CalgaryPapersinMilitaryandStrategicStudies,OccasionalPaperNo.

9,2013
LatinAmericanSecurityPages147166

MultidimensionalSecurity,Ungoverned
AreasandNonStateActors
BernardoPrezSalazar,UNHabitatand
CorporacinNuevoArcoIris

Introduction
Todaythethreattothecountriesoftheregionisnotthemilitary
forceoftheadjacentneighbororsomeinvadingforeignpower.
Todays foe is the terrorist, the narcotracker, the arms traf
ficker,thedocumentforger,theinternationalcrimeboss,andthe
moneylaunderer.Thisthreatisaweedthatisplanted,grown,
and nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such
ascoastlines,rivers,andunpopulatedborderareas.Thisthreat
is watered and fertilized with money from drugs, illegal arms
sales, and human tracking. This threat respects neither geo
graphicalnormoralboundaries.
GeneralJamesHill,CommanderofU.S.
SouthernCommand,2003.

As recognized by the Presidents 2011 Strategy to Combat

Transnational Organized Crime, transnational organized crime is
a global issue with global implications that directly impact the
UnitedStates.IntheU.S.SouthernCommandareaofresponsibil
ity,thesepowerfulgroupsexploitundergovernedareaswhere
state capacity is weak and corruption and impunity are ram
pant to consolidate control over drug, money, weapons, and
humansmugglingnetworksthatspanthehemisphere.
GeneralJohnKelly,CommanderofU.S.Southern
Command,2013.

A
decade ago, at the time when General James Hill as Commander
ofU.S.SouthernCommandstatedhisappreciationaboutungov
erned spaces as a major source of hemispheric insecurity, the
Organization American States (OAS) was broadcasting multidimensional
securityasarenewedapproachtodealwiththreatsandchallengestothese

CentreforMilitaryandStrategicStudieshttp://cmss.ucalgary.ca/ 147
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curityofstatesintheWesternHemisphereinthetwentyfirstcentury.Apart
fromgeopoliticalandmilitarymatters,thesethreatsconcernterrorismand
thepossibleaccess,possession,anduseofweaponsofmassdestructionand
their means of delivery by terrorists; the global drug problem, tracking
inpersonsandotherformsoftransnationalorganizedcrimeincludingcor
ruption,assetlaundering,attackstocybersecurity,andillicittrackingin
weapons;environmentaldegradationandnaturalandmanmadedisasters
aswellasHIV/AIDSandotherdiseasescoupledwithextremepovertyand
socialexclusionofbroadsectorsofthepopulation;andthepotentialfordam
agearisingfromaccidentorincidentduringthemaritimetransportofpot
entiallyhazardousmaterials,includingpetroleumandradioactivematerials
andtoxicwaste.
TofacethesecrosscuttingchallengestheOASsSecurityintheAmericas
Declaration,adoptedinMexicoCityonOctober28,2003,positstheneedfor
appropriatehemisphericcooperationandmultifacetedresponsesinvolving
partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society.
Specificallyinregardtothechallengerepresentedbytransnationalorgan
izedcrime,themultidimensionalsecurityconceptcommendscriminalizing
moneylaundering,kidnapping,illicittrackinginhumanbeings,corrup
tion,andotherrelatedcrimesinordertostrengthendomesticlegalframe
works so that the assets from the proceeds of these crimes are identified,
traced, frozen or seized and are ultimately confiscated and disposed of. It
alsocommitsgovernmentstoincreasemultilateralcooperationinparticular
throughtheexchangeofinformation,mutuallegalassistance,andextradi
tioninordertoreinforcenationalinstitutionsdedicatedtopreventingand
sanctioningtransnationalcrimesandidentifyingandprosecutingmembers
oftransnationalcriminalorganizations.
Yet, judging by the statement made before the U.S. Senate Armed
ServicesbythepresentCommanderoftheU.S.SouthernCommand,General
John Kelly in March 2013, the measures implemented in the multidimen
sionalsecurityframeworkhavenotsucceededinmodifyingmajoraspects
ofhemisphericinsecurity,inparticular,theconsolidationofpowerfulcrim
inal structures exploiting undergoverned areas that control illicit drug,
money,weapons,andhumansmugglingcircuitsbymeansofnetworksthat
spanthehemisphere.
Thisarticlediscussesthetheoreticalflawsaswellasevidenceconcern
ingtheshortcomingsofthishemisphericsecurityconcept,whichhastacit
underpinningsrelatedtostandarddoctrineofcounterinsurgentandstabil
izationoperations,particularlyindealingwiththechallengerepresentedby

