JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 7, 388-410 (1974)

A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim*

ALLAN GIBBARD

Department qf Philosophy, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637

Received May 21, 1973

1. INTRODUCTION

Anyone has the right to make certain decisions without outside inter-
ference. So libertarians claim, but the claim is inconsistent-or at least,
I shall show, it is inconsistent under one natural interpretation. Later,
I shall develop and test two interpretations which make the claim con-
sistent; one of them, I think, succeeds in expressing an important part
of what many libertarians want to say.
A. K. Sen [3, 41 has already found one problem with this libertarian
claim that everyone has a right to determine certain decisions by himself.
In one simple form, he shows, the claim is inconsistent with the Pareto
principle-the principle that an alternative unanimously preferred to
another is preferable to it. Thus we must either give up the libertarian
claim in that form or give up the Pareto princip1e.l Here I shall show that
even giving up the Pareto principle is no sure protection; considerations
behind the claim in Sens version also lead in a natural way to a version
that is inconsistent by itself. Later, I shall consider two ways to modify
this inconsistent libertarian claim. The first new version falls back into
Sens paradox: the claim in that form is self-consistent but inconsistent
with the Pareto principle. The second new version succeeds better: in
that version the claim is not merely self-consistent, but consistent as well
with the Pareto principle. A libertarian, in short, is neither entirely safe
if he gets rid of the Pareto principle nor inextricably in trouble if he keeps
it.

2. AN INCONSISTENTLIBERTARIANCLAIM

What, more precisely, do I mean here by the libertarian claim?

Begin with an example provided by Sen [4, p. 1521. I have a right, many
* This paper is revised in light of the incisive comments of an associate editor, for
which I am grateful.
1 For further discussion of this, see [2] and [5].
388
Copyright 0 1974 by Academic Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM 389

people would hold, to choose the color of my bedroom walk. That

means that if I prefer white bedroom walls to yellow, then no matter
who wants my walls yellow, it is preferable, other things equal, for them
to be white. The libertarian claim is that everyone has rights in this
sense -in a very modest version, that everyone has at least one such right.
Sen puts this modest version as follows: For each person, there is at
least one pair of distinct states of the world, x and y, such that if he prefers
x to y, then x is preferable to y, and if he prefers y to x, then y is preferable
to x [3, p. 871. Suitably formahzed, the claim even in this form is incon-
sistent with the Pareto principle. If a right, though, is to mean something
like the right to choose the color of ones own bedroom walls, then even
the modest claim that everyone has at least one right can be put more
strongly. For each person, the claim can be put, there is at least one
feature of the world-such as the color of his bedroom walls-that is
his business alone. That means that if two states of the world x and y
differ only in that feature, and he prefers x to y: then x is socially pre
to y. That, in turn, means at the very least that if x is attainable,
ought not to be chosen. That is what I shall call the i~b~~~~r~~~ claim.
Here is a case where the libertarian claim breaks down. 4 am a perverse
nonconformist: I want my bedroom walls to be a different color from
Mrs. Grundys. Grundy, on the other hand, is a conformist: She wants
her bedroom walls to be the same color as mine. Exactly four social
states are available: a,LG,, azov, aszo, and ayl, ; they differ only in the color
of our respective bedroom walls. The first index gives the color of my
wails and the second that of Grundys, so that in a,, , for instance, mine
are white and Grundys yellow.
Assume, then, the libertarian claim in a speciiic version: that if two
states differ only in the color of someones bedroom walls, the one he
prefers is preferable. In the case I have described, it follows for each
attainable state that it ought not to be chosen. Take state a,, . I prefer
a,, to a,, , for I want my walls to be different from Grundys, Since the
two differ only in the color of my bedroom walls: the one 3 prefer Is
preferable: a,, is preferable to aruE . I shall write this as
8 tow: then, ought not to be chosen, for avW is attainable and
Similarly, Grundy prefers aluwto a,w ; therefore a&aWU, and
not to be chosen. Again, I prefer a,, to aVs ; hence azOVPa.y!,
ought not to be chosen. Finally, Grundy prefers a,, to .aYW, and so auuPa,, ,
and a,, ought not to be chosen. Pn short, with P, used for my preferences
and P2 for Grundys, it follows respectively from aywPIaWW, awV2P2a,,,
wuplav2/, and ayvP2a21wthat a,Ja,, , awwf%uv, a,,P-a,, , ad
and each of the available alternatives ought not to be chosen.
Here is the argument in its general form. First, the hbertarian claim
390 ALLAN GIBBARD

needs to be formulated more precisely. The libertarian claim is that each

person has a right to determine certain features of the world by himself.
To state this claim, we must represent each state of the world by a number
of independent features: an alternative x, I shall say, is a p-tuple
(Xl ,a.-, x,) of features. Each index from 1 to p, then, designates an
issue: a choice among alternative possible features of some type. The set
of all complete alternatives, available and unavailable, can now be defined
as follows: For each issue i from 1 to ,u, let there be a finite set iV& of
feature-alternatives for issue i, each with at least two members. The set &Z
of alternatives, then, is the Cartesian product Ml x ... x MM ; it consists
of every p-tuple <x1 ,..., x,) with xi E M1 ,..., x, E M, .
A theory of justice, now, should say which possible social choices
would be just. It should make the set of just alternatives a function of
what the people involved prefer, which alternatives are available, and
any other relevant information. I shall represent a theory of justice by a
social choice function f defined as follows. Let v be a fixed positive integer,
the number of people in society. A preference v-t&e P is a v-tuple
VI ,**., P,) of orderings of A, called preference-orderings; a preference
v-tuple, then, gives a preference-ordering for each person in society.
A social choice jimction f (P, 9, .$) is a function whose domain consists
of the triples (P, 9, f) with P a preference v-tuple, 9 a nonempty
subset of &Z which we can think of as the set of available alternatives,
and t a member of a fixed set 8, where 9 is to be interpreted as the set
of all possible combinations of additional relevant factors: For every
such P, 9, and 5,f(P, y,& is a nonempty subset C of Y. C, then, is
the set of just or optimal alternatives from among Y, as a function f
of the individual preferences given by P, the set Y of available alternatives,
and other relevant factors given by 4. 2 Social choice function will be
abbreviated SCF.
Some words on notation. At this point, we have the following constants:

p: the number of issues; that is to say, the number of features in an

alternative;
M 1 ,..., Mu : finite sets of feature-alternatives, each with at least two
members;
v: the number of people in society;

2A SCF is similar to a constitution in Arrow [l]. Arrow, however, imposes a

number of conditions on constitutions-Collective Rationality, the Pareto Principle,
and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives-which are not assumed here. Thus
Arrows famous impossibility theorem, that no constitution satisfies the conditions he
sets out, has no bearing on the matter in this paper.
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM 398

F: a nonempty set of possible combinations of additional relevant

fact A.

