G.R. No.
L-34674 | October 26, 1931 | MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-
appellant, vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, respondent-appellee. | OSTRAND, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the
respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg,
requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by
the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality
of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from
foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole
purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in
the country.
The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if
Act No. 3155 was declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not
be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit
prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The CFI dismissed the complaint because of petitioners failure to file another
complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by
the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be
allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155
were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become
effective.
ISSUES:
1. WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional
2. WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act
No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion,
the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation
of the legislative powers
3. WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law
RULING:
1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former
laws or parts of laws by implication. The court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so. Aside from
the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The latter
was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the
country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the
promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the
development of the resources of the country are objects within the
scope of the police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands
has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. At the time
the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity
therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power
in passing the Act.
2. No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful
delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to
the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose
importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not an amendment
but merely supplemental to Tariff Law.
Araneta v Gatmaitan
Facts:
The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay,
and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general
clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel
Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because
of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint
for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
Issue:
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.
Held:
VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take
or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of
Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be
deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to
carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious
regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern
w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.
Distinction bet:
Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law shall be
Execution of Law authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised
under and in pursuance of law.
GREGO vs. COMELEC
274 SCRA 481, 1997
Facts: On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code
of 1991, private respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff by no less than the Supreme Court upon a finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of
the City of Manila in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and assumed
office. He was successfully re-elected in 1992 and 1995.
It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on the
ground that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under
said section, those removed from office as a result of an administrative case are
disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Issue: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1,
1992?
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating
the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held
that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and
judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the
dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?
HELD:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The
old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing
is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had
the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that
effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking
body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and
the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the
legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the
rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending,
or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid
precise of the rule-making power.

Held: The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to
the provision of Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. That the provision of the
Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from office
and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from applying
the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not
be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before
its passage.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.
FACTS: