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PRELIMINARY INJUCTION In addition, the other incorporators were shown to have also sold shares to the
1. RIVERA v. FLORENDO
GR No. L-57587
October 8, 1986
Recit ready versin: Fujiyama is a corporation, with Rivera as a majority
stockholder. Akasako, who claimed to own Riveras shares, sold to private
respondents (Jureidni and Tsuchiya) some of the shares of Rivera, but when the
latter tried to register their stock certificates with the Fujiyama Corporation, they
were denied. They filed a case for preliminary injunction/receivership, and the
court issued an order granting the private respondents the authority to manage the
corporations hotel and restaurant. Basically the main issue is whether or not what
was issued by the court was a mandatory injunction or an order for provisional
receivership. The SC clarified that it was for provisional receivership. The Rules of
Court provides that the issuance of an order for mandatory injunction is justified
only when the case is clear and free from doubt and dispute. Because the there were
many issues surrounding the shares subject of the alleged sale (such issues include
ownership and authority to sell Riveras shares, as Akasako was allegedly a dummy),
then the writ for mandatory injunction should not have been ordered in the first
place. Also, pursuant to the principle that no advantage may be given to one to the
prejudice of the other, the writ violated Riveras rights as a majority stockholder.
Petitioners: Aquilino Rivera; Isamu Akasako; Fujiyama Hotel & Restaurant Inc.
[Fujiyama]
Respondents: Hon. Alfredo Florendo (Manila CFI); Lourdes Jureidini; Milagros
Tsuchiya
Facts
Fujiyama is a corporation duly registered and organized under Philippine law.
Petitioner Rivera is an incorporator, with a total of 4,899 shares (P100 par value).
Thereafter, a certain Isamu Akasako, a Japanese national, and allegedly the real
owner of the shares owned by Rivera, sold 2,550 shares to respondents Jureidini
and Tsuchiya. After the sale was consummated and consideration was paid to
Akasako, Rivera refused to make indorsement [for stock transfer certificate
purposes] unless he was also paid.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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respondents, who now had 3,300 shares and held the majority of the outstanding
shares of the corporation. The stock certificates given to the respondents bore the
signatures of the president and the secretary of the corporation, as required by the
Corp Law. Rivera admitted the genuineness of the signatures.
Respondents however attempted several times to register to register their stock
certificates with the corporation, but to no avail. They filed a case for preliminary
injunction and/or receivership. A hearing was held and Judge Florendo
(respondent also) issued an order for a writ of preliminary injunction, authorizing
Tsuchiya and Jureidini to manage Fujiyamas hotel and restaurant.
[In case he asks: Petitioners counsel withdrew from the case and a bunch of
motions were filed]
Issue/Held: [relevant to class] W/N the order issued is that of preliminary
mandatory injunction or provisional receivership? Provisional receivership
Ratio
A. So what is a mandatory injunction?
1. It is granted when there is a showing
a. That the invasion of the right is material and substantial
b. The right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable
c. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage
2. A mandatory injunction commands the performance of a specific act.
a. As opposed to a prohibitive injunction, which is intended to
maintain status quo
3. The issuance of mandatory injunction should be justified only in clear
cases
a. It is generally improper to issue it before final hearing, because it
tends to do more than just the status quo
b. It should be issued only when there is willful and unlawful
invasion of plaintiffs right
c. The plaintiffs case is one free from doubt and dispute
B. Florendo violated the fundamental rule of injunctions, that a mandatory
injunction will not issue in favor of a party whose rights are not clear or free
of doubt, or as yet undetermined.
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1. The shares were purchased not from the registered owner (Rivera) but
from a dummy of Rivera (Akasako)
a. In other words: who owned the shares? Or who had the
authority to sell the shares? Was it Rivera? Was it Akasako?
No one knowsand thats exactly why the case was not free
from doubt.
2. Such contentious issues should be properly tried out at a trial on the
merits
a. The order granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was analogous to a judgment on the merits
b. The trial court should have first determined what Tsuchiya and
Juneidini actually sought, the registration of their shareholdings
and the issuance of new stock certificates
c. It is only after the trial that the subsequent act of management
may be ordered, giving the respondents the right to
appeal/review, and need not be immediately executor
C. Florendo also violated the rule that no advantage may be given to one to the
prejudice of the other
1. He violated that rule by using the order of injunction to transfer the
property in litigation from the possession of one party, to another
whose legal title is in dispute
2. The primary purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo (or
the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the
controversy).
a. Here, Rivera is the registered majority and controlling stockholder
before the sales happened
b. The issuance of the writ in question deprived him of his rights as
stockholder, and his position as corporate president
D. [Non-important non-provrem issue] Juneidini was charged with contempt.
1. Apparently, Juneidini refused to acknowledge the writ, by saying the
following statement: "I will not obey thatYes, I am higher than the
Supreme CourtI will obey only what my lawyer tells me."
a. It was alleged that she said this in a restaurant, and that she was
fazed with the unusual display of lawyers that were in the
restaurant at that time
b. Naturally, she denied saying that statement
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c. And she said that the writ was not addressed to her, nor her
counsel, but to the lower court (and thus she had nothing to
acknowledge)
2. Resistance or disobedience to a lawful writ constitutes indirect
contempt punishable under Rule 71.
a. It constitutes defiance of authority, justice or dignity of the
court
b. Such conduct tends to bring the authority into disrespect
c. It MUST, however, be exercised on the preservative and not
on a vindictive principle
3. Juneidini was not in contempt.
a. The evidence presented by petitioners were very one-sided
b. Although Jureidini did not immediately comply with the Writ,
it appears reasonable on her part to request that she be
allowed to confer with her lawyer first before she makes any
move of her own.
c. It is likewise reasonable for her counsel to request that he be
given time to file a motion for clarification with the Supreme
Court.
2. FERANIL VS. ARCILLA
GR No L-44353 | Feb 28, 1979 |De Castro
Petitioners: Martha Feranil and Primitivo Villegas
Respondents: Hon. Gumersindo Arcilla, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
III, City Court of Davao City and Spouses Alfonso Cardenas and Lolita Cardenas
Summary: Feranli and Villegas filed against Spouses Cardenas an ejectment case
with prayer for the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was
granted by the Court. The Spouses filed an answer (with a motion to dissolve the
writ) alleging that in the Complaint, it does not state that Villegas has a cause of
action against them since he is not in actual and/or physical possession of the land.
The City Court ordered Villegas to be dropped from the complaint as plaintiff and
the writ was dissolved since Villegas is the sole signatory of the requisite bond. The
Court ordered Feranil or Villegas to remove whatever improvements they introduce
on the premises in question after the issuance of said writ within 10 days from
receipt. I: W/N dropping Villegas from the complaint is proper NO. R: Three days
before the dissolution, Feranil and Villegas entered into a contract of lease for the
construction of a fruit stand. Since the Spouses refused to vacate the premises, by
virtue of the lease contract, Villegas has a cause of action and is entitled to the
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possession of the lot upon which to construct a fruit stand. I: W/N the dissolution of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction for lack of the requisite bond despite existence
thereof is proper NO. R: With Villegas reinstated as a proper party with sufficient
cause of action, the bond signed by him as principal is perfectly valid and effective to
support the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, which accordingly, should be
restored with full force and effect. I: W/N Martha Feranil or Villegas should remove
whatever improvements introduced in the premises after the issuance of the writ
but before trial on the main action NO R: The effect of the preliminary mandatory
injunction is to restore the plaintiffs to the possession of the lot in question after the
defendants have allegedly forcibly entered it. The possession once restored, entitles
them to the full enjoyment thereof, in the same manner and to same extent as they
had before the possession had been disturbed by the defendants. Thus, they are free
to exercise rights of ownership and possession.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari treated as SCA, filed by Martha
Feranil and Primitivo Villegas who were the plaintiffs in an ejectment case
with prayer for the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction, which
was granted.
In their answer to the complaint in the ejectment case, Spouses Alfonso and
Lolita Cardenas, alleged as one of their affirmative defenses the following:
(incorporated in the Answer is a Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued.)
o That the complaint states no cause of action in that: The plaintiffs
have admitted in par. 5 of the Complaint that "Martha Feranil is the
prior and legal possessor" rental be increased instead of original
agreement of P50, should be P80 to which defendants agreed.
o In synthesis, these allegations are admissions of plaintiffs that
defendants have juridical title to the possession of the land in
dispute as lessees and are not therefore illegally possessing the
same;
o Insofar as Villegas is suing as party-plaintiff, there is no allegation
in the Complaint that he was in the actual and/or physical
possession of the land which was disturbed by defendants;
therefore, he has not shown any interest in the nature of the action
for forcible entry:
o That Villegas has no capacity to sue as attorney-in-fact of Feranil
there being no factual allegations in the complaint that he is suing
as such and that he has been specifically authorized to institute
and prosecute the present action;
The City Court: Villegas is ordered dropped from the complaint in his
capacity as co-plaintiff, Denied defendants' motion to dismiss Feranil's
motion, Modified the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (granted to
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Feranil only), Ordering either Feranil or Villegas to remove whatever
improvements that they introduce on the premises in question after the
issuance of said writ within 10 days from receipt.