The variables range as follows:

i and j: indices from 1 to pcL.designating issues;
a, w, x, y, and z, sometimes with subscripts or primes: alternatives
in A. Each, then, is a p-tuple on the pattern w = (wl I..lY w,>;
b and c: integers from 1 to v, representing individuals;
P: preference v-tuples (PI ,,.., PJ, where each Pb is an ovdeving of
A-that is, satisfies the axioms,

9: nonempty subsets of 4;
E: members of 8;
f: SCFS.

Finally, x&y means myPbx, and for given P, 9, and E, C =S(P, 9, c)!-
The libertarian claim, then, is that for every person b there is an issue j
such that. in any alternative x, xj is his business alone. That means that
for every pair of alternatives x and y with xi = yi whenever B+ j, if
xP,y, then x is preferable to y. What is it for x to be preferable to y?
At the very least, it means that if x is available, then y is not optimal.
The following definitions, then, lead to the libertarian claim in what is
perhaps its most natural formulation.

DEFINITION 1. Givenf, P, Y, and e, we have xPy if and only if

XE.Y-+y$G.

DEFINITION 2. f accords b the right to x over y if and only if

w>P-~)(~obpbY + XPYI-

DEFINITION 3. x is a j-variant of y if and only if

(W)[i # j -+ xi = vi].

j-variants, then, are alternatives that differ from each other only in their
jth feature.

CONDITION L ON A SCF f: For every individual b there is an isme .j

392 ALLAN GIBBARD

such that for every pair of j-variants x aHd y, f accords b the right to x
over y.

THE LIBERTARIAN CLAIM. The just SCF satis$es Condition L.

That is to say, there is a SCF which, for each possible set of circum-
stances, gives the set of all alternatives which would be just under those
circumstances, and that SCF satisfies Condition L.
It will now be shown that if there is more than one individual, then
the Libertarian Claim cannot hold.

THEOREM 1. No SCF with number of individuals v > 1 satisfies

Condition L.

The proof follows the pattern of the wall-color example at the beginning
of this section. Suppose f satisfies Condition L and v > 1. Then consider
people 1 and 2: For each, there is an issue j of the kind claimed in L.
It makes no difference for the logic of the case which person has which
issue, and so, without loss of generality, we can suppose that person 1
has issue 1 and person 2 has issue 2. Thus, if x and y are l-variants, then f
accords person 1 the right to x over y, and if x and y are 2-variants, then f
accords person 2 the right to x over y. Now let w, and y, be distinct
members of M, , let w2 and yz be distinct members of M, , and let
x3 E MS ,..., X, E MU . Define four alternatives as follows:

amw= <w , wz,x3 ,..., x,),

aWY= <WI 2Y2, x3 ,*.-> xu>,
at/w = <Yl 2w2, x3 ,.*.,xu>,
a1121= <Yl 3Yz , x3 2)44).

Let 9 = ialrrw, awv, avw, aA.

Now let PI rank the members of Y in order a,,a,,a,,a,, . Let Pz
order them ayvawwaywawv . Now a, and ayg are l-variants, and hencef
accords 1 the right to awzlover a,, . Thus from Definition 2, since a,,P,a,, ,
we have awvPayll , and since a,, E Y, by Definition 1 we have avu$ C.
Likewise, agv and a,, are 2-variants, and hence f accords 2 the right to
ay2/over arw . Thus since a,,P,a,, , we have aYIJPazlw, and arw $ C. By
similar reasoning, since a,Jla,, , we have aww$ C, and since awwPzawv,
we have awv$ C. In short, none of the members aww, awzl, agw, and
agv of Y are in C, contradicting the stipulation that C is always a non-
empty subset of 9. The assumption that SCF f satisfies L leads to a
contradiction, and the theorem is proved.
 ??ARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM 393

3. A PARETO-INCONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM

Modest though it seems, then, the Libertarian Claim as formulated

sets a standard for justice which cannot be met. What has gone wrong?
In cme respect at least, the way the claim was worked out looks insidious.
The wall-color example started out with an apparent truism: that I have
a right to choose the color of my own bedroom walls. That meant, I said,
that if I prefer white walls to yellow, then no matter what anyone else
prefers, it is socially preferable, other things equal; for my walls to
white. That seems fair enough so far. My actual preferences, however,
were nst, properly speaking, for white walls or for yellow, but for walls
that differed from Grundys. That did give me a conditiona! preference
for white walls-a preference for white walls on condition that Grundys
walls were yellow -but that is not the same thing as an intrinsic preference
for white walls. The libertarian claim as given, though, !ets this mere
conditional preference govern: It says that if I want my walls to differ
from Grundys, then it is better to have my walls white and Grundys
yellow than to have both our walls yellow. In saying that, it may read
too much into the truism it was supposed to formulate.
Perhaps, then, a reasonable libertarian claim would disregard such
conditional preferences. I have an unconditional preference for white
walls over yellow If other things equal, I prefer white walls ts yellow
regardless of any other feature of the world. Perhaps what a libertarian
ought to claim is this: If I have an unconditional preference for white
walls over yellow, then regardless of what other people prefer, it is
preferable-other things equal-for my walls to be white.
Such a claim could be put as follows.

DEFINITION 4. Let x and y be feature-alternatives in &fj . Then for

a given I?, person 6 prefers x to y unconditionaily for issue j if and only if
for every pair of j-variants x and y, if xj = x and yj = y, then S?,y.

