People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Judge Palma Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
and Romulo Intia y Morada Case No. 219 G.R.
No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page
2, Footnote No.3
FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of
age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent
Judge dismissed the case on the ground that
her court has no jurisdiction to take further
cognizance of this case without prejudice to
the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court,
because he believed that jurisdiction over 16
years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the
Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines
youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age
but under 21 at the time of the commission of
the offense.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred
the case of the accused from the regular courts
to the Juvenile Court.
HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court expressly confers upon it a special and
limited jurisdiction over criminal cases wherein
the accused is under 16 years of age at the time
of the filing of the case. The subsequent
issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth
offender as one who is over 9 years of age but
under 21 at the time of the commission of the
offense did not by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age
from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
LIDASAN VS. COMELEC
FACTS
The question initially presented to the
Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is
Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack
planted upon the constitutional mandate that
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill"?
Comelec's answer is in the affirmative.
Offshoot is the present original petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive
signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body
of the statute, reproduced in haec verba,
reads
Sec. 1.Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan,
Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated
from said municipalities and constituted into
a distinct and independent municipality of
the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao
del Sur. The seat of government of the
municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors of the new municipality shall be
elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven
general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon
its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and
Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of
Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec
adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967,
the pertinent portions of which are:
 For purposes of establishment of precincts,
registration of voters and for other election
purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that
pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality
of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise
the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated
in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del
Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum
situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of
Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve
barrios in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought
about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September
7, 1967, the Office of the President, through
the Assistant Executive Secretary,
recommended to Comelec that the operation
of the statute be suspended until "clarified
by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20,
1967, stood by its own interpretation,
declared that the statute "should be
implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for
certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified
voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that
Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and
September 20, 1967 implementing the same
for electoral purposes, be nullified.
RA No. 4790 entitled An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the province of
Lanao del Sur , was signed into law and
came to light later that barrios mentioned in
the body of that statue are within the
municipalities of the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes
barrios located in another province Cotabato
is unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject in the title
HELD
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,
under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of
the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is
the second directive. The subject of the statute
must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the
fact that the Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in
the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA
4790, only its title was read from its introduction
to its final approval in the House where the bill,
being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress
to employ in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in
the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead
them to inquire into the body of the bill, study
and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether
or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need
not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which
is so uncertain that the average person reading
it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject
or scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"
projects the impression that only the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del
Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao
del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the
known fact is that the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig
and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao
del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different
from Lanao del Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members
of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del
Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of
passing upon the validity and constitutionality
of a legislative enactment, fundamental and
far-reaching in significance. The enactment
poses questions of due process, police power
and equal protection of the laws. It also poses
an important issue of fact, that is whether the
conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly
springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien
retailer. Through it, and within the field of
economy it regulates, Congress attempts to
translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in
the drive and urge for national survival and
welfare, into a concrete and tangible
measures designed to free the national
retailer from the competing dominance of the
alien, so that the country and the nation may
be free from a supposed economic
dependence and bondage. Do the facts and
circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No.
1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The
main provisions of the Act are: (1) a
prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception
from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15,
1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged
therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval
of the Act or until the expiration of term in
case of juridical persons; (3) an exception
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical
entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the
retail business) for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures
and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens
actually engaged in the retail business to
present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning
their businesses, giving, among other matters,
the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices
of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing
the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail
business who die, to continue such business
for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who
entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then)
particularly in the retail business. For some time
he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed
a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until
in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA
1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the
right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act
on the ground that it contravened several
treaties concluded by the RP which, according
to him, violates the equal protection clause
(pacta sund servanda). He said that as a
Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income
generation of the country he should be given
equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or
supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD:
Resuming what we have set forth above we
hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and
control; that the enactment clearly falls within
the scope of the police power of the State,
thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future;
that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process
of law clause, because the law is prospective
in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary and that
in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department
of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in
the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment
of the population affected; and that it cannot
be said to be void for supposed conflict with
treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject and
the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion
that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the
aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time
should have been given in the law for the
liquidation of existing businesses when the
time comes for them to close. Our legal duty,
however, is merely to determine if the law falls
within the scope of legislative authority and
does not transcend the limitations of due
process and equal protection guaranteed in
the Constitution. Remedies against the
harshness of the law should be addressed to
the Legislature; they are beyond our power
and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs
against petitioner.
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a
generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally
accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced;
and, that the equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because
it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a
treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his
right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay
city market.
[ G.R. No. L-18349, July 30, 1966 ]
THE MUNICIPALITY OF JOSE PANGANIBAN,
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, ETC.,
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE
SHELL COMPANY OP THE PHILIPPINES,
LTD., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
43404, dated January 27, 1961, dismissing
plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the collection of
sales taxes from the defendant-appellee on the
ground that the law which authorizes the said
plaintiff to impose and collect the same,
Republic Act No. 1435, is unconstitutional.
Republic Act 1435, entitled "An Act To Provide
Means For Increasing Highway Special Fund," is
actually an amendment to Sections 142 and 145
of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act 466, for as its first two
sections read:
"Sec. 1. Section one hundred and forty-two of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, is further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Section one hundred and forty-five of
the National Internal Revenue Code, is
amended to read as follows:
The amendments consist mainly in increasing
the rate of specific tax on manufactured oils and
other motor fuels, diesel fuel oil, naptha,
gasoline and similar distilled products.
