A Century of Automobility Rudi Volti Technology and Culture, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), 663-685. Stable URL: Ittp links jstor.orgsici?sici=0040-165X%28 1996 10%2937%9.A4%3C563% 3A ACOA G3E2,0.CO%AB2-O Technology and Culture is currently published by The Johns Hopkins University Press. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhupvful-jstor-orp/abouv'terms.himal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have ‘obtained prior permission, vou may not download an entire issue of a joumal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial us. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bbupsfukjstor-org/journals/jup titel. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- hupsfuk.jstor.org/ ‘Sun Mar 20 10:24:53 2005Essay A CENTURY OF AUTOMOBILITY Rup! vouts When Charles B, and J. Frank Duryea along with a few associates put together thirteen erude automobiles in 1896 for sale to the pub- lie, they likely had no notion that they were participating in the cre- ation of system of transportation that wonld profoundly alter Amer ican life, In the hundred years that have followed, the automobile has brought such massive changes that we are still trying to com prehend its full significance. Our relationship with the automobile has always been a complex one, and its history throws into sharp relief the myriad ways in which technology and culutre shape each other The automobile has been the subject of a vast literature, most of it devoted to particular cars,' motorsports! , and do-it-yourself repair and modification. But as a subject of scholarly inquiry Uhe automo- bile remains vastly underexamined. There is certainly no lack of glib generalizations about the automobile and its consequences, though, ‘most rest upon a slim basis of evidence.” To take one notable exam- ple: we can state with some confidence that the automobile played a role in changing sexual mores, but we have in fact very little sub stantive support for that claina.* Te is a topic that would benefit from, systematic research; this essay will, on occasion, note others, De Vou is professor of sociology at Pitzer College. He thanks Harvey Bonwin, Robert C. Past, Mark Rose, ohn Suudenmaier, and John D. Sullivan for che many helpful comments they made in cesponse to an eather draft ofthis aevle na recent catalog of movoring publicasons, I counted thirgyseven in-princ books covering various aspects ofthe Model A Ford, For conniosseurs of automanive medi ‘crit chere is even a rather expensive book devoted to the Ford Faicon Por a mudy of one wype of motor racing char also addresses some fundamenvai {issues regarding the nature af technalogy, see Robert C. Pox, High Perfomance: De Culture and Tenlagy of Drag Racing, 1950-1990 (Balemnore, 1983), ‘eis remarkable how often segments of Middinow by Helen and Rabert Lynd reappear when the sociology ofthe autoraobileivadelrewed. Sce Helen Merril Lmd and Robert S. Lynd, Middiinne: A Study of American Cudture (New York, 1999) ‘David L. Lewis, “Sex and the Automobile: From Rumble Seats to Rockin’ Vans," in Ths Autamaile ond Amorcan Culture, ed, David L, Lewis and Lawrence Goldscein ‘Ann Arbor, Mich, 1983} 2 1096 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. (9040-165X/96,/3704-5001$01.00 663664 Rudi Vole The Genesis of Mass Automobilty ‘The bicycle craze of the 1890s revealed a hunger for personal transportation, although the cantankerousness of early automobiles made them unlikely candidates for this role’ “Personal transporta- tion,” of course, has never been simply a matter of getting from, poinc to point B; generations of bikers, horseback riders, and bicy- lists could attest to the maxim that the journey is often more impor- tant than the destination. Early automobiles provided the pleasure inherent in, physical travel, to which was added the fascination of mechanisms that worked tolerably well at times and fell mysteriously silent at others. Rising to the challenges presented by primitive car- buretors, magnetos, and pneumatic tires appealed to many motor- ists, and was of even greater significance for manufacturers. For many pioneers of automobile production, a strong dose of techno- logical enthusiasm was at least as imporiant a motivator as the chance of turning a profit As sith all significant innovations, the history of the automobile shows that technological advance is fueled bby mote than. economic calculation. To be sure, enthusiasm, technological or otherwise, gets you only so far—as thousands of failed automotive entrepreneurs would sadly attest, The automobile industry also needed an abundant supply of financial capital. Many carly entrepreneurs kept their firms going on cash flows provided by the sale of their products, but the ones that flourished needed a sounder financial footing. Many of them found it like biotechnology stocks in the 1980s, the early automobile industry generated intense interest among investors.’ Some of the funds sunk into the fledgling industry were irretriew- ably lost, but many investments bore fruit because manufacturers ‘were alrcady familiar with production processes that in a general The role of bicycling in the development of better coads is discussed in Philip P. Mason, The Laague af American When and th Goad Raads Mocenent (Ph.D, diss, Univers) of Michigan, 1957), "For several diseusions of technological enthusiasm, see John L. Wright, ed, Pass fia Drouin: Endhasism for Technolgy in Ameria (Dearborn, Mich., 1992). Far an analy- sis of auto manufacturer motivations in the early yeas, see Donald Finlay Davis, Conspicuous Productions Autooils and Elles 2m Desi, 1899-1953 (Phiadelpbia, 1988), On the tension berween aura manufaccurers’ enthusiasm and che industry's remarkably slow adoption af flashy consumeris: advertising, see Pamela Walker Laled’s Cover Design, im this issue >A sclluseful early history of the automobile industry and its nancial underpin- ningeis Lawrence Howard Selzer, A Financial Hit, ofthe American Automat ty Boston and New York, 1928). Also of value are James R. Doolicle et al, The Romance of te Auiomabile Industry (New York, 1916) and Ralph C. Epstein, Te Awsome bie Testy (Chicago and New York, 1823),A Century of Automability — 665 way could be shifted to the manufacture of automobiles. Most early manufacturers had some experience with industrial products and production, even if they were only remotely connected to making cars; early automotive industrialists included men who oversaw the manufacture of everything from locomotives (Walter P. Chrysler) to plumbing fixtures (David Dunbar Buick). One firm, che Smith Automobile Company of Topeka, Kansas, was in the business of inake ing hernia trusses before (and after) taking up automobile manufac turing. Almost equally offbeat was the origin of the renowned Picrce- Arrow. George N. Pierce began as a manufacturer of birdcages, which led him to the manufacture of spokes for the wheels for bicy- cles, This was followed by the production of complete bicycles and, finally, automobiles. Like several other American cars of the time, early Pierce-Arrows were powered by DeDion-Bouton engines imported from France, the nation that led the world in automotive production at the end of the 19th century. Its lead was shortlived; by 1904 American man- ufacturers had surpassed their French counterparts as the world’s largest makers of automobiles. The United States lagged in the tech- nological development of the carly automobile, but American firms were second to none in manufacturing technology. Thus was set a pattern that endured for decades: the United States would lead the world in the development and adoption of advanced production technologies, while the products themselves were anything but avanegarde, Some of the manifest technological conservatism of American au- tomobiles was itself the result of advanced manufacturing methods, ‘especially the standardization necessary for large production runs, Standardization usually has the effect of “locking in" a technology, sometimes causing i€ to endure long after it has ceased to be opti- mal." Widespread automobile ownership also may have dampened technological progress. By the second decade of the 20th cenaury a significant percentage of adult Americans owned and operated cars, and most of them had little interest in the technical details of their Yoho 8. Rae, The Amora Automahile Fadusty (Boston, 1984} p. 18. "The origin ofthe gasoline powered automobile remains contentious issue. For a dueosson of the origins ofthe automobile and rmich ese, see Jarses J. Fink, The ‘Automobile Age (Cambridge, Mas, 1988). “See W. Brian Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Reaurns, and Lock- In by Fistorical Events," The Economis Journal 99 (March 1989); 116-31. In regacd tothe American automobile and the industry that produced it, see Wiliam J- Aber ‘nathy, The Preductivty Dilemona: Roadblock ia Innouatin i he Attra Indy Bal mace, 1975).666 Rudi Volti vehicles. Technological novelty carried no marketing advantage when a large segment of the buying public had already begun to Took upon the autornabile as litle more than an appliance. By way ‘of contrast, in times and places where the car has yet to become an item of mass consumption, technological sophistication is fikely 0 be an important selling point. In 1913, when automobile ownership in the United States was more than twice as common as it was in Briain," a British observer noted that "“the American buyer never inquires about mechanism. He wishes to know merely what price ‘you want for a car that will go and if it docs not go when he gets it there is wouble . . , He has paid for his car, and he is going to do what he pleases with it without any fecting for mechanics at all; whereas the average European buyer knows, or, at least, likes (0 think he knows, a good deal about the mechanical details of his chas sis." Atthe time these comments were written there was little doubt about the kind of power plant