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, Mike identified
through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing,
he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man
9am, Norie and Julieta, gathered courage and went out, saw Barkers bathed in
their own blood in the dining room, ran to Janet Albon and requested latter to
call the police
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived
o team from Baguio City Police Station, headed by Police Officer
Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the City
Health Department, also arrived
o team conducted an initial investigation
o went around the house and found a lead pipe at the toilet, a black T-
shirt and a green hand towel; also discovered another lead pipe at the
back of the door of the house
o interviewed the two househelps who provided him with descriptions of
the assailants
o team left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a
security guard
Enriquez conducted his own investigation
o master's bedroom, saw several pieces of jewelry scattered on floor
and empty inner cabinet
o Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent
to the Barker house to secure the premises; Enriquez then left upon
Dalits arrival
5pm, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at theBarker house to
conduct their investigation
o pipes, T-shirt, & green hand towel recovered by the Baguio City Police
-> PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad ->
court
o body of William Horace Barker -> Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian
Road, Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P.
Cabotaje, MunicipalHealth Officer of Tuba, Benguet; twenty-seven
injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument,
determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued
a death certificate
o wounded Teresita Barker -> Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center where she was treated and confined for eight days; attending
physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11
a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state; she sustained
multiple lacerations primarily an the left side of the occipital area,
bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles
7
adjoining eyes was paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after
2 days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were caused
by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her
injuries had been left unattended, she would have died by noontime of
27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.
1 September 1991: police team from the Tuba Police Station came to the hospital bed of
Mrs. Barker; was showed pictures, asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted
her
pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig
Dr. Hernandez told them it was improper to conduct it without first consulting
him;e Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness; her eyesight had
not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double vision
3 September 1991: remains of Mr. Barker were cremated; Mrs. Barker was discharged;
upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery
requested Enriquez to get back pieces of jewelry from Tuba Police
discovered that her Canon camera, radio cassette recorder and some pieces of
jewelry missing; aggregate value: P204,250.00
then executed affidavit of these missing items
29 November 1991: Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered
Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with police in determining
whereabouts of Salvamante
barangay captain, Basilio Requeron saw Salvamante together with a certain
"Putol" in September 1991; but has already left the place
4 March 1992: Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is
none other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan
Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Tuba PNP Chief Maj.
Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to
the. headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria,
Calauag, Quezon. commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed
SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and
according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution.
Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991
9 April 1992: while under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail, stated
willingness t be State witnesses
Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and
asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in
entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer,
Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since
he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial
Ray Dean Salvosa arrived, also had a talk with him
o Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to
Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then
brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the
vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose
in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to
the plan, but later on agreed to it; [kwento how they commited crime

as stated kanina] dagdag lang: after boarding jeep bound for Baguio,
alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked
until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they
boarded a bus for Manila
[DURING TRIAL]Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and
alibi: basically he said na hes been working as care taker in polvoron factory
since July 1991 in Muntinlupa Manila; tapos he spent vacation in Guinyangan,
Quezon, saw at times si Salvante who was his childhood playmate,
accompanied the latter to sell to his aunt a cassette player from Baguio; tapos
went back ulit to work; and then December break spent ulit sa Guinyangan
when he accompanied officemate to go back to their province but then he was
arrested na daw
Mar 5, 1992: Maqueda was detained
prosecution rebutted the testimony of Maqueda, presented Fredesminda
Castience, the owner of the polvoron factory, testified that she started her
business only on 30 August 1991, imposible to have hired Maqueda in July
o also presented SP03 Molleno who declared that he informed
Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was
investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave
his Sinumpaang Salaysay
trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution
witnesses Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and
thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction
"based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti"
[Note: trial court distinguished bet. an extrajudicial confession the Sinumpaang
Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa; Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
which read as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.]
ISSUE: WoN accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt (YES, by circumstantial
evidence)
RATIO:
o on Mrs Barker and househelps not able to positively identify Maqueda
o trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof
of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence, should have based
his arguments on this!
o SC commends the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a
person under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a
criminal complaint or information had been filed against him. However SC cant
agree that after such filing an accused "no longer has the right to remain silent
8
and to counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal"
o very restrictive application to Section 12(1); would also diminish the said
accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution
o In Galman vs. Pamaran: fact that the framers of our Constitution did not
choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words
"under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase
"any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric
of the Miranda doctrine
second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the
application of Miranda by making it applicable to the
investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in
custody
o it is clear that the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a
person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated
for the commission of an offense; paragraph was incorporated into
Section 12(1), Article III of the present Constitution with the following
additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and
independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the
services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights
therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel
o It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not
apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already
been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel
o [MIGHT ALSO BE IMPT, SINCE PROCEDURE: Once a criminal complaint or
information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a
warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since
the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for
any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with
the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is
subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.]
As to Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno
taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution
Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the
said section
statement was also taken in the absence of counsel-> wholly inadmissible
pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III (exclusionary rule)
As to the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean
Salvosa
not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights
Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the
course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be
utilized as a state witness

as to Ray Dean Salvosa, it was given to a private person; provisions of the Bill
of Rights are primarily limitations on government
extrajudicial admissions -> ADMISSIBLE
In addition, Urgent Motion for Bail: he explicitly .stated that "he is willing and
volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that
he is the least guilty among the accused in this case" -> Maqueda's
participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond
moral certainty
defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his
participation therein
Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and
Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond
doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were duly
proved in this case:
o He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker
house an hour after the crime in question was committed there;
o Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs.
Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons
who committed the crime
o He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
o He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and
both left the place sometime in September 1991;
o He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
o He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he
is the least guilty
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt
all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this
case
alibi failed, per unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does
not controvert that he was seen there
HELD: RTC affirmed, costs ag appellant
Amestuzo (Therese)
July 12, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs
VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VINAS, FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO
BAGAS y DALUHATAN and DIOSCORO VINAS y ODAL, accused, ALBINO BAHAS
y DALUHATAN, accused-appellant
Kapunan, J.
9
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Kalookan
FACTS:
February 22, 1991, 9:30 pm: A group of 8 armed men wearing masks entered
the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos Lacsamana at Sacred Heart
Village, Kalookan City and robbed the said premises of valuables in the total
amount of P728,000.00. In the course of the robbery, two members of the gang
raped Maria Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago, niece and employee,
respectively of complainant Lacsamana.
February 27, 1991: Accused-appellant Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo,
Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro Vias and four other accused, whose
identities are unknown and who are still at large up to the present, were
charged with the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape.
ARRAIGNMENT: All accused, including accused-appellant Albino Bagas
pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge. Thereafter, TRIAL ENSUED.
November 28, 1991: The trial court rendered judgment CONVICTING ALL OF
THE ACCUSED.
From the judgment of conviction, only Bagas appealed to the SC. His appeal is
based mainly on the ff:
(1) the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented
by counsel during his identification,
(2) the trial court's error in giving due weight to the open court
identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular
out-of-court identification, and
(3) the trial court's improper rejection of his defense of alibi.
Accused appellants Contention: Bagas maintains that from the time he was
arrested until he was presented to the complainants for identification, he was
deprived of the benefit of counsel. He narrates the circumstances surrounding
his arrest and investigation as follows:
February 26, 1991: Four days after the alleged incident, a group of
policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a
suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City
where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter.
They were looking for a certain "Mario" and searched the first and
second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit
Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Niloloko lang
yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino." It was at
this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he
was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.
Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle
together with accused Ampatin. While on board the jeep, accused
Ampatin told him that he (Ampatin) committed an error in pointing him
out to the police,"namumukaan lang niya ako, napagkamalian lang
niya ako."

They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and
placed under detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo
and Vias. When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was
brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and he
was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew
accused Amestuzo and Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the
negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-
appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an
emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one
of the policemen intervened.
The trial court committed a serious error when it deprived him of his 2.
constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation.
His singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the
benefit of counsel is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be
assisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested
by the police and placed on detention.
He maintains that the identification was a critical stage of prosecution at
which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial
proper.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not appellants right to counsel was violated (NO)
2. Whether or not there was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant (NO)
HELD: The decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant Albino Bagas of the
crime of robbery with multiple rape is hereby REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. His immediate release is hereby ordered unless he is held for some
other valid charges.
RATIO:
1. Whether or not appellants right to counsel was violated (NO)
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of
the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by
a person while he is under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this
stage.
People vs. Lamsing and People vs. Salvatierra: The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by
the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the
custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatoryand it
10
is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up.
There was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the
police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-
appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to
accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The
alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-
judicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis
of his conviction.
Whether or not there was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant (NO)
Accused-appellant: The identification was irregular since he was not placed in
a police line-up and instead, made to stand before the complainants alone.
SC: The contention has no merit. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. The fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone
and was made to stand before the accused by himself and
unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does not detract from
the validity of the identification process.
However, the complainants out-of-court identification of accused-
appellant was seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving
the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, the Court has
applied the totality of circumstances test enunciated in the case of People
vs. Teehankee which lists the following factors:
1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime
2) the witness' degree of attention at that time
3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness
4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification
5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.
The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by
complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly
suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-
appellant, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects
in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of
culprits.
The identification was practically suggested by the police themselves when
they announced to the complainants that accused-appellant was the person
pointed to by Ampatin. The fact that this information came to the knowledge of
the complainants prior to their identification detracts from the spontaneity of
their subsequent identification.
Peopel v. Obrero (Kat)
May 17, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag
has been at large.
When arraigned, Obrero pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued.
Prosecution
witnesses: Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los
Reyes.
Pat. Ines of the Western Police District investigated the robbery with homicide.
Jimmy Obrero y Corla: delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose
business was selling chickens to customers in Blumentritt St., Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Morning of Aug 11, 1989: Obrero was asked to deliver dressed chickens to Emma
Cabrera, a regular customer at Rm. 4-D Gatlin Bldg, 1344 C.M. Recto Ave., Sta. Cruz,
Manila.
10:20 a.m.: Obrero came back and turned over to his employer P2,000.00.
Pat. Ines: after receiving report of the killing, went to see Angie who received a
call from Cabrera informing Angie that her house had been robbed and her two maids
killed.
o went to Rosales, Pangasinan after being told that Obrero had gone there to attend
the burial of his grandfather but failed to find Obrero.
o Obreros sister, Merly Asuncion told them that Obrero had gone to La Union and
confided to her that he had allegedly done something wrong in Manila.
o identified two sworn statements, both executed on Aug 11, 1989, by Helen N. Moral,
a househelp of Emma Cabrera, and by Angie C. De los Reyes.
Moral: upon arriving in the house at 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her employer's
nephew, Carlos Emerson, found the bodies of the victims sprawled on the floor.
Sworn statement given on Aug 14, 1989 by Anita C. De los Reyes: on Aug 11,
1989, she had seen Obrero and Liwanag, their hands covered with blood, coming out of
the Gatlin Bldg.
Pat. Ines: on Mar 3, 1990, he and his group received info from Pat. Que of the
Urdaneta Police Station that Obrero was in Cataban, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They went
to the place and the next day, they were able to apprehend Obrero. Obrero was
positively identified by Anita De los Reyes
Obrero gave a confession in writing w/ the assistance of counsel, Atty.
Bienvenido De los Reyes, in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena
Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit stating the
circumstances of accused-appellant's arrest. He said Obero refused to sign the booking
and information sheet.
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession in Tagalog and signed by Obrero
in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.was presented in evidence
o Aug 10, 1989, his fellow employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in
order to be able to go to La Union to visit his family.
o Aug 11, 1989: after learning that only two helpers were then at the residence of
Emma Cabrera, Obrero and Ronnie decided to pull the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth
of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie
stabbed and killed her. Ronnie then gave the knife to Obrero who stabbed the younger
11
maid Remedios Hitta from which she died. They proceeded to Blumentritt St. and
divided the money Ronnie had taken from the house. Ronnie went to La Union, while
Obrero proceeded to Pangasinan.
Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes: a PC Captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N.
Ave, Manila.
o Mar 4, 1990: he happened to be at Station 7 of the WPD, representing a client
accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked by Lt. Generoso Javier of the WPD
Homicide Section to assist accused-executing an extrajudicial confession. He apprised
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, explaining to him that any statement made
by him could be used against him in court, but accused-appellant said he was willing to
give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery
with homicide.
Dr. Marcial G. Cenido: medico-legal officer who conducted autopsies on Aug 11,
1989 on the victims
o Nena Berjuega suffered 16 stab wounds from which she died. Six of these wounds
were fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate medical attention.
o Remedios Hitta suffered 12 stab wounds from which she died.seven fatal ones that
caused her death.
o there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds using a single
bladed weapon.
o the weapon used on both victims could have been the same and that both victims
sustained multiple stab wounds.
With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los Reyes, and Dr. Cenido and the
extrajudicial confession (Exh. O), as well as the sworn statements of Helen Moral and
Anita De los Reyes, the prosecution rested its case.
Defense
presented its sole witness accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla
He denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that he was
arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the
charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute
an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before
and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which
he signed because he does not know how to read. 10
TC (Aug 31, 1995): guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide (reclusion perpetua) He is further condemned to pay the heirs of the victims,
Remedios Hitta and Nena Berjuega P50,000.00 PESOS as civil indemnity for their death
and P4,000.00 as the amount of money taken
Hence, this instant appeal.
Defense: He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his
confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he
refused to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial
confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him.
ISSUE: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Obrero which forms the basis of his
conviction was valid?
RATIO:
Two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions in Art. III, 12 of the Constitution
o (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2

o (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the
subject of paragraph 1
Aside from Obreros bare assertion that his confession was obtained by force and
threat, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. He did not seek
medical treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he
was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it.
To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is
not the same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. He signed his name on
page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then,
he signed again as proof that after being given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a
statement. (Exh. O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to
authenticate that page as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third
page at the end of his confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the
third page in which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O).
We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact
that it was signed by accused-appellant five times.
Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact
that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he were
simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no
reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of
conclusive evidence showing the declarant's consent in executing the same has been
vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime
could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he
who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the
crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon
given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena
Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds
sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon.
It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete
with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity
and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been
applied. 11 When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they
could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where
the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and
where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed,
the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a
confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails
with the essential facts contained in such confession. 12
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the
fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under
the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from
which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into
an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in
custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of
12
his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be
used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 1
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes to
establish that the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when accused-
appellant executed his extrajudicial confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified: 14
o A I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional right to remain silent, to have an
attorney; that everything that he will say will be used for or against him. He, however,
consented to proceed with the written statement.
For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified: 15
o A: Yes, sir, I told him for the purpose of investigation custodial investigation I can
render my services to him and afterwards avail the services of another lawyer and I told
him his rights under the law, sir.
o A: He is willing at that time and [voluntarily] gave his affirmation that he wanted to
secure my services, sir.
o A I told him the rights under the Constitution, the right to remain silent, the right to
secure lawyer, the right not to give statement, the right not to be placed in any
identification procedure in a police line up, and I told him that all the evidences he might
give will be utilized against him in the court with respect to the case and despite of
that, he said he wanted to give his statement to the police in my presence.
o Q Was he able to give statement to the police?
o A Yes, sir. I was there inside the room with the client and observing fairly [when he]
gave statement voluntarily.
o Q Was that statement taken down into writing?
o A In a question and answer form, sir.
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-
appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and,
if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him.
This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions 16 of this Court, has been found to
be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.
Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police
investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering
that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in
People v. Januario: 17
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's
relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.
Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity
and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship
between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. 18
Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by
Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an
"independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station
commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. On this point, he
testified as follows:

o A If I am the lawyer, then all the testimonies and declaration is my preferential right, I
can divulge it even to my fellow officer.
o A I am extending my legal assistance to the client I am handling the case because if it
is true that he committed the crime then I will back out, if I found suspicion and there is
no proof at all, I go to the litigation.
The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:
o And absent any showing that the assisting lawyer, though a station commander but of
another police station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this Court holds that the
proceedings were regularly conducted. Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. De los
Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a member of the police force, when he
lend his assistance to the accused during his in-custody interrogation.
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula, 21 the independent counsel
required by Art. III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the
accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the
WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and
scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary
notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection
given to the suspect during custodial investigation.
Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot
stand. The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's
guilt consisting of the sworn statements of Helen Moral and Anita de los Reyes These
statements are likewise inadmissible for being hearsay. Consequently, there is no
identification of accused-appellant.
And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no
evidence of the robbery except the confession, of accused-appellant which is
inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction
of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the
heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. We cannot thus affirm the
conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed
during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. It may be that by this decision a
guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the
principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single
innocent person.
HELD: For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
DISPOSITIVE RTC REVERSED; Accused-appellant ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Jesalva v. People
January 19, 2011
BENJAMIN JESALVA,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
NACHURA, J.:
Type of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure
FACTS:
13
September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a criminal
complaint for Frustrated Murder againstJesalva. Four days after, the complaint
was amended, charging petitioner with the crime of Murder, as the victim
Leticia Aldemo died.
After conducting a hearing on the bail application of petitioner, the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, granted him bail.
MTC recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon.
Arraignment: petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
Trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
PROSECUTIONS VERSION:
Evening of Sept 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the
victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner), et.al were at
Nenas place playing mahjong. At about 10 oclock that night, Glorias
group left Nenas place and boarded the Isuzu panel of Jesalva. With
the exception of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina
to eat and drink. While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2)
bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and [F]undador until
11:30 in the evening.
Most of the group went home through Jesalvas Isuzu. While at
Glorias house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told
him to defer it until the next day because the stores were already
closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and
accompanied her and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia
boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated his car
and went to the direction of 6th Street instead of towards 7th Street
where Leticias house was situated.
Next day: the group of SPO1 Mendoza of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile
Patrol Section chanced upon petitioners Isuzu [panel]. The police
patrol team approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a
flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check what was going
on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since
childhood seated in front of the wheel so he called out his name.
Instead of heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond,
immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town
proper.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST
Sisters holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was walking from a
certain Leas house, he saw a woman naked from the waist down and
lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside
her. Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her
things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a
tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his
direction. De Vera called out, "What is that?" Because he received no
response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home
first and just come back to check the site later.

Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman
was bleeding that he even got stained with her blood. Afraid that he
might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such
that when De Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera
then proceeded to the police station to report the incident to [SPO1]
Balaoro.
De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to
comb the area but to no avail. On their way back at about 1:15 oclock
(sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De
Vera lost no time in identifying him to be the man he saw with the
woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed
innocence. He admitted he left the woman in Hazelwood where the
police found her.
Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released
until the next day. However, because the evidence pointed to
petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was
conducted. He "surrendered" at one (1) oclock in the afternoon
accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first cousin.
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc,
Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However,
Leticia told petitioner that they should just remain as friends because
she was already married, and that she loved her handsome husband.
At about 1:00 p.m, petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose
Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he
voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that
Leticia jumped out of his vehicle. At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9,
1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other police officers,
Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner
identified as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found
bloodstains thereat.
After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence.
Defense filed before the RTC its Demurrer to Evidence,
RTC denied
Defense filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order and Inhibition of
Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed.
The Presiding Judge of the RTC, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any
further action in the case.
Case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52.
Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied the same and set the reception of
evidence of the defense.
DEFENSES VERSION
Jesalva denied that he killed Leticia. He testified that he did not have
any reason to kill her, and that he had many reasons why he should
not kill her. The prosecution manifested that it would not conduct a
cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his testimony was
14
tantamount to pure denial. To prove that there was a broken chain of
circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo
de Vera (the tricycle driver who saw Olbes).
On cross-examination, he De Vera that he has known Jesalva for a
longtime; and he has good relationship with him; [petitioner] was his
bondsman in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of
firearms and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants
to repay his gratitude to [petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him to be a
witness in the case.
RTCs Ruling: In favor of the prosecution, Jesalva guilty beyond reasonable
doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of
Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of any direct evidence or
testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established, and that evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven. There was
no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant thereto and taking into
consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the sum of P50,000.00 to
the legal heirs of the victim, plus P42,755.45 for compensatory damages plus
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees
(People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).
On appeal, CAs ruling: Affirmed with Modification as to Penalty (with the
attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of accused-appellant,
the penalty reclusion temporal is imposed in its minimum period. Accordingly,
accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should suffer the indeterminate penalty
of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum
and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum)
Motion for Reconsideration denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
Jesalva claims that: no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and
where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was
responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecutions contention that, even if
he took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street, where
Leticias house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been
considered as a suspect in this case, considering that he was the last person
seen with Leticia when she was still alive. He avers that the statements he
made at the police station are not admissible in evidence, considering
that he was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that there was
no waiver of his right to remain silent.
OSG refutes that:
Only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and that SC
accords great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially
when affirmed by the CA.
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence was not an error
because the particular circumstances enumerated by both the RTC
and the CA satisfactorily meet the requirements of the rules and of
jurisprudence for conviction.