Aside from introducing the aforementioned
amendments, however, R.A. 3435 likewise
authorizes municipal boards or councils to "levy
an additional tax of not exceeding twenty-five
per cent of the rates fixed in (Sections 142 and
145 of the National Internal Revenue Code) on
manufactured oils sold or distributed within the
limits of the city or municipality." (Sec. 4),
directing in the premises, however, that the
proceeds from the above levy "shall accrue to
the road and bridge funds of the political
subdivision for whose benefit the tax is
collected." (Sec. 5). The full texts of Sections 4
and 5 read:
"Sec. 4. Municipal Boards or councils may, not
withstanding the Provisions of sections one
hundred and forty-two and one hundred forty-
five of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
hereinabove tended, levy an additional tax of not
exceeding twenty-five percent of the rates fixed
in said sections, on manufactured oils sold or
distributed within the limits of the city or
municipality: Provided, That municipal taxes
heretofore levied by cities through city
ordinances on gasoline, airplane fuel, lubricating
oil and other fuels, are hereby ratified and
declared valid. The method of collecting said
additional tax shall be prescribed by the
municipal board or council concerned.
"Sec. 5. The proceeds of the additional tax on
manufactured oils shall accrue to the road and
bridge funds of the political subdivision for
whose benefit the tax is collected: Provided,
however, That whenever any oils mentioned
above are used by miners or forest
concessionaires in their operations, twenty-five
percentum of the specific tax paid thereon shall
be refunded by the Collector of Internal Revenue
upon submission of proof of actual use of oils
and under similar conditions enumerated in
subparagraphs one and two of section one
hereof, amending section one hundred forty-two
of the Internal Revenue Code: Provided, further,
That no new road shall be constructed unless
the routes or location thereof shall have been
approved by the Commissioner of Public
Highways after a determination that such road
can lie made part of an integral and articulated
route in the Philippine Highway System, as
required in section twenty-six of the Philippine
Highway Act of 1953."
Pursuant to the above provisions, the plaintiff
Municipality enacted Ordinances Nos. 3 and 7,
series of 1956 and 1957, respectively, levying
taxes on all manufactured oils sold and
distributed within its territorial jurisdiction. And,
on the authority of the above-numbered
ordinances, the plaintiff municipality assessed
against the defendant-appellee herein a tax
liability of P46,531.39 for the latter's admitted
sales of the taxable product in the plaintiff
municipality for the period of October 1, 1958 to
December 31, 1957 and from January 1, 1953 to
May 17, 1960.
In connection with the sales which were taxed
under the aforementioned ordinances, the
parties hereto entered into a partial stipulation of
facts to the effect that:
"(d) During the period starting on October 1,
195G up to and including December 31, 1957,
defendant Shell sold to the Philippine Iron
Mines, Inc. 1,006,400 liters of gasoline, 64,718
liters lubricating oil and 855 metric tons of
diesoline. These goods were delivered to the
Philippine Iron Mine, Inc. in the following
manners:
295,200 liters of gasoline and 220 metric tons of
diesoline were delivered by defendant Shell by
its own lorries to the Philippine Iron Mines, Inc.
at Larap within the territorial jurisdiction of
plaintiff municipality.
711,200 liters of gasoline and 635 metric tons of
diesoline and 64,713 liters of lubricating oil were
delivered by defendant Shell to the Philippine
Iron Mines, Inc. through a common carrier, the
A.L. Ammen Transportation Co. (ALATCO)
"(e) During the period from January 1, 1958 up
to and including May 17, 1960, defendant Shell
sold to the Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. 2,224,900
liters of gasoline, 1,861 metric tons of diesoline
and 294,339 liters of lubricating oil. These
goods were delivered to the Philippine Iron
Mines, Inc. in the following manners:
1,318,500 liters of gasoline and 424 metric tons
of diesoline were delivered by defendant Shell
by its own lorries to the Philippine Iron Mines,
Inc. at Larap within the territorial jurisdiction of
plaintiff municipality.
906,400 liters of gasoline, 1,437 metric tons of
diesoline and 224,339 liters of lubricating oil
were delivered by defendant Shell to the
Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. through a common
carrier, the A.L. Ammen Transportation Co.
(ALATCO).
"(f) The charges for the deliveries made through
the ALATCO were paid for by defendant Shell,
but were charged to the Philippine Iron Mines,
Inc. which company paid for said charges to
defendant Shell, together with the purchase
price.
"(h) Except for those above-mentioned,
defendant Shell has not sold and/or delivered
any other manufactured oils within the territorial
jurisdiction of plaintiff municipality during the
period from October 1, 1956 up to and including
May 17, 1960. Plaintiff municipality, therefore,
admits that it has no claims for taxes for said
period under the subject ordinances, except
those mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph.
"(i) Defendant Shell has no depot,
establishment, office or place of business within
the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff municipality.
All the above-mentioned goods sold to the
Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. originated from the
orders therefor made, and the sales Perfected,
outside plaintiff municipality.
"(j) Defendant Shell admits having received a
letter of demand dated March 9, 1960 from
plaintiff municipality demanding payment of
taxes."
The defendant Shell resisted the above demand
and, at the trial on the complaint filed by the
plaintiff municipality for its collection, maintained
that it was not liable on the said claims of the
plaintiff because: First, Republic Act 1435, the
law pursuant to which Ordinances Nos. 3 and 7
above were enacted, was unconstitutional since
it embraced more than one subject, contrary to
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. And
second, assuming the said law to be
constitutional, still the levy made by the plaintiff
municipality was illegal because it referred to
transactions made and consummated outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the said municipality.