In another order issued by the City Court, the writ of preliminary injunction
was dissolved "for lack of the requisite bond required of Feranil without
prejudice on her part to pursuing appropriate legal remedies under the
Rules of Court.
CFI: Affirmed the orders of the City Court.
Issues/Held:
1. W/N dropping Villegas from the complaint is proper NO.
2. W/N the dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction for lack of the
requisite bond despite existence thereof is proper NO.
3. W/N Martha Feranil or Villegas should remove whatever improvements
introduced in the premises after the issuance of the writ but before trial on
the main action NO.
Villegas is a lessee
The complaint also alleges that on Sep 20, 1975, 3 days before the act of
dispossession imputed to the defendants, Feranil and Villegas entered into
a contract of lease for the construction of a fruit stand, and that since Sep
23, 1975, defendants have remained and continue to remain, in the illegal
possession of the premises. These allegations, together with that of par 13,
of the Complaint "that the continuance of the defendants in unlawfully and
forcibly entering the aforementioned property", and that "their unlawful
acts of the defendants have unjustly prejudiced the plaintiffs over the
reasonable expected earning of the premises ... make out also a case of
unlawful detainer, which is the proper cause of action of Primitive Villegas,
who, by virtue of the lease contract, is entitled to the possession of the lot
upon which to construct a fruit stand.
The allegation in the complaint "that the plaintiffs informed the defendants
that what they are occupying is the premises covered by a contract and had
advised them to vacate from the premises, but the defendants refused and
ignored, xxx" fulfills also the requirement of demand to vacate from both
Feranil and Villegas.
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction - Reinstated
The dissolution of the said writ on the ground that after Villegas, who alone
is a signatory of the requisite bond has been dropped, the bond has lost its
legal efficacy, is without factual or legal basis. With Villegas reinstated as a
proper party with sufficient cause of action, the bond signed by him as
principal is perfectly valid and effective to support the Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, which accordingly, should be restored with full force
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and effect.
Feranil Free to exercise rights of ownership and possession
The effect of the preliminary mandatory injunction is to restore the
plaintiffs to the possession of the lot in question after the defendants have
allegedly forcibly entered it. The possession once restored, entitles them to
the full enjoyment thereof, in the same manner and to same extent as they
had before the possession had been disturbed by the defendants. The
acknowledged legal effect of an injunction, which naturally varies, depends
on whether the injunction is prohibitory or mandatory.
o Mandatory injunction: the party in whose favor it is issued is
placed in the same situation he was before the commission of the
illegal act complained of, as if said act has never been committed.
o Prohibitory injunction: the specific act sought to be enjoined has
not yet been performed, and is one alleged to be illegal, by the
pleader. It is enjoined because it would cause irreparable injury if
allowed to be committed to the prejudice of the party asking for
the issuance of the injunction. The situation before the issuance of
the prohibitory injunction is thus preserved in status quo. In the
present case, the status quo is Feranil being in actual possession of
her own lot, is free to exercise rights of ownership and possession.
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent court dated March 31, 1976, dismissing
the petition for certiorari of the herein petitioner is hereby reversed. Accordingly, it
is hereby ordered: (1) that Primitive Villegas be as he is hereby reinstated as
plaintiff in the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2727-C of the City Court of Davao
(Branch II); (2) that preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved by the City Court
be as it is hereby restored in full force and effect; and (3) the order for the removal
of whatever improvements have been introduced in the premises after the issuance
of the mandatory injunction be, as it is hereby declared without effect. No special
pronouncements as to costs.
3. FILIPINO METALS vs. SECRETARY of DTI
G.R. No. 157498, July 15, 2005
Petitioners: FILIPINO METALS CORPORATION, MAXIMA STEEL MILLS CORPORATION, BUILDERS
STEEL CORPORATION, UNICORN METAL CORPORATION, VENUS STEEL
CORPORATION, LEGACY STEEL CORPORATION, PAG-ASA STEEL CORPORATION,
MARTIAN STEEL CORPORATION, LUNAR STEEL CORPORATION, CEBU STEEL
CORPORATION, CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION, STEEL ASIA MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION,and GRAND ASIA CORPORATION
Respondents: SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, and THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
TARIFF COMMISSION
Summary: Petitioners are manufacturers of various steel products such as
reinforcing bars, steel sections, and profiles. RA 8800 was enacted and the
petitioners are assailing its constitutionality. The RTC of Valenzuela found a strong
case against the constitutionality of the said law sufficient to justify a preliminary
injunctive relief. The CA reversed such order. Our issue in this case is whether or not
the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court be upheld? We have ruled that
when the petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong
enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to
a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought, the court should issue a writ of
preliminary injunction. Only two requisites are necessary for a preliminary injunction
to issue: (1) the existence of a right to be protected and (2) the facts, against which
the injunction is to be directed violate said right. In this case, petitioners have
demonstrated a clear right threatened by the questioned safeguard measures
Facts:
Petitioners are manufacturers of various steel products such as reinforcing
bars, steel sections, and profiles. The principal raw materials for these
products are steel billets, which come in various chemical and physical
compositions, sourced partly from domestic producers and partly from
overseas suppliers.
The domestic suppliers supply only about 15% of the countrys total
requirements. These are made from various scraps containing impurities.
They are of inferior quality compared to the imported ones made from
virgin-ore materials. Thus, petitioners are compelled to import a bulk of
their raw materials from foreign suppliers.
Republic Act No. 8800 was enacted codifying the provisions of Article XIX of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Safeguards.
o These agreements authorize the application of a safeguard
measure if a product is being imported into the country in such
quantities as would cause or threaten to cause serious injury to
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products.
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City, a petition for declaratory
relief and/or certiorari and prohibition seeking to declare Rep. Act No.
8800 as unconstitutional.
The RTC judge, while holding in abeyance a ruling on the validity of Rep. Act
No. 8800, found a strong case against the constitutionality of the said law
sufficient to justify a preliminary injunctive relief.
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Not satisfied, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. In its assailed decision, the appellate court concluded that the RTC
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of injunction.
Issue:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE RTC VALENZUELA,
DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENJOINING PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS FROM IMPLEMENTING R.A. 8800. Simply put, should the
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court be upheld? YES
2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE ADEQUATELY SHOWN A CLEAR
RIGHT TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. YES
Ratio:
Petitioners maintain that Rep. Act No. 8800 violates Article VI, Section 28
(2) of the Constitution.
o They contend that the said provision does not authorize Congress
to delegate the power to impose tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other duties or imposts to
persons other than the President. They further argue that RA 8800
impairs Philippine treaty obligations under the WTO Agreement
on Safeguards.
Respondents insist that the CA correctly ruled that RA 8800 enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality.
o Respondents claim it is improper for petitioners to raise the issue
of the alleged violation of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards since
it was not raised before the Court of Appeals. They also allege that
the supposed injury to be sustained by petitioners is neither grave
nor irreparable. Finally, respondents deny that they engaged in
forum-shopping.
We note that the issue of constitutionality of RA 8800 is not raised in the
instant petition. It is in fact pending litigation at the regional trial court.
Neither is the issue of forum-shopping allegedly committed by respondents,
determinative of the case at hand.
Rep. Act No. 8800, also known as the Safeguard Measures Act, authorize the
application of a safeguard measure upon a finding that a product is being
imported into the country in increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry.
o Hence, the primary purpose of safeguard measures is not at all to
generate revenue for the government, but to provide protection to
domestic industry threatened by import surges. Thus, while
suspending the collection of internal revenue taxes will definitely
cripple the government, enjoining the enforcement of safeguard
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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measures would not necessarily drain the national coffer. Note that
safeguard measures are not always in the form of a tariff increase.
Safeguard measures may, and in fact, usually take the form of a
simple quantitative restriction on imports.
Clearly, safeguard measures are not in the nature of taxes, in the sense of
being the lifeblood of the national economy, such that their enforcement
cannot per se be enjoined. Having settled this preliminary matter, we now
look at the merits of the instant petition.
