AN EXCERPT FROM THE...

2018
INDEX OF
U.S. MILITARY
STRENGTH
DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Edited by
Dakota L. Wood

COMING OCTOBER 2017: HERITAGE.ORG/MILITARY

2018 by The Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Ave., NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
The Naval Warfare Domain
Thomas Callender
T he maritime domain, in and through which
operations on and under the oceans and
seas are conducted, presents unique challenges
as well as advantages to maritime nations and
military forces. The domain is generally sub-
divided into two primary categories: littoral
(coastal) and open ocean (blue-water). The
littorals are defined by relatively shallow wa-
ters and close proximity to the coasts and in-
clude the territorial waters of coastal nations.
Open-ocean operations, as the name suggests,
are marked by waters beyond the maritime
boundaries of nations, with their extreme
depths and vast spaces.
While the maritime domain demands some
common capabilities and operational concepts
for all naval forces, littoral and blue-water en-
vironments require very different forces and
warfighting strategies. The maritime domain
drives some common characteristics for naval
vessels: relatively large size and payloads com-
pared to land and air platforms, slow speed,
limited organic sensor range, long-range com-
munications requirements, and naval logistics.
In addition, the maritime domain shapes na-
val concepts of operations with tactics such
as layered defense, forward presence, and
sea control.
Importance of the Maritime Domain
Since prehistoric times, the worlds oceans
and seas have played a critical part in the devel-
opment of mankind and many of mans domi-
nant civilizations. Evidence suggests that the
earliest man-made boats date back as far as
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45,000 years.1 Initially, these vessels were used
for coastal fishing, but as they became larger
and more sophisticated, people used them to
trade with other coastal civilizations. Once
man learned to navigate beyond sight of land
and to harness the wind, exploration and trade
routes developed across the Mediterranean
Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and
the Pacific Ocean. Maritime exploration also
led to human migration between continents
and island archipelagos.
The development of larger vessels made
it possible to transport greater quantities of
commodities both faster and more cheaply
than was possible over land routes. These
maritime trade routes eliminated the need to
transit through the sovereign territory of other
nations and pay often exorbitant tolls. How-
ever, the movement of large amounts of pre-
cious commodities by sea soon led to the rise
of piracy. Just as land armies arose to defend
national borders and trade routes, armed naval
vessels soon arose to help protect these mari-
time trade routes. From the Ancient Egyptians
to the Greeks and on to the rise of the British
Empire, dominant maritime trade and naval
power were critical to the rise and expansion
of these empires.
The oceans and seas still play a vital role in
the prosperity and protection of most of the
worlds population. Of the worlds 195 nations,
147 border an ocean or sea, and 40 percent of
the worlds population lives within 100 kilome-
ters (62 miles) of an oceanic coast.2 In addition,
maritime trade through international shipping
39
lanes comprises over 90 percent of global com-
merce.3 In a modern world that appears to be
dominated by wireless communications and
satellite broadcasts, 99 percent of all inter-
national data (phone, texts, and Internet) is
transported over approximately 200 undersea
fiber optic cables at speeds eight times faster
than satellites.4 While typically very robust,
these submarine cables are susceptible to land-
slides and other seismic events.
Challenges and Advantages of the
Maritime Environment
For those whose experience with the oceans
is limited to the coasts, the vastness of the
worlds oceans is difficult to convey. The five
recognized oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic,
Indian, and Southern) cover 71 percent of
the Earths surface with an average depth of
13,000 feet.5 The Atlantic Ocean covers ap-
proximately 41,105,000 square miles, and
the Pacific Ocean covers more than 60 mil-
lion square miles, or approximately 20 per-
cent and 46 percent, respectively, of the Earths
surface.6 For comparison, the Pacific Ocean is
larger than all of the Earths land masses com-
bined;7 the continental United States covers
only 3,120,426 square miles (1.58 percent) of
the Earths surface.8
The vastness of the worlds oceans presents
both advantages and challenges. The immense
oceanic distances and limited speed of ships
(1015 knots on average for transoceanic trav-
el) create natural barriers of time and space.
For example, these barriers prevented trans-
oceanic exploration and colonization for cen-
turies until shipbuilding technology and sea-
faring techniques became advanced enough
to withstand storms, navigate safely, and carry
sufficient supplies to survive weeks or months
of travel. While land forces can resupply along
their route with local fresh water and food,
transoceanic vessels must be self-sufficient for
extended periods, carrying or making adequate
fresh water, food, and fuel.
The limited speed of naval vessels limits
their rapid responsiveness or reposition-
ing. For example, the great circle route (the
40 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength
shortest distance between two points on the
curved surface of the Earth) between Nor-
folk, Virginia, and the Strait of Gibraltar at the
entrance to the Mediterranean Sea is 3,326
nautical miles. For a ship traveling at an aver-
age speed of 12 knotsa common economi-
cal speed for commercial shippingit would
take 11.5 days to make this transit, while a
modern jet passenger aircraft traveling at 500
knots would take approximately six hours and
40 minutes.
This time and distance effect requires pre-
planning or prepositioning of naval forces if a
nation desires a timely transoceanic response
to maritime crises. For the United States, this
has meant development of a forward-deployed
blue-water Navy. Maintaining a credible deter-
rent force constantly deployed near potential
naval adversaries enables the U.S. to respond
rapidly to maritime security crises before they
approach Americas shores. This could not be
accomplished with naval forces that remain
predominantly in their home ports or near
territorial waters.
The expanse of the oceans and the lack of
landmarks once a sailor gets beyond sight of
land present unique navigational challenges
when traversing thousands of miles of ever-
changing ocean surface. The fact that the
oceans surface varies from one second to the
next and does not offer any geographical ref-
erence points has led to the development of
rather sophisticated navigation techniques and
technologies. Satellite navigation systems such
as the Global Positioning System (GPS) pro-
vide a highly accurate real-time ships position
for both military and commercial vessels. GPS
and related technologies have afforded military
naval vessels the required positioning, naviga-
tion, and timing (PNT) accuracy that enables
use of precision-guided munitions and coordi-
nated military operations.