In brief, the defendant-appellee argues that R.A.
1435 actually legislates on two subject matters,
namely: (1) the amendment of Sections 142 and
145 of the National Internal Revenue Code and
(2) the grant of a taxing power to local
governments, contrary to the provision of the
Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
(Par. 1, Section 21, Article VI). Moreover, the
said defendant-appellee maintains that there is
absolutely nothing in the title of R.A. 1435 An
Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway
Special Fund which suggests that it is a statute
granting local governments certain specific
taxing powers so that even if the said subject
matter were reasonably related to the task of
increasing the Highway Special Fund, the law
would still be fatally defective because the recital
in its body is not expressed in its title. In the
premises, Shell points out that while R.A. 1435
announces in its title that it is an enactment to
increase the Highway Special Fund, Section 5 of
it decrees the accrual of the collections
thereunder to the Road and Bridge Fund.
According to the defendant-appellee, the
aforementioned variance testifies to the failure of
the title of the law in question to express its
subject because the Highway Special Fund, by
statutory definition, is separate and distinct from
the Road and Bridge Fund, the former being a
national fund while the latter is a local
appropriation. In support of this contention, the
defendant-appellee cites Section 3(g) of R.A.
917 which reads:
"(g) The term 'local funds' includes funds raised
under the authority of a province, chartered city,
or municipality; allotments of internal revenue
accruing by law to their general funds and the
'road and bridge' funds; and other revenue
accruing to their general funds and made
available by resolution of the Board or Council
concerned for expenditures, but does not
include apportionment or allotments from the
Highway Special Fund."
The lower court sustained the above arguments
and declared R.A. 1435 as unconstitutional and,
consequently, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
And so this appeal.
We find for the appellant.
Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely,
the necessity for increasing the Highway Special
Fund. Its provisions that certain sections of the
revenue code should be amended and that local
governments should be granted a taxing-power
not therebefore enjoyed by them are not really
its subject matter, but rather, the two modes or
means devised by Congress to realize or
achieve the alleviation of the Highway Special
Fund. Plainly, therefore, the said law measures
up to the standard set by aforequoted
Constitutional provision.
Insofar as the assault on the constitutionality of
R.A. 1435 is concerned, the distinction drawn by
R.A. 917 between the Highway Special Fund
and the Road and Bridge
Fund proves hardly anything. On the contrary,
R. A. 917 is a documentary evidence on the
direct and substantial relation of the above two
funds one to the other.
It is true that under Section 3(g) of R.A. 917 the
High-way Special Fund should be distinguished
from the Road and Bridge Fund. But the
distinction was made therein not for the purpose
of separating one from the other lout merely,
among others, "to control the disposition of all
funds accruing to the Highway Special Fund."
(Section 2, R.A. 917). To be sure, fifty per
centum of the apportionable balance in the
Highway Special Fund is assigned or allocated
by the said law to the Road and Bridge Fund
(Section S). There can be nothing
constitutionally questionable, therefore, in a law
which, makes reference to the Road and Bridge
Fund although its title speaks alone of the
Highway Special Fund. As above illustrated, the
said two funds are, while distinguishable, directly
and substantially germane to each other. Thus,
they so relate to each other that the use of one
in the title do justify legislating in the body on the
other. The constitutional rule at bar is satisfied if
all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed
in its title. (People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535; Gov't
vs. Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634; and Nuval vs. de la
Fuente, L-5695, January 21, 1953.)
Besides, the definition of the Highway Special
Fund as distinguished from the Road and Bridge
Fund under Section 3(g) of R.A. 917 is expressly
qualified thereunder as the definition "when used
in this Act and in subsequent Acts having
reference thereto, unless the context indicates
otherwise." It is evident that its use in the title of
R.A. 1435 is different from its use in R.A. 917.
The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision that "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill," is to
prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which
might completely fail to apprise the legislators or
the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation.
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil., 1155 ). This
does not seem to this Court to have been
ignored in the passage of R.A. 1435 since, as
the records of its proceedings bear out, a full
debate on precisely the issue of whether its title
reflects its complete subject was had by the
Congress which passed it. (See Congressional
Record, House of Representatives, Vol. Ill, No.
67, p. 2098 if.)
In deciding the constitutionality of a statute
alleged to be defectively titled, every
presumption favors the validity of the Act, As is
true in cases presenting other constitutional
issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act
unconstitutional whenever possible. Where
there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of
either the title, or the Act, the legislation should
be sustained. (Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Vol. I, p. 295). In the incident on
hand, this Court does not even have any doubt.
The other issue raised in the instant appeal has
long been settled by this Court. It is not the
place where the contract was perfected, but the
place of delivery, which determines the taxable
situs of the property sought to be taxed. Thus, it
is all inconsequential that, as the herein appellee
makes much of, the subject transactions Were
perfected and consummated in Manila and that
Payments therefor to Shell were made in Manila
by the purchasers. As We ruled in the case of
Shell vs. Sipocot, G. R. No. L-12680, March 20,
1959, sustaining the theory advanced by the
very appellee herein
'From the explanatory note and the general
discussion in Congress over the bill (House Bill
No. 5288), it can be readily gathered that one of
the main purposes for the enactment of the law
was to provide for the construction and the
improvement of principal road systems in
municipalities. (Congressional Record, House of
Rep., Vol. Ill, No. 67, pp. 2093 et seq.) The
logical conclusion would accordingly follow that
the taxable situs of the property to be taxed
should be where the same is used. This place is
ordinarily the place of delivery. As correctly
pointed out by the appellants (SHELL) the term
'sold' under the statute and the ordinance in
question does not mean a mere perfected
contract but a consummated sale, where
delivery becomes of the essence in determining
the situs of the sale. In the cases of Soriano y
Cia. vs. Collector: of Internal Revenue, 51 Off.