Under Rule 58, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, any of the following
grounds justifies the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
o That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an
act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
o That the commission or continuance of some act complained of
during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would
probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
o That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of
the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of the action, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In the instant case, the act complained of is the enforcement of RA
8800. Petitioners pointed out that RA 8800 delegated the power to fix
tariffs and imposts directly to the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry. Moreover, they showed that RA 8800 impairs Philippine treaty
obligations under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
We have ruled that when the petitioner assailing a statute has made out
a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of
the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear
legal right to the remedy sought, the court should issue a writ of
preliminary injunction.
o After a careful consideration of the submission by the parties, we
are convinced that petitioners herein have established a strong
case for the unconstitutionality of RA 8800sufficient for the grant
of a preliminary injunction. Note, however, that a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued merely to preserve the status quo
ante. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits
of the case can be heard fully. It is generally availed of to prevent
actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be
disposed of.
Respondents argue that RA 8800 enjoys the presumption of validity and
constitutionality until proven otherwise. True, but for the purpose of
issuing a provisional remedy, strictly speaking, this contention lacks
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relevance. Obviously, a law need not be declared unconstitutional first
before a preliminary injunction against its enforcement may be granted.
Needless to stress, the moment a law is nullified for being unconstitutional,
it ceases to exist. Thus, a writ of injunction would then become superfluous.
Only two requisites are necessary for a preliminary injunction to
issue:
o (1) the existence of a right to be protected and
o (2) the facts, against which the injunction is to be directed violate
said right.
o While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need
not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence required to
justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction need not be
conclusive or complete. The evidence need only give the court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction, pending the
decision of the case on the merits. Thus, to be entitled to the writ,
petitioners are only required to show that they have an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.
In this case, petitioners have demonstrated a clear right threatened by the
questioned safeguard measures. Being in a business heavily dependent on
importation of steel, they would be severely damaged once safeguard
measures are applied against steel imports. Petitioners have shown, to the
satisfaction of the trial court and this Court that any increase in tariffs or
quantitative restriction on imports will force them to close down their
respective businesses and lay off their employees.
This, to us, is sufficient to entitle petitioners to a preliminary
injunction. We thus hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision, dated
February 28, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 67397, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order, dated September 4, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City,
Branch 172, in Civil Case No. 82-V-01 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as
to costs.
4. PANAY MUNICIPAL CADASTRE vs. GARDUNO
Petitioners: Panay Municipal Cadastre, et. al.
Respondents: Judge L. Garduo, CFI Capiz, and Josue Soncuya
Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari assailing Garduos orders
Summary: Simple case. There is a land dispute between Soncuya and the Azarragas
Soncuya claims for damages, etc. During the pendency of this dispute, the
Azarragas entered into a contract of loan with the De La Rama firm, to fulfill its
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promises to Panay Municipal Cadastre, a corporation organized for the purpose of
effecting cadastral survey of lands in Kalibo. To secure such loan contract, the
Azarragas executed a mortgage in favor of the De La Rama firm on the land which is
subject of the dispute. As a result, the Soncuyas filed a civil action with Judge
Garduo. Guess what? Its primary purpose is to obtain a preliminary injunction to
prevent the parties from carrying into effect the contract secured by the mortgage!
So principal contract sya! The Judge granted it naman. The court said that such grant
was an irregular act and beyond the jurisdiction of the Judge because preliminary
injunction is a purely subsidiary remedy, not an independent action.
Street, J.:
Facts
Soncuya filed an original complaint in CFI Capiz (CivCase 2541) against six
individuals: the Azarragas, to recover damages amounting to P125,000
from them due to the following:
o Misfeasance in procuring a Torrens title to the property claimed
by Soncuya; and
o For various acts of waste committed by them in connection with
the misappropriation of the property mentioned.
The land consists of four parcels, constituting a portion of the larger of the
two lots described in the original certificate of title No. 9785. (So may two
lots yung 9785, isa malaki, isa maliit. Yung four parcels na yun is just a
portion of the malaki. Nalito ako sa wording dito kaya inexplain ko na lol).
In connection with such complaint, Soncuya asked for inscription of notice
of lis pendens on 9785, as well as a writ of attachment against two other
lands owned by the Azarragas (Certificate of Title No. 9804 and 10351
remember this, kasama mga to sa imomortgage)
o Attachment was discharged upon the filing of the Azarragas of a
12.5k pesos bond. The notice of lis pendens was also cancelled.
BEFORE this incident, a corporation in Capiz called Panay Municipal
Cadastre (PMC) was formed.
o It has a purpose of effecting a cadastral survey of lands in the
municipality of Kalibo.
o The Azarragas had obligated themselves to supply money to this
corporation for the purpose of the survey.
However, things were going bad for Azarragas and found themselves
without funds to meet their obligation to PMC, hence, they applied for a
loan of P25,000 with the De La Rama firm.
o (Alert: Source of present controversy) De La Rama granted this, but
to secure the money, a mortgage was executed on the land covered
by certificates of title Nos. 9785-9804, and 10351.
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After the mortgage, and while CivCase 2541 was pending trial, Soncuya
began a second civil action (CivCase 2643) in CFI Capiz against the
Azarragas and the De La Rama firm.
o This is to obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent the Azarragas
and the De la Rama firm from carrying into effect the contract
secured by the mortgage mentioned. (Please read their prayer in
this footnote in case sir asks.)1
Judge Garduno issued an order for the preliminary injunction upon filing of
an undertaking by Soncuya of 2000 pesos. The next day, the preliminary
writ of injunction was issued enjoining the De La Rama firm from extending
the credit stipulated for in the mortgage and the Azarragas from receiving
any portion of the money intended to be advanced.
Despite MRs, the judge refused to dissolve the injunction, hence, this
petition. (Note: How did PMC get into this case? They filed a motion in
intervention but was denied)
Issue/Held: Whether or not Judge Garduo committed GADALEJ in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction against the Azarragas and De La Rama firm YES.
Ratio
It will be seen that the injunctive order against which relief is sought in
this case was issued in a case (No. 2643) in which no other relief is sought
than the issuance of a preliminary injunction in aid of the prior pending
action in case No. 2541.
No ultimate substantive relief was sought in the second action.
The granting of such preliminary injunction is an irregular act and beyond
the jurisdiction of the Judge.
The preliminary injunction is purely subsidiary remedy, available in aid of
the right which is to be vindicated in the action wherein the preliminary
injunction is issued.
An independent action will not lie merely to obtain a preliminary
injunction .There must be some substantive right to be enforced in the
1 1st, restraining the defendants Azarraga from asking from their codefendant Hijos de I. de la Rama
more money from their credit than that which corresponds to the first month, if it had already been
delivered to them, according to the mortgage contract aforementioned;.
2nd, restraining at the same time the defendant Hijos de I. de la Rama from delivering to its
codefendants any sum on account of the said credit beyond the amount already delivered;.
3rd, equally restraining all the defendants from rescinding the mortgage contract aforementioned
until further order of the court;.
4th, the plaintiff also prays that a copy of the injunction be remitted to the register of deeds with
instructions to annotate it in the registry and in the certificates of title Nos. 9785, 9804, and 10351,
and to abstain from registering any annotation relative to transactions with respect to said
properties until further order of the court, and.
5th, likewise prays that costs in this case be adjudged against the defendants Azarraga
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
7
action in which the preliminary injunction is sought and which right is
intended to be conserved by the injunction .
This rule is fundamental; and a contrary practice cannot be tolerated, since
it would tend to a multiplicity of actions and lead to unnecessary expense
in litigation.
Any conservative remedy to which the plaintiff might really have been
entitled could have been obtained by motion in the original action (No.
2541).
5. BROCKA vs. ENRILE
Petitioners: LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO
SANTOS, VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL
OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ,
ORLANDO ORTIZ, NOEL REYES, EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO,
FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO
AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE,
CLARENCE SORIANO, OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO ILANO, JR.,
DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA HERNANDEZ,
EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA
CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. CALISTE
Respondents: JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ. GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG.
GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL. DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT,
RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN
Summary: petitioners were arrested and charged with Illegal assembly following a
violent dispersal of a demonstration held with the jeepney strike called ATCO.
Provisional release of the petitioners was ordered. However, they remained in
detention having involed PDA allegedly issued against them. Original or copy of PDA
was never shown. They were subsequently charged with Inciting to sedition infos
did not recommend bail. They were released provisionally on orders of President
Marcos. The accused still continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid
charge of inciting to sedition. WON the criminal prosecution of a case (inciting to
sedition) may be enjoined YES. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. There is a
need to prosecute criminal offenders but this should not be a license to violate every
citizens right to due process or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
Nature: This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release
of petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon
City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners.