With the advent and subsequent prolifera-
tion of GPS-denial or degradation technolo-
gies, it has become essential for modern mili-
tary vessels to have backup navigation systems
that are resilient and reliable even in the face
of enemy actions. Celestial navigationthe
determination of ones position on the Earths
surface based on the position of celestial bod-
ies, typically the sun, moon, or specific starsis
one such technique that relies on a clear sky
and a highly accurate chronometer. An essen-
tial skill for sailors across the centuries, celes-
tial navigation is again being taught to young
sailors as navies recognize that they cannot
rely solely on GPS. Another critical GPS-de-
nied navigation method is inertial navigation,
which provides the speed and position of a ship
or other platform by measuring its acceleration
in all three dimensions. Once extremely large
and expensive, current solid-state inertial nav-
igation units are getting smaller and cheaper,
enabling their use on small surface vessels and
even on unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs).
The vast ocean expanses have also provided
a measure of stealth for naval vessels, although
this is becoming less and less true. For years,
most modern naval vessels relied primarily on
organic radar and electronic support measures
(ESM) systems to locate and target adversary
naval vessels at over-the-horizon (OTH) rang-
es beyond the line of sight. Maritime patrol
craft and carrier aviation early-warning air-
craft were able to extend the ability of these
warships to locate and engage adversaries, but
the ocean is a very big place, and even with ra-
dar, finding a comparatively small ship was still
a challenge.
With the rise of intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, this
stealth via vastness was further reduced.
The limited number of ISR satellites, how-
ever, precluded continuous coverage of any
specific area, affording naval vessels opportu-
nities in specific time and location windows to
avoid detection.
The current proliferation of commercial
and military electro-optic/infrared, radar,
and electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites
is providing greater coverage of and more fre-
quent revisit rates to the worlds oceans. In
addition, maritime domain awareness tech-
nologies such as the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) provide the location and iden-
tity of commercial shipping, thereby helping
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to clarify the maritime picture. The prolifera-
tion of ISR unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is
also changing maritime surveillance by greatly
increasing the capacity for real-time OTH ISR
and targeting information for naval platforms.
Not only can long-range land-based UAVs
provide ISR coverage hundreds of miles from
shore for 12 hours or more at a time, but small-
er UAVs are being fielded that can be launched
and recovered from naval platforms, providing
naval fleets with organic ISR and cueing.
While these systems still have gaps in cover-
age and some require complex algorithms to
scour the vast amounts of imagery required for
open-ocean searches, it is getting harder for a
large surface naval vessel such as an aircraft
carrier to hide in the open ocean. To this end,
many modern navies are regularly practicing
electromagnetic emission control (EMCON)
operations as well as developing technologies
and tactics to deny or degrade ISR satellites
and related platforms.
The oceans depths provide their own con-
dition of stealth for submarines and other un-
dersea platforms such as UUVs, enabling un-
dersea forces to move unseen and relatively
undetected by adversary forces. This is because
the environment below the oceans surface is
drastically different from the world above it.
While light and radio waves can travel thou-
sands of miles through the Earths atmosphere,
they penetrate the oceans depths only from
several inches to a maximum of several hun-
dred feet depending on the frequency of the
electromagnetic wave (light or radio waves).
For example, only a minuscule fraction of sun-
light penetrates the oceans depths beyond
approximately 650 feet, and for much of the
oceans depths, visibility is less than 100 feet
in any direction. Radar and other radio trans-
missions cannot be used to search for objects
or to communicate with submerged subma-
rines or other undersea platforms. Although
this limits the ability of submarines or other
undersea platforms to communicate with
ships, aircraft, or land-based headquarters, it
also hides them from all but the most advanced
search techniques.
41
 While the air is the domain of radio waves
and light, the oceans depths are the domain
of sound. Sound is the most effective means
to communicate or to detect objects across
the vast expanse of the oceans. Compared to
light and radio waves, sound can travel from
thousands of yards up to thousands of miles
in water. For example, the vocalization of blue
whales (at frequencies as low as 14 Hz) has
been detected thousands of miles away.9 Sound
also travels eight times faster in water than in
air, and sound waves travel faster as tempera-
ture, water pressure, and salinity increase.
The deeper, warmer, and saltier the water, the
faster sound travels.
The variance in ocean temperature and
pressure with depth and geographic location
can be exploited to benefit naval operations.
Differences in temperature and pressure
cause sound waves to bend (or refract) toward
the area of slower speed of sound. This bend-
ing of sound waves can create acoustic blind
spots as well as deep-sea sound channels
where sound energy is easily transmitted for
long distances. Lower-frequency sound travels
further in water than higher-frequency sound
does. Submarines, surface ships, and aircraft
hunting for submarines, as well as land-based
command centers communicating with sub-
marines, will use these characteristics to hide
from acoustic search or to pulse acoustic en-
ergy into the water to affect communications
or locate an object.
Background ocean noise can mask quieter
noise sources such as submarines. The prima-
ry factors contributing to ocean background
noise are the sea state (how big the waves are);
the amount of local shipping traffic; seismic
events such as undersea earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, rock slides, and thermal vents; other
noisy maritime evolutions such as fishing and
offshore drilling; and even the animal life of the
ocean including clicking shrimp, whales, and
other marine mammals like porpoises.
Finally, undersea topography can affect the
transmission of sound. The oceans bottom
varies from extraordinarily deep trenches to
broad plains and undersea mountains, with
42 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength
the floor rising dramatically at times to form
walls that stretch upward to the continental
shelves. Acoustically, the shallow littoral wa-
ters behave differently from the deep oceans as
sound waves repeatedly bounce off rocky bot-
toms and the oceans surface or are attenuated
by muddy sea floors. As on land, these undersea
terrain features can affect the transmission of
sound and the flow of currents, which in turn
can affect temperature gradients as water
flows, rises, and falls. The complexity and vari-
ability of ocean waters drives undersea naval
forces to monitor these changes continuously
and alter their tactics and operating profile to
exploit any acoustic advantage as effectively
as possible.