CQNDITION k ON SCF J For each person b there is an imue j mch

that for every pair of j-variants x and y, whenever b prefers xj to yj uncon-
d~tiQ~~~~~y~~~issuej, then xPy.

LIBERTARIAN CLAIM II. The just SCF satisjks IL.

Condition L, then, seems a plausible statement of what a libertarian

should demand. There is a sense in which I have a right to walls of any
color I want, without necessarily having the right to match Grundys walls.
Condition L says that everyone has at least one right in that sense.
394 ALLAN GIBBARD

How does L fare? Unlike the old Condition L, as will be shown,

Condition L can be satisfied. It thus escapes the paradox that besets
Condition L in Section 2. L does, however, fall into Sens paradox:
L is inconsistent with the Pareto condition:

CONDITION P ON SCF $ For every P, 9, .$, x, and y,

PM XPCYI- XPY.

That Conditions L and P are inconsistent will be shown in Theorem 2.

In both these respects, L is like Sens libertarian condition (Condi-
tion L [3, p. 87]), which as a condition on SCFs, I shall call SL.

CONDITION SL ON SCFf: For eachperson b there are a pair of distinct

alternatives x and y such that f accords b the right both to x over y and
to y over x.
Even though L and SL are alike in some ways, the two are quite
different conditions. SL guarantees each person a special voice on only
one pair of alternatives, but the special voice is a strong one: the alternative
he prefers is to be preferable, no matter what his other preferences.
L guarantees each person a special voice on many pairs of alternatives
-indeed for some issue j, it gives him a special voice on all pairs that
dier solely in their jth feature-but the voice is limited. The one he
prefers is to be preferable if indeed he prefers its distinguishing feature
unconditionally; otherwise his preference may be overridden. L, then,
grants a weaker special voice than SL does, but grants it for more pairs
of alternatives.
Here is a case where rights in the sense given by L conflict with the
Pareto principle. I presumably still have a right to choose the color of my
bedroom walls, and that is now supposed to mean the following: If two
states of the world differ only in the color of my walls, then if I prefer
one color to another for my walls unconditionally, the state with the
color I prefer is preferable. Mr. Parker presumably has a right in the
same sense to choose the color of his walls. Now suppose I want my walls
to be white, but care even more that Parkers be white; suppose Parker
wants his walls yellow, but cares even more that mine be yellow. Then
in the notation of Section 2, with my walls put first and Parkers second,
I prefer the alternatives in order a,,a,,a,,a,, ; Parker, in order
a,,a,d,,a,, . Now I prefer white to yellow for my walls unconditionally;
that is to say, I prefer white walls to yellow whatever fixed color Parkers
may be. Parker likewise prefers yellow to white for his walls uncondi-
tionally. Hence, we get a cycle as follows. au,Vand awWdiffer only in the
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM 3%

color of Parkers walls, and since he prefers yellow to white uncondi-

tionally, we have aw,,Paww. aWWand a,, differ only in the color of my
walls, and since I prefer white to yellow ~~condit~o~a~~y, we have
hdJauw . Finally, we both prefer ayW to aGg, and so by the Pareto
principle, we have ayzr;PaWl/, and the cycle is complete. Sens paradox
stands, even when conditional preferences are disregarded.
Now for the formal statement and proof of this result.

THEOREM 2. No SCF with number of people v > 1 satksjes boric

Cotzdition L and Condition P.
Proof. Suppose ,f satisfies L and P, and u > I. Then as in the proof
of Theorem 1, we can suppose without loss of generality that person I
has a special voice on issue 1 of the kind stated in L, and person 2 has a
like special voice on issue 2. Thus for any pair of l-variants x and y,
if person I prefers x1 to y1 unconditionally for issue I, then xPy; hkewise
for any pair of 2-variants x and y, if person 2 prefers xB to ~1~uncondi-
tionally for issue 2, then xPy.
Now define .aUW, auu , agW, and avv as in the proof of Theorem 1,
Let person 1 prefer each alternative x with x1 = wI to its l-variant x
with x1 = y, , and in particular, let him prefer the four named alternatives
in order a,,a,v,a,,a,, . Then he prefers w1 to y1 unconditionally for issue 4~
Thus since a,,, and aYWare l-variants with w1 as the first feature of
and y, as the first feature of avW, we have awWPayW . Let person 2 prefer
each alternative x with xz = yz to its 2-variant x s,uch that x2 = w2 9
and prefer the named alternatives in order avvavwaWvamW I Thm he prefers
y, to wz unconditionally for issue 2, and since aug and aGWare 2-variants
with yB as the second feature of aWv and w2 as the second feature of a,,,, 9
we have at-c7jPa,uW e
Finally, let everyone else prefer avzvto a,, . Then since both person i
and person 2 do so as well, the preference for ayW over aWy is u~a~~rno~~.
Since Condition P holds, we therefore have azlUPaWV. That gives a cycle
a,,Pa,,, , a,,Pa,, , and a,,Pa,, ; hence if Y = (a,, , a,, s a,& then
none of the members of 9 are in C. That contradicts the stipulation
that C is always a nonempty subset of 9. The assumption thatf satisfies
both L and P leads to a contradiction, and the theorem is proved.
Now for the result that I., is consistent by itself. I, can be satisfied,
so long as there are enough issues to go around-so long as the number p
of features in an alternative is at least as great as the number v of people.

THEOREM 3. Ifp > v, then there is a SCF which satisfies I..

The theorem is proved by constructing a SCF which gives each person b

396 ALLAN GIBBARD

an appropriate special voice on the identically numbered issue b. Let Q

be the relation between x and y,
(3b)[x and y are b-variants & person b prefers xb to ya unconditionally
for issue b].
Letfbe generated from Q in the following manner: For each P, 9, and [,

f(P, Y, f) = {x: x E Y & (Vy)[y E 9 --) -yQx].