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nonstateactorscriminalizedbythestatecentricmultidimensionalsecurity
doctrine.Followingthisintroduction,afirstpartcriticizestheviewthatthe
state is necessarily the best actor capable of providing governance goods
andservices.Italsodealscriticallywithsubsequentdevelopmentagendas
focusedonstrengtheningstatemilitaryandpolicingcapacityasthemain
cornerstoneofstatebuilding.Thenextpartwilllookspecificallyatthecase
ofColombia,wherecounterinsurgent,antinarcoticandstabilizationdoctrine
andoperationshavebeenappliedfordecadeswithincreasingtroopdensity
tonoavailasallthecountrysborderareascontinuetorankamongthemajor
terroristsafehavensidentifiedbytheU.S.StateDepartmentintheWestern
Hemisphere.Athirdpartdiscussestherisksassociatedwithnationbuilding
agendas that unintendedly favor partnerships between criminal organiza
tionsandlocalpoliticalentrepreneurs.Afinalsectionpullsoverallconclu
sions from the balance presented concerning multidimensional security,
ungovernedareas,andnonstateactors.

TheState,NonStateActorsandHybridPoliticalOrders
Inthefuture,willgovernmentsornonstateactorsleadinsolvingproblems
caused by growing world population, rapid urbanization, and climate
change? Which will be more successful in confronting global challenges
suchasboostingeconomicproductivity,managingecientandsustainable
use of water, energy, and land, and generally procuring safe and healthy
livelihoodsandenvironments?Whichwillfindthepathtodeliveroverall
upwardsocialmobilityandcontrolofcorruption?
Such is the scope of the questions posed by the National Intelligence
Councilinitsmostrecentoutlookoftheworldin2030.1Thoughthereareno
straightforward answers, the study presages that the future will probably
rewardthoseabletoadaptfastenoughtoharnesschangeinsteadofbeing
overwhelmedbyit.
StatesintheWesternHemispherearecommittedtofightingnewthreats
to security, among them transnational crime, by means of confidence and
securitybuildingmeasuresbasedoninternationallaw,therespectforstate
sovereigntyandnonintervention,faithfulcomplianceoftreatiesandcoven
antsandactingappropriatelyinaccordancewithconstitutionalprovisions
ofeachstate,respectforandpromotionanddefenseofhumanrights,soli
darity,andcooperation.Yet,eventhoughtheconceptofmultidimensional
securityformallyaddressesotherpublicconcernsthatcannegativelyaect
humansecurity,suchasglobalpandemics,climaticvariability,anditsinflu
enceonnaturalandmanmadedisastersaswellasmassiveenvironmental

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degradationandextremepovertyandsocialexclusion,itsmainobjectiveis
clearlyfocusedonnationalsecurity.
Thisisespeciallyevidentinthecaseoftransnationalorganizedcrime,
whichisnotdealtwithasapublicsecurityproblembutasanationalse
curity threat precisely because these criminal structures allegedly have
the ability to challenge state sovereignty in areas where local governance
structuresarenotunderstatecontrol.Theseareasnaturallyoerfavorable
conditionsforcriminalactivitytothrivewithoutdetectionandwithimpun
ity,andprovidetheirperpetratorsrefugefromeortstocombatorcounter
them,makingthemconvenientlaunchingpadsforterroristattacksagainst
nationstatesandtheintereststheyrepresent.2
Understandably,diplomaticapprehensionsrenderinadmissibletheuse
oftermssuchasungovernedterritoryinocialOASdocuments.Yet,the
concernforterritorialvacuumsoutsidethecontrolofanationstateisama
jorfeatureinthesecuritydoctrinethatguidescounterinsurgency,counter
terrorism,antinarcotics,andstabilizationandpeacekeepingoperationsthat
arecarriedoutbymemberstatesindealingwiththechallengesidentifiedin
theframeworkofthemultidimensionalsecurityapproach.3
YetasRobertKaplan(1994)notes,understandingauthoritativeterritorial
governanceintodaysworldisnotwellservedbypoliticalmapscomprising
hundredsofcountriesmarkedbysharp,boldbordersanduniformcolors.
An invention of European colonialism, these political maps are conceived
tooerawaytoclassifynationalorganisms,makingajigsawpuzzle
ofneatpieceswithouttransitionzonesbetweenthem(58).Howevercoun
tries such as Sierra Leone and Nigeria, or Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or
Indonesia, constantly ridden with ethnic and religious strife and violent
politicalinstability,arefarfromthenationalorganismswhichappearas
evenly stained blots in political maps because they are not populated by
homogeneousculturalidentities.
The U.S. Department of States Country Reports on Terrorism, which in
August2010identifiedadozenterroristsafehavensintheworld,4seemsto
corroborateKaplans1994insight5thatthestateasagoverningidealcannot
be transported functionally to areas outside the industrialized world as a
foolproofmodelforsuccessfulterritorialgovernance.Apartfromthecoun
triesnamedabove,theStateDepartmentsmapincludestheTransSahara
(Algeria,Mali,Mauritania,andNiger),Yemen,Somalia,themaritimeborders
ofIndonesia,MalasiaandthePhilipines,Venezuela,theColombiaborder
region(Brazil,Ecuador,Panam,Per,andVenezuela),andtheTriborder
area(Argentina,Brazil,andParaguay).

