FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while
armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and
intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and
Juan Pilapil, Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to
their damage and prejudice. 1

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose
Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. 2 Of the
duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

In his appeal, Accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts
proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD
No. 532.

The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 oclock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers
Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon,
Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano
Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan
struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." 3 Then Catantan told Ursal to
follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hog-tied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom
of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them
to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its
passengers one of whom was visibly tied.

Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-
course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan
Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was
threatened with bodily harm instead.

Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open sea the engine
stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugenes hands were set free but his legs
were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos 4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.

As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the
Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this,
Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say
anything.

On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered
the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying
that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose
between the two, or I will kill you." 5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in
from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.

But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of
the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the
water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brothers legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat.
Fortunately, another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and
punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any
vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine
waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (Emphasis supplied).

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any
person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something
not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong." cralaw virtua1aw library

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack
on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the
Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were
already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant
also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants
of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to
approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art.
286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true
that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims,
shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of
Eugene is significant and enlightening

Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was
there anything unusual that happened?

A: Yes.

Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?

A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that pumpboat
boarded our pumpboat.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that pumpboat?

A: Four.

Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they do that?

A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (Emphasis supplied).

Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?

A: Only one.

Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?

A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (Emphasis supplied).

Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?

x x x
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (Emphasis supplied).

COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?

A: He aimed the revolver on me.

TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: What else did he do?

A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.

Q: What did he do with his revolver?

A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.

Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?

A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.

Q: To what place did he order you to go?

A: To Daan Tabogon. 6

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact
that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded
their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil
to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower
portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.

The incident happened at 3:00 oclock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with
four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to
submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he
had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence,
the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters. Thus, we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree

Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquillity of the nation and stunting the
economic and social progress of the people;

Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are
among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,

Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to
the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave
the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It
is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood
would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD
No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the people." Had
it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in
a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be
ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat,
proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the
Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that
would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they
were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.

The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot
exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused
Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in
Philippine waters.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him
accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against Accused-Appellant. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NOS. 153524-25. January 31, 2005]

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as
Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1
ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A.
BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the Ombudsman in its finding of
lack of probable cause made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored
practice of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a
showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public respondents herein -
officers of the Office of the Ombudsman - gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private
respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos
Sur.

From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be indubitable:

1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001
Elections3), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition;

2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries with
it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);

3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22
cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at
the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a standing
warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;

5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were
brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a
'Joint-Affidavit against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting
officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about
6:00 p.m. the 'Joint-Affidavit was filed and docketed;

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was releasedupon
the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was
brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria's
detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;

7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail
and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;

8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista's arrest for alleged
illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information
for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against
petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon,
informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N
and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;

9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N
and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.

10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-
affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.

11. After considering the parties' respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the first
assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and cralawlibrary

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states: rbl r l l lbrr

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided
in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and
thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed,
upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.

It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested without warrant are
punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be
filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged
crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having
been filed with the proper judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods. With respect
specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public
respondents gravely erred in construing Article 1254 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the
computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the
proper judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a
statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempts at
interpretation.5 Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco,
Jr.,6and Sayo v. Chief of Police of 7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their position that Sundays,
holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article 125, 9hence, the
arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.

In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain
that the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The
information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued
that based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law,
the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125. 10 Public
respondents countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with
the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12 rll

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public respondents did not
abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against private respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.13 rll

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents. Their disposition of
petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been
conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public respondents
ratiocinated thus:rbl r l l lbrr

As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on
applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the
computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of
warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office day. (Medina v. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it
appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos
Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001
at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could
be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of. 14 rll

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that -

.. . The arresting officer's duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities
within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of
petitioner's arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information
against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an official
holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not
an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the
Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have
the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers
and employees could very well compound the fiscal's difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough
to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the
very first office day following arrest.

And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of 16

--

.. . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more
than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of
arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to
make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has already been filed in
Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus: rbl r l l lbrr

In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not
prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the
complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a
standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m.
that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released
if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC Resolution No. 3328
were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001
(Annexes 'G and 'I', Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on June 8,
2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes 'J and 'K', Complaint-Affidavit). Was
there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances?
The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice
within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining
officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release
Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739). 17 rll

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,18 wherein we
ordained that -

.. . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is
satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him
and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this
power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail.
Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the
MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC
interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to defer to the Office
of the Ombudsman's determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical
considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman
with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of
the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound,
as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment,
finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse
of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have
to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide
to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 19 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the
Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

BAGUIO CITY

EN BANC

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL, A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ

Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmarias, Cavite,
Complainant, Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
-versus- QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court, CORONA,
Dasmarias, Cavite, CARPIO-MORALES,
Respondent. CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:
April 19, 2007
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Bizarre. The word would aptly describe this tale of the accuser turning out to be
the culprit.

This case started with Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas (Judge Mupas) of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmarias, Cavite, filing an administrative
complaint (Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI No. 02-1515-RTJ) against Judge
Dolores L. Espaol (Judge Espaol) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90,
Dasmarias, Cavite, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority,
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She
imputed these offenses against Judge Espaol for allegedly illegally usurping the
functions of the Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite, and for ordering her
(Mupas) on April 18, 2002, in connection with Criminal Case No. 9292-01 (People
v. Belinda Ventura Singello), to desist from accepting, for preliminary
investigation,' criminal cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, where suspects are apprehended pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Judge Espaol filed her Comment dated September 16, 2002[1] stating that since she
was appointed to the single sala RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite, under Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 6 of 1975, she ipso facto became the Executive Judge
exercising supervision over the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite. She further stated that
her Order dated April 18, 2002, directing the respondent to desist from conducting
preliminary investigation, did not deprive the latter of the authority to conduct
preliminary investigationbut merely stopped her from conducting the same
for being
violative of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7438.
In the same Comment, Judge Espaol said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite as a One-Stop Shop where criminal suspects apprehended
without a warrant are ordered detained in the municipal jail by virtue of an
unsigned Detention Pending Investigation of the Case, in lieu of a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No.
7438 and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus, according to Judge Espaol, the apprehended persons were
detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for preliminary
investigation. If the detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas would fix the amount of
bail and require that the premium, usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be
paid in cash. If the surety bond was secured outside of the MTC, the bond would
be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would go to the RTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the detention prisoners.

This Court, acting on the Report dated July 4, 2003 of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), issued on August 6, 2003 a Resolution, [2] the dispositive
portion of which reads:

(T)he Court Resolved to ADOPT the following recommendations:

(a) to DISMISS the charges against Judge Dolores L. Espaol for

lack of merit;

(b) to TREAT the comment dated September 16, 2002 of Judge

Espaol as a SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
against Judge Lorinda Mupas of MTC, Dasmarias, Cavite; and

(c) to REQUIRE Judge Toledo-Mupas to COMMENT on the

allegations against her, contained in Judge Espaols comment.

Thus, a complaint against the respondent Judge Mupas was deemed filed, and
docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1462-MTJ.

On September 8, 2003, Judge Mupas filed a motion seeking reconsideration of this

Courts Resolution. On October 1, 2003, this Court required the OCA to file its
comment thereon within 15 days from notice. The OCA wrote a Memorandum
dated April 15, 2004[3] to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. recommending
the denial of the respondents motion being a mere reiteration of her arguments
already passed upon by the Court. This Court adopted the said recommendation of
the OCA in its Resolution dated May 31, 2004.[4]

Accordingly, Judge Mupas faced the following charges: (1) violation of Rule 112,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, and Republic Act No. 7438; and (2) violation of the rules on
preliminary investigation (a) for the delay in the resolution of preliminary
investigation cases pending in [Judge Mupas] court; (b) for failure to perform her
ministerial duty of transmitting the records of the case, including the resolution on
the preliminary investigation, within 10 days from the issuance of the said
resolution to the provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and (c) for conducting
preliminary investigation despite the fact that there were many prosecutors in
Cavite not indisposed to do the job.

On September 19, 2005, Judge Mupas filed her Reply [5] (should be Comment) to
Judge Espaols Comment which was treated as a separate administrative
complaint. She claimed that the August 6, 2003 Resolution of this Court failed to
consider relevant laws, rules, and pronouncements of the Court itself. She further
said that under Rule 112, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
she is expressly authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. She questioned
the authority of Judge Espaol in ordering her to desist from conducting preliminary
investigations in the guise of supervising or reviewing her actions, as the said
authority was lodged in the provincial prosecutors. She pointed out that, in the case
of People vs. Belinda Ventura Singello (Criminal Case No. 9292-01), subject of
Judge Espaols Order dated April 18, 2002, the provincial prosecutor affirmed her
(Mupas) finding of probable cause against the accused without any question on the
manner in which the preliminary investigation was conducted.

She likewise claimed that, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 59-99 dated 1
June 1999, while in single-sala stations the presiding judges are ex
officio executive judges, for purposes of supervision in the interest of the service,
their salas may be merged with multi-sala stations. Therefore, the RTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite had long been merged with the multi-sala station of the RTC of
Imus, Cavite. In support of this claim, Judge Mupas noted that then Executive
Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the RTC of Imus, Cavite issued a Memorandum to all
judges within his supervision, including both Judge Espaol and Judge Mupas, to
submit periodic reports on detention prisoners.

She further argued that none of the detention prisoners had filed an administrative
complaint against her. She said that it was her duty to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints filed with her sala. In addition, Judge Mupas posited
that Judge Espaol could not entertain applications for bail in the RTC because the
cases were pending before the MTC.

On January 30, 2006, the Court noted this Reply (should be Comment), and
referred the same to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.

In the Memorandum dated July 26, 2006[6] addressed to then Chief Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban, the OCA found that the Reply of Judge Mupas was merely a rehash
of the arguments she raised in her Motion for Reconsideration; it did not refute the
specific allegations of Judge Espaol. The OCA said that the explanation given by
the respondent was unsatisfactory and insufficient to absolve her from
administrative liability. However, the OCA recommended that this case be referred
to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation. Eventually, this case was referred to Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.

During the proceedings before Justice Vidal, Judge Espaol filed her Rejoinder [Re:
Reply dated September 19, 2005] dated December 8, 2006[7] reiterating that: (1)
her Order dated April 18, 2002 was lawful and within her authority to issue as the
OCA declared that she was merely performing her function as Executive Judge of
Dasmarias, Cavite; (2) Judge Mupas violated the rights of the accused whose
preliminary investigation is pending in her court, they being detained by virtue
only of a "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" in place of a valid waiver
signed in the presence of counsel for considerable lengths of time; (3) there was no
basis for Judge Mupas counter-charge that she could not grant bail while
preliminary investigation was pending before the Mupas court, considering the
latter's absence upon the prisoners' applications for bail; and (4) Judge Mupas
failed to adequately explain her failure to forward the records and the resolution of
the preliminary investigation of accused Belinda Singello in Criminal Case No.
9292-01.

Judge Mupas filed her Comment (Re: Rejoinder Dated December 8, 2006) dated
December 21, 2006[8] and averred that: (1) acts made in her judicial capacity and in
good faith could not be subject to disciplinary action; (2) as judge, she enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties; (3) the preliminary
investigation she conducted was within the scope of her authority; and (4) the
reason behind the seeming delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation was
the heavy congestion of the dockets of the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite.
Preliminary conferences were conducted by Justice Vidal on January
2, 2007 and January 9, 2007.[9] However, both parties opted not to present any
testimonial evidence. In fact, Judge Espaol filed on January 5, 2007 an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion to Resolve, [10] praying that, inasmuch as the proceedings
were summary in nature, the case be decided based on the available records and
pleadings submitted.
On the same day, Judge Espaol filed her Reply [Re: Comment dated December 21,
2006],[11] arguing that: (1) Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law even
if she acted in good faith; and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance
of her judicial function could not cure the incompetence of the respondent.
Both the complainant[12] and the respondent[13] filed their respective memoranda
encompassing all the arguments they raised in their respective pleadings. Judge
Espaol also filed a Counter Memorandum (Re: Memorandum of the Respondent
dated January 18, 2007) dated January 29, 2007.[14]
In an undated Resolution filed with the OCA on February 9, 2007, Justice Myrna
Dimaranan-Vidal found, contrary to Judge Mupas claim, that the document entitled
"Detention Pending Investigation of Cases" cannot validly be deemed to be an
implied waiver of the rights of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Justice Vidal submits the following findings:
Extant from the records, is Respondents admission of her practice in the issuance
of the document entitled Detention Pending Investigation of Cases claiming,
however, that such document served as an implied waiver of the rights of the
accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

The undersigned disagrees.

Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:

 xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver
shall be null and void and of no effect. (Underscoring supplied)

The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is

unnecessary. Clearly, what the said provision requires to protect the rights of the
accused is a written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of a
counsel. However, the procedure adopted by the Respondent runs counter
thereto. She resorted to the issuance of a commitment order dubbed as Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case to legally prolong the detention of the accused
pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation. Obviously, this is not
within the contemplation of the law. Thus, the practice is highly erroneous a
blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

Judiciary[15] provides:

Canon 6 Competence and Diligence

xxx
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance
their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of
the training and other facilities which should be made available,
under judicial control, to judges.
xxx

Otherwise put, Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures to protect the
rights of the accused during preliminary investigation. Sadly, Respondent failed in
this regard. Instead, she maintained the practice of issuing this highly improper
order, i.e., Detention Pending Investigation of the Case, just to put a semblance of
legality in the detention of the accused.[16]

With respect to the other charges, Justice Vidal found the evidence insufficient to
support the accusations that Judge Mupas: (1) detained the accused for a long
period of time while the preliminary investigation was pending in her court; (2)
failed to transmit to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite the records of the case
within 10 days after preliminary investigation; and (3) acted without authority to
conduct preliminary investigation because there were enough prosecutors in Cavite
to conduct the same.
Justice Vidal then concludes:

However, the undersigned finds that Respondent should still be held

administratively liable. Respondents act of issuing orders dubbed as Detention
Pending Investigation of Cases instead of requiring the accused to execute a
written waiver, with the assistance of counsel, pursuant to Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of the measure of responsibility expected
from a judge.

Respondent should be reminded that the actions of everyone connected

with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge
to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of
responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat. Judicial
personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of
official duties [and] preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts
in the community.[17]

Thus, the dispositive portion of her Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and it appearing that this is the first time the
Respondent has committed the infraction, supra, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that she be REPRIMANDED for her practice of issuing the
"Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" orders with STERN WARNING
that a repetition thereof or any similar act will be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the findings of Justice Vidal, but We find the recommended penalty
too light, grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, especially when
viewed in the light of Judge Mupas record of incorrigible misconduct.

There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas practice of issuing "Detention Pending

Investigation of the Case" orders in lieu of a written waiver signed by the accused
with the assistance of counsel is, in the words of Justice Vidal, "a blatant
manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure." It is gross ignorance of the law,
pure and simple.

Under Rule 140, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10 SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge,
and Section 11 thereof provides the sanctions, as follows:
 SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

While Justice Vidal considered the respondent's practice of issuing "Detention

Pending Investigation of the Case" orders as a first-time infraction, We note that
this case is not the first time the respondent was charged and found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.

In Espaol v. Mupas,[18] the respondent judge was fined the amount of P21,000.00
for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the
law when she ordered the arrest of the accused in six criminal cases before the
expiration of the 10-day period she gave them to file their counter-affidavits, and
without any finding of probable cause.

In Loss of Court Exhibits at MTC-Dasmarias, Cavite,[19] aside from being

found guilty of grave misconduct for refusing to turn over to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) for ballistics examination a firearm that a court employee
surreptitiously took from the court's steel cabinet and used to commit suicide,
Judge Mupas was held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for
her failure to submit to the provincial prosecutor her resolution and the records of
the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation. The Court imposed on the
respondent the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay, with a stern
warning that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
 In Bitoon, et al. v. Toledo-Mupas,[20] the respondent was also found
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for changing the designation
of the crime from a non-bailable offense to a bailable one, i.e., syndicated estafa to
simple estafa, and granted bail without hearing on the ground that the accused is
entitled to it as a matter of right.The Court found her to have exceeded her
authority in the conduct of preliminary investigation and to have failed to observe
the elementary rules on bail. She was meted the penalties of a fine in the amount of
P40,000.00, suspension for three (3) months without salaries and benefits, and a
stern warning that a same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the penalty of fine of P40,000.00

was deleted on the ground that the acts of the respondent in the Espaol v.
Mupas and the Loss of Court Exhibits cases were done after the acts complained of
in Bitoon. While the Court maintained that the respondent's acts in Bitoon remain
inexcusable, the respondent was not found to be an incorrigible third-time offender
deserving the penalty originally imposed. The Court also noted that the respondent
was not motivated by malice, bad faith or corrupt motives and that there was an
absence of any serious damage to the complainants. However, the stern warning of
the Court should have been ample reminder that the penalty of dismissal would be
imposed should the respondent commit the same or a similar infraction.[21]

In the present case, while the documents denominated "Detention Pending

Investigation of the Case" were issued during the same period of time that the three
(3) above-cited cases were decided, it is noteworthy that Judge Mupas continued
with the practice even after her attention had been called. Worse, she remained
insistent that the document was an implied waiver of the rights of the accused
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.[22] Judge Mupas must be reminded
that although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good
faith in the performance of their official functions, a blatant disregard of the clear
and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them
susceptible to administrative sanctions.[23] Being among the judicial front-liners
who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of
familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the
public in the competence of our courts to render justice. [24] It subjects the judiciary
to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge
is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she
holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority.[25]

All said, this Court finds the respondent, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas,
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. Considering that this is her
fourth offense, she deserves to be meted the supreme penalty of dismissal from the
service, with all the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

WHEREFORE, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas of the Municipal Trial Court of

Dasmarias, Cavite is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. This being her
fourth offense, she is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits due her, excluding her accrued leave
benefits, and with perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This Decision is final and immediately executory.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO

and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., Petitioners, vs. THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., Respondents.

Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto

Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners. chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General for respondents.

 ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with

preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of
two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well
as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and

prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles,
and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP,
the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants,
subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose
Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required

to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later
reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing

petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution
of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned
articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the

ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having
previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity
of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to
quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition
in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of
the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and
widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this
special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent
power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice
Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it
is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its
rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...". chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of

laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the
lapse of a period of more than six [6] months. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 5
chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the

delay in the filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p.

3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June
16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had
been raided. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If

they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was
because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of
the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this
country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons
from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of

persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter
to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the
return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after
such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command,
they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the
desired results. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided
to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to

our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them
for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that
they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose

Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized
documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped
from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not
follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with
them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or
invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to
nullify the search warrants in question.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to

conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This
objection, however, may properly be considered moot and
academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on
August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to
search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search
Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the
two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion
is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which
states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D.
885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely,

two search warrants were applied for and issued because the
purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would
be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued
two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the
addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who
headed the team which executed the search warrants, the
ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical
error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address
appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he
issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b]. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the

premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been
held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge
who issued the warrant intended the building described in the
affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity
in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8 chanrobles virtual law library

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the

fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos,
Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal

properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. - A search warrant may be

issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense; chanrobles virtual law library

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the

offense; and chanrobles virtual law library

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of

committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties
that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property
must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it
may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore,
is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under
the warrants. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties

were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on
a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this
Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or
plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the

land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge

upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of
the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla
which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned

documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of
a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in
accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for

a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or
its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the
broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing
the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885,
as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant
and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause

is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used
and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13 chanrobles virtual law library

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez
v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in
said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the
test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Another factor which makes the search warrants under

consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the
articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo

(equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE
FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication,
letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other

publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the
subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and, chanrobles virtual law library

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE

FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; chanrobles virtual law library

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969 chanrobles virtual law library

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524; chanrobles virtual law library

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and, chanrobles virtual law library

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which

authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In
like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the
violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general,
and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of
any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of
the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime
of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore
invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under
the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a

notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the
Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the
Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased
in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both
Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode
would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice
of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and

printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship

abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment
and growth of the citizenry. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing

machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural
or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government
and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with
implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of
National Defense. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it

was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the
request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized
from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for

sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We

Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the
equipment and all materials in the premises. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19 chanrobles virtual law library
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign
Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos,
expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the

recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and

20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized
articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NOS. 172070-72 : June 1, 2007]

VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B.

ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C.
CASAMBRE, Petitioners, v. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN
MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A.
MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in their
 capacity as members of the Department of Justice panel of
prosecutors investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and
2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as
Chief, Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B.
MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G.
TANIGUE, Respondents.

[G.R. NOS. 172074-76 : June 1, 2007]

LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO,

TEODORO A. CASIO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V.
MARIANO, Petitioners, v. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R.
ZUO, in his capacity as Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL Y.
VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, AILEEN MARIE S.
GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A. WAGA (Panel),
RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Acting Deputy
Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detective
Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, in her capacity
as Acting Executive Officer of DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE (DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), Respondents.

[G.R. NO. 175013 : June 1, 2007]

CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his
capacity as the Secretary of Justice and overall superior of
the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G.
MOYA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and HONORABLE ELMO M.
ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 150, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
 The Case

These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition

and certiorari to enjoin petitioners' prosecution for Rebellion and to
set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation
and prosecution of petitioners' cases.

The Facts

Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and

petitioners in G.R. NOS. 172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G.
Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A.
Casio (Casio), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),1 are members of
the House of Representatives representing various party-list
groups.2 Petitioners in G.R. NOS. 172070-72 are private individuals.
Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation
to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases
pending with the RTC Makati.

G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a
"State of National Emergency," police officers3arrested Beltran on 25
February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and
detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested
without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran
of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran
was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for
Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon
City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of
the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of
Beltran's arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the
rally. The inquest prosecutor4 indicted Beltran and filed the
corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (MeTC).5
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27
February 2006, he was subjected to a second inquest, with 1st Lt.
Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion. A panel of
State prosecutors6 from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The
inquest was based on two letters, both dated 27 February 2006, of
Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza).
Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP), while
Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters
referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the CIDG's
investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. NOS.
172074-76, San Juan, and several others as "leaders and
promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo
government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a
"tactical alliance."