Then whenever yQx, then yPx. For suppose -yPx. That means that
y E Y but x E C. Hence from the construction offt since x E C, we have
y E Y -+ -yQx, and thus since y E 9, we have -yQx. From -yPx,
then, it followed that -yQx; hence if yQx, then yPx, as asserted.
The SCFJ; then, satisfies L. For by the construction of Q, if x and y
are b-variants and b prefers x to y unconditionally for issue b, then xQy.
Therefore, under those circumstances, xpy, and hencef satisfies L.
It remains to be shown thatfis really a SCF-that C is never the empty
set. C will be empty only if for every x in 9,

In that case there will be a cycle 0,

x,Qx, ,...> x,-IQX, , x,Qx, ,
where x1 ,..., x, are members of Y. To prove the theorem, we must
prove that such cycles do not occur.
Since xlQxz , from the way Q is defined, there is a b such that x1 and
x2 are b-variants of each other. Take that b, and for any alternative y,
let y* be the b-variant of x1 such that y,* = yb . The *-operator, then,
has the following properties:
(i) For all y and z, y* and z* are b-variants of each other.
(ii) If ya = zb, then y* = z.
In addition, the *-operator satisfies the following lemma.

LEMMA. Let yQz. Then if y is a b-variant of z, then y*Pbz*, and other-

wise y * = z*. In either case, then, y*R,,z*.

Proof. Let yQz. If y is not a b-variant of z, then by the way (2 is

defined, there is a c such that y is a c-variant of z. Clearly b f c, and so
y,, = zb , Therefore by (ii), y* = z*, and one part of the lemma is proved.
If, on the other hand, y is a b-variant of z, then from the way Q is
defined, we can have yQz only if b prefers yb to z, unconditionally for
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAK CLAIM 397

issue b. Thus, since by the definition of y* and z* we have y, = yb

andz, ==Zb, and since by (i) y* and z* are b-variants, by
of ~unconditio~ally prefers it follows that y*P,z. That c
proof of the lemma.
Now since x1 and x2 are b-variants, it follows from the lemma a
from x1Qx2 in cycle 0 that x,*Pbx2*. Also, by the lemma and cycle
-wehave x2*&x3*,..., x,*Rbxl *. Hence we have a cyclic individual prefer-
ence,
xl+PbXp*, X,*&X3*,..., X,RbX1*.

That violates the stip tion that individual preferences are orderings5
and hence such a cycle cannot occur. The theorem is proved.

4. A PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLArnl

A libertarian might, then, accept the Libertarian Claim II as an expres-

sion of what he wants to say and throw out the Pareto principle. In the
wall-color example of Section 3, he could then say, the just outcome is
the one in which my walls are white and Parkers are yellow. I, after all,
prefer white unconditionally for my walls, and Parker prefers yellow
unconditionally for his; and the color of ones own walls, the libertarian
can say, is his own business: If he prefers one color unconditionally,
then that is the color his walls ought to be. It should make no difference,
on this account, that we both prefer the state in which my walls are
yellow and Parkers are white. That preference stems from busybody
interests which ought to be ignored. Each of us should choose the color
of his own walls, however little he cares, and S&X the torments of the
nosy at the choice the other makes.
To some libertarians, however, that way of thinking will seem too
paternalistic: It keeps Parker and me from striking a bargain we would
e both prefer the outcome with my walls yellow and
but on the account in the last paragraph, that outcome
is nonoptimal. Many libertarians would hold that Parker and I s
be free to agree to that outcome. True, the preferences that would
us agree to it stem from nosiness, but a persons motives, such a libertarian
could say, are his own business. There is a strong libertarian tradition
oE free contract, and on that tradition, a persons rights are his to use or
bargain away as he sees fit. I shall not try here to formulate the notion of
free contract, but it does seem important at least to find a version of
the libertarian claim that is consistent with the Pareto principle, an
permits at least those bargains to which everyone would agree.
398 ALLAN GIBBARD

How, then, should the libertarian claim be modified to accomodate

the Pareto principle? Here is another case in which individual rights
apparently conflict with the Pareto principle. The conflict here, as in the
previous case, grows out of one persons taking a perverse interest in
the affairs of another, and to my eye, at least, it is plain in this case how
the conflict ought to be resolved. Later, I shall generalize the moral of
the example.
Angelina wants to marry Edwin but will settle for the judge, who
wants whatever she wants. Edwin wants to remain single, but would
rather wed Angelina then see her wed the judge. There are, then, three
alternatives:

wE : Edwin weds Angelina;

w, : the judge weds Angelina and Edwin remains single;
w, : both Edwin and Angelina remain single.

Angelina prefers them in order w,w,w, ; Edwin, in order w,,wEw,.

Here, naive considerations of rights and the Pareto principle combine
to yield a cycle. First, Angelina has a right to marry the willing judge
instead of remaining single, and she prefers wJ to w, . Hence w,Pw,, .
Next, Edwin has the right to remain single rather than wed Angelina,
and he prefers w, to w, , where the only difference between the two is
in whether or not he weds her. Therefore w,Pw, . Finally, since all prefer
w, to w, , by the Pareto principle we have wEPwJ . The cycle is complete:
w,Pw,, w,,PwE, and wEPwJ.
At what point should the cycle be broken ? It could be broken at the
step that invokes the Pareto principle-the step w,Pw, . On the account
that breaks the cycle there, wJ is optimal, and Angelina should wed the
judge. Here again, though, a libertarian may want to allow the parties
to bargain. Angelina has every right to wed the judge, but she prefers
Edwin; Edwin has every right not to wed Angelina, but if he wants her
not to wed the judge, then Edwin must wed her himself. Left freely to
bargain away their rights, then, Edwin and Angelina would agree to the
outcome w, .* wedding each other. Hence, a libertarian may well hold
that-deplorable though Edwins motives be-w, is a just outcome
under the circumstances. If so, the cycle is to be broken at the step
w,Pw,.
That means we must deny that Edwins preferring w, to w, automatically
makes w, preferable to wE . He has the right to remain single, but the
right is alienable: He can bargain it away to keep Angelina from marrying
the judge. For the right is useless to Edwin: Although he prefers w, to
w, , and could avoid w, by exercising his right to w,, over w, , Angelina
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM 399