that sat under the hood; it was almost invariably a gasoline-fueled internal combustion engine (ICE). An examination of how this came ta be provides an object lesson for an issue that has been of considerable interest (0 historians of tech- nology: the process of technological choice, and how it is deter- mined by more than technical considerations pure and simple. In rewrospect, the choice of the internal combustion engine seems straightforward, especially when the deficiencies of its two rivals, steam and electricity, are taken into account. The thermal efficieney of steam power was well below even the underdeveloped gasoline engines of the time, while the warmap time a steamer required could be more of a bother than the sometimes dangerous practice of starting a gasoline engine by vigorously swinging a crank. Electric cars held no such terrors, but their range was limited, as was their over-the-road performance ‘The shortcomings of steamers and electrics related to their techni- "fn 1913 the ratio of registered auromabiles ta the tata population af che United Suares was 1:77, while the ratio for Briain was 1.065. By 1927 the gap had uidened substantially. in he Linited Suates che cartorpopelation ratio was 15 8, while ia Brit. ain ic was 1°44. See Jean Pierre Bardou et al, The Autouabi Revsluton: The Ipact of an Industry (Chapel Hill, 1989) pp. 72, 112, H. Massac Buist. "A Bricon's American Naces” Salay of Automation Encino Bull sin 6 (September 1918): 485-504, "The reasons forthe fathure of steam and clectric cars ate presented in David Kirsch, “Turaing Pointsin Technology: Steaea, Gasoline apd Electric Powered Vehi- les ip America, 1899-1914" (paper presented athe annual meeting of the Society for che History of Technology, Charlottesville, Virginia, October 1905). See also Rudi Vol, “Why Internal Combustion?™ Asericin HeriagedfFavention and Technolgy 1 «Fall 1990): 43-47,A Century of Automobility 667 cal characteristics, but they were significant only because cars had (0 serve in a multiplicity of roles. If the automobile had remained primarily a device for recreation, the steam-powered car might have maintained 2 larger niche, for the demands that it made upon its driver were viewed by some as an enjoyable challenge. The legendary Stanley Steamer was festooned with gauges that required regular at- tention; boiler water level, steam pressure, main tank fuel pressure, pilot tank fuel pressure, oil sight glass, and tank water level. Just to get one started required the manipulation of thirteen valves, levers, handles, and pumps." The electric car served admirably as an around-town runabout, but most drivers wanted some dash and ex- civement in their motoring, even when their cars were largely em- ployed for mundane purposes." The electric also suffered from the fatal defect of being identified as a “woman's car,” a major failing at a time when the automobile was tightly intertwined with masculine culture. ‘The early history of the automobile shows that its overwhelming commercial swecess was not exchusively due to the mobility it offered. ‘Then, as now, cars provided privacy and a sense of power, two things that always have been in short supply in human societies. This trend was reinforced by subsequent technological developments, such as, closed bodies and more powerful engines. Much of the appeal of the automobile stems from its ability to confer a measure of insula tion from the outside world while providing at least the illusion of power. The private automobile is a greedy creature that makes vast claims on space, resources, and the budgets of its owners; only a device that promised more than transportation could have been so successful. An Industry Emerges At the beginning of the 20th century, only a few were able to sam- ple the delights of automobiling; most early automobiles were pur- chased by the well-tovio, for whom they served as high-priced toys, But before long the American automobile was enjoying a much larger customer base. As early as 1900 some American cars were be- “Lord Montegue of Beaulieu and Anthony Bird, Steam Cars, 1770-1970 (New Yori, 1971), p. 130, For a brief history of the steam aueornobile in Ameriea, and the reasons fr its commercial fulure, ee Clay McShane, Dour the Asphalt Path The Antomabile and the American Cty (New York, 1999), pp. 81-101 "Bor a recent study of the clecric car, see Michael rian Sehiffer, Taking Charge: ‘The Blecsic Car i America (Washington, 1994) NOn the "gendering” of the automabile see Viginia Scharf, Taking the Whe! Woman and the Coming of the Mor Age (Neve York, 1981).pioyuoaig 9 wnasnyy ping Lag atp Jo suoR?9|199 31H Wess) TEE “euBAY "oosTTOH MPIsINO past IH KE oR 24(ragt-o8 UNA plagUOAL -y uKeNRYY ploy Lu, 9 Jo TUORDLIIOD I WONG) -OZEE IRDOPIE IPELUARIOY HHH 129 BuLMON 4 2pOe—"y HE670 Rudi Volts ing made in respectable numbers, led by the Columbia electric with 1,500 and the steam-powered Locomobile at 759. Among the manu- facturers of early ICE-powered automobiles the leader