On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a

Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as
"leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an
Information with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged that
Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals "conspiring and
confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the
CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and
its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB)
with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise
publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government,
x x x."7The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-452, was
raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-
Delorino (Judge Delorino).

Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of

probable cause against him.8 Before the motion could be resolved,
Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled
to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).
In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the finding of
probable cause against Beltran.9 Beltran sought reconsideration but
Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without resolving
Beltran's motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom
the case was re-raffled, issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying
Beltran's motion.

Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders
dated 31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltran's
prosecution.

In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that

Beltran's inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati
correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.

G.R. NOS. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad

Petitions)

Based on Tanigue and Mendoza's letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to

petitioners on 6 March 2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ
Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of the complaint and its
attachment." Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had
quartered themselves inside the House of Representatives building
for fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest.

During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel

for the CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime
Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness against
petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent
prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit
to media members present during the proceedings. The panel of
prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their
counter-affidavits. Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of
documents supporting the CIDG's letters only on 17 March 2006.

Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the

prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and independence,
considering the political milieu under which petitioners were
investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of
Justice made to the media regarding petitioners' case,11 and the
 manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners'
motion on 22 March 2006. Petitioners sought reconsideration and
additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases. However, the
panel of prosecutors denied petitioners' motions on 4 April 2006.

Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March

2006 and 4 April 2006.

Acting on petitioners' prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ,

the Court issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. Prior to this,
however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006, issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46
others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the corresponding
Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-944 (later consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452
in Branch 146), charging petitioners and their co-accused as
"principals, masterminds, [or] heads" of a
Rebellion.12 Consequently, the petitioners in G.R. NOS. 172070-72
filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal
Case No. 06-944.

In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General

submits that the preliminary investigation of petitioners was not
tainted with irregularities. The Solicitor General also claims that the
filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944 has mooted the Maza petition.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against

Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is probable
cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and cralawlibrary

2. In G.R. NOS. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent

prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the prosecution
of Criminal Case No. 06-944.13

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been
lawfully arrested without warrant.14 Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when
such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful.' A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers15 states that the

officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to
Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could
only have conducted - as he did conduct - an inquest for Inciting to
Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of
prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for
Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second
inquest void. None of Beltran's arresting officers saw Beltran
commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just
committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe
that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers
alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an
allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.17

Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the
initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the
detained person was made "in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113."18 If the arrest was
not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under
Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.' Should the Inquest Officer find
that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:

a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b) note down the disposition on the referral document;

c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the

action taken; and cralawlibrary

d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the
City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is

approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on
hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the
order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said
detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee
the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with
the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other
supporting evidence. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

For the failure of Beltran's panel of inquest prosecutors to comply

with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ
Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran's inquest void.19 Beltran would
have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked
the trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause,
which effectively took the place of such proceeding.
There is No Probable Cause to Indict

Beltran for Rebellion.

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as

would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."20 To accord
respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons
of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts
would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor's findings
in such investigations.21 However, in the few exceptional cases
where the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
thus denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural
due process, we have not hesitated to intervene and exercise our
review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor's
findings.22 This exception holds true here.

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed'

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.

The elements of the offense are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against
the Government; and cralawlibrary

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either '

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or

(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or

(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially,

of any of their powers and prerogatives.23

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes

involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.24

The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the

inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other
documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these
documents and find merit in Beltran's contention that the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The
bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were
sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military
and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain
Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26 and Raul Cachuela
(Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,27 none of the affidavits
mentions Beltran.28 In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the
afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo, Casio,
Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle
which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and
that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another
individual who looked like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated
that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended
the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took
part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP
members used were purchased partly from contributions by
Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list
groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to
indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the
government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran
was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that
14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None
of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of
promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ
Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that
Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during
the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a
rebellion.

In fact, Cachuela's affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992

CPP Plenum as "Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)." Assuming
that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not
acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute
rebellion.29 As for the alleged funding of the CPP's military
equipment from Beltran's congressional funds, Cachuela's affidavit
merely contained a general conclusion without any specific act
showing such funding. Cachuela merely alleged that "ang mga ibang
mga pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa
Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA - pimumunuan nila SATUR
OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x x."30 Such a general conclusion
does not establish probable cause.

In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to

Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25 February 2006,31 as basis for the finding
of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his
statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners
attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the
Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others.

The claim is untenable. Fuentes' affidavit was not part of the

attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006.
Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes'
affidavit in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion
inquest against Beltran on that day. Indeed, although this affidavit
is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first presented it only during
the preliminary investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March
2006 during which Fuentes subscribed to his statement before
respondent prosecutor Velasco.

Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by

motu proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes'
affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltran's motion for judicial
determination of probable cause. Such belated submission, a tacit
admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran during the
inquest, does not improve the prosecution's case. Assuming them to
be true, what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case
for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of
the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance
in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a
government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts
constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution
acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information
against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal Case No. 06-452 is
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information
merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form
a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred
when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for
Rebellion based on the evidence before it.

The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Batangas

between members of MKP and CPP, including Beltran, also do not
detract from our finding.rbl rl l lbrr

Nowhere in the minutes was Beltran implicated. While the minutes

state that a certain "Cris" attended the alleged meeting, there is no
other evidence on record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San Juan,
from whom the "flash drive" containing the so-called minutes was
allegedly taken, denies knowing Beltran.

To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting,

maintaining, or heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal
Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation. Thus, even
assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking
part in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since
there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or
promoter of the Rebellion.33 However, the Information in fact merely
charges Beltran for "conspiring and confederating" with others in
forming a "tactical alliance" to commit rebellion. As worded, the
Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense.34

On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions

The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted

With Irregularities.
As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly
loath to enjoin the prosecution of offenses, a practice rooted on
public interest as the speedy closure of criminal investigations
fosters public safety.35 However, such relief in equity may be
granted if, among others, the same is necessary (a) to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner36 or (b) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights.37 The case of the petitioners in G.R. NOS. 172070-72 and
172074-76 falls under these exceptions.

The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable

by at least four years, two months and one day is outlined in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
thus:

Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the

following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits
shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to
continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the
respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence

submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those
which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall
be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at
his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be

made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the
expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent
shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-
affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided
in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by
him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file
a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does

not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the
investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the
evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and
issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be
present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of
the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of
the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5)
days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating
officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to
hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court

had mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the constitutional right
to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material
damage,"38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it.
Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule
112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied
by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed
and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the
unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as
complaints39 and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even
though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any
showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was
unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor,

after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds
to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss
the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents."
Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors
peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to
appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the
complaints and its attachments." During the investigation,
respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked
Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent
prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of
Fuentes' affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to
members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent
prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-
affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March 2006,
that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to
the CIDG letters.rbl rl l lbrr

These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors' statement

in the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary investigation
"was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal
Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to
petitioners, tolerating the complainant's antics during the
investigation, and distributing copies of a witness' affidavit to
members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the
opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent
prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent
credence to petitioners' claim that the entire proceeding was a
sham.

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice

system which spells for an individual the difference between months
if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one
hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we
have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not "a
mere formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one, forming
part of due process in criminal justice.41This especially holds true
here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and may be non-bailable for those accused as principals.

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent

prosecutors' filing of the Information against petitioners on 21 April
2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot the petitions
in G.R. NOS. 172070-72 and 172074-76. Our power to enjoin
prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of the
Information with the trial court.rbl rl l lbrr

On Respondent Prosecutors' Lack of Impartiality

We find merit in petitioners' doubt on respondent prosecutors'

impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises
supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an
interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary
investigation, that, "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable cause,
then it's up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x."42 Petitioners raised this
issue in their petition,43 but respondents never disputed the veracity
of this statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination
to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause.

A Final Word

The obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations

of respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors
brings to mind an observation we made in another equally politically
charged case. We reiterate what we stated then, if only to
emphasize the importance of maintaining the integrity of criminal
prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in particular,
thus:

[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not

allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office
is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political
ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and
fundamental objective of observing the interest of justice
evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike,
whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by
strict adherence to the established procedure may be public's
perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.44 rbl rl l lbrr

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we SET

ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150. In G.R. NOS. 172070-
72 and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders dated 22 March 2006
and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent prosecutors. We ORDER the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal
Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 164007 : August 10, 2006]

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT.
GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT.
(SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners, v. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO), Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the
above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP
Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the
AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to
destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to
track and arrest them.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP - mostly from the elite units of the Army's Scout Rangers and the Navy's Special Warfare Group -
entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building.

Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of
the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan.1 The troops then, through broast media, announced their grievances
against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the
military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao
City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal
of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They
also called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.

About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of
rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to
suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their
weapons at five o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The
aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the
government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed
around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.

A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup d etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso
Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood
incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup d
etat 2 against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61,
presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza.3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-
2678, involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge
Oscar B. Pimentel.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the
Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same military personnel.
Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of
National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of
Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with
the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the
charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) a motion praying
for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume
jurisdiction.

On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general
court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause
against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the
prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charge
of coup d etat against the 290 accused.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial
Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup d etat before the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of
the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accused are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners'
applications for bail.

In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the
findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the
Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article
96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno's recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge
Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they
filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from
charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the
offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is
not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them
to submit to its jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses
covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and
95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial. As
the charge against petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected
offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the court martial.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the
offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the
pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of
charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of
War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost
two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was
arraigned, and this was done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005,
herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within the
prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in violation of
Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the
General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July
26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the
accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the
accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied
by the general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15

In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He
alleges that "contrary to petitioners' pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18,
2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and,
"(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the
Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17

The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article
1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term "officer"
is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be
understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law,"
whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and
while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called,
drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they are required by
the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.

Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:

SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or
not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be
tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court,
is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President
of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any
such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54
to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that
members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup d etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next,
it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined
the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the
law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of
justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or offenses" as
"limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of
War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction
between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military
justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice system
is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest
degree of military efficiency.18 Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but
also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more
dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The
administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in
almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most
effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an
indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline
both in peace and in war.20

Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of
the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:

All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro
Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty to
protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and
legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and
the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of
War.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War 21

provides:

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. - Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet,
flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect
to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professionalconduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected"
nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same - dismissal from the service - imposable only
by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners' argument that they can no longer be charged before the court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its
Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged
crime of coup d etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically
amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes
or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the
law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an
action which can do so.22 And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that
such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find
it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya., 24
this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the
accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d etat, cannot be
given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies
what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Art. 56. False Muster.

Art. 57. False Returns.

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

Art. 59. Desertion.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,

Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National

Defense.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Articles 72 to 92:

Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.

Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.

Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.

Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 84. Military Property. Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage

or wrongful Disposition.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.

Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.

Art. 92. Dueling.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 97. General Article.

Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing
offenses. x x x.

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War
as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried
by the court-martial.

Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is
worth quoting, thus:

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is 'absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d etat.'
Firstly, the doctrine of 'absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes
punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine
applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil
courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the
doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel
because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of
civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and
other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization
dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to
unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment
by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a
civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of
military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief
of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short,
courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the President's control, and thus civilian
supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review
powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).

xxx

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only
to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to
correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed
court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged 'is absorbed and in furtherance of' another
criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one
of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present
case.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say
that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the
petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters involving
questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition,
such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved
may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts.26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior
courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they
have not been vested by law.28

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in
charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 173150 : July 28, 2010]

LYDIA C. GELIG, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct
conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being the duty of the
court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from. [1]

Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the Decision[2] promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27488 that vacated and set aside the Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-10314. The RTC Decision convicted Lydia for
committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only
of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Factual Antecedents

On June 6, 1982, an Information[4] was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion
committed as follows:

That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, at Barangay Nailon, Municipality
of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and seriously
intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon Elementary School while in the
performance of official duties and functions as such which acts consequently caused the unintentional
abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecution's Version

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the Nailon
Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time
material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from
Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her,
thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a
contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate [5] issued by a doctor in the Bogo General
Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after
the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to
her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate [6] was issued.

The Defense's Version

Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling her son names, so that his
classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and kicking
her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
direct assault with unintentional abortion, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty of
SIX (6) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise ordered to pay the offended party the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos for moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA vacated the trial court's judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since
Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia
or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. [8] Likewise, Lydia's purpose was
not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son. [9]

The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there was no
evidence that she was aware of Gemma's pregnancy at the time of the incident. [10] However, it declared
that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 23 of Cebu
City, dated October 11, 2002 is hereby VACATED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered CONVICTING the
accused-appellant for slight physical injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten (10) days.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Issues

Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries
pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of arresto menor minimum of ten days.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical
Injuries under the information charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion. [12]

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are then called upon to
render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and
sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if unassigned. [13]

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision
reads as follows:

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may be
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on

occasion of such performance.[14]

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its elements
are:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes
a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise
of his duties.

4. That there is no public uprising.[15]

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official duties,
that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking
their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the
classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of
Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the
principal's office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a
wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma's fall to the floor.

Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows:

Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority - Who shall be deemed as such. -

xxxx

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged
with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in
the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed
persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).[16]

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial court's
verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer
a person in authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private
person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was
busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that
they could talk properly,[17] but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When
Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated
person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider
while she was going to the principal's office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.

The prosecution's success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not necessarily
mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional
abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that
occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of
Gemma's attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she
suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct
consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.[18] It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca
since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia's assault and Gemma's abortion. Without
her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's abortion.

It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August
28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove
that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding
and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her
testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other factors.

The Proper Penaltyi>

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of direct assault, she
must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00, when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. [19] Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee
since she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing Gemma, another teacher, she laid her
hands on a person in authority.

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
[20]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[21] the petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate
term, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, and the maximum of which is that
properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the indeterminate term
of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of arresto mayor, maximum
to prision correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4)
years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. A
fine of not more than P1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered
finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault and is ordered to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @

ARMAND; EDWIN NUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE @ KA
JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN
DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO
MAGASIN @ BOBBY, Accused, RODRIGO DASIG, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kinaadman and Archival for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN

CASE AT BAR. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused
successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective
and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical
and obviously a mere refuge for appellants turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now
questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during
the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted
by Atty. Parawan who even signed the formers sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that
before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of
Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation
has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such
allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt.
Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE
THEREOF. The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim
is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). The Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the
Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.

He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who are still at large, in an information which
reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill,
treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with
unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his death soon
thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of his
official duties." 1

Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution
had presented its first witness, Accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower
court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the prosecution had
finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.
chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc.
Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in canning the traffic
at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc.
Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading
building.

At about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified
as Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to
approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediately
proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc.
Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the
ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office
from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatads gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is
dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back up. Thereafter, the Nues group
commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can
identify accused-appellant Nues because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he
noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his companions.

On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected
safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the
group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured
Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt.
Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and
subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nues was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal
Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in Cebu City.
Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office, who was
requested by the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer. Before the start of the
interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to which
appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his constitutional rights. The interrogation was
conducted in Cebuano upon appellants request. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and
Nues were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The
extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every page thereof with
the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the herein
statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation"
followed by the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was subscribed and sworn
to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador Solima.

In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken
was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he
conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder
with direct assault.

Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and consequently,
he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense. That even with the
presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counsel did not actively
assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to
the proceedings and not to protect appellant against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise
questions the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known anti-
Communist advocate and that the law firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had
personally examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latters statement was free and voluntary
and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of everything
therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the affiant from the start of the
investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?

A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as
a lawyer. So they informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a lawyer who
came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him
whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.

Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?

A No.

x x x

Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that investigation which was about
to be made?

A Yes.

Q Who are the persons present at that time?

A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and
Dasig.

Q What happened after that?

A The CIS started the investigation.

Q You mean this Ariston Ira?

A Yes.

Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, to counsel and if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his will be used against or
in his favor in the court of justice?

A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.

Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?

A The investigation started.

Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?

A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.

Q Was that reduced to writing?

A Yes.

x x x

Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo
Dasig, to the questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?

A Yes, they voluntary.

Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?

A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City
Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and then it was
subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).

Q Were you present during the proceeding?

A I was also present." 3

We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the extra-
judicial confession of the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court: chanrobles law library

"The prosecutions evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his investigation was properly
informed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer
of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer
Law Office who was available at that time, to assist him during the custodial investigation conducted by
T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was
confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein
accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative to his question as to whether he would be amenable
to be assisted by him as his counsel of his own choice.

"The prosecutions evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his counsel
was with him when his extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and sworn to by him
before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscals Office who, before accused has
actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial confession, has informed him
(accused) of his constitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession.

"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscals Office,
clearly shows that accused in executing the same has done so voluntarily and after having understood the
contents thereof which is in the visayan language, a language known to him, found on the last page thereof
now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B." cralaw virtua1aw library

"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of his co-
accused Edwin Nues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal Jopelinito
Pareja of the city Fiscals Office of Cebu City." 4

The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully
proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. 5 The
case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In Parojinog this court had
this to say: cralawnad

"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask
for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused
throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity
before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators.
He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus it was too late."
6

Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and hence,
should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously
a mere refuge for appellants turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the
integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the
investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by
Atty. Parawan who even signed the formers sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before
appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty.
Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not
been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out, such
allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt.
Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality. 7

Nevertheless, there is merit in appellants argument that granting he is guilty, what he committed was a
political crime of simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the Peoples brief,
which We quote: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder with
Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.

"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. (Article 135,
Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow
unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in
Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the
liquidation squad of the New Peoples Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime
of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority." 8

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues
and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in
one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person
in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It
cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused who was charged with
murder admitted his membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime
committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted
of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any
person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to
prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically
pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown leader.
Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the
resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession was legally
obtained. However, appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the
New Peoples Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime committed
is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

WHEREFORE, Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable
doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and
to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 88189. July 9, 1996.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIBURCIO ABALOS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

In this appeal accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction rendered
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex
crime of direct assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302. His arguments in the present appeal turn on
the central question of unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the version of the
criminal incident narrated by the sole prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence adduced, however,
indubitably confirms appellant s guilt of the offense charged. Accordingly, we affirm.

An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime of direct assault with murder
to herein appellant Tiburcio Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations

"That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and knowing fully well that one Sofronio
Labine was an agent of a person in authority being a member of the Integrated National Police with station
at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike said
Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood, which said accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the
purpose while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and qualified member of the said INP, was
engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such performance, that is,
maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby inflicting
upon him Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose which wound
directly caused his death.

"That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was present. 1

At his arraignment on June 7. 1983 appellant with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 2
The trial conducted thereafter culminated in the decision 3 of the trial court on February 3, 1989 finding
appellant guilty as charged and meting out to him the penalty of "life imprisonment, with the accessories of
the law." Appellant was likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00,
actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral damages; and to
pay the costs. 4

As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan, Samar,
appellant assaulted the victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of March 20, 1983, which was then
the day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in Barangay Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident
transpired near the house of appellant at the said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session
in front of the shanty of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from the residence
of Appellant.

According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos,
scolding his employees in his transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in earnings for
that day. While Major Abalos was thus berating his employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to
scold them and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder Abalos and set
off a heated argument between father and son. 5

While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue kami! Adi in mag-a-aringasa,"
meaning, "Police officer, help us! Somebodys making trouble here." The victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, then
appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim saluted Abalos when the latter
turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant hurriedly left and
procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford
Fiera vehicle.

He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting
the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later
expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right
after appellant struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible stray bullets 6 should a gunfight
ensue.

Appellants testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits having struck Labine with a piece
of wood during the incident in question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his father was
being attacked by a member of the New People s Army (NPA). According to appellant, he was then seated
inside their family-owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. near their home in
Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue uniform suddenly accost his father. At that time,
appellants father had just arrived from a trip from Wright, Samar and had just alighted from his service
vehicle, a Ford Fiera.

The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and while the two were grappling
for possession of the gun, appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a piece of wood
from Figueroa s store with which he then clubbed Labine whom he did not recognize at that point. When
Labine fell to the ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay Mercedes nearby, fearing
that the man had companions who might retaliate. When he came to know of the identity of his victim the
following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the authorities. 7

As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented by appellant was
roundly rejected by the lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant ascribes reversible
errors to the trial court (a) in not giving credence to the evidence adduced by the defense, (b) in believing
the evidence presented by the prosecution, (c) in relying on the prosecution s evidence which falls short of
the required quantum of evidence that would warrant a conviction, (d) in finding that treachery attended the
commission of the crime and failing to credit in appellants favor his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 8

In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces
of incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor
visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had called for help at the height of
the incident if only to corroborate Basals narration of the events. Appellant also assails as inherently
incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he
knew to the authorities. All these, unfortunately, are flawed arguments.

From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and
positive testimony of Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is
bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in
testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of
a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. 9 There was thus no need, as
appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since
her testimony would only be corroborative in nature.

The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling
reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. 10 Besides,
it is up to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own
assessment of the necessity for such testimony. 11 Also, no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to
Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow of the
victim that he was going to testify regarding her husbands slaying. 12

Appellants contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm is
rather preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would
assault a police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident
was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim s assailant but
likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim s violent death.

Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a long-time
resident of that municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and
which, by appellants own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from them. 13 Notwithstanding the
fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp and the
nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the combatants.

Curiously enough, appellant s assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his
testimony which is detailed on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight.
While appellant considers unbelievable Basals identification of him supposedly because of inadequate
lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father s assailant wearing a fatigue
uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching
the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle. 14 What
these facts establish is that the lights in the area at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an
excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellants pretense. Appellants testimony is thus negated by the
rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a credible witness, but that the same
must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.