Facts:
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Jan 28, 1985 - Petitioners were arrested by elements of the Northern Police
District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held
in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned
Transport Organization (ACTO).
They were charged with Illegal Assembly (1 st offense) in Quezon City RTC.
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of
Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other
petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each.
Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent
petition for bail
Feb9, 1985 - Despite service of the order of release, Brocka, et al. remained
in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action
(PDA) allegedly issued against them.
Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA
was ever shown to them.
Feb 11, 1985 - Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged with Inciting to
Sedition (2nd offense) without prior notice to their counsel. The original
informations filed recommended no bail. The circumstances surrounding
the hasty filing of the second offense:
o Utterances allegedly constituting 2nd offense (recommended no
bail) are the same utterances which are the subject of the 1 st
offense (entitled to be released on bail as a matter of
Constitutional right) - apparently respondents have conspired to
deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail.
Feb 14, 1985 - They were released provisionally on orders of President
Marcos. Narrated in Courts resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by
Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:
o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all
accused had already been released.
o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not
become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in
the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to
sedition.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or
harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution,
second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal (premised on one and the
same act -attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike)
o There may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the
law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses
and filing two informations (double jeopardy)
Issue/Held: WON the criminal prosecution of a case (inciting to sedition) may be
enjoined YES
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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Ratio:
GR: criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final.
o Exceptions: (based on different jurisprudence)
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent
the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.
Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal
proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by
state officials in bad faith.
Respondents invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from
detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA
was issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985
(upon receipt of the trial court's order of release).
o Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24
hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila).
o Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas
for its production, the prosecution merely presented a purported
xerox copy of the invoked PDA
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and
inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious
intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
Ilagan case - that "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should
be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified
true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the
time of the apprehension"
There is a need to prosecute criminal offenders but this should not be a
license to violate every citizens right to due process or manipulate the law
to suit dictatorial tendencies.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
The sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the
prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second
offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without
need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew.
o Informations for second offense were hastily filed two days after
Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial.
J. Salonga v. Cruz Pao - Infinitely more important than conventional
adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's
right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also
from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ."
Where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal
charges (like prevented from enjoying provisional release) until such time
that charges were filed and where a sham preliminary investigation was
hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
enjoined.
6. EMBASSY FARMS vs. CA
G.R. No. 80682 August 13, 1990
EMBASSY FARMS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT), HON. ZENAIDA S. BALTAZAR, Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CLVIII, (158), Pasig, Metro Manila, VOLTAIRE B. CRUZ, Deputy Sheriff,
Branch CLVIII, Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila and EDUARDO B.
EVANGELISTA, respondents.
Emergency: Asuncion (AGA) entered into a MOA with Evangelista (EBE) for the sale
of 19 parcels of land with a piggery farm and EBEs majority shares in Embassy
Farms for P8.6m located in Bulacan. EBE transferred control of the farm to AGA and
endorsed his shares but did not deliver them to AGA. Both sides were claiming the
other wasnt fulfilling his end of the deal. AGA files in RTC Pasig a case of rescission
of the MOA. Upon application of EBE, RTC Pasig issues a preliminary injunction
keeping the status quo prior to the MOA and that EBE shall maintain control of
Embassy Farms. Embassy Farms petitioned to CA and CA restrained the prelim
injunction. Embassy farms then filed its own injunction case vs EBE. Certiorari of
EBE to CA. CA resolved by upholding the prelim injunction of RTC Pasig and cancels
their own previous restraining order. Embassy Farms now questions the writ of
prelim injunction on several grounds. SC It was proper for RTC pasig to issue the
injunction Abecause it would be unjust and unfair to allow AGA to control and
manage the Embassy Farms despite the fact that AGA is asking for the rescission of
the MOA. It was proper to maintain status quo PRIOR to MOA since EBE has more at
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
9
stake (its a rescission case). Also generally an injunction is only enforceable within
the region. But there is an exception when, in interest of justice, the principal
business addresses of the parties and the decisions on the acts to be restrained are
originated within the Court's jurisdiction. Both parties are residents of the National
Capital Region. AGA is a resident of San Juan while EBE is residing at Paraaque.
Also, as noted by the Pasig Court all orders to be enforced and executed at Embassy
Farms in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan emanated from its main office which is
located at the 2nd Floor, Agora Complex, Domingo Street, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Facts:
1. August 2, 1984, Alexander G. Asuncion (AGA) and Eduardo B. Evangelists
(EBE) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Under said
MOA, EBE obligated himself to transfer to AGA 19 parcels of agricultural
land registered in his name with an aggregate area of 104,447 square
meters located in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan, together with the stocks,
equipment and facilities of a piggery farm owned by Embassy Farms, Inc.
EBE also obligated himself to cede, transfer all of his shares of stocks" in
Embassy Farins Inc. to AGA or his nominees" until the total of said shares of
stock so transferred shall constitute 90% of the paid-in-equity of said
corporation" (EBE owned 90% of the stocks of Embassy farm).
2. This was for a total sum of close to P8,630,000.00. Within a reasonable time,
AGA also obligated himself to organize and register a new corporation with
an authorized capital stock of P10,000,000.00 which upon registration will
take over all the rights and liabilities of AGA.
3. Pursuant to clause 8 of the MOA, on August 2, 1984, EBE turned over to
AGA the effective control and management of the piggery at Embassy
Farms. Likewise, in accordance with clause 15, EBE served as President and
Chief Executive of the Embassy Farms with a monthly salary of P15,000.
EBE also endorsed in blank all his shares of stock including that of his wife
and three nominees with minor holdings in Embassy Farms Inc.
4. However, despite the endorsement, EBE retained possession of said shares
and opted to deliver to AGA only upon full compliance of the latter of his
obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement.
5. Notwithstanding the non-delivery of the shares of stocks, AGA transferred a
total of 8,602 shares to several persons.
AGA CIVIL CASE
6. On April 10, 1986, AGA filed an action for rescission of the MOA with
damages in RTC Pasig, alleging EBE's misrepresentation on the piggery
business since said business is actually losing and EBE's failure to execute
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
the deeds of conveyance of the 19 parcels of land. (Not said explicitly but
EBE applied for preliminary injunction)
7. July 30 1987, The Pasig Court granted an order with writ of preliminary
injunction
a. xxx whereby restraining the plaintiff (AGA) from disposing the
stocks including rights sucklings, equipment and other facilities in
Embassy Farms, Inc; from harrassing defendant (EBE) and his
employees and associates; and preventing defendant from
discharging, performing and exercising his duties, prerogatives as
director, president and chief executive of Embassy Farms, Inc. xxx
subject to defendant's filing a bond of P1,750,000.00 conditioned
upon defendant's payment to such plaintiff Asuncion of all
damages which the latter may sustain by reason of this injunction
in the event the Court shall finally decide otherwise and in case
said plaintiff, Alexander G. Asuncion is adjudged entitled to such
damages.
8. On September 18, 1987, Embassy Farms, Inc. filed a petition with the CA for
prohibition with preliminary injunction. On September 22 1987, the CA
enjoined the enforcement of the Pasig Court's order dated July 30, 1987.
EMBASSY FARM CIVIL CASE
9. Meanwhile, on July 30, 1987, Embassy Farms instituted an action for
Injunction with damages against EBE in RTC Malolos. In its complaint it
alleged that sometime on July 11, 1987, EBE forced his way inside the
Embassy Farms and while inside took some cash and cheek amounting to
P423,275.45.
10. Motion to dismiss of EBE was denied. Thus, he filed a Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with preliminary injunction with the CA. CA
issued a consolidated resolution sustaining the order dated July 30, 1987 of
the Pasig Court. Accordingly, it set aside and lifted the restraining order
dated September 22, 1987. CA based its resolution on its findings that the
Board of Directors of Embassy Farms are nominees of AGA so that it
considered AGA and Embassy Farms as one and the same person. It noted
that EBE has not delivered the certificate of stock outstanding in his name
in the books of the corporation to AGA because the latter allegedly has not
complied with the terms and conditions of the MOA. Also the appellate
court opined that "(I)n the instant case, it will appear that no transfer of
shares of stock has been made by EBE to AGA as there had been no delivery
of the certificate in order to produce or effect the transfer of such shares of
stock." Embassy Farms filed MR denied.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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Issue: W/N CA committed a reversible error when it sustained the order dated July
13, 1987 of the Pasig Court and lifted the restraining order it had issued. NO
Embassy Farms argued that the Pasig Court has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide EBE's application of a writ of preliminary injunction because the
ouster of EBE and his reinstatement as President and CEO of Embassy
Farms is an intra-corporate matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
SEC. Embassy Farms also claimed that the Pasig Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Embassy Farms because it was not made a party in the
case. Neither could the orders of the Pasig Court be enforced at Loma de
Gato, Marilao Bulacan, the principal office of the corporation, because it is
located outside of the National Capital Judicial Region. And that the writ
was irregularly issued because it was issued 1 day ahead of the injunction
bond.