was Ransom E. Olds, who produced 425 curved-dash Oldsmobiles in 1901 and 2,500 in the year thar followed. Large-scale manufacture rested on the use of interchangeable parts that obviated the need for expensive hand-fiting of compo- nents, A striking demonstration of American manufacturing tech- nology came in 1908, when three Cadillacs were shipped to Britain and disassembled by officials of the Royal Automobile Club. The parts were mixed together and reassembled into complete cars that were then driven for 500 miles with no evident problems. In recogni- tion of this successful demonstration, the Royal Automobile Club awarded its Dewar Trophy for automotive achievement to Cadillac. ‘These early Cadillacs were made by a company that had taken over the remnants of the Detroit Automobile Company, a firm that folded before it even sold any cars. It is therefore a nice irony that the full extent of mass production was exploited by che man for whom the abortive Detroit Automobile Company had been founded: Henry Ford. Ford’s Model T, first produced toward the end of 1908, soon became the Ford Motor Company's sole product, occupying this sta ‘cus uncil 1927. By that time more than 15 million had been made, a record that stood until Volkswagen finally surpassed it in the 1970s. “The productivity increases that made these numbers possible were the result of a vast number of inventions and innovations, most of them unexamined by historians. Among them were the develop- ment of special-purpose machine tools, go~no-go gauges, fast-drying paints, improved glassmaking procedures, pneumatic tools, the de- velopment of metal stamping machines for large panels, as well as the apotheosis of industrial production technology, the assembly line. Unlike most other automotive production technologies, the as- sembly line has not lacked for scholarly attention. Indeed, interest in the assembly line has been well out of proportion to its numerical significance; even in the 1950s, when a much higher percentage of the American labor force was made up of blue-collar workers, fewer than 5 percent of manual workers labored on assembly lines." But, “the lime” has worked its way into our consciousness 2s the prime ‘example of everything that is demeaning, inhumane, and alienating The production innovations intcoduced at Ford are extensively covered in David Hounshell, From the American Sytem te lass Pradution, 1400-1932: The Devlopmunt of Manssfactring Technalig inthe United Staies Baltimore, 1984), "Robert Blauner, Adenation and Fronsin: The Favtry Worker and Hes Deductry (Chi. ago, 1964) p. 91.A Century of Automobility 671 about industrial production." The fascination with assembly lines has given us. far greater literature on automobile workers than ex- ists on secretaries, cashiers, and janitors, even though they have been far more numerous than automobile workers of every type. ‘While Ford was pushing the limits of standardization and assem- blyline production, General Motors was pursuing a strategy that al- lowed it to pass Ford in total sales, and to secure for itself the top position in the American car industry Under the leadership of AF fred Sloan, GM developed marketing practices that reshaped the industry. One of these was the enshrinement of styling as the prime means of attracting buyers, Following the establishment in 1927 of the Artand Color Section (later the Styling Section) headed by Har- ley Earl, GM products became industry style leaders. The basic engi- neering of their products differed little from that of their rivals, but the gospel of longer /lower/wider helped to solidify GM's status as the world’s biggest car manufacturer. The importance of styling was reinforced by GM's invention of the annual model year. Every Sep- tember a group of “all-new” GM cars would make their much-publi- ized appearance, presurnably sowing discontent among millions of drivers whose own cars had sunk deeper into obsolescence. GM also made good use of the clear status hierarchy of its products. Custom- cers might begin their automotive carcers with Chevrolets, but future financial success allowed the purchase of something even better from the GM stable~-an Oldsmobile, a Buick, or even a Cadillac for those who had reached the pinnacle of success. To be sure, few peo- ple had the financial resources to cover the purchase price of even a new Chevrolet, but GM made sure that this did noc remain an ‘obstacle. Whereas Henry Ford expected payment in full from his customers, GM created the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) to facilitate buying a caron credit. A major financial insticu- tion in its own right, GMAC initiated millions of GM customers into the delights of making payments for cars that had grown old and tired long before they had been paid off. ‘The combination of advanced production technologies and Studies of automotive assembly line work include Eli Chinoy, Autamatie Workers and the American Dream (New York, 1955) Charles R. Walker and