Appellants flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true
that he had merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the
NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father
right then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was the Station Commander of the
Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee from
the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was in the company of his own father who, aside
from his position, was then armed with a carbine. Appellant s explanation is, therefore, absurd and should
be considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in law.

On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held
accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing
atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is not a
true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public uprising. On the
other hand the second mode is the more common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there
is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a
person in authority. 15

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack,
use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was
made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance, and the
accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority. 16

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent
of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no
dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was
maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he
personally knew Labine to be a policeman 17 and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts
should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates
that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises
the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. 18 The killing in the instant case constituted
the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was
struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellants father. The evidence
shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he
deliberately got for that purpose.

Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry
was a policeman who could readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court below. On the
other hand, appellants voluntary surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial court would have
been inconsequential.

The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable penalty should have been death. The mitigating
circumstance, in that context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable since the penalty thus imposed
by the law is indivisible. 19 At all events, the punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have to
be reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription against the imposition of the death
penalty. 20

However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life imprisonment" is erroneous, as
the same should properly be denominated as reclusion perpetua. 21 Also, the death indemnity payable to
the heirs of the victim, under the present jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos
should be reclusion perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the
judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs
against Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-5803. November 29, 1954.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., Defendants.

NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, Defendants-Appellants.

Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag, Manuel Concordia, P. M. Stuart Del Rosario,
Tomas R. Umali, Eufemio E. De Mesa and Edmundo T. Zepeda for Appellants.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for

appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION CHARGING MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE; ACCUSED MAY BE
PROPERLY CONVICTED IF NO OBJECTION HAS BEEN INTERPOSED. Although an information charges more
than one offense, contrary to section 12, Rule 106 and section 2(e), Rule 113, the defendants having
interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried and may be convicted of said several and separate
crimes if found guilty.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITION. Where the purpose of the raid and acts of the raiders in rising publicly and
taking up arms, were not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code under rebellion, but rather, by means of force and intimidation, to
inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, the crime committed is
sedition.
3. ID.; ID.; ROBBERIES COMMITTED AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT; PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. The purpose of
the raiders was to kidnap or kill the mayor and destroy his house. Robberies were committed by only some
of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the
confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of the houses. Held: For these robberies
only those who actually took part therein are responsible.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment,
other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial Punsalan in the amount of P24,023;
Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the amount of
P12,800; Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the
heirs of Vicente Soriano in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Leocadio Untalan in the amount of P6,000;
Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo in the
amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount of P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of P60; and Juanito
Lector in the amount of P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency due to the nature of the principal penalty that is imposed upon them."cralaw virtua1aw library

The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid
staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by
armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete
destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of
Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan
and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five
civilians; that during and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing
one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by
the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in Tiaong not
only shortly before that raid but one or two years before it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old
time friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned
for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn
campaigned and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latters election as Congressman. However, these
friendly relations between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as
Congressman regarded himself as the political head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became
jealous because of his (Punzalans) fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him
instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. In time the strain in their relations became
such that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and they even filed mutual accusations.
According to Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six special policemen of his (Punzalans) to
flee to the mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this in order to discredit Punzalans administration;
that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen and tried to persuade them to return to the
town and to the service, but they told him that they and their companions would not surrender except with
and through the intervention of Congressman Umali, and so Punzalan had to seek Umalis intervention which
resulted in the surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted to have their
firearms, claiming that they all belonged to him from his guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that
after liberation he had merely loaned them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep peace and
order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant Umalis request further strained their relations, and that
thereafter Umali would not speak to him even when they happened to meet at parties.

On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umalis men, including his
bodyguard Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his
men and Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram stating that the firearms taken away from
the men were licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This incident was naturally resented by
Umali and spurred him to have a showdown with Punzalan.
Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and
to clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali
picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.

The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and
bitter, even ruthless. The election was to be a test of political strength and would determine who was who in
Tiaong, Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the
benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if he was elected, at the same time bitterly attacking
Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those meetings he
told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he would-not be elected and that even if he won the
election, he would not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin for
him (Punzalan). After denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would say that Umali as a Congressman was
useless, and that he did not even attend the sessions and that his chair in Congress had gathered dust, even
cobwebs.

To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness for
the prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had had some experience in political
campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness, still,
he had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political meetings he delivered speeches for Pasumbal.
He was ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the latters houses or
headquarters. The result of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in
Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were
keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalans
victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election speeches about blood flowing and
gold coffin.

Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short narration of the
happenings shortly before it, established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason
or purpose of said raid, the persons behind it, and those who took part in it. According to the testimony of
Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the election, at the house of
Pasumbals father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to
contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the
order of his Chief (Umali) went to the mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with
Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in
the elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.

The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and testified to
by Nazario Aonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later took an active part in the
raid. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference with
Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and had even outlined the
manner of attack, that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under Commander Lucio and Aladin, the
latter to lead the sector towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be
postponed because Pasumbal may yet win the election the following day, thereby rendering unnecessary the
raid and the killing of Punzalan.

Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali he
went to the house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the day following the election, with the
result of the election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan over Pasumbal. He was told by
Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal at the wheel. They
drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises
with instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of
Punzalan. After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and
carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and his mission to Abeng, he led the dissidents or part of
the contingent in the direction of Punzalans house and on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he
pointed out Punzalans house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat
in a canal. Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in
his yard. While doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just
across the street from their house, belonging to the father of Umali, and among those men they saw
Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20 armed men.
Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad
tracks.
It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the
attacking force was deployed toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and
the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army unit but to keep it from going to the
rescue and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party went toward Punzalans house
and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with bottles filled with gasoline (popularly
known as Molotovs cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on Punzalans house was to kill
him. Fortunately, however, and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who designed the raid, at
six oclock that morning of November 14th Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena,
the capital, to report the results of the election to the Governor.

The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including policemen
who happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio
Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali) and Moises Escueta enter the gate of Punzalans
house and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor
Punzalans house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of those firing at the house. Lacorte said that
he was guarding the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house
and going over to the place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn the house of
Mayor Punzalan" ; that he was hit on the left cheek and later Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and
he was hit in the right forearm and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said eye. Mateo Galit,
laundryman who was sitting inside a jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized defendant
Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in the yard said in a loud voice as though addressing somebody
in the house "Pare come down." Mrs. Punzalan who was then inside the house related to the court that at
about eight in the evening while she was resting, she heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution she took
her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed that her house was being fired at because the glass window
panes were being shattered and she heard the explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed by
flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of
smoke of gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and the children ran out of the house and went to hide in
the house of a neighbor.

Nazario Aonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk Commander
Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks of
the Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951, he saw Pasumbal come to the mountains
near Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November 14th by order of Commander Abeng he with
other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw River already near Tiaong, they
were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were
told by Commander Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help in the
town proper; that he took part in firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was
wounded; and that because of his wound he could not escape with his companions to the mountains when
the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of the town and so he was finally captured by said soldiers.

As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly
established not only by the going of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following instructions of
Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the
fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14th met the Huks at the Osiw
River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of
Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.

What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of
Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid
Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and
convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of Punzalan; nor was he seen
near or around said house. Because of his important position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish to
figure too prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the
instructions necessary and he could well stay in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from
Punzalans house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the company of
about 20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for developments. Then
he and his companions left in the direction of Taguan.

Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan,
about seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There is ample
evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbals home only around midnight. An Army soldier
named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbals home arriving there earlier in the evening and who was
invited to take some refreshments said that he did not see the two men until they arrived about midnight
when the Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of
circumstances that does not speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is
the rather strange and unexplained, at least not satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that
evening of November 14th. Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in Tiaong at the
commencement of the raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that
they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they were
informed by persons coming or fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some
houses were burning. As a matter of fact, considering the proximity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about
seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the fire and the glow produced by the burning
of three houses and the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of the hand
grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and heard from Taguan. The natural and
logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had really
happened and then render help and give succor to the stricken residents, including their own relatives. It
will be remembered that the houses of the fathers of Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents
and relatives were residing there. And yet, instead of following a natural impulse and urge to go to Tiaong,
they fled in the opposite direction towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely
avoided the same and preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he was
wet, and spattered and very tired. Had they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the
police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or better still, when the army
reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that evening was
returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there was fighting
in the town, he immediately returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing
by Taguan, where they were, Umali and Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and gone to
Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to the capital (Lucena) where before dawn, they went and
contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two
officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the
sending of aid or reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials, specially the
Army Commander that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever with the raid. Umali said
he was trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be suspected of having had some
connection with the raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali himself,
while still in Taguan that evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col.
Legaspi of the Army was looking for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was wanted of
him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the next day he took
the train for Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all contrary to
impulse and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily have done under the circumstances,
prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues,
but the innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as well reproduce that portion of the decision of the
trial court, to wit:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as true, for the
sake of argument, that the said accused were really at the party of Pasumbal on the night in question, that
would not prevent them from being in Tiaong between 8 and 9. Besides, why was it that night the hasag
lamp was replaced with candles when the reinforcements passed through Taguan about the midnight of
November 14, 1951. Why did Congressman Umali and company instead of going to Tiaong which was the
scene of the attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the house of
Felix Ona walking through a muddy path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid to pass through
the provincial road and preferred a muddy road instead? Was he trying to conceal himself? Why did
Pasumbal and company also go to the house of Ona? Why did they go to the house of Felix Ona instead of
going to the house of Manalo who could have given them better protection? And again why did Congressman
Umali and the other co-accused repaired and sought the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early
hour to the Army authorities, did they fear any reprisal? From whom? Why did Umali go to Manila from
Lucena on November 16, 1951? The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold
as a lion."

At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former should
seek the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem
rather strange and anomalous that a member of Congress should have friendly relations with the dissidents
whom the Government had been fighting all these years. But if we study the evidence, it will be found that
the reason and the explanation are there. As already stated, during the Japanese occupation, to further the
resistance movement, guerrillas were organized in different parts of the Philippines. One of these was the
guerrilla unit known as President Quezons Own Guerrillas (PQOG) operating in the provinces of Tayabas
(now Quezon) and Laguna. Umali, Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in
this guerrilla unit, Umali attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and Punzalan that of Lieutenant-
colonel, Pasumbal then being known as "Panzer." After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, and became
a Huk Commander. It was not unnatural that Umali and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and
association with Commander Abeng and seek his aid when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that
he knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano Ramos, one of the witnesses of the prosecution told the court
that way back in May 1950, in a barrio of San Pablo City he saw Umali confer with Commander Kasilag,
which Commander after the conference told his soldiers including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks to raid
Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan. Of course, the last part of the testimony may be
regarded as hearsay, but the fact is that Umali conferred with a Huk Commander as early as 1950. Then we
have the fact that on November 18 of the same year Punzalan wrote to President Quirino denouncing
Congressman Umali for fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign among them in preparation
for the elections the following year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of Tiaong stands at the
foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the dissidents under Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others
had their hideout, so that it was not difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal to communicate
and even associate with the dissidents in that region.

After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are constrained to agree with the trial court that
the three appellants are guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great measure, hinges on the
credibility of witnesses. The learned trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of
witnesses on the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their testimony, decided the Government
witnesses, including Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable. And we find nothing in the record to
warrant correction or reversal of the stand and finding of the trial court on the matter. We have not
overlooked the rather belated retraction of Amado Mendoza made on October 31, 1952, about a year and 9
months after he testified in court. Considering the circumstances surrounding the making of this affidavit or
retraction, the late date at which it was made, the reasons given by him for making it and the fact that
when he testified in court under the observation and scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was
the star witness for the prosecution and his testimony naturally extremely important, and the trial court
after the opportunity given to it of observing his demeanor while on the witness stand had regarded him as
a witness, sincere, and his testimony truthful, and considering further the case with which affidavits of
retraction of this nature are obtained, we confess that we are not impressed with such retraction of
Mendoza.

The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense or offenses committed. Appellants were charged
with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and
robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in
his brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his stand "asks for leave to
incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umalis petition for bail, counsel for appellants
considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non- existence of such complex crime, saying that the
nature of the crime committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because they had absolutely no part in
it whatsoever." For the present, and with respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide
this important and controversial question, deferring its consideration and determination to another case or
occasion more opportune, when it is more directly and squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity
to discuss and argue the question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the
moment that there is no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently
appellants could not have been legally charged with, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the
information should therefore, be regarded as having charged more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106,
section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no
objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate crimes
charged therein, we have decided and we rule that the appellants may properly be convicted of said several
and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that
we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose does not exceed, except
perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the Court below, which is life imprisonment.

We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime committed here
was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising
publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing the things
defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the
Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation,
etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official,
namely, Punzalan who was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to
constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which appellants were charged and of which they
were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly
to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were actually committed by only some of the
raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and
disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended
presumably to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only those who
actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With respect to the crime of
multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing
him injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder; the wounding of
Ortega, Aselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere physical injuries.

The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation because the premeditation was
for the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing of three others not intended by the raiders (People v.
Guillen, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 3433 and People v. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967). The killing may, however, be
qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless, with the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be punished with the
penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the penalty should be life imprisonment.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the appellants in their brief.

In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correccional and
to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which
we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the
reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan, they knew that it
was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of
Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court.
It shall be understood, however, that pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the
duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their
long duration, we find it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated
murder and physical injuries, however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Aselo, Rivano,
Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125796. December 27, 2000.]

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Petitioners, v. COURT OF

APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY CATUBIG, PETER MOLATO, and FLORENCIO
CANDIA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The issue in this case is whether, even before the start of trial, the prosecution can be ordered to change
the information which it had filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation
shows that the crime committed is not murder with multiple frustrated murder, but rebellion. The trial court
ruled that the power to determine what crime to charge on the basis of the evidence gathered is the
prerogative of the public prosecutor. The Court of Appeals, however, while agreeing with the trial court,
nevertheless found the prosecutor to have gravely abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated
murder on the ground that the evidence adduced at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime
committed was rebellion. Accordingly, it ordered the prosecutor to substitute the information filed by him.
Hence, this petition brought by the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte for a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The facts are not in dispute. On August 3, 1993, the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte 1 filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City, an information (docketed as Criminal Case No. 6427)
charging private respondents and 10 other individuals with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The
information reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses ATICO OBORDO alias "Dondoy," NACENCIANO PACALIUGA,
JR., ELEAZAR FLORENDO, NESTOR BASES alias "Beses/Belly," FLORENCIO CANDIA alias "Bimbo," JUDY
CATUBIG alias "Elboy/Al," PETER MOLATO alias "Joker," ALBERTO CATUBIG alias "Blacky", ALMARIO
CATUBIG alias "Nixon," JIMMY DENGAL alias "Macboy," ENRICO SIMBULAN alias "Monstop," JIMMY GARIG
alias "Nonoy," NILO CATUNGAN alias "Gino," and BERNIDO QUENECAS alias "Digoy" of the crime of MURDER
WITH MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That, in the morning, on or about the 1st day of May, 1988, in the municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga
del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with high caliber
firearms, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill by
means of treachery and evident premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and fire several shots to one Cpl. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ PA, which caused his
instantaneous death and causing injuries to the following victims namely: SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR PA, SGT.
RODRIGO BARADI PA, SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS and SGT. BELLIZAR PA, which injuries would ordinarily
cause their death; thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
MURDER, as a consequence, but which nevertheless did not produce it for reason of causes independent of
the will of the herein accused, that is the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said victims
which prevented their death; that as a result of the commission of the said crime the heirs of Cpl. Alfredo de
la Cruz and the herein victims suffered the following damages, vis: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On victim CPL ALFREDO DELA CRUZ: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Indemnity for victims death P50,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity 30,000.00

P80,000.00

SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Hospitalization P10,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity 10,000.00

P20,000.00

SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Hospitalization P10,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity 10,000.00

P20,000.00
SGT. RODRIGO BARADI: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Hospitalization P10,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity 10,000.00

P20,000.00

SGT. BELLIZAR: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Hospitalization P10,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity 10,000.00

P20,000.00

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 248, in relation to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code), with the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. 2

The foregoing information is based on a joint affidavit executed on June 1, 1993 by five individuals, who
claimed to be former members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), before the Municipal Trial Court of
Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. The affiants stated that on May 1, 1988, their group, which included
private respondents, figured in an armed encounter with elements of the Philippine Army in Campo Uno,
Femagas, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, as a result of which one soldier, Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz, was
killed while four others, Sgts. Rodrigo Alviar, Linomagan Piatos, Rodrigo Baradi, and a certain Bellizar, were
seriously wounded. Although private respondents did not appear nor submit affidavits in the preliminary
investigation, they appealed the resolution of the provincial prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice on the
ground that, in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated murder, the provincial prosecutor
disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed rebellion. When the case was filed in
court, private respondents reiterated their contention and prayed that the provincial prosecutor be ordered
to change the charge from murder with multiple frustrated murder to rebellion.

On September 29, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying private respondents motion for the
correction or amendment of the information. The trial court said: 3

Be it recalled, that as pointed out by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, the same movant counsel sometime on
July 22, 1993 filed a notice of appeal assailing the resolution of the provincial prosecutor dated July 16,1993
finding probable cause against all the above-named accused for the crime of Murder and Multiple frustrated
Murder, to the Honorable Secretary of Justice, by raising the same issue that "instead of recommending the
filing of a political crime such as subversion or rebellion, the investigating prosecutor is recommending the
filing of the common crime of murder to cover-up the apparent political color of the alleged crime
committed." Until the appeal by the movant therefore is resolved by the Secretary of Justice, this court will
have no basis to order the public prosecutor to amend or change the crime charged in the information.
Besides, this Court recognizes and respects the prerogative of the fiscal to determine whether or not a prima
facie case exists in a given case against the accused. This power vested in the fiscal cannot be interfered
with even by the courts.

But since the case has already been filed with this Court, jurisdiction thereover now lies with the court. It
may not even be bound by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice . . . .

Private respondents twice moved for a reconsideration and twice were rebuffed. They then filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court to set aside the orders dated September 29, October 24, and November 3, 1995
of the trial court. They impleaded the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte as co-respondent of
Judge Pacifico Garcia of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Without ruling on the petition, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision 4
dated July 24, 1996, the subject of this review, found the provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of
discretion in charging private respondents with murder with multiple frustrated murder. The Court of
Appeals held: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The New Peoples Army (NPA) is the armed component of the Communist Party in this country called the
National Democratic Front (NDF). The ultimate objective of the NPA/NDF is to overthrow the constitutional
democratic Philippine Government and supplant it with a government anchored on the communist ideology.

It is common practice of the military and police to charge captured or arrested members of the NPA with
capital offenses like murder, robbery with homicide, illegal possession of firearms used in the commission of
homicide or murder, arson resulting in death rather than on simple rebellion.

If an NPA fighter (terrorist, according to the military lexicon) commits homicide, murder, arson, robbery,
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance or on the occasion of his revolutionary pursuit,
the only crime he has committed is rebellion because all those common crimes are absorbed in the latter
one pursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 and several subsequent cases.

The reason why instead of charging the NPA fighter with capital offenses mentioned supra and not the
proper offense of rebellion is obvious. Rebellion is a bailable offense and given the resources of the NPA, it is
the easiest thing for it to bail out its members facing rebellion charges in court. Once out, the NPA fighter
goes back to his mountain lair and continues the fight against the government. If he is accused of a capital
offense where the granting of bail is a matter of discretion, his chances of securing provisional liberty during
the pendency of the trial are very much lessened.

Since, the military and the police carry the brunt of fighting the NPAs and in so doing they put their limbs
and lives on the line, it is easy for Us to understand why they usually charge the captured or arrested NPAs
with capital offenses instead of the proper offense which is rebellion. The police or military practice is of
course wrong, but it is not much of a problem because it is at most recommendatory in nature. It is the
prosecutory service that ultimately decides the offense to be charged.

x x x

No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the public prosecutor has the
discretion to determine the crime to be charged in a criminal action. But like all discretions, his must be
exercised soundly, meaning, reasonably, responsibly, and fairly. As stated by the Supreme Court in Misola v.
Panga cited in respondents Comment (p. 61, Rollo); "The question of instituting a criminal charge is one
addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information must be supported by the facts
brought about by an inquiry made by him." (Emphasis supplied).

If then, a public prosecutor deliberately ignores or suppresses an evidence in his hands which palpably
indicates the chargeable offense and files an information charging a more serious one, he departs from the
precinct of discretion and treads on the forbidden fi[el]d or arbitrary action.

This was what happened in the case at bench. The evidentiary bases of the criminal action against
petitioners are the Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony earlier adverted to. It is not at all disputed that
based upon these two documents, the proper offense to charge petitioners with is rebellion. No amount of
legalistic sophistry can make those documents support murder with multiple frustrated murder for these
offenses in the factual milieu in this case were all absorbed by rebellion.

We vehemently reject respondents contention that the petitioners do not suffer any prejudice because they
can use their theory that the chargeable offense is only rebellion as a defense in the trial on the merits and
if the trial court finds that the evidence establishes only rebellion, then, it can convict them under the
Information for just that lesser crime. This argument is not only wrong but betrays an insensitivity to
violation of human rights. If prosecutory discretion is twisted to charge a person of an unbailable offense
and, therefore, keeps him under detention when the truly chargeable offense is a bailable one, the
prosecutor transgresses upon the human rights of the accused. 5

The appeals court was more kindly disposed toward the trial court. It said: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Respecting the respondent court, the situation is different . . .

x x x
[T]he Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony mentioned earlier are not part of the records. The trial has
not yet been started and, therefore, no evidence has yet been adduced. There is no basis then for the trial
court even to call the attention of the prosecutor to a mistake in the crime charged.