The statements made by petitioner before SPO4 Desder, in the
presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and were not elicited
on custodial investigation.
Jesalva was not deprived of his rights since he was never held for
questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the police station
and, besides, he was accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jesalva can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence
2. Whether or not his statements were admissible in evidence
HELD: Yes to both.
RATIO:
1. It is well-settled that the positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail
over the bare denials of an accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by
both the RTC and the CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of
denial was weak, self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioners silence as to
the matters that occurred during the time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An
accused can only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof
required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We find that the
prosecution has met this quantum of proof in this case,
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom
a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are instances when,
although a witness may not have actually witnessed the commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator
of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the type of
positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of
direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all
circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or in
secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.
Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when
the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others,
as the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there FACTS:
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Custodial investigation, definition: "any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." This presupposes that he is suspected of
having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a
15
confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.
The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were
not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together
with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and
voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around
12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding
that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant
case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of
Appeals Decision dated October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in
Criminal Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Mapp v. Ohio (Mel)
June 19, 1961
Dollree Mapp
v.
State of Ohio
MR. JUSTICE CLARK
NATURE: Appeal from the Supreme Court of Ohio
DOCTRINE:
All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Federal
Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court. Wolf v. Colorado
overruled insofar as it holds to the contrary. (Syllabus)
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which protects
against "unreasonable searches and seizures," may not be used in state law
criminal prosecutions in state courts, as well, as had previously been the law,
as in federal criminal law prosecutions in federal courts.
The Supreme Court accomplished this by use of a principle known as selective
incorporation; in this case this involved the incorporation of the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment which are literally applicable only to actions of the federal
government into the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause which is
literally applicable to actions of the states. (Wiki)
May 23, 1957: 3 Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant's residence in
that city pursuant to information that "a person was hiding out in the home, who
was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing, and that there
was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home."
Miss Mapp and her daughter by a former marriage lived on the top floor of the
2-family dwelling. Upon their arrival at that house, the officers knocked on the
door and demanded entrance, but appellant, after telephoning her attorney,

refused to admit them without a search warrant. They advised their
headquarters of the situation and undertook a surveillance of the house.
The officers again sought entrance some 3 hours later when 4 or more
additional officers arrived on the scene. When Miss Mapp did not come to the
door immediately, at least 1 of the several doors to the house was forcibly
opened and the policemen gained admittance.
Meanwhile Miss Mapp's attorney arrived, but the officers, having secured their
own entry, and continuing in their defiance of the law, would permit him neither
to see Miss Mapp nor to enter the house. It appears that Miss Mapp was
halfway down the stairs from the upper floor to the front door when the officers,
in this high-handed manner, broke into the hall. She demanded to see the
search warrant.
A paper, claimed to be a warrant, was held up by one of the officers. She
grabbed the "warrant" and placed it in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which
the officers recovered the piece of paper and as a result of which they
handcuffed appellant because she had been "belligerent" in resisting their
official rescue of the "warrant" from her person. Running roughshod over
appellant, a policeman "grabbed" her, "twisted her hand," and she "yelled and
pleaded with him" because "it was hurting."
Appellant, in handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom where
the officers searched a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some
suitcases. They also looked into a photo album and through personal papers
belonging to the appellant. The search spread to the rest of the second floor
including the child's bedroom, the living room, the kitchen and a dinette. The
basement of the building and a trunk found therein were also searched.
They didn't find the bombing suspect or the gambling equipment but they
did find pornographic material in a suitcase next to her bed. She was
arrested, prosecuted, and found guilty for possession of pornographic
material.
TRIAL: No search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was the
failure to produce one explained or accounted for. At best, "There is, in the
record, considerable doubt as to whether there ever was any warrant for the
search of defendant's home."
OHIO SC: GUILTY of 2905.34 of Ohio's Revised Code for knowingly having
had in her possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books,
pictures, and photographs
"Based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of lewd and
lascivious books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful
search of defendant's home.
Believed a "reasonable argument" could be made that the conviction
should be reversed "because the methods' employed to obtain the
evidence were such as to `offend "a sense of justice," but the court
found determinative the fact that the evidence had not been taken
"from defendant's person by the use of brutal or offensive
physical force against defendant."
State (US OSG?) says that, even if the search were made without
authority, or otherwise unreasonably, it is not prevented from using
the unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, citing Wolf v.
16
Colorado (1949), in which US SC held "that, in a prosecution in a
State court for a State crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure."
ISSUES: Whether evidence discovered during a search and seizure conducted in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution shall be admissible in a State
court? (Alisin ang word na State siguro para sa Pilipinas) NO, not admissible
HELD: Supreme Court of Ohio REVERSED, and the cause REMANDED for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
RATIO:
Without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches
and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and undeserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule,
the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Weeks v. United States (1914): Court unanimously held that the warrantless
seizure of items from a private residence constitutes a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. It also prevented local officers from securing evidence by means
prohibited under the federal exclusionary rule and giving it to their federal
colleagues.
Fourth Amendment puts the courts of the United States and Federal
officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations
and restraints and forever secured the people, their persons, houses,
papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures
under the guise of law and the duty of giving to it force and effect is
obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the
enforcement of the laws."
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and,
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."
The use of the seized evidence involved "a denial of the constitutional
rights of the accused."
Court for the first time held that "in a federal prosecution, the Fourth
Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal
search and seizure." It required of federal law officers a strict
adherence to that command which the Court has held to be a clear,
specific, and constitutionally required -- even if judicially implied --
deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth
Amendment would have been reduced to "a form of words." It meant,

quite simply, that "conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts and that such evidence "shall not be used at all."
Wolf v. Colorado (1949): Fourth Amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the
exclusionary rule was not. The Court specified no redress for those whose
rights were violated.
IN THE CASE: Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as
is used against the Federal Government.
The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the States,
was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne cases.
In extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches -- state or federal -- it was logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine -- an essential part of the right to privacy -
- be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized
by the Wolf case.
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not
consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by
reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but, in
reality, to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter -- to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by
removing the incentive to disregard it."
Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning
the enforcement of any other basic constitutional right. The right to privacy, no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people, would stand in marked contrast to all other rights declared as "basic to
a free society."
As to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the
States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom
from convictions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an "intimate
relation" [in their perpetuation of "principles of humanity and civil liberty secured
only after years of struggle. They express "supplementing phases of the same
constitutional purpose to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy."
The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to,
although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence -- the
very least that together they assure in either sphere is that no man is to be
convicted on unconstitutional evidence
BENEFIT OF STATE APPLICABILITY OF EXCLUSIONARY RULE:
The State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, serves to
encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound
to uphold. The very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the
avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts."
17
Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional
standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual
obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their
approaches.
There are those who say, as did Justice Cardozo, that, under the
constitutional exclusionary doctrine, "the criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered." In some cases, this will undoubtedly be
the result. But, as was said in Elkins, "there is another consideration --
the imperative of judicial integrity." The criminal goes free, if he must,
but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States,
(1928): "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Adoption of the exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement. Only last
year, this Court expressly considered that contention and found that
"pragmatic evidence of a sort" to the contrary was not wanting.
"The federal courts themselves have operated under the exclusionary
rule of Weeks for almost half a century; yet it has not been suggested
either that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has thereby been
rendered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal justice in the
federal courts has thereby been disrupted. Moreover, the experience
of the states is impressive. The movement towards the rule of
exclusion has been halting, but seemingly inexorable."
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and
truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in
the true administration of justice.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of 'unreasonable searches and seizures' is
enforceable against the states. The federal exclusionary rule is not a command of
the Fourth Amendment, but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate.
 18

I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be action within the hierarchy of the police system, including prosecution of the police
enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an accused of papers and effects officer for a crime.
seized from him in violation of its commands. For the Fourth Amendment does not itself The only remaining remedy, if exclusion of the evidence is not required, is an
contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence, and I am extremely action of trespass by the homeowner against the offending officer. Mr. Justice Murphy
doubtful that such a provision could properly be inferred from nothing more than the showed how onerous and difficult it would be for the citizen to maintain that action, and
basic command against unreasonable searches and seizures. how meagre the relief even if the citizen prevails. 338 U.S. 338 U. S. 42-44. The truth is
Reflection on the problem, however, in the light of cases coming before the that trespass actions against officers who make unlawful searches and seizures are
Court since Wolf, has led me to conclude that, when the Fourth Amendment's ban mainly illusory remedies.
against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Without judicial action making the exclusionary rule applicable to the States, Wolf
Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis v. Colorado, in practical effect, reduced the guarantee against unreasonable searches
emerges which not only justifies, but actually requires, the exclusionary rule. and seizures to "a dead letter,".
Court is"unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers Once evidence, inadmissible in a federal court, is admissible in a state court a
to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a "double standard" exists which, as the Court points out, leads to "working arrangements"
witness against himself. that, undercut federal policy and reduce some aspects of law enforcement to shabby
Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally business. The rule that supports that practice does not have the force of reason behind
construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads it.
to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It
is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE
against any stealthy encroachments thereon. WHITTAKER join, dissenting.
"Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. It In overruling the Wolf case, the Court, has forgotten the sense of judicial restraint
would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history which, with due regard for stare decisis, is one element that should enter into deciding
has cast upon this Court to hold that, in order to convict a man, the police cannot extractwhether a past decision of this Court should be overruled.
by force what is in his mind, but can extract what is in his stomach. Wolf rule represents sounder Constitutional doctrine than the new rule which now
replaces it.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring. ISSUE actually: Whether 2905.34 of the Ohio Revised Code, making criminal
The Ohio Supreme Court sustained the conviction even though it was based on the mere knowing possession or control of obscene material, and under which appellant
the documents obtained in the lawless search. For, in Ohio, evidence obtained by an has been convicted, is consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured
unlawful search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution, at least where it was against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. That was the principal issue which
not taken from the "defendant's person by the use of brutal or offensive force against was decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, [was tendered by appellant's Jurisdictional
defendant." Statement, and which was briefed and argued in this Court.
This evidence would have been inadmissible in a federal prosecution. For, as Even the most cursory examination will reveal that the doctrine of the Wolf case
stated in the former decision, "The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of has been of continuing importance in the administration of state criminal law. Indeed,
the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, certainly as regards its "nonexclusionary" aspect, Wolf did no more than articulate the
under limitations and restraints. then existing assumption among the States that the federal cases enforcing the
We held in Wolf v. Colorado,, that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the exclusionary rule "do not bind the States, for they construe provisions of the Federal
States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But a Constitution, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, not applicable to the States."
majority held that the exclusionary rule of the Weeks case was not required of the Essential to the majority's argument against Wolf is the proposition that the rule of
States, that they could apply such sanctions as they chose. That position had the Weeks v. United States excluding in federal criminal trials the use of evidence obtained
necessary votes to carry the day. But, with all respect, it was not the voice of reason or in violation of the Fourth Amendment, derives not from the "supervisory power" of this
principle. Court over the federal judicial system, but from Constitutional requirement. This is so
As stated in the Weeks case, if evidence seized in violation of the Fourth because no one, I suppose, would suggest that this Court possesses any general
Amendment can be used against an accused, "his right to be secure against such supervisory power over the state courts. Although I entertain considerable doubt as to
searches and seizures is of no value, and might as well be stricken from the the soundness of this foundational proposition of the majority, I shall assume, for present
Constitution." purposes, that the Weeks rule "is of constitutional origin."
When we allowed States to give constitutional sanction to the "shabby business" At the heart of the majority's opinion in this case is the following syllogism: (1) the
of unlawful entry into a home, we did indeed rob the Fourth Amendment of much rule excluding in federal criminal trials evidence which is the product of an illegal search
meaningful force. There are, of course, other theoretical remedies. One is disciplinary and seizure is "part and parcel" of the Fourth Amendment; (2) Wolf held that the
"privacy" assured against federal action by the Fourth Amendment is also protected

against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (3) it is therefore "logically and
constitutionally necessary" that the Weeks exclusionary rule should also be enforced
against the States.
This reasoning ultimately rests on the unsound premise that, because Wolf carried
into the States, as part of "the concept of ordered liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the principle of "privacy" underlying the Fourth Amendment, it must follow
that whatever configurations of the Fourth Amendment have been developed in the
particularizing federal precedents are likewise to be deemed a part of "ordered liberty,"
and as such are enforceable against the States
It cannot be too much emphasized that what was recognized in Wolf was not that
the Fourth Amendment, as such, is enforceable against the States as a facet of due
process, a view of the Fourteenth Amendment which, as Wolf itself pointed out has long
since been discredited, but the principle of privacy "which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment."
The preservation of a proper balance between state and federal responsibility in
the administration of criminal justice demands patience on the part of those who might
like to see things move faster among the States in this respect. Problems of criminal law
enforcement vary widely from State to State
In my view, this Court should continue to forbear from fettering the States with an
adamant rule which may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems in
criminal law enforcement.
Finally, it is said that the overruling of Wolf is supported by the established
doctrine that the admission in evidence of an involuntary confession renders a state
conviction constitutionally invalid. Since such a confession may often be entirely reliable,
and therefore of the greatest relevance to the issue of the trial, the argument continues,
this doctrine is ample warrant in precedent that the way evidence was obtained, and not
just its relevance, is constitutionally significant to the fairness of a trial. I believe this
analogy is not a true one. The "coerced confession" rule is certainly not a rule that any
illegally obtained statements may not be used in evidence. I would suppose that a
statement which is procured during
The pressures brought to bear against an accused leading to a confession, unlike
an unconstitutional violation of privacy, do not, apart from the use of the confession at
trial, necessarily involve independent Constitutional violations. What is crucial is that the
trial defense to which an accused is entitled should not be rendered an empty formality
by reason of statements wrung from him, for then "a prisoner has been made the
deluded instrument of his own conviction."
That this is a procedural right, and that its violation occurs at the time his
improperly obtained statement is admitted at trial, is manifest. For without this right, all
the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or
any other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most
compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained
at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.
This, and not the disciplining of the police, as with illegally seized evidence, is
surely the true basis for excluding a statement of the accused which was
unconstitutionally obtained. In sum, I think the coerced confession analogy works
strongly against what the Court does today.
19
LECTURE by Clark: (Optional Reading except Wolf & Elkins probably)
Boyd v. US (1886)
Fourth and Fifth Amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own
testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of
crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of those Amendments."
"Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be
liberally construed. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
Concluding, the Court specifically referred to the use of the evidence there
seized as "unconstitutional."
Weeks v. United States (1914)
Same as in ratio
There are in the cases of this Court some passing references to the Weeks rule
as being one of evidence. But the plain and unequivocal language of Weeks --
and its later paraphrase in Wolf -- to the effect that the Weeks rule is of
constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed.
Byars v. United States (1927)
A unanimous Court declared that "the doctrine cannot be tolerated under our
constitutional system, that evidences of crime discovered by a federal officer in
making a search without lawful warrant may be used against the victim of the
unlawful search where a timely challenge has been interposed."
Olmstead v. United States (1928)
In unmistakable language restated the Weeks rule: "The striking outcome of the
Weeks case and those which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the
Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in
courts, really forbade its introduction if obtained by government officers through
a violation of the Amendment."
McNabb v. United States (1943)
"A conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of which is evidence obtained
in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand.
And this Court has, on Constitutional grounds, set aside convictions, both in the
federal and state courts, which were based upon confessions 'secured by
protracted and repeated questioning of ignorant and untutored persons, in
whose minds the power of officers was greatly magnified' or 'who have been
unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel.
The Court did then pass on to formulate a rule of evidence, saying, "in the view
we take of the case, however, it becomes unnecessary to reach the
Constitutional issue, for the principles governing the admissibility of evidence in
federal criminal trials have not been restricted to those derived solely from the
Constitution."
Wolf v. Colorado (1949)

Again for the first time, discussed the effect of the Fourth Amendment upon the
States through the operation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It said: "We have no hesitation in saying that, were a State
affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy, it would run counter
to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Nevertheless, after declaring that the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police" is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and, as
such, enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause," and
announcing that it "stoutly adhered" to the Weeks decision, the Court decided
that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not then be imposed upon the States
as "an essential ingredient of the right."
The Court's reasons for not considering essential to the right to privacy, as a
curb imposed upon the States by the Due Process Clause, that which decades
before had been posited as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's
limitation upon federal encroachment of individual privacy, were bottomed on
factual considerations.
While they are not basically relevant to a decision that the exclusionary rule is
an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment as the right it embodies is
vouchsafed against the States by the Due Process Clause, we will consider the
current validity of the factual grounds upon which Wolf was based.
The Court in Wolf first stated that "the contrariety of views of the States" on the
adoption of the exclusionary rule of Weeks was "particularly impressive"; and,
in this connection, that it could not "brush aside the experience of States which
deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a
deterrent remedy by overriding the States relevant rules of evidence."
While, in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost 2/3 of the States were opposed to
the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf case, more than half of
those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have
wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule. Significantly, among
those now following the rule is California, which, according to its highest court,
was" compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have
completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions.
In connection with this California case, we note that the second basis
elaborated in Wolf in support of its failure to enforce the exclusionary doctrine
against the States was that "other means of protection" have been afforded
"the right to privacy." The experience of California that such other remedies
have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States.
The obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of
other remedies has, moreover, been recognized by this Court since Wolf.
Likewise, time has set its face against what Wolf called the "weighty
testimony" of People v. Defore, (1926). There, Justice (then Judge) Cardozo,
rejecting adoption of the Weeks exclusionary rule in New York, had said that
"the Federal rule as it stands is either too strict or too lax." However, the force
of that reasoning has been largely vitiated by later decisions of this Court.
These include the recent discarding of the "silver platter" doctrine which
allowed federal judicial use of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution by
state agents; the relaxation of the formerly strict requirements as to standing to
challenge the use of evidence thus seized, so that now the procedure of
20
exclusion, "ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards," is available to
anyone even "legitimately on the premises" unlawfully searched, and, finally,
the formulation of a method to prevent state use of evidence unconstitutionally
seized by federal agents.
Because there can be no fixed formula, we are admittedly met with "recurring
questions of the reasonableness of searches," but less is not to be expected
when dealing with a Constitution, and, at any rate, "reasonableness is in the
first instance for the trial court.
It therefore plainly appears that the factual considerations supporting the failure
of the Wolf Court to include the Weeks exclusionary rule when it recognized the
enforceability of the right to privacy against the States in 1949, while not
basically relevant to the constitutional consideration, could not, in any analysis,
now be deemed controlling.
Irvine v. California (1954)
In answer to a plea made here Term after Term that we overturn its doctrine on
applicability of the Weeks exclusionary rule, this Court indicated that such
should not be done until the States had "adequate opportunity to adopt or reject
the Weeks rule. "Never until June of 1949 did this Court hold the basic search
and seizure prohibition in any way applicable to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Elkins v. United States
The controlling principles" as to search and seizure and the problem of
admissibility "seemed clear" until the announcement in Wolf "that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not itself require state
courts to adopt the exclusionary rule" of the Weeks case.
"The underlying constitutional doctrine which Wolf established that the Federal
Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers"
had undermined the "foundation upon which the admissibility of state-seized
evidence in a federal trial originally rested.
The Court concluded that it was therefore obliged to hold, although it chose the
narrower ground on which to do so, that all evidence obtained by an
unconstitutional search and seizure was inadmissible in a federal court
regardless of its source.
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right
to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on
our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court.
Alicando (Chrissa)
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v Arnel Alicando, accused-appellant
Dec 12, 1995
Puno,J
Nature: Automatic Review death penalty
Crime: rape w homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, 4 yrs old. She died

FACTS:
June 12, 1994, victims father, Romeo Penecilla was drinking with Rodriguez
and Gaddi. Appellant would join them but leave every now and then. They
stopped drinking at 4pm
Luisa Rabada: saw victim at window of appellants house. She offered to buy
her yema but appellant close the window and heard the victim crying. She
peeped through an opening and saw the appellant naken on top of the victim,
his left hand choking her neck. She left and gathered her children
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8pm. He and his wife looked for
Khazie Mae till 1pm
Rabada called to appellant from her window and asked what time Khazie left
the house. He said he didnt know
Another neighbor, Santiago, went out of his house to answer the call of nature.
He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie mae under his house
Rabada informed the Penecillas tthat appellant committed the crime. Appellant
was arrested
Appellant verbally confessed his guilt without assistance of consil. On this
bases, police were bale to recover slippers, earrings, stained pillow and tshirt
from his house
Autopsy report: death by asphyxia by strangulation
Trial court: death penalty
ISSUE: WON confession of guilt and evidence resulting therefrom is admissible (NO)
RATIO:
We find the the decision of the trial court is shot full of errors, both substantive
and procedural. The conviction is based on an amalgam of inadmissible and
incredible evidence an supported by scoliotic logic
1. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow
sec (1) of rule 116 on arraignment
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the
complaint or information.
The language requirement is new as imposed by the 1985 rules on criminal
procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is not
known if he knows English. It denies him of his right be informed and to due
process. When life is at stake, we cannot assume
2. The plea of guilt is likewise null and void. Sec 3 of Rule 116 was violated.
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
21
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately conducted a searching
inquiry.
The plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgement.
The inquiry must be based on (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the
full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.
The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of
guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea.
No information about the personality profile, age, socio-economic status, and
educational background. The questions were framed in English, the trial court
did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of
rape with homicide
The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment.
It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and
where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and
after his interrogation, etc. It turned a blind eye to the fact that the appellant
was mobbed by inmates in jail.
A conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. the
prosecution must prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt
3. -Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the
appellant were inadmissible, yet were considered by the TC
The pillow and tshirt with bloodstains are inadmissible evidence as they were
gathered by PO3 danilo tan as a result of custodial interrogation where
appellant verbally confessed without the benefit of counsel. Accdg to the cross
examination, P03 only stopped interrogating when he finished recovering all the
exhibits, which accused pointed out to (ex fish basin used to cover the dead
body)
Sec 12 pars 1 and 3 of Art III of the consti - it is not only the uncounselled
confession that is condemned as inadmissible but also the evidence
derived therefrom
We have adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the
poisonous tree. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
But even assuming that the pillow and tshirt are admissible, it was not
examined by an expert and proven the bloodstains were human, especially
since he is a butcher.
The burden to prove that an accused waive his right to remain silent and
the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial investigation
rests with the prosecution. And must be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence
It matters not that the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the
introduction of the evidence.