There are two main types of sound navi-
gation and frequency ranging (SONAR) that
provide an acoustic picture of the undersea
world. The first is passive sonar, which essen-
tially is listening for any noise sources on or be-
low the oceans surface. Passive sonar provides
only the direction from which the sound came.
Active sonar provides a much more com-
plete picture of the undersea environment.
Like bats and whales, ships and submarines
can transmit sound and then listen for the
return echo as the sound wave bounces off an
object. Most surface vessels, from small plea-
sure boats to large commercial transports and
naval vessels, use high-frequency active sonar
(tens to hundreds of kHz) depth sounders
to determine the ocean depth beneath them.
Active sonars used by submarines and other
naval vessels are typically in the 1 kHz to 10
kHz range, with some high-definition sonars
in the 100 kHz to 1 GHz or higher range. While
the higher frequencies give better resolution of
the ocean bottom and other undersea objects,
their effective range is less than 100 meters.
Conversely, low-frequency active sonars (less
than 1,000 Hz) can potentially detect subma-
rines at tens of thousands of yards in proper
acoustic conditions.
The disadvantage of active sonar is that
the transmitting platform gives away its own
presence and position. Since they do not
want to surrender their acoustic stealth, U.S.
submarines therefore operate their active so-
nar only in very select tactical situations.
The global maritime commons differ greatly
from land, where nations have very visible geo-
graphic boundaries and long-standing proto-
colscodified in laws, treaties, and recognized
practicesgovern how countries interact with
each other. Whereas almost all of the Earths
land masses are claimed by one nation or an-
other, the vast majority of the 139.7 million
square miles of its oceans are international wa-
ters and not subject to any one nations laws or
control.10 This means that ships can sail almost
anywhere without needing the permission of
or being subject to restrictions or obligations
imposed by any one nation.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines a na-
tions territorial sea as a belt of coastal waters
extending at most 12 nautical miles from its
coast. The United States has not ratified UN-
CLOS because of concerns about some of its
provisions, but it does recognize the agree-
ments conventions on territorial limits and
freedom of navigation as customary interna-
tional law and has established similar sover-
eign rights in U.S. law. While territorial waters
are regarded as the nations sovereign territory,
foreign ships (both military and civilian) are
allowed innocent passage through them, or
transit passage for straits, under specific guide-
lines. This sovereignty extends to the airspace
and seabed.
UNCLOS also establishes an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) in which a coastal state
assumes jurisdiction over the exploration and
exploitation of marine resources in its adja-
cent section of the continental shelf, taken to
be a band extending 200 miles from the shore.
Another important aspect of UNCLOS and in-
ternational maritime law is freedom of navi-
gation, according to which ships flying the flag
of any sovereign state shall not be subject to
interference by other states.
Since no one nations laws apply to these in-
ternational waters, they are governed by sev-
eral multilateral treaties. The most important
is the 1972 Convention on the International
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Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
which establishes among other things the
rules of the road or navigation rules to be
followed by ships and other vessels at sea to
prevent collisions between vessels. Since there
are no marked traffic lanes or stoplights on the
open seas, all ships must remain vigilant with
respect to the course and speed of other ves-
sels. As the USS Fitzgeralds June 2017 fatal
collision with a Philippine container ship dem-
onstrates, even routine at-sea training opera-
tions are dangerous and require a minimum
safe level of proficiency.11
In short, international maritime laws afford
the U.S. Navy the ability to project power in re-
sponse to crises or attempt to deter potential
adversaries by sailing U.S. warships anywhere
around the globe without having to obtain
the permission of any other nation. In similar
manner, they also afford maritime competitors
the opportunity to sail their naval platforms off
the U.S. coast. Visible examples of this are the
recent periodic deployments of Russian sub-
marines off the east coast of the U.S. near U.S.
naval bases (e.g., Kings Bay, Georgia).
While some nations focus their navies on
coastal defense against adversaries operating
near their coasts and territorial waters, the
U.S. Navy has taken a different approach. The
Navys maritime strategy since World War II
has focused on maintaining a continuous for-
ward naval presence that strives to deter ad-
versaries and, if necessary, engage them in the
open ocean or near their own coasts, keeping
the fight and threat far from U.S. shores. At
present, no other nation can conduct routine,
sustained naval operations far from its home
waters as does the U.S. However, some near-
peer competitors like Russia could attempt
to deploy small numbers of nuclear-powered
submarines off the U.S. coast to launch missiles
armed with conventional explosives against
targets of vital importance to the U.S. In light
of this threat, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM) maintain the
ability to find and target adversary undersea
forces closer to the U.S. homeland.
43
Implications of the Maritime Domain for
Naval Forces
The ocean and its unique characteristics
place demands on and drive the design of a
nations navy. This is most readily apparent
in the difference between a littoral or coastal
defense navy and a blue-water or global open-
ocean navy.
A coastal navy is focused on protecting a
countrys territorial waters and adjacent in-
ternational waters. How far a nations mari-
time area of concern extends from its coast
will depend on the nations strategic focus
and the size of its navy. A coastal navy that
operates within several hundred miles from
the coast can consist of smaller vessels such
as fast attack craft, frigates, and diesel subma-
rines. Since they generally will operate at sea
for days to weeks rather than months, they do
not require the size and ability to carry large
amounts of supplies, fuel, and ammunition.
Coastal waters typically are more protected
from severe storms and seas; as a result, coastal
naval vessels can be smaller and less robust
than open-ocean warships. Also, since they
operate closer to shore, these naval vessels will
be less dependent on satellite communications
and long-range ISR than are their blue-water
counterparts, which operate thousands of
miles from their military commanders. If nec-
essary, these navies can use line-of-sight UHF
or VHF communications with aircraft or other
surface vessels to pass urgent communications.
