LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS 3.
Gregorio Camantique - bought the property from
A. Preliminary Matters
a. Torrens System and Land Registration Laws in the
Philippines: Regalian Doctrine
i. Collado v. CA
FACTS:
- On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the
land registration court an application for registration of a
parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square
meters or 120.0766 hectares.
i. The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly
known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by
Survey Plan Psu-162620. A
ii. Attached to the application was the technical description
of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division,
Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-
12 Mariquina Watershed.
- On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an
Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.
- The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its
Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed
oppositions to petitioners application
- Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was
surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.
Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all
the corresponding real estate taxes.
- Transfers:
1. Sesinando Leyva earliest known predecessor-in-interest;
had the property surveyed in his name on March 22, 1902
2. Diosdado Leyva son of Sesinando, who inherited the
property
Diosdado Leyva and owned and possessed the property
until 1958; declared for tax purposes
4. Angelina Reynoso - bought the property from Gregorio
Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February
1958; tax declaration
5. Myrna Torres - ES bought the property from Angelina
Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of Sale
6. Edna Collado - bought the property from Myrna Torres
in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984
7. BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE
AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO
MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property
from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6
November 1985
8. more additional Owners - bought portions of the
property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO
TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA
MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS
GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987
- The trial court (land registration court) ruled that the
petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the lot and rendered a decision
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners.
- On the claim that the property applied for is within the
Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all
Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside
the Marikina Watershed are subject to private rights.
- Evidence was presented by the applicants that as per
Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be
within the area excluded from the operation of the Marikina
Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904
per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974
which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
 amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977
known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
- Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP
Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear
showing that the Lot had been previously classified as
alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
- Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of
holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR
for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISF
for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
- They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the
Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they are the
actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree
planting purposes. The motion was granted by the CA.
- In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals
granted the petition and declared null and void the decision
dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court.
RULING: The Court held that the private respondents failed to
present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as
described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk
of the public domain and declared by competent authority
to be alienable and disposable. It also held that the subject
land is of public dominion and thus cannot be alienated.
I. Petitioners do not have registrable title over the lot
a. Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated
July 26, 1904[10] established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (MWR for brevity)
situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal.
The lot is inside the MWR area.
b. REGALIAN DOCTRINE - all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.
c. Mortgage Law - provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims
d. Maura Law - required the adjustment or registration
of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would
revert to the state.
e. Public Land Act - was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands, for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein,
for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands.
i. Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that
the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.
ii. The term public land referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in
the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.
f. CA 141 general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands
 g. Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496
placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the
Torrens system.
i. TORRENS SYSTEM - requires the
government to issue a certificate of title
stating that the person named in the title is the
owner of the property described therein,
subject to liens and encumbrances annotated
on the title or reserved by law. The certificate
of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and
all claims to the parcel of land are quieted
upon issuance of the certificate.
h. PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree
enacted on June 11, 1978,[20] amended and updated
Act 496
i. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted
the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain. Both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well
as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine
Constitution belong to the State.
II. Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
a. The term natural resource includes not only timber,
gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged
lands, but also, features which supply a human
need and contribute to the health, welfare, and
benefit of a community, and are essential to the
well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of
property devoted to park and recreational
purposes.
b. Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
1067) provides that
Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any
surface water or overlying any ground water may be
declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a
protected area. Rules and Regulations may be
promulgated by such Department to prohibit or
control such activities by the owners or occupants
thereof within the protected area which may damage
or cause the deterioration of the surface water or
ground water or interfere with the investigation, use,
control, protection, management or administration of
such waters.
III. The petitioners did not acquire private rights over the
parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO33, segregating
the same as a watershed reservation
a. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements
of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain and that he
has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name arising from an imperfect
title.
i. An imperfect title may have been derived
from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real
or royal grant, a concession especial or special
grant, a composicion con el estado or
adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title
through purchase.
ii. Or, that he has had continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
thirty years preceding the filing of his
application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA
141.. as superseeded by RA 1942
b. Petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and
enforceable right or title because of the failure to
complete the required period of possession, whether
under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to
the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by
RA 1942 and PD 1073.
i. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in
possession for two years. Verily, petitioners
 have not possessed the parcel of land in the
manner and for the number of years required
by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
c. Even assuming that the Lot was alienable and
disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in
1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since
then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable
public land. At the time petitioners filed their
application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been
reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years
prior to the filing of petitioners application
d. On the argument that President of the Philippines
had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public
domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable
when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974.
i. A positive act (e.g., an official
proclamation) of the Executive
Department is needed to declassify land
which had been earlier classified as a
watershed reservation and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.[35] Unless
and until the land classified as such is released
in an official proclamation so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
ii. This technical description categorically stated
that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.
iii. Neither petitioners nor their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Lot for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title.
iv. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that
the Lot had been excluded from the MWR
upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283
on June 21, 1974, petitioners possession as of
the filing of their application on April 25,
1985 would have been only eleven years
counted from the issuance of the
proclamation in 1974. The result will not
change even if we tack in the two years
Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot
from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in
1904.
IV. Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction
a. It is now established that the Lot, being a
watershed reservation, is not alienable and
disposable public land. The evidence of the
petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that
the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a
portion of the area classified as a watershed
reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot
is void ab initio.
b. In view of this, the alleged procedural infirmities
attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the land registration
court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot
b. Land Registration Authority and Office of the
Registry of Deeds
i. Sec.4 and 6 (1) (2), PD 1529
c. Purposes of Land Registration
i. Legarda v. Saleeby
FACTS:
- The plantiff and the defendant occupy and own adjoining lots
in Ermita, Manila. There exists a stone wall between the 2 lots
and that wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
- On March 2, 1906, the plaintiffs filed a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of
October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should
be registered and issued to them the original certificate
 provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and
certificate included the wall.
- On the March 25, 1912, defendants predecessor also sought
the registration of the lot it occupies and the Court of Land
Registration decreed the registration of said title and issued
the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system.
The description of the lot given in the petition of the
defendant also included said wall.
- Plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in
the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .
- They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each
of said parties.
- The lower court however, without notice to the defendant,
denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the
defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant
RULING: the Court reversed the lower court and remanded the
case ordering it to consider the decision in the instant case. It
ruled that the first who had it titled has the better right. However,
it also ruled that innocent purchasers for value would are not an
exemption.
- The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that
the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was
a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was
binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In
other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the
wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name.