Robert H. Guest ‘The Maw on ht Assently Line (Cambridge, Mass, 1959; reprint, New York, 1979)! and Nelwan Lichtenstein and Scephen Meyer, eds, Ox the Line” Bess i vke History fof Auta Work (Uichana, IIL, 1991) A erasenational comparivon is provided by Sacosht Keamata, fon inthe Passing Lane: hn [asides Account of Lifein a Jopanese Auta Factry (New Vork, 1983), “Tath “Borda” and “Sloanise” are exticaly appraised in Krnma Rothschild, Paradise Last: The Deine of the Auto ndustnial Age (New York, 1973)core 94 mia Praguaang 3 unoenyy prod KuHa Jo suORrIEQ BMH WO) ~LB6I Fe HMIUA?AG TUNG Booy dundiwey soVOHY PIOA—— OIEA Contry of Automobility 678 equally advanced marketing strategies resulted in the development ‘of America's premier industrial sector. In the mid-1990s, the manu- facture of American cars was responsible for 4.5 percent of the U.S. gross national product. Alongside automobile manufacture, most other industries are pygmies. In the 1995 fiscal year, much-publi- cized Microsoft had revenues of $5.94 billion, a tidy figure to be sure but rather paltry when placed next to the $168.83 billion chat GM tok in2* And despite years of corporate downsizing, the auto- mobile is still the basis of about one out of every seven jobs in the United States. The last decade has seen an erosion of direct employ- ment in automobile manufacturing, but the car industry as a whole provides millions of jobs for repair technicians, insurance agents, service station attendants, sales personnel, police officers, and the myriad other occupations essential to the maintenance of automo- bility. What is American about American Cars? One of the great achéevernents of the automobile industry has been to disguise the fact that its products are mass produced objects that have been designed Co hold production costs to a miniraum, More than any other industrially produced item, the automobile has succeeded in capturing the fancy of potential customers through appeals that go well beyond the utilitarian. Since technological now elty or even technological sophistication has seldom been of much interest to American drivers, the commercial success of the Ameri- can automobile has been driven by styling.” And at the same time, the styling of the American automobile has been distinctively Amer- ican, Several features of the American economy and society have con- tributed to the emergence of an American automotive style. One ‘obvious feature of American cars has been their size. For example, 1930 Ford Model A roadster, the smallest Ford sold, weighed 2,155 wunds; a contemporary British Austin 7 weighed a mere 935 pounds. In the years chat followed, both American and European cars got bigger, but che differences remained. A 1969 Chevrolet Im- pala was nearly 19 feet long and weighed 3,835 pounds. An Opel rorune (April 28, 1986}: F-L, PA. Por che same period Focd's revenues were $137.14 bilion, Chrysler's, $53.19 billion, Qn aucomodve sling, see Pav] C. Wilson, Chrome Drsams: Automobile Sling Since 1893 (Radnor, Pa, 1976). For an attempt to pat auomvotive soiling in the context ‘of political economy, see David Cartman, Auto Opium: A Sacial History of American ‘Autaraaie Design (New York, 1994)674 Rudi Veli Rekord, the product of GM’s European operation, was less than 14 feet in length and weighed 2,050 pounds. ‘Some of this differential can be explained in terms of relative lew- els af economic prosperity; for mast people at most times, richer has meant bigger. International comparisons of incomes are notoriously tricky, but there can be little doubt that throughout most of the 20th century Americans have led the world in per capita income. One comparison can be made by looking at the wages of automobile workers themselves. In 1910, at the dawning of the age of mass auto- mobility, an American worker earned $2.70 a day. His French, Brite ish, German, and Italian equivalents earned $1.90, $1.57, $1.30, and $1.06, respectively. When incomes are compared with prices, the difference with the rest of the world becomes even more evident. For the statistically average warker, a new 1925 Model T cost the ‘equivalent of three months’ wages, an Austin 7 was simply beyond the realm of possibility for a British worker. Acthe same time, how- ever, many of the buyers of American automobiles were in precari ‘ous economic straits, and running a car meant the sacrifice of other consumption items. To note one example, from the 1920s until about 1950 a higher percentage of American houscholds owned an automobile than had telephones." The costs of buying and op- ‘erating a car were several times greater than the costs of residential phone service, but the latter was still not a negligible amount. Since the automobile and the telephone served functions that overlapped toa certain extent, one could be seen as at leasca partial substicuce for the other. And when a choice between the two had to be made— and many people had to make this choice—more households opted for the automobile.