It must be stressed at the outset that the case at bar is merely an offshoot of
a controversy yet to be decided on the merits by the Pasig Court. The action
for rescission filed by AGA in the Pasig Court will ultimately settle the
controversy as to whether it is AGA or EBE or both parties who have
reneged on their obligations under the MOA. We do not want to pre-empt
the Pasig Court.
TRANSFER OF STOCKS
Although EBE has indorsed in blank the shares outstanding in his name he
has not delivered the certificate of stocks to AGA because the latter has not
fully complied with his obligations under the MOA. There being no delivery
of the indorsed shares of stock AGA cannot therefore effectively transfer to
other person or his nominees the undelivered shares of stock. Under the
Corporation Code, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the
transferree of the certificate properly indorsed. However, no transfer shall
be valid until it is recorded in the books of the corporation.
In the case at bar the indorsed certificate of stock was not actually
delivered to AGA so that EBE is still the controlling stockholder of Embassy
Farms despite the execution of the MOA and the turn over of control and
management of the Embassy Farms to AGA on August 2, 1984.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
When AGA filed on April 10, 1986 an action for the rescission of contracts
with damages, the Pasig Court merely restored and established the status
quo prior to the execution of the MOA by the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. It would be unjust and unfair to allow AGA and his
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
nominees to control and manage the Embassy Farms despite the fact that
AGA is not asking for the delivery of the indorsed certificate of stock but for
the rescission of the MOA. Rescission would result in mutual restitution so
it is but proper to allow EBE to manage the farm. Compared to AGA, EBE
would be more interested in the preservation of the assets of Embassy
Farms during the pendency of the main case.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENFORCEABILITY OUTSIDE JURISDICTION
Generally, an injunction under Section 21 of BP 129 is enforceable within
the region. The reason is that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to be
performed outside its territorial boundaries. However, to avoid an
irreparable prejudice We allowed in Dagupan Electric Corp et al. v. Pano the
enforcement of an injunction to restrain acts committed outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. In Dagupan case We ruled that a
CFI has jurisdiction to try a case although the acts sought be restrained are
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction where the principal business
addresses of the parties and the decisions on the acts to be restrained are
located and originated within the Court's jurisdiction.
Here to avoid an injustice and irreparable injury, We apply the exception
rather than the general rule. Both parties are residents of the National
Capital Region. AGA is a resident of 7-A Lake Street, San Juan, Metro Manila
while EBE is residing at 113 R. Tirona Street, BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila.
Besides, as noted by the Pasig Court all orders to be enforced and executed
at Embassy Farms in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan emanated from its
main office which is located at the 2nd Floor, Agora Complex, Domingo
Street, San Juan, Metro Manila.
INJUNCTION BEFORE BOND
Suffice it to say that aside from the factual findings of the CA that the date
July 31, 1987, appearing on the bond is a typographical error, it must be
pointed out that with the injunction bond the party enjoined is amply
protected against loss or damage in case it is finally decided that the
injunction ought not to have been granted.
INTRACORPORATE ISSUE
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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Case at bar is not an intracorporate controversy within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the SEC. it is not a controversy between corp and
public, or corp and state, or corp and stockholders, or among stockholders.
Here the controversy in reality involves the contractual rights and
obligations of AGA and EBE under the MOA. AGA or his nominees are not
even the lawful stockholders of Embassy Farms because EBE for a
justifiable reason has withheld the delivery of the indorsed certificate of
stocks.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
REQUISITES
1. CERENO vs. DICTADO (GR No. 81550)
Petitioner: Cesar A. Cereno
Respondent: Hon. Luis D. Dictado, Presiding Judge, RTC at Daet, Camarines Norte,
Ramon B. Asis and Job De Vela, OIC, Office of the Municipal Mayor, Vinzons,
Camarines Norte
Date: Aprile 15, 1988
Summary: Cereno and Asis were mayoralty candidates of Vinzons. Cereno was
proclaimed and he took his oath of office. Thereafter, an election protest was filed by
Asis and Judge Dictado issued an order, ordering Cereno to desist from taking his
oath of office. Cereno filed a manifestation stating that he has already taken his oath
of office so it is now moot and academic. On the day that he was about to assume
office, he was served with a copy of the supplemental order of Dictado ordering him
to refrain from assuming office or to stop, desist and refrain from continuing until
further orders. SC held that Dictado was wrong when he ordered Cereno to desist
from assuming office. The pendency of the election protest filed by Asis is not
sufficient basis to enjoin Cereno from assuming office. The claim of Asis to the
contested office is a contingent right which could only ripen into an actual right
favorable to him when a judgment is rendered to this effect. An injunction is not to
protect contingent or future rights nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Cereno and respondent Asis were mayoralty candidates for the
municipality of Vinzons, Camarines Norte in the local election of 1988.
Cereno was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly
elected mayor of said town. He took his oath of office before the Second
Assistant Prosecutor Fiscal of Camarines Norte.
2. Asis filed an election protest before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte but
the same was ordered dismissed on the same day on the ground that the
claim that 84 votes case for Santiago Cereno, another mayoralty candidate,
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
were credited to Cesar Sereno (Petitioner), and that petitioner had already
been proclaimed.
3. Another election protest was filed by Asis seeking a judicial recount of the
votes cast in 2 precincts. Respondent Judge Dictado issued an order that
Cereno desist or refrain from taking his oath of office until further orders of
the court. Cereno filed a manifestation informing the court that he has
already taken his oath of office previously so that the restraining order has
become moot and academic.
4. Due to the absence of Judge Dictado, Judge Dames was requested by Cereno
to act on his manifestation, who issued an order that the restraining order
of the court has become moot and academic.
5. Thereafter, Cereno sent a letter to Job de Vela, the municipal Officer-In-
Charge (OIC), to the effect that he will assum the functions of Municipal
Mayor and requested a formal turn over. But as Cereno took steps to assum
the office, he was served a copy of the supplemental order of Judge Dictado
ordering him to refrain from assuming office or if he has already assumed
office to stop, desist and refrain from continuing until futher orders from
the court.
6. Cereno filed an ex-parte urgent motion to set aside the supplemental order
but Judge Dictado but the later has not acted on the same. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: WoN Judge Dictado acted in GADALEJ in ordering Cereno to restrain from the
performance of the functions of the office of the Municipal Mayor - YES HE DID
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the supplemental order of the
respondent judge is REVERSED and set aside for being null and void without
prejudice to the election protest proceeding which should be terminated with
deliberate dispatch. Immediately executory.
1. Sec. 5 of RA 6636 clearly states that the duly elected local officials shall
assume office on February 2, 1988. Cereno was proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor of Vinzons, Camarines Norte on January 20, 1988 and took
his oath of office on January 22, 1988 before the filing of the election
protest on January 25, 1988 by Asis. As he appears to be the duly elected
mayor of the aforesaid town, the law mandates that he assume office on
February 2, 1988. Judge Dictado committed grave abuse of discretion, and
acted in excess of his jurisdiction in ordering Cereno to desist and refrain
from assuming office on the said date against the clear provisions of Sec. 5
of RA 6636.
2. The pendency of the election protest filed by Asis is not sufficient basis to
enjoin Cereno from assuming office as required of him by law. The
efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. Until and unless
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
12
the election protest is decided against Cereno, he has a lawful right to
assume and perform the duties of Mayor.
3. The claim of Asis to the contested office is a contingent right which could
only ripen into an actual right favorable to him when a judgment is
rendered to this effect. An injunction is not to protect contingent or future
rights nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. Also, the OIC has no
lawful right to continue discharging the duties of Mayor of said town as
Cereno appears to have been duly elected to said office and has qualified
thereto.
2. PHILIP YU vs. CA
GR No. 86683
January 21, 1993
Petitioner: Philip Yu
Respondents: CA; Judge of Manila RTC; Unisia Merchandising (private respondent)
Recit-ready
Yu, exclusive distributor of Mayfair products in the Philippines, filed an injunction
suit against Unisia, who purchased Mayfair products through FNF Trading in
Germany for sale in the Philippines. RTC and CA denied the issuance of a writ of
injunction, because Unisia is a stranger to the contract between Mayfair and Yu. SC
said that the purpose of injunction is to prevent contractual interference by a
stranger to such contract, which is exactly what Unisia is in this case. Also, the
damage done by Unisia was irreparable, and thus a writ of injunction should issue.
