Torts

1. ABS-CBN V. CA

FACTS:

Viva, through Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN through its vice-president Charo Santos-
Concio, a list of 3 film packages or 36 titles from which ABS-CBN may exercise its right of
first refusal
Mrs. Concio informed Vic through a letter that they can only purchase 10 titles to be
schedules on non-primetime slots because they were very adult themes which the ruling of
the MTRCB advises to be aired at 9:00 p.m
February 27, 1992: Del Rosario approached ABS-CBN's Ms. Concio with a list
consisting of 52 original movie titles as well as 104 re-runs proposing to sell to
ABS-CBN airing rights for P60M (P30M cash and P30M worth of television spots)
April 2, 1992: Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III met wherein
Del Rosario allegedly agreed to grant rights for 14 films for P30M
April 06, 1992: Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-
president for Finance discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to
sell the 104 films, after the rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN
April 07, 1992: Ms. Concio sent the proposal draft of 53 films for P35M which Viva's
Board rejected since they will not accept anything less than P60M
April 29, 1992: Viva granted RBS exclusive grants for P60M
RTC: Issued TRO against RBS in showing 14 films as filed by ABS-CBN.
RBS also set up a cross-claim against VIVA
RTC: ordered ABS-CBN to pay RBS P107,727 premium paid by RBS to the
surety which issued their bond to lift the injunction, P191,843.00 for the
amount of print advertisement for "Maging Sino Ka Man" in various
newspapers, P1M attorney's fees, P5M moral damages, P5M exemplary
damages and costs. Cross-claim to VIVA was dismissed.
ABS-CBN appealed. VIVA and Del Rosario also appealed seeking moral
and exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees.
CA: reduced the awards of moral damages to P2M, exemplary damages
to P2M and attorney's fees to P500,000. Denied VIVA and Del Rosario's
appeal because it was RBS and not VIVA which was actually prejudiced
when the complaint was filed by ABS-CBN
ISSUE:
1. W/N RBS is entitled to damages. -YES
2. W/N VIVA is entitled to damages. - NO

HELD: REVERSED except as to unappealed award of attorney's fees in favor

of VIVA Productions, Inc.
1. YES.

One is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee
failed to obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may
be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith
or otherwise, It case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those
which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor
acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall
be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of, whether or not such damages has been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Actual damages may likewise be
recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's
business standing or commercial credit.
The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-contract, delict, or
quasi-delict. It arose from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged
knowledge of lack of cause of action. Needless to state the award of actual
damages cannot be comprehended under the above law on actual
damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code.
In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of fact, it asked for
reduction of the bond and even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the
matter, Clearly then, it was not necessary for RBS to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN
cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the counterbond
Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka Man"
for lack of sufficient legal basis.
Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral damages, while Article 2219
enumerates the cases where they may be recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral
damages may be recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of
Article 2219
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation
because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot,
therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be
experienced only by one having a nervous system. A corporation may
 recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the
award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances in quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted with gross
negligence and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner
It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based
on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for
moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code.
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. If
damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque
injuria.

2. Filipinas Broadcasting vs. Ago Medical Center

GRN 141994 January 17, 2005

FACTS:

Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program Expose. Respondent Ago was the owner of the
Medical & Educational center, subject of the radio program Expose. AMEC claimed that the broadcasts
were defamatory and owner Ago and school AMEC claimed for damages. The complaint further alleged
that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre
transmitted malicious imputations and as such, destroyed plaintiffs reputation. FBNI was included as
defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The trial court found Rimas statements to be within the bounds of freedom of speech and
ruled that the broadcast was libelous. It ordered the defendants Alegre and FBNI to pay AMEC 300k for
moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

RULING:

A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish
or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMECs claim, or moral damages fall under item 7 of Art 2219 of the
NCC.

This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. Art 2219 (7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person.
Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of
defamation and claim for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law
implied damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation
of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se.
thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, we find the award P500,000 moral damages
unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous, per se, AMEC has not
suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral
damages to P150k.

JOIN TORT FEASORS are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advice
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, as who approve of it after it is done, for
its benefit.