* Indeed, until World War IT, at least, the auto- mobile was more classless than the telephone. The emergence of a distinedy Amcrican style of automobile also ‘can be explained in part by government policies that protected the domestic market and in so doing helped to establish an insular auto- motive culture. In the early days of motoring, foreign cars never had much of a chance of racking up significant sales when their products had a 46 percent tariff imposed on them.® In 1913 the tariff on automobiles was reduced to 3 percent for cars costing under $2,000, but by this time the issue was moot; the superior production Shardov etal. (a. LI above), p. 66, * Claude S. Fisher, America Calling: A Saal Histor ofthe Telephone to 1940 (Berkeley, 1992), p. 114, Pbid, pp. 107-21 Pink (a. @ above), p. 44A Century of Automobility — 675 technology of Ford and other American manufacturers left no open- ing for imports.” Fuel costs significantly lower than in most other nations have also heen of great importance for the general design of American cars. ‘The availability of domestic petroleum helped to hold down the cost of gasoline, but the greatest difference with much of the world is to be found in the level of fuel taxes. Introduced in a few states in 1919, gasoline taxes were universal within ten years, but unlike the governments of mast other nations, state and federal governments did not use gasoline taxes as major sources of general revenue. Politi cal influence by ojl companies, car manufacturers, and other inter- ested parties insured that taxes would be kept low and that they would be used largely for the financing of road construction and maintenance. Low gasoline prices made fuel economy a secondary concern for most drivers. Because fuel economy was not of para- mount importance, American cars could be equipped with large, slowrewing engines that reduced gearchanging to a minimum. Even this was too much for many drivers; the first successful auto- matic wansmissions appeared in the late 1930s, another develop- ment that was facilitated by a Jack of concern with making the most efficient use of gasoline.” To be sure, the low price of gasoline was only an enabling factor; lange cars with big, engines suited a vast, open country. It is also sig- nificant that che biggest cars with the greatest stylistic excesses emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the aligopolistic control of the industry was at its height and styling constituted the main avenue of product differentiation, As noted above, American cars have historically lagged in the adoption of advanced technolo- gies. With the exception of automatic transmissions, virtually every significant postwar automotive technology used for production cars first appeared in other countries: fuel injection, disc brakes, inde- pendent rear suspensions, overhead camshaft engines, front wheel drive, and radial tires, co name the most significant. American. car manufacturers had litte interest in blazing technological trails that, in their estimation, few customers would follow. By the late 1950s, the American automobile had become a parody of itself, a tik finned, chrome-encrusted body sitting on top of a pathetically underdeveloped chassis. an carly automotive erameplant, dhe American Auatin (later the Bantam), sold for $445-8550 in 1980-31, a dme when $480 bough 3 new Ford Model A Tudor, [Not surprisingly, the Austin/Bancam sold in seall numbers. On the history of the aucomatic ranamission, see Philip ©. Cott, Changing Gear: The Dewiopmens ofthe Automate Transnision (Warrendale, Pa 1991)676 Rudi Voli Fic. 4.—New Jersey cloverleaf, 1953, (From the Collections of the Henry Ford ‘Muscum & Greenfield Village: P'888.161308) Enabodying all of these shortcomings was Ford's Edsel, a name now synonymous with failed grandiosity. First appearing as a 1958, model, it lasted only three years, a victim of misbegotten styling and an inconvenient economic recession, The marketing failure of the Edsel demonstrated, in a highly public way, that the buying public ‘was losing interest in bizarre grilles and plenty of chrome. Even so, Ford came through the Edsel debacle with no long-tasting financial wounds. The runaway success of the Mustang, introduced in the spring of 1964, seemed to indicate that the manufacture and market ing of American automobiles were nicely insulated from the worldCoomorssra afew poyuooin * winery Plog QvaH a Jo SuORDALED =P Worg) ULORTED “oxuDUTENAS G6 PUR OF ENTRY Se 677678 Rudi Valté and its constraints, Yet within a few years the economic and political environment in which the American automobile operated began 10 change in ways thac few had foreseen. The Assault on the Automobile In 1953 the president of General Motors, Charles E. Wilson, did ‘not say “what is good for General Motors is good for the county.” Even so, this pscudo-quotation has ofien been repeated as an exam- ple of the matchless arrogance of postwar automotive industry tead- ‘rs, By the time that Wilson made his alleged