claims her right to w,, over wO, and Edwin likes wj no better than WE.
If Edwin exercises his right to avoid wE , he gets something he likes no
better. In such circumstances, even though Edwin has a right to wOover
WE and prefers wOto wE , wE may still be optimal. It may be to Edwins
advantage to waive his right to wOover wE in favor of the Pareto principle.
To say that Edwin has a right to wO over wE , then, is to say this. If
(1) Edwin prefers w, to w, , and
42) there is no z such that
(a> Edwin prefers wE to z or is indifferent between them, and
(b) others claim their rights to z over wO,
then w,Pw, .
This is not yet a definition of right, for the clause others claim
their rights to z over wO has not been given a meaning. The meaning it
must be given is broad. The goal here, formally put, is to prevent cycies
of the form
x$x, ,...) X,-$X, ) x,Px,
by breakmg them at some point. The problem is to accomodate both
rights and the Pareto principle; the relation P, then, can be forced in two
ways: by someones claiming his right on an issue and by unanimous
preference. I shall say that others besides b claim their rights to z over x
if z and x are connected by a chain of such Ps-if there is a sequence
YI ,..I yn of alternatives in 9, with y1 = z and yh = x, and such that at
each step at least one of the following holds:

(3c)[c f b & c has the right to yL over yL+I & ~JJ,+~].

That leaves a characterization of rights which is circular. has the
right to has been defined in terms of itself. First, the expression Edwin
has the right to wO over wE was defined by using the expression others
claim their rights to z over w ,, ; now others claim their rights has been
defined using C has the right to yL over yLT1~ How can this circularity
be avoided ?
The best strategy, I think, is this: First take a complete list of everyones
rights without saying what a right is; then define in one step what it is
for a SCF to accord all of the rights on the list. First, then, the hst itself.

DEFINITION 5. A rights-system B is an assignment of ordered pairs

of alternatives to individuals. Formally put, a rights-system will be a set
of ordered triples of the form (x, y, b); if (x. y, b) E 92, it will be said
that 9 assigns (x, y> to b.
400 ALLAN GIBBARD

If a rights-system assigns (x, y) to person b, then, in effect, it attributes

to b the right to x over y without explaining what a right is.
To explain what a right is, we must now say what it is for a rights-
system to be embodied in a SCF. Vaguely put, what needs to be said is
this: If B assigns {x, y} to person b and xPBy, then under ordinary
circumstances, xPy. If, in addition, however, for some z, yR,z and others
besides b claim their rights under 9 to z over x, then bs right is waived,
and xPy does not necessarily hold. All this can be said without circularity.3

DEFINITION 6. Let Z be a finite sequence yI ,..., yA of alternatives.

Then for a given P and 5, others besides b claim their rights under W to z
over x through 2 if and only if y1 = z, yn = x, and for every L from 1 to
X - 1, at least one of the following holds:

(3c)k f b& (Y, , Y+I , c> E t@ & YJ~Y~

This will be written z $Q x[Z, W].

DEFINITION 7. For a given P, 9, and E, bs right to x over y is waived

under g if and only if for some z, z # y, yRbz, and for some sequence Z
of alternatives in 9, z >,b x[Z, 91. This will be written xW,y[9].

DEFINITION Given P, Y, and (, person b determines issue (x, y)

8.
under 3? if and only if

(j) (x, Y, b) E 9,
(ii> xpby,
(iii) NX wBy[99].
This will be written xD,y[9?].

DEFINITION 9. f realizes rights-system W if and only if for every P,

9, 6 b, x, and Y,
xDby[] + xPy.
We are now in a position to redefine what ,it is for a SCF to accord
someone a right. Definition 2 of accord a right led to trouble, both
for the libertarian claim and for ordinary beliefs about marriage rights.
Here, then, is a new definition, shaped to eliminate cycles arising from
marriage rights. To avoid confusion, I shall call rights in the new sense
alienable rights.
3 The definitions which follow are revised in light of conversations with Thomas
Schwartz.
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARiA?G CLAIM 401

DEFINITION 10. f accords b an alienable right to s over y if and only

if for some rights-system W, f realizes 93 and (x, y, b) E 22.
Condition IL, then, will just be the old Condition I, with alienable
right substituted for the old right.

CONDITION 1LONf: For every b there is a j mch that for euery pair of
j-variants x and y, f accords b an alienable right to x ouer y.

LIBERTARIAN CLAIM III. The ju,st SCF satis$es ~o~dit~o~ L.

5. Tm CONSISTENCY RESULT

Libertarian Claim III, it will now be shown, is consistent. Moreover,

it is consistent with the Pareto principle, that the just SCF satisfies Condi-
tion P. That is to say, the two conditions I, and P can be jointly sat&tie
so long as there are enough features to go around-so long as the number
p of features in an alternative is at least as great as the number Y of people.

THEOREM4. If p 3 v, then there is a SCF whicdzsatis$esboth Corzdi-

tion k and Condition P.
ProoJ Let .SZbe the rights-system such that for every x, y, and 6,
if and only if x and y are distinct b-variants. Then given
be the relation between x and y ,

As in the proof of Theorem 2, let f be generated by Q in the following

manner: For each P, 9, and 5;

Then from the way Q is defined, it is clear that S satisfies Conditions %

and P. It remains to be shown that f is really a SW-that C is never the
empty set. G can be empty only if there is at least one cycle

where x1 ,..., x, are members of 9. To prove the theorem, we must

show that such cycles do not occur.
Suppose, then, there is a cycle 0 of the kind indicated above. (For the
subscripts, I shall use mod 7 arithmetic, so that 1 - 1 = 7 and Y + 1 = 1.
Variables L and K will range from 1 to T.)
402 ALEAN GIBBARD