The court cannot send the appellant to diie on the basis of the procedural
irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the
TC. No valid judgement can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment.
HELD: decision annulled. Remanded for further proceedings.
Januario (Yesha)
February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ELISEO SARITA @
TOTO, EDUARDO SARINOS and SANTIAGO CID, accused.
RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN and EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, accused-appellants.
Panganiban, J.
[sobrang haba ng cases ko lahat! found this online and checked it also, added some
info]
Overview: Januario and Canape were involved in carnapping. Their involvement varies
from different versions of what happened. They gave verbal confessions to the crime,
which was only later on executed through a written statement and as assisted by
counsel who later turns out to be applying for a post in NBI. This was considered
inadmissible since it was a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Topic: Police Investigation; Exclusionary rule/ Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
Statement of the Case:
- This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC in Cavite, which held Rene
Januario and Efren Canape guilty of violation of Sec. 14 last sentence of RA 6539,
known as the Anti-Carnapping Law. Santiago Cid, in the same decision, is acquitted for
lack of evidence.
- 7 November 1988: Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Velasco, Jr. filed against
Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo Sarinos for
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law
- 4 September 1987: Januario and Canape, with Sarita and Sarinos, after
stabbing driver Geronimo Malibago and conductor Andrew Patriarca, took one Isuzu
passenger type jeep owned by Doris and Victor Wolf.
- 7 February 1989: Januario and Canape pleaded not guilty.
- 30 May 1989: Cid pleaded not guilty.
- Sarita and Sarinos remain at large.
Statement of Facts:
- Vicente Pons story:
o March 1988: Cid went to the house of prosecution witness Vicente Pons, Cid's
cousin. He asked Pons if he wanted to buy a jeep. Pons said he had no money but he
could look for a buyer who can pay 50,000.
o So Pons offered to look for a buyer provided that Cid would entrust the jeep to him.
o He offered it to Myrna Temporas who agreed to buy it for 65,000, which later
became 48,500 only.
- Myrna Temporas story:
22
o According to her, Pons told her that the jeep belonged to her niece, Doris Wolf.
o Pons, upon Doris Wolf's instruction, borrowed from Myrna 48,500 and used the jeep
as collateral.
o Pons failed to pay back the 48,500, and also failed to produce a deed of sale
covering the jeep. Myrna filed a complaint. She just found out during the complaint that
the driver and the conductor of the jeep had been killed by kidnappers.
- Upon NBI's investigation, they found that the carnapping of the jeep and the
killing of the driver and the conductor were done by Januario, Canape, Sarita and
Sarinos. The jeep was disposed of through Cid.
- From an oral investigation of Januario and Canape, NBI found out that the
driver and the conductor were killed inside a sugar plantation. A lawyer who was just
around, Atty. Carlos Saunar, was asked to assist the two during the investigation.
- Confession of Januario:
o Januario said that 2 weeks before September, he was in the house of Canape to
procure chicken and kalawit for his business. He also went there because his new
friends, Sarita and Samera, with Canape, wanted him to look for a buyer of a jeep. He
asked for a photo of the jeep but he was told that he'll have it later that night after they
have drinks at Toto's house.
o At about 5am, the group hailed a jeep. Here, Januario described how Canape, Sarita
and Sarinos tied up the conductor and the driver of the jeep and took control of the
vehicle. The jeep stopped after a while, and brought the conductor and driver down a
sugar plantation. Januario described how he heard growls, but did not witness what
happened. He also saw the bloodied hand Sarita and Sarinos.
o Upon reaching Libmanan, Januario said they went to Cid with whom Januario had
earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep. He got 1,000 cash and rice and eggs
worh 600.
- Januario signed this statement and swore berfore NBI Executive Director
Salvador Ranin. Also signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar as counsel.
- Confession of Canape:
o Sarita and Sarinos told him to look for a buyer of a jeep. He looked for a buyer with
Januario. They saw Cid as an interested buyer.
o They told Sarita and Sarinos about it. They drank, then at 5am, hailed a jeep, wrote it
and was asked by Sarita and Sarinos to take out a knife and point at the driver and
conductor of the jeep.
o They stopped at a certain point. Januario, Sarita and Sarinos brought the driver and
the conductor down the jeep at a sugar plantation, with Sarita later saying that
everything was already fixed "Ayos na".
o After this, they went to Cid and gave the jeep to him for 25,000.
o He also said that Cid and Pons knew that the jeep was just going to be stolen. He
also admitted that he himself knew that when they were looking for a buyer, the jeep
they will be selling will also be just stolen.
- Canape signed, subscribed and swore to this statement.
- 12 September 1989: Prosecution offered evidence, which the court admitted.
 23

- Defense manifested its intention to file a demurrer to evidence.
- 21 November 1989: Since defense has not presented Cid yet, the court ordered
the cancellation of his bail bond and gave his surety 30 days within which to show cause
why judgement against the bond should not be rendered.
- 22 December 1989: Court issued an order stating that the demurrer to evidence
may not be allowed anymore for failure to appear at the scheduled hearings.
- 26 December 1989: Defense nonetheless mailed a demurrer to evidence or
motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence.
- 10 January 1990: Trial Court dismissed the motion, since the demurrer
failed to contain a compelling reason to recall the previous order [the one that said
they cant na cause they dont appear].
- 6 February 1990: The court issued an order considering the cases terminated
against Januario and Canape, but granted a reservation to present evidence as regards
Cid.
- 9 March 1990: Defense presented Cid as witness. He said that a certain Raul
Repe, Toto Sarita and Digo Sarreal approached him about the sale of a jeep. He
referred them to Vicente Pons who he thought would buy the jeep.
- 27 March 1990: The court denied defense counsels motion to cancel the
hearing that day. Since Atty. Saunar was present, the trial court ordered that his
testimony be heard that day. Here, Saunar said that Atty. Vela, an NBI agent,
approached him. Vela, along with Atty. Toribio told him that Januario, Canape and
Sid verbally confessed to participation in a crime, and they were about the
execute their sworn statements, so they needed his assistance. Saunar agreed
and explained to the three the consequences of their confession. He told them
their constitutional rights, the Miranda rights, specifically. Prosecution reminded
the court that Saunar cant be presented as witness, so they consider him only as
additional evidence for the prosecution and/or rebuttal testimony.
- 11 May 1990: Defense manifested that it was closing its case.
Issue:
1. Was the admission of the testimony of Atty. Carlos Saunar proper?
2. Were the extra judicial confessions of Januario and Canape admissible as
evidence?

Held Rationale:

1. Yes. - Rule 119 of the Rules of Court shows the order of trial. The order is followed, but
strict observance of the rules depends upon the circumstances of the case, at the
discretion of the trial judge. Therefore, the court may allow the prosecutor to still present
involuntarily omitted evidence. Saunar's testimony was considered as a rebuttal witness
with respect to Cid, so it was considered.

2. No. - Atty. Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation
counsel.
- Even if he can be considered as a competent counsel, he is not
independent because at that time, he was applying for a position in the NBI, so his
loyalty would not be to the accused but to NBI.
- Section 12(1) of Article II of the Constitution states that admission of facts related
to a crime must be obtained with assistance of counsel, otherwise it would be
inadmissible. An admission, under Section 26 of Rule 130 is "an act, declaration, or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact". This is different from a confession, which is
defined in Section 33 as a "declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt of he offense.
- Januario and Canape made verbal admissions of complicity in the crime.
But such verbal admissions must be made with assistance of counsel. They were
not made with assistance of counsel when they made it in Naga City.
- People vs Alicando: There is a "libertarian exclusionary rule known as the
fruit of the poisonous tree, where once the primary source (the tree) is shown to
have been unlawfully attained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit)
derived from it is also inadmissible.
Judgement: Judgement: Januario and Canape are acquitted.
December 4, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Samontanez (Therese) vs.

ROBERTO SAMONTAEZ y DELA VEGA, accused-appellant.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
NATURE: On automatic review of the Decision of the RTC of Batangas convicting
appellant Roberto Samontanez of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE and
sentencing him to DEATH
FACTS:
November 25, 1995 (early morning): Corazon delas Alas saw her daughter,
eighteen (18) year-old Lolita delas Alas, off to school from their residence in
Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. That was the last time
Corazon had seen her alive because at 8:00 oclock in the evening of the same
day Lolitas lifeless and naked body was found in the middle of a sugar cane
plantation in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas. Lolita was
apparently raped before the attacker ended her life.
Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the crime.
Roberto Samontaez was seen at around 6:30 pm on November 25, 1995
while he was in the act of coming out of the sugar cane plantation of Perino
Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas near the place
where the dead body of Lolita was later found.
Earlier, at around 5:30 pm, Roberto passed by the house of Melecio Mendoza in
Sitio Bulanggutan, Barangay Bunducan and he headed eastward to the
direction of the sugar cane plantation of Desacola.
30 minutes later, Lolita was also spotted, and she was likewise heading
eastward to her house in Sitio Ilaya.
7:00 pm (still Nov. 25): Roberto returned heading westward and he passed
through the same path along the cane field.
November 28, 1995: Roberto was fetched by the police authorities of Nasugbu,
Batangas from his workplace at Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III,
Mendez, Cavite. During the investigation at the Nasugbu Police Headquarters,
Roberto admitted to the police that the other personal belongings of Lolita delas
Alas were inside his bag that was left at his workplace in Mendez, Cavite
January 11, 1996: Roberto Samontaez WAS FORMALLY CHARGED IN
COURT with the crime of rape with homicide under Art 335 of the RPC.
February 1, 1996 (ARRAIGNMENT): Upon being arraigned, Roberto
Samontaez, assisted by counsel de oficio, ENTERED THE PLEA OF NOT
GUILTY to the Information in this case.
March 14, 1996: PRE TRIAL WAS SCHEDULED AND TERMINATED.
BEFORE TRIAL ON THE MERITS, accused, through counsel, manifested his
intention of changing his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty.
The trial court ordered that the accused be re-arraigned in Tagalog, a dialect
which he understood, and the said accused THEN PLEADED GUILTY to the
charge of rape with homicide as stated in the instant information.
After being satisfied that the accused entered a voluntary and informed plea by
asking some questions, the trial court required the prosecution to adduce
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
24
culpability pursuant to Article 116, Section 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Prosecution Evidence:
On November 26, 1995, the victim, Lolita delas Alas alias Betia, left their house
in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas at around 6 am to
attend her classes at Kim Harold Computer School in Poblacion, Nasugbu,
Batangas.
She was expected to return home at 5pm of the same day. Having failed to
come home on time, the victims mother, Corazon delas Alas, decided to meet
Lolita in Barangay Pantalan which was her usual route in going home from
school.
Upon her arrival in Barangay Pantalan however, Corazon was informed that
Lolita had already passed by, and that by then she must have reached their
home. Corazon returned to Sitio Ilaya but found that Lolita was not yet home.
Filled with apprehension, Corazon sought the assistance of her neighbors,
Renato Bauyon and Dalmacio Salao, to locate her daughters whereabouts. At
8pm, Corazon fainted upon being informed by Bauyon and Salao that the dead
body of Lolita was found in the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola. The
body of her dead daughter was already inside the house when she regained
consciousness.
December 8, 1995: Corazon gave her sworn statement to the police on
December 8, 1995 in connection with the rape-slay case of her daughter. She
knew Roberto Samontaez because he was a resident of Sitio Balanggutan,
Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
It appears that on November 26, 1995: Carlito Samontaez, who is a first
cousin of both the accused-appellant and the victim, was on his way home after
gathering fodder for his animals when, at a distance of twenty 20 arms length,
he chanced upon Roberto at around 6:30 pm while the latter was coming out of
the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay
Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
Carlito and Roberto were coming from opposite directions. However, when they
came close to two (2) arms length with each other, Carlito observed that
Roberto, who was naked from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder,
was perspiring, somewhat surprised and looked pale (medyo po namumutla).
Carlito greeted Roberto and asked him where he just came from, but the latter
did not answer and left hurriedly. Carlito dismissed his cousins reaction,
thinking that he may have been merely drunk.
After reaching his house, Carlito joined in the search for Lolita upon learning
that she was missing. At 8 pm,, the victim was found dead in the sugar cane
plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya. Lolita was lying on her stomach,
naked and a black T-shirt was tied around her neck.
Melecio Mendoza (uncle of Roberto by affinity): Saw Roberto walking
eastward to Sitio Ilaya in Barangay Bunducan at about 5:30 pm on November
26, 1995. Melecio also saw Lolita at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of the
same day walking home to Sitio Ilaya. Subsequently, at 7:00 oclock in the
evenipmng, Melecio again saw Roberto passed by his house, this time heading
westward to Sitio Balanggutan in Barangay Bunducan. Roberto was naked
from waist up with his T-shirt placed on his shoulder

Melecio joined in the search for Lolita after having been requested by Renato
Bauyon. Lolita was totally naked and already dead when they found her in the
sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya which was approximately
one hundred (100) meters away from his house in Sitio Balanggutan.
Acting on the report that a dead woman was found in Barangay Bunducan,
Nasugbu, Batangas, SPO2 Buenaventura Masikat and other police officers of
Nasugbu, Batangas, together with Dra. Estela Hizon, proceeded to the crime
scene in Sitio Ilaya, Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas where the victim,
Lolita delas Alas, was found dead and lying on her stomach totally naked with a
black T-shirt tied around her neck. A panty was stuffed in her anal area. Her
hands were stretched upward and her bra was half removed.
SPO2 Masikat and SPO2 Dionisio Calara conducted an investigation (found 2
short pants and 1 piece of slipper belonging to the deceased, black bag
containing a lotion, maong pants and shoes, brown bag with Kim Harold ID, coin
purse, hair pin, powder kit and puff). They then interviewed people and learned
that Roberto Samontanez could possible be located at Hermogenes Trading in
Brgy Galicia III, Mendez Cavite where he worked.
November 28, 1995: SPO2 Masikat, together with police officers Ramos,
Malinay, Ocoma, Lejano and Ilao, all of found Roberto Samontaez at the
Hermogenes Trading. After talking to his employer, they invited Roberto to the
Nasugbu Police Headquarters. During the interrogation at the police
headquarters, Roberto informed SPO2 Masikat and SPO2 Calara that some of
the personal belongings of Lolita delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at
his workplace in Mendez, Cavite.
December 4, 1995: SPO2 Masikat and his group returned to Hermogenes
Trading and inquired from Mr. Nelson Hermogenes about the bag of Roberto.
Accordingly, Mr. Hermogenes produced a black bag purportedly belonging to
Roberto containing an Omax wrist watch, a Joop cologne and a pawnshop
receipt for a gold ring that was subsequently redeemed by SPO2 Masikat for
P500.00. The three (3) articles were positively identified during the trial of the
case by Corazon delas Alas as belonging to her daughter, Lolita delas Alas.
The police also found a fan knife (balisong) and a Barangay Clearance inside
the black bag of Roberto.
November 30, 1997: The prosecution RESTED ITS CASE.
January 14 and 29, 1998 (HEARINGS FOR THE PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE): The accused took the witness stand and
reiterated his previous PLEA OF GUILTY to the crime charged in the
information.
TRIAL COURT RENDERED A DECISION finding accused GUILTY.
Roberto Samontaez: Assails the validity of his plea of guilty to the charge in
the information in this case for having been improvidently made.
People: Belie the claim of the appellant by citing portions of the transcript of the
stenographic notes of the hearing during the appellants re-arraignment on
March 14, 1996 and that of the scheduled hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998
to show that he voluntarily entered the plea of guilty to the crime of rape with
homicide with full knowledge of the consequences of his plea of guilty.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the appellants plea of guilty was voluntarily made in accordance
with recognized Rules (NO)
25
2. Whether or not appellant was accorded his right to be informed of the nature of
the accusation against him (NO)
3. Whether or not the evidence gathered by the police are admissible as evidence
against the accused (NO)
HELD: The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangas dated
May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the appellant, Roberto V.
Samontaez, of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the case is
remanded to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused
until terminated.
RATIO:
1. Whether or not the appellants plea of guilty was voluntarily made in accordance with
recognized Rules (NO)
The record shows that the trial court relied on a) the appellants plea of guilty to
the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the information and b) the
evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial of the instant case.
Section 3 Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically
mandates the course that trial courts should follow in case where the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, as follows:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.- When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
Based on the aforecited rule, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after
a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered by the accused:
1. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea;
2. The trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability
through the requisite quantum of evidence; and
3. The trial court must ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
NOTE: Mandatory procedure. Any judge who fails to comply: grave abuse
of discretion.
Rationale: The courts must proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is to
avoid improvident pleas of guilty since by admitting his guilt before the court, he
would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequence of his plea.
The Court notes the trial courts efforts to ensure the propriety of appellants
plea of guilty to the crime of rape with homicide as evidenced by its lengthy
inquiries to the appellant in separate hearings. (see transcript in the Original)

