by the main provisions of the newly amended
Constitution. Subsequent events accept the
I. Statutes
A. Statutes, in general
Legaspi vs Secretary of Finance
political Law Forms of Government
Facts: Legaspi, then incumbent member of
the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to
declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting
tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets
and liabilities and some other purposes
unconstitutional. He argued that said decree
was promulgated despite the fact that under
the Constitution (T)he Legislative power shall
be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1,
Article VIII) and the President may grant
amnesty only with concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President (PM) can
issue such decrees.
HELD: It is to be observed that the original
text mentions President (Prime Minister). This
is so because . . . The incumbent President of
the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and
he shall continue to exercise all his powers
even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is
organized and ready to discharge its
functions, and likewise he shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under
the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested
in the President and the Prime Minister under
this Constitution.Parenthetically, the term
Incumbent President employed in the
transitory provisions could only refer to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Aquino vs.
Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA
275). After the April 7 amendments there
exists no longer a President (Prime Minister)
but A President and A Prime Minister. They
are now two different offices which cannot be
held by a single person not a transitory one
but a regular one provided for and governed
reality that we are no longer governed by the
transitory provisions of the Constitution. This
form of government is essentially
parliamentary with presidential features.
Benigno Aquino, Jr. vs
Commission on Elections
62 SCRA 275 Political Law De Jure vs De
Facto Government Marcos as a De Jure
President Under the 1973 Constitution
In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was
filed to seek the nullification of some
Presidential Decrees issued by then President
Ferdinand Marcos. It was alleged that Marcos
does not hold any legal office nor possess any
lawful authority under either the 1935
Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and
therefore has no authority to issue the
questioned proclamations, decrees and
orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos
government is a lawful government.
HELD: Yes. First of, this is actually a quo
warranto proceedings and Benigno Aquino, Jr.
et al, have no legal personality to sue because
they have no claim to the office of the
president. Only the Solicitor General or the
person who asserts title to the same office can
legally file such a quo warranto petition.
On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court
affirmed the validity of Martial Law
Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September
22, 1972 by President Marcos because there
was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said
proclamation pursuant to the 1935
Constitution; that the factual bases (the
circumstances of lawlessness then present)
had not disappeared but had even been
exacerbated; that the question as to the
validity of the Martial Law proclamation has
been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII
of the 1973 Constitution.
Under the (1973) Constitution, the President,
if he so desires; can continue in office beyond
1973. While his term of office under the 1935
Constitution should have terminated on
December 30, 1973, by the general
referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign
people expressly authorized him to continue
in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973
Constitution (which was validly ratified on
January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in
order to finish the reforms he initiated under
Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this was
the decision of the people, in whom
sovereignty resides . . . and all government
authority emanates . . ., it is therefore beyond
the scope of judicial inquiry. The logical
consequence therefore is that President
Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic
of the Philippines.
1. Kinds of statutes
a. Permanent
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
b. Temporary
ESPIRITU, ET. AL. VS. CIPRIANO, ET.AL.
G.R. NO. L-32743 February 15,1974
I. FACTS
This is a petitiion for certiorari filed by spouses
Primitivo and Leonora A. De Espiritu seeking the
nullification of two orders of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Br. XV/Trial Court
including (1) Order dated August 4, 1970
sustaining respondent Ricardo Ciprianos motion
to dismiss on the authority of Republic Act
6126/Rental Law and (2) Order dated October
16, 1970 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the 1st Order.
Respondent/Defendant Ciprianos house was
built on the property of plaintiff/petitioner
spouses Espiritus by virtue of an oral contract of
lease. Cipriano was their lessee since 1954.
Before 1969 the lease was on year-to-year
arrangement, rentals being then payable at or
before the end of the year. Starting January 1969
the lease was converted to a month-to-month
basis and rental was increased to P30 a month by
the lessors. Their dispute emanated on the
failure of Cipriano to pay rental since January
1969 at the monthly rate mentioned.
This lead to the filing of a complainant of
Unlawful Detainer against Cipriano in the
Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, with a favorable
decision for lessors Espiritu. Respondent
Cipriano filed a motion to dismiss said complaint
invoking the prohibitory provision of R.A. 6126,
which was upheld by the Trial Court in the 2
Orders assailed by spouses Espiritu.
II. ISSUE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
PROHIBITORY PROVISION OF R.A. 6126
III. RULING
SC found the petition of spouses Espiritu
meritorious, thus, reversing the Trial Courts
Decision and ordering the Trial Court for the
prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M on
the merits in accordance with RA 6031.
The increase in the rental was warranted/valid.
It has effected in January 1969. The law in
question took effect on June 17, 1970 or after 1
years after the increase in rentals had been
effected. The law had a limited period of
operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and
unequivocal language that:
Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling of a
unit or of land on which anothers
dwelling is located shall, during the
period of one year from March 31,
1970, increase the monthly rental
agreed upon between the lessor and
the lesses prior to the approval of this
Act when said rental does not exceed
three hundred pesos (P300) a month.
Hence, the prohibiton against the increase in
rentals was effective on March 1970 up to
March 1971. Outside and beyond that period
the law did not, by the express mandate of the
Republic Act, operate.
IV. LEGAL BASIS
1. THE SUBJECT PROVISION AFFECTS
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS HENCE A STRICT
AND PROSPECTIVE CONSTRUCTION
THEROF IS IN ORDER.
2. AS THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT MUST
BE HELD TO MEAN WHAT IS PLAINLY
SAYS.
3. EXPRESSIUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM
NO REASONABLE IMPLICATION THAT
THE LEGISLATURE EVER INTEDED TO
GIVE THE LAW IN QUESTION A
RETROACTIVE EFFECT MAY BE
ACCORDED TO THE SAME (INTENT OF
THE LAWMAKERS CAN BE VERIFIED ON
THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE CONGRESS
ON HOUSE BILL 953 WHICH BECAME
R.A. 6126)
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. and VICENTE A. RUFINO,
VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-23979 August 30, 1968
Facts: This is an action, against the Municipal
Board and the Mayor of the City of Manila, for a
declaratory relief. It was brought by the
Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc.
and its President, Vicente A. Rufino, to nullify
Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of the City of
Manila, approved on December 31, 1963, to take
effect on January 1, 1964. Which is an ordinance
regulating rentals of lots and building for
residential purposes. After appropriate
proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment declaring said ordinance
"ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab
initio without pronouncement as to costs. The
lower court struck down the questioned ordinance
upon the ground that the power to "declare a state
of emergency ... exclusively pertains to
Congress"; that "there is no longer any state of
emergency" which may justify the regulation of
house rentals; that said ordinance disconstitutes
an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the
use of private properties and arbitrarily
encroaches on the constitutional rights of
property owners"; that the power of the City of
Manila to "regulate the business of ... letting or
subletting of lands and buildings" does not
include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden
in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be
deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause
in the City Charter. Hence, this appeal by the
Mayor of Manila Said Ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not ordinance 4841 is
unconstitutional
Decision: the decision appealed from should be
as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
Rationale: The practical reason for the
requirement that a statute passed to meet a given
emergency, should limit the period of its
effectivity, is that, otherwise, a new and different
law would be necessary to repeal it, and said
period would, accordingly, be "unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain", so that "that
which was intended to meet a temporary
emergency may become a permanent law",9
because "Congress might not enact the repeal,
and, even if it would, the repeal might not meet
with the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto".
In line with the basic philosophy underlying the
authority to affect individual rights, this Court felt
that Commonwealth Act No. 671, otherwise
known as the Emergency Powers Act, was meant
to be and "became inoperative when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1946," and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226
promulgated subsequently thereto "were
issued without authority of law", because,
otherwise, said emergency regulations would
purport to be in force for an indefinite and
unlimited period of time, and, hence, would be
unconstitutional.