Case 1. For each b, there is at most one L such that ~,-~&x,[92] and
-vc> XL-1pcx . Then there is an c such that (tic) x,-~P~x,. Otherwise
the cycle 0 cannot be completed. For take a b and L such that x,-,D,x,[92]
but -(Vc) x,-~P~x,. Then (x,-, , x, , b) E 92, and so from the way 9I?
was defined, v-tuples x,-~ and x, differ in their bth place. To complete
the cycle, there must be a K different from L such that x,+~ differs from x,
in its bth place. Now x,-~D~x,[B] cannot hold for any c # b, since then
x,_, and x, would have to be c-variants. By supposition, x,+~D~x, does
not hold unless (Vc) x,-,P,x, . From the definition of Q, since x~-~Qx, ,
the only remaining possibility is that (Vc) x,_~P~x, .
Even though some step in the cycle must be one of unanimous prefer-
ence, there cannot be a unanimous preference at every step in the cycle,
because if there were, individual preferences would be cyclic, and thus
not orderings. Therefore, there must be a transition from nonunanimous
preference to unanimous preference: an L such that -(Vc) xl-$,x, , and
therefore (lb) x,-~D~x,, but such that (Vc) x,P,x,+~ . By supposition,
this L is the only one such that for that b, xLplDbx, and -(Vc) xLmlP,x, .
Then let .Z be the sequence rightward from x,+~ to x,-~ in the cycle

-.., X7 , x1 )...) x, ) x1 ,... ;

at each step x, , x,+~ in 2, either (de)x,P,x,+~ must bold or else for some
c f b, <x, , x,+1 >c) E 52 and x,P,x,+~ . Nence x,+~ >)b x,&Z, 91, and
since x, # x,,, and x,R~x,+~, by Definition 7, x,_~ Wbx,[92]. Therefore
by Definition 8, x,-~D~x, does not hold, and this case cannot arise.
Case 2. For some b, there is more than one L such that x,-,D,x,[SJ
but -(Vc) x,_,P,x, . Then of the two or more such L, pick the one that
makes x, highest in bs preference-ordering (or one of them in case of ties)
andcallit~.Thenlet~bethefirsttotheleftof~inthecycle...,r,l,...,~,l...,
such that xLd1Dbx,[9] and -(VIZ) x,J,x, . Then by the way K was
chosen, x,Rbx, , and in the sequence C,
XL 3 x L+l 9*--s K-1 9

x, >b x,&Z, S?]. By Definition 7, then, since x, # x, , x,Rbx, , and

x, >>b x,-JZ, W], we have x,-, W,x,[B?J. Therefore by Definition 8, we
do not have ~,-~D~x,[i], and this case does not arise. That completes
the proof of the theorem.

6. THE STRENGTH OF THE CLAIM

Libertarian Claim III is consistent with the Pareto principle, but is it
really a libertarian claim? Are alienable rights, as defined, rights in any
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM 403

sense strong enough to satisfy a libertarian? Having a right to something

should give a person a decisive say on the matter, so that normally on
that issue he can stand against the rest of the world. How decisive a say
on an issue does an alienable right give? Unless it is waived, an alienable
right lets a person decide an issue completely. The question, then, is how
easily circumstances arise in which an ahenable right is waived. If alienable
rights are to be rights in any recognizable sense, they must be waived
only in exceptional circumstances, where there is manifestly an irrecon-
cilable conflict of rights, or where rights conflict with the Pareto principle
so that someone would be better off waiving his right than he would
if the Pareto principle were sacrificed.
Now, it is plain from the definition that alienable rights will be waived
only un such circumstances of conflict; the danger is that such circum-
stances ght not be exceptional. Could a rights-system 92 assign so
many issues to so many people that a persons right on an issue would
usually be waived under 92? If there were such a specious rights-system 95$
then even if a SCF f realized B and 32 assigned issue {x, y) to someone,
his alienable right to x over y could not usually be exercised. Strictly
speaking, according to Definition 10, f would accord him an alienable
right to x over y, but the claim that f accorded him that alienable right
would be empty.
The following theorem shows such extreme fears ~~a~~~l~s.It shows
that ifs accords someone an alienable right to x over y, then at the very
least, if y is his sole last choice from among the available alternatives,
then no matter what others may prefer, f makes x preferable to y.

EHNHTION 11~ A SCF accords b a first-order right to x over y if and

only if for every P, 9, and 5, if

(vz)rz E Y & z f y * zP,y],

and x # y, then xPy.

Thus, what it is to accord a first-order right is defined without any
mention of realizing rights-systems. It will now be shown that any
alienable right is a first-order right in this sense.

THEOREM 5. A SCF f accords b an alienable right to x over y only if,f

accords b a$rst-order right to x over y.

fioof. Suppose x # y and (Qz)[z E Y & z f y + zP,y]. Then in the

first place, x&y, and (ii) in Definition 8 is satisfied. In the second place,
there is no z such that z E 9, z # y, and y&z. Thus, from Definition 7,
404 ALLAN GIBBARD

x W,y[L%] holds for no 9% and (iii) in Definition 8 is satisfied for every

rights-system 92.
Now suppose f accords b an alienable right to x over y, Then there is
an W realized by f which assigns (x, y) to b. That 2, then, satisfies (i)
in Definition 8. Thus (i), (ii), and (iii) in Definition 8 of Db are satisfied,
and hence XL&Y. Since f realizes ~22,we have xPy. We have shown that
whenever (Vz)[z E 9 & z # y -+ zP,y] and x # y, then xPy. Therefore b
has a first-order right to x over y, as the theorem asserts.
Alienable rights, then, are not empty. At the very least, they are first-
order rights, and it is clear from Definition 11 that to have a first-order
right is genuinely to have a special voice on an issue. First-order rights
cannot be accorded indiscriminately. According me a first-order right
to x over y precludes according anyone else a first-order right to y over x.
For suppose I had a first-order right to x over y and someone else had
a first-order right to y over x. Then if I preferred x to y and he preferred
y to x, and only x and y were available, then no alternative could be
chosen. That contradicts the definition of a SCF. In short, then, every
alienable right is a first-order right, and a first-order right gives a person
a special voice on an issue which cannot be accorded indiscriminately.
Rights of higher orders can be defined so that they are successively
harder to override. A second-order right, roughly, is a say on an issue
which can be overridden only by a conflict with the first-order rights of
others. Already, then, a second-order right gives a person a strong say
on an issue. For although first-order rights gave a person only a weak
say on an issue, they could not, we saw, be accorded indiscriminately;
hence, conflicts with first-order rights of others will, in all likelihood,
be unusual. Second-order rights, then, will be overridden only in unusual
circumstances. A third-order right can be defined as a say on an issue
which is overridden only by a conflict with the second-order rights of
others-and likewise for rights of higher orders. Rights of each order,
then, are waived under successively more stringent conditions. An
alienable right, it turns out, must be a right of every order.
Here, then, is the definition of &h-order rights put explicitly. First, let
W,(f) be the system of first-order rights, so that <x, y, b) E L%(j) if and
only if f accords b a first-order right to x over y. Here is a new use of
rights-systems: whereas before, rights-systems were simply given and
a SCFs realizing a rights-system was defined, now the rights-system
I?& is defined from f, and defined independently of the notion of
realizing a rights-system. Indeed, ordinarily, f will not realize 9&(f).
Now that 9Z1(f) is defined, we can go on to define a sequence of rights-
systems %(f), PDF>,. . . which assign rights of successively higher orders.
Once 93,(f) is defined, Definition 8 automatically gives sense to the expres-
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAIM 40.5