- While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are
parties, including the government.
- After the registration is complete and final and there exists no
fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an
interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the
decree of registration.
- The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to
all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the
registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again
litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the
validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose
and intent of the law.
- The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the
title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto.
- That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a
title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land.
- Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is judicial.
It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is
final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem.
- The registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not
already have a perfect title, he cannot have it registered. Fee
simple titles only may be registered.
- The certificate of registration accumulates in open document
a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is
the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner.
- The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should
not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles
would be lost.
- A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct
proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
- The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering
the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to
future litigation over the same between the same parties
.In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must
follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred;
there can be no persons who are not parties to the action.
- The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter
certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier
certificate. If it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary
rules of construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of
the two certificates of title to be conclusive.
- In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the
estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under
the prior certify cate who is the holder of, or whose claim
is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.
- While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case
of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide
that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of
this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to
include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold the title.
- We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision
which governs the right of the ownership of land when the
same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among
other things, that when one piece of real property had been
sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of
course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers
has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a
case depends upon priority of registration.
- While we do not now decide that the general provisions
of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration
Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think,
in the absence of other express provisions, they should have
a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the
effect of a double registration under said Act.
- Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in
consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the
torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in
case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons,
the earlier in date shall prevail
- In case of double registration under the Land
Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate
is the owner of the land.
- The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater
right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the
right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee
of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the
vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
- Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the
vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses
which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available
rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of
the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to
say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections.
- All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion
of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains.
The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which the
record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is
scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support.
- Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the
purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
 presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed.
- This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such
presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one
may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law.
- The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be
absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and
useless litigation.
- We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said
sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a
certificate under the torrens system.
- When land is once brought under the torrens system, the
record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
- It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two
persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold
that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with
all the requirements of the law should be protected.
DISSENT OF J. TRENT:
- I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the
reasoning of the majority opinion sustains the proposition
that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to
the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of
the later certificate.
- It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or
overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be
protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an innocent
purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier
certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate.
Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not
be heard to invoke the "just and equitable rule" as laid down
in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title
protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later
certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case wherein it
appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly
without fault, while the holder of the issuance of the later
certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by
merely entering his appearance in court in response to lawful
summons personally served upon him in the course of the
proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and
pleading his superior rights under the earlier certificate,
instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a
default judgment to be entered against him adjudicating title
in favor of the second applicant.
- But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects
sought to be attained by the introduction and adoption of the
so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The
avowed intent of that system of land registration is to
relieve the purchase of registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of
the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the
validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet
it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice
of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office
of the registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its
contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
- If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the
new system of land registration, instead of making transfers
of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of
avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain
searches of the land record and registries, in order to
ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase, will,
in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty
of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the
validity of the title to lands purchased by him
- One of the principal objects, if not the principal object,
of the torrens system of land registration upon which our
Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to
facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the
Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and
all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of
 looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands
furnished by the Court of Land Registration.
ii. Albienda v. CA
FACTS:
- Spouses Ruben Sumampao and Angeles Sumampao, private
respondents herein, were applicants for a free patent over a
piece of the land designated as Lot No. 1548, Pls-67, situated
in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
i. respondents acquired Lot 1548 under a deed of sale
dated November 11, 1968 executed in their favor by
Antonio Baldonase;
ii. that the latter previously purchased said land from
Loida Baterbonia, who in turn had bought it from
Galicano Ontua, the primitive owner thereof;
iii. that having acquired the land in 1968, respondents
occupied and cultivated the same, and paid the taxes
thereon
iv. sometime in 1973, petitioner Albienda, claiming
ownership over the adjoining land designated as Lot
No. 1550, took possession not only of said Lot 1550,
but also usurped a portion of eight [8] hectares of Lot
1548 belonging to respondents;
v. Despite repeated demands, Albienda refused to vacate
said portion and to restore possession thereof to
respondents
- Claiming that an 8-hectare portion thereof was erroneously
included in the technical description of the certificate of title
covering Lot 1550, the adjoining land belonging to petitioner
Felda Albienda, respondents instituted in the then Court of
First Instance of Agusan del Sur an action against Albienda
for correction of the latter's certificate of title, TCT No. T-
1718, and for recovery of possession of said portion of the
land, with damages.
- Petitioner averred that Lot 1550, containing an area of
196,848 square meters, originally belonged to Enesaria Goma,
in whose name the same was registered under the Torrens
System on July 23, 1958;
i. That on July 14, 1959, Enesaria Goma sold the land to
Gliceria Senerpida who possessed it continuously and
peacefully until November 21, 1972, when petitioner
acquired the same for value in good faith;
ii. that upon registration of the deed of sale executed in
favor of petitioner, the latter was issued TCT No. T-
1718 covering Lot 1550 with an area of 196,848 square
meters, which is the same area stated in the certificates
of title of petitioner's aforenamed predecessors-in-
interest
- petitioner alleged that even granting arguendo that the
technical description appearing in her certificate of title was
erroneous, the action for correction thereof and for
reconveyance of the disputed property was unavailable,
considering that more than one year had elapsed since the
issuance of the original certificate of title in 1958 to
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Enesaria Goma
- Responents reply:
i. Lot No. 1550 originally belonged to Enesaria Goma,
who commenced possession thereof sometime in 1940;
ii. that said land was registered in her name on July 23,
1958;
iii. that on July 14, 1959 Enesaria Goma sold the land to
Gliceria Senerpida who in turn conveyed it to petitioner
Albienda by virtue of a deed of absolute sale dated
November 21, 1972.
iv. that petitioner was issued a certificate of title covering
the said Lot No. 1550, but claimed - that "the technical
description in the title is spurious in origin because it
does not tally or conform to the technical description in
the survey return submitted by the Bureau of Lands
surveyors who conducted the survey of the said land
- On August 22, 1958 Loida Baterbonia, respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, wrote the Director of Lands
requesting a recomputation of the respective areas of the
adjoining properties known as Lot 1548 and Lot 1550
- The chief of survey party No. 15-D, stationed in San
Francisco, Agusan, to whom said letter was referred, issued
an indorsement dated December 2, 1958 stating that "it is
 believed that there has been a mistake in the computation of
the technical description of Lot 1550 . . . inasmuch as at the
time the said computation was done in Manila the plan was
not yet available as it was still in this [the Agusan] office.