Facts (short and simple case)
Philip Yu claims to be the exclusive distributor of wallcovering products,
produced by the House of Mayfair (an English company).
Yu filed a suit for injunction against Unisia Merchandising, who Yu claimed
to have purchased Mayfair merchandise through FNF Trading in West
Germany, and sold said merchandise in the Philippines.
Yu also claimed that Unisia misled Mayfair, by saying that Unisia intended
to ship the goods to Nigeria, but in reality sold goods in the Philippines.
Unisia claimed that the contract between Mayfair and Yu was only binding
between them, and did not bind Unisia.
Using this last point, the RTC denied the complaint for the issuance of
preliminary injunction.
o Basically, the RTC ruled that since there was no privity of contract
between Yu and Unisia, an order to restrain Unisia from selling
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
goods bought from FNF Trading would be without legal
justification.
CA also denied the issuance of a writ, by stating that Yu was not able to
demonstrate an unequivocal right which he sought to protect, and that
Unisia is indeed a stranger to the contract between Mayfair and Yu
Nevertheless the SC granted a TRO against Unisia.
Issue/Held: W/N the CA and RTC were right in dismissing the complaint for
injunction?NO.
Ratio:
That the exclusive sales contract between Mayfair and Yu is beside the
point (hence, completely irrelevant).
o This is because the remedy of injunction is afforded to prevent
a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such
contracts, where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting
injury is irreparable.
o The liability of Unisia, thus, does not emanate from the contract
between Mayfair and Yu, but it is an independent act generative
of civil liability.
o Note that the SC has not pronounced Unisias liability at this stage,
The SCs job in this particular case is simply to rectify certain
misperceptions as regards the feasibility of requesting a
preliminary injunction to enjoin a stranger to an agreement.
The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the
profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a
party may protect.
o Such right may not be diminished or rendered illusory by the
expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or firm to obtain
goods from the supplier to defeat the very purpose for which the
exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the
sole authorized distributor
o Basically, you cant do indirectly what you cant do directly. (This
refers to Unisias act of purchasing Mayfair shizz through FNF
Trading)
The act of Unisia in misleading Mayfair that the goods will be shipped to
Nigeria is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces a party to
renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the
other contracting party to relief therefrom
o The damage that resulted to Yu was irreparable
o Each sale made by Unisia is continuous and repeated, and is a
constant and frequent recurrence
o Thus, no fair and reasonable redress was available
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
13
o And it would be highly impractical if Yu would file a suit for every
time Unisia made a sale of Mayfair products
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 13, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16019 and the Order dated October 16,
1988 issued by the magistrate at the court of origin are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon petitioner's posting of a bond in the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to be approved by said court, to remain effective
during the trial on the merits until final determination of the case. The manager of
private respondent. Frank Sia, is hereby ordered to pay to the Clerk of Court within
five (5) days from notice hereof the fine of P500.00, as previously imposed on him,
with a warning that failure to do so will be dealt with more severely.
3. HERNANDEZ vs. NAPOCOR
GR No. 145328 | March 23, 2006
Petitioners: Eduardo F. Hernandez, Encarbacion R. Legaspi, Jaime Blanco, Enrique
Belo, etc.
Respondent: National Power Corporation [NAPOCOR/NPC]
Summary: NAPOCOR constructed steel towers as part of its Power Transmission
Project which are very near the houses of the petitioners. Petitioners opposed such
because they found studies linking exposure to electromagnetic fields with
leukemia/cancer. Even Chiz opposed such in his privilege speech. After an impasse
in the negotiations, the petitioners filed for TRO/Writ of Prelim. Injunction in the
trial court. TC granted the writ. NPC filed certiorari in the CA, alleging that the TC
cannot do such thing because PD 1818 prohibits courts from issuing TROs/PIs in
cases involving infrastructure projects. The SC disagreed, because PD 1818 has its
own limitations, and that the right to health of the petitioners is more important.
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Facts
With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their
battle cry, petitioners, all residents of Dasmarias Village, are clamoring for
the reversal of the decision dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000,
denying their MR.
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped
steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to support overhead high
tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-
Balintawak Power Transmission Project.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Said transmission line passes through the Sergio Osmea, Sr. Highway
(South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmarias
Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners homes are.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the
internet on the possible adverse to their health. Petitioners learned that
exposure to electromagnetic fields may cause cancer or leukemia.
They aired this growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series
of meetings with them.
Cong. Francis Escudero, in his privileged speech, denounced the cavalier
manner with which Napocor ignored safety and consultation requirements
in the questioned project in his privileged speech.
This eventually reached the attention of the Chairman of the House
Committee of Energy, Rep. Fuentebella. NPC gave him four options that
they have come up with the residents to address the problem:
o Option 1 = Transfer the line to Lawton Avenue, P 111.84
million(proposal of Dasmarias/Forbes)
o Option 2 = Maintain 12 meters distance along the village, P 77.60
million (pushed for by NPC)
o Option 3 = Construct an underground line P 482.00 million
o Option 4 = Reroute along C-5 and South Luzon Expressway, P
1,018.83 million
Having reached an impasse in the negotiations, petitioners filed a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
NAPOCOR.
o Their primary contention is that the hazardous effects of the
radiation would greatly affect their health;
o Prayed for damages and relocation of the transmission lines to
Lawton Avenue.
Judge Ibay issued an order, which temporarily restrained the respondent
from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through the
said project. (Note: Iba pa to sa PI na iissue nya mamaya)
NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order.
o Primary Contention: There is this law, Presidential Decree No.
1818 2 (1981), entitled "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing
2 Sec. 1 provides: No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy
involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource
development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including
among other public utilities for transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
14
Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving
Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects of, and
Public Utilities Operated by, the Government. Hence, the trial court
has lack of jurisdiction in acting on the matter.
In the interregnum, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against NPC. An injunction was necessary to stay
respondent NAPOCORs activation of its power lines due to the possible
health risks posed to the petitioners. NPC is prohibited from
energizing/transmitting electricity through the said cables, upon posting of
P5M bond.
o Asserting its jurisdiction over the case, the trial court was of the
view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence
proscribing injunctions against infrastructure projects do not find
application in the case at bar because of the health risks
involved.
CA reversed the order of the trial court, sided with NAPOCOR.
o The proscription on injunctions against infrastructure projects of
the government is clearly mandated by the above-quoted Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, as reiterated by the Supreme
Court in its various Circulars.
Issue/Held:
Whether or not the trial court may issue a TRO and Preliminary Injunction
to enjoin the construction and operation of the towers by the NAPOCOR,
notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818 YES.
Rationale:
Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued on 16 January 1981, prohibiting
judges from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure
projects. In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary order, preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute
or controversy involving an infrastructure project."
o Garcia vs. Burgos PD 181 was held to prohibit courts from
issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project in order
not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government
projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the
nation.
This rule, however, is not absolute:
continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public
utility or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
o The prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
o On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions
of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of such on the ground
that NPC impinged on their right to health under the Constitution.
Moreover, petitioners asserted that there was no consultation conducted
with them, which is in violation of the Local Government Code.
o The right to health and the question of violation of the LGC are
veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with
jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary
injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case from the
protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
The issuance by the TC finds legal support under Section 3, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court (See codal same lang, under the GROUNDS)
The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained,
the act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the
judgment ineffectual.
There is also adequate evidence to prove that the project would imperil the
health of the petitioners:
o Adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the project to cancer
and leukemia;
o NPC brochure mandates 20-meter easement from the lines
because of the health risks, which falls short of the 12-meter
easement that NPC was proposing.
o Privilege speech of Chiz
o Series of negotiations and meetings
We take judicial notice that the area alluded to as location of the NAPOCOR
project is a fragile zone being proximate to local earthquake faults,
particularly the Marikina fault, among other zones.
Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the
affected communities of a government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a
shortcut to this requirement. In fact, there appears a lack of exhaustive
feasibility studies on NAPOCORs part before making a go with the project
on hand.
A preliminary injunction is likewise justified prior to a final determination
of the issues of whether or not NAPOCOR ignored safety and consultation
requirements in the questioned project. Indeed, the court should grant such
if the purpose of the other party is to shield a wrongdoing. A ruling to the
contrary would amount to an erosion of judicial discretion.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
15
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not
require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant.
o Probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where
one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and
permanent injunction.