3. PEOPLE v. ELRANIE MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 130606. February 15, 2000

This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant Elranie Martinez guilty of rape
of Melina and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

While denial is a legitimate defense in rape cases bare denials can not overcome the categorical
testimony of the victim. Here, Melinas testimony is clear, candid, straightforward and consistent. She
had positively identified accused-appellant as her malefactor and established all the elements of the
offense. That the physical examination yielded no conclusive evidence that she had been raped does not
affect her credibility. The lack of tell-tale signs of rape on her private part can be explained by the fact
that she is a married woman with four children. This fact actually bolsters her credibility. She had no
motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant.

4. Ilisan v. People of the Philippines (2010) Nachura, J.

Petitioner: Romeo Ilisan y Piabol

Respondents: People of the Philippines

Concept: Relevance
Brief Facts: In a baptismal party, there was a drunken melee where the group of Ilisan mauled Gaton. Ilisan
shot Gaton in the abdomen, killing him. The RTC and the CA convicted Ilisan of homicide, giving more weight
to the witnesses of the prosecution and notwithstanding the negative results on the paraffin test. The SC
upheld the CA, only increasing the actual damages.

Doctrines: Relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso
facto diminish the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. On the contrary, a witness relationship to
the victim would even make the testimony more credible as the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives
of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons
other than the true culprits.

As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.

Paraffin tests are extremely unreliable.

FACTS:

1. February 3, 2002 - A baptismal celebration was held at Ricky Silvas residence in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Among the attendees were Ilisan and Joey Gaton. They belonged to different groups of guests.
- While they were having a drinking spree with their respective groups, one of Ilisans companions
apparently got irked by the way Gaton looked at him.
- Ilisan and his companions mauled Gaton. A melee ensued, and Ilisan shot Gaton at the abdomen,
causing the latters instantaneous death.
- The gun used was a .45 caliber pistol.
2. February 7, 2002 Information for murder was filed against Ilisan.
3. Pieces of evidence:
- Prosecution: testimonies of Gabriel Gaton (victims brother; was summoned to the place of the
incident while his brother was being mauled), Marlon Dellamas (went to the scene of the incident
to look for his brother Jojo), and Edgardo Dag-um (he was at the place where the mauling and
shooting transpired). All three positively identified Ilisan as the gunman. Dellamas and Dag-um were
the victims neighbours.
- Defense: testimonies. Ilisan and his witnesses Jomarie Ilisan and Jaime Escasinas (Ilisans brother and
cousin) claimed that another guest Chito Partisala, a jail guard in Bicutan, was the assailant.
- Also presented Engr. Leonard Jabonillo, forensic chemist of the Central Police District Crime Lab,
who testified that Ilisan tested negative for gunpowder residue when paraffin tests were
conducted a day after the incident.
4. RTC: convicted Ilisan of homicide.
- Accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over the declarations
of the defense.
- No adequate proof that treachery and evident premeditation qualified the killing.
- Sentenced Ilisan to suffer imprisonment for a term ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amounts of P75, 000 as actual damages, P50,000 for the death of the victim
and P50,000 as moral damages.
5. On appeal to the CA, Ilisan questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who allegedly
harbored ill motive against him because they were either related to the victim or to one of the
participants in the commotion.
- Also argued that the negative results of the paraffin residue test conducted on him strongly indicate
his innocence.
6. CA: RTC decision was affirmed, with modification of the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence
to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal medium, and the reduction of the award of actual
damages to P58,520. Hence, the present petition.
7. Ilisan appealed to the SC, reiterating the issues he raised before the CA.

ISSUES and RULING:

1. WON the prosecutions witnesses are credible. (YES)

2. WON there was misappreciation of the facts. (NO)
3. WON the paraffin test should be given weight. (NO)
4. WON Ilisan's version of events should be accepted. (NO)
5. WON imposed penalty is correct. (YES except for actual damages)

RATIO:

1. Yes, the prosecutions witnesses are credible.

- As to Gabriel: The fact that Gabriel is the victims brother does not impair his credibility as witness.
Relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso
facto diminish the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. On the contrary, a witness
relationship to a victim would even make the testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for
a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the culprit. The
natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty
would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits.
- As to Dellamas and Dag-um: There is no indication that the two were improperly motivated when
they testified. Aside from the prosecution witnesses relationship with the other participants in the
fight, Ilisan failed to show any other basis for the ill motive he imputes against them. As a rule, absent
any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith
and credit.
- The Court is bound by the findings of the TC in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked
or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a conviction.
2. No. There was no misappreciation of facts committed by the courts below.
- The courts were uniform in their reliance on the prosecutions version. Both were correct in
concluding that the identity of Ilisan and his actual shooting of Gaton were established beyond
moral certainty through the testimonies of 3 witnesses:

Witness Gabriel Gaton:

Q: How far were you when you saw that man who was pointing a gun at your brother Joey?