- The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondents Sumampaos, and ordered that:
i. The government officials concerned to make the
necessary corrections in TCT No. 1718 in the name of
Felda Albienda of Lot No. 1550, Pls-67, Rosario and
Vicinity Public Lands Subdivision, Lapinigan, San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur to conform to the survey
return and technical descriptions prepared by Guillermo
Ferraris, Chief, Regional Surveys Division, Bureau of
Lands, Cagayan de Oro City
ii. Albienda vacate the area overlapped or encroached by
them on said lot and to turn over the possession of the
same to plaintiffs
- Petitioners appealed to the then Court of Appeals which
affirmed said decision in toto, thus, the present petition.
RULING: the Court reversed the judgment of the TC and the
CA and ruled that correction of the title is not proper
- The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens
System is to quiet title to land, to put a stop forever to
any question as to the legality of the title except claims
which were noted in the certificate at the time of
registration, or which may have arisen subsequent
thereto
- Section 38 of the Land Registration Act which is pertinent to
the issue at hand is clear and unambiguous: "Every decree of
registration shag bind the land, and quiet title thereto ...
it shall be conclusive upon and against all persons . . .
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citations, or included in the general description 'To All Whom
It May Concern.' "
- It is a settled doctrine that even when the decree of
registration has been obtained by fraud, the party
defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to
file a petition for review before a competent court, and
such petition can prosper only if no innocent purchaser
for value has acquired an interest in the land.
- Section 38 categorically declares that "upon the expiration
of the said term of one [1] year every decree or certificate
of title issued in accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible."
- The instant action to correct the certificate of title in
question was filed on July 13, 1977 or about 19 years after
the issuance of said certificate of title. Since the period
allowed by law for setting aside the decree of
registration of a certificate of title-had long elapsed, the
original certificate of title issued in the name of
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest had become
indefeasible.
- The Transfer Certificate of Title derived therefrom is likewise
unassailable, for under Section 39 of Act 496, "every person
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith
shall hold the same be free of all encumbrance except those
noted on said certificate."
- every person dealing with registered land may rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor
and the law will in no way oblige them to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property
(Cabanos v. Registry of Deeds)
iii. Capitol Subdivisions, Inc. v. Province of
Negros Occidental
FACTS:
- Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, consisting of Lots
378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641, with an aggregate
area of over 502 hectares, originally registered in the name of
Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar.
- Lot 378 has an area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and
was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776, issued
on August 25, 1916, in the name of the Amenabars
- On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the aforementioned
hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in some documents
 as Jose Benares Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000,
payable installments, as set forth in the deed of sale.
- On February 8, 1924, said Original Certificate of Title No.
1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained, in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his name.
- On March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had
been mortgaged by Jose Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. for the sum of P27,991.74.
- On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the
Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National
Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were
duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental and annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title
- The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently
foreclosed, in pursuance of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental dated September 29, 1931 and
the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as
purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead,
transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151 which, owing
to its subsequent loss, had to be reconstituted as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-1371
- November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to
Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares, for the sum of
P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the
condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain
in the Bank
- Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the
plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1798, covering 378 was issued, in lieu of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer Certificate of
Title RT-1371), in the name of Capitol Subdivision
- When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale by the
Bank, on September 29, 1949, plaintiff took steps to take
possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was
the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental.
- Immediately, thereafter, or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff
made representations with the proper officials to clarify the
status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with the
explanations given by said officials, it brought the present
action on June 10, 1950.
- Defendant alleged the following:
i. That it had acquired Lot 378 in the year, 1924-1925,
through expropriation proceedings;
ii. That immediately after the commencement of said
proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot and
began the construction thereon of the provincial
hospital, which was completed in 1926;
iii. That since then it had occupied said lot publicly,
adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner
thereof;
iv. That, "for some reason or other and for cause beyond
comprehension of the defendant title thereto was never
transferred in the name of said defendant
v. That said lot had been placed in defendant's name for
assessment purposes under Tax Declaration No. 16269
(dated December 31, 1937); and
vi. That plaintiff had acted in bad faith in purchasing said
lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that
the provincial hospital was where it is up to the present,
and did not declare said lot in its name for assessment
purposes until 1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo
Montelibano, the controlling stockholder, president and
general manager of plaintiff corporation, was the first
City Mayor of Bacolod which contributed to the
support, operation and maintenance of said hospital.
- Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant,
the Province of Negros Occidental, the possession of Lot 378
of the cadastral survey of Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and a
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said
lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in addition to
attorney's fees and costs
- Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered
judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal taken by the defendant,
this judgment was, however, set aside by the Supreme Court
 (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which,
likewise, ordered the case remanded to the lower court "for
further trial",
- Another decision was rendered by the CFI dismissing
plaintiff's complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed
conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The case is, once again,
before us, this time on appeal by the plaintiff, the subject
matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000,
exclusive of interest and costs
RULING: The Court reversed the judgment of the CFI awarding
damages to plaintiff Capitol. It remanded the case to the lower court for
further proceedings. It held that the President of Capitol, Carlos, Benares
did not know until 1949 that lot 378 was the very land occupied by the
provincial hospital.
- There is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known
to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such
knowledge be deduced from the circumstances that he is a
son of its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the latter
appears not to be well-posted on the status of his properties.
- Indeed, Jose Benares did not apparently know that there were
two (2) expropriation proceedings effecting said properties:
that the P12,000 received by him from the Government was
not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the
properties mortgaged by him to the Bank.
- Several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise
agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government
had been reached and that the expropriation had not been
consummated:
i. The only entries in the docket relative to the
expropriation case refer to its filing and the publication
in the newspaper of the corresponding notices
ii. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by
Anacleta Agsam to the Government, followed by the
cancellation of the certificate of title in her name and
the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name
of the Province, when contrasted with the absence of a
similar deed of assignment and of a transfer certificate
title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378,
strongly suggest that no such assignment or agreement
with respect to Lot 378 had been made or reached
iii. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. since March 12, 1921, and this mortgage,
duly registered and annotated, inter alia, on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose
Benares, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935.