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IndeedtheU.S.StateDepartmentsmap(Figure1)maybeanunderstate
ment,asquasistatesorareasoflimitedsovereigntycharacterizedbya
disconnectionbetweenlegalandeectivesovereigntyaccountforabouttwo
thirdsoftheplanetaccordingtostudiescarriedoutduringthepasttwenty
five years.6 Yet the fact that governance structures are not controlled by
nationstatesintheseterritoriesdoesnotmeanthattheyareungoverned.
Instead,alternativeformsofgovernancecontrolledbynonstateactorsbased
ontribal,sectarianorclanrelationsorevenpersistentinsurgencies,arebetter
positioned to compete for the loyalty of populations they serve or control
becausetheyareoftenmoreeectivethanthenominallylegalterritorial
sovereigninprovidingforprotectionfromviolentthreatstoindividualsand
variousformsofsocioeconomicandpoliticalinequity,aswellasaccessto
sourcesofincome,shelter,health,andeducationalservices,amongothers.
Insum,thenotionofungovernedareasmainlyreflectsabiasedconcep
tion of governance rooted in a normative preference for territorial rule by
sovereignStates.7

Figure1.TerroristSafeHavensIdentifiedbyU.S.DepartmentofState,2010.

(Source:U.S.DepartmentofStatesCountryReportsonTerrorismreleasedinAugust
2010,citedbyGAO2011,5.)

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Perhapsabetterconceptualframeworktounderstandterritorialgovern
anceoutsidetheWesternindustrializedworldisthemodelofhybridpolitical
orders.Emergentinthecontextofconstitutionalliberaldemocracies,hybrid
politicalordersoperateaccordingtoformal,legallyenforceablerules,butmust
competewithconflictingandalternativeterritorialgovernancemodelsbased
onotherformsofsociopoliticalorderthatarerootedinnonstate,indigenous
societalstructuresthatrelyonawebofsocialrelationsandmutualobligations
toestablishtrustandreciprocity.Insomecases,cleavagesobservedinstate
territorialauthority,capacity,andlegitimacyaresodeepthatthecontrolof
violence,resources,andrulemakingisfirmlyaccruedbyterritorialelitesby
meansoftheirownmilitias,courts,andevenbasicservices.8
The expansion of authoritative territorial governance structures con
trolled by nonstate actors is favored by the fact that globalization under
mineseectiveterritorialauthorityofsovereignnationstates.Asaresult
ofconditionstiedtoeconomicaidanddevelopmentassistancefromWestern
and international donors during the 80s and 90s, global diusion of neo
classicaleconomicliberalismhasledtoincreasingprivatecontrolinmarkets
anddecreasingstateregulation.Deregulationoftradeandfinancialmarkets
haveincreasedporousnessofnationalborderscompromisinggovernments
abilitytoregulatecrossborderflowsofgoods,services,information,tech
nology, and people, as well as to collect taris and taxes. Fiscal restraints
progressivelyhaveunderminedsocialandeconomicsafetynetsaswellas
theabilityandlegitimacyofgovernmenteortstoprovidethegovernance
goodsthatcreatefavorableconditionsforequitabledomesticeconomicpros
perityandnationalsocialcohesion.9
Thebottomlineisthatinthecontextofglobalization,economicgrowth
hasceasedtobeapathleadingtodistributivejusticeformanysocialgroups
in many places, undermining the legitimacy of state controlled territorial
governancestructureswherethistrendpervades.Consequentlyinsettings
where misdistribution of wealth increases, working conditions deteriorate
andsocialsafetynetsshrink,parallelmarketsandgovernancestructures
controlledbynonstateactorsmaybecomesocially,economically,andpol
iticallyrelevant,iftheyprovecapableofconnectingwillingsupplierswith
willing customers for goods and services (including criminalized goods
andservicessuchasdrugs,smuggledgoods,andmoneylaundering,among
others); warranting protection from hostile law enforcement and public
regulators; defining property rights and regulating disputes; operating
socialsafetynetstotakecareofvulnerablehouseholdsanddependentsof
thosekilledorjailed;andevenservingaslendersoflastresort.10