However, the COURT IS NOT CONVINCED that such lengthy inquiries
conducted by the trial court during the re-arraignment of the appellant as well as
during the subsequent hearings for the presentation of evidence of both the
prosecution and the defense sufficiently established voluntariness and full
comprehension of the appellant of his plea of guilty to the crime charged
in the Information.
Appellant earlier entered the plea of Not guilty to the Information in this case
during his arraignment on February 1, 1996. Subsequently, the appellant
manifested, through his counsel de officio, his intention to change his previous
plea to that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in the Information.
After having entered the plea of guilty on re-arraignment, the trial court
proceeded to propound questions on the appellant during which affirmative
responses were elicited from the appellant apparently to show that his
subsequent plea of guilty was his own voluntary decision.
The trial court per its Decision under review, however, failed to dwell on a
significant development that transpired during the scheduled hearing on
November 13, 1997 when the appellant revealed in open court, through
counsel, that his subsequent plea of guilty was prompted by pressure
from a certain policeman so that he (appellant) agreed to admit the
commission of the offense charged. (see transcript in the Original)
The trial court brushed aside the disclosure from the appellant that he was
pressured by a policeman to change his earlier plea of not guilty to that of guilty
to the charge in the information.
It did not propound any clarificatory questions about the matter on the same
occasion such as the identity of the concerned policeman, the nature of the
pressure and the circumstances under which the alleged pressure was applied 3. Whether or not the evidence gathered by the police are admissible as evidence
on the appellant.
Although further inquiries were undertaken by the trial court in the subsequent
hearings on January 14 and 29, 1998, the questions addressed to the appellant
were primarily aimed at eliciting affirmative responses or confirmations of his
plea of guilty.
The statement of the appellant that he was pressured by a certain policeman
apparently escaped the memory or concern of the trial court as it did not crop up
in its inquiry during those subsequent hearings.
Left unventilated, the appellants allegation of pressure generates doubt on the
voluntariness of his plea of guilty to a capital offense.
2. Whether or not appellant was accorded his right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him (NO)
Furthermore, the trial court failed to mention and explain clearly to the appellant
the elements of the crime of rape with homicide as charged in the Information.
As a result, appellant was not properly accorded his fundamental right to
be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him, which is
an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
The appellant who reached grade IV only stated that he did not know the
consequences of his plea of guilty during the hearing on February 14, 1996 and
again, during the hearing on January 14, 1998. While the trial court informed
26
the appellant that his plea of guilty meant that he admitted liability for the crime
of rape with homicide, as charged in the information, which carries the penalty
of death, it failed to emphasize that his said plea of guilty would not, under any
circumstance, affect or reduce the death penalty, the imposition of which is
mandatory under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
Additionally, the trial court failed to apprise the appellant of the civil liability (e.g.
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages) arising from the crime of
rape with homicide which shall be imposed on him as perpetrator of the crime.
Despite appellants apparent willingness to accept the penalty for his crime, it is
not farfetched to say that appellant was actually led to believe that the penalty
for his crime may still be reduced upon his plea of guilty thereto especially when
the trial court informed the appellant, through counsel, that he should adduce
evidence.
Also, the trial court should have probed deeper to the extent of securing every
material detail of the crime in its lengthy inquiries to the appellant subsequent to
his re-arraignment. Questions tending to elicit corroborative responses to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should have been asked of the
appellant.
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go
about the matter of a proper searching inquiry, it would be well for the trial
court, for instance, to require the appellant to fully narrate the incident that
spawned the charges against him, or by making him re-enact the manner in
which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the
court missing details of significance in order to determine, once and for all, his
liability for the crime.
against the accused (NO)
The trial court considered pieces of evidence that are inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
The facts show that the appellant Roberto Samontaez was actually arrested by
police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his
workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not appear from
the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights
during the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III,
Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
It also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel during the said
custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession
obtained from the appellant during the police custodial investigation
relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the
said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not
objected to during the trial by the counsel of the appellant.
People vs. Alicando:
According to this rule (fruit of the poisonous tree), once the primary
source ( the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained
as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the fruit of the poisonous
tree is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The fruit of the
poisonous tree is at least once removed from the illegally seized

evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito
Samontaez and Melecio Mendoza, both of which merely seek to establish the
presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime scene on or about the
time when the crime took place. Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for
the crime charged in the case at bar rested primarily on his plea of guilty which
appeared to have been improvidently made and hence, contrary to the letter
and spirit of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Mojello (Kat)
March 9, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO, appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Nature: automatic review
FACTS:
Dec 15, 1996, 9p.m: Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group
including Roger Capacito and his wife and the sps Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the
Capacito residence at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way home, he
saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Capacito, walking together
some thirty meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota. Since he was used to seeing
them together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this. He
proceeded to his house.
Dec 16, 1996, 5-6 am: The Rayco family was informed that the body of Lenlen
was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio immediately proceeded to the site and
saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. He was devastated. A remorse of
conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his niece and even attempted to take
his own life
Mojello was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound
for Cadiz City.
On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he
was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias
Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay
Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it
was executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later on
voluntarily signed it. Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge
Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan.
Dr. Sator: swelling of the labia majora and hymenal lacerations positively indicate
that the victim was raped. He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and
contusions on her neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia. Cause of
death: cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to
the head and the trunk.
Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of
"not guilty." Trial followed.
27
Jan 21, 1999: TC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide(death penalty)
ISSUES:
W/N the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence
W/N appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
RATIO:
Appellant: the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily
entered into. He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his
constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him. Hence, his confession,
and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Application of the law on custodial investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12,
paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which embodies what jurisprudence has termed as
"Miranda rights."
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was
based on the leading case of People v. Galit and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, rulings
subsequently incorporated into the present Constitution. The Miranda doctrine under the
1987 Charter took on a modified form where the right to counsel was specifically qualified
to mean competent and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice.
Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements compared to its
American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence of counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has
evolved to provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in
Miranda v. Arizona.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996,
applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438,
Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel.
In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore
admissible in evidence.
Appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution.
The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating
officers informed him of such rights. As further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio
testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by
the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. Appellant manifested on record his
desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that
before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken, he advised
appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the
questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. Atty.
Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the
contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence
and independence in representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover,
appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during
the custodial proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the
tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can

impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who,
for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
People v. Continente: A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged
by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's appointment
during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could
not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the
claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where
abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the
confession is admissible against the declarant.
Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's
apprehension by the police authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two
grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2) improper waiver of the right to
counsel as it was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the
December 23, 1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant's
confession should nevertheless be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods were used at the outset,
there is still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession later on by
properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and circumstances
than those which prevailed originally.
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and
intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda
doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438,
Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his investigation, explained to
appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect, notably Cebuano, a language
known to the appellant,
He was fully apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to
counsel, as contained in such confession. Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias
Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before
Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of
MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the
appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He
subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his statement, Atty.
Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were present as well as other
people.
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid
requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence.
Appellant: c his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial
confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who threatened him,
nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the
contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he
uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
People v. Pia: "where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress
or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who administered
the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their
28
alleged maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and
where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions."
The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against
the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so,
manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. To hold otherwise is to
facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of threat, torture,
coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever.
People v. Enanoria: further declared that another indicium of voluntariness is the
disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the
declarant.
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with
duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent
evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit
are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to
overturn the presumption.
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the
defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. In cases where the
Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should be subsequently
applied in order to determine the probative weight of the confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains
unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to
ensure that a suspect has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the
right to counsel. It is in the paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective
administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine.
Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police authorities is central to the criminal
justice system; Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements
under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It
follows that the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not
"fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree itself is not poisonous.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty despite the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with the
corpus delicti as established by the Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio
Rayco, leads us to no other conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen
Rayco on December 15, 1996. It passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be
sustained.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the
victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on
the occasion of the rape a homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical
evidence further precludes us from connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual
assault, given the quantum of proof required by law for conviction. No estimated time of
death was given, which is essential in making a connection with the appellant's story that
he went home after a night of drinking. Although the circumstances may point to the
appellant as the most likely perpetrator of the homicide, the same do not constitute an
unbroken chain of events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that appellant

was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in the reconstruction of
facts and inferences surrounding the death of Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to
boxing the victim when she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. No physical, scientific or
DNA evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed the victim.
Fingerprints, if available, would have determined who committed the homicide. Thus,
appellant cannot be convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of
evidence which thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said special
complex crime.
Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape, the
victim Lenlen Rayco being then eleven years old. The sexual assault was necessarily
included in the special complex crime charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.
RTC: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Dindo Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua ;pay the heirs of the victim, Lenlen Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Ho Wai Pang v. People (Joan)
October 19, 2011
HO WAI PANG,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
September 6, 1991, 11:30PM United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from
Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the
passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as
tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong)
presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco
(Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined
the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first
traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes
and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined,
she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the
first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and
opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white
crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus
immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo
and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes
earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger
manifest and further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first
found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which
contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two
of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu
29
Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the
baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two
or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered
from the baggages of the six accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated: he conducted a test on the
white crystalline substance which yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. After, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with
tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
Next day: The 13 tourists were brought to the NBI for further questioning. Out of
the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as
against petitioner and his five co-accused.
Six separate Informations were filed against petitioner and his co-accused
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation which the trial court granted.
The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among
the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended
Information under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the
other Informations. The Amended Information reads:
Pleaded not guilty.
All the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their defense.
They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal
substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the
travel agency.
RTC ruling: Guilty of conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF
IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY
EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00)
each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the accused though
retroactively for having a less stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment
provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The fine ofP30,000.00 for each accused is
imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the accused
[than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION
AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed
since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused wong kok wah @
sonny wong, chan tak piu, ho wai ling and inocencia cheng.
All the accused appealed to SC.
Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on separate dates their
respective withdrawal of appeal.
SC granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Per Entry of Judgment,
said Resolution became final and executory.
Ho Wai Pang then was the only one left to pursue his appeal.
CAs Ruling: Appeal denied and RTC decision affirmed. While conceding that
petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that
there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also
rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and

statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial
courts ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
Motion for Reconsideration denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUES:
Whether or not the following rights were violated:
1. right to counsel during custodial investigation
2. right to confrontation
HWP claims that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the
witnesses testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses
would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered
against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
OSG counters that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or
the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioners
call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do
so, he should have manifested it before the court.
HELD: No to both.
RATIO:
1. The rule: Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the
so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during such investigation. "The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is
not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation." (Aquino v.
Paiste)
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial
questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right
under Section 1231 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of
the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during
his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement
was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused,
the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and on the existence of the confiscated shabu.
Petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been caught
in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any
confession or admission (as in the Ming case).
The testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court,
hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing
direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime.
30
2. Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation. He did not register any
objection to the presentation of the prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony
of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that
the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is
that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the
other witnesses and test their credibility.
Right to confrontation, definition and purpose: The right to confrontation is one of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity
for cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also
been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-
examination.
On conspiracy: Conspiracy among the accused was duly established. On the allegation
of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude conspiracy. However, just
like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct evidence but by
circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence
which if taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy: (1) they know each other; and (2) all
the illegal substances confiscated from the six accused were contained in chocolate
boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in their luggages.
"Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony." "[C]onspiracy which determines
criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an
acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime."39 "It need not be shown that
the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue
a common design."
On guilt beyond reasonable doubt (because no chocolate box was found in his
bag): True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified, she declared that
she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioners bag.
Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two
chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently
explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they
were at the ICU. This slight clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her credibility nor
the veracity of her testimony.
Still, malum prohibitum (he alleges he was not aware of the shabu): It bears
stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it
is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act
is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict
an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal intent.
On penalty: affirmed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED
and the assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

Gaanan v IAC (Mel)
October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
NATURE: Petition for certiorari from the decision of the IAC
LAW: Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 or Anti Wiretapping Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
FACTS:
October 22, 1975 (AM): Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon, a
teacher of Don Bosco, discussed the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint
for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
Pintor made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned Gaanan, who is a lawyer, to come to
his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. Gaanan
went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
Petitioner:
When Pintor called up, Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault.
(a) P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands
(b) P5,000.00 for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the
case
(c) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don
Bosco
(d) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(e) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don
Bosco
Respondent:
31
(f) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier
filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas
Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be filed later;
(g) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco
(h) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to
the mass media;
(i) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor.
20 minutes later, Pintor called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to
the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Pintor then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money. Pintor called up again and instructed
Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then DPWH.
Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant
himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Gaanan executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of Gaanan to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he
filed against Pintor.
Since Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent, Pintor charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
LC: Gaanan and Laconico GUILTY of violating R.A. 4200 Section 1. Penalty: 1
year imprisonment
Petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
IAC: AFFIRMED TC Decision
Communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200;
Petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and
consent of the complainant;
Extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered
in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
Telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. In 1964,
when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the
Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used
instruments and the punishment of their use was already discussed.
However, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of
telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise
described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
 32

An extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer
the context of the Ra 4200 because it is not a part or portion of a complete set or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other
of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a
apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be shares its line with another.
transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a Rathbun v. United States: Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk
main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to
party or end. overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation
of any privacy of which the parties may complain. The conduct of the party
ISSUE: would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-
a. Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited "devices or set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between
arrangement" in Section 1 of RA 4200, such that its use to overhear a private that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two the same purpose.
parties using a telephone line? (NO)
b. Whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in b. Yes. GENERAL RULE: Penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
favor of the petitioner-accused? (YES) accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
HELD: Petition GRANTED. Decision of IAC ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner construed as not including an extension telephone.
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti- People v. Purisima: Reason - Tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals;
Wiretapping Act. the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited. The purpose is not to enable a guilty
RATIO: person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
a. NO, an extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, definition of forbidden acts." On the construction or interpretation of a legislative
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. the law.
R.A. 4200 refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or
the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. telephone conversation. Senator Diokno: What this bill intends to prohibit is
The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction conversations which later on will be used in court.
that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in
the meaning of any of its parts. 'Particularization followed by a general court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the
expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former'. However general the terms telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No.
cases that are different from those in the law. ' 4200 or others of similar nature.
The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend Katz (Chrissa) adopted from consti 2 digests. feel ko si monching gumawa kasi par
instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which form. haha! i added and edited and kept his separate etc opinions :D
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to Katz vs US
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the December 18, 1967
party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are Justice Stewart
not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, Reasonable basis
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now FACTS:
when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main

The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of
California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in
violation of a federal statute.
At trial the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to
introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations, overheard
by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to
the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.
In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the
recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because
"there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by the petitioner. This is
in connection with the long-standing doctrine held in the earlier decisions of
Olmstead and Goldman.
The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally
protected area."
The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort
to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is
"constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this
case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.
ISSUE Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone
conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as
evidence against a person? (yes)
RATIO:
The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally
protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not
places from unreasonable intrusion.
Although the telephone booth was constructed partially of glass, what he sought
to exclude was not the intruding eye but the uninvited ear. He did not shed his
rights to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might
be seen.
A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters
into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world.
The government contends that the activities in this case should not be tested by
fourth amendment requirements, for the survaillance technique they employed
involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls. However, this has been discredited.
The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any
technical trespass under local property law
The Governments activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioners telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.
33
Moreover, the surveillance was limited both in scope and in duration, to the
specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioners unlawful
telephonic communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief
periods during which he used the telephone booth, and they took great care to
overhear only his conversations.
. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the
inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves,
not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the
search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a
neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the
search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific
court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to
notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized.
In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search
upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a
particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have
been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," and that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored
"the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth
Amendment," a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of
the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.
HELD: Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it
led to the petitioner's conviction, the judgment must be reversed
J. Harlan, concurring opinion:
Two-fold requirement regarding the 4th amendment. (1) first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, (2) second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not
"protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the
other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard,
for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
J. White, concurring opinion:
Wiretapping without judicial notification for purposes of national
security are not covered by this decision. Warrant is not required if the President himself
or his chief legal officer has authorized the act.
J. Black, dissenting opinion:

The first clause protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures . These words connote the idea of tangible things
with size, form, and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, or both. The
second clause of the Amendment still further establishes its Framers' purpose to limit its
protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those
"particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping,
is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be
searched nor seized. Rather than using language in a completely artificial way, I must
conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping. Tapping
telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping (and wiretapping is nothing more than
eavesdropping by telephone) was, as even the majority opinion in Berger, supra,
recognized, "an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. In
those days the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their
windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private discourse." There can be no doubt
that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict
the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the
appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment.
Key Concepts:
Requirements in the issuance of a judicial approval for limited search and
seizure aka wiretapping:
1) proper notification of the need of such investigation and specifically informed of
the basis on which it was to proceed
2) clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail
3) held under precise and determinate circumstances
4) for the purpose of acquiring a detailed and factual affidavit alleging the
commission of a specific criminal offense
5) no greater invasion of privacy may be permitted than what is necessary
(In this case, the FBI failed to procure judicial approval.)
Requirements in admitting evidence for trial:
(1) by an undercover police agent to whom a defendant speaks without knowledge that
he is in the employ of the police, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
(2) by a recording device hidden on the person of such an informant, Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); and
(3) by a policeman listening to the secret micro-wave transmissions of an agent
conversing with the defendant in another location, On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952). When one man speaks to another he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so
doing, including the risk that the man to whom he speaks will make public what he has
heard.
Probable cause - reasonable belief that a crime had been or will be committed
White (Yesha)
April 5, 1971
United States v. James A. White
J. White
NATURE: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
34
FACTS:
1966, respondent James A. White was tried and convicted under two
consolidated indictments charging various illegal transactions in narcotics
violative of 26 U.S.C. 4705(a) and 21 U.S.C. 174. He was fined and
sentenced as a second offender to 25-year concurrent sentences
during trial, evidence was admitted of certain incriminating statements of
respondent that were overheard by warrantless electronic eavesdropping
by Government agents by means of a transmitter which informer Harvey
Jackson consented to wear during his meetings with respondent
On four occasions, the conversations took place in Jackson's home; each of
these conversations was overheard by an agent concealed in a kitchen closet
with Jackson's consent and by a second agent outside the house using a radio
receiver.
Four other conversations -- one in respondent's home, one in a restaurant, and
two in Jackson's car -- were overheard by the use of radio equipment.
The prosecution was unable to locate and produce Jackson at the trial, and the
trial court overruled objections to the testimony of the agents who conducted the
electronic surveillance. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and defendant
appealed.
Court of Appeals held that the agents' testimony was impermissible under
the Fourth Amendment, and reversed respondent's conviction.
ISSUE: whether the Fourth Amendment (right ag unreasonable search & seizure) bars
from evidence the testimony of government informant, which agents overheard by
monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter [NO]
RATIO:
1. The Government's use of agents who themselves may reveal the contents
of conversations with an accused does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
and this Court's decision in Katz v. US, does not disturb the rationale of On Lee
v US, in this respect, and require a different result because the agent uses
electronic equipment to transmit the conversations to other agents.
a. Katz v. US: swept away doctrines that electronic eavesdropping is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment unless physical invasion
of a constitutionally protected area produced the challenged evidence;
absence of physical intrusion into the telephone booth did not justify
using electronic devices in listening to and recording Katz' words,
thereby violating the privacy on which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone in those circumstances
b. CA understood Katz to render inadmissible against White the agents'
testimony concerning conversations that Jackson broadcast to them;
SC cant agree: Katz involved no revelation to the Government by a
party to conversations with the defendant, nor did the Court indicate in
any way that a defendant has a justifiable and constitutionally
protected expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will
not then or later reveal the conversation to the police
c. Hoffa v. US: "no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth
Amendment is involved," for that amendment affords no protection to

"a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." No warrant
to "search and seize" is required in such circumstances, nor is it
when the Government sends to defendant's home a secret agent who
conceals his identity and makes a purchase of narcotics from the
accused
d. Concededly, a police agent who conceals his police connections may
write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and
testify concerning them without a warrant authorizing his encounters
with the defendant and without otherwise violating the latter's Fourth
Amendment rights.
e. For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent,
instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations
with defendant, either
(1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on
his person,
(2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations
either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the
transmitting frequency
Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what
expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justifiable" -- what expectations
the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant. If the law gives
no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a
police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has recorded
or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the
State's case. Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.
2. The unavailability of the informant as a witness does not create any
Fourth Amendment issue
issue of whether specified events on a certain day violate the Fourth
Amendment should not be determined by what later happens to the
informer. His unavailability at trial and proffering the testimony of other
agents may raise evidentiary problems or pose issues of prosecutorial
misconduct with respect to the informer's disappearance, but they do
not appear critical to deciding whether prior events invaded the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
3. Since the decision in Katz v. United States, was not retroactive, CA erred in not
adjudicating this case by the pre-Katz law established by On Lee to the effect
that the electronic surveillance did not involve a Fourth Amendment
violation [that was the jurisprudence THEN]
HELD: CA judgment reversed; evidence was admissible
Knotts (Therese)
Argued December 6, 1982
Decided March 2, 1983
United States v. Knotts
REHNQUIST, J.,
35
NATURE: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
FACTS:
Having reason to believe that one Armstrong was purchasing chloroform to be
used in the manufacture of illicit drugs, Minnesota law enforcement officers
arranged with the seller to place a beeper (a radio transmitter) inside a
chloroform container that was sold to Armstrong.
Officers then followed the car in which the chloroform was placed, maintaining
contact by using both visual surveillance and a monitor which received the
beeper signals, and ultimately tracing the chloroform, by beeper monitoring
alone, to respondent's secluded cabin in Wisconsin.
Following three days of intermittent visual surveillance of the cabin, officers
secured a search warrant and discovered the chloroform container, and a drug
laboratory in the cabin, including chemicals and formulas for producing
amphetamine.
After his motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless monitoring of
the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted in Federal District Court for
conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the monitoring of the beeper was
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the monitoring of Armstrong using the beeper was done in
violation of the Fourth Amendment/in violation of his legitimate expectation of privacy
HELD: NO. There was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the contemplation of the
Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Reversed.
RATIO:
Monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of
privacy on respondent's part, and thus there was neither a "search" nor a
"seizure" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.
The beeper surveillance amounted principally to following an automobile on
public streets and highways. A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements.
While respondent had the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling
place insofar as his cabin was concerned, such expectation of privacy would not
have extended to the visual observation from public places of the automobile
arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway, or to movements of
objects such as the chloroform container outside the cabin.
The fact that the officers relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the
use of the beeper, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting their sensory faculties with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case. There
is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to
the movement of the chloroform container within the cabin, or in any way that
would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin.