Gaz.; 4548; Vegetable Oil Corporation vs.
Trinidad, 45 Phil. 822; and Earnshaw Docks and
Honolulu Iron Works vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 54 Phil. 696, it has been ruled that for
a sale to be taxed in the Philippines it must be
consummated there; thus indicating that the
place of consummation (associated with the
delivery of the things subject matter of the
contract) is the accepted criterion in determining
the situs of the contract for purposes of taxation,
and not merely the place of the perfection of the
contract." (p. 5. Italics supplied)
It does not seem, sporting of the appellee herein
to disavow the above ruling now. It was the one
who vigorously argued its merit then, and now
that it is sought to be given full effect and
meaning, it complains that the said ruling is
wrong, evidently because it is the subject of the
implementation. Such an attitude speaks very
weakly of the herein appellee's good faith.
Of course, Shell now maintains that while the
Sipocot ruling was to the effect that the place
where the contract was perfected could not tax
the sales thereunder if the delivery of its object
was at some other locality, the said ruling did
"not state that the tax can be imposed by the
municipality where delivery is made." This
argument is meritorious but only to the end that
this Court has cast suspicion on the appellee's
lack of good faith in asserting the same.
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered reversing the decision appealed from.
The appellee is ordered to pay the claims of the
herein appellant as recited in the first three
paragraphs of its prayer to its Complaint dated
June 16, 1960, plus interest computed at the
legal rate from the filing of the said complaint to
their actual payment and costs.
Judgment reversed.
Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co.
of the Philippines
Case No. 181
G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint for the
collection of sales taxes from Defendant on
the ground that the law which authorizes
collection of the same is unconstitutional.
Defendant Company refused to pay taxes LATIN MAXIM
accruing from its sales because

according to them the taxable sites of the

property sought to be taxed is not the said Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.

Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA Case No. 33

1435 or Act to Provide Means for
G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)
Increasing Highway Special Fund is
FACTS:
unconstitutional because it embraces two
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA
subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax
6132. The said Act purportedly
code, and 2) grant of taxing power to
encompasses more than one subject for the title
the local government, and makes reference to
of the Act allegedly fails to include
Road and Bridge Fund.
the phrase TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
ISSUE:
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
W/N RA 1435 is constitutional.
The statute plainly reads: An Act Implementing
HELD: Resolution to Both Houses Numbered

RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses

only one subject reflected by its Numbered Four of the Congress of the

title Road and Bridge Fund. Statutory definition Philippines Calling for a Constitutional
prevails over ordinary usage of the Convention, Providing for Proportional

term. The constitutional requirement as to the Representation Therein and Other Details
title of the bill must be liberally Relating to the Election of Delegates to and

construed. It should not be technically or the Holding of the Constitutional Convention,

narrowly construed as to impede the power Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act

of legislation. When there is doubt as to its Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for
validity, it must be resolved against the Other Purposes.

doubt and in favor of its validity. In the ISSUE:

abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is
W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing
the constitutional requirement that A bill shall more than one subject.
embrace only one subject, expressed
HELD:
in its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in
No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and
legislation because the title must be able to
therefore unnecessary because
apprise legislators and the public about the
the title expressly indicates that the act
nature, scope, and consequences of
implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2
that particular law.
and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both
Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise
categorically state in their titles that the
Constitutional Convention called for therein is
to propose amendments to the Constitution of
the Philippines, which phrase is
reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions.
The power to propose amendments to the
Constitution is implied in the call
for the convention itself, whose raison detre is
to revise the present Constitution. It is
not required that the title of the bill be an index
to the body of the act or be
comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough
that it fairly indicates the general
subject and reasonably covers all the provisions
of the act so as not to mislead
Congress or the people. All the details provided
for in RA 6132 are germane to and are
comprehended by its title.
People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje
Case No. 203
G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46
FACTS:
Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court
finding her guilty for the
violation of illegal practice of medicine and
illegally advertising oneself as a
doctor. Defendant practices chiropractic
although she has not secured a
certificate to practice medicine. She treated and
manipulated the head and body
of Regino Noble. She also contends that
practice of chiropractic has nothing to do
with medicine and that unauthorized use of title
of doctor should be understood to
refer to doctor of medicine and not to doctors
of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act
3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express
its subject.
ISSUE:
W/N chiropractic is included in the term
practice of medicine under
Medical laws provided in the Revised
Administrative Code.
HELD:
Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to
Amend (enumeration of
sections to be amended) is sufficient and it
need not include the subject matter of
each section. Chiropractic is included in the
practice of medicine. Statutory
definition prevails over ordinary usage of the
term. The constitutional requirement as
to the title of the bill must be liberally construed.
It should not be technically or
narrowly construed as to impede the power of
legislation. When there is doubt as to
its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt
and in favor of its validity. A bill shall
embrace only one subject, expressed in its title,
to prohibit duplicity in legislation by
apprising legislators and the public about the
nature, scope, and consequences of
the law.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation
Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An Act to
Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121.
In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is
empowered, in any franchise contract for the
supply of electric power constituting 50% of the
electric power and energy of that franchisee, to
realize a net profit of not more than 12%
annually of its investments plus 2-month
operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to
renew all existing franchise contracts so that the
provisions of the act could be given effect.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title An
Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No.