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Withtheglobaldiusionofideasaboutdemocracyandhumanrights,
andthespreadofstandardsthatequategoodgovernancewiththeruleof
law, government accountability, respect for human dignity, and universal
provision of access to basic goods and services, these alternative govern
ance structures are commonly framed as transnational and subnational
challengers of state sovereignty threatening national and international
security. Consequently, areas under control of nonstate actors that do not
complywiththereferredstandards,tendtobeprimetargetsforstabiliza
tionandnationbuildingoperations,whetherintheformofhumanitarian
nongovernmental organizations providing emergency service delivery, or
internationalfinancialinstitutionsandWesterngovernmentsconditioning
assistance on improvements in transparency, human rights, and environ
mental protection, and, in extreme cases, by means of armed intervention
directed to support nationbuilding processes based on strengthening
state military and policing capacity in order to reestablish statecentric
democraticgovernancestandards.11
Stateslegitimizetheseinterventionsbycriminalizingnonstateactors
and their activities, often in accordance with the multidimensional secur
ityguidelines,eventhoughinmanycasesthelatterhavelocalsupportand
legitimacy precisely because they are able to oer working solutions that
satisfice local needs. Naturally, nonstate actors labeled as criminals in
thesesettingsdonotdefinethemselvesascriminalsandinsteadframetheir
activitiesasstrategiestosustainorimprovetheirlivelihoodsunderspecific
givencircumstances.Asaresult,criminalizationinthesetypesofsettings
tendstoblurthelinebetweenwarandcrime,andburdensthetaskofthe
occupyingmilitaryandpoliceforcestryingtowintheheartsandminds
ofthelocals.Thus,asthecaseofColombiadiscussedinthenextsectionwill
illustrate,counterinsurgencyandstabilizationoperationsinareascontrolled
bynonstateactorsproveineective,evenwhenmilitaryandpoliceforces
aredeployedwithhightroopdensities.

CounterinsurgencyandNonStateTerritorialGovernance
Dynamics
Counterinsurgencydoctrineassumesthatcompetingterritorialgovernance
structurescontrolledbynonstateactorscanbeunderminedanddefeated
by occupying and transforming the targeted political hybrid order. The
strength of these feral governance structures lies in the relationship be
tweennonstateactorsthatcontrolthesestructuresandthegeneralpopula
tion,whichprovidesintelligence,logisticsand,ultimately,asanctuarythat

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allows nonstate actors to blend into the population and disappear under
pressure.Counterinsurgencyarguesthatseveringthisrelationshipispos
siblebyoeringeconomicincentives,makingdealswithemergentelitefac
tionsandprotectingthepopulationfrominsurgentswhomightconduct
retributiveattacksforcollaboratingwiththeoccupyingforce.Inthisreckon
ing,counterinsurgencymisjudgesthefactthatvaluesaswellassocialand
politicalidentitiessuchaskinrelationships,religion,andtribalismarevery
realamongmanypopulations.Thereforetheoccupyingforcesabilityto
alterthesevaluesisdubious,nomatterhowhelpful,sincere,andsympathetic
theoccupyingforceis.Insum,theassumptionthatamassofmilitaryand
policetroopscanachievemorethanintimidateanoccupiedpopulationfora
givenperiodoftimeishighlyquestionable.
Andyet,afterthedebaclesthatfollowedtheU.S.invasionsofAfghanistan
andIraqduringthedecadeendingin2010,estimatingmilitaryandpolice
forces needs for occupation control in critical limit situations remains a
crucialissuefordefenseandsecurityplanners.12
Multiple questions have been raised concerning troop density in
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Should the number of
troopsdeployedbedefinedbasedonenemystrength,populationdensityor
theextensionoftheterritorialareaofoperation?Incalculatingtroopdensity
needs,areindigenouspoliceforcescountedasowntroops?Whatproportion
oftroopsshouldbeusedtoperformpolicework?
Presently,thereseemstobeconsensusonsomeanswerstotheseques
tions.Militarymanualsagreethatthemaincriterionfordeterminingtroop
density in occupation scenarios is population density, so troop per popu
lation rates are now universally used. Historical experience of successful
counterinsurgency and stabilization campaigns in dierent contexts sug
geststhatrequiredtroopdensitiesareintherangeof60210per10,000of
thelocalpopulation(McGrath2006,162).Thereisalsoconsensusconcerning
theneedforgreatertroopdensitywheretheintensityofinsurgentactivity
ishigher.Inthisregard,someanalystsproposetroopdensityforthreedif
ferentlevelsofintensityincounterinsurgencyandstabilizationoperations.
In settings where insurgencies exhibit ongoing military activity (intense
level),troopdensityneedsareestimatedintherangebetween100and200
per 10,000. In situations characterized by frequent clashes between civil
ian factions (intermediate level), troop density requirements are reckoned
in range between 40 and 100 per 10,000 inhabitants. In generally peaceful
contexts(lowlevel),atypicaltroopdensityisassessedintherangeof2040
per10,000.13Furthermore,historicalexperiencesuggeststhataboutonethird

