SUBJECT AREA: CIVIL

CASE: Milagros Diaz, et al. Vs. Spouses Gaudencio Punzalan and Teresita Punzalan,
G.R. No. 203075. March 16, 2016

DOCTRINE: The allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners' claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by the Spouses Punzalan right from the start. This failure of petitioners to allege
the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint
did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
MCTC corollarily failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case

SUBJECT AREA: CRIM

CASE: People of the Philippines Vs. Eduardo Dela Cruz y Gumabat, G.R. No. 205414.
April 4, 2016

DOCTRINE: The Court has always reiterated "what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Here, the Court
opines that said requirement was sufficiently complied with. It is evidently clear that
there exists no gap in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug seized from appellant
for all the links thereof beginning from the moment the item was obtained from appellant
up to the time the same was presented in court were sufficiently accounted for. Thus, it is
because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items that the Court excuses their failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of
RA No. 9165 for on said failure, alone, appellant cannot automatically be exonerated.

SUBJECT AREA: CIV

CASE: Heirs of Danilo Arrienda, Rosa G. Arienda, et al. Vs. Rosario Kalaw, G.R. No.
204314. April 6, 2016

DOCTRINE: In actions involving title to or possession of real property or any interest

therein, there is a need to allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
action, or the interest therein, for purposes of determining which court
(MeTC/MTC/MCTC or RTC) has jurisdiction over the action. However, it must be
clarified that this requirement applies only if these courts are in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction. In the present case, the RTC was exercising its appellate, not
original, jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Arrienda's appeal and Section 22 of B.P.
Blg. 129 does not provide any amount or value of the subject property which would limit
the RTC's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by first level courts.
SUBJECT AREA: REMEDIAL

CASE: Francis C. Cervantes Vs. City Service Corporation and Valentin Prieto, Jr., G.R.
No. 191616. April 18, 2016

DOCTRINE: Accordingly, the 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with
the CA should be counted from the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the
NLRC Decision dated July 22, 2009 on November 19, 2009. While there was a notice of
Resolution dated July 22, 2009, said notice was not served upon petitioner's counsel.
Thus, strictly speaking, the running of the 60-day period to appeal should be counted
from November 19, 2009 when the notice of Resolution dated July 22, 2009 was served
on petitioner's counsel. While the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA, the
instant petition would still suffer the same verdict of dismissal in view of the identical
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. The findings of fact made by Labor Arbiters
and affirmed by the NLRC are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality, and are
considered binding if the same are supported by substantial evidence.

SUBJECT AREA: TAX (I DONT KNOW IF I SHOULD SHORTEN THE

DOCTRINE)

CASE: Romeo Pucyutan, for and in behalf of the City of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila as
its City Treasurer Vs. Manila Electric Company, Inc., G.R. No. 197136. April 18, 2016

DOCTRINE: The tax declarations cannot be validly considered as a notice of

assessment under Section 27 of P.D. No. 464.
First, a tax declaration is issued pursuant to "Section 22 of P.D. No. 464" which mandates
"that upon discovery of real property, the provincial, city or municipal assessor shall
make an appraisal and assessment of such real property in accordance with Section 5 of
the law, irrespective of any previous assessment on taxpayers valuation thereon," while a
notice of assessment is issued pursuant to Section 27 of the law which mandates the
"assessor xxx to give written notice within thirty days of such assessment, to the person
in whose name the property is declared."
Second, a tax declaration is mandated by Section 22 of P.D. No. 464 to be issued "upon
discovery" by the assessor of the "real property" to be appraised and assessed, while a
"written notice of assessment" as required by Section 27 of the same law has to be issued
by the assessor "within thirty days" from "such assessment."
Third, no tax accrues as a result of the assessor's issuance of a tax declaration, for at that
time, the assessor is merely tasked by Section 22 of the law "to determine the assessed
value of the property, meaning, the value placed on taxable property for ad valorem tax
purposes." On the other hand, the written notice of assessment is what ripens into a
demandable tax.
SUBJECT AREA: CIV

CASE: Republic of the Philippines, et al. Vs. Sps. Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R.
Regulto, G.R. No. 202051. April 18, 2016

DOCTRINE: There is "taking," in the context of the State's inherent power of eminent
domain, when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there
is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property or when he is
deprived of the ordinary use thereof. Using one of these standards, it is apparent that
there is taking of the remaining area of the property of the Spouses Regulto. It is true that
no burden was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still retained title and possession of
the property. The fact that more than half of the property shall be devoted to the bypass
road will undoubtedly result in material impairment of the value of the property.

SUBJECT AREA: POLI

CASE: Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Vs. Chairperson Ma. Gracia M.
Pulido-Tan, Commissioner, et al., G.R. No. 216776. April 19, 2016

DOCTRINE: The PCSO Board of Directors who approved Resolution No. 135 are
liable. Their authority under Sections 6 and 9 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, is not
absolute. They cannot deny knowledge of the DBM and PSLMC issuances that
effectively prohibit the grant of the COLA as they are presumed to be acquainted with
and even duty-bound to know and understand the relevant laws/rules and regulations that
they are tasked to implement. Their refusal or failure to do do not exonerate them since
mere ignorance of the law is not a justifiable excuse. As it is, the presumptions of "good
faith" and "regular performance of official duty" are disputable and may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence. On the other hand, the other PCSO officials and
employees who had no participation in the approval and release of the disallowed benefit
can be treated as having accepted the same on the mistaken assumption that Resolution
No. 135 was issued in the valid exercise of the power vested in the Board of Directors
under the PCSO charter.

SUBJECT AREA: ETHICS

CASE: Arthur S. Tulio Vs. Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin, A.C. No. 7110. April 20, 2016

DOCTRINE: In Ngayan v. Atty. Tugade, we ruled that a lawyer's failure to answer the
complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his
flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath
of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Buhangin's
failure to submit his position paper without any valid explanation is enough reason to
make him administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with all the lawful
directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member thereof, but more so because IBP
is the Court designated investigator of this case. As an officer of the Court, respondent is
expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which
should be complied with promptly and completely.

SUBJECT AREA: ETHICS

CASE: Prosecutor III Leo C. Tabao Vs. Sheriff IV Jose P. Cabcabin, etc., A.M. No. P-
16-3437. April 20, 2016

DOCTRINE: It bears emphasis that while the sheriff may perform other tasks and duties
assigned by the said Judges or Clerks of Court, the same should be "related" thereto, i.e.,
(1) within the scope of his job description, or (2) identical with or subsumed under his
present functions. As aptly noted by the Investigating Judge, Sheriff Cabcabin's act of
entertaining the voluntary surrender of an accused in a criminal case for purposes of
posting cash bail bond is neither expressly stated nor can be necessarily implied from the
job description of a court sheriff. Such act is beyond the scope of his assigned job
description, and is hardly identical with or is subsumed under his present duties and
functions, as defined in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.

SUBJECT AREA: ETHICS

CASE: Office of the Court Administrator vs Judge Romeo B. Casalan, A.M. No. RTJ-
14-2385. April 20, 2016

DOCTRINE: A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him.
Without an extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within
the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes
a serious violation of Section 16, Article III of the Constitution. Failure to render
decisions and orders within the reglementary period is also a breach of Rule 3.05, Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. Classified as less serious charges under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, undue delay in rendering decision or order, and violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars, are penalized with either suspension without pay for a period of
not less than One (1) month, but not more than Three (3) months, or a fine of more than
Pl0,000.00, but not more than P20,000.00.