Smaller fast attack craft employ shorter-range
(tens of miles) OTH anti-ship missiles that can
receive targeting information from onboard or,
in some cases, even shore-based radars. Larger
frigates will operate farther from shore and can
support longer-range OTH weapons that can
engage adversary surface vessels at ranges in
excess of 100 miles, requiring timely and ac-
curate targeting information from other ships,
aircraft, or space-based ISR.
Diesel submarines are perfectly suited to
the coastal defense mission. Usually operating
in a defensive posture off a strategic area of the
coast or near a choke point, diesel submarines
can operate at very slow speeds (five knots or
44 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength
less) that allow them to conserve their battery
energy, which provides propulsion and electri-
cal power while submerged. In areas where the
continental shelf extends into diesel subma-
rine patrol areas, modern diesel submarines
can even bottom themselves to conserve en-
ergy even further.
A modern diesel submarine operating on its
battery or Air Independent Propulsion (AIP)12
is extremely quiet and difficult to detect by
passive sonar, especially when operating in or
near congested coastal waters. A modern die-
sel submarine armed with wake-homing tor-
pedoes requires only a moderately proficient
crew to attack an adversarys surface ship as
it transits through a choke point. A coastal de-
fense approach can be supported by land-based
aircraft (fighters, maritime patrol craft, and
helicopters); OTH radars; and anti-ship cruise
missiles. A coastal navy also does not require a
large fleet of logistics ships, because its ships
and submarines can return quickly to port for
fuel, supplies, and weapons.
Naval mines are extremely well suited to a
coastal defense strategy whose primary mis-
sion is to keep potential adversaries out of its
area of concern or far enough away that they
are unable or degraded in their ability to con-
duct maritime strikes ashore. Naval mines are
relatively cheap compared to modern preci-
sion-guided munitions, and a littoral minefield
can easily be laid by small naval vessels or even
by militia vessels (civilian vessels that can be
used for some low-end military missions). Just
one ship hitting a mine effectively shuts down
a choke point or area of concern until it can
be confirmed that all mines are cleared. Since
the high-frequency sonars required to detect
undersea mines have limited range, it can take
weeks or months to survey and clear a suspect-
ed minefield. This mission gets even harder if
the local adversary has surface dominance over
the minefield area, thus preventing the use of
mine countermeasure ships.
Since the transit time to and from coastal
navys bases to desired operating areas is rel-
atively short (hours to days), a smaller force
can maintain a specific defensive posture.
Additionally, coastal navies can surge addi-
tional forces quickly if needed and have them
on station within hours. Finally, coastal de-
fense navies can use undersea acoustic arrays
in or near their territorial waters to provide
early warning of adversary submarines or un-
manned undersea vehicles approaching their
coastlines or critical undersea infrastructure.
A blue-water or global open-ocean navy
like the U.S. Navy has very different demands
that drive the design of its vessels as well as the
overall structure of the force. Since these war-
ships operate thousands of miles from their
nearest naval base for months at a time, they
must be larger than their coastal counterparts
for a variety of reasons. First, blue-water naval
vessels must be large enough to withstand the
worst possible storms and seas; a ship with a
maximum speed of 2030 knots may not be
able to outrun a hurricane or other large storm.
They must also have larger crews to support
sustained 24-hour operations for months on
end and perform preventive maintenance to
ensure maximum operational readiness.
Since forward-deployed warships can-
not count on getting supplies from a port in
their forward operating areas during a time of
conflict, they must be able to carry sufficient
supplies (food, spare parts, etc.) to operate for
several months if necessary and must carry
sufficient fuel for an operating range of several
thousand miles to enable transoceanic cross-
ings without refueling. Blue-water naval ves-
sels also require weapons magazines that are
large enough for them to perform their initial
warfighting missions.
These warships are usually multimission,
since operational commanders must have the
flexibility to respond rapidly to numerous mili-
tary contingencies without waiting weeks for
the warship with the right mission capability
to arrive. While not every ship can perform ev-
ery mission, having a mix of numerous multi-
mission ships forward deployed enables these
naval forces to respond to the vast majority of
contingencies. Blue-water navies also require
a large logistics fleet to resupply warships with
food, fuel, repair parts, and ammunition while
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underway, thereby enabling them to remain for-
ward deployed and on station for months on end.
The level of training required for blue-water
sailors to attain the required proficiency to op-
erate safely and effectively in the harsh open-
ocean environment is significantly greater than
the level needed for short-duration littoral op-
erations. This training must include at-sea lo-
cal area operations to simulate the conditions
they will face on deployment to ensure that the
crew is proficient in all potential missions they
could be called on to perform.
An open-ocean global navy requires a much
larger force structure than its coastal counter-
part. The typical rule of thumb for naval force
structure is that it takes a minimum of four
ships of a given class to have any one of those
ships deployed. This accounts for one vessel in
major extended maintenance, one on deploy-
ment, one just returned from deployment,
and one preparing for deployment. Since it
takes weeks for a ship to transit to a forward-
deployed area, the geographic combat com-
manders must maintain a specific minimum
number of deployed ships and submarines of
various classes so that they can respond im-
mediately to a major combat operation. Even
in peacetime, the strategic deterrent provided
by a sufficiently large forward naval presence
can cause potential adversaries to refrain from
taking hostile or other undesirable actions.
Blue-water submarines also have different
demands on their designs compared to their
coastal counterparts. Nuclear propulsion is
more advantageous for a blue-water subma-
rine than diesel electric or an air-independent
battery recharge method.
As noted, it can take weeks to transit an
ocean even at an average speed of 1215
knots. A diesel submarine can transit at
that average speed for less than one day
before it must slow and come near the
surface to recharge its battery. A nuclear
submarine, however, can operate at its
maximum speed for days or weeks with-
out surfacing if required to transit rapidly
across the globe.