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of the force in counterinsurgency or stabilization operations should be al

locatedtoaddresspolicework,includingvehiclecheckpoints,protectionand
escortofpersons,crowdcontrol,tacticaloperations,crimepreventionand
control,andconflictmediation,amongothers.14
These parameters drawn from counterinsurgency doctrine shed light
in considering present day military and police troop density figures for
Colombia,acountrywherecounterinsurgencyoperationspersistinperiph
eralareasandscarcelypopulatedareaswhilestabilizationoperationsmainly
prevailinmoredenselypopulatedareastocountertheactivitiesofcriminal
structuresdealingwiththechallengesfocusedonbythemultidimensional
securityapproach,amongthem,drugtrackingandotheractivitiessuch
astrackinginpersons,corruption,assetlaundering,andattackstocyber
securityandillicittrackinginweapons,amongothers.Anoutstandingfea
tureinthecaseofColombiaiswidespreaddiusesocialviolenceexpressed
inanationalmurderratein2012ofaround33per100,000inhabitants,with
morethanaquarterofits1,122municipalitiesrecordingmurderratesequal
toorabovethenationalaverage.
TheoverallsituationinColombiacorrespondstoanintermediatestage
ofoperationalintensity,whichaccordingtocounterinsurgencyparameters
reviewedabove,demandingtroopdensityintherangebetween40and100
troopsper10,000inhabitants.Recentreportsonthesizeofthesecurityforces
in Colombia mention figures in the range of 285,000 troops in the armed
forcesand161,000troopsinthenationalpolice.15Basedonanestimatedtotal
population of 46,581,823 for 2012,16 Colombia currently has a density of 96
troopsper10,000inhabitants,ofwhichnearlyathirdarecommittedtopolice
work,suggestingthattroopdensityissituatedintheupperendoftherange
establishedbycounterinsurgencydoctrineforintermediateintensityoper
ationalscenarios.
ThisbalancedtroopdensityinColombiaistheresultofeortsformore
than a decade spent fighting guerrillas, paramilitaries and, more recently,
criminalgangslinkedtodrugtracking(CGLDT)17inordertoregaingov
ernmentcontrolofterritoriespreviouslyundertheinfluenceofthesegroups,
manyofwhichwerehometolargeextensionsofillicitcocacrops.Combined
counternarcoticsandcounterinsurgencyeortshavesignificantlyreduced
thenumbersofguerrilla,paramilitary,andCGLDTcombatantsaswellasof
illicitcocacroppingareas.
In 1999, when the illicit coca cropping area in Colombia was nearly
160,000 hectares, 85 percent of this area was concentrated in twentynine
municipalities. A decade and US$5 billion later, coca cropping area was

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slashed to nearly 67,000 hectares, and the 30,000 strong standing forces of
nonstateillicitlyarmedgroupshadbeencuttoaquarteroftheiroriginal
size.Municipalitiesaectedbytheiractivitiesfellfromover500in2004to
around300in2009.18SeeFigure2.
Figures provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense reckon that
numbers of nonstate illicitly armed units, as well as their standing forces
operatingindierentpartsofthecountryhavesignificantlydeclinedsince
2004:

In2004,168nonstateillicitlyarmedunitstotaledajointstand
ingforceestimatedintherangeof24,50049,200combatants;
nearly40percentbelongedtotheRevolutionaryArmedForces
ofColombia(FARC)(estimatesrangebetweenaminimumof
10,300 and a maximum of 20,000), 40 percent to the United
SelfDefense Forces of Colombia (AUC) (10,02519,950), and
theremaining20percenttoNationalLiberationArmy(ELN)
(4,1759,250).
In2006,111nonstateillicitlyarmedunitssummedtogether
anestimatedstandingforceintherangeof11,85023,350com
batants;twothirdsbelongedtoFARC(7,77516,150),20percent
toCGLDT(2,4254,300),andtheremaining15percenttoELN
(1,6502,900);and
In2009,fortyeightnonstateillicitlyarmedunitsgatheredan
estimatedstandingforceintherangeof7,85017,550combat

Figure2.TotalIllicitCocaCroppingArea,Colombia19992010.
,

(Source:SIMCI,20002011.)

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ants; three fourths belonged to FARC (5,47513,350), 20 per

centtoCGLDT(2,0753,650),andlessthan5percenttoELN
(300550)19SeeFigure3.