Pending the final determination of the case, it is prudent for the trial court
to preserve the status quo, since the writ is a preservative remedy to
ensure the protection of a partys substantive rights pending the final
judgment in the principal action.
o At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have
consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is
more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the
issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of
great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainants favor; where there is
a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his
protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the
defendant, than to establish a new relation. (PPA vs. Cipres
Stevedoring).
With regard to the circulars, there is not a hint suggesting an unbridled
prohibition against the issuance of TROs/PIs.
o Circular 2-91, 13-93, and 68-94: it seeks to enjoin the
indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions;
o Circular 7-99: Judges are enjoined to observe utmost caution,
prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of TROs/PIs to avoid
any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for consideration
other than the strict merits of the case.
In sum, what Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely
frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by
provisional remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting
the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic
development effort of the nation.
o It was not meant to be a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the
fundamental right to health, safety and well-being of a community
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
4. OLALIA vs. HIZON
G.R. No. 87913 May 6, 1991
Petitioners: LEONOR A. OLALIA and her husband JESUS G. OLALIA
Respondents: LOLITA O HIZON, represented by her Atty. In Fact, ATTY. ABRAHAM
P. GOROSPE
Summary: Hizon filed a complaint for unfair competition with damages and prayer
for preliminary injunction against Olalia. The TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
was granted by the RTC of Pampanga. Olalia filed and MR and went to the CA on
certiorari. The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC. Our issue in this case whether, on
the basis of the evidence submitted at the hearings on the motion for preliminary
injunction, the Order was correctly issued. NO The SC held that the submission of
Olalia that Hizon had not suffered business losses but in fact had even increased her
sales during the period of the alleged unfair competition. Such profits were not
denied at all by Hizon; on the contrary, she expressly admitted them on cross-
examination. Worse, Hizon also could not give an idea of the reasonable profit she
would have made were it not for the Olalia's supposed infringement and was unable
to even only approximate her losses. In short, there was not enough evidence
presented at the hearings to substantiate her claims of injury as a justification for
the issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Facts:
This case involves a conflict between two sisters-in-law who are
competitors in the meat business.
o Both sell tocino, longanisa, chicharon and corned beef, one under
the name of Pampanga's Best and the other under the name of
Pampanga's Pride.
Lolita O. Hizon filed a complaint for unfair competition with damages and
prayer for preliminary injunction against her brother's wife, Leonor A.
Olalia.
o Hizon claimed that she had been using the business name
Pampanga's Best since 1974 and that her goodwill had been
impaired because of the petitioner's use of the name Pampanga's
Pride for her own products.
After issuing a temporary restraining order, which he extended twice,
Judge Eli G.C. Natividad of the RTC of Pampanga, following several hearings,
granted the application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
o x x x this Court hereby orders defendants Leonor A. Olalia and her
husband Jesus G. Olalia and/or any other persons acting under
their command, and/or for in their behalves, to desist and refrain
from using the billboards, wrappers, and other promotional
paraphernalias with the tradename/trademark "PAMPANGA'S
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
16
PRIDE---TOCINO, LONGANIZA, CHITCHARON AND CORNED
BEEF," pending the termination of this litigation, and/or unless a
contrary Order is issued by this Court.
Olalia, without filing a MR, immediately went to the CA on certiorari and
asked that the order be set aside. CA issued a temporary restraining order,
then a preliminary injunction. The petition was denied on the ground that
the RTC had not committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order.
The appellate court declared that the conclusions reached by the trial court
were if at all, only errors of judgment that were not correctible in a petition
for certiorari. The conclusions were reached by the trial judge according to
his own perceptions based on a study of the evidence submitted to him at
the hearings on the motion, including the testimony of witnesses on the
alleged similarity of the trade names and its effect on the private
respondent's business. There was no arbitrariness.
Issue: Whether, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the hearings on the
motion for preliminary injunction, the Order was correctly issued. NO
Ratio:
We issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the
challenged decision.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act.
o It is merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the
principal action. The justification for the preliminary injunction is
urgency. It is based on evidence tending to show that the action
complained of must be stayed lest the movant suffer irreparable
injury or the final judgment granting him relief sought become
ineffectual. Necessarily, that evidence need only be a "sampling,"
as it were, and intended merely to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
the case on the merits. The evidence submitted at the hearing on
the motion for the preliminary injunction is not conclusive of the
principal action, which has yet to be decided.
A careful reading of that order suggests that it was issued only on the
strength of the allegations in the complaint and the P50,000.00 bond flied
by the plaintiff. That is not enough, of course.
o We note, however, that it is also indicated therein that it was
issued "after notifying defendants and hearings conducted." We
may therefore presume that the trial judge regularly performed
his functions and actually considered the evidence presented at
the hearings before issuing his order.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
We agree with the respondent court (CA) that in a petition for certiorari,
the only allowable ground is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Alleged errors of fact or law committed by the court a quo do
not involve its jurisdiction and may therefore be corrected only in an
ordinary appeal. The only exception is where such errors are shown to
have been made with grave abuse of discretion or with such a capricious or
whimsical exercise of its judgment "so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. In such a situation, the
questioned judgment of the court a quo may be validly reviewed and
reversed on certiorari as tainted with grave abuse of discretion resulting in
loss of jurisdiction.
It is observed that in sustaining the trial judge, the CA assumed that the
former had exercised his best judgment in concluding that there were
"confusing similarities" between the two trade names. It was influenced,
according to the respondent court, by such factors as "the sameness of the
goods offered for sale under the two competing trademarks/tradenames
(meat products like tocino, longanisa and chicharon), the close similarities
in the respective sizes of the said goods, the group or class of the usual
buyers of said goods, the use of the word "PAMPANGA" in both tradenames,
the short distance between the vicinities of the business of petitioners and
private respondent, the use by both of the same attractive color
combination/scheme of red green and yellow."
o We note, however, that this finding was based on incomplete
evidence. The appellate court was not being asked to rule finally
on the claimed "confusing similarities" but only tentatively, to
determine if the preliminary injunction had been properly issued.
Its finding on the supposed infringement was therefore
premature. Right or wrong, that finding is yet to be examined
more fully when the principal action is set for trial on the merits
and the parties complete their evidence in support of their
respective positions.
The Court is not in a position at the present time to rule on such evidence,
which is not yet at hand, and so will not preempt the trial court in the
resolution of that question.
There is one important matter, however, that both the trial court and the
respondent court have disregarded. This is the submission of Olalia that
Hizon had not suffered business losses but in fact had even increased her
sales during the period of the alleged unfair competition. Such profits were
not denied at all by Hizon; on the contrary, she expressly admitted them on
cross-examination. Worse, Hizon also could not give an idea of the
reasonable profit she would have made were it not for the Olalia's
supposed infringement and was unable to even only approximate her
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
17
losses. In short, there was not enough evidence presented at the hearings to
substantiate her claims of injury as a justification for the issuance of the
preliminary injunction.
To reiterate, the evidence to be submitted at the hearing on the motion for
preliminary injunction need not be conclusive and complete, we find that
the private respondent has not shown, at least tentatively, that she has
been irreparably injured during the five month period the petitioner was
operating under the trade name of Pampanga's Pride.
o On this ground alone, we find that the preliminary injunction
should not have been issued by the trial court. It bears
repeating that as a preliminary injunction is intended to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff, that possibility should be clearly
established, if only provisionally, to justify the restraint of the act
complained against. No such injury has been shown by the private
respondent. Consequently, we must conclude that the issuance of
the preliminary injunction in this case, being utterly without basis,
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion that we can correct on
certiorari.
The following observation of this Court in Golding vs. Balatbat, is applicable
to the case before us:
o The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction
rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the
prevention of the multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown
to bring the case with these conditions, the relief of injunction
should be refused.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the
freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or
precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that
the law permits it and the emergency demands it.
Maintenance of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court would
prevent Olalia from using her accustomed business name and require her
to operate in the market under a different name unfamiliar to her
customers. This would be unfair under the circumstances. As we have held
that Hizon has not sufficiently shown that she is entitled to this remedy, it
is just and equitable that it be lifted until the dispute between the parties is
thoroughly threshed out and finally resolved after trial on the merits.
Two more points must be made before we conclude.
o Strictly speaking, the petitioners should have first filed a motion
for reconsideration with the trial court before filing their petition
for certiorari with the respondent court, as that court correctly
held. Her apprehensions of the "futility" of a reconsideration
because of the "partiality" of the trial judge are not acceptable and
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
do not excuse her deviation from the prescribed procedure. Only
the importance of the issues did.
o We also note with disapproval the extension by Judge Natividad of
the temporary restraining order dated September 22, 1988, for no
less than two times, to cover a total of 60 days. This was a clear
violation of B.P. Blg. 224 limiting such order to twenty days only
and of the decisions of this Court annulling such extensions. Judge
Natividad is hereby reprimanded for violating these strictures.