We hold that respondent court did not commit an error in issuing the assailed orders, mu[ch] less gravely
abuse[d] its discretion in issuing them. 6

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing premises, We a) dismiss the petition as against respondent court for lack of
merit; and b) order the respondent office of Provincial Prosecutor to file a substitute Information in Criminal
Case No. 6427 charging the petitioners with rebellion only. 7

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred

I. IN MAKING DISPARATE AND IRRECONCILABLE RULINGS CONCERNING THE CORRECTNESS OF THE

ACTION OF PETITIONER AND THE LOWER COURT.

II. IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER GRAVELY ABUSE[D] ITS DISCRETION IN CHARGING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WITH MURDER AND MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDERS. 8

We find the contentions to be well taken.

First. It was improper for the Court of Appeals to consider the record of the preliminary investigation as
basis for finding petitioner provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion when such record was
not presented before the trial court and, therefore, was not part of the record of the case. Rule 112, 8 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. The record of the preliminary investigation whether
conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.
However, the said court, on its own initiative or that of any party, may order the production of the record of
any part thereof whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein,
or shall be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for its production.

The certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals was limited to the record of the trial court and indeed the
Court of Appeals recognized this by absolving the trial court of any liability for abuse of its discretion. It is
petitioner provincial prosecutor which it found guilty of grave abuse of discretion in filing a case for murder
with multiple frustrated murder against private respondents because, in its view, the crime committed is
rebellion. The Court of Appeals based its ruling on the joint affidavit of five prosecution witnesses and their
testimonies relating to such affidavit before the Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte,
which had conducted the preliminary investigation. But this could not be done because the petition before it
was a petition for certiorari to set aside orders of the Regional Trial Court denying private respondents
motion to compel petitioner to change the charge against them from murder with frustrated murder to
rebellion.

To sustain the procedure followed by the Court of Appeals of considering evidence dehors the record of the
trial court would be to set a bad precedent whereby the accused in any case can demand, upon the filing of
the information, a review of the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation for the purpose of
compelling the trial court to change the charge to a lesser offense. Such a ruling would undermine the
authority of the prosecutor and impose an intolerable burden on the trial court. As held in Depamaylo v.
Brotarlo: 9

. . . The Court in a number of cases has declared that a municipal judge has no legal authority to determine
the character of the crime but only to determine whether or not the evidence presented supported prima
facie the allegation of facts contained in the complaint. He has no legal authority to determine the character
of the crime and his declaration upon that point can only be regarded as an expression of opinion in no wise
binding on the court (People v. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960; de Guzman v. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619). This power
belongs to the fiscal (Bais v. Tugaoen, 89 SCRA 101).

It is to be noted that private respondents did not even attend the preliminary investigation during which
they could have shown that the crime committed was rebellion because the killing and wounding of the
government troopers was made in furtherance of rebellion and not for some private motive.

Second. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the crime as made out by the facts alleged in the Joint Affidavit of
witnesses is rebellion and not murder with multiple murder. The affidavit reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE) S.S.

Municipality of Jose Dalman)

x ----------------------------------------------- x

JOINT AFFIDAVIT

I, Teofilo D. Sarigan, 31 years old, Manuel A. Cuenca, 28 yrs. old, Romulo A. Pacaldo, 25 years old,
Carmelito Carpe, 36 yrs. old, all married and Pablo D. Maladia, 20 yrs. old and with postal address of Brgy.
Lopero, Brgy. Lumaping, of Jose Dalman, Brgy. Villahermosa, Roxas, all of ZDN, Brgy. Sigamok, Dumingag,
ZDS and Brgy. Lipay, Jose Dalman, ZDN after having been duly sworn to an oath in accordance to law do
hereby depose and answer questions propounded: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

01. Q Why are you here now in this office?

A To render statement regarding the alleged incident wherein we were previously involved when we were
still with the underground movement of CPP/NPA that transpired on or about 011000H May 1988 at vicinity
Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan, ZDN against the government troops of 321B.

02. Q Since when the five (5) of you entered the underground movement of CPP/NPA?

A Since May 16, 1980, August 12, 1980, March 12, 1981, May 7, 1983 and August 27, 1987, sir.

03. Q What is your previous position?

A CO, FCOM (Front Command) and second deputy secretary of FC-1 "BBC, the Vice CO, FCOM, the CO,
FCOM after @ Bebeth surrendered, a Yunit Militia (YM) member, GYP element under squad Lion all of FC-1
"BBC" in which we are operating within the Province of ZDN.

04. Q Will you narrate to me what and how the incident you are referring to all about?

A Actually sir, last 30 April 1988 our main force of FGU, FC-1 "BBC" had a meeting at vicinity basketball
court of vicinity Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan, ZDN. While on that status our security group left at the
highground portion of the place [and] engage[d] the advancing government troops of 321B afterwhich we
then decided to postpone the meeting hence, the government troops presence. However, on the following
day of 01 May 1988 at about 10:00 oclock in the morning when we assembled again at the aforesaid place,
firefight occurred between us and the government troops of 321B which resulted to inflict casualties to the
321B troopers, KIA one (1) Cpl. Alfredo Dela Cruz and wounding four (4) others, Sgt. Rodrigo Alviar, Sgt.
Linogaman Piatos, Sgt. Rodrigo Baradi and Sgt. Bellizar while on our side with one wounded @ TOY.

05. Q Can you still recall the names of those other NPAs that participated in that encounter against the
government troops?

A Yes, sir. ATICO OBORDO @ DONDOY, NACENCIANO PACALIUGA JR. @ ALFIE/IGI, ELEAZAR FLORENDO,
NESTOR BASES @ BELOY/BELLY, FLORENCIO CANDIA @ BIMBO, JUDY CATUBIG @ ELBOY/AL, PETER
MOLATO @ JOKER, BENVENIDO CATUBIG @ RASTY, ALBERTO CATUBIG @ BLACKY/RENATO, ALMARIO
CATUBIG @ NOEL, ROGER CATUBIG @ JAMES, JOEL CATUBIG @ NIXON, JIMMY DINGAL @ MACBOY,
ENRICO SIMBULAN @ NONSTOP, @ DANDY, @ WAWAY, @ ALBA/JONAS, JIMMY GARIG @ NONOY, NILO
CATUNGAN @ GINO, BERNIDO QUENECAS @ DIGOY, @ CRISTINE/LFA @ MARILOU @ ELNA, @ BENIGNO,
PAULINO CORPUZ @ JR/PAWA, BENJAMIN SANTANDER @ JAKE, @ NESTOR, @ JAY, @ ISAGANI, @ RONIE,
ESMAEL OBORDO @ ANICIO, @ FREDO, @ RUEL, @ DODONG, JULITA ADJANAN @ GENIE, @ TONY, @ RJ,
@ LANNIE @ DEMET, @ RENDON, @ JESS, @ SAMSON AND many others, sir.

Q Then what transpired next?

A Right after the encounter, we withdraw our troops towards vicinity SVR, complex, Sergio Osmea, Sr.,
ZDN.

Q Do you have something more to say?

A Nothing more, sir.

Q Are you willing to sign your statement without being forced, coerced or intimidated.

A Yes, sir.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE hereunto affix our signature this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN,
Philippines.

(SGD.) TEOFILO D. SARIGAN (SGD.) MANUEL A. CUENCA

Affiant Affiant

(SGD.) ROMULO A. PACALDO

Affiant

(SGD.) CARMELITO L. CARPE (SGD.) PABLO G. MALADIA

Affiant Affiant

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN, Philippines.

(SGD.) ADELA S. GANDOLA

Municipal Trial Judge

Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission of the crime indicated in the foregoing affidavit.
Merely because it is alleged that private respondents were members of the CPP/NPA who engaged
government troops in a firefight resulting in the death of a government trooper and the wounding of four
others does not necessarily mean that the killing and wounding of the victims was made in furtherance of a
rebellion. The political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime
committed to be rebellion. Otherwise, as in People v. Ompad, 10 although it was shown that the accused
was an NPA commander, he was nonetheless convicted of murder for the killing of a person suspected of
being a government informer. At all events, as this Court said in Baylosis v. Chavez: 11 chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

. . . Certainly, the public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be
initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have elements common to more than
one offense does not rob the prosecutor of that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require him to charge
the lesser offense although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the more serious one. 12

In Baylosis v. Chavez, the accused, who were NPA members, assailed the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1866
under which they were charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that it gave
prosecutors the discretion to charge an accused either with rebellion or with other crimes committed in
furtherance thereof. In rejecting their contention, this Court said:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code treats rebellion or insurrection as a
crime distinct from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies that might conceivably be committed in the
course of rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the evidence in the hands of the public
prosecutor, and not the latters whim or caprice, which gives the choice. The Code allows for example,
separate prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that
the former has been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter. 13
The burden of proving that the motivation for the crime is political and not private is on the defense. This is
the teaching of another case, 14 in which it was held: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of
mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows . . .

x x x

[I]t is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist
....

The proceedings in the case at bar is still in the pre-arraignment stage. The parties have yet to present their
respective evidence. If, during the trial, private respondents are able to show proof which would support
their present contention, then they can avail of the remedy provided under the second paragraph of Rule
110, 14 15 which provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in
double jeopardy . . . .

Until then, however, petitioner provincial prosecutor is under no obligation to change the charge against
private respondents.

Third. The Court of Appeals says it is a common practice of the military and the police to charge captured
members of the NPA with capital offenses like murder, robbery with homicide, or illegal possession of
firearms rather than rebellion. The alleged purpose is to deny them bail since murder is a capital offense and
private respondents will have a right to bail only if it can be shown that the evidence against them is not
strong, whereas if the charge is rebellion, private respondents would have an absolute right to bail.

As already stated, however, given the Joint Affidavit of the prosecution witnesses alone, it is not possible to
determine at this stage of the criminal proceeding that in engaging the government troops in a "firefight,"
private respondents were acting in pursuance of rebellion. It could be that the "firefight" was more of an
ambush staged by the NPA, as shown by the fact that while the government troop suffered one dead and
four wounded, the CPP/NPA suffered only one wounded.

The charge that it is "common practice" for the military and the police to charge suspected rebels with
murder in order to prevent them from going out on bail can be laid equally at the door of the accused. As
noted in Enrile v. Salazar: 16

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic
quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere
terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their
ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion. 17

What the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the trial or at the hearing on the
application for bail. Those accused of common crimes can then show proof that the crime with which they
were charged is really rebellion. They are thus not without any remedy. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 24, 1996, is REVERSED insofar as it orders
petitioner to file a substitute information for rebellion in Criminal Case No. 6427. In other respects, it is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 186739-960 : April 17, 2013

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision 1 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol
(Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized under Article
177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-
Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders
with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the
vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of
the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-
government organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon
province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests products,
the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding
fees to the municipal treasurer.2 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest
products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the
remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria
(Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of
the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.

Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the permit, and official
receipt number, the said Informations uniformly read: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo
M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Administrator, respectively,
of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and committing the offense in relation
to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product) to (person given the permit) under O.R.
No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do
so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to the
damage and prejudice of the of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The details for each Information are as follows:5
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Criminal Date of Description of Forest Person Given the Official

Case No. Commission Product Permit Receipt
No.

0039 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat/ David Villareal Jr. 1623446
marang

0040 16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623463

0041 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. malaruhat Francisco Mendoza 1708352

(assorted sizes)

0042 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or 3,000 board Edmundo dela Vega 1708353
ft good lumber

0043 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft good lumber David Villareal, Jr. 1708321

0044 15 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft good lumber Romeo Sabiduria 1708322

0045 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1625521

0046 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft good lumber Naty Orozco 1623421
(assorted sizes)

0047 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft lauan Winnie Aceboque 1623415

0048 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft lauan Edmundo dela Vega 1623041

0049 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 1623314

0050 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310

0051 21 Oct. 2002 1,000 board ft sliced Conchita Odi 0830825

lumber

0052 21 Oct. 2002 400 board ft sliced lumber Lita Crisostomo 0830826

0053 28 Oct. 2002 450 board ft marang Agosto Astoveza 0830829

lumber

0054 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft sliced lumber Edna E. Moises 0943941
(assorted sizes)

0055 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft sliced Dante Z. Medina 0943964

lumber (assorted sizes)

0056 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft sliced lumber Johnny A. Astoveza 0943975
(assorted sizes)

0057 27 Jan. 2003 7 pcs sliced lumber & 1 Sonny Leynes 1181827
piece 18 roda

0058 14 Feb. 2003 2,000 pcs trophy (wood Flordeliza Espiritu 1182033
carvings)

0059 17 Feb. 2003 700 board ft sliced lumber Nestor Astejada 1181917
(assorted sizes)

0060 18 Feb. 2003 1,632 board ft hard wood, Arthur/ Lanie 1182207
kisame & sanipa Occea

0061 20 Feb. 2004 126 pcs lumber Lamberto 1708810

Aumentado

0062 3 March 2003 450 board ft hard wood Nestor Astoveza 1182413
(assorted sizes)
0063 6 March 2003 160 pcs sliced lumber Remedios Orozco 1182366
(assorted sizes)

0064 10 March 1,500 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1181996

2003 (assorted sizes)

0065 11 March 900 board ft sliced lumber Fernando Calzado 1182233

2003 (assorted sizes)

0066 13 March 1,408 board ft hard wood Nestor Astejada 1182553

2003 (assorted sizes)

0067 20 March 90 pcs. sliced lumber Remy Orozco 1182157

2003 (assorted sizes)

0068 21 March 90 pcs. sliced lumber Rene Francia 1182168

2003 (assorted sizes)

0069 25 March 500 board ft lumber Thelma Ramia 1182179

2003 (assorted sizes)

0070 26 March 1 pc. 60 x 75 bed (narra) Roy Justo 1182246

2003 finished product

0071 14 April 2004 95 pcs. kalap (9 ft.); 6 pcs. Anita Solloza 3651059
post (10 ft.) & 500 pcs.
Anahaw

0072 08 April 2004 460 board ft lumber Remy Orozco 3651101

(assorted sizes)

0073 14 April 2004 69 pcs. sliced lumber Dindo America 3651101

(assorted sizes)

0074 23 April 2003 870 board ft hard lumber Amado Pradillada 3651268
(assorted sizes)

0075 24 April 2003 400 board ft lumber Romy Buendicho 3651237

(assorted sizes)

0076 24 April 2003 400 board ft rattan Emmanuel 3651324

Buendicho

0077 30 April 2004 1,000 board ft good lumber Mylene Moises 3651335-C
(assorted sizes)

0078 30 April 2004 500 board ft sliced lumber Carlito Vargas 3651336
(assorted sizes)

0079 08 May 2003 72 x 78 bed (narra); 3 pcs. Fely Justo 3651519

60 x 75 bed (ling manok)
& 1 pc. 48 x 75 ed (kuling
manok) finished product

0080 12 May 2003 294 board ft lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 3650927

0081 13 May 2003 43 pcs. sliced lumber Amando Lareza 3651783

(assorted sizes)

0082 14 May 2003 750 board ft good lumber Wilma Cuerdo 3651529

0083 15 May 2003 440 board ft lumber Marte Cuballes 3651532

0084 15 May 2003 214 pcs. 2x6x7 or 1,500 Anneliza Vargas 3651531
board ft finished product

0085 26 May 2003 57 pcs. sliced lumber Danny Sanchez 3651585

 (assorted sizes)

0086 27 May 2003 400 board ft cut woods Emy Francia 3651394

0087 30 May 2003 300 board ft lumber Daisy Cuerdo 3650943

0088 30 May 2003 1,000 board ft lumber Lea Astoveza 3651161

(assorted sizes)

0089 05 June 2003 130 pcs. or 1,500 board ft Jose Noly Moises 3651809
lumber cut woods

0090 06 June 2003 300 board ft lumber Mercy Escaraga 3651169

0091 18 June 2003 800 board ft good lumber Dante Medena 3651749

0092 24 June 2003 28 pcs. good lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 1247102

(assorted sizes)

0093 25 June 2003 190 pcs. good lumber Dante Medina 1247205
(assorted sizes)

0094 02 July 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Dante Medina 1247221

0095 02 July 2003 105 pcs. fresh cut lumber Emmanuel Lusang 1247167
(assorted sizes)

0096 04 July 2003 Assorted sizes of good Alberto dela Cruz 1247172
Lumber

0097 07 July 2003 Bulukan woods Conchita Ligaya 1247175

0098 07 July 2003 6 pcs. Haligi Jane Bulagay 1247173

0099 11 July 2003 700 board ft. cut woods Dominador Aveno 1247452

0100 14 July 200 800 board ft. cut wood/ Dante Medina 1247180
lumber

0101 16 July 2003 600 board ft. cut lumber Rachelle Solana 1247182

0102 23 July 2003 1,200 board ft. hard lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247188

0103 23 July 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1247129

0104 28 July 2003 959 board ft. cut lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247428

0105 29 July 2003 600 board ft. lumber Marilou Astejada 1247191

0106 01 Aug. 2003 1,000 board Malaruhat Ruel Ruzol 1247198

0107 05 Aug. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Virgilio Aumentado 1322853

0108 08 Aug. 2003 4.8 cubic ft. Amlang Rosa Turgo 1322862
woods

0109 12 Aug. 2003 788 Board ft. cut woods Maria Teresa 1322865
Adornado

0110 25 Aug. 2003 500 board ft. assorted Romy Buendicho 1322929
lumber

0111 28 Aug. 2003 2 sala sets Roy Justo 1322879

0112 29 Aug. 2003 456 pieces good lumber Marilou Astejada 1323056
(assorted sizes)

0113 03 Sept. 2003 5 cubic ft softwoods Rosa Turgo 1322834

(assorted sizes)
0114 05 Sept. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Agustin Vargas 1323064
lumber (assorted sizes)

0115 08 Sept. 2003 80 pcs. wood post Peter Banton 1323124

0116 09 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (soft wood) Efifania V. Astrega 1323023

0117 11 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (assorted Noling Multi 1323072

species) Purpose Corp.

0118 11 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Agustin Vargas 1323071

0119 12 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1323073
(assorted sizes)

0120 15 Sept. 2003 950 board ft. Malaruhat Edna Moises 1323128

0121 16 Sept. 2003 14 pcs. Panel door Roy Justo 1323041

0122 17 Sept. 2003 546 board ft. soft woods Mr. Marquez 1322951

0123 19 Sept. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Decembrano 1323085

lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria

0124 22 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Jeffrey dela Vega 1323095

0125 22 Sept. 2003 1 Jeep load hard wood Federico Marquez 1323100

0126 25 Sept. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang

0127 03 Oct. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang

0128 02 Oct. 2003 60 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astorza 1482662

(assorted sizes)

0129 03 Oct. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Virgilio Villareal 1482666
lumber (assorted sizes)

0130 03 Oct. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Amado Pradillada 1482815
(assorted sizes)

0131 03 Oct. 2003 1 full load (soft wood) Flordeliza Espiritu 1482867

0132 03 Oct. 2003 6,342 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482716

0133 03 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482717

0134 07 Oct. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Mylene Moises 1482670
(assorted sizes)

0135 13 Oct. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Acebaque 1482734
(assorted sizes)

0136 13 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Bautista 1482740
(assorted sizes)

0137 13 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Lawaan Trinidad Guerero 1482774
(assorted sizes)

0138 16 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Lawaan Federico Marquez 1482782

0139 17 Oct. 2003 4,602 board ft. good Nenita Juntreal 1482787
lumber (assorted sizes)

0140 20 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Belen Ordinado 1482793
(assorted sizes)
0141 23 Oct. 2003 66 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1482847
(assorted sizes)

0142 25 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. good Dante Medina 1323277
lumber

0143 27 Oct. 2003 1,800 board ft. good Dante Medina 1482951
lumber (assorted sizes)

0144 28 Oct. 2003 1,254 board ft. good Jonathan Supremo 1323281
lumber (assorted sizes)

0145 28 Oct. 2003 2,500 board ft. lumber Ramir Sanchez 1483001
(assorted sizes)

0146 28 Oct. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Rolando Franela 1323280
(assorted sizes)

0147 03 Nov. 2003 850 finished products Naty Orozco 1483020

(cabinet component,
balusters, door jambs)

0148 03 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. good lumber Elizabeth Junio 1483022
(assorted sizes) & 6
bundles of sticks

0149 10 Nov. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1483032
lumber (assorted sizes)

0150 10 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483033

0151 12 Nov. 2003 900 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1483041
(assorted sizes)

0152 12 Nov. 2003 Mini dump truck good Rizalito Francia 1483042
lumber (assorted sizes)

0153 14 Nov. 2003 500 components, 100 pcs Annie Gonzales 1483070
balusters (assorted sizes of
stringers, tassels)

0154 14 Nov. 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Winnie Aceboque 1323287

0155 17 Nov. 2003 1,600 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483072
lumber (assorted sizes)

0156 05 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. Tapil & 7 Belen Ordinado 1483023
pcs. 1x10x14

0157 05 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Leonardo Aveno 1623003
(assorted sizes)

0158 05 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483027

0159 07 Nov. 2003 433 bundles of semi-finished Naty Orozco 1483031

products

0160 08 Nov. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Armando Pradillada 1483134
(assorted sizes)

0161 25 Nov. 2003 30 pcs. sliced lumber Ariel Molina 1632059

0162 19 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Dante Medina 1623053
lumber (assorted sizes)

0163 20 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Maria Teresa 1323288
(assorted sizes) Adornado
0164 20 Nov. 2003 1,500 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1483080
lumber (assorted sizes)

0165 21 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1623057
lumber (assorted sizes)

0166 25 Oct. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1322982
(assorted sizes)

0167 25 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483090

0168 25 Nov. 2003 70 bundles of Rattan Manuel Buendicho 1483095

(assorted sizes)

0169 28 Nov. 2003 6,542 board ft. finished Nenita Juntareal 1623019
products (cabinet and
components)

0170 01 Dec. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1623061

0171 01 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1483123

0172 01 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. lumber Belen Ordinado 1623063
(assorted sizes)

