SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
Yes. , it has been proven by the testimony of the surviving witnesses to the will, Francisco Reyes and
1. Settlement of estate of deceased persons; what it intends to achieve and what it
seeks to establish
2. Rights to succession; when transmitted
Article 777 of the Civil Code
3. Right to the property transmitted from the moment of death; case law
Bunyi v. Factor. GR 172547. June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 350Tito
4. Intestacy inferior to testacy
Castro v. Martinez Gallegos, GR L-3880. Mar. 9, 1908, 10 Phil. 307 Delos Reyes
Castro v. Martinez Gallegos, GR L-3880. Mar. 9, 1908, 10 Phil. 307 Delos Reyes
Facts:
MarcelinaCuico y Rodis was the owner of a house built of wood and nipa on Calle Cadiz, city of Cebu,
valued at 200 pesos. She executed a nuncupative will before a notary under which she died and wherein
she disposed of the house in which she lived. In one of the will's clauses, she bequeathed 10 pesos to
each once of her nephews, the children of her brother Valentin, named Godofredo, Mateo, Quitin,
Romana, Salud, and Constancia.
Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and a certain Ignacio and Teopista Castro challenged the will, after
Mateo and Quintin received their legacies.
Under the will, Antonio Martinez Gallegos and EvaristoRodis were appointed as executors. In compliance
with clause 4 of the same, they sold the house and lot for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut.
Afterwards, Ferragut sold the same to Tomas Osmena; he later on sold it to Martinez Gallegos. The latter
finally sold it to Ramon Velez y Santos for the price of 2, 500 pesos.
The plaintiffs in their complaint that they we declared as the owners of the property of the deceased; that
it be placed in their property; and in case that the same could not be found, for the sum of 4,000 pesos
as indemnity. It is alleged in their complaint: (1) That MarcelinaCuico was not of sound mind, nor in
control of her mental faculties, nor was she capable of disposing of her property at the time and place of
its execution; (2) that the signature of Jose A. Casals which appears as the signature of the will is not in
law sufficient as the legal signature of said MarcelinaCuico, nor by anyone in her name, or at her
request.
The court declared that the will was not only null and illegal but was also fraudulent. Naturally, it results
that all the transfers made by Martinez Gallegos were and are null and illegal, and that the title thereto
has always remained with the heirs of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not intestacy is inferior to testacy thus the court erred in granting the petition to transfer
ownership of the property to the plaintiffs.
Ruling:
BrigidoFamador, that the testatrix dictated her will to the notary, that she was in the full enjoyment of
her mental faculties, that she was in the free use of her speech, and that she had asked the witness
Casals to sign for her. And in the heading of the will the notary attests that the testatrix was in the free
use of her intellectual faculties, and that in his judgment and in that of the witnesses, she had the
necessary legal capacity to make her will and that she was in the free use of her speech; all of the
foregoing antecedents are confirmed by the detailed testimony of the priest who administered the
sacraments to the sick woman and by EvaristoRodis, a relative of the testatrix, who was appointed one of
the executors and declares that he conversed with her after the execution of the will.
If the party, or parties executing a will are unable to sign the same, the notary shall so state, and a
witness shall sign for him without the necessity of previously stating that he does so as a witness and on
behalf of the testator, or testators, who are not able to do so, because it is the duty of the notary to make
such statement in the instrument itself" as was stated by the notary who authorized the will in question,
saying that the testatrix ratified the contents of the will, and that she did not sign the same because she
was prevented by her illness, "the witness Casals doing so at her reguest . . . ."
Should the testator declare that he does not know how, or is not able to sign, one of the attesting
witnesses or another person shall do so for him at his request, the notary certifying thereto. (Civil Code,
art. 695.
It is a legal doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of justice of Spain, that "wills
executed with the formalities of law are presumed valid."
It is also a legal doctrine established among others, that "the normal condition of the faculties of the
testator is presumed under the law."
And finally it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions, "that is not proper to declare the
nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when the notary who authorizes the
instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time of executing the will, was of
sound mind."
Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of MarcelinaCuico y Rodis have
been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of law .
Nothing can be done upon the ground of nullity of an act without first obtaining, or at least petitioning at
the same time for a declaration of nullity; and the plaintiffs have limited themselves to asking that they
be declared the owners of the property of the late MarcelinaCuico, without first obtaining, or petitioning
at the same time for a declaration of nullity of the will whereby Marcelina transmitted said property to
others.
In the event that will in question was really null, the proper thing to do would be open the intestate
succession of MarcelinaCuico by means of the procedure established by law; in which action the
declaration of heirs of MarcelinaCuico could be obtained with the right to demand the nullity of the acts
or contracts by virtue of which the property of the intestate estate has been transferred to third persons
5. Modes of settlement of the estate of a deceased person
Rule 69, RoC
 1, Rule 74, RoC
3, Rule 74, RoC
Rules 75 to 79, RoC
Rule 79, RoC
6. Prompt filing of money claims against the decedent arising from contract
2 and 5, Rule 87, RoC
Tan Sen Guan v. Go Sui San, GR L-22451. Dec. 22, 1924, 47 Phil. 96Dinglasan
Rule 72 #6 Tan Sen Guan v. Go Siu San
47 Phil. 89 (1924)
G.R. No. L-22451
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue and the defendant is the
administrator in the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Antonio
Tampoco. Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue, about the month of January, 1920, the sum of
P25,802.60, which with the interest stipulated by the two deceased Tan Peng Sue and Antonio
Tampoco in their lifetime at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent per year, amounted to P30,272.89 at the
end of the year 1922
2. upon the death of Antonio Tampoco on February 5, 1920, proceeding was instituted in the CFI
Manila for the settlement of his estate
3. on December 14 of that year commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever claim
might be presented against the estate, and d rendered their final report on June 27, 1921,
which was approved by the court below on July 14 of said year;
4. about August 30, 1922, the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Tan Peng
Sue, moved the court that the committee on claims be again authorized, or a new committee
appointed, to hear and decide a claim that he had and which he was to present against the
estate
5. on September 21, 1922, Geo. R. Harvey, judge, appointed new commissioners and the latter
recommend payment by the defendant administrator, which was by agreement of the parties
estimated at P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922.
6. On December 22, 1923, the court presided over by Judge Diaz rendered decision, absolving the
defendant administrator of the estate of Tampoco from the complaint, holding that the
commissioners appointed on September 21, 1922, had no authority under the law to hear and
decide said claim, because the court that had appointed them had on the said date no
jurisdiction to appoint them in view of the fact that more than fourteen months have elapsed
since their final report was submitted by the former committee on claims in the aforesaid
testamentary proceeding and approved by the court. To this decision the plaintiff excepted on
the 29th day of the same month, and moved for the new trial on January 9, 1924, on the
ground that said decision was against the law and the facts proven at the trial.
7. On March 27, 1924, the lower court presided over by the Honorable Geo. R. Harvey, judge, after
considering the motion for new trial, rendered a new decision, setting aside that of December
22, 1923, and ordering the administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco to pay the
administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue the sum of P28,802.60, with interest thereon at the
rate of 9 6/10 per cent annum from March 28, 1920.
Pre-Issue: WON motion for new trial is proper
HELD: Yes.
the discretionary power granted the judges by section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
revise or amend their judgments, before the same become final, may be exercised upon a motion
based on section 145, subsection 3, jointly with, or separately from the power to grant new trial,
although the exercise of the power to grant new trial necessarily requires the revocation of the
former judgment; that under section 145, a judge may correct errors in his decisions, and in
revoking his original decision by amending it upon the motion a reopening of the case
Issue: WON action for new trial had already prescribed
HELD: Yes.
1. The failure of Tan Chu Lay, heir of Tan Peng Sue, to present his claim was an omission
committed by an heir who had knowledge of the existence of the credit of his deceased father.
The fact that Tan Chu Lay might have been induced by fraudulent machinations and unlawful
influence of the defendant administrator cannot affect the legal consequences of said act. And
even if it be admitted that the widow of Tan Peng Sue was in China while the committee on
claims was acting in the proceeding for the settlement of Antonio Tampoco's estate, still the
result would be the same. The law does not make any reservation or exception whatever, and
this court cannot make either.
a. The pertinent part of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: A person
having a claim against a deceased person proper to be allowed by the committee, who
does not, after publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the committee as
provided in this chapter, shall be barred from recovering such demand or from
pleading the same in offset to any action, except as hereinafter provided.