Despitethesesignificantreductions,theshortcomingsofthecombined
antinarcotic and counterinsurgency strategy are increasingly visible as a
resultofthesuccessfuladaptationofthesenonstatearmedactorstocounter
insurgency and coca crop eradication eorts: according to the Ministry of
Defense and United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), illicit
armedgroupspersistinapproximately150municipalitieswheremajorcoca
croppingareashavebeenresilienttoeradicationeorts.20
As the number of illicit armed units and their standing forces have
declinedovertime,atrendhasemerged:thereisgrowingconcentrationof
illicitarmedunitsinfortyninemunicipalitiesthatpersistentlyrecord7880
percentofthetotalannualcocacroppingareainColombiaduringthesecond
halfofthedecadeendingin2010.Accordingtothelocationandestimated
forceofnonstateillicitlyarmedunitsreportedbytheMinistryofDefense,
thereferredmunicipalitiessheltered36percentoftheirestimatedstanding
forcesin2004,42percentin2006,and73percentin2009.21
Severalhypothesescanbeoeredtointerpretthistrend.Anobviousone
hastodowiththefinancialsupportprovidedbyrentsforcefullyextracted
fromcocacroppersandbuyers.Anotheristhefactthatmunicipalitieswhere
cocacropshavepersistedinthepastusuallyhaveareaswhicharedensely

Figure3.IllicitArmedGroupsinColombia:EstimatedStandingForce2004,2006,2009.

>E

'>d

h

&Z

D/E Dy D/E Dy D/E Dy

(Source:UNODC/GovernmentofColombia2005;2007;2010;calculationsandgraphby
author.)

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planted with landmines, mainly to resist manual crop eradication imple

mentedbythegovernmentsince2005,makingthemmoredefensibleinthe
faceofgroundbasedcounterinsurgentoperations.Finally,areaswherecoca
croppingpersistsovertimearelikelytohavebeenaectedbypermanent
forceddisplacementoftheiroriginaltenant,andinmanycaseshavebeen
repopulated with households that are subordinated or loyal to the locally
dominantillicitarmedgroup.
Complementing the counternarcotic eort is the counterinsurgent
National Territorial Consolidation Plan (PNCT), which aims to ensure
sustainable security and peace in regions aected by illicit crops and the
presenceofillicitarmedgroups.Consolidationareasareselectedbasedon
the historic convergence of destabilizing factors such as fragile state pres
ence, persistent illicit cropping and presence of illicit armed groups, high
rates of forced displacement and victimization, as well as widespread en
vironmental destruction. The implementation of the PNCT began in the
Macarenaregion(Meta)in2007andisexpandingtootherkeysareassuch
as Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Montes de Maria (Bolivar and Sucre),
northernAntioquia,Crdoba,PutumayoandthePacificCoastLowlandsin
Nario,amongothers.ToachieveitsgoalsthePNCTdevelopsandmaintains
locallegaleconomicactivitiessupportedonstrategiesdesignedtoensure
institutionalpresencewithsocialdevelopment.22
WeighingtheresultsofadecadesworthofwarondrugsinColombia
itseemsthatgovernmentpolicymakersandocialshavehelplesslypainted
themselves into a corner while leaving open room for nonstate illicitly
armed groups to carry on with their business. In eect, antinarcotic and
counterinsurgenteortshavepusheddrugtrackersandnonstateillicitly
armedgroupstofindanextendednumberoflocationswithinthecountrys
vastandscarcelypopulatedterritorythatoerthemadequateconditionsto
continuepursuingtheirbusiness,thusoverextendingthestatemilitaryand
police force capacity to sustain authoritative legal territorial governance
structuresonapermanentbasis,evenwithtroopdensitiesinthehighend
oftherangeestablishedbycounterinsurgencydoctrineinmediumintensity
operationalscenarios.
In the process of being displaced by counternarcotic or counter
insurgent operations from one location to another, nonstate armed actors
havefiguredoutlocalgovernancearrangementsthatallowthemtoreadily
reestablishtheircashflowsbymeansofillicitcocacropsinareasabandoned
in the past by forceful pressure. Upon their return, fallow cropping areas
and economically viable cropping extensions are easily reactivated on the

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basisofpastexperience,asaresourcesforlocallaborandproductioninput.
Processinginfrastructureiseasilysetupaswellascommerceforproduce.As
thecyclerepeatsitself,trackersandnonstateillicitlyarmedgroupshave
become more ecient in expanding coca cropping areas rapidly with the
aidofpreviouslytrainedlocalsthatremainloyalorsubordinatedtothem,
aswellasbyexploitingothercashgeneratingactivitiessuchasextracting
rentsfromgoldmining,timber,andlandgrabbingactivities,togetherwith
certainlocallegalenterprises.Inshort,thewarondrugshastaughtthem
toadapttemporarygovernancestructurestotakeadvantageofanimmense
territorial extension (the combined area of the fortynine municipalities in
observationtotalsnearly300,000km2,roughlyanareaequivalenttothesize
ofPoland),withquickaccesstocashandbroadopportunitiestomomentarily
gainmilitaryandpoliticalinitiativeinthepursuitoftheirbusinesses.
In fact, after a decade of being targeted by combined counternarcotic
and counterinsurgent operations, Colombias nonstate illicitly armed
groupshavesuccessfullyinstalledintheirtacticalbookwhatBruceBagley
haslabeledthecockroacheect.Thatis,

the displacement of criminal networks from one city/state/

region to another within a given country or from one country
to another in search of safer havens and more pliable state
authorities.23