Moreover, Lot 378 could not have been expropriated
without the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the
latter was not made a party in the expropriation
proceedings
iv. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted
second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which would not
have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged
then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been
expropriated subsequently thereto without the Bank's
knowledge and participation. What is more, in the deed
executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935, promising
to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it
was explicitly stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and
410, forming part of said Hacienda and designated as
Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B and 410-A, had been
expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication,
that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
- Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens
System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real
estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto
giving the public the right to rely upon the face of
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further
inquiry
- Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation
case for the hospital site had begun, said lot was mortgaged to
the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly
registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935.
 - Prior to this date, or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was
subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which
acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934.
- When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell the
property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter, subsequently
conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as well as when the
bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on
September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name
of the Bank.
- As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect
from the defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that,
since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378 is not contested,
and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is
due by reason of the expropriation of said lot.
- In short, plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of
the time when possession thereof was actually taken by
the defendant, plus consequential damages including
attorney's fees from which consequential damages the
consequential benefits, if any, should be deducted, with
interests, at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the
plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual taking.
iv. Traders Royal Bank v. CA (1999)
FACTS:
- Spouses Maximo and Patria Capay executed a mortgage over
several properties as security for the loan extended by Traders
Royal Bank.
- The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having
remained unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings upon the mortgaged property.
- To prevent the propertys sale by public auction, the Capays, on
September 22, 1966, filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, alleging that the mortgage was void since they did not
receive the proceeds of the loan.
- The trial court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary
injunction.
- Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City
a notice of lis pendens over the disputed property. Said notice
was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays certificate
of title
- Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted
thus allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Foreclosure
proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the property
was sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the auction sale.
A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name on the same
day.
- On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the name
of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale.
- Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for
the recovery of the property with damages and attorneys fees.
- CFI rendered its decision declaring the mortgage void for want of
consideration. The CFI ordered, among other things, the
cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the name of TRB and the
issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay
spouses.
- TRB appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold
the land to Emelita Santiago in whose name a new certificate of
title, TCT No. 33774, was issued, also, without any notice of lis
pendens annotated thereon.
- Santiago in turn divided the land into six (6) lots and sold these to
Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz and Artemio Sanchez, who
became co-owners thereof.
- Alcantara and his co-owners developed the property and
thereafter sold the six (6) lots to separate buyers who were issued
separate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis pendens.
- Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the decision of
the trial court as to the award of damages but affirming the same
in all other respects.
- For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the
petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court was denied
in a Resolution dated September 12,1983. TRBs motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated
October 12, 1983.
- The Courts September 12, 1983 Resolution having become final
and executory on November 9, 1983, the trial court issued a writ
of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City to
cancel TCT No. T-16272 in the name of TRB, and to issue a new
one in the name of the Capay spouses.
- Said writ, however, could not be implemented because of the
successive subsequent transfers of the subdivided property to
buyers who obtained separate titles thereto. Thus, a complaint for
recovery of possession/ownership dated 8 June 1985 was filed
before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against TRB and
the subsequent transferees of the property
- The trial court ruled in favor of the Capays and their successors-
in-interest.
- TRB and the respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- It ruled that the non-bank respondents cannot be
considered as purchasers for value and in good faith, having
purchased the property subsequent to the action in Civil
Case No. Q-10453 and that while the notice of lis pendens
was not carried over to TRBs certificate of title, as well as to
the subsequent transferees titles, it was entered in the Day
Book which is sufficient to constitute registration and notice to
all persons of such adverse claim
- As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals said that the bank was
in bad faith when it sold the property knowing that it was
under litigation and without informing the buyer of that
fact.
- TRB filed with this Court a petition for review to set aside the
CA decision
- the non-bank respondents moved for a reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals decision. Convinced of the movants arguments,
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on August 10,
1994 granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the
complaint as against them
- The Capays thus filed with this Court a petition for review
RULING: The Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and ordered TRB to pay the Capays the fair market value of the
property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago. It likewise
held that the decision is without prejudice o whatever criminal, civil
or administrative action against the Register of Deeds and/or his
assistants that may be taken by the party or parties prejudiced by the
failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the
certificate of title in the name of TRB.
I. The Non-Bank Respondents has the better right over the
property
First, when TRB purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale, the notice of lis pendens that the
Capays caused to be annotated on their certificate of
title was not carried over to the new one issued to TRB.
Neither did the certificate of title of Emelita Santiago, who
purchased the property from TRB, contain any such notice.
When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6)
new certificates of title were issued, none of which
contained any notice of lis pendens.
Santiago then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-
owners who next sold each of these to the non-bank
respondents.
The non-bank respondents, therefore, could not have
been aware that the property in question was the subject
of litigation when they acquired their respective portions
of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title
of their respective predecessors-in-interest that could have
aroused their suspicion.
The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what
appeared on the face of the title of their respective
predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go
beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of
the principal objects of the Torrens system of land
registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving
lands.
The main purpose of the torrens system is to avoid
possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate
transactions relative thereto by giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry.
 Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness
of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over
the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and
order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of
such an outright cancellation would be to impair public
confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been
regularly or irregularly issued by the court.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and
the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate
to determine the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it
was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee
the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If
a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being
told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This
would not only be unfair to him.
What is worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and
not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership.
Moreover, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically
inspected the properties and inquired from the Register of
Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of the
property they were purchasing-an exercise of diligence above
that required by law.
Between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible
for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the
resulting loss.
o The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way
back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not
annotated in TRBs title.
o The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A.
Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and the
consolidation of title in the banks name following the
lapse of the one-year period of redemption. But in the
next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not bother to
find out the status of their title or whether the liens
noted on the original certificate of title were still
existing considering that the property had already
been foreclosed.
o In the meantime, the subject property had undergone
a series of transfers to buyers in good faith and for
value. It was not until after the land was subdivided
and developed with the buyers building their houses
on the other lots when the Capays suddenly appeared
and questioned the occupants titles. At the very least,
the Capays are guilty of laches.
Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the
ruling in Villasor vs. Camon, Levin vs. Bass and Director of
Lands vs. Reyes to the effect that entry of the notice of lis
pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is
sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is
notice to all persons of such adverse claim.
Certainly, it is most iniquitous for the Capays who, after
sleeping on their rights for fifteen years, to assert
ownership over the property that has undergone several
transfers made in good faith and for value and already
subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced
thereon by their owners.
II. The Capays are entitled to the recovery of the fair market
value of the property
TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis
pendens because when the property was foreclosed by it,
the notice of lis pendens was annotated on the title. But
when TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was
cancelled after the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which was
issued in place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over
the notice of lis pendens.