INITION 12. %?',+l(f) is the rights-system such that for every x, y,

(x, y, b> E W,+,(f) if and only if both (x, y, 6) E B,(f) and for
, 9, and &
XDilY@%f 11 - XPY.

2!,(f) is now defined recursively for every n; I shall. often abbreviate it

as g2, . For each II, we can now define an nth:order right.

DEFINITIQN 13. f accords b an n&-order rig,& to x over y if and only if

&gr,b)E%z.
Now for the crucial result of this section: alienable rights are rights
of every order.

THEOREM 6. If ff accords b an alienable right to x over y, then for

every n, f accords b an ath-order right to x over y.

This theorem is a corollary of the following theorem, which is proved

in the Appendix.

THEOREM 6. Let f realize rights-system 9. Therz for every n,

92 _c.9?,(f).

heorem 6 follows from Theorem 4* is easy to see. Suppose S

accords b an alienable right to x over y. Then there is a rights-system W
realized by f such that (x, J, b) E W. For each n., then, by Theorem 4*,
(x, y, b) E B,(f), and thus f accords b an yZth order right to x over y9
as Theorem 4 asserts.
The converse of Theorem 4 also holds: not only is an alienable right
a right of every order, but, it can be shown, a right of every order is an
alienable right. Thus, alienable rights can be completelly characterized
as rights of every order.

~~~~~~~ 7. For any x, y, and b, f accords b a right of every order

to x over y if and only jf f accords b an aliePzable right to x over y.

The part of the theorem that is still to be proved is that if f accords b

a right of every order to x over y, then f accords b an ahenabble right
to x over y. That follows from Theorem 7*, which is proved in the
Appendix.
406 ALLAN GIBBARD

DEFINITION 14. SF = StYIn ~2~n .-+.

It has been shown that if f realizes 98, then .9?_C9; in the Appendix,
it is shown:

THEOREM 7. f realizes 92.

From that, it immediately follows that a right of every order is an
alienable right, and Theorem 7 is proved.
The new characterization of alienable rights as rights of every order
shows that they are rights in a stringent sense-that they are waived
only under exceptional circumstances. First-order rights cannot be
accorded indiscriminately; a second-order right gives a person a say on
an issue that can be overridden only when it conflicts with the first-order
rights of others; hence a second-order right gives a person quite a special
say on an issue. A third-order right gives a person a say on an issue that
can be overridden only by a conllict with the second-order rights of
others-a strong say indeed. An alienable right, it has been shown, is
a right of every order.
Libertarian Claim III, then, is not only compatible with the Pareto
principle, it is a claim that everyone has rights in a strong sense of the
term. It is a sense which, despite its complexity, seems natural in the case
of Edwin zis Angelina examined in Section 4. Libertarian Claim III, then,
seems a tenable way to formulate what libertarians convinced of the
Pareto principle want to say. A libertarian can consistently hold the
Pareto principle and still claim that in a strong sense, everyone has
rights.

THEOREM 6. Let f realize rights-system 92. Then for every n, 92 s_C

9fn .
Proof. From Theorem 5, we have 92 _C%?I. It remains to be proved
that if 93 _C92%) then 92 _CWn+l .

LEMMA 1. Suppose 92 C 92%, and let 2 be the sequence yl ,. .., yA .

Then if z gfi x[Z, W], then z SD x[C, a,].

Proof. Suppose 2 2 an and z>>~ x[Z, 981. By Definition 6, yl = z,

yA = x, and for every L with 1 < c < X, one of the following holds:

W) Y&PCY,l , (1)
(Wk =f b & (YL , Y+l , c> E @ & YP,Y,,l. (2)
 PARETO-CONSISTENT LIBERTARIAN CLAXM 407

Take any L from 1 to X - 1: for that L either (1) holds or (2) holds. If (2)
holds, so that for some c, (y, , yLil , c) E 9, then since B _C5% ) then
for that C, (y, ) yL+I , c> E .%n, and hence

Wk f b 82 (Y 2 YL+l) c> E %z 82 YPCYLI1.

For each L from 1 to X - B, then, either (1) holds or (3) holds.

Definition 6, z >,, x[C, W,], and the lemma is proved.

LEMMA 2. Suppose B? C W, . Then ifxW,y[kV], lhevl xWby[.G@,].

Proof Suppose B? C 2% and x W,y[g]. Then by ~e~~itio~ 7, for
sequence Z of alternatives in 9, z f ys yRbz, and z x[Z, a]-
For that z and JY>then, by Lemma 1, z sb x[.Z, %?,I. By
then, x W&Z,].

LEMMA 3. Suppose 9 c %, . Then if (x, y, b) E 9 and xD,y[9?,], then

xD,ypq.

Proof. Suppose WC%, , (x, y, b) E B?, and x Then by

Definition 8 of Db ,

y hypothesis,

and from (6) by Lemma 2, it follows that

-x W,y[Bq. (8)
Hence by Definition 8, from (4): (7j, and (8) we have XII,&%]. That
proves the lemma.
Now the proof of the theorem: Suppose W C $Cn but A& 2 gn+l.
Then for some x, y, and b, (x, y, b) E 9 but (x, y, b) $ 9?)n+l , Then for
that x, y, and b, by Definition 12 of gnfl , for some P, Y, and 5 we have
xD,J@!~] but not xPy. Now from Lemma 3, since (x, y, b) E ZZ,
xD,y[CZ,], and 9 C 5%) we have x&y[Rj. By Definition 9, then, since
xD,y[G?] but not xPy, f does not realize 9, contrary to supposition.