45
 With its greater propulsion power
(~40,000 shaft horsepower compared to
4,000 for a diesel boat), a nuclear sub-
marine can be much larger (~7,800 tons
submerged) than a diesel submarine (less
than 2,000 tons submerged) and therefore
carry more weapons and a larger crew.
A nuclear submarines greater available
power also enables it to have sufficient
atmosphere control and fresh water
producing equipment to allow lengthy
submerged operations.
The key drawback of a nuclear submarine
compared to a diesel submarine is the noise
generated by its power plant. The reactor sup-
port equipment and steam plant are inherently
much louder than a diesel submarine operating
an electric motor on the battery. These systems
can be made extremely quiet and more closely
approach the minimal noise levels of a diesel
submarine, but the engineering is much more
complicated and expensive. For example, it
took the Russian/Soviet Navy and now the Chi-
nese Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
decades to develop the expertise to quiet their
nuclear submarines so that they could not be
heard tens of thousands of yards away.
Similar demands drive the design of open-
ocean aircraft carriers. Most immediately
noticeable is the size of a modern carrier. For
an aircraft carrier to provide sufficient power-
projection capability anywhere on the globe, it
must be able to store, launch, and maintain a
variety and large quantity of aircraft in a car-
rier air wing. For example, a U.S. Navy carrier
air wing typically consists of 68 aircraft of six
different types.13 Steam-driven catapults to
launch aircraft and an arrested landing system
to enable their recovery aboard ship provide
significant decreases over traditional run-
ways, but a minimum distance is still needed
for aircraft to take off and land on the carriers
deck (modern U.S. carriers are more than 1,000
feet long). The carrier must also hold sufficient
aviation fuel and ordnance to support car-
rier flight operations for several days without
46 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength
resupply, and the manpower required to oper-
ate both the carrier and the carrier air wing is
substantial: A typical U.S. carrier deploys with
over 5,000 personnel.
All of these requirements result in a vessel
that is 60,000 tons to over 100,000 tons for the
Nimitz class.14 The large size, need for extended
periods of high speed for carrier operations,
and power requirements of support equipment
(especially the catapult system) make nuclear
power attractive for modern carriers.
A credible blue-water or global open-ocean
navy is expensive to build, train, and maintain,
but it provides the capability for global power
projection and enduring forward presence.
Increasing Maritime Competition and
Threats
The worlds oceans have never been more
critical to its prosperity and security. Global
maritime traffic has increased almost fourfold
over the past 20 years,15 with even more dra-
matic increases in the Indian Ocean and the
East and South China Seas. The sea-lanes con-
necting Asia with North America, the Mediter-
ranean, and Northern Europe flow through the
Suez Canal and account for over 15 percent of
todays global shipping traffic.16 These global
shipping lanes are extremely congested and
subject to increased risk of collisions, terror-
ism, or piracy as they pass through critical
choke points. Each year, for example, 50,000
ships transit the Strait of Malacca, averaging
more than 135 per day, and the Suez Canal
handles upwards of 75 ships per day.17 World
seaborne trade accounts for 80 percent of glob-
al merchandise trade, some 10 billion tons of
cargo.18
Although global maritime piracy has de-
creased significantly over the past few years
due to the efforts of multinational naval task
forces such as Combined Task Force 151 off the
east coast of Africa and actions by the commer-
cial shipping industry, piracy remains a preva-
lent concern. Some areas such as the Gulf of
Guinea are seeing increased activity. The
threat of maritime piracy affects shipping costs
by causing commercial shipping companies
to route their ships farther out into the open
ocean to avoid these small pirate vessels, thus
creating longer and less efficient routes; to
deploy armed guards and other self-defense
measures; and to transit areas of increased
threat at faster speeds that burn more fuel per
distance traveled.
The search for oil, gas, and mineral resourc-
es has fueled an unprecedented increase in
undersea exploration. The commercial use of
remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and UUVs
to explore the oceans bottom and to inspect
and maintain deep-sea oil rigs has helped drive
the technological maturation and increasing
capabilities of small to medium-sized UUVs.
Rapidly improving UUV and ROV technology
also makes it possible for a growing number of
state and non-state actors to find and cut un-
dersea cables clandestinely.
The 2006 magnitude 7.0 Taiwan earthquake
severed eight submarine cables in multiple
places, resulting in a severe Internet disruption
in China. It took 11 special cable-laying ships
49 days to repair the damage.19 If an adversary
or natural disaster cut the majority of cables
to the continental United States or even to Ha-
waii, where U.S. Pacific Command Headquar-
ters is located, it would likely take months to
find and repair the damage. Trillions of dollars
of international financial transactions would
be affected, and secure military communica-
tions would be dangerously reduced. It should
be noted that of the 56 commercial cable-lay-
ing/repair ships in operation worldwide, only
one is registered in the U.S., and the U.S. gov-
ernment owns only one cable-repair ship, the
USNS Zeus.20 Just how many repair ships the
commercial undersea industry would dedicate
to such U.S.-focused repairs is therefore uncer-
tain at best.
The search for undersea natural resources
has political and legal implications. According
to the United States Geological Survey, as much
as one-fifth of the planets undiscovered petro-
leum reserves may reside in the Arctic: roughly
90 billion barrels of oil and 1,670 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas.21 Under international mari-
time law, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia,
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org
and the United States all have a legal claim to
this valuable seafloor territory. UNCLOS al-
lows these nations to file claims for additional
territory out to 350 nautical miles if they can
prove their continental shelves extend into the
Arctic seabed. To date, Russia, Denmark, and
Norway have submitted claims to an extended
continental shelf in the Arctic, providing yet
another potential source of maritime conflict.
In the South China Sea, China has staked
claims to maritime territory that includes the
Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarbor-
ough Shoal. These claims overlap with the EEZ
claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil-
ippines, and Vietnam. In addition to fishing
rights, potentially lucrative oil and natural gas
deposits are at stake. In the past few years, the
Chinese have begun island-building projects
on the Subi, Mischief, and Fiery Cross reefs
to advance their disputed territorial claims.