Eugenio (Kat) (From previous digests in Consti :>)
Republic vs. Eugenio
[Feb. 14, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA,
BRANCH 34, PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, respondents.
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
TYPE OF ACTION: Petition for certiorari and prohibition, Rule 65
DOCTRINE:
In the Philippines, the right to privacy with regard to bank accounts is statutory in nature,
its source being the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955 (RA No. 1405). The general rule is that
bank deposits are absolutely confidential in nature. The Anti-Money Laundering Act
(AMLA) provides an exception to such a rule, but only upon fulfillment of the
requirements set forth in the AMLA and the Bank Secrecy Act.
For instance, an inquiry order into bank accounts can be issued, but not ex parte.
SUMMARY/CONDENSED VERSION OF THE FACTS:
Pantaleon Alvarez and Cheng Yongs respective bank accounts were subject of two bank
inquiry orders issued by Makati and Manila RTCs. The said orders were issued upon
probable cause that the accounts were related to violations of RA 3019 as well as
violations of the AMLA. Alvarez and Cheng Yongs wife Lilia contest said orders because
they were issued through ex parte applications. RP contends that ex parte applications
are allowed and that the RTC orders are immediately executory. Respondents argue
otherwise. The court looked into the said issue in relation to the respondents right to
privacy with regard to bank accounts.
FACTS:
This case assails four rulings
This case arose from the aftermath of the SCs ruling in the case Agan vs.
PIATCO (Decision dated May 5, 2003; Resolution denying MR dated Jan. 21, 2004)
The said ruling nullified the concession agreement awarded to the Philippine
International Airport Terminal Corporation (PIATCO) over the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport International Passenger Terminal 3 (NAIA 3) Project
Because of the said ruling, a series of investigations concerning the award of
the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the
Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner AMLC
May 24, 2005: OSG wrote AMLC requesting the latters assistance in obtaining
more evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA
3 project (also noting that the RP was presently defending itself in two international
arbitration cases filed in relation to the said project)
The CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial
transactions of certain individuals involved in the award, including respondent
36
Alvarez who had been the Chairman of the PBAC (Pre-qualification Bids and Awards
Committee) Technical Committee of the project
By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation
of Sec. 3(j) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in
favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so
qualified or entitled.
The CIS search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different
banks
June 27, 2005: AMLC issued Resolution No. 75: it resolved to authorize the
Executive Director of AMLC to sign and verify an application to inquire into and/or
examine the [deposits] or investments of Pantaleon Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad,
Alfredo Liongson, and Cheng Yong, and their related web of accounts wherever these
may be found, as defined under Rule 10.4 of the Revised IRR; and to authorize the
AMLC Secretariat to conduct and inquiry into subject accounts once the RTC grants the
application to inquire into and/or examine the bank accounts of those 4 individuals
In short, to conduct inquiries regarding the bank accounts of aforementioned
people
Rationale for the said resolution: founded on the cited findings of the CIS that
amounts were transferred from a Hong Kong bank account (owned by Jetstream Pacific
Ltd. Account) to bank accounts in the Philippines maintained by Liongson and Cheng
Yong
The same Resolution noted that by awarding the contract to PIATCO despite
its lack of financial capacity, Alvarez caused undue injury to the government by
giving PIATCO unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence, in violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Under the authority of the said Resolution, AMLC filed an application to inquire into
and examine the deposits or investments of the said people before the Makati RTC, Br.
138
July 4, 2005: Makati RTC rendered an Order granting the AMLC the authority as
petitioned for (Makati RTC bank inquiry order)
Trial court was satisfied that there was probable cause to believe that the deposits
in the various bank accounts are related to the offense of violation of the RA 3019 (now
the subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan)
Pursuant to the above Makati RTC bank inquiry order, CIS proceeded to inquire
and examine the deposits, investments, and related web accounts of the four

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-
Ignacio, wrote a letter dated Nov. 2, 2005 requesting AMLC to investigate the accounts
of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract.
The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were
used in the commission of unlawful activities that were committed in relation to
the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan (a memorandum was
attached on why the investigation of the accounts is necessary in the prosecution of the
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan)
In response to the said letter, AMLC promulgated Resolution No. 121 on Dec. 9,
2005 which authorized the executive director of AMLC to inquire into and examine the
accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and
two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank
Resolution said that the memorandum attached extensively justified the existence of
probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities mentioned are related
to unlawful activity of violation of Secs. 3(g) and 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended
Following the said Resolution, the Republic, through AMLC, filed an application
before the Manila RTC to inquire into and/or examine 13 accounts and 2 related web
accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 project
Among the said accounts of Alvarez (DBS) and Cheng (Metrobank)
Raffled to Br. 24 (presided by respondent judge)
Jan. 12, 2006: Manila RTC issued an order granting the Ex Parte Application
(Manila RTC bank inquiry order)
Order said that the allegations in the application were impressed with merit and in
conformity with Sec. 11 of RA 9160 or the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2001
and Rules 11.1 and 11.2 of the Revised IRR
Thus, authority was granted to AMLC to inquire into the said bank accounts
Jan. 25, 2006: Alvarez, through counsel, entered his appearance before the
Manila RTC and filed an Urgent Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order of Jan. 12, 2006
(the Manila RTC bank inquiry order)
He alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was issued
following an ex parte application
He argued that nothing in the AMLA authorized AMLC to seek the authority to
inquire into bank accounts ex parte (i.e. done by, for, on application of one party alone)
Jan. 26, 2006: Manila RTC issued an order staying the enforcement of its bank
inquiry order and giving RP 5 days to respond to Alvarezs motion
RP then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Jan. 26, 2006 Manila
RTC order and sought to strike out Alvarezs motion that led to said order
Alvarez filed a Reply and Motion to Dismiss the application for bank inquiry order
May 2, 2006: Manila RTC issued an Omnibus Order granting RPs MR, denying
Alvarezs motion to dismiss and reinstating the Manila RTC bank inquiry order of Jan. 12,
2006
Manila RTC reiterated that the material allegations in the application for bank inquiry
order stood as probable cause for the investigation and examination of the bank
accounts and investments
May 10, 2006: Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion expressing his apprehension that
AMLC would immediately enforce the omnibus order when he intends to file an MR,
which would be rendered moot and academic
37
May 11, 2006: Manila RTC issued an order requiring the OSG to file
comment/opposition and reminding the parties that judgments and orders become final
and executory only upon the expiration of the 15-day period to file an MR
May 15, 2006: Alvarez filed his MR
Jul. 5, 2006: MR was denied
Jul. 11, 2006: Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation
He manifested having received reliable information that the AMLC was about to
implement the Manila RTC bank inquiry order even though he was intending to appeal
Jul. 12, 20o6: Manila RTC issued an order directing the AMLC to refrain from
enforcing the bank inquiry order until the expiration of the period to appeal
Jul. 12, 2006 (same day): Alvarez filed a Notice of Appeal with Manila RTC
Jul. 24, 2006: Alvarez filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Clarification
He alleged having learned that the AMLC had begun to inquire into the bank
accounts of the other persons mentioned in the application for bank inquiry order
Considering that the Manila RTC bank inquiry order was issued ex parte, without
notice to those other persons, Alvarez prayed that the AMLC be ordered to refrain from
inquiring into any other bank deposits and alleged web of accounts enumerated in said
application
He also prayed that the AMLC be directed to refrain from using, disclosing, or
publishing in any proceeding or venue any information or document obtained in violation
of the May 11, 2006 order
FIRST ASSAILED DECISION
Jul. 25, 2006: Manila RTC issued an order clarifying that the Ex Parte bank inquiry
order cannot be implemented until Alvarezs appeal is resolved
AMLC was ordered not to disclose or publish any information or document found or
obtained in violation of the May 11, 2006 order
It reasoned that the other persons mentioned in AMLCs application were not
served with the bank inquiry order
Jul. 27, 2006: in response, RP filed an Urgent Omnibus MR urging that it be
allowed to immediately enforce the bank inquiry order against Alvarez and that Alvarezs
notice of appeal be expunged from the records since appeal from an order of inquiry is
disallowed under the AMLA
Jul. 10, 2006: meanwhile, Cheng Yongs wife Lilia Cheng filed with CA a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Application for TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against RP through AMLC, Judge Eugenio, and Makati RTC Judge
Marella, Jr.
She says she owns a conjugal Citibank account with Cheng Yong that is covered by
the Makati RTC bank inquiry order and 2 conjugal bank accounts with Metrobank
covered by the Manila RTC bank inquiry order
She imputed grave abuse of discretion on Makati and Manila RTCs in granting the
ex parte applications
She argued that the applications violated her right to due process
That the bank inquiry order under the AMLA can only be granted in connection with
violations of AMLA and that the AMLA cannot apply to bank accounts opened and
transactions entered into prior to the effectivity of the AMLA or to bank accounts outside
the Philippines
SECOND ASSAILED DECISION

Aug. 1, 2006: CA issued TRO enjoining the two RTCs from implementing,
enforcing, or executing the respective bank inquiry orders and AMLC from enforcing and
implementing such orders
Aug. 1, 2006 (same date): Manila RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the
resolution of the urgent omnibus MR (filed by RP) then pending before it until the
resolution of Lilia Chengs petition with CA
Aug. 1, 2006: the Manila RTC order amended its previous July 25, 2006 order by
deleting the last paragraph prohibiting AMLC from disclosing or publishing any
information or document found or obtained in violation of the May 11, 2006 order
Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification dated Aug. 14, 2006 arguing that
the deletion of the said paragraph would allow the AMLC to implement the bank inquiry
orders and publish information obtained even before the Manila RTC orders could
become final and executory.
THIRD ASSAILED DECISION
Aug. 15, 2006: Manila RTC reiterated that the bank inquiry order it issued could
not be implemented or enforced by the AMLC until the appeal is finally resolved
Present petition was filed on Oct. 2, 2006, assailing the 2 Manila RTC orders (July
25 and Aug. 15, 2006) and the CA TRO (Aug. 1, 2006)
FOURTH ASSAILED DECISION
Through an Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated Oct. 9, 2006, RP informed SC
that on Sept. 22, 2006, CA granted a writ of preliminary injunction in Lilia Chengs
favor
SC initially granted a TRO (Oct. 6, 2006) and later a Supplemental TRO (Oct. 13,
2006) in RPs favor but on respondents motion suspended the implementation of TROs
(Dec. 11, 2006)
RPs general advocacy is that the bank inquiry orders are valid and immediately
enforceable
As such, the assailed rulings are sullied with grave abuse of discretion
These conclusions presuppose that a bank inquiry order issued upon
probable cause may be issued ex parte and once issued, is immediately executory
It further argues that the information obtained following the inquiry is beneficial to
the AMLC in discharging its responsibility regarding the effective implementation of the
AMLA and that any restraint in the disclosure of such info would render meaningless the
relief supplied by the inquiry order
RP also questions Lilia Chengs standing, noting that none of the inquiry orders is
directed against her
RP also argues that Alvarez cannot assert any violation of the right to financial
privacy in behalf of other persons whose bank accounts are being inquired into,
particularly those who did not take any step to oppose such orders
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bank inquiry orders are valid;
More specifically, whether or not bank inquiry orders can be issued ex parte (No)
RATIO:
38
Money laundering: any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of
illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources
(International Criminal Police Organization/Interpol)
A crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby
making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources (AMLA, Sec. 4)
In addition to providing for penalties for money laundering, AMLA also authorizes
certain provisional remedies to aid AMLC in the enforcement of AMLA such as freeze
orders (Sec. 10) and bank inquiry orders (Sec. 11)
Sec 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. -- The Court of Appeals, upon
application ex parteby the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that
any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as
defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective
immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended
by the court.
Sec. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. -- Notwithstanding the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act
No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit
or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of
any competent court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established that
there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful
activities as defined in Section 3(I) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4
hereof, except that no court order shall be required in cases involving unlawful activities
defined in Sections 3(I)1, (2) and (12).
To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire
into or examine any deposit of investment with any banking institution or non-bank
financial institution when the examination is made in the course of a periodic or special
examination, in accordance with the rules of examination of the BSP.
Sec. 10 of AMLA provides that a freeze order may be issued ex parte
Such specific language is absent in Sec. 11 with regard to bank inquiry
orders
The current language of Sec. 10 and Sec. 11 was crafted at the same time (RA
9194, amending the AMLA of 2001)
It was through the same enactment that ex parte proceedings were introduced into
the AMLA, but it was introduced only for freeze orders
Nothing in the provision, nor the available legislative record points to an ex parte
judicial procedure in the application for a bank inquiry order
The SC sees the sense in such a distinction: freeze orders inhibit the owner/s from
utilizing money or property. Thus, to make such an order anteceded by a judicial
proceeding with notice would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds by the
owner even before the order could be issued. As such, ex parte applications are allowed.
On the other hand, bank inquiry orders do not necessitate any form of physical
seizure of property of the account holder but only the examination of particular deposits
or investments. The records to be inspected cannot be physically seized or hidden by the
account holder because the records are in the possession of the bank; they cannot be
destroyed unless with extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.
Despite the alert to the account holder, the latter will still be unable to do anything to
conceal or cleanse his bank account records without cooperation from the bank

The SCs finding that ex parte applications for bank inquiry orders are not allowed
is that notice should be given to owners of the account to allow them the
opportunity to contest the issuance of said order
Also implies determination of probable cause by a court of justice; the court cannot
simply take the AMLCs word that probable cause exists
SCs construction of Sec. 11 is undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy
considerations
If sustained, RPs argument that a bank account may be inspected by the govt
following an ex parte proceeding have significant implications on the right to privacy
Embodies the right to be let alone, the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized people
As for the constitutional right to privacy, with respect to bank deposits:
American jurisprudence (US vs. Miller): no legitimate expectation of privacy as to
the bank records of a depositor
Constitution has not bothered with the triviality of allocating specific rights peculiar
to bank deposits
However, there is a statutory source for such a right: BANK SECRECY ACT OF
1955 (RA No. 1405)
Section 2. 1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines,
its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
As such, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy in the
Philippines.
Subsequent laws, such as the AMLA, may have added exceptions but it is still the
general rule, unless and until it is repealed.
Exceptions must be specifically legislated
Doubts must be resolved in favor of absolute confidentiality
AMLA provides an exception such that if there is probable cause, the AMLC
may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of
violation of the AMLA
But such an order still cannot be issued ex parte
Thus, with regard to Lilia Chengs standing, having established her joint ownership
of the 3 accounts, she has the standing to assail the orders because the same interfere
with her statutory right to maintain the secrecy of said accounts
The statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authorizing the
inquiry anyway but only upon the fulfillment of the requirements in Sec. 11 of
AMLA or Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act
At the same time, the account owners have the right to challenge whether said
requirements were indeed complied with
As for the retroactive application AMLA: only the DEPOSITS BEFORE its
enactment on Oct. 17, 2001 are unaffected, not the TRANSACTIONS entered into
AFTER, regardless of when the accounts used were opened.
HELD:
39
Petition dismissed.
IV. Search & Seizure
Stonehill v. DIokno (Joan)
June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE et. al.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
On the ground of violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code, a total of 42 search
warrants were issued against Stonehill et.al. and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, to search the persons and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
Stonehill et.al. claim that the search warrants are null and void, because:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with
law.
March 20, 1962, Stonehill et.al. filed with the Supreme Court an original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and
/or representatives from using the effects seized in the deportation cases, and
that, in due course, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
Respondents-prosecutors alleged that:
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
 40

SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed, but it was partially lifted or
dissolved:
First group, NO injunction: papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations;
Second group, YES injunction: the papers, documents and things found and seized in
the residences of petitioners
ISSUES
1. On first group: Whether or not the petitioners had cause of action
2. On second group: Whether or not the search warrants are valid (because petitioners
claim they are general warrants); If no, whether or not they are admissible as evidence
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity
of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
No particularity in the objects to be seized: The description in the warrant authorized
the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of
our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

HELD: Respondents raise Moncado vs. People's Court (even if the searches and seizures under
1. Stonehill et.al. have no cause of action. consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
2. The warrants were not valid. the warrants for the search of three (3) residences are admissible in evidence)
null and void; and the searches and seizures therein made are illegal.
SC: We are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case
RATIO: (which is in line with American common law) must be abandoned. Most common
1. They had no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
the seizures made, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, Judge Learned Hand: Exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. The right to object to the wrong be repressed.
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations.
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
The question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
corporation whose property was taken.(A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. US) requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
2. Two points must be stressed: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. establish a probable cause.

No specific offense; they were abstract: it just said that they committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." It was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
No specific acts were alleged: It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code."
Criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations, in general, committed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly
abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority
usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power
of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

Lastly, on MR and Amendment filed by petitioners that some of the places searched
should be considered as residences, and other effects seized in the offices of the
corporations to include personal belongings: SC is not satisfied that the allegations, and
the contents of the affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by
the petitioners. SC thinks it is not necessary to express their opinion on the matter and
leave it open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences
of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted,
insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned
residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed
and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the
same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
All the search warrants, are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and
are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the
searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful.
Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants are
void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal
standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search
warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
The petitioners had the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other
than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost
verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing.": Ownership of the properties
seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress,
and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure.
Control of premises searched gives "standing.": Independent of ownership
or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners
have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary
or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched.
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed
against said person gives "standing.": Possession (actual or constructive),
no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule
even before Jones. (p. 199)
The SC should order the return to the petitioners all personaland private papers
and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their
residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
Burgos v Chief of Staff (Mel)
41
December 26, 1984 (1973 Constitution)
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS
MEDIA SERVICES, INC.
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL
SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL
ESCOLIN, J.:
NATURE: Petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction
FACTS:
December 7, 1982: 2 search were warrants issued on by respondent Judge
Ernani Cruz-Pano of CFI Rizal
Authorized to search business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[a]: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]: 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
Seizure of office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor
of the "We Forum" newspaper
Verbatim:
All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the
"WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters
and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement
and April 6 Movement; and
Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly A]
Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; B] DATSUN pick-up
colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; C] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS
524; D] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and, E]
TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong
Silang."
Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants for:
Judges failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and his witnesses as mandated by as mandated by Art.
3, Sec 2 of the Constitution and Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Invalid search at RMS Bldg. address as even though the search
warrants were issued to search 2 distinct places, they pinpointed only

to one distinct place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly
keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City based on that portion of Search Warrant No.
20- 82[b] which states: Which have been used, and are being used as
instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion
penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and
concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
Seizure of articles belonging to co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. when the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone
Seizure of real properties under the disputed warrant (only personal
property could be seized)
Inadequacy of documents to have sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. These documents
were presented by Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the
P.C. Metrocom during application for the search warrants and the Joint
Affidavits of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, members of
the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla who
conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the
application for the search warrants.
Being in the nature of general warrant
Petitioners further pray for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents
be enjoined from using the articles seized as evidence against Jose Burgos, Jr.
and the other accused in a criminal case at RTC QC through a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
At the hearing of the plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction, OSG opposed petitioners' prayer but manifested that
respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in
the criminal case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of
the articles". With this, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction
was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have SC dismiss the petition:
As petitioners had come to SC without having previously sought the
quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
On the ground of LACHES. While said search warrants were issued on
December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed
only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than 6
months.
Reason presented by petitioners for delay in the filing of the
petition was that they sought the help of President Marcos
first, asking the return at least of the printing equipment and
vehicles but after waiting in vain for 5 months, petitioners
finally decided to come to Court.
On the ground of ESTOPPEL. Since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had
used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in his
Criminal Case, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the
search warrants.
42
ISSUE # 1: Whether the search warrants are null and void for:
1. failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses (moot and academic)
2. having been issued to search 2 distinct places when it was meant for one and the
same place (NO, typographical error only)
3. being directed to Burgos, Jr. alone but articles belonging to co-petitioners Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services Inc. were seized (NO, Sec. 2, Rule
126 does not require property to seized be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is directed)
4. authorizing the seizure of real properties (NO, machineries, although bolted to the
ground remain movable/personal property because petitioners do not own the
land/building where they are located)
5. being issued on the basis of documents in the application of Col. Rolando Abadilla
with the Joint Affidavit of two other members which could not have provided sufficient
basis for the finding of probable cause (YES)
6. being in the nature of a general warrant? (YES)
RATIO:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had
indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. The 2 search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for judge to have issued two warrants
intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be
searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla
himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that
might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real.
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing
officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is
relevant.
This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant
on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge
who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit.
And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in
the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched.
3. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or
may not be owned by him.
This rule enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a
search warrant A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
the following personal property: [a] Property subject of the offense; [b]
Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense;