121 does not embrace, thus making it a rider
because it is violative of the constitutional
provision requiring that a bill, which may be
enacted into law, cannot embrace more than
one subject, which shall be expressed in its
title.
HELD:
Section 3 is constitutional.
Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is
sufficient that the title makes reference to the
legislation to be amended (in this case
Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional
provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive
enough to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect without expressing each
and every ends and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Title doesnt need to be a
complete index of the contents of the act.
Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81
G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of
this act expressed that indigent tenants should
be represented by Public Defendant of
Department of Labor. Congress then amended
this in Republic Act No. 2263: An Act Amending
Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.
Section 19 of the amendatory act says that
mediation of tenancy disputes falls under
authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also
provides that indigent tenants shall be
represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy
Mediation Commission.
ISSUE:
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is
unconstitutional because of the constitutional
provision that No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
HELD:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The
constitutional requirement is complied with as
long the law has a single general subject, which
is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional
provisions relating to subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as
to cripple or impede proper legislation.
LATIN MAXIM:
24a, 37, d
Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291
G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong because Article VIII,
Section 49 of this act provided that the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
shall be split into two separate districts.
ISSUE:
W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the
subject matter of R.A. No. 7675.
HELD:
RA 7675 is constitutional.
Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of
a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city .Moreover, a liberal construction
of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation. The Constitution
does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein.
LATIN MAXIM:
20a, d
Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of
Rizal
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)
FACTS:
The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted
its Ordinance No. 13, section 2 of which
provided that all owners and proprietors of the
industry known as fishing, with nets
denominated cuakit and pantukos, before
engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction
within three leagues from the shore-line of this
municipality, are obliged to provide themselves
with a license issued by this municipal
government, after payment of a fee of P50
annually, payable every three months. The
authority for the enactment of the ordinance was
from section 2270 of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of
1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, is invalid.
HELD:
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of
1916, now section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not
violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of
the Philippine Bill which provided that no private
or local bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject,
and that subject shall be expressed in
the title of the bill because the Administrative
Code is neither a private nor a local bill.
The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title,
An Act amending the Administrative Code. It
does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the
Jones Law, which provided that no bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject and that subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill, because it was
merely a revision of the provisions of the
Administrative Code enacted for the
purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the
Reorganization Act.
LATIN MAXIM:
37
People of the Philippines v. Valeriano
Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230
G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957)
Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55
FACTS:
Defendant was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of
Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The
defendant moved to quash the information on
the ground that the title of the act, which was an
Act to regulate the importation, acquisition,
possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to
prohibit the possession of same except in
compliance with the provisions of this Act, did
not include weapons other than firearms, and
that Section 26 violated the constitutional
provision that no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-
one title rule
2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution.
HELD:
No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780
on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title
rule referred to private and local bills only, and to
bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that
was already in force and existing at the time
the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision
of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed
in the title of the Act remained operative
because it was not inconsistent
with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of
Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution.
LATIN MAXIM:
30a, 36a, 46a, 50
People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Case No. 204
G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947)
Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63
FACTS:
The Peoples Court found the Appellant, guilty of
treason. Appellant attacked the constitutionality
of the Peoples Court Act on the ground that it
contained provisions which deal on matters
entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed
in its title, such as:
(1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance;
(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification
of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a
procedure for their substitution;
(3) a provision which changed the existing Rules
of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a
provision which suspends Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the Peoples Court Act was
unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The Peoples Court was intended to be a full
and complete scheme with its own machinery for
the indictment, trial and judgment of treason
cases. The provisions mentioned were allied
and germane to the subject matter and purposes
of the Peoples Court Act. The Congress is not
expected to make the title of an enactment a
complete index of its contents. The constitutional
rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the
subject expressed in its title.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon.
Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48
G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963)
Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31
FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the
margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the
Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank
refused to pass in audit and approved the said
refunds upon the ground that Petitioners
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde
is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2,
par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this
statute reads: The margin established by the
Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of
the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.
ISSUE:
W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by
law from the payment of the
margin fee.
HELD:
The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of
RA 2609 refers to the finished product as
expressed by the National Institute of Science
and Technology, and is distinct and separate
from urea and formaldehyde which are
separate chemicals used in the manufacture of
synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is
a finished product, while the ones imported by
the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the
importation of urea and formaldehyde is not
exempt from the imposition of the margin fee.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 6c, 25a
Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23
G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)
Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House
of Representatives to the Senate. Senator
Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments
which were approved by the Senate. The
House, without notice of said amendments,
thereafter signed its approval until all the
presiding officers of both houses certified and
attested to the bill. The President also signed it
and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator
Tolentino made a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a
wrong version of the bill because it did not
embody the amendments introduced by him and
approved by the Senate. Both the Senate
President and the President withdrew their
signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid.
Petitioner argued that the authentication of the
presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive
proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted
and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief
Executive withdrew their
signatures therein, the court declared that the
bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall
keep a journal. An importance
of having a journal is that in the absence of
attestation or evidence of the bills due
enactment, the court may resort to the journals
of the Congress to verify such.
Where the journal discloses that substantial
amendment were introduced and
approved and were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President for
signature, the court can declare that the bill has
not been duly enacted and did not
become a law.
LATIN MAXIM:
b2
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 210
G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83
FACTS:
In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources pursuant to the authority
granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003
(Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits
trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No.
37 was subsequently amended with FAO No.
371. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of
said order, challenged its legality on the ground
that FAO No. 371 was contrary to Act No.
4003, the former having no fixed period and thus
establishing a ban for all time while the latter
stating that prohibition was for any single period
of time not exceeding five years duration.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 371 was invalid.
HELD:
Section 2 of FAO No. 371 was valid. Although
FAO No. 371 was defective because it failed to
specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in
case of discrepancy between a basic law and a
rule issued to implement it, the basic law
prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 371
would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the
period of five years for any single period of time,
but it was not necessarily rendered void by the
omission.
LATIN MAXIM:
37, 38a
KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.
Case No. 68
G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)
FACTS:
DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed
asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within a
range of 15% above and below the LTFRB
official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB
issued Memorandum Circular No.92-009
allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25%
of the prescribed fares. PBOAP, without a public
hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of
the deregulatory policy and announced 20%
increase in existing fares. Petitioner filed a
petition opposing the increase in fares. SC
issued a temporary restraining order to prevent
PBOAP from implementing fare increase.
ISSUES:
1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to
increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is
unconstitutional on the ground that there was no
filing for a petition of purpose in the said
increase.
2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public
necessity for the increase thus violating the
Public Service Act and Rules of the Court.
HELD:
1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its
powers to PBOAP.
2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide
such public necessity as reason for the
fare increase.
LATIN MAXIM:
None
Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank
Case No. 57
G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)
FACTS:
Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled An
act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON
CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate
value from July 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as
provided in the Act. The Central bank released
Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that:
For exports of bananas shipped during the
period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the
stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. For
exports of bananas shipped during the period
from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the
stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For
exports of bananas shipped during the period
from July 1, 1973- June 30, 1974; the
stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%.
ISSUE:
W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995.
HELD:
Central Bank acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In case of discrepancy between the
basic law and the rule or regulation issued to
implement the said law, the basic law prevails.
The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the
terms of the basic law.
LATIN MAXIM:9c
China Banking Corp. v. CA
Case No. 59
G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.84
FACTS:
Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp.
and its president, So Ching, in return for
promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra
mortgages were additionally executed by So
Ching and his wife on July and August 1989.
The loans matured but So Ching was not able to
repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to
file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two
mortgaged properties. The properties were to be
sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28,
1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching.
The issuance of the preliminary injunction was
granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged
properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for
reconsideration and elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act
No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case,
instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So
Ching was contending.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose
the properties.
2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should
govern the extra judicial foreclosure.
HELD:
1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties.
2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law.
Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over
Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a
stature is superior to an administrative
directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed
or amended by the administrative directive.
LATIN MAXIM:
None
Santos v. Honorable Estenzo
Case No. 140
G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)
FACTS:
The decedent is a driver for Peoples Land
Transportation Company, of which Petitioners
are manager and proprietor. The Workmens
Compensation Commission awarded the
decedents widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus
burial expenses not exceeding P200. After 5
years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the
mother of the decedent, ordered Petitioners to
pay the award plus P500 as attorneys fees for
failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the
decision be annulled or modified based on
Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmens
Compensation Commission and prays further
that the P500 in attys fees exceeded the
allowed fees according to Sec.6 Rule 26 of the
said Rules.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Rules of the Workmens
Compensation Commission amended R.A. No.
772 and as a result deprived the court of its
jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in awarding the P500 in attorneys
fees.
HELD:
Petition was dismissed.
1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot
amend an act of Congress. Furthermore, the
Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after
the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main
case.
2. The court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in awarding the P500 since the said
rule only applies to the Commission and not the
Court.
LATIN MAXIM:
30, 35, 46a
Grego v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 120
G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997)
Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98
FACTS:
One of the Respondents was elected for his 3rd
and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of
Manila. His qualifications are being questioned
by herein Petitioner, who is also asking for the
suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings
into consideration the fact that Respondent was
removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff
upon finding of serious misconduct in an
administrative case held on October 31, 1981.
Petitioner argues that Respondent should be
disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner further argues that
the Local Government Code should be applied
retroactively.
ISSUE:
W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local
Government Code should be applied
retroactively due to its wording.
HELD:
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code
should not be applied retroactively. It is
understood that statutes are not to be construed
as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to
affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily
implied from the language of the enactment. The
fact that the provision of the Code in question
does not qualify the date of a candidates
removal and that it is couched in the past tense
should not deter the court from applying the law
prospectively. The term to be looked at in the
issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a
technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position. Since Respondent was
reelected, this does not fall under the scope of
the term.
LATIN MAXIM:
25a, 46c
Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan
Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)
FACTS:
Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging
slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees
including slaughterhouse fees, meat 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No.
inspection fees, corral fees, and internal 371. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of
organ fees, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
655. Petitioners questioned the validity or said
Ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance
No. 24, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction
provided by Commonwealth Act 655.
HELD:
Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the
issuance of the said ordinance. The
Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to
charge slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent
ordained the payment of other said fees, it
overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The
only other fees that would be acceptable were
veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it
was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the
court ordered Respondent to refund the fees
with the exception of slaughterhouse fees. One
of the rules of statutory construction is that
certain sections or parts of sections of an
ordinance may be held invalid without affecting
the validity of what remains, if the parts are not
so interblended and dependent that the vice of
one necessarily vitiates the others.
LATIN MAXIM:
15a, 37
People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 210
G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83
FACTS:
In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources pursuant to the authority
granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003
(Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits
trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No.
said order, challenged its legality on the ground
that FAO No. 371 was contrary to Act No.