2. Under section 690, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the period fixed by the
committee on claims may apply to the court, within six months after the period previously fixed,
for the renewal of the commission for the purpose of examining his claim. Also a creditor may
make such application even after six months from the expiration of the period formerly fixed
and before the final settlement of the estate, if the committee shall have failed to give the notice
required by section 687.
a. the application of the plaintiff was presented fourteen months after the expiration of
the period fixed for the filing of claims. And while it was presented before the final
settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco, yet, it having been proved that the
committee had published in the newspaper La Nacion the notice required by law, there
was no possible ground for granting said application. Even considering this application
under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we believe that the lapse of fourteen
months is an unsurmountable barrier opposing the granting of said application.
WON the notice to the creditors was done in the proper manner
HELD: Yes.
1. Before a credit may be held barred by our procedural statutes relative to liquidation of
inheritance, it must appear, among other things, that the committee have designated
convenient hours and places for the holding of their meetings for the examination and
admission of claims, and that they have published this fact in the manner provided by the law.
Unless this is done, the right of a creditor cannot prescribe, and he who claims the benefit of
prescription has the burden of proof.
2. the committee on claims in the aforesaid proceeding had published for three consecutive weeks
a notice to claimants, stating that they might present their claims within the period of six
months, the committee to hold meetings at the office of Attorney M.G. Goyena, room No. 1, 34,
Escolta, on the last Wednesday of each month at 3:30 p. m. for the purpose of hearing and
deciding claims, notwithstanding the appointment issued by the court, in which the places are
designated where the notice should be posted, and the newspaper in which it should be
published for three weeks, giving the creditors the period of six months to present their claims.
For the foregoing the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is hereby declared that the
plaintiff appellee has lost his right to enforce his claim in this proceeding, without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 Johnson, Malcolm, Avancea, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.. Street, J., dissents.
Strret, dissenting
the following appears from the stipulation of facts and exhibits:
During all this time, nothing, as has already been said, was done with regards to the estate of
Tan Peng Sue. His widow was in China and no legal representative was appointed to look after
his affair. When his widow and heirs learned of the death of Tampoco's executor, Go Sui San,
assured them that the same will be respected and paid when demanded; that there was no need
of presenting the claim before the committee or the probate court as the same appeared already
on the books of the estate; and that it was to their advantage not to segregate it from the mass
as it was gaining interest. Certain different amounts on this account were in fact received by the
widow and heirs of Tan Peng Sue who naturally became more convinced of the advices of Go Sui
San. (See affidavits of Go Biec and Tan Chui Lay, folios 79 to 86 of record.) Consequently, the
claim of Tan Peng Sue was not presented to the original committee on claims in the estate of
Tampoco.
Based upon such facts, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
7. Purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of estate in the probate court
Estate of Olave v. Reyes, GR L-29407. July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 767 Eugenio
Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (1983)
Short Summary: Administrators of estate of decedent entered into an amicable settlement with a creditor
company who wanted to collect from the estate of the decedent in a separate proceeding. This was done
w/o prior approval of the probate court. SC held that prior approval of the probate court needed because
(1) the claim of the creditors is a claim against the estate; and (2) probate court already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case, to the exclusion of the other court)
Facts
-there's already a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave in the Manila
court. There's an order from this court providing that the co-administrators should first secure the
probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the 17 titles of the estate
-Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed Civil case for collection of debt and
attorney's fees in Davao court against the co-administrators of the estate of AmadeoOlave
-even after order from the probate court to secure first its approval, SAMCO and the co-administrators
entered into an AMICABLE SETTLEMENT wherein one of the 17 titles of the estate was ceded to SAMCO
as payment for its claim. This was done w/o notice and approval of the probate court
-DAVAO COURT: approved amicable settlement
WON SAMCO PROPERLY FILED CLAIM IN A SEPARATE PROCEEDING? NO
1. R87.1: "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; . . ."
2. Claim of Samco could only be pursued by filing it in the administration proceedings and w/n the
prescribed period, or else barred forever
3. Why present claims in the probate court: to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the
executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to
apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely
arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the
administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment
of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall share pro-rata in
the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.
4. Manila Probate court already has exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding and the properties claimed:
R73.1
5. The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior
approval of the probate court.
6. The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect
the estate of deceased persona. In that way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each
claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
8. Complaint against person/s suspected of keeping properties belonging to the
estate; probate court has no authority to decide the issue of ownership
Modesto v. Modesto, GR L-11801. June 30, 1959, 105 Phil. 1379 -Galicinao
Adapon v. Maralit, GR 46898. Jan. 20, 1940, 69 Phil 383Riego
TOPIC:Complaint against person/s suspected of keeping properties belonging to the estate; probate court
has no authority to decide the issue of ownership
FACTS:
On December 16, 1936, Pedro Adapon presented for probate the last will and testament of his deceased
father, RudocindoAdapon in the CFI of Batangas. The will was admitted to probate and Pedro was
appointed as administrator by the court. He then filed an inventory of the property and assets of the
estate. However the surviving spouse of the deceased from a 2nd marriage, FelisaMaralit, filed to the
court to order the administrator to pay her a monthly allowance of P50 as well as to include certain
properties to the inventory which was omitted from the inventory (1k cavansofpalay, credit in favor of
deceased, carabaoes etc.) The Administrator in his answer, claimed ownership over the properties. Thus
the oppositorMaralit, during the hearing moved that in view of the claims of ownership made in the
answer, theadministrator should be relieved of his duties and another be appointed to act in his place.
LC ruled that the allegations in the motion of the oppositor widow is not sufficient to warrant the removal
of the administrator. The court however ordered the administrator to include certain properties in the
inventory, To this the administrator appeals, contending that the court erred in ordering the inclusion of
such properties. Thus this case.
ISSUE: WON the probate court could, upon petition of oppositor to include certain properties in the
inventory prepared by the administrator, to some of which the said administrator had laid claims of
ownership determine the question of ownership and thereby meet the issues as thus presented.
HELD:
No. It is not seen how the probate court can determine the respective merits of the conflicting claims
made by the administrator and the oppositor without necessarily declaring the lawful ownership of the
properties involved. Such a declaration is necessary and inevitable and without it the probate court
cannot properly proceed and dispose of the petition submitted by theoppositor. However under Sec 599 of
the code of civil procedure, the probate jurisdiction of the CFI only relates to matters having to do with
the settlement of estates and probates of wills of deceased persons the appointment and removal of
guardians and trustees and the powers, duties and rights of guardians and wards, trustees and cestuis
10. Service of notice to the heirs not a jurisdictional requirement
que trust. As may have seen the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the
Abut v. Abut, GR L-26743. May 31, 1972, 45 SCRA 326 Vallejo
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS: FACTS:Gavina Abut, through counsel, seeks the admission of the amended petition in which she
substitutes for the original petitioner, Generoso Abut, who died after his original petition was filed,
published and the Court had taken jurisdiction thereof. In the original petition the deceased Generoso
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS; EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS; Abut appears to have been named executor of the will of the deceased Cipriano Abut; that he was in
possession and custody of the latter's will; and that he sought to be named executor of the will of the
DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP.Under section 599 of the Code of Civil Procedure, deceased Cipriano Abut. In the amended petition Gavina Abut alleges that the will was delivered to her
the probate jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance relates only to matters having to do with "the by Generoso Abut before his death and that it is now in her custody and possession, and she prays that
she be appointed administratrix of the estate of the deceased Cipriano Abut.
settlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased persons, the appointment and removal of guardians
and trustees, and the powers, duties, and rights of guardians and wards, trustees, and cestuis que Considering the foregoing amendments embodied in the amended petition, and the fact that publication
trust." As may be seen, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of of the petition is a jurisdictional matter intended to inform whomsoever may be interested in said petition
and to afford him or her an opportunity to assert his or her rights, the Court believes that the original
questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding. petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of another petition pursuant
to the requirements of the Rules of Court.

9. Jurisdiction acquired through publication ISSUE: W/N the court erred in dismissing the orifinal petition? YES
Perez v. Perez, GR L-14781. July 15, 1959, 105 Phil. 1132 Tito
HELD: A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
Perez vs Perez publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said
G.R. No. L-12359 July 15, 1959 will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition
named additional heirs not included in the original petition3 did not require that notice of the
Facts: amended petition be published anew. All that Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be
This appeal does not belong here. Involving, as it does the summary settlement of a testate estate. notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either by mail or personally.