A: (Witness indicating a distance of 10 meters more or less.)

Q: And how far was the man with a gun from your brother Joey?

A: (Witness indicating a distance of 2 meters.)

Q: What was the position of your brother Joey when the man was pointing his gun to your brother Joey?

A: Sidewise, sir.

Q: What happened after you saw the man pointing a gun at your brother?

A: I shouted: Dont (Huwag naman) but he ignored me and then the gun went off.

Q: What happened after the gun went off?

A: After firing the gun, he pointed the gun to the bystanders.

Q: What happened to your brother?

 A: He fell down, sir.

Witness Dellamas:

Q: What happened after they entered the gate which you said was opened?

A: The person who was armed with a gun shot at Joey Gaton.

Q: How far were you when this person shot Joey Gaton, how far were you to this person?

A: I was very near, maam. I was about a meter only away from them.

xxxx

Q: And what happened after this person who you just identified as Romeo Ilisan shot Joey Gaton, what
happened?

A: Joey Gaton fell down, maam.

Witness Dag-um:

Q: Mr. Witness, you said a while ago that Joey Gaton was already dead, how did he die?

A: He was shot, sir.

Q: Who shot him?

A: Romeo Ilisan, sir.

xxxx

Q: You pointed to Romeo Ilisan as the person who shot Joey Gaton, how far were you when Romeo Ilisan
shot Joey Gaton?

A: About two (2) meters away sir.

3. No, paraffin tests in general have been rendered inconclusive by the SC.
- Paraffin tests can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; still, the test
alone cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm.
- The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability
but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun.
- Conversely, the absence of gunpowder nitrates, the day after the incident, does not conclusively
establish that he did not fire a gun; neither are the negative results yielded by the paraffin test a proof of
innocence.
- People v. Manalo: "Even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding,
it cannot be definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a gun and
yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before the test. The Court
has even recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the hand if, as in the
instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol.
- Thus, the positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of the three eyewitnesses to the crime deserve full
merit in both probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on
petitioner and his witnesses anomalous claims.

4. No, such version is a mere afterthought intended to exculpate Ilisan.

- If it is true that they saw Partisala shoot Joey, why did they not tell the policeman who arrived at the
scene immediately that Partisala was the gunman? Why did Jomarie wait until somebody pointed to the
accused as the gunman before he told them that it was Partisala who shot the victim?
5. Yes, the prison term and the other awards for damages are correct, except for actual damages.
- Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
proven, the penalty should be applied in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months)
- Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the maximum penalty will be selected from the above range,
with the minimum penalty being selected from the range of penalty one degree lower than reclusion
temporal, which is prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). Thus, the 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor (as minimum) to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, imposed by
the RTC, and affirmed with modification by the CA, is correct.
- Actual damages pertain to the actual expenses incurred by the victims heirs in relation to his death, i.e.,
burial and funeral expenses. To justify an award, it is necessary for a party to produce competent proof
or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts.
- In this case, the actual expenses incurred for the wake and burial of the victim were duly shown by
receipts in the aggregate amount of P88,520.00. But the CA awarded only P58,520.00, which appears to
have been caused by the non-inclusion of Exhibit "L," a receipt for P30,000.00 paid by the victims wife
for the deceaseds autopsy and embalming treatment, and use of mortuary equipment for the
interment.
- Having convincingly proved the nature of the sexpense in the amount of P30,000.00 in Exhibit "L," it is only
right to increase the actual damages awarded to the victims heirs to P88,520.00.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED with modification.

Digest maker: Kris

6. LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON (Pau)

G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005

Facts:

In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo,
Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around
Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.

At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they
traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in
an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo
Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in
the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.

Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was subsequently amended to include
the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle.

On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the Castillon
heirs but reduced Lamberts liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On the claim
of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real
party in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue/s:

1. Did the CA err in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy
Orpilla that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of
the accident? In other words, was Lambert negligent?

2. Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?

Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death
and therefore she is not liable for damages.

Held

1. No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way,
was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate
cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The
cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed
with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.

Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing
into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles who bump
the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who bump the
rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently
contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the
collision.