NationBuildingorBuildingLocalPartnershipsBetweenPolitical
EntrepreneursandCriminalOrganizations?
In the framework of eorts directed to regain state control of territorial
governance structures functioning under hybrid political orders, nation
buildinginitiativesrepresenttheothersideofthesamecoinofcounterinsur
gentandstabilizationoperations.Nationbuildingispromotedasastrategy
for constructive statesociety engagement.24 States often tend to legitimize
counterinsurgentandstabilizationoperationsasanecessarystepinorderto
introducedemocratization.Yetinmanycasesdemocratizationunintendedly
favorspartnershipsbetweenpoliticalentrepreneursandcriminalorganiza
tions,deliveringthemcontrolofocialrulemakingpowerswhichcanbe
usedtobenefitafewandtoputthemajorityatgraverriskthaninprevious
socialandpoliticalorders.
Political entrepreneurs are usually figures specialized in leading
struggles for legitimacy and recognition of a social group and its claims.
Theynormallyspecializeincreatingandmanipulatingpoliticalidentityasa

159
6(&85,7<81*29(51('$5($6$1'12167$7($&7256

powerfullevertoencouragecollectiveaction.Theyalsomotivateanddrive
collectiveactionbymeansoftheirconnectionswithspecialistsinviolence,
such as nonstate illicit armed groups or organized criminal structures,
willing to provide their technical and professional skills. In sum, political
entrepreneursgenerallyspecializeinthreateningtouseviolenceinorderto
advancetheirclaims.25
Thus electoral democratization in local contexts incentivizes polit
icians to seek votes in poorer, undergoverned districts by establishing
relationshipswithlocalstrongmenandexchangingpersonalorpublicassets
forvotes.Theoutcomeisthedevelopmentofcomplexrelationshipsbetween
local strongmen, some of whom dominate criminal structures, and public
administration circuits. The resulting alliances usually gain incontestable
positiontomanipulatelocalelectoralmachinesandtakeoverthelocalstate
apparatusthroughthecorruptionofpoliticalauthoritieseagerforcashtofi
nancetheircampaigns.Intime,theserelationshipsusuallyallowtheformer
toaccumulateenoughinfluenceontheirowntoshedtheiroriginalpolitical
patrons,andsubstitutethemputtinguptheirowncandidatesinoce.26
Criminal activities thrive as local authorities are overwhelmed by the
taskofgoverningconflictinginterestsandclaims,particularlyinenviron
ments of inequality, exclusion, and progressive informalization. In the
resultant hybrid political system, law and order emerge as a result of a
variable symbiosis between ocials (local government agents, police, and
justice administrators), local power players (common criminality, non
stateillicitlyarmedgroups),andmoralauthorities(localleaders,priests,
evangelicalpastors,andsuccessfullocalentrepreneurs),inshiftingalliances
thatoscillatebetweenselectiveinvolvement,insulation,andabandonment,
alternatelyseekingformsofaccommodationsandconfrontationwiththelo
callegalandillicitpowerbrokers.27
Colombiaprovidesanillustrativecaseofthepoliticalandinstitutional
dynamicdescribedabove.Asaresultofpoliticalandfiscaldecentralization
reformsthatwerepassedduringthe1980sintheattempttocreatemeaning
fulaccesstothepoliticalsystem,nonstateactorsgainedandstrengthened
theirgriponpublicbudgetsinterritoriesandpopulationsundertheirinflu
ence. In this manner a significant share of decentralized public resources
wereinfactmadeavailabletofinancetheexpansionofarmedclientelismby
illegalgroupsonboththeleftandright.28
Subsequently, in 2003 new political movements backed by right wing
paramilitary groups were able to elect 251 mayors and nearly 400 town
councilmen in dierent regions of the country.29 Over the past ten years,

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 %(51$5'23e5(=6$/$=$5

manyelectedocialsrepresentingthesemovementshavebeenbroughtto
justice before Colombias Supreme Court, and legal electoral reforms have
raisedthevotingthresholdneededforapoliticalmovementorpartytobe
ociallyrecognizedbytheNationalElectoralOrganization.30
Yetin2011theElectoralObservationMission(MOE),anongovernment
alorganizationmonitoringlocalelectoralcampaignsonthegroundinorder
toassessrisksconcerninguseofpoliticalviolenceandelectoralfraud,found
thehighestriskratingsinmunicipalitieslocatedinborderareasassociated
withdrug,firearms,andammunitionsmugglingroutesoperatingthrough
EcuadorandVenezuela,aswellasmunicipalitiesincludedintheNational
Territorial Consolidation Plan mentioned in the previous section. This, in
spiteofeortsandresourcesspentformorethanadecadeonmajorcounter
insurgencyandantinarcoticoperationsinColombia.
Evenmorealarming,thefindingspointtothefactthattheoverallrisk
ofelectoralfraudhasnotdeclinedsince2006andthatmostofthepresent
riskisendorsedtocorruptpoliticiansandpublicservantsthreateningtorig
electionsfromwithintheElectoralOrganization.31