4003, the former having no fixed period and thus
establishing a ban for all time while the latter
stating that prohibition was for any single period
of time not exceeding five years duration.
ISSUE:
W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 371 was invalid.
HELD:
Section 2 of FAO No. 371 was valid. Although
FAO No. 371 was defective because it failed to
specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in
case of discrepancy between a basic law and a
rule issued to implement it, the basic law
prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 371
would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the
period of five years for any single period of time,
but it was not necessarily rendered void by the
omission.
LATIN MAXIM:
37, 38a
National Housing Authority v. Reyes
Case No. 85
G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
FACTS:
Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of
25,000 sq/rn, subject of an
expropriation proceedings granted by the court
in favor NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed value of
P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner
opposed the payment claiming that it was too
excessive. He cited PD 464 which
provides just compensation not to exceed the
market value declared by the owner
in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge
granted the payment of P6,600.00,
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD
1224 which states that the government
shall choose between the value of real property
as declared by the owner x x x or
the market value determined by the City or
Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower.
ISSUE:
W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224
determines the valuation on just
compensation.
HELD:
Courts accord the presumption of validity to
executive acts and legislative
enactments, x x x because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution x
x x. The Respondent Judge should have
followed just compensation in expropriation
cases, that the lower value made by the
landowner should be the basis for fixing the
price. The petition for Certiorari is granted.
LATIN MAXIM:
37
Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito
Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 73
G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)
FACTS:
Private Respondent entered into a contract of
lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years.
After it expired, Private Respondent refused to
vacate the premises, and hence, the filing of an
ejectment suit against the Respondent. The
case was terminated by a compromise
agreement, and the lease continued from 1979
to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner
filed another ejectment suit. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1)
the lease contract has not expired; and (2) the
compromise agreement entered into constitutes
res judicata. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of
Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the continuance of lease is made to
depend upon the will of the lessee?
2. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by
compromise agreement on res judicata?
HELD:
This is untenable because the continuance of
lease is not dependent upon the will of the
lessee. On the compromise agreement, the
lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the
language employed indicates that it was the
intention of the parties. On the second issue, the
compromise agreement does not apply because
the present case requires a different set of
evidence. The compromise agreement does not
foreclose any cause of action arising from a
violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res
judicata does not apply.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 11a, 26,
Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;
Case No. 74
G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring
the authority to regulate Jai- Alai from local
governments to the Games and Amusements
Board (GAB). The City of Manila passed an
Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to
allow the Associated Development Corporation
(ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President
Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers
and authority of local governments to grant
franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other
forms of gambling. Then President Aquino
issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD.
No. 810 which revokes and cancels the
franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and
Amusement Corporation. In 1998, ADC tried to
operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and
Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D.
771 which expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling issued by local governments.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of
Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392
which transferred from local governments to the
GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D.
771 is violative of equal protection and non-
impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not
delegate to the City of Manila the power to
franchise the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O.
392 removes the power of local governments to
issue license and permit. All laws are presumed
valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not
repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It
did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because the said decree had
revoked all franchises issued by the local
governments without exceptions.
LATIN MAXIM:
5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Case No. 169
G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)
FACTS:
Petitioner, an Iglesia ni Cristo, was a member
of the Respondent Union which had with their
Company a collective bargaining agreement
containing a closed shop provision allowed
under R.A. 875: Membership in the Union shall
be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement RA 3350 amended RA 875: but
such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization.
Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union,
which wrote a formal letter to the Company
asking to separate the Petitioner from service.
ISSUE:
1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join
association?
2. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional?
3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse
of discretion when ruling that the Union should
pay 500 and attorneys fee.
HELD:
The right to join associations includes the right
not to join or to resign from a labor organization.
Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution,
as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973
Constitution, provide that the right to form
associations for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil
Code provides that attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation may be awarded when
the defendants act has compelled the Plaintiff to
incur expenses to protect his interest and in
any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 40b
Taada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287
G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)
Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in
demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
otherwise provided as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE:
W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2
of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of
publication.
HELD:
No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication per se, which cannot in any event be
omitted. Publication in full should be
indispensable. Without such notice or
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignorantia Legis non
excusat. The court, therefore, declares that
presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published shall have no
force and effect, and the court ordered that the
unpublished decrees be published in the Official
Gazette immediately.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a
Gutierrez v. Carpio
Case No. 55
G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)
FACTS:
The Litigants here compromised a civil case on
July 13, 1928, agreeing that if within a month
from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to
repurchase a certain land, the ownership would
vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs
duly
tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed
that by that time, August 13, 1928, the time
when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or
fixed period had already elapsed.
ISSUE:
W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of
tendering.
HELD:
No. The repurchase of the land was made within
the stipulated period. The above issue depends
upon the kind of month agreed upon by the
parties, and on the day from which it should be
counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been
modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code,
according to which month now means the civil
month and not the regular-30-day month. In
computing any fixed period of time, with
reference to the performance of an act required
by law or contract to be done within a certain
limit of time, the day from which the time is
reckoned is to be excluded and the date of
performance included, unless otherwise
provided. There is nothing in the agreement
providing otherwise.
LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 39a
Guzman v. Lichauco
Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to
recover possession of certain properties in
Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the
Plaintiff. The unsuccessful Defendants having
appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the
Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty
to conform with the provisions of Sec. 88 of the
CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they
desire to avoid the immediate execution
of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the
Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, on or before the
TENTH day of each Calendar month, the sums
of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as
the reasonable value of the use and occupation
of the property held by them. The Defendants
made such dilatory payments however they
failed to make such payments on or before the
tenth day of the month. As a result, the Plaintiff
moved the court to execute the judgments. The
court ordered the immediate execution of the
judgment.