2. Yes. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the
victims negligence. Article 2179 reads as follows:

When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.[15] The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1)
was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one
or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.[21] These circumstances, although
not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same
result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of
percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall
recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the
private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

7. SMC vs Teodosio

On September 5, 1991, Eduardo Teodosio was hired by San Miguel Corporation (SMC) as a casual forklift operator
in its Bacolod City Brewery. Respondent continuously worked from September 5, 1991 until March 1992, after
which he was asked to rest. A month after, respondent was rehired for the same position, and after serving for
about five to six months, he was again asked to rest. After three weeks, he was again rehired as a forklift
operator. He continued to work as such until August 1993. Sometime in August 1993, respondent was made to sign
an Employment with a Fixed Period contract by SMC, wherein it was stipulated, among other things, that
respondents employment would be from August 7, 1993 to August 30, 1995, or upon cessation of the
instability/fluctuation of the market demand, whichever comes first. Thereafter, respondent worked at the plant
without interruption as a forklift operator.

On March 20, 1995, respondent was transferred to the plants bottling section as a case piler. In a letter, respondent
formally informed SMC of his opposition to his transfer to the bottling section. He asserted that he would be more
effective as a forklift operator because he had been employed as such for more than three years already. Respondent
also requested that he be transferred to his former position as a forklift operator. However, SMC did not answer his
letter. In an undated letter, respondent informed SMC that he was applying for the vacant position of bottling crew
as he was interested in becoming a regular employee of SMC.

On June 1, 1995, SMC notified the respondent that his employment shall be terminated on July 1, 1995 in
compliance with the Employment with a Fixed Period contract. SMC explained that this was due to the
reorganization and streamlining of its operations.

In a letter dated July 3, 1995, respondent expressed his dismay for his dismissal. He informed SMC that
despite the fact that he would be compelled to receive his separation pay and would be forced to sign a waiver to
that effect, this does not mean that he would be waiving his right to question his dismissal and to claim employment
benefits as provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and company policies. Respondent signed a
Receipt and Release document in favor of SMC and accepted his separation pay, thereby releasing all his claims
against SMC.

Respondent filed a Complaint against SMC before the NLRC Bacolod City, for illegal dismissal and
underpayment of wages and other benefits. Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. Aggrieved, respondent sought recourse before the NLRC Cebu City. NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the Labor Arbiters decision. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution.
CA grants the respondents petition, SMCs motion for reconsideration is denied. Hence this petition.

Issues: 1) whether the respondent was a regular employee of SMC; 2) whether the respondent was illegally
dismissed; and 3) whether the respondent is entitled to his monetary claims and damages.

Held: 1.)Respondent is a regular employee under the Art. 280 of the Labor Code; Respondent Eduardo L. Teodosio
became a regular employee in September 1992.

2.) Having gained the status of a regular employee, respondent is entitled to security of tenure and could only be
dismissed on just or authorized causes and after he has been accorded due process; Respondent is awarded
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

3.) Respondent is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are recoverable where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy . On the other hand, exemplary damages are
proper when the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner, and public policy requires
that these acts must be suppressed and discouraged in the present case, respondent failed to sufficiently establish
that his dismissal was done in bad faith; was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; and was arbitrary
and oppressive to labor, thus entitling him to the award of moral and exemplary damages, thus entitling him to the
award of moral and exemplary damages; The awards of moral and exemplary damages granted by CA
are DELETED.

Nominal Damages

1. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES vs. CA

G.R. No. 83612 November 24, 1994

FACTS:
Tirso V. Antiporda, Sr. was, contracted by Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co. (SGV) to be the institutional
financial specialist for the agricultural credit institution project of the Investment and Development Bank of
Malawi in Africa. For the engagement, Antiporda would be provided one round-trip economy ticket from
Manila to Blantyre and back with a maximum travel time of four days per round-trip. On September 17,
1984, Lufthansa, through SGV, issued the ticket for Antiporda's confirmed flights to Malawi, Africa. The
ticket particularized his itinerary: Manila -Bombay- Nairobi- Lilongwe -
Blantyre.