While the Chinese have claimed that these
islands are being built for civilian purposes,
to increase safety for ships transiting the wa-
terway, analysis of recent construction shows
airfields, radars, and hardened shelters that
indicate a military focus.
Key Naval Warfare Competitors and
Challenges for the U.S. Navy
The rapid maturation and proliferation of
certain technologies have affected the maritime
environment and security challenges for the U.S.
The proliferation of commercial satellites has
greatly improved the ability of many nations to
conduct open-ocean command, control, commu-
nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Space-based elec-
tro-optical and synthetic aperture radar sensors
permit wide-area search for surface vessels be-
cause, unlike the land with its forests, mountains,
and other masking terrain, there is nowhere to
hide on the oceans surface. Commercial satel-
lite communications provide global communi-
cations capabilities to nations and navies that
do not possess their own, as well as redundant
communications for near-peer adversaries.
Forty of the worlds 109 coastal nations cur-
rently possess submarines.22 The capabilities
47
and proficiencies of these submarine fleets
vary significantly from nation to nation, but
modern export submarines and weapon sys-
tems provide even a very small navy with a
credible naval threat. The vast majority of
these submarines are quiet diesel submarines
that operate in coastal defense missions.
Since the passive radiated noise of modern
diesel submarines is extremely low when op-
erating on the battery, resulting in exception-
ally short passive sonar detection ranges of
less than 2,000 yards, active sonar is the most
effective means by which to search for and lo-
cate diesel submarines. Their limited speed
and endurance (most can sprint at speeds
in excess of 20 knots only for less than one
hour) prevent them from effectively evading
a searching platform using active sonar. In
addition, efforts by Russia and China to quiet
their nuclear submarines have reduced their
passive detection ranges, making open-ocean
search and localization by U.S. naval forces
more difficult and requiring the use of mul-
tiple anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets,
such as the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor
System (SURTASS), maritime patrol aircraft,
and destroyers.
Underwater acoustic arrays have become
more prevalent in the littoral areas of most of
the worlds continents. Although the vast ma-
jority of these arrays are for oceanographic re-
search, submarines operating in their vicinity
could possibly be detected. Modern air-based
and space-based surface search radars also
have the ability to detect submarines operat-
ing at periscope depth, provided one knows ex-
actly where to look or can apply sophisticated
data analysis techniques designed to detect the
unique radar signature of an exposed subma-
rine periscope or antenna mast as it interacts
with a constantly changing ocean surface.
Some argue that advancing non-acoustic
anti-submarine warfare (NAASW) capabili-
ties will soon make the oceans transparent,23
but the laws of physics and projected technol-
ogies do not support this assessment. While
the probability of detecting a submarine
either acoustically or by means of NAASW
48 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength
increases significantly for a submarine oper-
ating in the littorals off near-peer adversaries,
especially at periscope depth, a submarine or
other undersea platform remains compara-
tively much harder to detect than even the
stealthiest aircraft. The undersea environ-
ment continues to provide a significant mili-
tary advantage to navies that are able to oper-
ate in it effectively.
The proliferation of precision-guided mu-
nitions, especially land-based and sea-based
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and other
advanced weapons technologies provides an
increasing threat to U.S. naval forces, especial-
ly when operating in choke points and the lit-
torals. Just as the flat ocean expanses make it
easy to see surface ships, they also provide an
unobstructed field of fire for adversaries with
the ability to field ASCMs. Since ships can-
not hide at sea, they must have the capability
to defend against these increasingly capable
weapons. Although unsuccessful, the October
2016 Houthi missile attack from land-based
launchers in Yemen against the USS Mason
while it was operating in the Red Sea clearly
illustrates the reality of this threat.24 The de-
velopment of long-range (greater than 1,000-
mile) anti-ship ballistic missiles presents a
potential threat to carrier strike groups and
other surface naval forces.
Rapidly maturing UAV technologies and
their proliferation to both state and non-state
actors presents another growing maritime
threat. Small military and commercial micro-
UAVs can easily be weaponized, allowing
them either to drop small explosives on ships
or other targets or to serve as kamikaze
UAVs. These small and slow UAVs are hard
to detect with traditional air-search radars,
which are focused on larger and fast-moving
military aircraft and missiles. While the very
small commercial UAVs have a rather limited
range of less than five miles, their range and
endurance are rapidly increasing, and even to-
day, they could be launched from shore or from
a nearby civilian vessel against a naval vessel
transiting a choke point.
Key Nations That Affect U.S. Navy Design
and Missions
Iran. The Iranian Navy is a regional navy
that has been shaped by its maritime operat-
ing environment on the Arabian Gulf and the
Gulf of Oman. Aided by land-based aircraft and
a very capable Russian-built integrated air de-
fense system, the Iranian fleet consists primar-
ily of coastal patrol frigates, fast attack craft, fast
inshore attack craft, and submarines. Iranian
diesel submarines and mini-submarines armed
with torpedoes and anti-ship missiles are ideal
platforms with which to lie in wait undersea in
Iranian territorial waters and hold the Strait of
Hormuz at risk. The Iranian Navy has been ob-
served employing its fast attack craft (FAC) and
fast inshore attack craft (FIAC) in swarm tactics
meant to overwhelm the capacity of adversary
warships to target and engage incoming vessels
and their anti-ship cruise missiles.
Although the Iranian Navy possesses only a
few dedicated mine-laying vessels, it could em-
ploy its FAC/FIAC and other vessels to deploy
the over 2,000 naval mines in its inventory.25
Naval mines would be extremely effective in
controlling the relatively narrow Strait of Hor-
muz, as evidenced by the damage inflicted on
the USS Samuel B. Roberts when it struck an
Iranian floating contact mine in April 1988.
Although not a naval capability, Irans ballistic
missile capabilities and their potential threat
to Europe have led to a ballistic missile defense
(BMD) mission for specified U.S. Navy cruisers
and destroyers.