and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property
must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at
the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property
sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
Rules mandate that things to be seized must be personal property. Machineries
etc. may seem immovable property as seen under NCC 415[5] which state that
"machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or
on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry
or works are considered immovable property.
However in Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo: Machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as
the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed.
5. Documents not enough to support a finding of probable cause. Mere generalization will
not suffice. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.
Equally insufficient is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by
our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for
subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free
Philippines, and April 6 Movement."
43
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the
facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance: "The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause."
6. YES, they are in the nature of general warrants. And when the search warrant applied
for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication
of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Stanford v. State of Texas: The search warrants which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in
Texas," "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of
any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the
Connecticut General Statutes were held to be a general warrant, and therefore
invalid.
ISSUE # 2: Whether petition should be dismissed for failure to first file a motion to quash
before the court which issued said search warrants and not directly to the SC? (Yes, but
SC can recognize bec. public interest case)
RATIO:
Petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court,
should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued
them.However, this procedural flaw notwithstanding, SC take cognizance of the
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all
metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies SC to exercise its inherent
power to suspend its rules. Justice Abad Santos in C. Vda.deOrdoveza v.
Raymundo: It is always in the power of the court (SC) to suspend its rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it".
ISSUE # 3: Whether petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches? (NO)
RATIO:
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable

time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial
system, there is no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment.
On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently
negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of
the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
ISSUE # 4: Whether petition should be dismissed as petitioner is estopped from assailing
the validity of search warrants as he has marked seized articles as evidence in his
criminal case? (NO)
RATIO: No. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can
do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them
as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search
warrants assailed in this petition.
HELD/DISPOSITIVE: Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge NULL AND VOID. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles GRANTED and all articles seized are RELEASED to
petitioners.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
Search warrants VOID. Action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression
of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross violation of the
Constitution.
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the
application; abstract averments will not suffice.
Nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the
claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D. No. ISSUE: WON act of private individual allegedly in violation of consti rights can be invoked
885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the against the state, (NO)
decree.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search 1. The constitutional right refers to immunity from interference by GOVERNMENT
warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among
other things, of the following: Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books
and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement
and April 6 Movement.
Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did
they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor
in the warrants which answers the questions. The warrants are general warrants
which are obnoxious to the Constitution.
There was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is
nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced
the former and has the same content but against which no action was made.
Marti (Chrissa)
44
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs
ANDRE MARTI, accussed-appellant
Jan 18, 1991
Appeal from decision of Special Criminal Court of Manila/ RTC, convicting accused of
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
FACTS:
Aug 14, 1987 10:00am-11:00am, appellant and common-law wife, Sherley
Reyes went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying 4 gift-wrapped
packages to be sent to a friend in Switzerland. Anita Reyes, the proprietress
attended to them. Appellant filled up contract and wrote name, passport
number, etc.
Anita asked to inspect the packages but was refused. Packages contained
books, cigars, and gloves
Packages were placed inside box, layered w styro
Before delivery to Bureau of Customs, husband of Anita, Mr Job Reyes opened
package following standard procedure. He smelled an odor, felt dried leaves in
the gloves and took samples to NBI for laboratory examination
In presence of NBI, MR. Reyes found dried marijuana leaves in box, cake-like
marijuana leaves instead of books, and underneath cigars.
Appellant could not be located as his passport address was the Manila Central
Post Office
Information was filed for violation of RA6425, Dangerous Drugs Act
Defense: violation of constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Art II Sec 2 and 3)
Origin in 1935 Charter, which is from 4th amendment to US Constitution
Previous cases struck down admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of
consti safeguard, however these cases involved searches by the State thru law
enforcers/ govt agencies
RATIO:
It was Mr Reyes who made the inspection, which was a standard operating
procedure. NBI made no search; they were only present and observed what
was in plain sight. It was not a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution
purpose: Protection against the state to declare some forbidden zones in
private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
1987 charter modifications did not change whom restriction is directed against
if the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be secures to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if at the
initiative of the proprietor without the intervention of police, the right cannot be
invoked.
2 appellant contends that his rights while under custodial investigation were not
observed, However, evidence does not indicate that he gave statements without

assistance of counsel. In fact, he refused to give a written statement while under
investigation
3. appellant contends the owner is a certain Michael, a German national whom appellant
met in a pub and after 30 mins asked him to ship the package and gave him 2k as the
German was about to leave the Phils
However, a person would not simply entrust a package of considerable value
and 2k to a stranger
He did not explain why he agreed to ship the package for Michael
He was previously convicted of possession of hashish in Germany in 1982.
The consignee, Walter Fierz was also convicted for drug abuse
He did not even know Michaels fullname/ passport number and did not indicate
such on contract
he signed the contract as the owner of the package. he is estopped to claim
otherwise
HELD:
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. CHARGE AFFIRMED
Bangcarawan (Yesha)
July 11, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
Puno,J.
Facts:
Information
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known
as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or
prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659
arraignment: not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution, (facts?):
March 11, 1999: interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from
Manila to Iligan City
March 13, 1999, 3am: vessel was about to dock at Iligan City port when security
officer, Mark Diesmo, received complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about
her missing jewelry; Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no.
106 as the culprit
Diesmo and 4 other vessel security force members accompanied Canoy to
search for suspect; later found in economy and identified as the accused,
Basher Bongcarawan
accused was informed of complaint and was invited to go back to cabin. With
his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage.
45
accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When
requested by security, accused opened suitcase, revealing a brown bag and
small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Suspecting substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately
reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused
beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance
6am., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and
RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took
custody of the accused and the seized items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown
bag and 8 small plastic packs of white crystalline substance.
When asked about contraband articles, accused explained that he was just
requested by a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the
latter's brother in Iligan City.
accused and seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector
Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF
Headquarters, while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the
NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI
Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," weighing
399.3266 grams.
VERSION OF DEFENSE, accused as witness:
March 11, 1999, 10 pm, he was in Quiapo where he met Alican "Alex"
Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City; was requested by
Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches
to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port
boarded same nght, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or
"maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the
Samsonite suitcase
March 13, 1999, 4am as vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his
baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark
ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While
they were conversing, 5 vessel security force members and a woman he
recognized as his co-passenger at cabin came and told him he was suspected
of stealing jewelry
He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked
He was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section and
took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase. He left the small
"maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be
confiscated by the security personnel
When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the
same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret
combination lock.
The security personnel forcibly opened suitcase and found packs
of white crystalline substance inside which they suspected to be
"shabu."

RTC Iligan, Dec 27, 1999, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of P500,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999
until the present, the period of such preventive detention shall be
credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is
hereby ordered delivered to the National Bureau of Investigation for
proper disposition.
Issue:
1. WoN drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against accused-appelant
(YES)
2. WoN court erred in holding appellant owned confiscated evidence, therefore
admissible (NO)
Ratio:
1. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is protection against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held in People
v. Marti, "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State."
a. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed
b. IN THIS CASE, baggage was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried
out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
c. on vessel security personnel should be considered as police
authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to
maintain peace and order: NO MERIT. vessel security officer is
private employee and does not discharge any governmental
function
2. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated
drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
-The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed.
We are left with the third.
United States v. Tan Misa: to warrant conviction, possession of dangerous
drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi
existed together with the possession or control of such articles. It has been
ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie
46
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi. Hence, burden of evidence is
shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi.
accused-appellant has utterly failed. In the absence of palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial
court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal.
accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage,
he knew it would be inspected.Why he got the Samsonite suitcase
allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known
only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not
present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents
consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated,
but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also
contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by
him.
accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the
contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. Does he
really exist?
no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living,
breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who
entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he
has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify
and support the claim of the accused."
Held: RTC Iligan affirmed
US vs Place (Therese)
Argued March 2, 1983
Decided June 20, 1983
US vs Place
OConnor, J.
NATURE: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
FACTS:
When respondent's behavior aroused the suspicion of law enforcement officers
as he waited in line at the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket to
New York's La Guardia Airport, the officers approached respondent and
requested and received identification.
Respondent consented to a search of the two suitcases he had checked, but
because his flight was about to depart the officers decided not to search the
luggage. The officers then found some discrepancies in the address tags on the
luggage and called Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorities in New
York to relay this information.
 47

Upon respondent's arrival at La Guardia Airport, two DEA agents approached
him, said that they believed he might be carrying narcotics, and asked for and
received identification. When respondent refused to consent to a search of his
luggage, one of the agents told him that they were going to take it to a federal
judge to obtain a search warrant.
The agents then took the luggage to Kennedy Airport where it was subjected to
a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog which reacted positively to one
of the suitcases. At this point, 90 minutes had elapsed since the seizure of the
luggage.
The length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the
conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.
This Fourth Amendment violation was exacerbated by the DEA agents' failure to
inform respondent accurately of the place to which they were transporting his
luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what
arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation
dispelled the suspicion.
Pendon (Kat)
November 16, 1990.

Thereafter, the agents obtained a search warrant for that suitcase and upon
opening it discovered cocaine. Respondent was indicted for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, and the District Court denied his motion to
suppress the contents of the suitcase.
He pleaded guilty to the charge and was convicted, but reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Court of Appeals: REVERSED, holding that the prolonged seizure of
respondent's luggage exceeded the limits of the type of investigative stop
permitted by Terry v. Ohio, and hence amounted to a seizure without probable
cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the seizure of respondents luggage violated the Fourth
Amendment (YES)
ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER TRADING COMPANY
vs.
CA, HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, RTC
of Negros Occidental, FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
Bacolod City and THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC COMPANY,
BACOLOD CITY,
MEDIALDEA, J.
NATURE: PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Feb 4, 1987, First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine
Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed an application
for a search warrant

HELD: Under all of the circumstances of this case, the seizure of respondent's luggage o KENNETH SIAO who may be found at KENER TRADING located at Rizal Street
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained corner Lacson Street, Bacolod City has/have in her/his/their possession and control the
from the subsequent search of his luggage was inadmissible, and Place's CONVICTION following property/ies
MUST BE REVERSED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed. o NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and
other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories
o which he/she/they is/are concealing in the premises above mentioned.
RATIO:
o subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D. Magallanes of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bacolod City and supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L.
When an officer's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo Abaja
carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny of the CIS of Bacolod City
permit the officer to detain the luggage temporarily to investigate the Questions:
circumstances that aroused the officer's suspicion, provided that the
investigative detention is properly limited in scope. o 1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal circumstances?
o 2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KEN-NETH SIAO located at
The investigative procedure of subjecting luggage to a "sniff test" by a well- Rizal Street, near cor. Lacson St., Bacolod City?
trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a "search" within the o 3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that said KENNETH SIAO who may
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. be found in the said premises/house has/ have in his/her/their possession and control the
following property, to wit:
When the police seize luggage from the suspect's custody, the limitations o 4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described property/ies is/are being kept
applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the in said premises /house?
permissible scope of an investigative detention of the luggage on less than
probable cause. Under this standard, the police conduct here exceeded the
permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop.
 48

On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge Magallanes o Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
issued Search Warrant No. 181, commanding the search of the property described in the effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
warrant. purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City conducted a search of the premises
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
described in the search warrant and seized the following articles, to wit: 1) 272 kilos of
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
galvanized bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar. The receipt
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon
was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and marked from Kenneth Siao
a finding of probable cause.
A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) was filed against
Probable cause for a search: such facts and circumstances which would lead a
Kenneth Siao with the office of the City Fiscal by the National Power Corporation.
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
Thereafter, Siao filed a counter-affidavit alleging that he had previously relinquished all
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
his rights and ownership over the Kener Trading to herein petitioner Erle Pendon. In a
searched
resolution (pp. 22-23, Record) dated May 18, 1987, the office of the City Fiscal
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint for In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) the judge (or)
the same violation against petitioner. On the same day, a complaint (p. 24, Record) for officer must examine the x x witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed against petitioner and docketed as Criminal oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching
Case No. 5657 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. questions and answers
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987, an application for the These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of
return of the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 on the ground that the Criminal Procedure
said search warrant was illegally issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an opposition to the
o Sec. 4. Examination of complain-ant; record.The judge must, before issuing the
application (pp. 31-32, Record). The application was subsequently amended to an
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
application for quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of the
and under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
articles seized by virtue thereof
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
Aug 24, 1987: respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the affidavits submitted.
application for the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree
of the issuance thereof. upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, however, the
opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be substantiated or
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on October
supported by the record.
14, 1987
The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge
Oct 20, 1987: pet filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant
mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order, assailing the legality of the search
Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The application
warrant and praying for the permanent prohibition against the use in evidence of the
contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal
articles and properties seized and the return thereof to petitioner.
knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the
April 4, 1988: CA dismissed the petition, found the existence of a probable cause possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was
to justify the issuance of the search warrant. sought to be issued.
ISSUE: Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
W/N the issuance of the search warrant was valid? NO
he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
HELD: order that the Judge may be able to o properly determine the existence or non-
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of found later that his declarations are false.
searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently o It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
complied with. routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
RATIO: must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. \
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented by
III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines the applicant can hardly satisfy the same requirement. The public respondent

prosecutor admitted in his memorandum that the questions propounded were pre- No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be,
typed. their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant.
The four (4) questions propounded could hardly support a finding of probable
cause. The judge could have exploited this last ques-tion to convince himself of the
existence of a probable cause but he did not. There was also no statement in the joint
deposition that the articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft
was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof. It was not
even shown what connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading or with the premises
sought to be searched. By and large, neither the application nor the joint deposition
provided facts or circumstance which could lead a prudent man to believe that an offense
had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense, if any,
are in the possession of the person named in the application.
x x x [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search
warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the
Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and
said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under
oath may not be in public Far more important is that the examination or investigation is
not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To
repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.
Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires
that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed
in the warrant, to wit: NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly,
aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories are so general
that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the
premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioners petition before respondent
Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the
business of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories
and empty bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under
the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged
that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or
embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended
to be used as a means of committing an offense.
It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about the existence
of probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant.
In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles seized by virtue of
search warrant No. 181 was taken from the possession of petitioner who signed the
receipt in behalf of Kener Trading, which possession is punishable under Section 5, P.D.
1612, which states:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing.Mere possession of any goods, article, item,
object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing.
49
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction
should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC Sergeant
Mamaril as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet angular bar (p. 21,
Record). There is no showing that the possession thereof is prohibited by law hence, the
return thereof to petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles seized
pursuant to an invalid search warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution.
DISPOSITIVE: petition GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring Search
Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and VOID; 2)
ordering the return of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner;
and 3) permanently enjoining respondents from using in evidence the articles seized by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.
Silva v. Honorable Presiding Judge, RTC Negros Oriental (Joan)
October 21, 1991
NICOMEDES SILVA @ " Comedes", MARLON SILVA, @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA
SILVA,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, BRANCH XXXIII, DUMAGUETE CITY,
FERNAN, C.J.:
Type of Action: Special Civil Action for Certiorari
FACTS:
June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom
Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for
Search Warrant" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City
against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. This application was
accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur M.
Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo.
Same day. Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for
Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1,
directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the
residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. as amended.
Pertinent portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath (sic)
MSGT. Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr. and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat.

Leon T. Quindo that there is probable cause to believe that possession and control of
Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is about to be committed
and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that marijuana dried leaves,
cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's Room (Rgt. side lst Floor)
located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are:
X (Subject of the offense stated above
(Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense;
X (Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the
day (night) of the room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open (sic)
aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and take possession
of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring the said
property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. 3
The serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the
amount of P1,231.40.
June 16, 1986, Antonieta filed a motion for the return of the said amount on
the grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize
marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or
refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section
11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court "holds
in abeyance the disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing
of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant."
July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on
the grounds that:
(1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search
Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by merely
filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Cruz, who, by then, had
replaced retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of
merit, finding the requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search
warrant duly complied with.
A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an
order dated October 19, 1987, which prompted petitioners to file the special
civil action for certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the
Order dated August 11, 1987, denying their motion to quash Search Warrant No, 1.
HELD: YES. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when: (1) he failed
to determine whether there is probable cause; and (2) when he rejected the motion of
Antonieta for the return of her seized money.
RATIO:
50
(1) The judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is
probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching
questions and answers.
Probable cause, definitions:
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched". This probable cause must be shown to be within
the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay. (Prudente vs. Dayrit)
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends
such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in
pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The
3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search
Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was
general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable cause
upon which a warrant may issue. (Nolasco vs. Pao)
In the case at bar, Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must
examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of
Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with
the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon. In fact
there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:
Q Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search
warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated
above, and other proceeds of fruit of the offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to be
used as means of committing an offense?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know personally who is/are the person who has/have the property in his/their
possession and control?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you know all this (sic) things?
A Through discreet surveillance.
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very
broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were
merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the
witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.

In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers.
(2) The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when
they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that
Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did
not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and
that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject of the
offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense and
NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense.
Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected
Antonietas petition.
CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION:
Purpose of Art. III, Sec. 2, Constitution: to prevent violations of private security in
person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the
law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1
is hereby declared null and void. Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to order the return to petitioner Antonieta Silva
of the amount of P1,231.40 which had earlier been seized from her by virtue of the illegal
search warrant. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
People v Mamaril (Mel)
January 22, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BENHUR MAMARIL
AZCUNA, J.:
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the RTC Lingayen
51
LAWS: Sec. 2, Art. III Consti, Rules of Court, Rule 126
FACTS:
Information: Feb. 1, 1999 in Lingayen, Pangasinan, Mamaril unlawfully keeps
and possesses crushed marijuana leaves contained in 78 sachets with a total
weight of 236.83 grams and 2 bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weighing 1600
grams, each brick weighing 800 grams, with a total weight of 1,836.83 grams, a
prohibited drug, without authority to possess the same. Contrary to Sec. 8 of
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
Arraignment: Not guilty.
Pre-trial conference: Admitted facts
Search was made in the house of Mamarils parents where he lives on
Feb. 1, 1999, 2:30 PM at Lingayen; Mamaril was in the balcony of the
house when it was searched
Search was conducted by PNP who brought a camera;
Existence of the report of physical science report issued by the PNP
Crime Laboratory through Chemist
Mamaril was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999
Trial:
The Prosecutions Evidence
Jan. 25, 1999: Search warrant was applied before RTC Lingayen by Intelligence
Section PNCO of Lingayen authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited
drug, at the family residence of Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street,
Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Granted by Judge Ramos who issued
Search Warrant No. 99-51
Feb. 1, 1999 (2:30 PM): Police officers went to the residence of Mamaril and
implemented Search Warrant.
Mamarils mother was under the house when they arrived and when
they asked her his whereabouts, she said that he was in the house,
upstairs. When they went upstairs, Mamaril was coming out of the
room and upon seeing them, he turned back and tried to run towards
the back door.
Police told him to stop, which he did. He was then informed that they
had a search warrant to search the house premises which they
showed to him and his mother. Mamaril looked at the search warrant
and did not say anything.
PNP then searched the house which was witnessed by 2 members of
the barangay council in said area whom the police brought with them
Things confiscated:
55 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana
leaves, which were found in a buri bag ("bayong") under appellants house
3 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana
leaves and seeds contained in an eye-glass case;
22 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana
leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair;
2 bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray
bag found inside the closet of appellants room.