Thus, on September 25, 1984, Antiporda took the Lufthansa flight to Singapore from where he proceeded
to Bombay on board the same airline. He arrived in Bombay ascheduled and waited at the transit area of
the airport for his connecting flight to Nairobi which was, per schedule given him by Lufthansa, to leave
Bombay. Lufthansa, informed Antiporda that his seat in Air Kenya Flight 203 to Nairobi had been given to
a very important person of Bombay who was attending a religious function in Nairobi. Antiporda protested
but Air Kenya Flight 203 left for Nairobi without him on board. Stranded in Bombay, Antiporda was
booked for Nairobi via Addis Ababa only on September 27, 1984. He finally arrived in Blantyre at 9:00
o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1984, more than a couple of days late for his appointment with
people from the institution he was to work with in Malawi.

Consequently, ,Antiporda's counsel wrote the general manager of Lufthansa in Manila demanding
P1,000,000 in damages for the airline's "malicious, wanton, disregard of the contract of carriage."
Apparently getting no positive action from Lufthansa, on January 21, 1985, Antiporda filed with the RTC
of Quezon City a complaint against Lufthansa.

Lufthansa argued that it cannot be held liable for the acts committed by Air Kenya on the basis of the
following:

(a) it merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in behalf of Air Kenya; consequently the contract of
carriage entered into is between respondent Antiporda and Air Kenya, to the exclusion of petitioner
Lufthansa;

(b) under sections (1) and (2) Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention, an airline carrier is liable only to
untoward occurrences on its own line;

(c) the award of moral and exemplary damages in addition to attorney's fees by the trial court is without
basis in fact and in law.

ISSUE: Was there a breach of obligation by the defendant in failing to transport the plaintiff from Manila
to Blantyre, Malawi, Africa?

HELD:
This case is one of a contract of carriage. And the ticket issued by the defendant to the plaintiff is the
written agreement between the parties herein. From the ticket, therefore, it is indubitably clear that it was
the duty and responsibility of the defendant Lufthansa to transport the plaintiff from Manila to Blantyre, on
a trip of five legs.

SC rejected Lufthansa's theory that from the time another carrier was engaged to transport Antiporda on
another segment of his trip, it merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in behalf of said carrier. Although the
contract of carriage was to be performed by several air carriers, the same is to be treated as a single
operation conducted by Lufthansa because Antiporda dealt exclusively with it which issued him a
Lufthansa ticket for the entire trip. By issuing a confirmed ticket, Lufthansa in effect guaranteed Antiporda
a sure seat with Air Kenya. Private respondent Antiporda, maintained the Court of Appeals, had the right
to expect that his ticket would be honored by Air Kenya which, in the legal sense, Lufthansa had
endorsed and, in effect, guaranteed the performance of its principal engagement to carry out his five-leg
trip. Lufthansa cannot claim that its liability thereon ceased at Bombay Airport and thence, shifted to the
various carriers that assumed the actual task of transporting said private respondent.

The appellate court also ruled that Lufthansa cannot rely on Sections (1) and (2), Article 30 of the
Warsaw Convention because the provisions thereof are not applicable under the circumstances of the
case.

Sections (1) and (2), Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention provide:

(1) In the case of transportation to be performed by various successive carriers and falling within the
definition set out in the third paragraph of Article I, each carrier who accepts passengers, baggage, or
goods shall be subject to the rules set out in the convention, and shall be deemed to be one of the
contracting parties to the contract of transportation insofar as the contract deals with that part of the
transportation which is performed under his supervision.

(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his representative can take action only
against the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or the delay occurred,
save in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole
journey.

Antiporda's cause of action is not premised on the occurrence of an accident or delay as contemplated
under Section 2 of said Article but on Air Kenya's refusal to transport him in order to accommodate
another. The provision does not contemplate the instance of "bumping-off" but merely of simple delay,it
cannot provide a handy excuse for Lufthansa as to exculpate it from any liability to Antiporda.

In justifying its award of moral and exemplary damages, the lower court emphasized that the breach of
contract was "aggravated by the discourteous and highly arbitrary conduct of an official of petitioner
Lufthansa in Bombay."

. . . . Bumped off from his connecting flight to Nairobi and stranded in the Bombay Airport for 32 hours,
not even Lufthansa office in Bombay, after learning plaintiff's being stranded in Bombay and his
accommodation problem, provided any relief to plaintiff's sordid situation. It was a pathetic sight that he,
tasked to perform consultancy work in a World Bank found himself stranded in a foreign land where
nobody was expected to help him in his predicament except the defendant, who displayed utter lack of
concern of its obligation to the plaintiff and left plaintiff alone in his misery at the Bombay airport.

Temperate Damages