Capays guilty of inaction and negligence as against TRB. It
may be recalled that upon the commencement of foreclosure
proceedings by TRB, the Capays filed an action for
 prohibition on September 22, 1966 against the TRB before
the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that attempt,
the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of
the property. The case reached this Court. Prescription or
laches could not have worked against the Capays because
they had persistently pursued their suit against TRB to
recover their property.
On the other hand, it is difficult to believe TRBs assertion
that after holding on to the property for more than ten (10)
years, it suddenly realized that it was acting in violation of the
General Bank Act.
What is apparent is that TRB took advantage of the
absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of their
certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary
purchaser. This notwithstanding the adverse decision of the
trial court and the pendency of its appeal.
TRB, whose timing indeed smacks of bad faith, thus
transferred caused the property without the lis pendens
annotated on its title to put it beyond the Capays' reach.
Clearly, the bank acted in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy, and should be held liable for
damages.
Considering, however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB
had been declared null and void for want of
consideration and, consequently, the foreclosure
proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays
would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of their
property. Nevertheless, this remedy is not now available
to the Capays inasmuch as title to said property has
passed into the hands of third parties who acquired the
same in good faith and for value.
d. Classification of Lands
i. Under CA 141 and the Constitution
1. Hermoso v. CA (2009)
ii. Under the Civil Code, Art. 419-421
iii. Land Classification of Reclaimed Lands
1. Chavez v NHA (2007)
iv. Land Classification of Friar Lands
v. Land Classification of Ancestral Land
e. Non-Registrable Properties
i. Republic v. CA (1989)
ii. Bureau of Forestry v. CA (1992)
iii. Heirs of Jose Amuntaegui v. Director of Lands
(1983)
iv. Collado v. CA (2002)
Hermoso v. CA
April 24, 2009| Nachura, J. | Classification of Lands
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: Property at issue: parcels of land in Bulacan. Petitioners
claim that the lots are covered by PD 27, that they are tenant-farmers and
that emancipation patents should be issued in their favor. Respondents
claim that since the lands were already classified by the DAR Secretary
declaring the same as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes, PD 27 did not apply to the said land, since the
same only applies to agricultural land. [Magulo yung details ng procedure
hue, pero panalo the entire time si Petitioner sa RTC and Office of the
President. Pero sa CA nanalo si Respondents, and pati sa SC nanalo sila]
DOCTRINE:
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that alienable lands
of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e.,
primary classification and secondary classification.
The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically
mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that
agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary
classification. Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a
number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification
of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or
other urban uses
FACTS:
 Parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan, identified
as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and Lot 3415 owned by
Antonio Francia.
o The lots comprises (sic) an area of 2.5 and 1.5850
hectares, respectively, and forms part of a larger parcel of
land with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos,
Jr., Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all
surnamed Francia.
Since 1978, petitioner Laureano V. Hermoso and Miguel Banag
(Banag) have been occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415
as tenants thereof.
(#1) They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
o July 4, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued an order granting the petition
DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to
process the issuance of emancipation patents in
favor of said Laureano Hermoso and Miguel
Banag after a parcellary mapping
o Respondents (Heirs Of Antonio Francia And Petra
Francia,) filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration
and reinvestigation
Partially granted
DIRECTING the DAR personnel
concerned to hold in abeyance the
processing of the emancipation patent of
Miguel Banag until the issue of tenancy
relationship in DARAB Cases
(#2) In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and 425-BUL-92 (eto yung
DARAB cases na sinasabi earlier)
o The cases delved on whether both petitioner and Banag
are tenants of respondents in the subject landholding.
o On June 3, 1996, the DARAB rendered a Decision
upholding the tenancy relationship of petitioner and
Banag with the respondents.
o Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied.
o A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the
CA. However, the petition was denied on technical
grounds in a Resolution dated October 9, 1996. MR
denied
o The case was eventually elevated to this Court in G.R.
No. 127668.
o On March 12, 1997, the Court denied the petition for lack
of verification, and subsequently, also denied the MR so
SC ruled that there was a tenancy relationship.
(Continuation ata ng #1) Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed
before the DAR, an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an
emancipation patent.
o On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the motion, MR of
respondents DENIED
They claimed that the lands involved have been
approved for conversion to urban purposes in an
Order dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR
Secretary.
The conversion order stated that the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does
not cover the subject parcels of land.
o So on March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Order
affirming the March 13, 1997 order granting the motion
for issuance of emancipation patent in favor of Banag.
o On March 30, 1998, respondents appealed to the Office
of the President but DENIED
o CA, in a Rule 43 reversed the OP, ruling for
respondents. MR denied
P.D. No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of
land pursuant to the June 5, 1973 Order of the
DAR Secretary reclassifying the lands and
declaring the same as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes.
(So di na agricultural)
Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands
as early as October 14, 1978.
RULING: DENIED! Respondents ang panalo. BUT the case is
remanded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan for
the proper computation of the disturbance compensation of petitioner.
(Compensation na lang makukuha ng petitioners huehue)
WoN the parcels of land in issue are covered by PD 27 NO. They
are not agricultural lands, having been reclassified by the DAR
Secretary
(WRONG) Petitioner avers that the final and executory decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 127668 (case #2 ata to) affirming that he is a
tenant of the landholding in question entitles him to avail of the right
granted under PD 27.
o In other words, because of the finality of the decision
declaring him a tenant of the landholding in question, in
effect, the subject lots are considered as agricultural lands
and are thus covered by P.D. No. 27.
(CORRECT) Respondents, for their part, claim that the lands were
already declared suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3844 as early as 1973.
o Hence, they are no longer subject to P.D. No. 27.
Classification of alienable lands of the public domain [SYLLABUS
TOPIC]
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that
alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types,
i.e., primary classification and secondary classification.
o The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These
are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII
of the Constitution.
o The same provision of the Constitution, however, also
states that agricultural lands of the public domain may
further be classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. This further classification of
agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.
Under existing laws, Congress has granted
authority to a number of government agencies to
effect the secondary classification of agricultural
lands to residential, commercial or industrial
or other urban uses.