Police took pictures of the articles and prepared a receipt of the
property seized. They also prepared a certification that the house was
properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the barangay
officials who witnessed the search. Police officers then brought
appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station
and turned them over to the desk officer
Feb. 2, 1999: Confiscated articles were brought to Crime Laboratory at La
Union for examination. Appellant was also brought for a drug test
Specimens are "POSITIVE for the presence of marijuana. Urine
sample of appellant was also POSITIVE for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride known as "SHABU."
The Defenses Evidence
Mamaril denied that he was residing at his parents house since he has been
residing at a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan
since Dec. 18, 1998.
Feb. 1, 1999: He was there at the time because he and his live-in partner visited
his mother and arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00 p.m., while appellant
was at the back of his parents house, about 7 to 9 policemen, in civilian clothes,
arrived and asked him to go upstairs. They immediately handcuffed him and
brought him to the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony until the
search was finished after more than 30 minutes. He was then brought to the
clinic of one Dr. Felix and a medical examination was conducted on him. Then
he was brought to the municipal hall.
Mamaril testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and
white bag containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the
search when he was at the balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw
the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying in court.
He admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly
searched was his.
Feb. 2, 1999: He was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando,
La Union where he gave his urine sample. Appellant insinuated that the
confiscated items were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with
some policemen in Lingayen. However, he admitted that the policemen who
searched his parents house did not threaten or harm him in any way
Records on Search Warrant
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, testified on the available records
regarding the search warrant.
He only had with him the application for search warrant, the
supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado
Fernandez and the return of the search warrant.
Before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the person
supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching questions
and answers made by Executive Judge Ramos in connection with the
application for the search warrant was the former OIC-Branch Clerk of
Court and legal researcher, Mrs. Aniston. However, during the trial of
this case, she was in the US.
Atty. Enrico asked her daughter who is a court stenographer, about
said transcript, but it has not been found. He then testified that based
52
on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He added that they
tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not find it
Records cannot be found because the store room which they were
placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered.
On the same day that prosecution formally offered its testimonial and
documentary exhibits, the defense filed a motion with memorandum
contending that:
Exhibits of the prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under
Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said exhibits
were seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judges
examination of the complainant and his two witnesses was not in
writing; and
Search warrant was illegally or improperly implemented.
Appellant prayed that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded
as evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility
of the same be deferred until such time that he has completed the
presentation of his evidence in chief.
Prosecution opposed the motion, and the TC denied appellants motion
RTC: GUILTY of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and penalized
under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended. PENALTY: RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of P500,000. Period of preventive imprisonment
credited in full
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
Petitioners Arguments
Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued considering that there was no
evidence showing that the required searching questions and answers were
made anent the application for said search warrant.
Clerk of Court testified that no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in connection with the application for said search warrant.
It cannot be said that the judge made searching questions upon the alleged
applicant and his witnesses, which is in violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution (right against unreasonable search and seizure) and Section 5,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the articles allegedly seized from Mamaril are inadmissible in evidence
considering that the search warrant was illegally issued? (YES)
b. Whether appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of the
search because he did not protest against? (NO)
c. Whether the inventoried articles in the receipt of seized property and the
corresponding certification are inadmissible in evidence since Mamaril was not assisted
by counsel when he signed the same? (Not necessary to answer)
RATIO:
a. Yes, items are inadmissible in evidence. Search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform to the requirement mandated by law that the
examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and

reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers and said
depositions in writing must be attached to the record. The evidence seized pursuant
to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance
with Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution.
Atty. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, presented before the court only the
application for search, supporting affidavits of PO3 Santiago and Diosdado
Fernandez and return of search warrant. He could not produce the sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge
examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as
required by law. There was no transcript of said proceedings.
Mata v. Bayona: Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false.
This is guaranteed by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Said Constitutional provision is
implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the
judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in
writing in the form of searching questions and answers
OSGs argument that the issuing judge examined under oath, in the form of
searching questions and answers, the applicant and his witnesses as it is so
stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51 cannot be credited. He may have done so
but the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into
writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the
complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record. That
the confused state of the records in Atty. Castillos branch when he assumed
office was the reason for such loss is untenable.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Mata v. Bayona: Nothing can justify
the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites.
Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera: It has been said that of all
the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the
exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny
of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement
53
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.
In issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements
of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be
given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption
of regularity is to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify it.
b. No, search is still illegal. Failure to object to search cannot be deemed to be a waiver.
People v. Burgos: Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that
consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to
object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin: As the constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
"Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst)
Silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search
warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. The
police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence
was searched. At that time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant
was issued in accordance with the law. It was only during the trial that appellant
had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing
appellant to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the
evidence formally offered by the prosecution. Under the circumstances, no
intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or
during the trial.
c. It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude
the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant. Without the aforesaid
illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the conviction of
appellant.
HELD:
Decision of the RTC Lingayen, Pangasinan REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and VOID and the search and seizure made
at appellants residence ILLEGAL.
For lack of evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
BENHUR MAMARIL is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement.

The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the
trial court is hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition.
Malaloan (Chrissa)
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
May 6, 1994
Regalado,J
FACTS:
CAPCOM filed with RTC Caloocan an application for search warrant for an
alleged violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions)
at Fairview, QC
CAPCOM proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor for the
Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research was taking place.
Firearms, explosives and subversive doc among others were taken during the
search and EILER instructors were indicated for violation of the PD before
branch 88 of RTC of QC
petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search
Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before
the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence
Illegally Obtained
respondent Judge consolidated the cases but denied the prayer for the
quashal of the search warrant. the validity of which warrant was upheld;
opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within
the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines,
and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court
but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital
Judicial Region)
CA affirmed, hence this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: WON a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter,
issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial
jurisdiction (yes)
RATIO:
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments as their disquisitions
postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on
search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous
doctrines, in the area of law enforcement
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to
invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition
allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City
54
A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in
the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it
before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process
designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one
has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency,
as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require
observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed
where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may
ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal
articles sought to be seized are then located.
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the
prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a
search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate
venue of a case under the foregoing rules
Petitioners rely on circular 19 and 13 to say that "only the branch of a Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an
application for and issue a warrant to search that place." However, these
circulars do not apply to all search warrants, only those in Metropolitan manila
and other courts with multiple salas and to particular crimes. Jurisdiction is
conferred by substantive law (BP129) and not procedural law, much less and
admin order or circular.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the
criminal case can issue the search warrant. It may be conceded, as a matter of
policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed
has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such
criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful
substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19
shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction
does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant
therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and
justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has
jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or
his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be
denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the
court's territorial jurisdiction.
HELD: the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of responden
CourtAppeals is hereby AFFIRMED
Groh (Yesha)
Feb. 24, 2004
JEFF GROH, PETITIONER
v.
JOSEPH R. RAMIREZ et al.

J. Stevens
Facts:
Respondents, Joseph Ramirez and members of his family, live on a large ranch
in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana
Petitioner, Jeff Groh, has been a Special Agent for the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) since 1989
February 1997, a concerned citizen informed petitioner that on a number of
visits to respondents ranch the visitor had seen a large stock of weaponry,
including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket
launcher
petitioner prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch
application stated that the search was for any automatic firearms or parts to
automatic weapons, destructive devices to include but not limited to grenades,
grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the
purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or
launchers
Petitioner supported the application with a detailed affidavit, which he also
prepared and executed, that set forth the basis for his belief that the listed items
were concealed on the ranch
Petitioner then presented these documents to a Magistrate, along with a warrant
form that petitioner also had completed
Magistrate signed the warrant form
warrant failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize
in the portion of the form that called for a description of the
person or property to be seized, petitioner typed a description
of respondents two-story blue house rather than the alleged
stockpile of firearms
warrant did not incorporate by reference the itemized list contained in
the application
warrant stated Magistrate was satisfied the affidavit established
probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed on the
premises, and that sufficient grounds existed for the warrants issuance
following day, petitioner led a team of law enforcement officers, including both
federal agents and members of the local sheriffs department, in the search of
respondents premises
Joseph Ramirez was not home, only wife and children
Petitioner states that he orally described the objects of the search to
Mrs. Ramirez in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone
According to Mrs. Ramirez, however, petitioner explained only that he
was searching for an explosive device in a box.
officers search uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives
When the officers left, petitioner gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the
search warrant, but not a copy of the application, which had been
sealed
following day, in response to a request from respondents attorney, petitioner
faxed the attorney a copy of the page of the application that listed the items to
be seized. No charges were filed against the Ramirezes
55
Respondents sued petitioner and the other officers, raising eight claims,
including violation of Fourth Amendment
District Court entered summary judgment , found no Fourth Amendment
violation, because it considered the case comparable to one in which the
warrant contained an inaccurate address, and in such a case, the court
reasoned, the warrant is sufficiently detailed if the executing officers can
locate the correct house
court added that even if a constitutional violation occurred, the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the failure
of the warrant to describe the objects of the search amounted to a
mere typographical error
CA affirmed the judgment with respect to all defendants and all claims, with the
exception of respondents Fourth Amendment claim against petitioner
court held that the warrant was invalid because it did not describe
with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be
seized, and that oral statements by petitioner during or after the
search could not cure the omission
court concluded all of the officers except petitioner were protected by
qualified immunity
SC granted certiorari
Issue:
whether search pursuant to a warrant that failed to describe the persons or
things to be seized violated Fourth Amendment (YES)
whether petitioner is entitled to qualified immunity, given that a Magistrate
Judge, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question,
found probable cause to conduct the search (NO)
Ratio:
The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized
does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity.
Fourth Amendment requires particularity in the warrant, not in the
supporting documents.
We do not say that Fourth Amendment forbids a warrant from cross-
referencing other documents, but in this case, warrant did not
incorporate other documents by reference, nor did either the affidavit
or the application (which had been placed under seal) accompany the
warrant
Petitioner argues that even though the warrant was invalid, his search of
respondents ranch was functionally equivalent to a search authorized by
a valid warrant since Magistrate authorized search on basis of adequate
evidence of probable cause.
SC does not agree. warrant did not simply omit a few items from a list
of many to be seized, or misdescribe a few of several items. Rather, in
the space set aside for a description of the items to be seized, the
warrant stated that the items consisted of a single dwelling residence
blue in color. In other words, the warrant did not describe the
items to be seized at all.

warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as
warrantless within the meaning of our case law
case law: searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable,absent exigent circumstances, a
warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is
unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is
probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found
within
Petitioner maintains that the search in this case satisfied those goalswhich
he says are to prevent general searches, to prevent the seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another, and to prevent warrants from being issued
on vague or dubious information,
The mere fact that the Magistrate issued a warrant does not
necessarily establish that he agreed that the scope of the search
should be as broad as the affiants request.
purpose of the particularity requirement is not limited to the
prevention of general searches; particular warrant also assures the
individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority
of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power
to search.
It is incumbent on the o. fficer executing a search warrant to ensure the search
is lawfully authorized and lawfully conductedBecause petitioner did not have in
his possession a warrant particularly describing the things he intended to seize,
proceeding with the search was clearly unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the search was
unconstitutional.
As to whether petitioner is entitled to qualified immunity despite that violation
If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a
reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct
particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution
guidelines of petitioners own department placed him on notice that he might be
liable for executing a manifestly invalid warrant. An ATF directive in force at the
time of this search warned: Special agents are liable if they exceed their
authority while executing a search warrant and must be sure that a search
warrant is sufficient on its face even when issued by a magistrate.
even a cursory reading of the warrant in this caseperhaps just a simple
glancewould have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police
officer would have known was constitutionally fatal.
Held: CA judgment affirmed
Paper Industries (Therese)
May 19, 1999
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M.
NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D.
AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO,
HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION,
ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
56
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL
OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND,
respondents.
Panganiban, J.
NATURE: Petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for:
(1) the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993
and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon
City; and
(2) the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State
Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with IS No. 95-167
FACTS:
January 25, 1995: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a
search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating:
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in
[its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are
the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing
the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the
premises described;
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the
law to take possession and bring to the described properties
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion
issued the contested search warrant.
February 4, 1995: The police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP
compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the
petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash" before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash"
and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence."
March 23, 1995: The RTC issued the first contested Order which denied
petitioners' motions.
August 3, 1995: The trial court rendered its second contested Order denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid (NO)
HELD: The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED and Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No
pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the
basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and
the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in
writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify
on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.( Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court)
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court
failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2)
SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance or the
search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not
described with particularity.
No Personal Examination of the Witnesses
Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1)
the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2)
a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and
Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod however, none of the
aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court.
Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the
search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod.
The trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the
applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod. Obviously, His Honor relied
mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this
language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false.
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the
PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This,
however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his
personal knowledge, not belief.
Particularity of the Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the
Constitution to be searched only to those described in the warrant. Thus, this
Court has held that "this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to
57
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case
of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards."
Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more
specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient
showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in particular
place.
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place
with particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises,"
but it did not specify such premises
Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were
"inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." As the Court noted in an
earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures."
They are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means evidence means of
coercing evidence . . .."
Dichoso (Kat)
June 4, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, SONIA DICHOSO y VINERABLE and JAIME
PAGTAKHAN y BICOMONG,accused.
REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.
Nature: Automatic Review
FACTS:
Mar 8, 1991: Informations filed against Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag and his wife
Dichoso y Vinerable
o sell, deliver, give to another and distribute (1) 1.3 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) and 6 decks of aluminun foil of shabu, a regulated drug and
(2) dried marijuana fruiting tops, leaves and seeds, a dangerous drug, without being
authorized by law.
Jaime Pagtakhan: charged with illegally possessing a regulated drug (shabu) and,
thus, violating Sec 16, Art III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended
Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because she "cannot be located."
The three (3) cases were consolidated for joint trial in RTC of San Pablo City and
proceeded as against accused Jaime Pagtakhan and Redentor Dichoso after the two
had entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment.
Feb 22, 1991: the Narcotics Command of the 4th Regional Unit stationed at
Interior M. Paulino St., San Pablo City applied for a search warrant to be issued on the

house of sps Redentor Dichoso and Sonia Dichoso at Farconville Subd., Phase II, San
Pablo City.
After searching questions on the applicant and his deponent the Court was
satisfied that there existed probable cause to believe that indeed said spouses were
keeping, selling and using an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and marijuana in said residence. Consequently, a Search Warrant was issued
Feb 23, 1991, 2pm: Upon approaching said residence the team met an old man
and Evangelista introduced himself and his companions as Narcom agents duly armed
with a search warrant. Evangelista asked for Redentor and Sonia and the old man
opened the gate into the Dichoso compound for the Narcom Agents. The old man led
them to the Nipa house where inside Redentor, Jaime Pagtakhan and two other persons
were sitting near a small table with suspected shabu and paraphernalia on top thereof.
Taken aback the foursome did not move. Evangelista told them that they were Narcom
agents, and that they should not make any move and they had with them a search
warrant to serve. He then asked Sgt. Tila, a team member, to fetch for the barangay
chairman. In the meantime Evangelista served a copy of the search warrant to Redentor.
After about 15-20 mins Chairman Francisco Calabia arrived and was met by Evangelista
who forthwith showed him a copy of the said warrant. Calabia read the search warrant
and explained the contents thereof to Redentor.
The search ensued inside the nipa house. Evangelista discovered 200g more or
less of suspected marijuana wrapped in plastic, six (6) decks of suspected shabu
wrapped in an aluminun foil and the "Golden Gate" notebook (Exhibit F) containing the
list of suspected customers of dangerous and regulated drugs together with the
corresponding quantity and prices inside a cabinet which was standing on the right side
upon entering the door of the nipa house. From Pagtakhan's right hand, Evangelista
recovered a small quantity of suspected shabu.
The search was shifted to the main house of the Dichosos that produced negative
results.
Evangelista instructed Besinio to collect the confiscated items recovered at the
nipa house of the Dichosos. Besinio separately wrapped the items whereupon he and
Gapiangao made markings on the same. Besinio also put the names of Redentor and
Sonia inside some of the pages of Exhibit "F". The team then got from the main house a
plastic bag where all the confiscated items were put. Besinio sat in a corner of the nipa
house and prepared in his own handwriting the PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit "B") attesting
to the result of the search conducted by the NARCOM team listing thereon the different
confiscated items, another PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit "C") attesting to the lawful manner
the search was conducted, and the Receipt (Exhibit "D"), all dated February 23, 1991.
Said exhibits were alternately given to Calabia who read the contents thereof before
voluntarily affixing his signatures thereon. Then, he explained to Redentor and
Pagtakhan the contents of said exhibits. Afterwhich, Redentor likewise voluntarily affixed
his signatures thereon. (Exhibits B-1, C-1 and D-3). Pagtakhan also affixed his
signatures on Exhibit "B" and "D" opposite the items confiscated in his possession by
Evangelista. A certain Angelito Ancot affixed his signature on Exhibits B and C also as
witness. Redentor was then given a copy each of Exhibits B, C and D (Exhibits B-4, C-4
and D-4). Subsequently, Calabia and the Narcom team left the Dichoso residence. Said
team brought with them for further investigation at their headquarters Redentor,
Pagtakhan and the two other persons found inside the nipa house. Said two other
persons who were later known to be a certain "Jun" and a certain Bayani Salamat were
set free by the Narcom after having convinced the investigators that they were innocent
58
visitors or house guests of Redentor. Evangelista prepared a letter addressed to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, requesting examination of the
confiscated drugs. At about 9:50 P.M. of that same day accused Redentor and
Pagtakhan executed their separate waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
with the assistance of counsel (Exhibits "J" and "K").
On February 25, 1991 (Monday) the Narcom made a return of the search warrant
and inventory to the Court (Exhibit E).
On February 26, 1991 (Tuesday) Besinio handcarried the confiscated items to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. P/Major Rosalinda L. Royales, Forensic Chemist
concluded, after qualitative examination, that the one (1) transparent plastic bag
containing 1.3 grams of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) placed
in a plastic bag with markings and the six (6) foils containing 0.3 grams of suspected
metamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) wrapped in a foil and placed in a plastic
bag with markings gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic)
(shabu). Additionally, the one (1) aluminum foil containing 0.02 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) placed in a plastic bag with markings as
confiscated from Pagtakhan gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
[sic] (shabu) and the one (1) light green plastic bag containing 103.7 grams of suspected
dried marijuana fruiting tops, crushed leaves and seeds wrapped in a newspaper gave
positive results for marijuana (Exhibits M, series).
17 June 1991: TC: Jaime Pagtakhan and Redentor Dichoso guilty as charged.
o Redentor Dichoso violated Section 15, Article III and Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. (reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 )
o Jaime Pagtakhan violated Section 16 of said Act. Both of them should be made to
suffer the consequences of their unlawful acts. (straight penalty of Six (6) years and one
(1) of prision mayor and to pay the costs)
25 June 1991: clarified the sentence imposed on accused Dichoso by declaring that the
sentence of reclusion perpetua refers to each of the two (2) cases against him, and
amended the decision by inserting the words "in each case" after the words "to suffer"
and before the words "the penalty" in the decretal portion thereof.
Accused Redentor Dichoso filed a Notice of Appeal.
The records does not disclose that accused Jaime Pagtakhan appealed from the
decision.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N the search warrant was valid? YES
(2) W/N there was a frame-up ? NO
(3) W/N Exhibits B, C, and D should be admitted in evidence?
(4) W/N Exhibits F should be admitted in evidence?
(6) W/N the search on the land and the nipa which belonged to another was valid?
(6) W/N appellant was guilty?
HELD
We affirm the assailed decision.
RATIO:
(1)
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more
than one (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is
unpersuasive.

