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need to invest in a ballistic missile force. these flights. It has recently been alleged, by
upstaged Khans organisation by taking the
However, Pakistan lacked the a former high-level Indian defence official,
lead in the design, development and testing
infrastructure, personnel, or a large civilian that in return Islamabad transferred
of nuclear weapons. In addition, PAEC
satellite launch programme that could be nuclear materials and technology using a
oversaw the M-11 acquisition programme
used as a base to develop ballistic missiles. private airline run by a retired Pakistani air
from China. It is thus plausible that Khan
From 1987 onwards, US attempts to restrict force officer with close connections to
used his considerable personal influence
the international trade in ballistic and Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence
within the Pakistani government to secure
cruise missiles, and other dual-use items agency (ISI).
support for the No-dong programme as a
and technologies, placed additional Missile cooperation between Islamabad
means of salvaging his organisations
obstacles in the path of Pakistans attempts and Pyongyang became public when
declining institutional influence.
to develop an indigenous ballistic missile Pakistan tested a No-dong (renamed
capability. Confronted with these Ghauri) in April 1998. North Korean
problems, Pakistan in 1989 signed a deal North Korean contacts missile crews were present and apparently
with China to purchase 34 solid-fuelled M- As early as 1992, Pakistani officials visited helped Pakistan with the test-launch.
11 ballistic missiles, which can deliver a 500 North Korea to view a No-dong prototype, The US State Department subsequently
kilogramme payload over 300 kilometres. and, in May 1993, Pakistani engineers and determined that this transfer violated
Subsequently, Pakistan also negotiated the scientists attended the No-dong test-launch the MTCR and imposed sanctions on
sale of approximately 1225 liquid-fuelled at Musudan-ri. When then-Pakistani Pakistans Khan Research Laboratories
No-dong ballistic missiles from North prime minister Benazir Bhutto visited and North Koreas Changgwang Trading
Korea. The No-dong system can apparently Pyongyang in December 1993, analysts Company. However, this did not stop
deliver a 7001,000kg-payload over some speculated that a missile deal featured on missile cooperation between Islamabad
1,0001,300km. her agenda. Subsequently, in late 1995, and Pyongyang. In 1999, Indian custom
Pakistan and
seized the North Korean ship Ku Wol San difficult to draw definitive conclusions any ideological grounds on which
at Kandla in Gujarat, India. Although the over whether Pakistani governments Pakistani scientists might be recruited to
ships manifest listed water purification were complicit in deals with North Korea. the North Korean cause.
equipment, a search revealed that it was
carrying missile components and metal
casings to Pakistan. Indian officials also
Some analysts have suggested that
civilian governments prior to 1999 may
not have been aware of the activities of
North Korea
On balance, it seems plausible that the
Pakistani military and KRL would have
been complicit in the gas centrifuge-for-
discovered 22 technical manuals for Scud- the nuclear and military bureaucracies; missile deal with Pyongyang. Their
type ballistic missiles. others claim that cooperation with North decision is also likely to have had the tacit,
North Koreas transfer of complete Korea was a clandestine operation if not formal approval, of the DCC or its
missile systems to Pakistan triggered conducted by A.Q. Khan and the KRL equivalent, the prime minister, or, in the
considerable speculation regarding what without formal and explicit authorisation absence of a civilian government, the
Pyongyang had gained in return. Money from Pakistani governmental authorities. president. However, if the military
was an obvious reward, as missile sales Still, there is sufficient information reached a decision independently, this
became North Koreas largest foreign available to make some plausible would imply that any assurances on
exchange source in the mid-1990s. suppositions about the nature of decision- proliferation issues made by Pakistans
However, the poor state of Pakistans making. civilian leaders and diplomats would lack
economy placed limits on the amount Pakistans nuclear weapons programme final authority. This interpretation has
Islamabad could pay. Furthermore, unlike has been closely coordinated and reopened a debate on the issue of whether
China, North Korea had no geopolitical supervised by the military ever since their Islamabad might transfer nuclear and
interests in building up Pakistans strategic 1977 overthrow of Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos missile technologies to wealthy Islamic
capabilities against India. Some analysts civilian regime. After the transition from states in the Persian Gulf, especially if Iran
believe that North Korea wanted to test its military to democratic rule in December were to acquire nuclear weapons.
ballistic missiles in Pakistan and obtain test- 1988, power was shared by a triumvirate
data as a result. This would be especially comprising the president, the army chief
important in view of Pyongyangs and the prime minister. Although there is US responses
moratorium on further domestic ballistic some evidence to suggest that civilian Although Powell has repeated Musharrafs
missile tests following the Taepo-dong prime ministers might have been unaware refutation of alleged PakistanNorth Korea
launch over Japan in August 1998. of the minutiae of the nuclear weapons links, 25 November saw the secretary say
Evidence for a missile for uranium- programme, they were certainly privy to that he had made it clear to the Pakistani
enrichment technology swap emerged in key decisions and informed of important leader that any sort of contact between
summer 2000 with the detection, by US developments. Prior to the creation of a Pakistan and North Korea [] would
intelligence, of North Koreas clandestine national command authority in the late be improper, inappropriate, and would
efforts to procure high-strength aluminium 1990s, decisions regarding nuclear have consequences [as yet unspecified].
tubes to build gas-centrifuges. Based on weapons and related strategic programmes Nonetheless, despite Pakistans breach of
this and other undisclosed evidence, US were probably made by the Development non-proliferation norms, the US has several
intelligence analysts concluded that Control Committee (DCC) or by its reasons to avoid the traditional sanctions-
Pakistan was the source of North Koreas equivalent. based approach in seeking to modify
uranium enrichment technology. The latest The suggestion that Khan and the KRL Pakistans behaviour. If Islamabads
US disclosures do not detail the precise worked out a deal with North Korea assertion that no cooperation is occurring
nature and extent of the technological independent of government seems at present is true, then nothing would
exchanges between the two countries. But implausible. Firstly, although the nuclear be achieved by applying sanctions
US government sources suggest that establishment enjoys much internal retroactively. Furthermore, Pakistani
cooperation involved the exchange of autonomy in decision-making, nuclear nuclear and missile entities, including the
scientific personnel and some highly scientists are subject to supervision by the KRL, are still subject to technology denials
questionable shipments to North Korea. It national command authority. Secondly, by the US Department of Commerce.
has been suggested that cooperation of a technical, financial, and strategic Hence, additional sanctions would be
some form between the two countries evaluation was likely to have preceded symbolic but superfluous. The thinking
continued as recently as JulyAugust 2002. the decision to acquire the No-dong among senior administration officials is
Pakistan has refuted the allegations military organisations are unlikely to that although sanctions impose costs on the
and insisted that there is no ongoing make decisions concerning the acquisition targeted state, the targeting state also
programme of cooperation with North of nuclear strike systems lightly. Thirdly, loses leverage and influence. The Bush
Korea at present. On 26 October, Secretary any decision to transfer nuclear weapons- administrations approach of engaging
of State Colin Powell said that President related technologies would have grave Pakistan is premised on the assumption
Pervez Musharraf had assured him that international ramifications. It is difficult to that Pakistans compliance with non-
there is no [] interchange taking place imagine how Khan could have made such proliferation norms and regulations can
now of any kind . When asked whether a momentous decision independently and only be secured if Islamabad is convinced
this applied to the past as well, Powell without the benefit of even a limited high- that the positive sum of its ties with the
replied we didnt talk about the past [] level debate in the Pakistani government. US outweighs any conceivable strategic
and I dont want to get into who might Another theory is that North Korea and economic advantages that might
have done what, when, and at what point could have recruited Pakistani nuclear accrue from the proliferation of WMD
in history. scientists without Islamabads knowledge technologies. Nonetheless, Islamabads
or approval. In the early 1990s, North alleged links with Pyongyang will only
Korea nearly succeeded in recruiting serve to make many in Washington highly
Decision-making issues Russian missile scientists and engineers suspicious of Pakistans intentions,
The lack of transparency surrounding with competitive salary offers. However, notwithstanding its current position as a
Pakistans nuclear decision-making Pakistans nuclear scientists are relatively valuable ally in the war on terror.
Volume 8 Issue 9 November 2002 Pakistan and North Korea The International Institute for Strategic Studies