The same considerations impelled the Court to
invalidate Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546,
issued on November 10, 1952. Indeed, otherwise
"the result would be obvious unconstitutionality",
by making permanent a law intended to afford a
relief for a temporary emergency, the length of
which should be "fixed in the law itself and not
dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of
either Congress or the President".
We have not overlooked the fact that the cases
adverted to refer particularly to the constitutional
provision authorizing Congress, "in times of war
or other national emergency", to delegate to the
President, "for a limited period", and subject to
specified "restrictions", the power "to promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy". We are inclined to believe,
however, that in providing that the lifetime of the
authority given must be "for a limited period", the
framers of our Charter were influenced by the fact
that powers were being delegated to the
Executive, as much as by the circumstance that,
since the cause for the grant of power was
temporary, so should the grant be, for the effect
cannot remain in existence upon the removal of
its cause. In fact, Congress has, in actual
practice, accepted this limitation upon its exercise
of police power to meet a condition of emergency.
Thus, Commonwealth Act No. 499 regulated the
transfer of vessels and of shipping facilities,
effective until adjournment of the next regular
session of the National Assembly. This was
followed by Commonwealth Act No. 689 which
penalized speculation on rents of buildings
destined for dwelling purposes, but only "for a
period of two (2) years after its approval." This Act
was amended by Republic Act No. 66 which, inter
alia, extended its period of effectivity to "four (4)
years after it approval."
Needless to say, the powers of municipal
corporations delegated thereto by the National
Government cannot escape the inherent
limitations to which the latter as the source of
said powers is subject. Then, again, since our
law on municipal corporations is, in principle,
patterned after that of the United States, the rule
therein, to the effect that "in a proper case,
emergency legislation, limited in time, may be
enacted under the police power" of a municipal
corporation, should be considered a part of our
legal system.
c. In respect to application: prospective or
retroactive
d. In respect to operation: declaratory,
curative, mandatory,
directory, substantive, remedial, and penal
e. In respect to form: affirmative or negative
B. Enactment of Statutes
1. Legislative power of Congress
Article VI, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1
The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.
Occena vs. ComelecG.R. No. L-56350 April
2, 1981Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition
proceedings against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments
goes further than merely assailing their
alleged constitutional infirmity. The rather
unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not
the fundamental law. The three Resolutions
were: 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an
amendment allowing a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign
country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes 2) Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly; and 3) Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections. The three
resolutions were approved by the
Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and
27, 1981which the date of plebiscite has
been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within the
90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is
a fundamental law.(2) Whether or not the
Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power
to propose amendments.(3) Whether or not
the three-fourth votes is necessary to
propose amendments as wellas the standard
for proper submission.(4) Whether or not
the three BatasangPambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments are
valid.
Held:
Yes, the Interim BatasangPambansa has the
power and privilege to propose
amendments. On January 17, 1973, the
present Constitution came into force and
effect. With such a pronouncement by the
Supreme Court and with the recognition of
the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to
respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for
instability was removed. Thereafter, as a
matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The
1973Constitution is the fundamental law.
The existence of this power is indubitable as
the applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite explicit. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments.
In that capacity, only a majority vote
is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth
votes required when it sits as a legislative
body applies as well when it has been
convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed. That is not
a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. It is not a
requirement either when, as in this case, the
Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its
constituent power to propose amendments.
Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines naturalized in a foreign
country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the
vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing
with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a
vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the
Article on the Commission on Elections by a
vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim
BatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981, thus
making them valid.
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of
Finance
235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995)
Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills
EVAT Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the
constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known
as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)
Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill
did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24,
Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA
7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed
the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the
1streading it was referred to the Senate Ways
& Means Committee thereafter Senate
passed its own version known as Senate Bill
1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking
out its text and substituting it with the text of
SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House
Bill and the Senate version just becomes the
text (only the text) of the HB. (Its
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-
petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said
Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is
procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court
rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power
of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative
must come from the HoR. Note also that there
were several instances before where Senate
passed its own version rather than having the
HoR version as far as revenue and other such
bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over
what has been done.