The three bodies which can classify lands
[DAR] Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June 15,
1988, explicitly provides:
o Section 65. Conversion of Lands.After the lapse of five
(5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes,
or the locality has become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for residential, commercial
or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of
the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to
the affected parties, and subject to existing laws,
may authorize the reclassification or conversion of
the land and its disposition: Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
[Local Governments City and Municipality] On the other hand,
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991[24] states:
o SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. A city or
municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the
sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the
purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural
lands
[Court] But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative
enactments, there was already R.A. No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, which was approved on August 8, 1963 walang
kwenta yung provision
Back to the case huehue
The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled to
the issuance of an emancipation patent under P.D. No. 27.
o The said decree promulgated by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos,
 o However, the law specifically applied "to tenant-
farmers of private agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and corn under a system of share
tenancy or lease tenancy, whether classified as
landed estate or not."
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the
coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the
land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural
land, as follows:
o (c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:
o (b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such
farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land
cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27.
This considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the
DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial
or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition
for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.
Pahabol argument by petitioner wala talaga zzz
The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the
emancipation patent in his favor under P.D. No. 27 is the fact that
respondents were not able to realize the actual conversion of the land
into residential purposes. To bolster his claim, petitioner relies on
Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844:
o Provided, further, That should the landholder not
cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year
after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed
that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the land and recover
damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions.
However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already been
amended by R.A. No. 6389, as early as September 10, 1971
deleted that portion
o Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the
landowner to implement the conversion of the
agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes within a
certain period was deleted. With the enactment of the
amendatory law, the condition imposed on the landowner
to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to a
non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was
deleted.
The remedy left available to the tenant is to claim
disturbance compensation.
NOTES:
Chavez v. NHA
August 15, 2007| Velasco Jr., J | Classification of Reclaimed Lands
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: Smokey Mountain Development and Recreation Project
(SMDRP) in Tondo. Frank Chavez files a petition to declare JVAs related
to SMDRP null and void, for the reason that said lands (called R-10) are
of the public domain and thus unalienable (among others). Court ruled
against Chavez on this issue, but right to information was upheld, so
respondent NHA is ordered to allow access to petitioner to all public
documents and official records relative to the SMDRP.
DOCTRINE:
[Reclaimed lands are public domain. But, they may be classified as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain when so declared
by the President]
Chavez contends that for these reclaimed lands to be alienable, there
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Absent such law or proclamation, the reclaimed lands cannot
be the enabling component or consideration to be paid to RBI as these
are beyond the commerce of man - WRONG
The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable
lands of public domain of the State for the following reasons, viz:
First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations classifying the
reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to
disposition or concession
[MO 415 (Aquino) and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 (both Ramos)]
Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the
DENR anchored on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 issued by President
Ramos, without doubt, classified the reclaimed areas as alienable
and disposable.
Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as alienable or
disposable, we find that RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides
ample authority for the classification of reclaimed land in the SMDRP for
the repayment scheme of the BOT project as alienable and disposable
lands of public domain.
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly declare
that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the project
proponent have become alienable and disposable lands and
opened for disposition; nonetheless, this conclusion is necessarily
implied, for how else can the land be used as the enabling component for the Project
if such classification is not deemed made?
The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they
are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State
which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations,
60% of which are owned by Filipinos.
The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to
transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of
public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes
and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.
From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed
land has been declared alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial
property.
FACTS: (sobrang shortened na to kasi andaming shit facts)
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus by Frank Chavez
o To declare NULL AND VOID the Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) dated March 9, 1993 between the
National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. and
the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project (SMDRP) and subsequent agreements
(Aquino) January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415[9]
approving and directing the implementation of the SMDRP. Secs. 3
and 4 of the Memorandum Order stated:
o Section 3. The National Housing Authority is hereby
directed to implement the Smokey Mountain
Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area
Across R-10 through a private sector joint venture
scheme at the least cost to the government.
o Section 4. The land area covered by the Smokey
Mountain dumpsite is hereby conveyed to the National
Housing Authority as well as the area to be reclaimed
across R-10.
(Ramos) March 19, 1993, the NHA and RBI entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement[17] (JVA) for the development of the Smokey
Mountain dumpsite and the reclamation of the area across R-10
based on Presidential Decree No. (PD) 757
o The JVA covered a lot in Tondo, Manila with an area of
two hundred twelve thousand two hundred thirty-four
(212,234) square meters and another lot to be reclaimed
also in Tondo with an area of four hundred thousand
(400,000) square meters.
(Estrada) November 1998, President Estrada issued Memorandum
Order No. 33 reconstituting the SMDRP EXECOM and further
directed it to review the Supplemental Agreement and submit its
recommendation on the completion of the SMDRP dahil di pa rin
tapos
(Arroyo) On November 19, 2001, the Amended Supplemental
Agreement (ASA) was signed by the parties di pa rin tapos heu
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA
and other subsequent agreements
 Meanwhile, respondent Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI)
entered into an agreement with the asset pool for the development
and operations of a port in the Smokey Mountain Area
o The asset pool paid the subscription by conveying to
HCPTI a 10-hectare land which it acquired from the
NHA being a portion of the reclaimed land of the
SMDRP. Corresponding certificates of titles were
issued to HCPTI, namely: TCT Nos. 251355, 251356,
251357, and 251358 eto ata yung reclaimed land
RULING:
WoN NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to
reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner YES. PEA not the
exclusive agency to reclaim lands
Chavez: Petitioner contends that neither respondent NHA nor
respondent RBI may validly reclaim foreshore and submerged land
because they were not given any power and authority to reclaim lands
of the public domain as this power was delegated by law to PEA.
EO 525 reads:
o Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall
be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of
the National Government. All reclamation projects shall
be approved by the President upon recommendation of
the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through
a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity;
Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national
government agency or entity authorized under its charter
shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforequoted provision points to three (3) requisites for a legal
and valid reclamation project, viz:
o (1) approval by the President;
o (2) favorable recommendation of PEA; and
o (3) undertaken by any of the following:
by PEA
by any person or entity pursuant to a contract it
executed with PEA
by the National Government agency or entity
authorized under its charter to reclaim lands
subject to consultation with PEA
Thus, while PEA under PD 1084 has the power to reclaim land
and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for integrating,
directing and coordinating reclamation projects, such authority
is NOT exclusive and such power to reclaim may be granted or
delegated to another government agency or entity or may even
be undertaken by the National Government itself, PEA being
only an agency and a part of the National Government.
As applied to the facts: all requisites are present
o 1) Approved by 2 presidents Aquino and Ramos
o 2) The requisite favorable endorsement of the
reclamation phase was impliedly granted by PEA.
President Aquino saw to it that there was
coordination of the project with PEA by
designating its general manager as member of the
EXECOM
o 3) While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is
challenged by petitioner, we find that the NHA had more
than enough authority to do so under existing laws. While
PD 757, the charter of NHA, does not explicitly mention
"reclamation" in any of the listed powers of the agency,
we rule that the NHA has an implied power to reclaim
land as this is vital or incidental to effectively, logically,
and successfully implement an urban land reform and
housing program enunciated in Sec. 9 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
The power to reclaim on the part of the NHA is
implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA
6957, and PD 3-A (dami na quote huehue)
[TOPIC?]WoN respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore
and submerged lands considered as inalienable and outside the
commerce of man YES. There were 3 presidential proclamations
declaring such lands alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
 Chavez contends that for these reclaimed lands to be alienable, there
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable and open to disposition
or concession.
o Absent such law or proclamation, the reclaimed lands
cannot be the enabling component or consideration to be
paid to RBI as these are beyond the commerce of man.
The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and
disposable lands of public domain of the State for the following
reasons, viz:
o First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations
classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or
disposable hence open to disposition or concession
MO 415 (Aquino) and Proclamations Nos. 39 and
465 (both Ramos)
o Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598
issued by the DENR anchored on Proclamations
Nos. 39 and 465 issued by President Ramos, without
doubt, classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and
disposable.
Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as alienable or
disposable, we find that RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides
ample authority for the classification of reclaimed land in the
SMDRP for the repayment scheme of the BOT project as alienable
and disposable lands of public domain.
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly
declare that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to
the project proponent have become alienable and disposable
lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this conclusion
is necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the enabling
component for the Project if such classification is not deemed made?
The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds,
they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of
the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos.
o The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless
to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate
lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its
avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer
patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and
prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.
From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare
reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as
patrimonial property.
WoN respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was
no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use
YES. Implicit in the conveyance to the NHA
Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the
lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was
however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed
areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public
service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the
same to the NHA partly for housing project and related
commercial/industrial development intended for disposition
WoN there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands YES
PD 757 is clear that the NHA is empowered by law to transfer
properties acquired by it under the law to other parties
WoN the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public
bidding -NO. But public bidding was not needed since these lands
are already patrimonial property. (Only public domain requires
bidding)
Petitioner concedes that he does not question the public bidding on
the right to be a joint venture partner of the NHA, but the absence
of bidding in the sale of alienable and disposable lands of public
domain pursuant to CA 141 as amended.
Secs. 63 and 67 of CA 141, as amended, are in point as they refer to
government sale by the Director of Lands of alienable and disposable
lands of public domain. This is not present in the case at bar. The
lands reclaimed by and conveyed to the NHA are no longer
lands of public domain. These lands became proprietary lands
or patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of the titles
over the reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence outside the
 ambit of CA 141. The NHA can therefore legally transfer
patrimonial land to RBI or to any other interested qualified
buyer without any bidding conducted by the Director of Lands
because the NHA, unlike PEA, is a government agency not tasked to
sell lands of public domain. Hence, it can only hold patrimonial lands
and can dispose of such lands by sale without need of public bidding.
NOTES:
Other issues
o True that DENR approval is needed for reclamation
In this case, it was deemed given since the
President approved it, and qualified political
agency shit
o Right to information
Meron, so Respondent NHA is ordered to allow
access to petitioner to all public documents and
official records relative to the SMDRP
Republic v. CA, 131 SCRA 532
August 31, 1984| Cuevas Jr., J | Non-Registrable Properties
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: The lot which is the subject matter of this land registration
case, with an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the shore of
Laguna de Bay, in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. A portion of the
land sought to be registered is covered with water four to five months a
year, by the Laguna de Bay (Lake). Republic opposes the registration,
contending that said parcel is part of the lake bed of the Laguna de Bay.
SC ruled that such parcel is not part of the lake bed nor is it foreshore
land
DOCTRINE:
Extent of lake bed
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of
1866, as follows:
"The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground
covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth." The
phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been
interpreted in the case of Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season,
such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the
time during the year"
What is a foreshore land?
The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition
of a foreshore land, to wit: ... that part of (the land) which is between
high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides x x x"
"The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide."
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion
of the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing
into Laguna de Bay from different sources." Since the inundation of a
portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot
be considered a foreshore land
FACTS:
The lot which is the subject matter of this land registration case, with
an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the shore of Laguna
de Bay, in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna.
o Whats unique about this parcel of land? A portion of the
land sought to be registered is covered with water four
to five months a year, by the Laguna de Bay (Lake)
o Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed
his application for registration of said parcel on May 9,
1966.
The application was opposed by the Director of
Lands and by private oppositors (Bautista, et.al.)
During the latter part of 1965 and in 1966,
private oppositors had simultaneously
filed their respective sales applications
with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966,
they opposed Santos del Rio's application
for registration.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for
registration.
Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the
Court of Appeals. (So the parcel of land was registered in the
Petitioners name)
 The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their
respective Petitions for Re-view of said decision, contending at the
property was not registrable.
RULING: CFI upheld. Registration of the land in name of Santos Del
Rio is proper.
WoN property in question is registrable YES
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory,
is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as
those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of private
ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. The New Civil
Code enumerates proper-ties of public dominion in Articles 420 and
502 thereof.
o Article 420 provides:
"The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth."
o Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
"(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs
and brooks running in their natural beds and the
beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on
lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on
public lands and their beds;
Is the land sought to be registered part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay
- NO
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion
of the land sought to be registered is covered with water four to five
months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or
is at least, a foreshore land, which brings it within the enumeration in
Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it cannot
be the sub-ject of registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of
1866, as follows:
o "The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the
ground covered by their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth."
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above
definition has been interpreted in the case of
Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be
the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de
Bay during the dry season, such depth being
the "regular, common, natural, which occurs
always or most of the time during the year"
As applied
o Laguna de Bay is a lake.
The alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an
ordi-nary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the
water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five
months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the
rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the
land in question.
Since the rise in the water level which causes
the submersion of the land occurs during a
shorter period (four to five months a year)
than the level of the water at which the land is
completely dry, the latter should be
considered as the "highest' ordinary depth"
of Laguna de Bay.