Russia. The Russian Navy, like Irans, has
been shaped by its unique maritime operating
environment. With much of the Barents Sea
covered with ice for part of the year, provid-
ing a bastion for its nuclear strategic sub-
marines, it is logical that Russia has priori-
tized its submarine force over a large surface
blue-water navy. A resurgent Russian Navy has
focused its modernization efforts on subma-
rines and small surface combatants (frigates
and corvettes). Its new Yazen-class nuclear
guided missile submarine is assessed as being
extremely quiet and capable of launching con-
ventional or tactical nuclear long-range cruise
The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org
missiles. The new Borei-class nuclear ballistic
missile submarine demonstrates Russias con-
tinued prioritization of a submarine strategic
nuclear deterrent.
The new Russian Maritime Doctrine illus-
trates the Russian Navys focus on the Arctic
and Atlantic Oceans with the ultimate goal of
restoring its blue-water capabilities.26 In the
Black and Baltic Seas, the Russian Navy would
assist any future efforts for Russian influence
and territorial expansion in Eastern Europe.
The past few years have seen a dramatic in-
crease in provocative and sometimes unsafe
engagements between Russian warships and
fighter aircraft and U.S. Navy warships and
maritime patrol aircraft in the Mediterranean,
Baltic, and Black Seas.
China. Over the past two decades, the Chi-
nese military has focused its modernization
efforts on developing capabilities to disrupt
the U.S. militarys power projection forces
in the Western Pacific, with a focus on its
carrier strike groups and C4ISR enterprise.
Chinas emphasis on denying U.S. access to the
South China Sea and East China Sea has con-
centrated primarily on land-based anti-ship
and anti-land ballistic missiles with effective
ranges out to over 1,000 miles as well as land-
based fighter aircraft best suited for control
of the close-in air domain. Long-range land-
based OTH radars and airborne early-warning
aircraft and satellites provide the necessary
detection and targeting data for these long-
range weapons.
The development of these long-range,
land-based anti-ship capabilities has less-
ened Chinas dependence on naval platforms
(destroyers, frigates, fast attack craft, and die-
sel submarines) to disrupt or deny U.S. naval
power projection in the South China sea. The
Chinese saw the advantages presented by the
South China Seas maritime environment in
the context of their strategy and developed new
technologies to take advantage of them: the vast
capacity advantage that land-based aircraft and
anti-ship weapons can provide over a forward-
deployed blue-water navy with limited weap-
ons magazines and extended logistic tail.
49
 Although not critical to support this area
denial strategy against the U.S., the PLAN has
been slowly developing blue-water naval capa-
bilities: indigenous aircraft carriers, advanced
guided missile destroyers, and quiet nuclear
attack submarines to supplement its regional
naval force structure. These blue-water capa-
bilities help China to protect its growing eco-
nomic interests in Africa and other maritime
areas far beyond the second island chain. It
remains to be seen whether China is able to
develop the logistics foundation to support a
truly forward-deployed naval powerlogistics
ships, a network of friendly forward bases, and
the operational proficiency to project naval
power effectively far from its homelandor
whether platforms such as its aircraft carriers
are merely symbols of Chinas economic and
military strength.
Implications for U.S. Fleet Design
Given the characteristics of the maritime
domain and the evolving challenges affecting
the U.S. Navys ability to protect U.S. national
security interests, the Navy must likewise
evolve to remain relevant.
The Navy must be able to operate in all
subsets of the maritime domainconstricted
choke points and archipelagos, the littorals,
the Arctic seas, the expansive open ocean, and
the complex depths of the undersea worldas
well as to defeat potential maritime adver-
saries with capabilities ranging from swarms
of fast attack craft to near-peer competitors
long-range anti-ship missiles. This should
drive a force structure comprised of a mix of
multimission naval platforms possessing the
defensive and offensive capabilities necessary
to control the sea when and where necessary
and to project power from the sea against any
competitor that attempts to deny the U.S. ac-
cess to regions, markets, and allies.
50 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength
The fleet must be large enough for forward-
deployed naval forces to provide an enduring,
credible deterrent to potential adversaries
in all critical geographic maritime regions of
concern. A sufficiently large, forward-deployed
force also enables the Navy to respond rapidly
to emerging and unforeseen crises wherever
and whenever such response is needed.
Since the U.S. Navy always prefers to play
the away game, keeping enemies as far from
the U.S. as possible, there is a pressing require-
ment for increased magazine size on naval
platforms and secure intra-theater weapons
replenishment and reload capability. Conflicts
in distant theaters typically do not allow time
for ships to return to a regionally local port,
much less the U.S., for resupply. A robust lo-
gistics and airborne tanker fleet and a resilient
and secure C4ISR enterprise provide the es-
sential foundation for global maritime opera-
tions far from land-based defenses and logis-
tics support.
Fortunately, the Navys senior leadership
has recognized these challenges and is striving
to develop new naval strategies and capabili-
ties to maintain Americas advantages in this
domain. These efforts include Distributed
Lethality;27 Design for Maintaining Maritime
Superiority;28 Undersea Domain Operating
Concept (UDOC);29 and Electromagnetic Ma-
neuver Warfare (EMW).30
The key to success in all of these efforts
will be a commensurate commitment by the
U.S. Congress to provide adequate and sta-
ble funding so that the Navy can maintain a
healthy, well-trained fleet of sufficient size and
capability to secure U.S. interests in the mari-
time domain.
Endnotes
1. John Noble Wilford, On Crete, New Evidence of Very Ancient Mariners, The New York Times, February 15, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/02/16/science/16archeo.html (accessed July 30, 2017).
2. Center for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University (CIESIN), Socioeconomic Data and
Applications Center (SEDAC), Percentage of Total Population Living in Coastal Areas, http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/
papers/Coastal_Zone_Pop_Method.pdf (accessed July 30, 2017).
3. International Chamber of Shipping, Key Facts, 2017, http://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/key-facts (accessed July 30,
2017).