remark, Arlie Haagen- ‘Smit, a chemistat the California Institute of Technology, had already found abundant evidence that. automotive emissions were a major ‘cause of the thick blanket of smog that had become a depressingly common feature of the southern California environment. In typical fashion, the industry denied that there was any such connection. But when the evidence became overwhelming, first the government of the state of California and then the federal government began to throw a regulatory noose around the automobile. As had happened before, a deficient technology provided a stimulus for governmental intervention. Just as in the early 19th century the tragic explosion ‘of stcamboat boilers had given rise to the first instance of federal regulation, automobile-induced problems impelled action by the federal government. The regulations that ensued had a profound effect on automotive technology. ‘The regulation of automotive emissions began in California with, the mandated installation of positive crankcase ventilation (PCV) valves on all 1963 model cars in order to prevent the escape of un- burned hydrocarbons from engine crankcases. This helped, but it did nothing to address the major source of pollution. tailpipe emis- sious. Accordingly, in 1966 the state began to set limits on exhaust emissions, The federal government then took the lead with the pas- sage of the 1970 Clean Air Act, which, among other things, estab lished ernissions standards for motor vehicles, to go into effect dur- ing the 1975 fiscal year. Difficulties in meeting dhese standards led to congressional passage ofa number of waivers, butamendrents to the Clean Air Act passed in 1990 stipulated the phasing.in of stricter tu 1953 President Fisenhtower nominated Wilson for secretary of defense. Wher) asked by a Senate commitce if there might be any conflict between his government service and his past affiliation with GM, Wilson replied, "I have always believed that wists good for the caunury is gaod for General Motors, and vice vers,” John G. Burke, "Bursting Boilers and Fedecal Pawer” Tacnligy and Culture 7 (3986): 1-28,A Century of Automobiity 679 standards." Federal regulations have led to dramatic reductions of automotive emissions; as a group, cats manufactured during che 1990s produce about one-tenth the emissions of cars manufactured in 1970, Lower emissions have translated into cleaner air; in South- em California, ozone concentrations, a key component of photo- chemical smog, fell from 0.58 parts per million in 1970 to 0.38 parts ‘per million in 1990-—even though the vehicle population went from 64 million to 10.6 million during this period. Emissions regulations had their intended effect because they served to accelerate the development of a host of pollution-contro] technologies: fuel injection, computerized engine management sys- tems, unleaded gasoline, exhaust gas recirculation (EGR), and cata- lytic converters. In effect, a 19th-century technology, the internal combustion engine, had been given a reprieve by the application of late-20th century technologies. The ICE-powered automobile was saved by a technological fix, but this fix was the product of substan- tial governmental intervention, Government activism also was one of the forces impelling the de- sign of safer cars. The initial impetus, however, came from another ‘quarter. Throughout the century, books by the titans of the auto industry had celebrated automobiles, the companies that made them, and the men who had made the companies.” In 1965 a very different book appeared, one that was destined (0 exert at least as auch influence over its readers as the books by Ford, Sloan, and ‘Chuysler had over theirs. The hook was Unsafe at Avty Speed; its author ‘was a little-known lawyer named Ralph Nader.* Although hyperbolic in places, Nader's book did point to a number of design features that increased the dangers of an accident. Unsafe at Any Speed did not create the safety movement ex nihilo, but i€ served (0 catalyze ‘a growing concern over the dangers of driving. Perlaps an increas- ingly safety-conscious public would have eventually demanded safer S'atmissions standards (in grams per mile for 1994-2003 model automobiles are: hydrocarbons, .25, carbon monoxide, 24; nitrogen oxides, 0.4; particulate matter, 0.08, For a complain af emissions sandards (rom 1968 w those proposed for 2004, ee Gary Brymer, Blue Ses, Gran Palit: The Clean Air At of 1990 Washington, DC, 1999), p. 16) James M. Lenes and Willian J. Kelly, “Clearing the Airin Los Angeles,” Scenic Ameraan (October 1993), p. 36. “Henry Facd, My Life and Work (Garden City, N.¥, 1926): Alfred Pritchard Sloan, doors ofa Wha lar Man (New York, 1941); Walter P. Chrysler, Lifsofan Amar ‘am Workmast (Philadelphia, 1938). The contemporary equivalent i, of course, Lee A Iacocca, Tacs: Ax Aulsingraphy (New York, 1984). sRalph Nader, Unsafe at any Spook The Designed fa Dangercafthe American Autamabie (New York, 1965). A revised edition appeared in 1972