Conclusions
This article began by considering the scope of the future outlook of the
world in thenext couple ofdecades, asrecentlyproposed bythe National
IntelligenceCouncil(NIC).AccordingtotheNICtheprobableoutcomewill
beshapedbythewayinwhichtensionsbetweengovernmentsandnonstate
actors are resolved in the dierent dimensions of development, including
economic, social, political, and cultural issues. The result will depend on
how each part proves able to adapt in order to harness change instead of
beingoverwhelmedbyit.
TheNICsframeworkoersavantagepointtoconsidergovernments
concernsregardingsecurityintodaysworld.Presentlygovernmenteorts
inthisrespectareincreasinglyfocusedonnonstateactorsinvolvedindrug
tracking,sexslavery,corruption,assetlaundering,attackstocybersecurity,
andillicittrackinginweapons,allofwhichhaveemergedintheglobalized
world as a multidimensional challenge to human and state security. Thus
the multidimensional security approach argues for the need to develop
appropriatehemisphericcooperationandmultifacetedresponsesinvolving
partnerships between governments,the private sector, andcivil society in
ordertosuccessfullydealwiththesecomplexchallenges.
Yetwhenconsideringconcretecasesinwhichstatesarecommittedto
fightingthesenewthreatstosecurity,asinthecaseofColombiaforthepast

161
6(&85,7<81*29(51('$5($6$1'12167$7($&7256

couple of decades, measures are clearly directed to warrant a statecentric

model with evident underpinnings related to the standard doctrine of
counterinsurgentandstabilizationoperations,bluntlyreducingsecuritypri
oritiestonationalsecurityobjectives.Thisperspectivegenerallyoverlooks
thesecurityneedsofpeoplewithparticularidentities,politicalvalues,and
demands that may best be met by responses led by nonstate actors. This
omissionisoneofthemainflawsofthecounterinsurgentandstabilization
doctrine that aims to impose democratic governance standards in a top
down fashion, as is reflected in the unsatisfactory results obtained to the
presentwiththistypeofoperationsinareasoftheworldlabeledbytheU.S.
Departmentofstateasterroristsafehavens.
Lackofnuanceinthisregardhasledpolicymakerstocharacterizeterri
toriesnotundercontrolofstatecenteredgovernancestructuresaspotential
threatstonationalsecurity.Hencetheconceptsofungovernedorunder
governedareasnegativelyexpressthepreferenceofstatesforstatecentered
territorial governance structures, and legitimize international crusades
to criminalize nonstate actors that govern these territories not following
properdemocraticgovernancestandards.
Clearlysomeofthesesafehavensareundercontrolofcriminalorgan
izationsandoerfavorableconditionsforcriminalactivitytothrivewithout
detection and with impunity, and provide their perpetrators refuge from
eortstocombatorcounterthem,makingthemconvenientlaunchingpads
forterroristattacksagainstnationstatesandtheintereststheyrepresent.Yet,
universalcontemptforterritorialvacuumsoutsidethecontrolofanation
statemayleadtowrongfuldemonizationandcriminalizationofnonstate
actorsthatareabletolegitimatelydelivertoacompliantsocialbaseadequate
governanceservicesandgoodsmoreeectivelythanthenominallylegal
territorialsovereign.Suchpoliciesmayleadtomoreinstabilityinthefuture
withoutbringingtheworldanyclosertoresemblingthesimplistic,nation
statebasedpoliticalmapoftheworld.
In 2030 it is probable that concerns related to the security needs and
demandsofpeoplethatis,humansecurityaswellasthesecurityofthe
state,willstillbelinkedtoprinciplesandinstitutionssuchasinternational
law,therespectforstatesovereigntyandnonintervention,faithfulcompli
anceoftreatiesandcovenants,andactingappropriatelyinaccordancewith
constitutionalprovisionsofeachstate.However,therelevanceandincidence
that these principles and institutions will have in delivering governance
goods and servicessecurity among themwill depend on the ability of
nationalandinternationalpolicymakerstoexpandtheirunderstandingof

162
 %(51$5'23e5(=6$/$=$5

securitybeyondthestatecentricconception,andtodevelopapproachesthat
allowstatestolivewithterritorialgovernanceresponsesthathavenonstate
actorsattheirheart.

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