4. Declan McCullagh, NSA Eavesdropping: How It Might Work, CNet Magazine, February 7, 2006, https://www.cnet.com/news/nsa-
eavesdropping-how-it-might-work/ (accessed July 30, 2017).
5. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service, How Many Oceans
Are There? revised July 6, 2017, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/howmanyoceans.html (accessed July 30, 2017).
6. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service, How Big Is the
Atlantic Ocean? revised June 17, 2015, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/atlantic.html (accessed July 31, 2017); U.S. Department
of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service, How Big Is the Pacific Ocean? revised
July 6, 2017, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/biggestocean.html (accessed July 31, 2017).
7. The Earths total landmass is estimated to be 149 million square kilometers, or 57.5 million square miles, less than the 60 million
square miles of the Pacific Ocean. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2018, entry for World statistics,
Geographic Overview, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html (accessed August 6, 2017).
8. U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates, https://www.
census.gov/geo/reference/state-area.html (accessed August 5, 2017). The Census Bureau estimates the total landmass of the
continental United States (to include the District of Columbia) to be 3.12 million square miles. The CIA estimates the Earths
surface area to be 510 million square kilometers, or 197 million square miles. See CIA, World Factbook 2018, Geographic
Overview.
9. National Geographic, Blue Whales and Communication, Video Highlights from Kingdom of the Blue Whale, March 26, 2011,
http://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/science/blue-whales-and-communication.aspx (accessed July 31, 2017).
10. Global Development Research Center, The Worlds Oceans, https://www.gdrc.org/oceans/world-oceans.html (accessed July 28,
2017); Sea Around Us, High Seas, 2016, http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/highseas (accessed August 2, 2017).
11. U.S. Navy, Special Report: USS Fitzgerald Collision, Navy Live: The Official Blog of the U.S. Navy, June 17, 2017, http://navylive.
dodlive.mil/2017/06/17/uss-fitzgerald/ (accessed July 31, 2017).

12. Edward C. Whitman, Air Independent Propulsion: AIP Technology Creates a New Undersea Threat, Undersea Warfare Magazine,
Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall 2001), http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_13/propulsion.htm
(accessed July 31, 2017).
13. U.S. Navy, Aircraft CarriersCVN, Fact File, last updated January 31, 2017, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.
asp?cid=4200&tid=200&ct=4 (accessed August 6, 2017).
14. Ibid.
15. Becky Oskin, Ship Traffic Increases Dramatically, to Oceans Detriment, Live Science, November 18, 2014, https://www.
livescience.com/48788-ocean-shipping-big-increase-satellites.html (accessed July 31, 2017).
16. Jean-Paul Rodrigue and Theo Notteboom, Strategic Maritime Passages, Chapter 1, Application 2, in The Geography of Transport
Systems, ed. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Hofstra University, Department of Global Studies and Geography, https://people.hofstra.edu/
geotrans/eng/ch1en/appl1en/ch1a2en.html (accessed July 28, 2017).
17. Ibid.
18. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2016, p. 6, http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/rmt2016_en.pdf (accessed August 6, 2017).
19. Michael Sechrist, New Threats, Old Technology: Vulnerabilities in Undersea Communication Cable Network Management
Systems, Discussion Paper, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2012, http://
www.belfercenter.org/publication/new-threats-old-technology-vulnerabilities-undersea-communication-cable-network (accessed
July 28, 2017); Douglas Main, Undersea Cables Transport 99 Percent of International Data, Newsweek, April 2, 2015, http://www.
newsweek.com/undersea-cables-transport-99-percent-international-communications-319072 (accessed July 28, 2017).
20. International Cable Protection Committee, Cableships of the World, updated May 26, 2017, https://www.iscpc.org/cableships-of-
the-world/ (accessed July 28, 2017).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org 51

21. Robert Lamb, 5 Most Coveted Offshore Petroleum Reserves, How Stuff Works, September 15, 2008, http://science.
howstuffworks.com/environmental/energy/5-offshore-petroleum-reserves.htm (accessed July 28, 2017).
22. Global Fire Power, Total Submarine Strength by Country, 2017, http://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-submarines.asp (accessed
July 28, 2017).
23. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Transparent Sea: The Unstealthy Future of Submarines, Breaking Defense, January 22, 2015, http://
breakingdefense.com/2015/01/transparent-sea-the-unstealthy-future-of-submarines/ (accessed July 31, 2017).
24. Hope Hodge Seck, USS Mason Fired on a Third Time Near Yemen, CNO Says, Military.com, October 16, 2016, http://www.military.
com/daily-news/2016/10/16/uss-mason-fired-on-a-third-time-near-yemen-cno-says.html (accessed July 28, 2017).
25. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Sowing the Seas with Fire: The Threat of Sea Mines, Breaking Defense, March 30, 2015, http://
breakingdefense.com/2015/03/sowing-the-sea-with-fire-how-russia-china-iran-lay-mines-and-how-to-stop-them/ (accessed
July 31, 2017).
26. Sean MacCormac, The New Russian Naval Doctrine, Center for International Maritime Security, updated November 24, 2015,
http://cimsec.org/new-russian-naval-doctrine/18444 (accessed July 31, 2017).
27. U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control, January 9, 2016, p. 9, http://www.
navy.mil/strategic/SurfaceForceStrategy-ReturntoSeaControl.pdf (accessed July 31, 2017).
28. Admiral John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 1.0, January 2016,
http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf (accessed July 31, 2017).
29. News release, Undersea Domain Operating Concept Approved by Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, September 9, 2013,
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp%3Fstory_id%3D76420 (accessed July 31, 2017).
30. See Naval Warfare Development Commands NEXT, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2015), issue devoted to Advancing Electronic
Maneuver Warfare, https://www.nwdc.navy.mil/NeXT%20Assets/archive/NWDC_Mag_SUMMER_FALL%202015%20APP.pdf

(accessed July 31, 2017).

52 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength