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ALLAN GIBBARD
1. INTRODUCTION
Anyone has the right to make certain decisions without outside inter-
ference. So libertarians claim, but the claim is inconsistent-or at least,
I shall show, it is inconsistent under one natural interpretation. Later,
I shall develop and test two interpretations which make the claim con-
sistent; one of them, I think, succeeds in expressing an important part
of what many libertarians want to say.
A. K. Sen [3, 41 has already found one problem with this libertarian
claim that everyone has a right to determine certain decisions by himself.
In one simple form, he shows, the claim is inconsistent with the Pareto
principle-the principle that an alternative unanimously preferred to
another is preferable to it. Thus we must either give up the libertarian
claim in that form or give up the Pareto princip1e.l Here I shall show that
even giving up the Pareto principle is no sure protection; considerations
behind the claim in Sens version also lead in a natural way to a version
that is inconsistent by itself. Later, I shall consider two ways to modify
this inconsistent libertarian claim. The first new version falls back into
Sens paradox: the claim in that form is self-consistent but inconsistent
with the Pareto principle. The second new version succeeds better: in
that version the claim is not merely self-consistent, but consistent as well
with the Pareto principle. A libertarian, in short, is neither entirely safe
if he gets rid of the Pareto principle nor inextricably in trouble if he keeps
it.
2. AN INCONSISTENTLIBERTARIANCLAIM
9: nonempty subsets of 4;
E: members of 8;
f: SCFS.
Finally, x&y means myPbx, and for given P, 9, and E, C =S(P, 9, c)!-
The libertarian claim, then, is that for every person b there is an issue j
such that. in any alternative x, xj is his business alone. That means that
for every pair of alternatives x and y with xi = yi whenever B+ j, if
xP,y, then x is preferable to y. What is it for x to be preferable to y?
At the very least, it means that if x is available, then y is not optimal.
The following definitions, then, lead to the libertarian claim in what is
perhaps its most natural formulation.
(W)[i # j -+ xi = vi].
j-variants, then, are alternatives that differ from each other only in their
jth feature.
such that for every pair of j-variants x aHd y, f accords b the right to x
over y.
That is to say, there is a SCF which, for each possible set of circum-
stances, gives the set of all alternatives which would be just under those
circumstances, and that SCF satisfies Condition L.
It will now be shown that if there is more than one individual, then
the Libertarian Claim cannot hold.
The proof follows the pattern of the wall-color example at the beginning
of this section. Suppose f satisfies Condition L and v > 1. Then consider
people 1 and 2: For each, there is an issue j of the kind claimed in L.
It makes no difference for the logic of the case which person has which
issue, and so, without loss of generality, we can suppose that person 1
has issue 1 and person 2 has issue 2. Thus, if x and y are l-variants, then f
accords person 1 the right to x over y, and if x and y are 2-variants, then f
accords person 2 the right to x over y. Now let w, and y, be distinct
members of M, , let w2 and yz be distinct members of M, , and let
x3 E MS ,..., X, E MU . Define four alternatives as follows:
PM XPCYI- XPY.
Then whenever yQx, then yPx. For suppose -yPx. That means that
y E Y but x E C. Hence from the construction offt since x E C, we have
y E Y -+ -yQx, and thus since y E 9, we have -yQx. From -yPx,
then, it followed that -yQx; hence if yQx, then yPx, as asserted.
The SCFJ; then, satisfies L. For by the construction of Q, if x and y
are b-variants and b prefers x to y unconditionally for issue b, then xQy.
Therefore, under those circumstances, xpy, and hencef satisfies L.
It remains to be shown thatfis really a SCF-that C is never the empty
set. C will be empty only if for every x in 9,
That violates the stip tion that individual preferences are orderings5
and hence such a cycle cannot occur. The theorem is proved.
claims her right to w,, over wO, and Edwin likes wj no better than WE.
If Edwin exercises his right to avoid wE , he gets something he likes no
better. In such circumstances, even though Edwin has a right to wOover
WE and prefers wOto wE , wE may still be optimal. It may be to Edwins
advantage to waive his right to wOover wE in favor of the Pareto principle.
To say that Edwin has a right to wO over wE , then, is to say this. If
(1) Edwin prefers w, to w, , and
42) there is no z such that
(a> Edwin prefers wE to z or is indifferent between them, and
(b) others claim their rights to z over wO,
then w,Pw, .
This is not yet a definition of right, for the clause others claim
their rights to z over wO has not been given a meaning. The meaning it
must be given is broad. The goal here, formally put, is to prevent cycies
of the form
x$x, ,...) X,-$X, ) x,Px,
by breakmg them at some point. The problem is to accomodate both
rights and the Pareto principle; the relation P, then, can be forced in two
ways: by someones claiming his right on an issue and by unanimous
preference. I shall say that others besides b claim their rights to z over x
if z and x are connected by a chain of such Ps-if there is a sequence
YI ,..I yn of alternatives in 9, with y1 = z and yh = x, and such that at
each step at least one of the following holds:
(j) (x, Y, b) E 9,
(ii> xpby,
(iii) NX wBy[99].
This will be written xD,y[9?].
CONDITION 1LONf: For every b there is a j mch that for euery pair of
j-variants x and y, f accords b an alienable right to x ouer y.
5. Tm CONSISTENCY RESULT
Case 1. For each b, there is at most one L such that ~,-~&x,[92] and
-vc> XL-1pcx . Then there is an c such that (tic) x,-~P~x,. Otherwise
the cycle 0 cannot be completed. For take a b and L such that x,-,D,x,[92]
but -(Vc) x,-~P~x,. Then (x,-, , x, , b) E 92, and so from the way 9I?
was defined, v-tuples x,-~ and x, differ in their bth place. To complete
the cycle, there must be a K different from L such that x,+~ differs from x,
in its bth place. Now x,-~D~x,[B] cannot hold for any c # b, since then
x,_, and x, would have to be c-variants. By supposition, x,+~D~x, does
not hold unless (Vc) x,-,P,x, . From the definition of Q, since x~-~Qx, ,
the only remaining possibility is that (Vc) x,_~P~x, .
Even though some step in the cycle must be one of unanimous prefer-
ence, there cannot be a unanimous preference at every step in the cycle,
because if there were, individual preferences would be cyclic, and thus
not orderings. Therefore, there must be a transition from nonunanimous
preference to unanimous preference: an L such that -(Vc) xl-$,x, , and
therefore (lb) x,-~D~x,, but such that (Vc) x,P,x,+~ . By supposition,
this L is the only one such that for that b, xLplDbx, and -(Vc) xLmlP,x, .
Then let .Z be the sequence rightward from x,+~ to x,-~ in the cycle
at each step x, , x,+~ in 2, either (de)x,P,x,+~ must bold or else for some
c f b, <x, , x,+1 >c) E 52 and x,P,x,+~ . Nence x,+~ >)b x,&Z, 91, and
since x, # x,,, and x,R~x,+~, by Definition 7, x,_~ Wbx,[92]. Therefore
by Definition 8, x,-~D~x, does not hold, and this case cannot arise.
Case 2. For some b, there is more than one L such that x,-,D,x,[SJ
but -(Vc) x,_,P,x, . Then of the two or more such L, pick the one that
makes x, highest in bs preference-ordering (or one of them in case of ties)
andcallit~.Thenlet~bethefirsttotheleftof~inthecycle...,r,l,...,~,l...,
such that xLd1Dbx,[9] and -(VIZ) x,J,x, . Then by the way K was
chosen, x,Rbx, , and in the sequence C,
XL 3 x L+l 9*--s K-1 9
W) Y&PCY,l , (1)
(Wk =f b & (YL , Y+l , c> E @ & YP,Y,,l. (2)
PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAXM 407
Take any L from 1 to X - 1: for that L either (1) holds or (2) holds. If (2)
holds, so that for some c, (y, , yLil , c) E 9, then since B _C5% ) then
for that C, (y, ) yL+I , c> E .%n, and hence
y hypothesis,
-x W,y[Bq. (8)
Hence by Definition 8, from (4): (7j, and (8) we have XII,&%]. That
proves the lemma.
Now the proof of the theorem: Suppose W C $Cn but A& 2 gn+l.
Then for some x, y, and b, (x, y, b) E 9 but (x, y, b) $ 9?)n+l , Then for
that x, y, and b, by Definition 12 of gnfl , for some P, Y, and 5 we have
xD,J@!~] but not xPy. Now from Lemma 3, since (x, y, b) E ZZ,
xD,y[CZ,], and 9 C 5%) we have x&y[Rj. By Definition 9, then, since
xD,y[G?] but not xPy, f does not realize 9, contrary to supposition.
Therefore, if .% C gn then %?C %!n+l , and the theorem is proved.
THEOREM 7 *. f realizes B.
408 ALLAN GJBBARD
XaYPu, (9)
-xPy. (10)
In that case, there is no y1such that xD,y[B,]. For from (9), by Defini-
tion 8 of D, , (x, y, b) E W. Hence by Definition 14 of W, for every n,
<x,y,b)E%. (11)
Since (x, Y, b) E gn+l , by Definition 12 of c%~+~, if xDby[&], then
xPy. From (lo), then,
-x KYPfnl. (13)
From (9), by Definition 8 of Db ,
XPhY. (14)
From (14), (ll), and (13), by Definition 8, xDay[&J, contrary to (12).
Therefore,
(W x WbYL%&I. 05)
At the same time, from (9) by Definition 8,
-x W,y[k?P]. (161
It remains to be shown that (15) and (16) are incompatible. First, two
lemmas.
x >>b y[-T;, ,%I, at each step y, , yL+1 in the sequence .6, at least one of
the following holds:
WC?YLPCYLfl3 (1)
(WC =+ b 22 (Y 3 Ye1 : c> c 22 & YPCYi-11. (9
Therefore at each step in the sequence .Z, (1) or (2) holds.
Defmition 6, x >>b y[Z, W], and 2: is not the shortest s~bse~~~~~e of 2
such that x >b y[Z, 3]. That proves the lemma.
In either case, then, (I) or (17) holds for that L. (1) or (17) holds, then,
for every L from il to h - 1, and so by Definition 6, z >Zb x[Z, a]. Since
2 # y and y&z, we have x Wby[Wo], contrary to assumption. Therefore
for so1ne 8, -2. 2% XL% %J.
NOW let y be such an n. Then for every n > y, NZ >>b x[Z, 8& For
by Definition 12, it follows immediately that Bm C 9,, , and hence from
Lemma I, if z >,b x[Z, B,], then z >>b x[Z, B$,]. Thus since NZ >b x[Z9 &],
for every y12 y, -Z >>b x[Z? 9,], and the lemma is proved.
NOW the proof of the theorem: On the assumption that the theorem
was false, it was shown that
410 ALLAN GIBBARD
Assume (15) and (16). In (15), xWOy[gn] means that for some z and 2,
z # y & y&z & z >>b x[Z, W,] & 2 consists of members of Y. (18)
REFERENCES