Therefore, if .% C gn then %?C %!n+l , and the theorem is proved.

THEOREM 7 *. f realizes B.
408 ALLAN GJBBARD

Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that f does not realize B. Then by

Definition 9 of crealizes, for some P, 9, [, x, y, and 6,

XaYPu, (9)
-xPy. (10)

In that case, there is no y1such that xD,y[B,]. For from (9), by Defini-
tion 8 of D, , (x, y, b) E W. Hence by Definition 14 of W, for every n,

<x,y,b)E%. (11)
Since (x, Y, b) E gn+l , by Definition 12 of c%~+~, if xDby[&], then
xPy. From (lo), then,

(12) thus holds for every n.

It follows that for every IZ, x JV,y[=G?,]. For suppose for a given n,

-x KYPfnl. (13)
From (9), by Definition 8 of Db ,

XPhY. (14)
From (14), (ll), and (13), by Definition 8, xDay[&J, contrary to (12).
Therefore,
(W x WbYL%&I. 05)
At the same time, from (9) by Definition 8,

-x W,y[k?P]. (161

It remains to be shown that (15) and (16) are incompatible. First, two
lemmas.

LEMMA 4. If x BZby[Z, W], then there is a subsequence22 of 2 such

that each alternative appearsat most once in 2 and x gfi y[Z, 921.

Proof. Let 2: be a shortest subsequence of 2 such that x s>b y[Z, a].

Then no alternative appears more than once in Z. For if, on the contrary,
where 2 = y1 ,..., yh , for some 9 and K, 8 < K and ye = yK , then let Z
be the sequence yl ,..., ye , yKtl ,..., y,, . Then each step in the sequence 2:
is a step in the sequence Z. Now by Definition 6 of sb, since
 PARETCbG6)NSISTENT LIBERTARlAN CLAIM 409

x >>b y[-T;, ,%I, at each step y, , yL+1 in the sequence .6, at least one of
the following holds:

WC?YLPCYLfl3 (1)
(WC =+ b 22 (Y 3 Ye1 : c> c 22 & YPCYi-11. (9
Therefore at each step in the sequence .Z, (1) or (2) holds.
Defmition 6, x >>b y[Z, W], and 2: is not the shortest s~bse~~~~~e of 2
such that x >b y[Z, 3]. That proves the lemma.

LEMMA 5. If -xWby[fP], then for every a with z f y and y&z and

every sequence22 of alternatives ipl Pv, there is a y such that for every
n 2 y, -2 >>b x[& B,].

Pr55J Suppose -x W,y[W], take a z such that z # y and y&a,

and take a sequence 2 = y1 ,..., yh of members of Y. It will first be
shown that there is a y such that -2 >,b x[Z, 9q. Suppose otherwise,
so that for every n, z >,h x[& $J. Then take any 6 from 1 to h - 1;
for each yz,at least one of the following holds:

IV4 YLpcYL+l, (1)

WEc f b Jk (YL 3 Y+l , c> E gn & Y,P,Y,ll. Ia
Thus for that L, either (1) holds, or ifit does not, then (2) holds for every FZ.
In the second case, for every n, (y&, yLil , c) E 93%) and hence
(y 9yL+l , c) E 9P. From this and (2),

In either case, then, (I) or (17) holds for that L. (1) or (17) holds, then,
for every L from il to h - 1, and so by Definition 6, z >Zb x[Z, a]. Since
2 # y and y&z, we have x Wby[Wo], contrary to assumption. Therefore
for so1ne 8, -2. 2% XL% %J.
NOW let y be such an n. Then for every n > y, NZ >>b x[Z, 8& For
by Definition 12, it follows immediately that Bm C 9,, , and hence from
Lemma I, if z >,b x[Z, B,], then z >>b x[Z, B$,]. Thus since NZ >b x[Z9 &],
for every y12 y, -Z >>b x[Z? 9,], and the lemma is proved.
NOW the proof of the theorem: On the assumption that the theorem
was false, it was shown that
410 ALLAN GIBBARD

Assume (15) and (16). In (15), xWOy[gn] means that for some z and 2,

z # y & y&z & z >>b x[Z, W,] & 2 consists of members of Y. (18)

By Lemma 4, it follows that there is a z and a 2 which satisfy (IQ such

that no alternative appears more than once in Z. The length of Z, then,
is no greater than s, the number of alternatives in Sp. For every n, there
are a z and a 2 such that

z and 2 satisfy (18) and 2 is of length < s. (19)

Consider all z and 2 which satisfy (19) for IZ = 1. Since there are a
finite number of alternatives in P, there are a finite number of such pairs
z, Z. Now by Lemma 5, for each such z and Z, there is a number y such
that for every n 2 y, -z >b x[Z, J%,]. Since there are a finite number
of such z and 2, there must be an n greater than any such y. For this IZ,
from the way the 2s were defined, there are no z and 2 which satisfy (19).
That contradicts the earlier conclusion that for every y1there is a z and
a 2 which satisfy (19). The assumption that the theorem is false has led
to a contradiction, and thus the theorem is proved.

REFERENCES

1. K. J. ARROW, Values and collective decision-making, in Philosophy, Politics, and

Society, Third Series, (P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds.), pp. 215232, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1967.
2. C. HILLINGER AND V. LAPHAM, The impossibility of a Paretian liberal: Comment
by two who are unreconstructed, J. Pol. Econ. 79 (1971), 1403-1405.
3. A. K. SEN, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Chap. 6*, Holden-Day, San
Francisco, CA, 1970.
4. A. K. SEN, The impossibility of a Paretian liberal, J. Pal. Econ. 78 (1970), 152-157.
5. A. K. SEN, The impossibility of a Paretian liberal: A reply, J. Pol. Econ. 79 (1971),
1406-1407.