The printed brief makes no assignment expressly challenging the court's jurisdiction; but in discussing
their second error, oppositors-appellants insist the lower court did not "acquire jurisdiction to receive the
evidence for the allowance of the alleged will" because two heirs had not been notified in advance of such
Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the termination of the case,5 and remains
will.
unaffected by subsequent events.The court below erred in holding that it was divested of jurisdiction
In reply to this, the petitioner-appellee says the persons mentioned were not entitled to notice, since they
just because the original petitioner died before the petition could be formally heard. Parties who could
were not forced heirs grandnephew and niece and had not been mentioned as legatees or devisees
have come in and opposed the original petition, as herein appellees did, could still come in and oppose
in the will of the deceased. And as to Milagros Perez, petitioner asserts that notice had been addressed to
the amended petition, having already been notified of the pendency of the proceeding by the publication
her last known residence in this country.
of the notice thereof. In the case of Perez vs. Perez4 this Court explained:
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction
Thus it appears that such "no notice" argument has no legal foundation. At any rate
Held: the omission, if any, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court; it constituted a mere
procedural error that may or may not be the basis of reversal (Jocson vs. Nable, 48
Thus, it appears that such "no notice" argument has no legal foundation. At any rate the omission, if any, O.G. 90). Indeed, this Tribunal has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over
did not affect the jurisdiction of the court: it constituted a mere procedural error that may or may not be all persons interested in the estate through the publication of the petition in the
the basis of reversal. Indeed, this Tribunal has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons newspapers (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 159; Jocson vs. Nable, supra) which
interested in the estate through the publication of the petition in the newspapers which in this case in this case admittedly took place.
admittedly took place.
Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural convenience, not
Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of
jurisdictional requisite. So much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted
procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. So much so that even if the
from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not adviced the decree allowing the will
names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the petition for allowance of the
does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction.
will and therefore were not advised the decree allowing the will does not ipso
Needless, to add, in fine, the jurisdictional question directly appealable to this Court refers to facto become void for want of jurisdiction ...
jurisdiction over the subject matter, not mere jurisdiction over the persons,
Wherefore, this record will be referred to the Court of Appeals for disposition in accordance with
law.
The admission of the amended petition, of course, does not mean that GavinaAbut's prayer that
she be appointed administratrix with the will annexed is necessarily meritorious.It simply
recognizes that since the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the res, such jurisdiction
continues until the termination of the case. The first question that the lower court should hear and
decide is the probate of the will; and the question of whether or not Gavina Abut should be appointed
administratrix must be decided on the basis of the facts to be presented and after the will is proved and
allowed, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 78.
RULE 73. VENUE AND PROCESS
SECTION 1, RULE 73. WHERE ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS SETTLED
1. Venue for ordinary civil actions and for special proceedings have the same
meaning; residence defined
Jao v. CA, GR 128314. May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 407tito
2. Distinction between residence under election laws and for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions under the Rules of Court
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, GR 104960, Sept. 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408 Delos
Reyes
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, GR 104960, Sept. 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408
Delos Reyes
FACTS:PhilipRomualdez, the petitioner, is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision to establish his legal
residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his residential house therein. He
soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place where he voted. After the people power,
petitioner left the country and fled to America for asylum. When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines in
December 1991, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the
registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC on February 1, 1992 for the Synchronized National
and Local Election scheduled for May 11, 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct
No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. On February 21, 1992, DonatoAdvincula, respondent, filed a petition with
the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166 alleging that Romualdez was a resident of
Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently
arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines
and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. Romualdez contends that he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that
he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986
up to the third week of December 1991. After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte held in
favor of the petitioner Advincula then appealed the case to the respondent court then it rendered the
assailed decision that the petitioner is disqualified to register as a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby
reverses the decision of the lower court in toto. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:Issue: Whether or not petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte
despite his sudden departure to the U.S?
HELD: YES.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term
"residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." 19 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. 20 That residence, in the case of the
petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire
a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. 21 In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 22
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great
apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the
members of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have
somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be
described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are
used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
The Court closely examined the records, and was not convinced that the petitioner had, in fact,
abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile elsewhere.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty
of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensure
that the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of the governed. 23 We,
therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort even all the way up to this
Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it but
only on behalf of those entitled and bound to exercise it.
WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; of the Decision
of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated 03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
3. What determines venue?
4. Venue distinguished from jurisdiction
Malig v. Bush, GR L-22761. May 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 449Dinglasan
Rule 73 #4 G.R. No. L-22761
ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH, represented in this suit
by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIA SANTOS BUSH, defendant-appellee.
On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged
natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born
of the common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941;
 that said John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of the plaintiffs, were not suffering
from any disability to marry each other; that the defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal
wife of the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; that she submitted to the
court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will whereby he
bequeathed his estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger;
that the defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the
deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only
in July, 1962.
They prayed that the project of partition be annulled on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation on
the part of the defendant, who knew that herein plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of
the decedent;
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of
limitations. The plaintiffs opposed and the defendant filed a reply to the opposition. On January 10,
1963 the lower court denied the motion, it appearing that the grounds upon which said motion is
based are not indubitable. In time, the defendant filed her answer specifically denying all the material
averments of the complaint and invoking laches, res judicata and statute of limitations as affirmative
defenses.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since
the action was one to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court
alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. On
October 31, 1963
TRIAL COURT: granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the
defendant but because the action had prescribed.
The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss?
It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata
and statute of limitations, was denied because those grounds did not appear to the court to be
indubitable. The second motion reiterated none of those grounds and raised only the question of
jurisdiction.
In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court in effect did so
motuproprio, without offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point. In fact the court did not even
state in its order why in its opinion the action had prescribed, and why in effect, without any evidence
or new arguments on the question, it reversed its previous ruling that the ground of prescription was
not indubitable.
In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94, it was held:
Section 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it
specifically ordains that a motion to this end be filed. In the light of this express requirement we do not
believe that the court had power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly presented. The
fact that the parties filed memoranda upon the courts indication or order in which they discussed the
proposition that the action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and independently of
the case for libel did not supply the deficiency. Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in
which an action may be dismissed, and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other,
under the familiar maxims, inclusiouniusestexclusivoulterius. The only instance in which, according to
said Rules, the court may dismiss upon the courts own motion an action is, when the plaintiff fails to
appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to
comply with the Rules or any order of the court.
Although a motion to dismiss had been presented defendant the resolution of the court granting the
same was based upon a ground not alleged in said motion. But assuming that the lower court could
properly consider the question of prescription anew, the same still did not appear to be indubitable on
the face of the allegations in the complaint. 000
The defendant cites Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides that an action for acknowledgment of
natural children may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, except in two
instances not obtaining in this case, and that the present action was commenced after the death of the
putative father of the plaintiffs. The said provision is not of indubitable application, since the plaintiffs
do not seek acknowledgment but allege as a matter of fact that they are the acknowledged natural
children and the only heirs in the direct line of the late John T. Bush. Whether or not this allegation is
true will, of course, depend upon the evidence to be presented at the trial.
The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground posed in her motion to dismiss,
citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court formerly in force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which says:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record
It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate.The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited
indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing
so, the Rule specifies that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and
approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be
made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through
fraud, they have been deprived.
Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, this Court believes that the
plaintiffs cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Costs against the defendant-appellee in this instance.
5. Rule refers to venue and not to jurisdiction
6. Rules on venue and jurisdiction in probate proceedings
Lim v. CA, GR 124715. Jan. 24, 2000, 323 SCRA 102 Eugenio
Fule v. CA, GR L-40502. Nov. 29, 1976Galicinao
Facts
Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A.
Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging that Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the
estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
Preciosa B. Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the order appointing Fule as special Held
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration
has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
Yes. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G.
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix. Garcia prayed that she be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix after due
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
hearing. While the motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a motion
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
to remove Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
for reconsideration, that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
incomplete misrepresentations;
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Fule with the physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
CFI of Calamba, Laguna, was published. place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
by Virginia G. Fule alleging, among others, the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina
more than temporary.
Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia, and that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the
original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule. Preciosa B. Garcia The last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
opposed the supplemental petition because it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the CFI which it did not Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
possesse at the beginning because the original petition was deficient. residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia,
which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that
his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar had already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only
on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters
of administration
Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in
7. Court which has jurisdiction over probate cases
interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not
a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia. Judge Malvar Lim v. CA, GR 124715. Jan. 24, 2000, 323 SCRA 102 Riego
denied the motion. TOPIC:Court which has jurisdiction over probate cases
FACTS:
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition
and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to
annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C. In 1994, Pastor Lim died. His wife, Rufina Lim petitioned with the lower court, acting as a probate court,
for the inclusion of 5 corporations into the inventory of the estate of Pastor Lim. The 5 corporations were:
The CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C for Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing,
lack of jurisdiction. Fule elevated the case to the SC.
Inc. and Action Company. Rufina alleged that the assets of these corporations were owned wholly by
However, even before Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had Pastor; that these corporations themselves are owned by Pastor and they are mere dummies of Pastor.
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Rizal, Quezon The corporations filed a motion for exclusion from the estate. They presented proof (Torrens Titles)
City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia.
Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix showing that the assets of the corporations are in their respective names and titles. The probate court
upon a bond of P30,000.00. She only infomed Judge Ericcta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before denied their motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court.