0173 03 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. Laniti Rosa Turgo 1483125

0174 04 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Dante Medina 1483127

0175 04 Dec. 2003 26 pcs. lumber (assorted Nenita Juntareal 1483128

sizes) & 2 bundles of sticks

0176 05 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483131

0177 08 Dec. 2003 678 board ft. good lumber Elenor Rutaquio 1623082
(assorted sizes)

0178 08 Dec. 2003 200 board ft. lumber William Rutaquio 1623010
(assorted sizes)

0179 09 Dec. 2003 1,800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1623090

0180 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
lumber (assorted sizes)

0181 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
lumber (assorted sizes)

0182 12 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1483147

0183 16 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Malaruhat Jonathan Marcial 1623033

0184 16 Dec. 2003 650 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1482987

0185 16 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1482986

0186 18 Dec. 2003 100 board ft. lumber Aladin Aveno 1322992

0187 19 Dec. 2003 780 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1323000

0188 19 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. coco Felecita Marquez 1322998
lumber

0189 22 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. lumber Belen C. Ordinado 1623209

0190 29 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Aciboque 1623211

0191 29 Dec. 2003 300 board ft. lumber Yolanda Crisostomo 1623210
0192 30 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. Lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623215

0193 20 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483086
(assorted sizes)

0194 30 June 2003 450 board ft. fresh cut Mylene Moises 1247126
lumber

0195 13 July 2001 1 L-300 load of finished Evangeline Moises 9894843-Q

and semi-finished products

0196 02 July 2001 96 pcs. good lumber Rollie L. Velasco 9894996-Q

(assorted sizes)

0197 07 May 2004 1,500 board ft. babayahin Nemia Molina 200647
lumber

0198 19 April 2004 107 pcs. sliced lumber Carlo Gudmalin 1868050
(assorted sizes)

0199 5 March 2004 10 pcs. Deadwood Elizabeth Junio 1708899

(Bulakan)

0200 2 March 2004 600 board ft. Amalang Roda Turgo 1867608
wood

0201 1 March 2004 149 sliced lumber (assorted Necito Crisostomo 1708891
sizes)

0202 1 March 2004 80 bundles of rattan Manuel Buendicho 1708890

0203 23 Feb. 2004 30 pcs. sliced lumber Leonardo Aveno 1708863

(assorted sizes)

0204 13 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Federico Marquez 1708698
(assorted sizes)

0205 12 Feb. 2004 69 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Florencio Borreo 1708694
(assorted sizes)

0206 17 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Ronnie Astejada 1708774
(assorted sizes)

0207 04 Feb. 2004 600 board ft. sliced lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708486
(assorted sizes)

0208 1 March 2004 21 pcs. Lawaan (assorted Atan Marquez 1708878

sizes)

0209 4 Feb. 2004 563 board ft. sliced lumber Decembrano 1708487
(assorted sizes) Sabiduria

0210 06 Feb. 2004 80 pcs. Buukan (Ugat) Maila S. Orozco 1708547

0211 30 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708534
lumber (assorted sizes)

0212 29 Jan. 2004 950 board ft. good lumber Leonardo Moises 1708528
(assorted sizes)

0213 28 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708518
lumber (assorted sizes)

0214 28 Jan. 2004 5, 000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708521
lumber (assorted sizes)

0215 28 Jan. 2004 350 board ft. good lumber Amando Pradillada 1708368
(assorted sizes)
0216 23 Jan. 2004 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708517
(assorted sizes)

0217 21 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1708508
lumber (assorted sizes)

0218 06 April 2004 800 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1868025
(assorted sizes)

0219 11 March 300 pieces or 1, 200 board Ernesto Aumentado 1708975

2004 ft. sliced lumber (assorted
sizes)

0220 02 Feb. 2004 7,000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708376
lumber

0221 08 Jan. 2004 600 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1623451

0222 10 Dec. 2003 300 pieces good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1623096

0223 18 Nov. 2003 6,432 board ft. assorted Naty Orozco 1483048
species

0224 30 Oct. 2003 8,000 board ft. Malauban Ma. Teresa 1483019
Adornado

0225 21 Oct. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1482796
lumber (assorted sizes)

0226 21 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Malaruhat Leonardo S. Aveno 1323271
(assorted sizes)

0227 21 Oct. 2003 10,875 board ft. lumber Annie Gonzales 1323273
(assorted sizes)

0228 20 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. sliced lumber Bernardo Gonzalvo 1482835

0229 17 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft. lumber Naty Orozco 1482834

0230 17 Oct. 2003 16 pcs. panel door Roy Justo 1482743

(finished product)

0231 01 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. good lumber Analiza Vargas 1482710
(assorted sizes)

0232 01 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Malaruhat Engr. Mercado 1482760
(assorted sizes)

0233 30 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1482810
(assorted sizes)

0234 29 Sept. 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Wennie Acebuque 1482703
(assorted sizes)

0235 15 Sept. 2003 1,500 board ft. malaruhat Decembrano 1323076

lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria

0236 10 Sept. 2003 200 board ft. good lumber Junier Franquia 1323027
(assorted sizes)

0237 29 Aug. 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Annaliza Vargas 1322830

0238 07 Aug. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Abilardo dela Cruz 1247200
(assorted sizes)

0239 06 Aug. 2003 1,000 board ft. hardwood Jennifer Nudalo 1322802

0240 25 June 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Roy Justo 1247024
 0241 26 May 2003 800 board ft. lumber Adelino Lareza 3651096

0242 26 May 2003 Assorted sizes good lumber Rollie Velasco 3651587

0243 23 May 2003 342 sliced lumber (assorted Dolores S. Gloria 3651499
sizes)

0244 20 May 2003 500 board ft. lumber Marylyn de Loreto/ 3651574
Melita Masilang

0245 02 May 2003 123 pieces sliced lumber Armando Lariza 3651656
(assorted sizes)

0246 17 Feb. 2003 70 pieces sliced lumber Efren Tena/ Romeo 1182204
(assorted sizes) Serafines

0247 07 Feb. 2003 1 piece narra bed; 1 piece Roy D. Justo 1182060
narra panel door; 6 pcs.
Refrigerator stand & 1 pc.
Narra cabinet (finished
product)

0248 05 Dec. 2002 140 pcs. round poles Lamberto R. Ruzol 0943647

0249 20 Nov. 2002 500 board ft. lumber Luz Astoveza 0943618
(assorted sizes)

0250 30 Oct. 2002 1,200 board ft. sliced Arceli Fortunado 0830698
lumber (assorted sizes)

0251 04 Oct. 2002 500 board ft. Huling Roy Justo 0830646
Manok

0252 27 Sept. 2002 300 board ft. sliced lumber Roy Justo 0830625
(assorted sizes)

0253 24 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Inna L. 0830771

lumber (assorted sizes) Customerado

0254 23 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Normelita L. 0830610

lumber (assorted sizes) Curioso

0255 03 Sept. 2002 2,000 pcs. trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 686642

carvings) Espiritu

0256 7 March 2002 2,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090549

carvings) Espiritu

0257 03 Dec. 2001 10,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090769

carvings) Espiritu

0258 12 Sept. 2001 1,075 board ft of sticks & Lea A. Rivera 7786333
1,450 board ft. Bollilo
(assorted sizes)

0259 07 Oct. 2003 Assorted lumber Roy D. Justo 1482765

Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense with the
presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for decision based on the documentary evidence
and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and the prosecution
submitted their respective memoranda.6 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ruzol's Defense

As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on following arguments: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to
transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also those
powers that are necessarily implied from the powers expressly granted as well as those that are necessary,
appropriate or incidental to the LGU's efficient and effective governance. The LGU is likewise given powers
that are essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants. The general welfare clause
provided in Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of authority that
enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any power that will benefit their local constituencies.

(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of the DENR to
the LGU. And the permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control
communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers.

(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of Transport Fees levied by the
municipality for the use of local public roads for the transport of salvaged forest products. Under (a) Section
5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section
186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the municipality is granted the power to create
its own sources of revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.

(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or lumber is denominated "Certificate
of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber; hence, even if
accused issued the Transport Permits on his side, a person wanting to transport the said forest products
would have to apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR. The Transport Permits issued by the accused
were never taken as a substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said permits contain the
annotation "Subject to DENR rules, laws and regulations."

(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport Permits were issued by accused
Sabiduria in his capacity as Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to impute upon the
accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may have been committed in the issuance thereof
following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309).

(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221 Transport permits
through the Provincial Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly.

(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did not act "under the pretense of
official position," accused Ruzol having issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor and there was no
pretense or misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of DENR. 7 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting
Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby rendered finding him GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Two Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of Usurpation of Official Functions
as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for
each case a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.

However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule
as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M. SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221 charges.
The cash bond posted by him for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused upon
presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by this Court dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the
Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including the name of Sabiduria in the Hold
Departure List is ordered recalled and cancelled.

SO ORDERED.8 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits with
respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of General Nakar. 9 To the graft
court, Ruzol's issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.

The Issue

The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for usurpation revolves
around the validity of the subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of
whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with
the DENR, and no one else.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Subsidiary Issue: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid

In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the authority to issue
transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No. 705
(PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation to Executive
Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.

Section 5 of PD 705 provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have jurisdiction and authority
over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest reservations including watershed reservations presently
administered by other government agencies or instrumentalities.

It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration, and reforestation of
forest lands; the regulation and supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the
taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof; the implementation of multiple
use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection, development and preservation of
national parks, marine parks, game refuges and wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to
prevent kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in collaboration with other bureaus,
the effective, efficient and economic classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of
forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and regulations.

The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer and plywood mills and other
wood processing plants and conduct studies of domestic and world markets of forest products. (Emphasis
Ours.)

On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation
of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
 xxx

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following
functions:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

xxx

(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal lands, and mineral resources
and in the process of exercising such control the Department shall impose appropriate payments, fees,
charges, rentals and any such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such
resources.

xxx

(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forest, land and
mineral resources; cralawlibrary

(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, conservation, licensing and
regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation and monitoring
of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for the extraction, exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources products; the implementation of programs and measures with the end in
view of promoting close collaboration between the government and the private sector; the effective and
efficient classification and sub-classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of natural
resources laws, rules and regulations; cralawlibrary

(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-production, joint venture or production
sharing agreements, licenses, permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges and arrangement
concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's natural resources and shall continue
to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such privileges and
arrangement upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for all other causes
which are furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interests;

xxx

(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest products, grading and
inspection of lumber and other forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and other forest
products. (Emphasis Ours.)

Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates that the permittee
should secure the necessary transport and other related documents before the retrieved wood materials are
sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the entity or person
concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit a "permit issued by the DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose
abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops
and branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be allowed to gather or recover logs or timber
which had already been marked and inventoried by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that
DENR is the sole agency vested with the authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.

The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating salvaged forest products" is not
one of the DENR's functions which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 7160
(RA 7160) or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government
units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.

xxx

(2) For a Municipality: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

xxx

(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation
of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects;
management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers;
establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)

According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the DENR to the
LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of community-based forestry products; (2) management and
control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; and (3) establishment
of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development projects. 13 It also referred to DENR Administrative
Order No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions,
programs and projects of the DENR which had been devolved to the LGUs, as follows: 14 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 3.1 Forest Management

a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular appropriations, except at least one
project per province that shall serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by the DENR, and
those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds; cralawlibrary

ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in protected areas and
critical watersheds; cralawlibrary

iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation projects, subject to policies and
procedures prescribed by the DENR; cralawlibrary

iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of
1990 and other guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and

v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.

b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or
five thousand (5,000) hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned LGUs shall
endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry projects; cralawlibrary

c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which are sources of
local water supply as identified or to be identified by the DENR; and

d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small watershed areas and
communal forests, as defined in Section 2 above, such as but not limited to: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin; cralawlibrary

ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations; cralawlibrary

iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site; cralawlibrary

iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities; and

v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment and other implements used in the
commission of offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other forestry
laws, rules and regulations.

Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above mentioned,
shall remain with the DENR.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not included in
the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport permits remains
with the DENR15 and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.

We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be discussed shortly,
the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances
to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their
enactment have been faithfully complied with.

While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural
resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has
designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of the
law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or
in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In
fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus,
shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.

On the contrary, the claim of DENR's supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of
local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16
of the LGC of 1991, which provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the
municipality.17
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and
maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at enhancing
the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate measures in the proper
utility and conservation of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol's
memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this
objective that the subject permits to transport were issued by Ruzol to regulate the salvaged forest products
found within the municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward
illegal logging in the area.19 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest
products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by
DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall share with the
national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable management and
development of the environment and natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction." 20 The significant
role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC
1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest
Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 1. Basic Policies

Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative Order No.
30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU
partnership on devolved and other forest management functions: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable development
of the country's environment and natural resources.

1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and development of
the forest resources within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs shall
endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in forest management.

1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and efficient
management of forest resources. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other government
agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an integral activity of comprehensive land use planning
to determine the optimum and balanced use of natural resources to support local, regional and national
growth and development.

1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable management of
forest land resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in the
various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the
management of the devolved functions. As the LGUs' capacity in forest management is enhanced, the
primary tasks in the management of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the
DENR becomes assistive and coordinative.

1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall devolved [sic]
additional functions and responsibilities to the local government units, or enter into agreements with them
for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.

1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community empowerment, DENR and
DILG shall forge the partnership and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking and
strengthening the participation of local communities for forest management including enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)

To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of
usurpation of DENR's authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement DENR's
duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU's territorial jurisdiction.

This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in
an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that
both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government." 21 Hence, if there
appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or regulations issued by different
government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other, but
rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. 22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a
Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under
the general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to
comply with the procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.

Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport fees levied by the
municipality for the use of public roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been conferred by law the
right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGU's power to create its own sources of revenue
pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. Local government units may impose and collect such reasonable
fees and charges for services rendered.

xxx

Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. Local government units may exercise the power
to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed
under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided,
That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to
declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not
be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)

Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as Municipal
Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;

xxx

vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources
of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the municipality; and
protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis Ours.)

Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the
subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges
under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance
wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed. 24 Needless to say, one of the
fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources
expressly authorized by law or ordinance."25 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal mayor to
issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the
legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact ordinances against acts which
endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other natural resources. 26 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar's Revised Municipal Revenue
Code27 and Municipal Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the
permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the regulation and
transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.

Ruzol's insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU's devolved function to "manage and control
communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-30 29 is specious. Although We recognize the
LGU's authority in the management and control of communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We
reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters
established by law for its effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the
LGC, the LGU's authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to national policies
and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest" 30 has a well-defined and technical
meaning.31 Consequently, as an entity endowed with specialized competence and knowledge on forest
resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment of communal forest. The DILG, on behalf of
the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined the following procedure: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 8.4 Communal Forest

8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest

The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and municipal governments shall be
governed by the following general procedures: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake the actual identification and
assessment of existing communal forests. The assessment shall determine the suitability of the existing
communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then these communal forests may be disestablished. The
Approval for disestablishment shall be by the RED upon recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment
Team through the PENRO and the RTD for Forestry; cralawlibrary

(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still
suitable to achieve their purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is located shall pass resolution requesting the DENR
Secretary for the turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon receipt of said
resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially transferring said communal
forest to the concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the concerned LGU within
fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the administrative order; cralawlibrary

(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order and turnover of said communal
forest to the city or municipality, the LGU to which the communal forest was transferred shall formulate and
submit to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a management plan governing the sustainable
development of the communal forest.

For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR shall, in coordination with the
concerned LGU, undertake a forest resource inventory and determine the sustainable level of forest resource
utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest management planning to ensure
sustainable development. The management plan should include provision for replanting by the communities
and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.

8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest

The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following guidelines: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential
communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality.

(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest land use planning to be
undertaken jointly between the DENR and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall
indicate, among others, the site and location of the communal forests within the production forest
categorized as such in the forest land use plan; cralawlibrary

(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief executive shall initiate the passage by
the LGU's sanggunian of a resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative Order
declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The required administrative order shall be issued within
sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;
cralawlibrary

(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the city/municipal LGU shall formulate
the management plan and submit the same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall include provision
for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis
Ours.)

It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following requirements
must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within the geographic
jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate, among other
things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through a
resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR
Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.

In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied with.
Thus, in the absence of an established communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there was
no way that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the management and control of a
communal forest.

This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements for the issuance
of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. As
earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not substitute, the Wood
Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the regulation of salvaged forest
products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood
Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding permit to transport
issued by the LGU.

Main Issue: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and
penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent
himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government
or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to
any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)

As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime: first, by
knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do
so.32The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the crime of
usurpation of official functions.33
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits to
transport salvaged forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without being lawfully
entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant in the present case
because the authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the DENR. 35 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We rule otherwise.

First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and
that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution.36 As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the accused,
during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction will
leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)

Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his
life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence
requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the
innocence of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)

Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt and it
is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. 39 As explained by this Court in
People v. Berroya:40chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the State
is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with
unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public
officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking
contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These
inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction when there is a
reasonable doubt of guilt."

Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a
careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official functions of the DENR.

We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution's theory that the
DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest
products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the
DENR.

But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to
issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the
general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records,
the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by
the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal
mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of
any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of,
or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.

It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, 42 this Court enunciated that good faith is a defense
in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to
describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or
benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious." 44 Good faith is actually a question of
intention and although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one's self-serving
protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts. 45 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In dismissing Ruzol's claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject permits,
why did he have to secure the approval of the various NGOs, People's Organizations and religious
organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very well have issued subject permits even without
the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was legally empowered to do so
considering that the endorsement of these organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had to arm
himself with their endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he had no legal basis for issuing
the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and back-up. 46 (Emphasis Ours.)

We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor established doctrine to
draw a conclusion that good faith is negated when an accused sought another person's approval. Neither is
there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is present when one seeks the opinion or affirmation
of others.

Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public consultation
was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign supporting Ruzol's good intentions to regulate and monitor the
movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In fact,
the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzol's decision alone; it was, as
earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants who agreed that the subject
permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter's
authority as local chief executive.47
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol's good faith is negated by the fact that if he truly
believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence and
obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly. 48 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The graft court's above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol
willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution,
he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and credibility to publicly
object against Ruzol's allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-
Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol's claim of good faith.

As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the shoulders
of DENR alone each and every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant
role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but also a right for which a
citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation, environmental
degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share
in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.

Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal
mayor an act which was executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations,
industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, We consider his acts as
invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is
in consonance with the settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not
crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused." 49 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist," as
"there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting." 50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that
"criminal mind" when he issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as
municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within General Nakar in order
to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable for these
seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of
encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and conservation of our
natural resources.

Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further that this
case demands only the determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under
the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary, We hereby
resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice,
rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the
Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 192565 : February 28, 2012]

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-
Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and
Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63,
Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash
the information for perjury filed by Tomas. cralaw

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a
false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the
Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal
or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998.
The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by
falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did
not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly laid
since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and
not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not
alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving the
same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another
court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony
while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. [5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently
denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.[6]

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-
Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the
rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v. Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be
in the place where the false document was presented.

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos.
174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue
with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject
document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in
Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court of
Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself
which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false
certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al.,
based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned documents but
rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of Makati City.
[9]
(emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the
order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also
observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati
City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the
principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. [10]

The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for perjury
against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than
our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of
the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the
perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In his Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General
also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional
giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the
criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should
be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper
court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the
criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The
reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
[12]
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an
accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are
available.[13]

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which
has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from
its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where
the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a
statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a
sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required
to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent person
authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five
days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In
relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of
the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in
different fora.[14]

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the
allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping
was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth
elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were
also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have
been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay
City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. [17] (underscoring ours)

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is
the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant
to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements
constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay
City.

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the division
rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was
the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified
petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The
verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed
in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or
Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified
petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We
cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v. Caet[18] which ruled:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information
that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material
to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of
the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring
deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We
ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn
to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As
supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an
American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties
before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime
is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of how the
crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case
(Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the
Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a
material matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective
arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of
Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is
a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American
case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took
effect.[22]

The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation in
court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the
prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No.
1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 [23]for the
procedural aspect.

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in
which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare,
depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does
not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand
pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of
holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392[24] and 5393[25] of the Revised Statutes
of the United States.[26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit
punishable in our jurisdiction.[27]

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court of the
place where the crime was committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a false
document in a judicial proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the
false document was presented since the presentation was the act that consummated the crime.

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC [29] interestingly explains the
history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and
the present Code. To quote these authors:[30]

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional
Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly
repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of
the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury
Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under the
Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but
our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The
provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some
contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697
on perjury. [italics ours]

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a
criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on
any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved perjured
statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place
where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue
would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an actual
testimony made before the SEC.

In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an affidavit
that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the
affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no
distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making of
false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal,
civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits).
Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of
the court; it could not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the
offense charged in the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in
court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn
statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled
that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these
cities where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the
[Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue. [31] To the Court, whether
the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial,
the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement, [32] citing Caet as authority
for its statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very
categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that
Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false
testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the
RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling
would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such
distinction was made under Caet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any
distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that
portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion
refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was
taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time General
Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106
of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper
venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place.This change was
followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
[34]
and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal
Procedures expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place
where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza
B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the
RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by
Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and
venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law
so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the
RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or
her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the
crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted,
venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as
the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed. cralaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NOS. 163972-77 : March 28, 2008]

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-
24196,1 questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.

The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as follows:

Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts
of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively,
which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it
appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and
collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the
charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of
public document by a public officer or employee.

In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same
with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said
accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered
to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.

Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the
accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual. The
prosecution explained:

"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading
guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto
Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts."

Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said
accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because:

"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official
receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused
to the government has already been restituted x x x.3

The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioner's Motion to
Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent
reason was presented to justify its approval.5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated May 31,
2004.

This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea
bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed
his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount
involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.6

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a
lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.7

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118
of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference,8 viz:

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special
laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against
the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by
the court. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not
made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several
witnesses.9

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be
made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, 10 and that the plea
of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however
use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of
guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. 12

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed
entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,14 viz:

x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May
31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v.
Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo
explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:

x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could
rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the
lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The
reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser
offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less
bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.16

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the
prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of
the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties
they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the
economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and
corruption in government."17 chanrobles virtual law library

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However,
subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be
accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -

Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law,
through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent
and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts.18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in order to afford equal
justice to petitioner.

In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14, 2007,
approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie
"Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case
and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement,
the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement
complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that
the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the
plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to
Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is Plunder. 21

The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied
to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16, 2002,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:

In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total
amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February
26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.

There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the
accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.

With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading
guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto
Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality
of Bato, Leyte.22

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and
Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents
through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring
a third person.23

On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender committed any of
the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the falsification was
committed in a public or official or commercial document.24

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public
officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds
or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated,
taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking
by another person of such funds or property. 25 Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer
to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, "shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use." In this regard, it
has been ruled that once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a)
the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor;
and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered.27

Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other, to wit:

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. 28

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable
for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty
to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner
took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of
Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the
Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless,
absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account was in violation of a law or
regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the
lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty
as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government funds, 29 not to
mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case.
Unlike Estrada which involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in comparison.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a discriminatory
dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004
are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let
records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 143591 : November 23, 2007]

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P.
SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN YU LIM,
JR.,Petitioners, v. MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo
Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric Lee and Ben T. Lim, Jr.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agent's compensation and expenses,
damages, and attorney's fees,2 against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 754. Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency 3 allegedly entered into
with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder
and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank's property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.
Attached to the motion were the following documents: 1) a letter 5 dated December 19, 1994 signed by
Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the
subject property; 2) an unsigned letter6 dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn
G. Ong; 3) a letter7 dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G.
Ong; and 4) a Memorandum8 dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were
presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban
Bank or by the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, respondent Pea filed his Complaint-
Affidavit9 with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. 10 He claimed that said documents were falsified
because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither
stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.11 Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence
before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.

In a Resolution12 dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were
probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the
documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of
the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories
were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they
were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and
later, in their Pre-Trial Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding Informations14 were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685,
and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants15 for the arrest of the petitioners.

On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation.16 Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of
the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed
that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such
counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied
on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in
contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable
cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have been suspended on the ground that the
issue being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.

In an Order17 dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that
preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case - - - which fell within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in
accordance with the Rules. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the
warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was
not a prejudicial question, and thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly,
the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.

Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating
the arguments in their omnibus motion.18 They, likewise, questioned the court's conclusion that by posting
bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant of arrest.

On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition.19 Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorariunder
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners now raise before us the following issues:

A.

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an
Information in court? cra lawlibrary

If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not the investigating
prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-
affidavit?

B.

Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge of the
complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?

C.

Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show
the existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the
criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the
judge in determining the existence of probable cause?

D.

Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?

E.

Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause? 20

On August 2, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 21 enjoining the judge of the
MTCC from proceeding in any manner with Criminal Cases Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire
period that the case is pending before, or until further orders of, this Court.

With the MTCC proceedings suspended, we now proceed to resolve the issues raised.

Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot and academic when the petitioners posted
bail and were arraigned.

We do not agree.
It appears that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they
wanted to avoid embarrassment being then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners' refusal to enter a plea, the court entered a plea of "Not Guilty."

The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the validity of
the arrest has already been superseded by Section 26,22 Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his
arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto.23

Records reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash the information and warrant of arrest, and
for reinvestigation, on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a
stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. 24On the date of the
arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, obviously because the issue of the legality of the
information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the Court. This notwithstanding, the court entered a
plea of "Not Guilty." From these circumstances, we cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of the
petitioners, as to preclude them from raising the issue of the validity of the arrest before the CA and
eventually before this Court.

In their petition filed before this Court, petitioners prayed for a TRO to restrain the MTCC from proceeding
with the criminal cases (which the Court eventually issued on August 2, 2000). Thus, we confront the
question of whether a criminal prosecution can be restrained, to which we answer in the affirmative.

As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or
restrain criminal prosecution. However, the following exceptions to the rule have been recognized: 1) when
the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) when
it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3)
when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; 5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6) when
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a
case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance; and 10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.25

Considering that the issues for resolution involve the validity of the information and warrant of arrest, and
considering further that no waiver of rights may be attributed to the petitioners as earlier discussed, we
issued a TRO on August 2, 2000 to give the Court the opportunity to resolve the case before the criminal
prosecution is allowed to continue. The nature of the crime and the penalty involved (which is less than 4
years of imprisonment), likewise, necessitate the suspension of the case below in order to prevent the
controversy from being mooted.

We now proceed with the main issues, viz.: 1) whether petitioners were deprived of their right to due
process of law because of the denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-
affidavit; 2) whether the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their
arrest were properly issued; and 3) whether this Court can, itself, determine probable cause.

As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly claim the right to preliminary investigation. Still,
petitioners insist that they were denied due process because they were not afforded the right to submit
counter-affidavits which would have aided the court in determining the existence of probable
cause.26 Petitioners also claim that the respondent's complaint-affidavit was not based on the latter's
personal knowledge; hence, it should not have been used by the court as basis in its finding of probable
cause.27 Moreover, petitioners aver that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime.
Specifically, it was not established that the documents in question were falsified; that petitioners were the
ones who presented the documents as evidence; and that petitioners knew that the documents were indeed
falsified.28 Petitioners likewise assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint-affidavit, they had not yet
formally offered the documents as evidence; hence, they could not have "introduced" the same in
court.29 Considering the foregoing, petitioners pray that this Court, itself, determine whether or not probable
cause exists.30
The pertinent provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 31 namely, Sections 1, 3 (a) and 9(a) of
Rule 112, are relevant to the resolution of the aforesaid issues:

SECTION 1. Definition. - Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.32

SEC. 3. Procedure. - Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. 33

SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure.'

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. - If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the
procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action
based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. 34

Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 35 of
the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months. Clearly, the case is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary investigation is not
mandatory.36

Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the complaint-affidavit of the respondent and did not
require the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should not be faulted for taking this
course of action, because it is sanctioned by the Rules. To reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and
affidavit with respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the appropriate action
based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means that the
prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or
file the information if he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of
counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and
supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge must personally determine the
existence of probable cause. Again, the petitioners insist that the trial judge erred in issuing the warrant of
arrest without affording them their right to submit their counter-affidavits.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.37

In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest in the case at bench, we find nothing
wrong with the procedure adopted by the trial judge - - - he relied on the resolution of the prosecutor, as
well as the supporting documents submitted by the respondent. There is no provision of law or procedural
rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge can determine whether
or not there exists probable cause to issue the warrant.

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the prosecutor in determining
probable cause for the filing of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining probable cause
for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. To reiterate, preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and
the submission of counter-affidavit was not necessary. rbl r l l lbrr

However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the procedure laid down by the Rules, a closer scrutiny
of the records reveals that the Informations should not have been filed and the warrants of arrest should not
have been issued, because of lack of probable cause.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.38 It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he is to be prosecuted.39 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. 40

On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the existence
of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 41

To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a
rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be
swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor's findings in such investigations. 42 In the same way, the
general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 43 It is only in exceptional cases
when this Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of
probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect
the orderly administration of justice.44 The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the
exception.

Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the RPC or Introduction of Falsified
Document in a Judicial Proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:

1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.

2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions No. 1 or 2 of Article 172.

3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding. 45

The falsity of the document and the defendant's knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the
offense.46

The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the complaint-
affidavit of the respondent, together with the following attached documents: the motion to dismiss and
answer filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754; petitioners' pre-trial brief in said case; the alleged
falsified documents; a copy of the minutes of the regular meeting of ISC during the election of the board;
and the list of stockholders of ISC.47 On the basis of these documents and on the strength of the affidavit
executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and
documents were used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.

Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find the complaint-affidavit
and attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. Specifically, the respondent failed
to sufficiently establish prima facie that the alleged documents were falsified. In support of his claim of
falsity of the documents, the private respondent stated in his complaint-affidavit that Herman Ponce, Julie
Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix their
signatures; and that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI. 48 He further claimed that
Enrique Montilla's signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to respondent was
forged.49 These are mere assertions, insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or the issuance of the
warrant of arrest.

It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within
their (affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures of Ponce, Abad,
Ong and Montilla were falsified does not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did
respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim
that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion that the
signatories were mere dummies of ISCI and they were not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of
the corporation. At the very least, the affidavit was based on respondent's "personal belief" and not
"personal knowledge."50 Considering the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the respondent, he could
have submitted the affidavit of other persons who are qualified to attest to the falsity of the signatures
appearing in the questioned documents. One cannot just claim that a certain document is falsified without
further stating the basis for such claim, i.e., that he was present at the time of the execution of the
document or he is familiar with the signatures in question. Otherwise, this could lead to abuse and malicious
prosecution. This is actually the reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant. The requirement assumes added importance in the instant case where the accused
were not made to rebut the complainant's allegation through counter-affidavits.

Neither can the respondent find support in the documents attached to his complaint-affidavit. The minutes
of the regular meeting, as well as the list of stockholders, could have possibly shown that the signatories
were not officers or stockholders of the corporation. However, they did not at all show that the questioned
documents were falsified. In the letter allegedly signed by Ponce and Abad, there was no representation that
they were the president and corporate secretary of ISCI. Besides, the mere fact that they were not officers
or stockholders of ISCI does not necessarily mean that their signatures were falsified. They still could have
affixed their signatures as authorized representatives of the corporation.

True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless,
although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it
should at least be more than mere suspicion.51 While probable cause should be determined in a summary
manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential
accused's constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State
from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from
false, fraudulent or groundless charges.52 It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the
accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. 53

Considering that the respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim that the documents
were falsified, it follows that the introduction of the questioned documents in Civil Case No. 754 is not an
offense punished by any provision of the Revised Penal Code or any other law. The petitioners should not be
burdened with court proceedings, more particularly a criminal proceeding, if in the first place, there is no
evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense was committed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 20, 2000, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 49666 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated August 2, 2000 is
hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, is ORDERED to
DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683-86.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, G.R. No. 143591

JR.,CORAZON M. BEJASA,
ARTURO E.
MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. Present:
SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE
LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR.,
and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners, BRION, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
PEREZ, and
- versus - MENDOZA, JJ.**

MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON.

MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as
Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Bago City, Promulgated:
Respondents.
May 5, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in
its Decision[1] dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is correct when
it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan,
Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H.
Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and recall of the warrants of
arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case for recovery
of agents compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees [2] against Urban
Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as
Civil Case No. 754. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract
of Agency[3] allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former
undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from
unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] arguing that they
never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were
the following documents: 1) a Letter [5] dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original
owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter [6] dated 7 December 1994
addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a Letter [7] dated 9 December
1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a
Memorandum[8] dated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said
documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed
as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Pea filed his
Complaint-Affidavit[9] with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.[10] He
claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not
actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor
officers and employees of ISCI.[11] Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as
evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.

In a Resolution[12] dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable

cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of
Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents
were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the
principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified
considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents
formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by
petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, and then adopted in
their answer and in their Pre-Trial Brief.[13] Subsequently, the corresponding
Informations[14] were filed with the MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo
Blanca issued the warrants[15] for the arrest of the petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall
Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation.[16] Petitioners insisted that they were
denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they
claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then
they argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were
submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit
and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in
contravention with the Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the
information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the
accused, i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a director of Urban Bank, contrary to what
complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal cases should have
been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case is a
prejudicial question.
In an Order[17] dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus
motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in
the instant case which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court,
likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no
longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court
also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question,
and, thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the
court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts necessary to
constitute an offense.

Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and

Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in
issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their
omnibus motion.[18] They, likewise, questioned the courts conclusion that by
posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the
warrants of arrest.

On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. [19] Thus, petitioners
filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, raising the following issues:

A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the
finding of probable cause required for the filing of an Information in court?

If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable

cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the
very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?

B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the
personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of
probable cause?

C.
Where there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure,
and the record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of
probable cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and
dismiss the criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his
counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of probable
cause?

D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?

E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?
[20]

On the other hand, respondent contends that the issues raised by the
petitioners had already become moot and academic when the latter posted bail and
were already arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a TRO [21] enjoining the judge of the
MTCC from proceeding in any manner with Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686,
effective during the entire period that the case is pending before, or until further
orders of, this Court.

We will first discuss the issue of mootness.

The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that
they had posted bail and were already arraigned.

It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being
then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite
the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not Guilty
for them.

The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a
waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already
been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal
Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea
and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.[22]

As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:[23]

It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this
Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the
legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this
Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was
designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules
governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence
retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate
retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at
the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time
of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behoved
the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners petition
for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her

personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the
finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by
 the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner
had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable
cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should
be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible. x x x.

Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of

Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail
bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their
right to question the validity of their arrest.[24] On the date of their arraignment,
petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of
their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a
plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude
them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of
bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should
not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which
we have returned in People v. Red[25] stated:

x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the
Island and Province of Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque.
In view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may properly be held
that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in
detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary
examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this
right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they
furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929,
praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of the summary examination; the first motion
being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the second
remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.

Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted
to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.

The rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which are:
(1) the procedural aspect, i.e., whether the prosecution and the court a quo properly
observed the required procedure in the instant case, and, (2) the substantive aspect,
which is whether there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT:

Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to
submit their counter-affidavits and were not accorded the right to a preliminary
investigation. Considering that the complaint of Atty. Pea was filed in September
1998, the rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the issue
are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.

Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7

hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent
and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any
fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary
public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.

Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of

the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed

directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure
outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and
other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.
(underscoring supplied)

The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized
under second paragraph of Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.
 Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of
not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated
in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of
exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding
or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall
use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of
the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next
lower in degree.

Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to

imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day. [26] The next lower in degree
to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period which translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months[27] of imprisonment. Since the crime committed is not covered
by the Rules of Summary Procedure,[28] the case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the ordinary rules. In such
instance, preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section covers only
crimes cognizable by the RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the
applicable rule.

Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an
information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In the
determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint,
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does
not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he
finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a
resolution and file the corresponding information.

The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:

 COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT

I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay,

Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after having been sworn in accordance with law
hereby depose and state:

1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City entitled Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea v. Urban Bank, et
al Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro
Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee,
Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)

2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank,

Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the bank) in ridding a certain parcel of land in Pasay
City of squatters and intruders. A certified true copy of the Complaint in the said
case is hereto attached as Annex A.

3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true

copy of which is attached as Annex B), Answer dated 28 October 1996 (Annex
C), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex D) filed by the bank and
the respondent members of the board, the said respondents used as evidence the
following documents:

a. Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly signed by a certain Herman

Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISC) (a copy of which is
attached as Annex E), which states:

December 19, 1994

Urban Bank
Urban Avenue, Makati
Metro Manila

Gentlemen:

This has reference to your property located among Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City
which you purchased from Isabela Sugar Company under a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed on December 1, 1994.

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking
to deliver to you the full and actual possession and control of said property, free
from tenants, occupants or squatters and from any obstruction or impediment to
the free use and occupancy of the property and to prevent the former tenants or
occupants from entering or returning to the premises. In view of the transfer of
ownership of the property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary for Urban Bank to
 appoint Atty. Pea likewise as its authorized representative for purposes of
holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property and to represent
Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the abovementioned
purposes.

It is understood that any attorneys fees, cost of litigation and any other charges or
expenses that may be incurred relative to the exercise by Atty. Pea of his
abovementioned duties shall be for the account of Isabela Sugar Company and
any loss or damage that may be incurred to third parties shall be answerable by
Isabela Sugar Company.

Very truly yours,

Isabela Sugar Company

By:

HERMAN PONCE

JULIE ABAD

b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a certain

Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto attached as annex F,
which states:

December 7, 1994

To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA

From: MARILYN G. ONG

RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.

Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea, who has been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc.
to take charge of inspecting the tenants would like to request an authority similar
to this from the Bank to new owners. Can you please issue something like this
today as he (unreadable) this.

b. Letter dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same

Marilyn Ong, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex G, which states:

December 9, 1994

Atty. Ted Borlongan

URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA

Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan

Dear Mr. Borlongan

I would like to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached
immediately as the tenants are questioning authority of the people who are
helping us to take possession of the property.

Marilyn Ong

c. Memorandum dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as

annex H, which states:

MEMORANDUM
To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Pea
Director

From: Enrique C. Montilla III

President

Date: 20 November 1994

You are hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the
corporation situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT No. 5382 of the
Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, immediately upon the expiration of the contract
of lease over the said property on 29 November 1994. For this purpose, you are
authorized to engage the services of security guards to protect the property against
intruders. You may also engage the services of a lawyer in case there is a need to
go to court to protect the said property of the corporation. In addition, you may
take whatever steps or measures are necessary to ensure our continued possession
of the property.

ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III

President

4. The respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced the
aforestated documents as evidence in the civil case knowing that the same are
falsified. They used thae said documents to justify their refusal to pay my
agents fees, to my damage and prejudice.
 5. The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex E) is a falsified document, in that the
person who supposedly executed the letter on behalf of ISC, a certain Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad did not actually affix their signatures on the document.
The execution of the letter was merely simulated by making it appear that
Ponce and Abad executed the letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in fact
do so.

6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever
stockholders, officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In the letter,
Herman Ponce was represented to be the President of ISC and Julie Abad, the
Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19 December 1994, the real President of
plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla was the Corporate
Secretary. A copy of the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year
1994, during which Montilla, et al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex I.
On the otherhand, a list of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of the
transaction is attached as Annex J.

7. The same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7 December
1994 and athe letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly written by a ceratin
Marilyn Ong. Nobody by the said name was ever a stockholder of ISC.

8. Lastly, with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique

Montilla, III his signature thereon was merely forged by respondents. Enrique
Montilla III, did not affix his signature on any such document.

9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Teodoro C.

Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C. Gonzales Jr.,
Benjamin L. De Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the crime of use
of falsified documents under Artilce 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code.(underlining ours)

10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may serve.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEA

It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent

merely introduced and identified the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro
Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee,
Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr. However, in the accusatory
portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not
included among those charged with the crime of use of falsified documents under
Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that
respondent did not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was
acknowledged to be a member of the board. And there was no explanation in the
Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was
included. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the complaint and the
specific averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was never mentioned.

The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to

determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to have been brought to
the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a
big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not commit.

Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may properly
fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It should be realized,
however, that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its
wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it
behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to
determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information in
court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.[29]

Atty. Pea, in his Second Manifestation[30] dated 16 June 1999, averred that
petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., were already estopped from raising the fact
that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a member of the board of directors of Urban Bank, as
the latter participated and appeared through counsel in Civil Case No. 754 without
raising any opposition. However, this does not detract from the fact that the City
Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not carefully scrutinize the complaint of
Atty. Pea, which did not charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.

What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for
the arrest of the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the
Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation
raising among others the issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of the
board of directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert that an
innocent person may have been included in the complaint. In the Order[31] dated 13
November 1998, in denying the motion to quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled
that:
 Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those
alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the information
because said motion is hypothethical admission of the facts alleged in the
information x x x. (citations omitted.)

We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since it

was at the expense of liberty. This cannot be condoned.

In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the
judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause:

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

(a) x x x.

(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. If the
complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal
Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this
Rule shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest after personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that [n]o x x x warrant of arrest

shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized.
[32]
Interpreting the words personal determination, we said in Soliven v.
Makasiar[33] that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require
thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and
investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to
the existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly
the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much
more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the
report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other
documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the extent of the
judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be
sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond
it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. [34] He
should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's
probing questions when the circumstances warrant.[35]

An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person,

and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.[36]

Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was
here a clear abdication of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge
blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the
petitioners. The careless inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest
gives flesh to the bone of contention of petitioners that the instant case is a matter
of persecution rather than prosecution.[37]On this ground, this Court may enjoin the
criminal cases against petitioners. As a general rule, criminal prosecutions cannot
be enjoined. However, there are recognized exceptions which, as summarized
in Brocka v. Enrile,[38] are:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;[39]

 b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;[40]

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;[41]

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;[42]

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;[43]

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;[44]

g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;[45]

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;[46]

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
[47]
and

j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.[48]

THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT:

Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code or Introduction of Falsified Document in a judicial proceeding. The elements
of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions
Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.
[49]

The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are
essential elements of the offense. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the
Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of
respondent Atty. Pea, attached to which were the documents contained in the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also included as
attachments to the complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the alleged
falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during the election of the
Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders. [50] Based on these documents
and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City Prosecutor concluded that
probable cause for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the strength of the
same documents, the trial court issued the warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the
existence of probable cause.

Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or
any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and
circumstances without restoring to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would
justify conviction.[51]

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[52] the task of the presiding judge when

the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause
for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged
with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.[53]

We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by

respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Pea
stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of
the questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures therein; and that they
were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI. [54] He further claimed that
Enrique Montillas signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to
respondent was forged.[55] These averments are mere assertions which are
insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of warrants
of arrest. These averments cannot be considered as proceeding from the personal
knowledge of herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was present
at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither was there any mention in the
complaint-affidavit that herein respondent was familiar with the signatures of the
mentioned signatories to be able to conclude that they were forged. What Atty. Pea
actually stated were but sweeping assertions that the signatories are mere dummies
of ISCI and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the
corporation. Again, there is no indication that the assertion was based on the
personal knowledge of the affiant.
 The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal
knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence. A witness, therefore, may not
testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or
heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned.[56] Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony
or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written,
as well as oral statements.[57]

The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied

considering that herein petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut the
complainants allegation through counter-affidavits.

Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad, neither of the two made the representation that they were the
president or secretary of ISCI. It was only Atty. Pea who asserted that the two
made such representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a stockholder of
ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer book of ISCI. And, there was
neither allegation nor proof that Marilyn Ong was not connected to ISCI in any
other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn Ong was not a stockholder of ISCI, such
would not prove that the documents she signed were falsified.

The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise
of the public prosecutors function without any showing of grave abuse of
discretion or manifest error in his findings. [58] Considering, however, that the
prosecution and the court a quo committed manifest errors in their findings of
probable cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.

Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez[59] as reiterated in Baltazar v. People is

apropos:

It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the
accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations
and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts
before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons. The judge or
 fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating
that the judiciary lives up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the findings of the prosecutor as well as the court a quo as to the existence of
probable cause.The criminal complaint against the petitioners should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2
August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City, is
hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142011. March 14, 2003.]

ALFONSO C. CHOA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Alfonso Chan Choa, Petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25, 1989, he filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City, a verified petition for naturalization, 1 docketed as Special Proceeding No.
5395.

During the initial hearing of the case on August 27, 1990, petitioner testified on direct examination but he
was not able to finish the same. On August 29, 1990, he filed a motion to withdraw his petition for
naturalization. 2 The trial court granted the motion in its Resolution dated September 28, 1990, 3 which
partly reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, has not yet finished testifying on direct-examination. Although the
petitioner has not stated in his said Motion To Withdraw Petition the reason why he is withdrawing his
petition at this stage of the proceedings, the petitioner can not be compelled to continue with his petition for
naturalization.

"In view thereof, the petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, is allowed to withdraw his petition for naturalization. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library

Meanwhile, on August 5, 1992, State Prosecutor Pedro D. Delfin on detail at Bacolod City, acting upon the
complaint of petitioners wife, Leni, filed an Information 4 with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 3, Bacolod City, charging petitioner with perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322. The Information reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
made untruthful statements or falsehoods upon material matters required by the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. No. 473) in his verified Petition for Naturalization dated April 13, 1989 (sic), 5 subscribed and sworn
to before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer oath, which petition bears Doc.
No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by
stating therein the following, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

5.) I am married to a Filipino. My wifes name is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street,
Bacolod City. I have two (2) children whose names, dates and places of birth, and residence are as follows:
virtual 1aw library
chanrob1es

Name Date of Birth Place of Birth Residence

ALBRYAN July 19, 1981 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA Bacolod City

CHERYL May 5, 1983 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,

LYNNE ONG Bacolod City

CHOA

x x x

10) I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have
conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the
Philippines in my relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which I am
living.

x x x

when in truth and in fact, said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2) children
were not then residing at said address at # 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having
left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and were then residing at
Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City; that contrary to his aforesaid allegation in his verified Petition for
Naturalization, Accused, while residing at 211 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City,
has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not
his wife since 1984, and begetting two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his wife,
the private offended party herein, have long been separated from bed and board since 1984; which
falsehoods and/or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualification to become a
citizen of the Philippines.

"Act contrary to law." cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision 6 dated February 21, 1995 finding petitioner guilty of
perjury, as charged, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense which he is presently charged, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that may be considered, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional and to pay the costs." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration, 7 contending, among others, that there is no basis to
convict him of perjury because almost two years prior to the filing of the Information, his motion to
withdraw the petition for naturalization containing the alleged false statements was granted by the
MTCC, hence, the alleged false statements were no longer existing or had become functus officio.
The MTCC, in its Order 8 dated March 31, 1995, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in a Decision dated September
12, 1996, affirmed the MTCC judgment. 9

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
19968. In his comment, the Solicitor General recommended the acquittal of petitioner, contending
that the withdrawal of his petition for naturalization rendered the same functus officio, thus making
the questioned false statements inexistent.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 8, 1999, 10 affirmed the RTC Decision with
modification, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court to be in accordance with law
and evidence, we AFFIRM the same with the modification that petitioner-accused-appellant Alfonso
Choa is sentenced to suffer imprisonment, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law without
any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, for a period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional.

"SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library

In convicting petitioner, the Appellate Court adopted as its own the RTCs findings as follows: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Evidence presented clearly proved that all the above-enumerated elements (of perjury) have been
duly executed by the accused. His allegations in his petition regarding his, his wifes and childrens
residences and his positive averment of the fact that he is of good moral character and had
conducted himself in an irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines are material
matters in connection with his petition for naturalization as they are essential facts required by Sec.
7 of C.A. No. 473 for one to fulfill for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. They are the very facts
which would be the subject of inquiry by the court hearing the petition and the same would be the
basis of the courts ruling whether one is qualified and granted Philippine citizenship.

"Paragraph 2 of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the statement or affidavit is to be
made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath. The information shows
that the statement was duly subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., a
person competent and authorized by law to receive and administer oath and the same was entered
in his notary register as Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1989.

"That the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood could be gleaned from the
discrepancies in his given addresses. In his petition for naturalization he gave No. 46 Malaspina
Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City as his and his wifes residence, while in the birth certificates and
the affidavit of admission of paternity of both Fonsella Kae Saludar and Steve Albert Saludar, he
gave No. 211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City as his address besides from the
fact that while may have been residing in the above-stated addresses, his wife and children have
been staying at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City since the latter part of 1984. Furthermore,
cohabiting openly with another woman not his wife and siring (2) children with the same, in open
defiance with the norm of morality of the community where monogamy is the accepted practice, is
very, inconsistent with his allegations of a moral life, proper and irreproachable, considering that
the accused, by his own admission is a graduate of the University of St. La Salle, a school known for
its high academic and moral standards. These assertions are not only willful and deliberate but a
perversion of truth which the law is mandated to punish.

"Section 7 of C.A. 473 provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent Court, a petition
in triplicate, accompanied by two (2) photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and
surname; his present and former residence, his occupation; the place and date of his birth, whether
single or married, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and each of the
children. . . . . . .. (Emphasis supplied)

"The above-cited provisions are the pertinent law which specifically requires any person desiring to
acquire Philippine citizenship to accomplish, thus complying with the fourth element of the crime of
perjury. (pp. 119120, Original Records, Vol. II)" 11

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated February 22, 2000. 12

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. 13

Both the petitioner and the Solicitor General in their respective pleadings contend that the
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because: (a) not all the elements of
the crime of perjury are present; and (b) the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization which
contains the alleged untruthful statements bars the prosecution of petitioner for perjury.

Thus, the issue here is whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false
statements he stated in his petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior to the filing
of the Information for perjury.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner has been charged and convicted,
provides:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires.

"Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein." cralaw virtua1aw library

The elements of perjury are: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;

2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and
administer oath;

3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood;
and

4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose. 14

All these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully and deliberately alleged false
statements concerning his "residence" and "moral character" in his petition for naturalization. This
was sufficiently proven by the prosecution, as succinctly noted by the Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision.

The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by petitioner before Notary Public
Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and authorized by law to receive and administer oath.
Also, petitioner started testifying under oath on his false allegations before the trial court.

The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral character" are material matters
because they are among the very facts in issue or the main facts which are the subject of inquiry 15
and are the bases for the determination of petitioners qualifications and fitness as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. Thus, C.A. No. 473 provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
 x x x

"Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living;

x x x

"SEC. 7. Petition for citizenship. Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the
competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner; setting forth his
name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his
birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the
wife and of the children; . . .; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the
same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; . . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the "residence" and "moral character" in the
petition for naturalization has been underscored by this Court in Chua Kian Lai v. Republic, 16 thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner must be of good moral character. That
circumstance should be specifically alleged in the petition.

x x x

"The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his petition his present and former places of
residence (Sec. 7, Com. Act No. 473). That requirement is designed to facilitate the verification of
petitioners activities which have a bearing on his petition for naturalization, especially so as to his
qualifications and moral character, either by private individuals or by investigative agencies of the
government, by pointing to them the localities or places wherein appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng
Giok v. Republic, 112 Phil. 896). Moreover, the suppression of that information might constitute falsehood
which signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character and is not, therefore, qualified to be admitted
as a citizen of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)

Fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner instead declared
falsely in his verified petition for naturalization that "he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification under C.A. No. 473." 17 Clearly, he willfully asserted falsehood under oath on material
matters required by law.

We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor General that petitioner could no
longer be prosecuted for perjury in view of the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his
false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is
alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a prosecution for the said crime is commenced.
18 At the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the
elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that he wilfully stated material falsities
in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating any reason therefor. 19
But such withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability
for perjury he already committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from
prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the Philippine naturalization law but the
judicial proceedings as well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as
evidence of his unlawful act.

Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a pleading, the allegations therein are
absolutely privileged and cannot be used for any criminal prosecution against him, citing Sison v. David, 20
People v. Aquino 21 and Flordelis v. Himalaloan. 22

The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically
stressed that the term "absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical meaning,
in connection with civil actions for libel and slander." The purpose of the privilege is to ensure that
"members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely
and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for
the recovery of damages. It is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice." 23
Certainly, in the present case, petitioner cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication
rule since the false statements he made in his petition for naturalization has instead made a mockery of the
administration of justice. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for having alleged false
statements in his verified answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because
"an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent
that one element of the crime of perjury is absent . . ., namely, that the sworn statement complained of
must be required by law." 24

Anent the alleged violation of petitioners constitutional right to equal protection, suffice it to state that such
right cannot be invoked to protect his criminal act.

In People v. Cainglet, 25 this Court emphatically stressed that "every interest of public policy demands that
perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the
administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments be fair and free
from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they
do not."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The appealed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. NOS. 164368-69 : April 2, 2009]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE
SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 to seek the reversal of
the Sandiganbayan's Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada's
(Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.2

THE FACTS

On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of
alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in
Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in
order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE
President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS 'JOSE VELARDE' IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias
"Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information,
this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565.

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.

On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and
decide the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent
Estrada.3

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the
Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The People's evidence for the illegal alias charge,
as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo
(Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada
opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the
account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando
Chua were present on that occasion;

B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby
Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings
Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by
deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):

A. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")

b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL")

c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")

d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")

e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")

f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ")

g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")

h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS")

i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")

j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")

k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")

l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the
Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and when
deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted
into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003.4 The accused separately moved to reconsider the
Sandiganbayan Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to
the motions.6 The Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003. 7

After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in
these cases.8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense
leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).

Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. 10 His demurrer to
evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds 11 :

1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa
Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use
the name "Jose Velarde";

2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be
gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;

3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are
banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper
procedures; and cralawlibrary

4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the following
arguments:12

1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of
no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited.
Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302;

2. Movant's reliance on Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;

3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and the habitual use
thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict movant for
illegal use of alias; and cralawlibrary

4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder.

Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.

THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN'S RULING

The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient points of
the assailed resolution are:

First - the coverage of Estrada's indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for
the indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information - i.e., the testimonies and
documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out
that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 February 2000" and "sometime prior or
subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually
taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecution's
procedural tool to guard against any variance between the date stated in the Information and that proved
during the trial in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean
and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or events separate and distinct from
those that took place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from interpreting the
Information any other way.

Second - the People's failure to present evidence that proved Estrada's commission of the offense. The
Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished
under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the
context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada's case, the Sandiganbayan
noted, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the
nature of the transaction involved - the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust
account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended, 14 and prior to the enactment of Republic
R.A. No. 9160.15

Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":

A. Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000
is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were the
act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did - represent himself as 'Jose
Velarde' in several transactions," standing alone, violates Estrada's right to be informed of the nature and
the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by
the succeeding phrase - "and use and employ the said alias 'Jose Velarde' " - which "is neither his registered
name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities." Thus, Estrada's representations before persons other than those mentioned in the Information are
immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities"
specified in the Information. Estrada's representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore covered
by the indictment.

b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel that mere communication to
a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is
defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the
accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed
strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel,
even if it applies, considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged communication rule
to be non-actionable. Estrada's use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged
communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:

Movant's act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the witnessing
thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be considered as
'public' as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the
transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by this name in addition to his real name.
Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs:

Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name
from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde"
is shown by the nature of a numbered account - a perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust
Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further
ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity - the obligation R.A. No. 6713
imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and liabilities. 16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and
R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of
his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account
(such as the name he used to open it).

Third - the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition
in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other
similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that
allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 - another confirmation that the
opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be
harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute
should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the
Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use of an
alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before
bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of
CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.

THE PETITION

The People filed this petition raising the following issues:

1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and
in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was not public despite the
presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000;

2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and
in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable under
banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142;

3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and
in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No.
142;

4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and
Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;

5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph Estrada on
February 4, 2000;

6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier final finding
on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall
use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil
registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered
in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry
and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their
names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure
such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal
and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien,
and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or
reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien
immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or
names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.

How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias - "a name or names used by a
person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to
his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth - [for the use of alias to] fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended." 18

Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as
follows:

The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade.
Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not
be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand
and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 19

Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under
CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the
application of and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.

Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from
Estrada's position in the government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the President of
the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient to
justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the Republic, on the
other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction,
expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact
allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was
already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen name of
the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on
the People's claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a
penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 21 The mode of
violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be.

The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6, 2002)
denying Estrada's motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the
application of Ursua under the following tenor:

The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit
of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily
relies in his motion to quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster Third New
International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that another name
has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, the
amended information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the
accused.

The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua case where
another name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he
intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to his real name. 22
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding
this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability - a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The
People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it
resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.

We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere
interlocutory order - a ruling denying a motion to quash 23 - that cannot be given the attributes of finality and
immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or
particular matters in, a case.24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its
effects would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake
substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest. 25 It is basic remedial law that an
interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit a civil case,
instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says Perez:

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res
judicatacannot be applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question
was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an
interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case,
the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners
and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the
main issue of whether or not private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease
entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the
restraining order was lifted.28

Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the
Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This
is far different from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the
prosecution's case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to
prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a
different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and the
change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is
strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua.

In an exercise of caution given Ursua's jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its petition
that Estrada's case is different from Ursua's for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and
intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estrada's
use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde"
was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law
and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than
satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that
Estrada's use of the alias was public.

In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties' expressed positions, we shall now examine within
the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The
prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied
the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.

What is the coverage of the indictment?

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage
of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on
February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction - one that took place on February 4, 2000 -
but there were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information
specifically referred to "several transactions" - "with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To
the People, the restrictive finding - that the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the
phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" - drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the
constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the documents
signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship between the allegations of the
multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto,"
on the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" into a
useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted escape route.

The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional
requirement that the accused has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense
will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime.
This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time" given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged,
and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time
within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action (citing People v.
Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of
the commission of an offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the
liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of
the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place that would prevent
Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of
using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.

We see no merit in these arguments.

At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature - the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional
right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed.29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and
for the court to pronounce judgment.30 The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely
stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense.
The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.31

The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the
facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense.32 In short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written,
must fully inform or acquaint the accused - the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the
complaint or information - of the charge/s laid.

The heretofore cited Information states that "' on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused [did] - willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS 'JOSE VELARDE' IN
SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered
name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities."

We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan's reading of the Information, as this was how the accused
might have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his
defense. Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly states that
(1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to
February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several
transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about
or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on
February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the
Information could have simply said "on or about February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative
approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a
surplusage that has no meaning separately from the "on or about" already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary
consequence of the use of the "OR" between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that referred back to
February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and would
have been clearly in accord with the People's present interpretation) had the Information simply used "AND"
instead of "OR" to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various
dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People,
the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would
violate Estrada's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple
transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an
opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.

Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information, another issue that
the allegation of time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of
the offense charged, were actually alleged in the Information. chanrobles virtual law library

The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People's case, as it deals a fatal blow on the
People's claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an
alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.
This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.

The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and

the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.

We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.

The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy
under the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers - Aprodicio Laquian and
Fernando Chua - when Estrada's signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of
an alias that violates CA No. 142.

On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estrada's prosecution
for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave
abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts
existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by
the legislature. Additionally, that Estrada's prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated
October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142,
penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank
transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the
use of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in
CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its
application; it was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank
regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and
enforceable provision of CA No. 142.

On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing in
CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that
R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142's coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed
only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least related with one
another. The three laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one
another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different
conduct, and covers a different class of persons,33 and there was no need to force their application to one
another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence
between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-
163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People, may
not be considered a deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and
deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is
separate and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not
covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as
amended).

The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the transaction or communication was
privileged in nature was erroneous - a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that
a person who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other than his original name or the
alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are
bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 1405.
At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and
not Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other
people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and use of the alias before
Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.

Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers does
not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-
gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to
silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The People contends that the
law - R.A. No. 1405 - was not intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the
commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and applied
so that right and justice would prevail.

We see no merit in these arguments.

We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel -
that mere communication to a third person is publicity - does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our
close reading of Ursua - particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and
the historical reasons we cited above - tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is more than
mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly,
or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a
violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be
known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust
Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose
Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to
Estrada's privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President;
Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while
Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy
and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be
for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The
same holds true for Estrada's alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for
these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada's representations to these people were made in
privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation
of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account - a transaction that R.A. No.
1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.34 We previously rejected, in Ejercito v.
Sandiganbayan,35 the People's nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and
trust transactions, when we said:

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the
mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not
lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be understood broadly and
not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the
bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to
deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country.
(Underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third persons, then
such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the
bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of
boosting the economic development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner and
Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by Urban
Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore,
intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of
account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be
invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended to be
understood broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission
of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) chanrobles virtual law library

The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is clear
from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited
but also to those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to
"deposits" in the strict sense of the word.rbl r l l lbrr

Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested.

Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858. 36

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are
statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. 37 Given the private nature of Estrada's act of signing
the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that
there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even
consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is
essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This
statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done
publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly
manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking
transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment
against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws. 38

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt to
harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily
rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405
is significant only because Estrada's use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the law considers
private or, at the very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to
the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA
142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires
harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together when these
spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the
indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining in Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis - -vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here
whether Estrada's use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and
legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense
charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on
the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People
fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do
so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 139857 : September 15, 2006]

LEONILA BATULANON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification the
April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and
3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999 Resolution3 denying
the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI)

employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to
December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from
and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities
concerning the release of loans were discovered.4

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of

commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion

Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative,
Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of
the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the
same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of
PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an
entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of
P4,160, Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line
thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that she received
the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was
granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth
and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never
received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued
in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there
release to herself the same and received the loan of P4,160 and
thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit
the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.5

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion,

Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative,
Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same,
and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position
and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the
name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry
therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of
P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the
signature of Gonafreda Oracion showing that she received the loan,
thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted
a loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said
person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and
never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same
and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter
misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said
amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute
the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion,

Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative,
Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the
appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn
Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was
granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it appear
that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date
with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact
Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted
loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set
forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check
Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein
the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said
Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency,
when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan,
and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to
defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the
same, and received the amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to
the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned
amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion,

Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative,
Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the
appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis
Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was
granted a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear
that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with,
and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact
Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner
set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the
Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis
Batulanon by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon,
thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the
loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon
never received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there
release to herself the same and receive the loan of P5,000, and
thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the
said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of

General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453,
3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial

on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio,

Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the
preparation of cash vouchers9 testified that on certain dates in
1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying
amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982,
Cash Voucher No. 30A10 for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda
Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A11 for
P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru
Cash Voucher No. 276A13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October
16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to
Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were
not eligible to apply for loan because they were not bona fide
members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was
a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she
applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew
her membership in 1983.16Medallo stated that pursuant to the
cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a
fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names
of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made it
appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the
amount stated therein.18 As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash
Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the
handwriting of appellant.19

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its
board of directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallo's testimony
that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not
members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-
law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in
1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors.20

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in

1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified
that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis
Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee
and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed
that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's
handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans
taken, only that in Arroyo's name was settled.22

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa

Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense

and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the
year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the
financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was
asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the
vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash
Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to
identify the other vouchers because the Journal had missing pages
and she was not the one who prepared the entries.23

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she
did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and
Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her
presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money
to them;24 that the three were members of the cooperative as
shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of
directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to
certify to the correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has
become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release
loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his
absence;25 that she signed the loan application and voucher of her
son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that
she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to
avoid suspicion of irregularity;26that contrary to the testimony of
Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative
provided they are children of regular members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name
because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has to
pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's
loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the
cases were filed in court.27 She also declared that one automatically
becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to
1982, the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.29

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-

1982, because the cooperative had been registered since 1967.30

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting

Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila

Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled
case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of
ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION
CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of
P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the complaints
until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.31

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the

trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant

LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayormaximum,
AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative
Credit, Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty
(P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints
until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is

the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the
prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda
Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an
unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo.33 She avers that the
crime of falsification of private document requires as an element
prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been
prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are
accounts receivable by the cooperative.34

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through
falsification of commercial document, appellant could be convicted
of falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it
is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of
the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the
information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no

concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and in
which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the
facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given
in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the
acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, "Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you
commit a crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged,
in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the
crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused
performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to
be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name
of the crime which those acts constitute.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172,

paragraph 236 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph
7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in
any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused
damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed
with intent to cause such damage.37

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of

falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing
the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos.
30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts
appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it
appear that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when
they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts
reflected in the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation

of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing
that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from
the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that
while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the
cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the

signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it
appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by
these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible
testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon
proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo.
Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-
bound to present the persons whose signatures were forged as
Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient.
Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person.

Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis.

There is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill
motive.