ISSUE:
W/N the payments were made on or before the
Tenth day of each month.
HELD:
The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one
day late. The term month must now be
understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch
as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has
modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the
latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days.
LATIN MAXIM:
25a, 25c
U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161
G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the government from an
order of the court, setting aside the forfeiture of
a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the
principal on February 7, and the sureties were
notified on the same day to produce the thereof
their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that
the Defendants bond be forfeited and the
execution issued against the principal and the
sureties for the amount thereof, and that an alias
warrant be issued for the arrest of the
Defendant. By various orders of the court, the
sale was postponed from time to time, and
finally occurred on July 8, 1912, with
government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912,
the principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the
court, on application of the sureties, set aside
the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the
sheriff to annul the sale.
ISSUE:
W/N the execution sale occurred on the date
directed by the court.
HELD:
Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
unless otherwise specially provided, the time
within which an act is required by law to be done
shall be computed by excluding the first day and
including the last; if the last be a Sunday or a
legal holiday, it shall be excluded. This section
is only applicable if there is a computation
needed to be done. However, in this case, there
is no necessity for such computation for the date
is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also
directed that the sale should take place on a
named future date. The sale here of the property
must stand.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c
PNB VS CA
Case No. 238
G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993)
Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195
FACTS:
To secure payments of his loans, Private
Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner
bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner
bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged
property and won the highest bidder at the
auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was
registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in
favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the
said lots to a third party. The notices of sale of
Appellants foreclosed properties were published
on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues
of the newspaper Daily Record. The date March
28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April
11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday,
respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires
that the notice of auction sale shall be
published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the
requirements of weekly publication of notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
HELD:
It must be conceded that that Article 13 is
completely silent as to the definition of what is
week. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term
week was interpreted to mean as a period of
time consisting of seven consecutive days. The
Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with
the legal requirement of publication.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 9a, 9b
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124
G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No.
L-25327 (May 29, 1970)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19
FACTS:
Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled
as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they
are working from the purchasers where no
notice was previously given to them by the
vendor of the latters intention to sell the
property and where the vendor did not execute
the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code before the
registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court
dismissed
petitions, stating that the right of redemption
granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is only for
leasehold tenants and not for share tenants,
claiming that share tenancy and leasehold
tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code
that the code expressly grants said right to
leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover,
the court held that if the intention of Congress
was to extend the right of redemption to share
tenants through judicial legislation, the section
would have expressly said so.
ISSUE:
W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec.
12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only
leaseholders and not share tenants.
HELD:
Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous
assumptions and premises, reducing
agricultural lessee to only leasehold tenants.
The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code is the abolition of agricultural share
tenancy. The policy of the State is to establish
owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter
would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and
vital purpose of the statute.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a
Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43
U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300
G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911)
Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20
FACTS:
They made an oath before an election officer in
the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in
connection with the general election held on
Nov. 2, 1909) that they owned real property with
the value of P500. Evidence showed that the
Appellants, except for Daniel Navarro and
Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of the
assessed value of P500.
ISSUE:
W/N the said statutes true test of property
qualification to vote is the actual/market value of
the property owned or the assessed value
thereof.
HELD:
It was the intention of the legislator as proved
from an examination of the immediate context of
provisions of the statute defining property
qualifications of a voter, and of the statute as a
whole. In the statute, property qualification is an
alternative to qualification based upon an annual
payment. Both qualifications are under a single
head, suggesting an intimate relation between
the two in the mind of the legislator. Another
section of the statute disqualifies people who are
delinquent in the payment of public taxes
assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This
provision was directed to the case of
delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well
as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an
election law) is intended to secure purity of the
ballot box. If the property qualification is
actual/market value, it would be highly
improbable to enforce the statute within a
reasonable time because it will be difficult to
determine.
LATIN MAXIM:
10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37
Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149
G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977)
Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22
FACTS:
Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of
Labor Relations, required referendum election
among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to
their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers.
Petitioners contended that there was no
statutory authorization for the Respondent to
require referendum election and that
Respondent and the Bureau were beyond
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents
and giving them jurisdiction.
HELD:
Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this.
Respondent and the Bureau were within
jurisdiction. Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor
Code is very clear concerning executive
departments original and exclusive authority to
act.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9c, 20a, 24a
Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255
G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935)
Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote No.25
FACTS:
Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao,
Albay. On November 16, 1931, Act No. 3899
which provided for the age retirement among
justices was approved. A few years later,
Petitioner became 65 years of age (age
retirement as provided by Sec. 203 of the
Administrative Code, amended further by Act.
No. 3899). Shortly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar
was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the
place of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934,
Villar assumed office.
ISSUE:
W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the
Administrative Code, as further amended by Act
No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary
justices appointed prior to the approval of the
Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the
age of 65.
HELD:
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the
Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act
No. 3899).
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 46a
B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26
G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27
FACTS:
On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action
in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private
Respondent De Jesus for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land in said area. In
her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in
question was covered by PD 2016 (a
complementary provision of PD 1517, which
aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction.)
ISSUE:
W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in
upholding her rights as a lessee.
HELD:
PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in
invoking her rights as a tenant. While
it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said
provision still aims to protect the tenants from
unscrupulous landowners from demanding a
steep price for the land, as well as unjust
eviction.
LATIN MAXIM:
12a, 25a