Judge Malvar on February 14, 1975 and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of
Appeals on January 30, 1975.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court in this case have jurisdiction in this case.
Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform
the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals.

Issue HELD:

Whether there is improper venue Yes, the probate court in this case have jurisdiction in this case.

The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross
value of the estate of the decedent. The provisions of Republic Act 7691, which introduced amendments
to Batas PambansaBlg. 129, are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxxxxxxxx
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value
of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed One
Hundred Thousand Pesos(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged,
Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys, litigation expenses and
costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided further, that
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions;
xxxxxxxxx"
REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:
Succession; Testate and Intestate Proceedings; Probate Courts; Jurisdiction; The determination of which
court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent.The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon
the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
Same; Same; Corporation Law; Ownership; Land Titles; Where real properties included in the inventory of
the estate of a decedent are in the possession of and are registered in the name of corporations, in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said
titles in favor of said corporations should stand undisturbed.Inasmuch as the real properties included
in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the
name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and
distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction Doctrine; Rudimentary is the rule that a
corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or
membersby legal fiction and convenience it is shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a
character alien to the persons comprising it.It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality
separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of
the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or
those of the entities connected with it. Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with
a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by
legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a
character alien to the persons comprising it.
Same; Same; Piercing the veil of corporate fiction requires the court to see through the protective shroud
which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes
one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in First Philippine International Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, We enunciated: x xx When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or
an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with
which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will
be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals, x x xPiercing the veil of
corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders
from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. The corporate mask may be lifted
and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of
another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist; where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is
sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.
Same; Same; Test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction.The test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is
as follows: (1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such
control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right;
and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent piercing the corporate veil.
Same; Same.Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.
Same; Same.Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing
must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.
Same; Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Affidavits; Affidavits are inadmissible in evidence where the
affiants were not presented during the course of the proceedings.Granting arguendo that the Regional
Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner
nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of
corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and
LaniWenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty
probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits
are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the
proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said
documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner
consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
Mendoza v. Teh, GR 122646. Mar. 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 764 Tito
[G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997]
MENDOZA vs TEH
Facts:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased
husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for
reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary
injunction docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B.
Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on
December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of
her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;
Private respondents filed their answer with motion to dismissalleging among others that the complaint
states no cause of action. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents
contend that a special proceedings case for appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be
incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts
among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter
which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued
that since petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the appointment of the
estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction over the
case.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisidiction
Courts; Jurisdiction; Probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the
RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate.An action for reconveyance, which involves title
to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC.
Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the
appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1
of Rule 73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of
administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit
of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking
such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private
respondents confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 provides
that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located, in this
case,Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of
his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.
Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure.
Jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or title to
property is not applicable in this case because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of
Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction,
is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Moreover, the instant action for
reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. Considering that the RTC
has jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it
was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
8. Court first taking cognizance excludes all others; Domicile of the testator affects
only the venue but not the jurisdiction
Rodriguez v. De Borja, GR L-21993. June 21, 1966, 17 SCRA 41 Vallejo
FACTS: The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila;
that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and AdelaidaJacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of
Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez
and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the
alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn;
that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr.
Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria
Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia
Pangilinan and AdelaidaJacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by
them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal;
that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time
of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite,
Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed
at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of OngsingcoVda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja,
G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of
Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in
Rizal on March 12, 1963.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI BULACAN has JURISDICTION? YES
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4,
1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motuproprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the
will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court(Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction,
such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published
three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the
testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance
of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a
decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time
when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the
Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bulacan court is incontestable.1wph1.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any
other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it
were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court,
since the same enjoins that:
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the
Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent
was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish
priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout
some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the
Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is
conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue
but not the jurisdiction of the Court
NOTE: PETITIONER RELIANCE to Sec 1 of rule 73 is untennable. Section 1 only deals with
the venue.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law
upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but
not the jurisdiction of the Court
9. When the administrator cannot enter into any transaction without prior court
approval
Estate of Olave v. Reyes, GR L-29407. July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 767galicinao
10. Instances where two cases are filed, one testate and the other intestate: which
courts should exercise jurisdiction; case laws
Roberts v. Leonidas, GR L-55509. Apr. 27, 1984, 129 SCRA 33 Delos Reyes
Roberts v. Leonidas, GR L-55509. Apr. 27, 1984, 129 SCRA 33 Delos Reyes
FACTS:Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on
November 27, 1977. Survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and two children, Edward (Pete)
and Linda, and by Juanita and Ethel (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in
divorce.
He executed on January 23, 1959, two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will
disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated
in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:
 I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my
daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them
in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine in Court of Tooele County, Utah. Two
weeks later, Maxine, Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita and their mother Juanita
Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into
a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed the lawyers of the parties. It was
stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators)
of Grimm's Philippine estate.
On January 9, 1978, Ethel, filed with CFI Instance intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
She was named special administratrix. On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the
probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to
the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, withdrew that opposition and
motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators.
Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court
ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold
some of the testators properties. Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and
filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M.
Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each
to his four children or 12.5%. Later, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del
Callar as their lawyer.
On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that
the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del
Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
On September 8, 1980, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying
for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to
return the same to Maxine. Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to
the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the
intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of
October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the
testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard
in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to
the petition for probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an
intestate proceeding by Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in
the Utah district court)
RULING:Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because
Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should
be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to
the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose.
Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices
and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved.
Cuenco v. CA, GR L-24742. Oct. 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 360 Dinglasan
Rule 73 #33 ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA,
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES. and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
respondents.
FACTS:
Sen. Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and
their 2minor sons, all residing in Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents
herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion CuencoManguera, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and TeresitaCuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first
instance of Cebu, alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila; that he
was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu
and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on
10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering
the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and
Province of Cebu.
In the meantime, petitioner Rosa CayetanoCuenco filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City)
for the probate of the deceaseds last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa filed in said Cebu court
an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special
Administrator. Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioners motion to
dismiss until after the CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probateproceedings.
Respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,on the groundof lack
of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of
respondents and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUE(s):
1. WoN CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
2. WoN CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebus order
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
HELD:
The Court finds that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceaseds last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testators
express wish.
The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over all
matters of probate, both of testate and intestate estates. On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the
Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to
prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume; jurisdiction from
doing so, the Rule specifies that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The cited Rule provides:
Section 1 1.Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
A fair reading of the Rulesince it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-
ordinate jurisdictionindicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedents last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided
with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition
before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance
of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which
has before it the petition for probate of the decedents alleged last will.
The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction
nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead
deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and
designated executrix of the decedents last will, since the record before it (the petitioners opposition
and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent
had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition
proceedings the Cebu courts order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the
Quezon City court/thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu courts order of deference) to
exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedents will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor
with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedents will to probate and appointing petitioner as
executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the
provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Courts exercise of its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts,22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly
assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City courts exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate
of the decedent and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of
petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedents express will and all its
orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to
annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the
Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed
and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible
documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally
filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
11. Wrong venue in probate a waivable procedural defect
Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occidental, GR L-21938. May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 252 Eugenio
12. Jurisdiction over probate proceedings
13. Limited jurisdiction of probate courts
Coca v. Borromeo, GR L-29545. Jan. 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 278 Galicinao
Facts
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They
possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon,
Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and
Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3)
Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan who died
in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras.
A Special Proceeding was instituted with the CFI of Misamis Occidental on September 5, 1963 for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses. On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a
project of partition wherein the combined areas of the Lotswere partitioned.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They
contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which
recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of one of the Lots. The CFI
deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed
by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen
hectares in all which were excluded from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is
determined in an ordinary action.
On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the project
of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve
hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed
by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan. Appellants Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan
appealed the decision, contending that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide
the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of the Lot. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares
when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition.
Issue
Whether the court had jurisdiction to decide a question of title or ownership
Held
Yes. Generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. The instant case may be treated as an
exception to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action. Here, the
probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the
hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs who
have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
14. Powers and duties of the probate court
3, Rule 73, RoC
3, Rule 77, RoC
5, Rule 79, RoC
11, Rule 86, RoC
11, Rule 88, RoC
2, Rule 89, RoC
1, Rule 90, RoC
15. Probate court powerless to act on property rights from contracts
Reyes-Mesugas Reyes, GR 174835. Mar. 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 345Riego
GR 174835. Mar. 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 345
TOPIC:Probate court powerless to act on property rights from contracts
FACTS:
Lourdes Aquino Reyes, mother of petitioner and respondent, died intestate, leaving to her heirs, among
others, three parcels of land, including a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 24475. A
compromise agreement was entered into by the parties whereby the estate of Lourdes was partitioned. A
decision was rendered by the RTC pursuant to the said compromise agreement. Petitioner filed a motion
to cancel lispendens annotation for TCT No. 24475 arguing that the settlement of the estate proceeding
had terminated; hence, the annotation of lispendens could already be cancelled since it had served its
purpose. Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to the compromise
agreement, executed side agreements which had yet to be fulfilled. One such agreement was executed
between petitioner and respondent granting respondent a one-meter right of way on the lot covered by
TCT No. 24475. The RTC denied the motion to cancel the notice of lispendens annotation for lack of
sufficient merit but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, sitting as probate court, has jurisdiction over the issue of right of way.
HELD:
NO, the RTC, sitting as probate court, has NO jurisdiction over the issue of right of way.
In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as a probate court. Settled is the rule that a
probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on
the rights to property arising from the contract. It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of
the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. It is apparent therefore that when the
RTC approved the compromise agreement, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end.
Moreover, judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory as
there is no appeal from such judgment. When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending
litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, such action constitutes an
implied waiver of the right to appeal against the said decision.
REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:
Judgments; Compromise Agreements; When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending
litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, such action constitutes an
implied waiver of the right to appeal against the said decision.A compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Once
submitted to the court and stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract
binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the
controversy, it has the force and effect of any judgment. Consequently, a judgment rendered in
accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such
judgment. When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a
decision be rendered approving said agreement, such action constitutes an implied waiver of the right to
appeal against the said decision.
Probate Courts; Jurisdiction; Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction
it acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property arising from the contract,
and approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of
the Rules of Court.In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as a probate court.
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining Clara Tambunting died on April 2, 1950, leaving properties, real and personal, of great value. Her will
was probated on August 21, 1950. Survived by her husband Vicente L. Legarda, she left as sole and
to the estate but never on the rights to property arising from the contract. It approves contracts entered
direct heir her grandson Vicente Legarda Price, an only child of her only child and daughter Clarita
into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. It is apparent Tambunting married to Walter Scott Price. Clarita died during the Liberation in 1945; her surviving
spouse Walter Scott Price later remarried and returned to the United States. His sister Pacifica Price de
therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on September 13, 2000, the settlement
Barrios married to a brother of Atty. Salvador Barrios was later appointed guardian of the minor Vicente
of the estate proceeding came to an end. Legarda Price who by now must be around ten or eleven years old.
Same; Lis Pendens; Any agreement other than the judicially approved compromise agreement between
Three co-administrators were appointed Vicente L. Legarda, represented by his father-in-law Atty.
the parties is outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court; A notice of lispendens may be Sarte; Pacifica Price de Barrios, represented by her brother-in-law Atty. Barrios; and Augusto
Tambunting, represented by Atty. Eduardo D. Gutierrez. Each co- administrator filed a bond in the sum
cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
of P10,000. At the time the estate was valued at P200,000.
recorded.A notice of lispendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to protect the
On June 15, 1951, Attys. Sarte and Gutierrez filed a joint petition asking the probate court that their
title of the party who caused it to be recorded. The compromise agreement did not mention the grant of a
authorized attorneys fees of P25,000 each be equalized to that of Atty. Barrios which was P50,000.
right of way to respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially approved compromise agreement Pacifica Price, co-administrator and her counsel Atty. Barrios opposed the petition but later withdrew
their opposition provided that the additional fees of P25,000 each sought by Attys. Sarte and Gutierrez be
between the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court. Thus, any other agreement
paid from the share of their clients, namely, Benjamin, Augusto, Romeo and Julieta, represented by Atty.
entered into by the petitioner and respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the Gutierrez and Vicente L. Legarda represented Atty. Sarte. Because of the conformity of the parties this
petition for increase was granted by the probate court, and to be paid from the estate, but with the
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate court. Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to
understanding that the fee of P50,000 given to Atty. Barrios and the fees of Attys. Sarte and Gutierrez of
cancel the notice of lispendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had no right which needed to be P25,000 each plus the additional P25,000 to each should be the limit to the amounts of attorneys fees
chargeable to the estate, and that any additional attorneys fees sought and awarded should come from
protected. Any alleged right arising from the side agreement on the right of way can be fully protected
the estate of their respective clients and with the consent of the latter.
by filing an ordinary action for specific performance in a court of general jurisdiction.
The probate court was informed that the estate had around P1,000,000 in cash deposited in Philippine
Same; Same; When the courts judgment on the settlement of estate decision was recorded in the
and United States Banks from which the attorneys fees already mentioned could be paid, and cash
Registry of Deeds pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lispendens inscribed advances to the heirs and legatees could be made.
on the affected property was deemed cancelled by virtue of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In line with the recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph 2, Section 77 of On February 6, 1952, an omnibus petition filed by all the heirs, principal legatees and co-administrators
and their attorneys was filed asking the court to fix and approve the cash value of the usufruct of the
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 provides: Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendensxxx xxx xxx xxx
surviving spouse Vicente L. Legarda in the amount of P50,000; to pay an additional attorneys fees to the
xxx At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action such as three lawyers Sarte, Barrios and Gutierrez in the amount of P100,000 each; to pay an account of said
additional attorneys fees the sum of P20,000,000 to each attorney and that in order to pay said amounts
to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in
of P50,000, cash value of the usufruct, P60,000 advance to the attorneys and P50,000 as partial
which a memorandum or notice of lispendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, payment of the taxes to the Government, the three co- administrators be authorized to procure a loan
from the trust funds deposited in the name of Vicente Legarda Price in the amount of P160,000.
the notice of lispendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of
court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof. Thus, when In an order dated February 29, 1952, Judge San Jose denied the prayer for authority to secure a loan;
denied the prayer for the payment of additional attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000 each, but
the September 13, 2000 decision was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal pursuant to Section 4,
approved the agreement of the parties fixing the cash value of the usufruct of Vicente L. Legarda in the
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lispendens inscribed on TCT No. 24475 was deemed cancelled sum of P50,000. This amount was paid to Vicente Legarda and is included in the P225,000 paid to him
according to the partial distribution already stated. In the same order Judge San Jose directed the
by virtue of Section 77 of PD No. 1529.
administrators to wind up the probate proceedings within 30 days.

Presumably, because of the claims and representations made by the three attorneys Sarte, Barrios and
16. Probate court as a trustee Gutierrez that the estate had a conservative value of P7,000,000, the Government on April 27, 1953, filed
Tambunting De Tengco v. San Jose, GR L-8162. Aug. 30, 1955, 97 Phil. 491Tito a claim for taxes, estate and inheritance, including surcharges, in the amount of P1,581,671.80, based
apparently on the value of the estate as stated in the petition for increase of attorneys fees dated
TAMBUNTING DE TENGCO vs SAN JOSE January 31, 1952. Subsequently, however, his claim of the Government for taxes was reconsidered
presumably upon representation of the co-administrators and attorneys that the estate was worth much
Probate Court as Trustee less than P70,000,000 and the Government accordingly reduced its claim for taxes from P1,581,671.80
(Note: Anghaba ng facts of the case, hindeko ma-relate yung topic Probate Court as Trustee) to P493,734.26, and from this latter amount one may estimate the actual value of the estate at between
two and two and a half million pesos.

Facts: On August 14, 1953, Julieta Tambunting thru her new attorneys petitioned the probate court to set aside
its order of April 9, 1952, granting to each of three respondent attorneys P70,000 as additional attorneys
fees and its order of November 26, 1952, granting to Atty. Gutierrez a separate fee of P30,000 for
preparing the will of Clara Tambunting, all on the ground that the said fees were procured through
fraudulent misrepresentation that the value of the estate was P7,000,000 when in fact said attorneys
knew it to be only two million pesos, this, with the collusion of the administrators and their respective
attorneys, to the prejudice of the estate especially of the minor Vicente Legarda Price under the
guardianship of one of the co-administrators. In its order of December 28, 1953 Judge San Jose denied
said petition apparently on the ground that it was filed out of time, well beyond the period fixed by Rule
38 of the Rules of Court relative to petitions for relief; he also denied a motion for reconsideration of this
order of denial.
Issue: WON the probate court retains control and jurisdiction over incidents connected with it.
Held:
YES. As a rule, during the pendency of special proceedings, the probate court retains control and
jurisdiction over incidents connected with it, including its orders not affecting third parties who may, by
such orders, have acquired vested rights. This control and jurisdiction is particularly extensive to, and
effective against, its own officers, such as administrators appointed by it and attorneys representing
them or representing parties included in the proceedings. An order fixing the fees of an administrator or
of an attorney rendering professional services to an administrator continues to be under the control of
the probate court until the case is closed, and until then the court may modify or set it aside in the sense
that it may decrease or increase the same according to the facts and circumstances as they develop and
unfold in the course of the probate proceedings; and if said fees have already been partially or fully paid,
they may yet be ordered returned or reimbursed to the estate, or a bond may be required of the court
officer receiving them to guarantee the return or reimbursement if later found to be necessary.
In view of the foregoing, not only the order of the probate court dated August 27, 1954 denying the
appeal is set aside but also its order of December 28, 1953, and respondent Judge is directed to consider
and pass upon the petition of August 14, 1953, anew and on its merits. It is also suggested that
respondent Judge examine and review the whole proceedings from the beginning to determine whether
the expenses incurred in the administration, including the awards of the different amounts to the co-
administrators and the attorneys were warranted, and if not, to fix the amounts which in its opinion are
reasonable and proper considering the real and actual value of the estate, the extent and value of the
services rendered, etc. and take whatever action is necessary
17. Probate courts cannot determine the issue of ownership except provisionally
Bernardo v. CA, GR L-18148. Feb. 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 367Vallejo
FACTS: Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died and a testate
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the CFI. His will was admitted to
probate disposing of his properties in favor of his widow and cousins.LaterHermogenadied. She was
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the
will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16,
1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a
counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses.
In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended:
(1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him
exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her
half share of such partnership;
(2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the
validity of the donation; and
(3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be
litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
The probate court declared the donation void. In the same order the court disapproved both
projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in
the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed
of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal
heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses."
HELD: In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to
title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where
one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also held that
when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to
the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate
court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v.
Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting
property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the
course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced
(Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily
has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the
widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon
petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties
whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the
testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is
this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being
asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the
requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented
by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
By presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim
that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the
question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the probate
court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their
appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where
the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion.5 Theycan not be
permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.
18. Rationale for the rule
Agtarap v. Agtarap, GR 177099. June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 455vallejo
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP G.R. No. 177099 June 8,
2011

FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia
(Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and
Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926.
They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a
grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating
for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994. Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator.
He was latter appointed by the probate court and was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph,
Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to
the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they
became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built
with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house
were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built
with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order
of Partition, holding that considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the
existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed
on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict
by evidence other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce
accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the
real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed
the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the
heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both
appealed to the CA. The CA settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the
estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover, the CA the estate of
Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another
court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she
would receive from Joaquins estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarapcasado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, is vested with
the power and authority to determine questions of ownership.
HELD: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. However,
this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the
probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to
the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse. We hold that the general rule does not apply to the
instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties
will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of
whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to
settle the estate of Joaquin
NOTE: Probate courts: jurisdiction The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as aprobate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do withthe probate
of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceasedpersons, but does not extend to the
determination of question ofownership that arise during the proceeding. The jurisdiction of a
probate extends to matters incidental or collateralto the settlement and distribution of the
state, such as thedetermination of the status of each heir and whether the property inthe
inventory is conjugal or exclusively property of the deceasedspouse.
Exception as justified by expediency and convenience.
1st the probate court may provisionally pass upon in anintestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, orexclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudiceto the final determination of ownership in a separate action.
2nd if the interested parties are all hers to the estate, or thequestion is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent tothe assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court is
competent toresolve issues on ownership.its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral tot thesettlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination ofthe
status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory isconjugal or exclusively
property of the deceased spouse.
19. Probate court may pass upon the issue of ownership with the consent of the parties
Pascual v. Pascual, GR L-48140. May 4, 1942, 73 Phil. 561Delos Reyes
Pascual v. Pascual, GR L-48140. May 4, 1942, 73 Phil. 561 Delos Reyes
FACTS:On September 14, 1940, while the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased
Eduarda de los Santos were pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal plaintiff, SinforosoPascual,
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Ponciano S. Pascual and others, an action
for the annulment of a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga, supposedly executed
without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor of the defendants. The complaint alleges
that plaintiff and defendants are all residents of Malabon, Rizal, and are legitimate children of the
testratix, Eduarda de los Santos. Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause of
action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency of another action. The trial court granted the
motion on the ground that the action should have been brought by the executor or administrator of the
estate left by the deceased, and directed the plaintiff to amend his complaint within five days. Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint however the trial court declaring that such amendment did not cure the
insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed the action. It is from this order of dismissal that plaintiff
interposed his appeal.
Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the property
or rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his executor or
administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the heirs have no
standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or administrator is
unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place. (Pomeroy on Code
Remedies, p. 158, 11 R C. L. p. 262; 21 Am. Jur., 940) Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been
made to the defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the executor appointed by the probate
court. Such executor naturally would not bring an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His
refusal to act may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case under the exception. It should be noted
that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor,
thus indicating that the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased.
Defendants contend that there is here a wrong venue. They argue that an action for the annulment of a
contract of sale is a personal action which must be commenced at the place of residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, at the election of the plaintiff (Rule 5, sec. 1, Rules of Court), and, in the
instant case, both plaintiff and defendants are residents of Malabon, Rizal, but the action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. It appearing, however, that the sale is alleged to
be fictitious, with absolutely no consideration, it should be regarded as a non-existent, not merely null,
contract. (8 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 2nd ed., pp. 766-770.) And there being no
contract between the deceased and the defendants, there is in truth nothing to annul by action. The
action brought cannot thus be for annulment of contract, but is one for recovery of a fishpond, a real
action that should be, as it has been, brought in Pampanga, where the property is located (Rule 5, sec. 3,
Rules of Court.)
Defendants argue further that the action brought by the plaintiff is unnecessary, the question involved
therein being one that may properly be raised and decided in the probate proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not probate court has jurisdiction with regard to the issue of ownership.
HELD:The general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate
proceedings. (Bauermann vs. Casas, 10 Phil., 386; Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil., 273; Guzman vs. Anog, 37
Phil., 61; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil., 664; Adapon vs. Maralit, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Sup., p. 84.) The court
is, however, of the opinion and so holds that, when as in the instant case, the parties interested are all
heirs of the deceased claiming title under him, the question as to whether the transfer made by the latter
to the former is or is not fictitious, may properly be brought by motion in the testate or intestate
proceedings on or before the distribution of the estate among the heirs. This procedure is optional to the
parties concerned who may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience in the
preparation or presentation of evidence, and accordingly, the action brought by the appellant is not
improper.
Order is reversed, and the case is remanded the trial court for further proceedings, with costs against
appellees.
Cunanan v. Amparo, GR L-1313. Feb. 16, 1948, 80 Phil. 229Dinglasan
Rule 73 #19 CUNANAN vs. AMPARO
16 February 1948
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial
administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the intestate proceeding
provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
Nature: Petition for review by petitioner in her capacity as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Isaac
Cunanan and Candida Joaquin of two orders of respondent Judge, alleging that these orders were made
without and/or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
Ponente: Tuason
FACTS:
1. It results that in the aforesaid special proceeding, Bonifacio Soriano, one of the present
respondents, filed a money claim for P880 against the decedent's estate, alleging that on various
dates in 1937 and 1938, the deceased received from him diverse sums of money aggregating
P880.
a. Rosalina Cunanan, the administratix, filed a motion setting out Bonifacio Soriano's
claim and two others totalling P2,054, besides a debt of P1,600 in favor of one
Filomeno Santos bearing 12 per cent interest per year.
b. To pay these obligations, and because funds were needed to defray the expenses on the
farm, she asked the court for authority to negotiate a loan in such amount or to sell so
much of the property described in the inventory as might be sufficient to satisfy the
said obligations, which motion was granted.
2. On June 1, 1944, Rosalina Cunanan manifested to the court that she had tendered to Bonifacio
Soriano in March of that year P880 but that Soriano refused to accept it on the ground that the
money she offered was Japanese notes and had no value.
a. She prayed that the creditor be ordered to accept the amount tendered, to execute the
necessary deed of cancellation, and to return the possession of two parcels of land
which had been conveyed to him.
b. Honorable Quintin Paredes, Jr., Judge, authorized the administratix to deposit with
the clerk of court P880 in full payment of the obligation in favor of Bonifacio Soriano
and ordered Soriano to deliver the property in his possession to the administratix.
c. This order was not appealed nor was any motion for its reconsideration filed, so far as
the pleadings would reveal.