Therefore, the land sought to be
re-gistered is not part of the bed or
basin of Laguna de Bay (and thus
registrable)
Is it foreshore land - NO
Neither can it be considered as foreshore land.
 The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate
definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
o ... that part of (the land) which is between high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides x x x"
o "The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according
to the flow of the tide."
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a
portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling
directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different
sources."
o Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not
due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be
considered a foreshore land
Conclusion the land is registrable
The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of
Lands, it is not a public land and there-fore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title.
Now, does the petitioner have registrable title? YES
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
already possesses over the land. Registration under the Torrens Law
was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership.
o Public instrument of sale in favor of his father from
whom he inherited said land.
o Tax declarations
o Tax receipts
o Court of Appeals found applicant by himself and through
his father before him, has been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the
disputed land for more than thirty (30) years, counted
from April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a
third person by purchase.
o The record does not show any circumstance of note
sufficient enough to overthrow said findings of facts
which is binding upon Us.
Re: claims of private oppositors
The claim of private oppositors, that they have reclaimed the land
from the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed the
same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve their
position.
o In the first place, private persons cannot, by themselves
reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the public
domain without proper permission from government
authorities.
o And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the
reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party
reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the
terms of the authority earlier granted.
Private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the
alleged reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel
must fall. In the second place, their alleged possession can never
ripen into ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the
concept of owner can serve as the root of a title acquired by
prescription.[21]
o As correctly found by the appellate court, the private
oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land
with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant
del Rio. The fact that some of them at one time or
another did not pay rent cannot be considered in their
favor. Their use of the land and their nonpayment of
rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and
these could not have affected the character of the latter's
possession[22] which has already ripened into ownership
at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
NOTES:
Bureau of Forestry v. CA, 153 SCRA 351
August 31, 1987| Paras, J. | Non-registrable Properties
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: Four parcels of land in Iloilo were sought to be registered
by Diago, alleging that she acquired such via deed of sale from an estate.
Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed, the latter claiming
that the said lands were mangrove lands (forest lands) and thus non-
registrable. Pending registration, the land was sold to Gallo, who
continued the petition in his name. RTC and CA allowed the registration.
SC ruled that the area in dispute is within a timberland block or
classification of the municipality and certified to by the Director of
Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and
hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the
subject of registration proceedings.
DOCTRINE:
1) Lands needed for forest purposes are public land, and are portions of
the public domain, which cannot be the subject of registration
2) Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership
FACTS:
July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo
described in Plan Psu-150727, containing an approximate area of
30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for registration by
Mercedes Diago
o who alleged among others that she herself occupied said
parcels of land having bought them from the testate
estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had
bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21,
1934.
Opposed by Director of Lands and Director of Forestry
o The Director of Lands
neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-
interest have sufficient title over the lands
applied for, which could be registered under the
Torrens system
they have never been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lands for at
least 30 years prior to the filing of the
application.
o The Director of Forestry
certain specific portions of the lands subject
matter of the application, with an area of
approxi-mately 194,080 square meters are
mangrove swamps and are within Timberland
Block
June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the
subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965,
moved to be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion
an Amended Application for Registration of Title
RTC granted registration of the 4 parcels of land.
Bureau of Forestry appealed to CA
o DENIED
RULING: CA REVERSED HUE
WoN the 4 parcels of lands are regsitable YES.
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the
Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly
within the disposable portion of the public domain.
The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares is now the center of
controversy
The land in question is forest land, and not registrable
Respondent court (CA) in affirming the decision of the Iloilo trial
court ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4080
hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland
Block "B", L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered
part of the public forest not susceptible of private ownership
since petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these
lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural
purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural
lands.
o THIS IS WRONG HUEHUE
Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block or
classification of the municipality and certified to by the
Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for
forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the sub-ject of registration proceedings.
o Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no
need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court
convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more
 valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there
was no question of whether the land is forest land or not.
Be it remembered that said forest land had been declared
and certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the
original applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes
Diago, filed it
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that
as a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable
under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973
o "x x x It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction
and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all
public forests and forest reserva-tions and over the
granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom,
including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised
Administra-tive Code).
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
was lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification
of public lands into alienable or dis-posable, mineral or forest
lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not of the courts.
With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is
not the court which determines the classification of lands of the
public domain into agricul-tural, forest or mineral but the Executive
Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President.
Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the
res-pondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the
disputed area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by
the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Lands belonging to public domain cannot even be acquired by
prescription
Furthermore, private respondents cannot claim to have obtained
their title by prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them
necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part
of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription,
unless the law expressly permits it.
It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz,
23 SCRA 1184).
NOTES:
Heirs of Amuntaegui v. Director of Lands, 126 SCRA 69
November 29, 1983| Gutierrez Jr., J. | Non-Registrable Properties
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: A parcel of land (now a fishpond) in Capiz was sought to
be registered.. Various persons filed opposition, among which include
Director of Forestry which alleged that said land is forest land and thus
not registrable. RTC granted the petition BUT CA reversed, ruling that
the land was forest land and that 30 years of OCEN possession was
proven. SC ruled that a) said land was forest land, despite the fact that
parts of it became a fishpond and most of the trees were removed and b)
possession, no matter how long, of a forest land, does not ripen into
private ownership.
DOCTRINE:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23
SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership.
FACTS:
The parcel of land sought to be registered (confirmation of imperfect
title and its registration) is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters
o sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into
fishpond, so medyo naubos yung trees and shit
 Roque Borre, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration.
Maraming oppositors:
o Heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the
application
o Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of
Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for
registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove
swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain.
o Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of the lot
o During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner
Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may
have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also
filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have
said lot registered in his name.
The CFI awarded Berbers claim to part of the land, and also ruled in
favor of Borre and Alpasan (the transferee)
Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry appealed to
the CA
o REVERSED the RTC
o during that period the land was registered, the land was a
classified forest land
o not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that
during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed
by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a
registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years
before filing of the application
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the
subject of registration
RULING CA affirmed.
WoN Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration
in the names of the private applicants. YES. Forest lands are non-
registrable, and even possession for 30 years does not ripen into
ownership
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover
o Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz
(23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56
SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area
covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it
being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is
void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government
is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such
land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the
public domain.
The records show that Lot No. 885 never ceased to be classified as
forest land of the public domain.
Cited Regalian Doctrine
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:
o "As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all
lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors-in-interests since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."
 In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not
apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public
land classified as forest.