It is clear that the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general search warrant
because while it is for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992
as amended," the body thereof, which is controlling, particularizes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, and specifies the offense involved, viz., illegal
possession of marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in connection therewith. These
are evident from the clause, "are illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount
of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the compound of their residence at
Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City."
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and
defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus
be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
We, therefore, agree with the Solicitor General that the search warrant in question
contains fatal infirmity that may justify its invalidation.
Since Search Warrant No. 028 is valid, the articles seized by virtue of its
execution may be admitted in evidence. Consequently, the trial committed no error
in denying the appellant's motion to quash the said warrant and refusing to
dismiss the informations filed against him.
(2) Frame-Up:
This Court rejects the appellant's claim that he was framed. This defense requires
strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement
agents acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Appellant failed to rebut
this presumption. He did not even attempt to prove that the NARCOM agents who
obtained the search warrant, conducted the search and recovered the prohibited drugs
had motives other than to enforce the law and stem the menace of drug addiction and
trafficking which has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of
incorrigible, cunning and dangerous operations. It may be stressed here that the defense
of frame-up can be easily fabricated and the accused in drugs cases almost always take
refuge in such a defense.
Furthermore, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, appellant's claim of a
frame-up only concerns the deck of shabu allegedly taken out of the pocket of one Jun
who asked for and was readily permitted by the appellant to use shabu on that occasion.
It does not concern, much less explain, the origin of the other prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia seized during the search.
(3)Admissibility of Exhibits "B," "C" and "D":
These exhibits are not "simply inventories or receipts of articles seized from
appellant" as the appellee wants this Court to believe. A clearer examination thereof
shows that CIC Rolando Bisenio, who prepared them, deliberately wrote, in bold letters
below the name REDENTOR D. DICHOSO (over which the appellant was made to sign)
the words "MAY-ARI" in Exhibit "B" and "MAY-ARI BAHAY" in Exhibit "C," while the word
"OWNER" is printed below the sub-heading "COPY OF THE RECEIPT RECEIVED" in
Exhibit "D." By such descriptive words, appellant was in fact made to admit that he is the
owner of the articles seized (Exhibit "B"), the house searched (Exhibit "C") and the
articles inventoried in the receipt (Exhibit "D"). Thus, while it may be true that the
appellant was not asked specific questions regarding the vital issue of ownership,
Bisenio obtained an admission from the former through the said exhibits. This was a
clever way of circumventing the aforesaid Constitutional rights to counsel and to remain
59
silent. Admittedly, at the time Bisenio prepared the exhibits, the appellant was already in
the effective custody of the NARCOM agents deprived in a significant way of his freedom
of action. The preparation of the exhibits substituted, for all legal intents and purposes,
the custodial interrogation.
There was no need of requiring the appellant to sign documents similar to Exhibits
"B" and "C." As to Exhibit "D," which is the receipt for property seized, it is a document
required by Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court to be given by the seizing officer
to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were
made.
Nevertheless, the above discussions do not alter the result of this appeal. As
correctly stated by the appellee, these exhibits were not appreciated by the trial court as
extrajudicial confessions but merely as proof that the articles therein enumerated were
obtained during the search which, by the way, was sufficiently established by the
testimonies of the NARCOM agents independently of the said exhibits.
(4) Seizure of Exhibit "F":
This so-called warrant rule that only those listed in the search warrant
may be seized which the appellant claims to have been enunciated in 1920
in Uy Khetin vs. Villareal. 24 and which he now summons to his rescue, is not
without exceptions. Among such exceptions is the plain view doctrine.
We are not, however, inclined to rule that the foregoing exception applies to this
case, for the reason that the search warrant was not for unlawful sale of shabu or
marijuana but for unlawful possession thereof as shall be hereinafter discussed and that
the notebook per se is not an article possession of which is illegal or criminal. Exhibit "F"
proves neither sale nor possession.
(5) Ownership of the House Searched:
It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is
under his control or possession. It was established, even by the defense's own evidence,
that the appellant and his spouse have been using the said nipa house. He admitted that
the nipa house is actually part of and adjacent to the big or main house in the Dichoso
residential compound, and that he and his family have been using the nipa house as a
resting place even before the search.
Any doubt as to the appellant's control over the nipa house where the seized
articles were recovered is wiped out by the testimony of the defense's own witness,
Francisco Calabia, who affirmed that the appellant and his wife Sonia Dichoso actually
reside therein while Redentor's parents and brother reside in the big house.
(5)
This Court finds that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a
conviction for unlawful sale of shabu and for unlawful sale of marijuana. There is,
however, overwhelming evidence which establishes with moral certainty the guilt of the
appellant for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana under Sec. 16, Art. III and Sec. 8,
Art. II, respectively, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
We find, however, that the conclusions drawn from Exhibit "F" are merely
conjectural. For one, the prosecution did not attempt, and thus failed, to prove that the
handwritten entries therein were made by the appellant. It could have easily done so by
presenting, in accordance with the Rules, either a handwriting expert or an ordinary
witness familiar with the handwriting of the appellant. There is, as well, no competent
proof that the said entries refer to transactions regarding shabu or marijuana and that the
figures appearing therein pertain to prices of dangerous drugs.
 60

The facts in the instant case do not warrant the application of People vs. Toledo, MENDOZA, J.:
which the trial court and the appellee cited as authority. Other than exhibit "F," there is no
evidence of sale, delivery, distribution or transportation of prohibited drugs by the Type of Action: Appeal
appellant.
The other case cited by the appellee, People vs. Claudio, is of no help to the FACTS:
prosecution.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, what is material is the proof that the Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on
selling transaction transpired coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti December 28, 1995.
as evidence, and that to sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357: possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
be clearly and unmistakably established. Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without
In the case at bar, not a single witness of the prosecution, not even Sgt. the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said
Evangelista, claims to have seen the appellant sell or deliver shabu or marijuana to law.
anybody. Although Sgt. Evangelista testified that he was sold by his civilian informer or Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358: had in his possession and under his
agent that the latter was able to buy shabu from and was offered marijuana by the custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
appellant, the said civilian informer, who was presented by the NARCOM when it applied Arraignment: Salanguit pleaded not guilty whereupon he was tried.
for a search warrant, was not presented in court during the trial of the cases below. Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: forensic chemist and chief
The unlawful sale of shabu or marijuana must be established by unequivocal and of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
positive evidence. Laboratory, and 2 police.
There is no doubt, however, that the appellant is guilty of unlawful possession of Prosecution evidence:
shabu under Section 16, Article III and unlawful possession of marijuana under Section
December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC
8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in Criminal Case No.
Br. 90 Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-
6711-SP (91) and Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91), respectively. The crime of unlawful
appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon
possession of shabu, a regulated drug, under Section 16 is necessarily included in the
City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified
crime of unlawful sale thereof under Section 15. Similarly, the crime of unlawful
that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of
possession of marijuana under Section 8 is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful
shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-
sale of marijuana under Section 4 of the Act.
appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
The appellant cannot evade liability for illegal possession of dangerous drugs by
accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
his admission that he sometimes uses shabu. Throughout the trial of the case below, the
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge
appellant, whose petition for bail due to health reasons was denied, he has not been
Dolores L. Espaol:
shown to be a drug dependent and even if he was, indeed, a drug dependent, he did not
SEARCH WARRANT
voluntarily submit himself for rehabilitation as required by the law.
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
On the contrary, appellant's admission during the trial that he used shabu "once in
G R E E T I N G S:
a while" 43 only helps ensure his conviction for violation of Section 16 of the Dangerous
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining
Drugs Act because the unauthorized use of a regulated drug like shabu is one of the acts
under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness
punishable under the said section.
SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to
DISPOSITIVE: RTC modified. As modified, accused-appellant REDENTOR DICHOSO y
believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control
DAGDAG is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal
Annex "A", the properties to wit:
Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Section 8 of Article II of the said Act in Criminal Case No.
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG
6712-SP (91). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced in each
PARAPHERNALIA
case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years as minimum to
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of Twelve Thousand Pesos
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of
(P12,000.00).
the day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and
take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said
People v. Salanguit (Joan)
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
April 19, 2001
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Cavite, Philippines.
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO,

10:30PM, same day: A group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve
the warrant.
Police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but
nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house,
apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house.
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small
heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of approximately
1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it.
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with
them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the
items they had seized.
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence. The white crystalline substance were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of
dried leaves were found to be marijuana.
Accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated
by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano:
On the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their
house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their
house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long
firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in
the roof.
When he demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of
paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-
appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was
withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.
He was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag
containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and
canned goods.
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and,
after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the
NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was
detained.18
Soledad Arcano: the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food,
and took away canned goods and other valuables.
RTC ruling:
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months ofarresto
61
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; and,
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.The 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana
bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition
according to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby
directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of
Investigation pursuant to law.
Salanguit appealed with SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
1. the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence
against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
Salanguit claims that: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug
paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense;
and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
2. the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-
appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine was also invalid
3. there was employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the
warrant.
Salanguit claims that policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and
had broken doors and windows in the process.
HELD:
1. The first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's
house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with
respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
2. The marijuana is inadmissible in evidence. However, the confiscation of the drug
must be upheld.
a. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found,
i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his
immediate control. the against accused-appellant.
b. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.
3. No unnecessary force was employed.
RATIO:
1. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.

In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity
can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.
Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are
fulfilled.
a. There is Probable Cause for shabu, none for the drug paraphernalia.
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-
buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything
about drug paraphernalia.
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for
the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at
all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general
in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that
wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would
in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated. (Aday v. Superior Court)
b. Specificity of the Offense Charged
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous
drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the
said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
c. Particularly of the Place
OSG: .....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose,
Quezon City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case
No.160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to
wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched
was located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the
deposition of witness which described the premises as "a house without a number
located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location
of the premises to be searched.
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched.
2. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must
be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.
a. Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
62
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the
police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the
shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
"plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other
items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification -whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused -and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges.
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a
search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However,
a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and
the premises within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search
is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to
reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
b. Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to
justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in
newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention
of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted
in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be
upheld.
3. Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open
any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein
to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.
Salanguits claim is unsupported by reliable and competent proof No affidavit or sworn
statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been
presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim. The occupants of the
house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the
searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified
the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension
that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City is AFFIRMED .

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same courtis hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial
court is AFFIRMED .
Kho v Makalintal (Mel)
April 21, 1999
BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN
vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PURISIMA, J.:
NATURE: Petition for certiorari
FACTS:
May 15, 1990: NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search
warrants by the respondent Judge Makalintal of MeTC Paranaque against
Petitioner Benjamin V. Kho, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St.,
BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque.
On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same
court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house
at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque.
The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted
a personal surveillance and investigation in the 2 houses referred to on the
basis of confidential information they received that the said places were
being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-chop
vehicles. Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in
anticipation of criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination
of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued (4) Search Warrant
Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
Search Warrant No. 90-11: Unlicensed radio communications
equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners,
monitoring device and the like.
Search Warrant No. 90-13: Unlicensed radio communications
equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio
communications equipments, scanners, monitoring devices and
others.
Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to: Unlicensed
firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said firearms.
Search Warrant No. 90-14 states: Chop-chop vehicles and other
spare parts.
May 16, 1990: NBI agents searched subject premises
BF Homes, Paranaque: Armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11 and
90-12, they recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of
rounds of ammunition.
63
No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque: Another team of NBI
agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-13, 90-14 and 90-15, recovered
several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a
thousand rounds of ammunition.
The simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various
radio and telecommunication equipment, 2 units of motor vehicles
(Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle.
Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the
NBI agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or
entity for the confiscated firearms in question.
Likewise, the radio transceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned
out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of the government agencies
concerned.
May 22, 1990: The raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent
Judge requesting that the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI
May 28, 1990: Petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search
Warrants, contending that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause;
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being
general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural
requirements set forth by the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules
of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.
MeTC Paranaque: DENIED the Motion To Quash
Petitioners:
Question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the
absence of any probable cause
Violation of Procedural Requirements: Eg. Judge asked How did
you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin
Kho at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila? Respondent Judge allegedly assumed that
the firearms at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead
of asking for a detailed account of how the NBI agents came to know
that the firearms being kept there were unlicensed.
Search warrants are general warrants. The things to be seized were
not described and detailed out, i.e. the firearms listed were not
classified as to size or make
Searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the
search warrants in question
Failed to properly identify themselves and showing necessary
credentials including presentation of the Search Warrants;
Failed to furnish Search Warrants and allowing the occupants of the
place to scrutinize the same;
Failed to give ample time to the occupants to voluntarily allow the
raiders entry into the place and to search the premises.

Entered the premises by climbing the fence and by forcing open the
main door of the house.
Herded the maids and the 16yo. son of defendant Kho into the
dining room where they were confined for the duration of the raid. Son was
gagged with a piece of cloth, his hands were tied behind his back and he was
made to lie face down.
Khos hands were immediately tied behind his back (initially with a
rag and later with the electric cord of a rechargeable lamp) and was restrained
in a kneeling position with guns pointed at him throughout the duration of the
search.
It was only after the search was completed and the seized items
stuffed in carton boxes (and a T-bag) that his hands were untied so he can sign
the search warrants which he was forced to do.
All throughout the search, Kho and his companions were kept in the
dining room and continuously intimidated of being shot while the raiders search
all the rooms all by themselves and without anybody seeing whatever they were
doing.
Surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents were not sufficient to
vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Sought to restrain the NBI from using the objects seized by virtue of such
warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return
immediately the said items, including the firearms, ammunition and
explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units
of vehicles and motorcycle.
ISSUE:
Whether MeTC erred in denying the Motion to Quash (the Search warrants)?
(NO)
a. Whether the surveillance by NBI agents was insufficient to constitute the requirement
of personal knowledge in applying for a search warrant? (NO)
b. Whether search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set
forth by the Constitution? (NO)
c. Whether the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants? (NO)
d. Whether the Motion to Quash must be approved as there was abuse in the
enforcement of the challenged search warrants? (NO)
e. Whether petition is moot and academic? (YES)
HELD: DISMISSED for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and
academic.
RATIO:
a. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation
testified unequivocally that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two
houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. It is therefore
decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the
personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
64
Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together
with his witnesses and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons being
unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to.
NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded
from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the aforementioned house in BF
Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside the compound posing as an
appliance agent
b. SC discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the
respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. He had the singular
opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one who
personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions
vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants.
Central Bank v. Morfe: The question of whether or not a probable cause exists
is one which must be determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations. The existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon
the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of
the applicants and the witnesses (Luna v. Plaza).
Petitioners allege that Judge did not comply with constitutional and statutory
requirements. They fault respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific
questions. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge
conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their
witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them
searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them,
in compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements.
It can be gleaned that the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the
witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. It
was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what
questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are
germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable
cause.
c. Subject search warrants are not general warrants and comply with Constitutional and
statutory requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must
be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part
of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they
are looking for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and
time spent in researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the
purpose of the search nugatory.
NBI agents could not have been in a position to know beforehand the exact
caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. They could not have known the
particular type of weapons involved before seeing such weapons at close range.
The surveillance conducted could not give the NBI agents a close view of the
weapons being transported or brought to the premises to be searched. Thus,
they could not be expected to know the detailed particulars of the objects to be
seized. Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for subject search
 65

warrants should be adjudged in substantial compliance with the requirements of examination of the building, and an inquiry of the utility company(police asked if there is a
law. front or rear or middle room. They said one third floor was only listed to Lawrence
Also, the use of the phrase and the like is of no moment. The same did not mcWebb), the officer who obtained the warrant reasonably concluded that there was only
make the search warrants in question general warrants. Oca v. Maiquez: the one apartment on the 3rd floor
Court upheld the warrant although it described the things to be seized as books When six Baltimore police officers executed the warrant, they fortuitously encountered
of accounts and allied papers. McWebb in front of the building and used his key to gain admittance to the first-floor
Failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same hallway and to the locked door at the top of the stairs to the third floor. As they entered
general. Crim Pro book of Retired Justice Ricardo Francisco: A description the vestibule on the third floor, they encountered respondent, who was standing in the
of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor hallway area.
necessarily precise; and its nature will necessarily vary according to The police could see into the interior of both McWebb's apartment to the left and
whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of respondent's to the right, for the doors to both were open. (neither informed them they
concern. Further, the description is required to be specific only so far as lived in separate apartments)
the circumstances will ordinarily allow. Only after respondent's apartment had been entered and heroin, cash, and drug
People v. Rubio: ... But where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their paraphernalia had been found did any of the officers realize that the third floor
contained two apartments. In fact, the third floor was divided into two apartments, one
description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description
be given, for this would mean that no warrant could issue. occupied by McWebb and one by respondent Garrison. the search was discontinued.
It was the contraband that provided the basis for respondent's conviction for violating
d. The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the challanged search Maryland's Controlled Substances Act
warrants is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is TC: denied motion to supress evidence, Court of Special Appeal affirmed
assailed is the validity of the issuance of the warrant. The manner of serving the ISSUE: The question presented is whether the seizure of that contraband was prohibited
warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue to be resolved here. As aptly opined by the Fourth Amendment
and ruled by the respondent Judge, petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal, civil RATIO:
and administrative laws for their problem at hand, which cannot be solved by their There is no question that the warrant was valid and was supported by probable cause
present motion to quash. A literal reading of its plain language, as well as the language used in the application for
According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during the warrant, indicates that it was intended to authorize a search of the entire third floor.
the search sued upon belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation This is the construction adopted by the intermediate appellate court and it also appears
Bureau of which he is an agent and therefore, the NBI agents involved had no to be the construction adopted by the trial judge.
authority to search the aforesaid premises and to confiscate the objects seized. One sentence in the trial judge's oral opinion, however, lends support to the construction
Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties are adopted by the Court of Appeals, namely, that the warrant authorized a search of
questions of fact outside the scope of the petition under consideration. McWebb's apartment only
In our view, the case presents two separate constitutional issues, one concerning the
e. Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation validity of the warrant and the other concerning the reasonableness of the manner in
of Section 3 in relation to Section 14 of R.A. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti- which it was executed
Carnapping Act of 1972, have been instituted against the petitioners, the petition for 1. on validity of warrant
mandamus with preliminary and mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of
restrain respondent NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has become moot and any warrant except one "particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
academic. or things to be seized." The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to
prevent general searches
Maryland (Chrissa) The question is whether that factual mistake invalidated a warrant that undoubtedly
Maryland v Garrison would have been valid if it had reflected a completely accurate understanding of the
Justice Stevens building's floor plan.
But we must judge the constitutionality of their conduct in light of the information
FACTS: available to them at the time they acted. we agree with the conclusion of all three
Baltimore police officers obtained and executed a warrant to search the person of Maryland courts that the warrant, insofar as it authorized a search that turned out to be
Lawrence McWebb and "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor ambiguous in scope, was valid when it issued
apartment." 2. on reasonableness of manner of execution
When the police applied for the warrant and when they conducted the search pursuant to the officers recognized, they were required to discontinue the search of respondent's
the warrant, they reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the premises apartment as soon as they discovered that there were two separate units on the third
described in the warrant. After making a reasonable investigation and exterior floor

The officers' conduct and the limits of the search were based on the information available
as the search proceeded.
the Court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes
that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests
and executing search warrants
the mistake in fact does not invalidate the warrant precisely because the police do
not know of the mistake in fact when they apply for, receive, and prepare to
execute the warrant, the police cannot reasonably know prior to their search that the
warrant rests on a mistake in fact. It is only after the police begin to execute the warrant
and set foot upon the described premises that they will discover the factual mistake and
must reasonably limit their search accordingly.
We find no persuasive reason to impose such a burden over and above the bedrock
requirement that, with the exceptions we have traced in our cases, the police may
conduct searches only pursuant to a reasonably detailed warrant.
Franks (Yesha)
June 26, 1978
JEROME FRANKS v DELAWARE SUPREME COURT
Blackmun, J.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE
FACTS:
Friday, March 5, 1976. Cynthia Bailey was sexually assaulted and gave a
description of her attacker to the police - his clothing as consisting of a white
thermal undershirt, black pants with a silver or gold buckle, a brown leather
three-quarter-length coat, and a dark knit cap that he wore pulled down around
his eyes
same day and on an unrelated count the police had picked up Jereome Franks
for the sexual assault of a 15 year old girl.
Franks made an incriminating comment before Robert McClements, youth
officer accompanying him, saying he was "surprised" the charges were about
the 15 year girl because he knew her and he had thought that the officer had
said "bailey" and he did not know her. At the time of this statement, the police
allegedly had not yet recited to petitioner his rights under Miranda v. Arizona
following Monday, March 8, Officer McClements happened to mention the
courthouse incident to a detective, Ronald R. Brooks, who was working on the
Bailey case
March 9, Detective Brooks and Detective Larry D. Gray submitted a sworn
affidavit to a Justice of the Peace in Dover, in support of a warrant to search
petitioner's apartment
In paragraph 8 of the affidavit's "probable cause page" mention was
made of petitioner's statement to McClements. In paragraph 10, it was
noted that the description of the assailant given to the police by Mrs.
Bailey included the above-mentioned clothing. Finally, the affidavit also
described the attempt made by police to confirm that petitioner's typical
outfit matched that of the assailant.
warrant was issued on the basis of this affidavit
66
Pursuant to the warrant, police searched petitioner's apartment and found a
white thermal undershirt, a knit hat, dark pants, and a leather jacket, and, on
petitioner's kitchen table, a single-blade knife. All these ultimately were
introduced in evidence at trial.
Prior to petitioner Jerome Frankss Delaware state trial on rape and related
charges and in connection with his motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment
grounds items of clothing and a knife found in a search of his apartment, he
challenged the truthfulness of certain factual statements made in the
police affidavit supporting the warrant to search the apartment, and
sought to call witnesses to prove the misstatements.
The trial court sustained the State's objection to such proposed testimony and
denied the motion to suppress, and the clothing and knife were admitted as
evidence at the ensuring trial, at which petitioner was convicted.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a defendant under no
circumstances may challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police
to procure a search warrant.
ISSUE: whether defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right, under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to
challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting the
warrant (YES, provided that, well see Ratio)
RATIO:
In deciding today that, in certain circumstances, a challenge to a warrant's
veracity must be permitted, we derive our ground from language of the Warrant
Clause itself, which surely takes the affiant's good faith as its premise: "[N]o
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation
. . . ."
considerations cited by respondent are insufficient to justify an absolute
ban on post-search impeachment of veracity [there were 6 given in the case
but SC said they are insufficient anyway, will move on to what needs to be
satisfied to allow post-search questioning of truthfulness in affidavit relied on to
issue warrant]
Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause,
the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment,
requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. The trial court
here therefore erred in refusing to examine the adequacy of petitioner's proffer
of misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit.
(a) To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than
conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. The
allegation of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard must point out specifically
with supporting reasons the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be
false. It also must be accompanied by an offer of proof, including affidavits or sworn or
otherwise reliable statements of witnesses, or a satisfactory explanation of their absence.
 67

(b) If these requirements as to allegations and offer of proof are met, and if, when
material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side,
there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of
probable cause, no hearing is required, but if the remaining content is insufficient, the
defendant is entitled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to a hearing.

(c) If, after a hearing, a defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the false statement was included in the affidavit by the affiant knowingly and intentionally,
or with reckless disregard for the truth, and the false statement was necessary to the
finding of probable cause, then the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of
the search excluded from the trial to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking
on the face of the affidavit.
Because of Delaware's absolute rule, its courts did not have occasion to
consider the proffer put forward by petitioner Franks. Since the framing of
suitable rules to govern proffers is a matter properly left to the States, we
decline ourselves to pass on petitioner's proffer. The judgment of the Supreme
Court of Delaware is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

HELD: Delaware SC reversed, remanded for further proceedings