3. On July 17, 1944, the administratix filed a complaint against Soriano for contempt of court,
alleging that she had complied with the court's order of June 15, 1944, but that Soriano
disobeyed that part of it which commanded him to return the two parcels of land to the estate of
Isaac Cunanan and Candida Joaquin.
a. Judge Paredes, on August 4, 1944, found Soriano not guilty of contempt, having
"granted him the benefit of doubt" on the strength of Soriano's defense that he, in the
words of the decision, "misunderstood, or misconstrued, the order of this court, dated
June 15, 1944."
b. However, Judge Paredes reiterated his order that Soriano "deliver the property in
question to the administratix Rosalina Cunanan for the benefit of the Intestate Estate."
c. He also directed the clerk of court to turn over to Soriano the P880 which had been
deposited with him, "upon proper proof that the possession of the property has been
actually delivered to the Intestate Estate."
4. On September 1, 1944, Bonifacio Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
August 4, 1944, that is, the last order of Judge Paredes.
 a. Soriano stated as grounds of his motion, first, that the title to those lots had been
consolidated in his and his wife's names "by virtue of a deed of sale in their favor by
Isaac Cunanan and Rosalina Cunanan on April 7, 1938, which was later on amended
by another instrument dated July 28, 1938," and, second, that under the terms of the
sale, the vendors were given the option to repurchase the said lots not later than April
7, 1944.
b. Soriano also alleged that a transfer certificate of title to the two lots had been issued to
him and his wife by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.
c. Honorable Rafael Amparo (respondent herein), who now was presiding over the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in a lengthy order granted Soriano's motion and later
on confirmed it.
d. He justified the refusal of Bonifacio Soriano to accept Japanese military notes and
Soriano's insistence on being paid in the same currency which he had paid for the
land.
e. He set aside the order of Judge Paredes of August 4, 1944, and denied "the petition of
the administratix dated July 25, 1946, praying, in effect, that said order be enforced."
ISSUE: Was respondent judge right when he reversed and set aside the order of Judge Paredes and
denied the petition of petitioner-administratrix?
HELD: YES! Respondent Judge was soo wrong.
RATIO:
1. It must be pointed out that the order of Judge Paredes of June 15, 1944 "directing Bonifacio
Soriano to accept from the petitioner Rosalina Cunanan the amount of P880 and to execute the
necessary document in favor of said administratix and to deliver the possession of the property
in question," was not appealed or excepted to and is now final.
a. It had already become final when, on August 16, 1946, Judge Amparo made his
order.
b. It was Judge Paredes' order of August 4, 1944, on the administratix's motion for
contempt of court filed on July 17, 1944, which Soriano sought to have reconsidered
and which Judge Amparo set aside on August 16, 1946.
c. Although the allegations do not show when Soriano received notice of Judge of
Paredes' order of June 15, 1944, he must have been notified of it before the proceeding
for contempt against him started, at the latest, proceeding in which he was absolved.
d. And the tenor of the order acquitting Soriano gives rise to the inference that he abided
by the order of June 15 which he was accused of disobeying, for the order gave as
reason for his exoneration the fact that he had not properly disobeyed him.
2. The Court does not agree with the respondents that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to order
the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate.
a. This power is a mere consequence of the power to approve Soriano's claim; a power
which the court undoubtedly had and which Soriano himself invoked with full
knowledge of then facts.
b. As a general rule, with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property
under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the
course of the intestate proceeding provided the interests of third persons are not
prejudiced. Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of
First Instance.
c. The respondent Soriano's objection relates exclusively to the procedure, which is
distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice which
may be waived.
d. Certainly, there is waiver where, as here, and has been pointed out, the party who
raises the objection was the one who set the court in motion, and who, by failing to
disclose the existence of a sale under pacto de retro, suppressed jurisdictional facts
that might be in the way of his claim's success.
3. Soriano is bound by his own petition and by the court's adjudication of his claim made in
consonance with his prayer.
a. A party cannot trifle with a court's decision or order which he himself sought with full
awareness of his rights under the premises, by taking it or leaving it at pleasure.
b. The allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusively as
against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contradictory of, or
inconsistent with, his pleadings.
c. Specifically, he is not allowed to ask money back when the peso value is good, and
later say he wants to keep the land when the peso's purchasing power is down.
4. The tender of payment by the administratix, to say the least, operated to preserve her right of
redemption. The Court's ruling that the repurchase of the lots should have been effected in
Commonwealth currency is bereft of reason and justice and is not the law as Japanese war
notes were the only money in circulation in March, 1944.
a. It seems to us extremely unjust and unreasonable to expect the administratix at that
time to repurchase the lots in any other means of exchange.
b. If it be correct a point which we do not decide that the purchaser could not be
compelled to accept payment in the currency in use at the time of repurchase, then the
period of redemption should have been considered extended until that currency was
replaced with one more acceptable to the creditor.
c. Suspension of the time of repurchase should have followed the vendor's inability to
effect the redemption in Commonwealth currency by reason of circumstances not of
his own making. As we have said, this was the least that should have been conceded to
the debtor. Thus given a grace, the administratix had until within reasonable time
after liberation top repurchase the property.
DISPOSITION: The petition is granted and the orders of the respondent judge of August 16 and
September 16, 1946 are reversed, with costs against the respondent Bonifacio Soriano.
20. Probate court to distribute the estate and determine the heirs
Solivio v. CA, GR 83484. Feb. 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 119Eugenio
Litam v. Espiritu, GR L-7644. Nov. 27, 1956, 100 Phil. 364Galicinao
Pimentel v. Palanca, GR 2108. Dec. 19, 1905, 5 Phil. 436Riego
GR 2108. Dec. 19, 1905, 5 Phil. 436
TOPIC:Probate court to distribute the estate and determine the heirs
FACTS:

Margarita Jose, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Amoy, China, on the 4th
of February, 1902. Her last will was duly proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
the 15th day of April, 1902, and on the same day EngracioPalanca was duly appointed administrator of
the estate of the deceased. He entered upon the discharge of his duties as such administrator, and is still
engaged therein. As far as appears from the bill of exceptions the estate still remains unsettled, and no
final decree has ever been entered therein.
By her said will Margarita Jose left all her property, amounting to over 50,000 pesos, to her two children,
Vicente Barreto, alias Tan-Keng, and Benito Carlos, alias Doon. On the 8th day of July, 1902, Juana
Pimentel, the mother of said Margarita Jose, commenced this, an ordinary action, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, alleging that the two children of Margarita Jose were illegitimate, and that she was
the heir at law and entitled to the whole estate. The prayer of the original complaint was that the plaintiff
be declared the lawful heir and entitled to all the property of her daughter, Margarita Jose.
The defendant named in this original complaint was the "Estate of Dona Margarita Jose." The summons
in the action was served upon the administrator, EngracioPalanca. He appeared and demurred, on the
ground, among others, that there was a defect of parties, and that the two sons should have been made
defendants. This demurrer was overruled. He took an exception to the overruling of the demurrer, and
answered, denying generally the facts stated in the complaint. A trial was had in the Court of First
Instance, and judgment was entered in favor of th defendant on the 28th of July, 1903, the court holding
that Vicente Barreto was the legitimate son of Margarita Jose Plaintiff made a motion for a new trial,
which was granted on the 15th day of September, 1903. On the 22d day of January, 1904, the plaintiff
presented an amended complaint, naming as defendants EngracioPalanca, as administrator of the estate
of Margarita Jose, and Benito Carlos and Vicente Barreto.
The defendants all answered the amended complaint. A trial was had in the court below, and on the 7th
of April, 1904, judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. The court held that Vicente Barreto was
the legitimate son of Margarita Jose; that Benito Carlos was an illegitimate son, and that Margarita Jose
had a right to bequeath her property to these sons to the exclusion of the plaintiff. He held also that the
plaintiff, not having appealed from the probate of the will, could not maintain this action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in its decision.
HELD:
No, the lower court did not erred in its decision but not upon the ground stated in the decision of the
court.
When a will has been proved, an administrator appointed, and the estate is in process of settlement in
the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, as provided in Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and no final decree has been entered therein, no ordinary action between parties can be maintained for
the purpose of determining who are the heirs of the deceased.
It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the Court of First
Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in any other
court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to be
heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the plaintiff in the estate determined. The very purpose of
the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until they
are settled and determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such as the present one
can be maintained.
REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE; WILLS; ADMINISTRATOR; ACTION TO DETERMINE HEIRS.When a will has been
proved, an administrator appointed, and the estate is in process of settlement in the Court of First
Instance in a special proceeding, as provided in Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no final decree
has been entered therein, no ordinary action between parties can be maintained for the purpose of
determining who are the heirs of the deceased.
ID.; ID.; PROBATE, ACTION TO SET ASIDE.No ordinary action can be maintained to set aside the
probate of a will or the appointment of an administrator. The remedy is by appeal in the proceeding in
which the orders were made.
ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS.The probate of a will does not determine the validity of any
disposition of property made therein.
21. Probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution; exceptions
6, Rule 88, RoC
3, Rule 90, RoC
13, Rule 142, RoC
De Valera v. Ofilada, GR L-27526. Sept. 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 96Tito
DE VALERA vs OFALIDA
Facts:
Civil Case, a special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Valera. Virgilio
Valera was the administrator of the estate, He died on March 21, 1961. He was survived by his widow,
AngelitaGarduqueVda. de Valera and their ten (10) children.
Later, Adoracion Valera Bringas, who claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera,
was appointed administratrix. She filed on April 16, 1964 in the intestate proceeding a petition to require
"Celso Valera and family and Angelita de Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the
one-third pro-indiviso portion of the Valera residence located in Bangued, Abra.1
That residence is item 3 of the original inventory dated April 10, 1964 submitted by Mrs. Bringas.
On February 17, 1965 (before the motion for reconsideration was resolved) Mrs. Bringas filed in the
intestate proceeding a pleading known as "Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of
the Fruits of the Properties or Value and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix."7
She prayed in that motion that Judge Donesa's order for the payment of rentals be executed against the
heirs of Virgilio Valera; that the heirs be ordered to deliver to her the fruits of the properties of the estate
of Francisco Valera, which, according to her calculation, amounted to P100,000 for twenty years, plus
legal interest supposedly amounting to P5,000; that the heirs be ordered to deliver the sum of P4,684.98
representing the insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera; and that the Sheriff be
ordered to "to seize such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs" "to be sold according to law for the
payment of double the value of the fruits and the amount of monies alienated and embezzled".
As already stated, in an order dated April 15, 1966, respondent Judge Macario M. Ofilada denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera and granted the motion of Mrs. Bringas for
execution and for the delivery of certain funds and properties.
Issue: WON Hon. Ofalida erred in issuing the writ of execution
Held:
YES. As a general rule, probate court cannot issue writ of execution.The probate court generally cannot
issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to
the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the
necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment
enforceable by execution.
Instances when probate court can issue a writ of execution.The Rules of Court expressly specifies
that the probate court may issue execution (a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and
heirs in possession of the decedents assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88); (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of
partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90); and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate
proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142). This may mean, under the rule of inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius, that
these are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
With particular reference to the sum of P4,784.96, which represents the insurance and war damage
monies allegedly embezzled by Virgilio Valera, the lower court, sitting as a probate court, had no
jurisdiction to enforce, by execution, the payment of double the value of that amount. The alleged
embezzler was dead. Execution was not warranted under Sections 7 and 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court,
which both refer, to a living person, meaning a person entrusted with a part of the decedent's estate "by
an executor or administrator", and to a person who committed "embezzlement before letters (were)
issued". Section 8 explicitly provides that the embezzler's liability shall be determined in "an action", and
not in the intestate proceeding.
22. Probate courts vested with jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs regarding
ownership of property allegedly belonging to deceased
Flores v. Flores, GR L-24173. Nov. 24, 1925, 48 Phil. 982Vallejo
FACTS: the CFI of pampanga admitted to probate the will of one Jose Flores. Rafael Flores, a brother of
the deceased, was named in the will as executor and by him the petition which resulted in the probate of
the will was presented. But Romulo Macalino succeeded later to the office of administrator.
It appears that in life Jose Flores had been three times married, and he left children surviving him from
each of said marriages.In the course of the settlement of the estate various questions have arisen with
reference to the nature of the property to be divided and the respective interest of the different sets of
children therein, but for the purposes of this appeal attention will be directed only to the contention over
the claims of the two surviving children of the second marriage, Sotero Flores and Agueda Flores, who
figure in this proceeding as appellants.
In a certified copy of the decision in a registration proceeding, it appears that the lands covered by the
certificate of title had been purchased by Jose Flores on September 15, 1902, or in the lifetime of his
second wife, Maria Agustin. After her death Flores instituted proceedings to register said lands and
procured the Torrens certificate of title thereto in his sole name. This had the effect, so the court seems
to have supposed, of making these lands the exclusive property of Flores and of extinguishing their
character as conjugal property of the prior marriage. To hold otherwise, said his Honor, would have the
effect of revising the decree of the land court and impairing a title which that court had decreed to Flores.
ISSUE: W/N probate court has jurisdiction? YES
HELD: The surviving husband is ex-officio manager, or administrator, of the conjugal estate. He
has the power to alienate the property for the purpose of liquidating the estate and the purchaser
under him undoubtedly gets valid title (Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713). But as long as the
husband retains the property in whatever form, he holds it in the character of administrator and is
virtually a trustee for those interested in the conjugal partnership. Nor does the obtaining of a
Torrens title in any wise change the situation. In section 70 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496),
it is, among other things, expressly declared that nothing contained in this Act shall in any way be
construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof from any rights incident to the relation of
husband and wife or to change or affect in any other way any other rights or liabilities created by
laws and applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act. It is
needless to say that there is no express provision anywhere in the Act which has the effect of
extinguishing the responsibility of the husband with respect to the conjugal estate or which
would enable him, by taking a Torrens title, to escape from his responsibility as
administrator and liquidator. Furthermore, in Severino vs. Severino (44 Phil. 343), it is clearly
shown that the registration of property in the name of one who holds in a trust character
does not extinguish the trust or destroy the rights of the beneficiary. His Honor was
therefore in error in this case in supposing that the Torrens certificate of title (Exhibit D-1),
covering lands which had been acquired during the second marriage had changed in any way
the character of the property as ganacial property of the spouses in said marriage. The first
assignment error is therefore well taken in so far as it relates to the ruling of the court with respect
to the character of said property. Property acquired during marriage pertains to the conjugal
partnership regardless of the form in which the title is then or there afterwards
taken. lawph!1.net
23. Probate court vested with jurisdiction to determine if properties belong to conjugal
partnership
Bernardo v. CA, GR L-18148. Feb. 28, 1963, 117 Phil. 385vallejo
Bernardo v. CA, GR L-18148. Feb. 28, 1963, 117 Phil. 385 vallejo
FACTS: Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died and a testate
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the CFI. His will was admitted to
probate disposing of his properties in favor of his widow and cousins.LaterHermogenadied. She was
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the
will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16,
1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a
counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses.
In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: Albino v. Borromeo, GR L-19722. Feb. 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 247Eugenio
(1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him 24. Exclusionary rule
exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her 25. Publication of the filing of the application and of the date of hearing
half share of such partnership;
(2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the
Pilapil v. Heirs of Briones, GR 150175. Feb. 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 197Galicinao
26. Recourse in case the venue is improperly laid
validity of the donation; and
(3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be Eusebio v. Eusebio, GR L-8409. Dec. 28, 1956, 100 Phil. 593Riego
litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
GR L-8409. Dec. 28, 1956, 100 Phil. 593
The probate court declared the donation void. In the same order the court disapproved both
projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in TOPIC:Recourse in case the venue is improperly laid
the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed FACTS:
of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal
heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses." Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of
HELD: In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952,
title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where resided in Quezon City. Eugenios siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating
one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also held that in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had
when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to
the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate been improperly laid. The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenios petition and overruled his siblings objection.
court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v.
Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting
property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the ISSUE: Whether or not venue had been properly laid in Rizal.
course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced
(Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
HELD:
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando,
has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son,
to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the
widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was
petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his sons
whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the
testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is residence. It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one
this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being owns health even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to
asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the
requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres
by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator. retained such domicile.
By presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim
that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of such
question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the probate
court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their intent Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify
appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or
the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion.5 Theycan not be
permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In
the deed of sale of his house at 889 A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his
Probate court has no jurisdiction over an encumbrance
residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion
Register of Deeds of Pampanga v. PNB, GR L-1781. Sept. 27, 1949, 47 OG 1157Delos
Reyes Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
Diaz v. Sawamoto, GR L-22085. Apr. 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 937Dinglasan
Attorneys fees; against whom chargeable
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical
presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with
the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.

Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because
they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically
made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the
purpose only of assailing the same.

In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.

If proceedings ex or the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more
courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of TacianaVda. de Borja
vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that
venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding
proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:

VENUE; ESTATE OF DECEASED WHERE SETTLED; RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE DEATH;
DOMICILE OF ORIGIN.Where it is apparent, from the facts duly established, that the domicile of origin
of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the
presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof
to the contrary, for it is well settled that a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is
gained. (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p. 70; Restatement of the law of conflicts of laws, p. 47; In re Estate of
Johnson, 192 lowa 78).
DOMICILE; NOT CHANGED BY PRESENCE IN A PLACE FOR ONES OWN HEALTH.It is well settled
that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for ones own health, even if
coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness to return home. (1 Beale,
Conflict of Laws, pp. 172173; Sell also Shenton vs. Abbott, Ind. 15, A. 2d. 906; US. vs. Knight, D.C.
Mont., 291 Fed. 129).