The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a

compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases,
except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by
the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been
prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its books
as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only
grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan.
These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are
they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn
Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to
settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the understanding
however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected
from Batulanon.39

The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are
private documents and not commercial documents because they are
not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions41 nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial
law.42 Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined
as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized,
by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth.43

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the

prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime
charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said
crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.44 The
prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden
completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of

private document,45 it is important to ascertain whether the offender
is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with
estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a
meansto commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is
falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of
falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it appear in the time
book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario,
worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he
had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the
Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The
accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not
work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the

pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear
that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned
the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in
excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty
of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the
accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by
Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150
sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents,
succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of
falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly

held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.

Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document

with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period,
which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into
consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled
to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within
the range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1)
day to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in Criminal Case
Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed
the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of
private documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for
each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify
PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount
of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by
Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was settled with the
understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money
is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until
the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes
final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until
its satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by

Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are
the following:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or

proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or

proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document

which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a

copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance

thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner
Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash
voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name
of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in
Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the
signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to
indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of
Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification
under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact
that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the
latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of
falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements,
which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such
representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a
different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that
petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private
document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash
voucher of Dennis.50

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation

under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the

offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or

property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the

prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the

offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is
evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)51

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the

appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of
the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of
the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He
replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount
drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his
cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila
Rail Road Company until the end of the month. When an audit was
conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been
carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with
the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although
in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with
the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a
judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:

Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very

evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here
discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or
diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in
itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense
is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the
intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes
to be able to restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered.
xxx

Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we
find all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the money
for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by
him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be
disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation
and as such had immediate control of the current funds for the
purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the
same. That he, in the exercise of such control and custody, was
aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that
one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who,
if he had acted on his own responsibility, might also have
misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of
estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his
personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and
substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the
checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the
appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period.
The checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were
retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control
they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have
kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with
instructions to retain them.

xxx

But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of
the accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As
we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this
nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the
crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight,
appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods
does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend
this interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations
convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in
this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute
is clear and makes no distinction between permanent
misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the
present case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged
is injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the only
injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad
Company during the period the funds were withheld by the
appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this
court that the disturbance in property rights caused by the
misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. v.
Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. v. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)53

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager,

Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for PCCI.
Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she
fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to
secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she
obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received
by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of
PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum
misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified
members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the
disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's
misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was

P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not
exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying circumstances, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the

following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon
is found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private documents
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to
indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated
the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The
interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of
this judgment until its satisfaction; andcralawlibrary

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of

estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise
ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the
sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate
of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment
until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600* : February 01, 2011]

VIVIAN T. DABU, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. EDUARDO RODEN E.

KAPUNAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 51 AND ACTING JUDGE, BRANCH 52,+ MA. THERESA
CORTEZ, LEILA O. GALO, BOTH COURT STENOGRAPHERS, SUZETTE O. TIONGCO, LEGAL
RESEARCHER, ALL OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, GUAGUA, PAMPANGA,
RESPONDENTS.

[A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC : February 01, 2011]

RE: EVALUATION OF THE REPORT AND INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY EXECUTIVE JUDGE ROGELIO
C. GONZALES, RTC, GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, ON ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CASES IN BRANCHES
49, 50, 51, 52 AND 53 OF THE GUAGUA REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to the powers vested in the Court under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, [1] the
Court acts upon these two consolidated administrative cases against [1] Judge Eduardo Roden E.
Kapunan (Judge Kapunan), then presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial
Court of Guagua, Pampanga (RTC); [2] stenographer Ma. Theresa Cortez (Cortez); [3] stenographer Leila O.
Galo (Galo); and [4] Legal Researcher Suzette Tiongco (Tiongco), all of Branch 51, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga.

In A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600, complainant Vivian T. Dabu (Dabu) claimed that she was appointed 4thAssistant
Provincial Prosecutor for Pampanga sometime in June 1999. In October of the same year, from her station
in San Fernando, Pampanga, she was transferred and re-assigned to Guagua, Pampanga, to serve Branches
50, 51 and 52 of the RTC therein.

According to Dabu, just a few months into her assignment, she noticed that unlike in Branch 50, she was
not being called upon to intervene or investigate cases involving annulment of marriages in Branches 51 and
52, both presided by Judge Kapunan, despite the fact that the cases for annulment of marriage were being
raffled equally among the five (5) branches of the RTC, in Guagua, Pampanga.

Curious on what appeared to her as an oddity, and having previously learned that cases for annulment of
marriage were being "fixed" in the said station, Dabu went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and got from
its docket the list of annulment cases raffled to Branches 51 and 52 pertaining to the period from August 1,
1999 to March 2000. She then went to each branch and requested the records of the cases in the list. She
then found out that the records were being falsified and made to appear that a prosecutor appeared during
the supposed hearings of the annulment cases, when, in truth, the prosecutors who supposedly appeared
were either on leave or had already been re-assigned to another station.

The other case, A.M. No. 01-3-138, stemmed from an article written by Atty. Emil P. Jurado (Atty.
Jurado) in the November 1, 2000 issue of the Manila Standard. It reported that an RTC branch in Guagua,
Pampanga, had been improperly disposing cases for annulment of marriage in "syndicated efforts involving
court personnel and a public assistance office lawyer."
Determined to ascertain the truth of the allegations made in the article, then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. instructed Executive Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales (Judge Gonzales) of RTC, Guagua, Pampanga to submit
inventories of marriage annulment cases filed in the five (5) branches of the RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, from
January 1997 to November 2000.

In the evaluation[2] of the report and inventory submitted by Judge Gonzales, then Deputy Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez[3] recommended that the matter be joined with the proceedings in A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1600 so that "a complete picture and history of the anomalous treatment by Branches 51 and 52 of
annulment of marriage cases" would be made.

In its Resolution[4] dated March 13, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of A.M. No. 1-3-138-RTC and
A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-1028-RTJ.

During the hearing of these cases, only Judge Kapunan and Tiongco participated. Cortez manifested that she
would not adduce evidence in her behalf and would submit the case for disposition/recommendation on the
basis of the records and evidence adduced during the investigation. Respondent Galo, on the other hand,
neither appeared nor filed any comment or pleading.

The result of the investigation revealed something not expected of a proper judicial office. As reported in
detail by the Investigating Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos [5] (Investigating Justice) of the Court of Appeals:

On August 24, 2000, Complainant Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu executed an Affidavit citing
several incidents wherein the court records of cases for annulment of marriage, lost titles and declaration of
presumptive death were being falsified. The Affidavit was treated as a Complaint for falsification of court
records against Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan and court stenographers Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O.
Galo. Respondent Suzette Tiongco was not included in the charge of falsification of court records as
complainant ha[d] no evidence linking her thereto but the Office of the Court Administrator included her
with the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Complainant alleged that during the period between November 1999 and August 2000, respondent Judge
was the presiding judge of Branch 51 and the acting judge of Branch 52, both of the Regional Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga, with three (3) of the personnel of Branch 51, namely: Leila Galo, Ma. Theresa Cortez
and Suzette Tiongco.

Respondent Judge and Galo were detailed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, at the same time
and were returned to their original assignment at the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga also at the
same time x x x.

Respondents Galo and Cortez were appointed to the position of court stenographers for Branch 51 x x x.
However, respondent Galo, during the said period, did not perform the duties of a stenographer but acted as
a secretary for respondent Judge x x x. She received all communications pertaining to respondent Judge or
to cases pending before Branches 51 and 52 x x x. Respondent Judge gave specific instruction on this
matter to the Court's personnel x x x.

The other staff of Branch 51 (sic) holds office at the 3 rd floor of Goseco hall, which is located across the
municipal hall of Guagua, Pampanga. On the other hand, all of the staff of Branch 52 (sic) is holding office at
the 2nd floor of Goseco Hall.

All the records of Branches 51 and 52 are being kept at the Goseco Hall except for the records of cases
which have pending incidents to be resolved, or an Order/Decision for signature, or to be heard, or is
needed by respondent Judge which are in the office of the respondents at the municipal hall x x x.

Prior to November 1999, the assigned prosecutor for Branch 51 is Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C.
Pineda and for Branch 52 is former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo. Beginning 10 November
1999 up to 31 August 2000, herein complainant was the assigned prosecutor for Branches 51 and 52.

As evidence for the charge of falsification of court records, complainant presented the following cases:

1. Civil Case No. G-3655

Nonito Vitug vs. Gracita Sangan
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 3 November 1999, there was allegedly a hearing which was held in the presence of former Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo, wherein the plaintiff and the psychologist testified and, thereafter,
the counsel of record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his evidence, and, without the objection of the public
prosecutor, the case was deemed submitted for decision x x x. The minutes and transcript of stenographic
notes were prepared by respondent Cortez.

On 9 November 1999, a Decision was rendered, which states on paragraph 3, page 1, thereof that
"Prosecutor Reyes Manalo on November 3, 1999 submitted his Report that no collusion exists between the
parties" but no such Report is attached to the records of the case x x x.

Former Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo testified that as early as 25 October 1999, when he filed his Application
for Leave for the month of November, he was already on leave and, from then on, has never appeared
before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga until his retirement in June 2000 x x x.
This was corroborated by the stenographer of said Court, Zenaida A.C. Caraan x x x.

In the criminal cases heard on 3 November 1999, respondent Judge issued Orders declaring the hearing on
said date cancelled and resetting the same to another date in view of the absence of the public prosecutor x
x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, on the other hand, testified that none of the parties is his client and that he never
appeared in the said case x x x.

2. Civil Case No. G-3675

Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 12 November 1999, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda allegedly issued a Manifestation
finding no collusion between the parties x x x. He, however, testified that he did not issue any
"Manifestation" in connection with this case x x x.

On 15 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly conducted in the presence of the said public prosecutor
wherein the plaintiff testified and the case was re-set on 29 December 1999 for the presentation of the
psychologist x x x. The minutes and transcript of stenographic notes were both prepared by respondent
Cortez x x x.

However, the Orders in the criminal cases heard on the same date, 15 November 1999, which were also
prepared by respondent Cortez and signed by respondent judge, stated that the hearing was cancelled in
view of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.

Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda testified that he was, as of 8 November 1999, assigned to
Branches 54 and 55 of the Regional [T]rial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, and from then on, never
appeared before Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga x x x. This was corroborated
by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of the said Court, Eduardo P. Carlos x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo again testified that none of the parties is his client and he never appeared in such
case x x x.

The Decision in this case was included in the cases reported as having been decided or disposed of for the
month of March 2000 x x x.

3. Civil Case No. G-3659

Ricardo Layug vs. Zerlina Arteta

For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 3 November 1999, a Manifestation was allegedly issued by former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D.
Manalo x x x but he testified that he did not issue the same x x x.

On 5 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held in the presence of the said public prosecutor wherein the
plaintiff and a psychologist testified, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his evidence and
without the objection of the public prosecutor, the case was submitted for resolution x x x.

Again former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo and Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo denied any
participation in the case.

4. LRC Case No. G-73

In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owner's Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 217416-R,
Rev. Fr. Francisco R. Lansang,
Petitioner,
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

5. LRC Case No. G-74

In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owner's Duplicate Copy of
TCT Nos. 441074-R to 441089-R,
Beatriz Lansang, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 25 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the petitioners were presented, the counsel on
record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo offered his evidence, and, thereafter, these cases were deemed submitted for
resolution x x x. The minutes of hearing and transcript of stenographic notes were prepared by respondent
Cortez x x x.

On December 6, 1999 separate Orders were issued granting the petitions favorably x x x. These cases were
reported in June 2000 to have been decided or disposed of x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo proffered the same testimony x x x.

6. Civil Case No. G-2579

Benito Samia, Jr. vs. Josephine L. Lorenzo-Samia
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 21 February 2000, a Decision was rendered stating therein that a Psychological Evaluation Report was
submitted but none appears on the record x x x.

Likewise, between 13 December 1999 and 21 February 2000, no other hearing was conducted despite the
fact that the Order dated 13 December 1999 indicated the next hearing on 17 January 2000 and the dorsal
side of page 111 of the record states "Reset 2/21/00" x x x. There was also no record that plaintiff offered
his evidence, rested his case, or submitted the case for resolution x x x.

The said Decision was included in the monthly report of cases disposed of in June 2000 x x x.

7. Civil Case No. G-3717

Tomas Tamayo vs. Adoracion Sampang
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

The plaintiff, Tomas Tamayo, testified that the case was filed by respondent Cortez before the Regional Trial
Court of Guagua, Pampanga, after the latter agreed to help him in the "processing" of the annulment of his
marriage; that he never appeared before any lawyer for the notarization of his Verified Petition; that he was
initially told that there would be no hearing in his annulment case and it will be granted within three (3)
months; that he gave the amount of Php 15,000.00 in connection thereto which was returned to him after
he withdrew his case; that respondent Galo took from him Php4000.00 in payment of the "psychologist fee"
which amount was not returned to him; that he gave the amount to respondent Galo after she identified
herself as a court employee and even presented an identification card of respondent Judge x x x.
In his testimony, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo stated that the plaintiff is not his client x x x.

8. Civil Case No. G-3677

Joseph Voltaire Datu vs. Marissa S. Tamarez
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 11 April 2000, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo denying his signature
appearing on the said Complaint and claiming it to be a forgery x x x.

On the witness stand, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo reiterated that none of the parties is his client and that the
signature appearing in the Complaint is not his x x x.

9. Sum. Proc. No. G-1205

In re: Petition for Summary Proceeding
For Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Absentee Felicitas Jabilona,
Joselito Flores, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 27 July 2000, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the counsel on record, Atty. Romeo B. Torno offered
his evidence x x x.

Atty. Romeo B. Torno, however, testified that he did not appear before the said Court on the said time and
date as he was then appearing before Branch 50; that after his ex partepresentation of evidence, the next
hearing was scheduled on 27 July 2000 at 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon but the same was cancelled since he
has no witness to present; and that, thereafter, there was no other hearing held or conducted in this case x
x x.

On August 7, 2000, an Order was issued granting the Petition x x x.

Atty. Torno suspected that respondent Cortez prepared the same and when he confronted her, she replied
that "everything is okay" x x x.

10. Civil Case No. G-3730

Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal Jr.
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 30 June 2000, an Order was issued stating that a hearing was allegedly held wherein the plaintiff
testified, the Psychological Evaluation Report filed, and the case deemed submitted for resolution x x x. The
records of the case, however, bear an Order dated 9 June 2000 with the same contents x x x.

On even date, 9 June 2000, a Decision was issued in favor of the plaintiff x x x.

Refuting the charges against him, respondent Judge averred in his Comment [6] that:

a) his signatures appearing in the records of "Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal, Jr., docketed as Civil Case Nos.
G-3730, and "Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon," docketed as Civil Case No. G-3675, were forgeries;

b) after the said cases were made known to him during the latter part of July 2000 and since he received
complaints [from] litigants about the "activities" of respondent Galo, he conducted a discreet investigation,
but stopped the same upon the filing of this complaint;

c) he is a victim of falsification and did not conspire or connive with the other respondents in the commission
thereof.

On May 28, 2001, Judge Kapunan suffered from cardio-pulmonary arrest and died at the age of fifty-four.
According to his heirs, the evidence of the complainant was insufficient to support the charges against their
late father and, thus, sought the dismissal of the complaint.

From a mere examination of the signatures of Judge Kapunan on the questioned court records, it is clear
that his signatures were not forged. As correctly pointed out by the complainant and the Investigating
Justice, except for the abovementioned cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to specifically deny
under oath his participation in the anomalous cases or to challenge the genuineness of his signature
appearing in the court records of the questioned cases enumerated by Dabu. Thus, following Section 8, Rule
8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[7] this amounts to an admission by Judge Kapunan that he indeed
signed the questioned orders, decisions and court records.

Also, in all the questioned cases pointed out by Dabu, including the cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan
failed to offer any evidence to support his defense that his signatures therein were forged. The rule is that
he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the responsibility of
presenting evidence to that effect.[8] Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court,[9] the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: [1] by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted on or been charged; [2] by a comparison,
made by a witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. At the very least, he should
present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness.[10] As
a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.[11] This, unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do.

At any rate, contrary to the assertions of Judge Kapunan, in the case of Vitug, the records show that as
early as May 31, 2000, he already issued an order granting the appeal of the Solicitor General. He could not,
therefore, claim that he was only made aware of the anomalies in Vitug after it was decided.

Further, as noted by the Investigating Justice, Judge Kapunan himself confirmed in his June 2000 report of
decided cases that the cases of Lansang and Samia were among those he had decided. Thus, he could not
claim that his signatures in the decisions of those cases were forged.

The Court finds specious the allegation of Judge Kapunan that the "processing" of cases were committed by
Galo all by herself, and that he conducted a "discreet investigation" when he learned of her activities. Judge
Kapunan offered no plausible reason why he failed to finish his investigation other than the lame excuse that
he stopped his investigation due to the filing of the complaint. The reason is clear. There was no
investigation conducted. As opined by the Investigating Justice, [12] had there been an investigation, Judge
Kapunan should have completed it, found the culprit, filed the appropriate charges, and cleared his name.

With respect to Galo, she failed to appear in the proceedings below or file any comment, or any pleading.
The proceedings below established that she received payments from litigants as "psychologist fee." She
even admitted to Dabu on at least two occasions that she had "processed" certain cases involving annulment
of marriage with the "go signal" of Judge Kapunan. In fact, she admitted to Dabu that she was "processing"
one case where one of the parties was a friend of Judge Kapunan, upon orders of the latter.

On the other hand, Cortez admitted preparing the questioned orders, decisions, minutes of hearings, and
transcripts. She tried to justify her actions by claiming that she only acted upon the instructions of Galo.
Unfortunately, these circumstances do not justify her acts at all.

Taking all these into consideration, it is undeniable that Judge Kapunan, Galo and Cortez acted together in
issuing questionable orders and decisions through falsification of public documents.

With regard to Tiongco, however, there is no evidence against her. The inclusion of Tiongco in this case was
only upon the initiative of the Office of the Court Administrator. As the record is bereft of any evidence to
hold her liable, her exoneration is in order.

Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing
justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court
regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an office
in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the
people's respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public
trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of
responsibility.[13]

Falsification of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It also amounts to
dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and
falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon
commission of the first offense.

Furthermore, falsification of an official document is punishable as a criminal offense under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and dishonesty is an impious act that has no place in the judiciary.

The penalty of dismissal, however, can no longer be imposed and carried out with respect to the late Judge
Kapunan. The administrative complaints against him have become moot and academic and the case should
be deemed closed and terminated following our ruling in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube[14] and Apiag v. Cantero.[15]

WHEREFORE, finding respondents, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo, GUILTY of falsification of official
documents and dishonesty, the Court hereby orders their DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The case against respondent Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan is hereby dismissed for being moot and
academic due to his untimely demise.

Respondent Suzette O. Tiongco is EXONERATED of the charges.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the Decision 1dated 22
June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution 2 dated 2 February
2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA- G.R. C.R. No. 00670.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman Visayas, in an Information 3 dated 14 February 2006, which
reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly
appointed and qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having been arrested by agents
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly known as Shabu, the dangerous drug after a
confirmatory test conducted on said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The records do
not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special
investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply
NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants
claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of
Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling
drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they
were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said
police office, they met James who demanded from them ?100,000, later lowered to ?40,000, in exchange
for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint
and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even
received calls supposedly from James instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the complainants. A team
was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at
the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz
by using a pre-marked ?500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount
demanded by James and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the
NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was
required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous
drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report No. 2006-
TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while eating
at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI
Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done
by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however,
denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated 6 June 2007, found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu
Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City. 5

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTCs validation of the result of the urine test despite its
dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he alleges that
the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in
clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing
jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under circumstances similar to his would violate a
persons right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.

Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of hearsay
evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug
test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment, 6 saying that petitioners
arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, as they involve
questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest the
validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by
direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was grounded on a
valid and existing law.

THE ISSUE

We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or not the
drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

OUR RULING

We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or
jurisprudence.

We gloss over petitioners non-compliance with the Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly legible
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution.

Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for
use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6)
months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of
this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (?50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (?200,000.00): Provided, That this Section
shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of
any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein
shall apply.8

The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were
established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.

Disregarding petitioners objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also reasoned
that a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is
already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine
from ones body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA,
erroneous on three counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover

persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, [a] person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or
arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A.
9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
importation,9 sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation,10manufacture11 and possession12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession thereof during parties, social gatherings or meetings 13; being employees
and visitors of a den, dive or resort;14 maintenance of a den, dive or resort;15 illegal chemical diversion
of controlled precursors and essential chemicals16; manufacture or delivery17 or possession18 of
equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs during parties, social gatherings or
meetings19; unnecessary20 or unlawful21 prescription thereof; cultivation or culture of plants classified
as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof;22and maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals. 23To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is
tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged
act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to rehabilitate
persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and convicting
them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated
in People v. Martinez24as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by
law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where
the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being
subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with
the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time
offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under
Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is
imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug
use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the
basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them
with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest
was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have
filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all,
they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the
maximum penalty under Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of
such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a
dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls
on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing
charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the
confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to
afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of
dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere
residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase a person apprehended or arrested in Section 15 applicable to all persons
arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount
to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the
application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case
would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (Emphasis
supplied)

The drug test is not covered by

allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises
the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity
of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. 26 However, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.27

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of
evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when
it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis,
238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is,
the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777
[1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence, it has
been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil.
145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the
outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337
[1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86
Phil. 244 [1950]) 28 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC
and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioners urine for purposes of
drug testing was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner
therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his
residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner
and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later,
the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang
claimed that the latters urine sample was inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an
uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

In the Gutang et al. case, the Court clarified that what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material. The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under
the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the
accused. The Court said: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed
facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that
petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily
gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree
with the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the circumstances of petitioner in
the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his
urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the
present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and
finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use
of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of

petitioners right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked
for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved
futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders in
their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they
must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely
that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly
transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth
Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.