Whether he did so out of ignorance of the law or out of willful
disobedience, neither of which can be condoned, he is warned that
repetition of this irregularity will be dealt with more severely.
We find that the Order dated November 28, 1988, was invalidly issued
by the Regional Trial Court and that it should not have been sustained
by the Court of Appeals.
Held: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED
and the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court is LIFTED. The Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, is DIRECTED to proceed to the trial on the
merits of Civil Case No. 8243 and to decide the same with proper dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
5. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION vs. BAYONA
GR No L-13555 | May 30, 1962 | Bautista Angelo
Petitioner: The Social Security Commission
Respondents: The Hon. Judge Froilan Bayona, et al.
Summary: The Faculty Club of the University of Santo Tomas, Inc. and San Beda
College Lay Faculty Club, Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief with preliminary
injunction to command SSC to desist from compelling them to integrate their private
system into the SSS. They cited various reasons why the non-issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction would cause irreparable injury. (ex. take away available
funds, respondents may never take back their funds, criminal prosecution would
ensue if the respondents refuse to join the SSS. I: W/N there is an existence of
irreparable injury NONE. R: "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will
enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which
produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture,
and not by any accurate standard of measurement". The array of figures regarding
the irreparable injury that the respondent corporations will suffer merely
succeeded in proving that the damage, if any, is susceptible of mathematical
computation. It is not then irreparable. If full compensation can be obtained by way
of damages, equity will not apply the remedy of injunction.
Facts:
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
18
The Faculty Club of the University of Santo Tomas, Inc. and San Beda
College Lay Faculty Club, Inc. (respondents) filed a petition for declaratory
relief with preliminary injunction before the CFI of Manila alleging that
they have existing agreements with their respective employers the UST
and SBC for the establishment of gratuity and retirement funds which
have been in operation prior to Sept. 1, 1957; that the Social Security
Commission (SSC) tried to compel them to integrate their private system
into the SSS on said date; that inasmuch as their private systems grant
more benefits to the members than the SSS the integration of their private
systems would deprive their members of property without due process of
law, as well as would impair the obligation of their contract to the
detriment of the members. Hence, they prayed for the issuance of
preliminary injunction ex parte commanding the SSC to desist from
compelling them to integrate during the pendency of the case on the
ground that, unless said Commission is enjoined, it might enforce the penal
provisions of the Social Security Act.
The court a quo, Judge Bayona, presiding, issued ex parte a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the SSC from compelling the integration
sought for. SSC moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction but was
denied.
Respondent corporations advance the following reasons why the non-
issuance of the injunction would cause them irreparable injury:
a. To lift the injunction would mean to take away the availability of
the funds of respondent corporation from their members who may
borrow them in case of necessity
b. To dissolve the injunction would be to take away respondents'
funds which they may never be able to get back taking note of Sec
31 of the Social Security Act, as amended, which says that no
person shall be deemed to be vested with any property or right by
virtue of the enactment of said Act;
c. If respondent corporations refuse to join the SSS, criminal
prosecution would ensue against their officers and members.
Issue/Held: W/N there is an existence of irreparable injury. NONE.
Ratio:
"An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that
degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt,
inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not
by any accurate standard of measurement". An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of "a serious charge of, or is destructive to,
the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has
been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the
loss thereof".
The array of figures regarding the irreparable injury that the respondent
corporations will suffer merely succeeded in proving that the damage, if
any, is susceptible of mathematical computation. It is not then irreparable.
If full compensation can be obtained by way of damages, equity will not
apply the remedy of injunction.
Neither can respondent corporations contend that their integration would
mean the destruction of their existing private systems. The most that can
happen would be a diminution of benefits in proportion to the reduction of
the contributions to their private systems. But while they may suffer such
reduction in benefits they also stand to benefit under the government
system. Respondents may continue with whatever private social system
they may have at present as a complement to the benefits afforded to them
under the government system without prejudice to their integration into
the government security system.
It may be conceded that, if the injunction be lifted, the possible damages
respondents may suffer are their contributions and those of their
employers to the government security system. But restoration of said
contributions had been assured by petitioner should the provision under
consideration be declared unconstitutional and invalid.
Respondents would be more harassed and prejudiced in case the
constitutionality of the law is upheld, since they will have to pay all the
back contributions from September, 1957, including interests, up to the
time the preliminary injunction is dissolved. Restoration would then be
much more difficult in view of the contingencies that may arise with regard
to the members of their private system. There are, to be sure, more weighty
reasons favoring the lifting of the injunction issued by respondent judge.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued by respondent judge is hereby lifted. No costs.
6. OLLENDORFF vs. ABRAHAMSON
G.R. No. 13228 (September 13, 1918)
William Ollendorff is engaged in the business of manufacturing ladies underwear for
export. Ira Abrahamson was hired by Ollendorff for 2 years. Abrahamson obligates
himself, his heirs, successors and assigns that he will not engage in a similar
competitive business to that of Ollendorff in any area in the Philippines for a period
of 5 years. He left Ollendorffs business and went to the US and when he returned to
the Manila, he was already a manager of the Phil. Underwear Company. Preliminary
injunction is properly issued.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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Any continuing breach of a valid negative covenant is irreparable by the ordinary
process of courts of law. By irreparable injury is not meant such injury as is
beyond the possibility of repair or compensation in damages, or great injury
or great damage, but that kind of injury, whether great or small, that ought not
to be inflicted, of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefore in a court of law.
Facts:
Plaintiff has been engaged in Philippines in the business of manufacturing
ladies embroidered underwear for export. Material is imported and needle
workers embroider decorative patterns. The embroidered material is
returned to the factory in Manila where is prepared for export.
On September 1915, Ollendorff and Abrahamson entered into a contract
wherein Ollendorff commits to employ Abrahamson for the first part of a
term of two years.
Abrahamsom obligates himself to the promotion and furtherance of the
business and interest of Ollendorff, and to perform such duties as may be
assigned to him.
o He also binds and obligates himself, his hiers, successors, and
assigns that he will not enter or engage in a similar or competitive
business to that of Ollendorff in any area in the Philippines for a
period of five years.
Abrahamson continued to work for Ollendorff, until he left the plaintiffs
employ and went to the United States on account of ill health, after one
year.
Some months after his departure for the united States, Abrahamson
returned to Manila as the manager of the Philippine Underwear Company, a
corporation.
The corporation does not maintain a factory in the Philippines, but sends
material and embroidery designs from New York to its local representative
in the Philippines who employs Filipino needle workers to embroider the
deigns and make up the garments in their homes.
o The only difference from Ollendorff is the method of doing the
finishing work the manufacture of the embroidered material into
finished garments.
Defendant admits that both firms turn out the same class of goods and that
they are exported in the same market.
Shortly after Abrahamsons return, Ollendorff commenced this action, the
principal purpose is to prevent by injunction, any further breach of
Abrahamsons contract of employment. The lower court granted a
preliminary injunction, and upon trial, the injunction was made perpetual.
Defendant Abrahamson argues that plaintiff failed to substantiate the
averments of his complaints that such is actually competitive to that of
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Ollendroff. Further, Defendant argues that even assuming the breach of
agreement, the judgment is erroneous because the contract is void, and
that plaintiff failed to show that he has suffered any estimable pecuniary
damage.
Issues/Held:
Whether the contract is void.- No
Whether the preliminary injunction is properly issued - Yes
SC:
The contract was not void.
It must be noted that the obligations created by contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and must be enforced in accordance
with their tenor. The only limitation is that such must not be contrary to
law, morals, or public order. In this case, there was no reason that would
show that the contract is prohibited.
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was properly issued.
It is contended that plaintiff has not proved that he has suffered any
estimable pecuniary damage by reason of defendant's breach of the
contract, and that for that reason his action must fail. It is further
contended that in no event is it proper to enforce such a contract as this by
injunction, because it has not been alleged and proved that the continuance
of the acts complained of will cause plaintiff "irreparable damage."
The admitted fact that the plaintiff has failed to establish proof of pecuniary
damage by reason of the breach of contract by the acts committed prior to
the issuance of the preliminary injunction is a bar for money judgment for
damages for the breach of contract, but it will not justify the Court in
permitting defendant to continue to break his contract over plaintiffs
objection. The injury is a continuous one.
The fact that the court may not be able to give damages for that part of the
breach of the contract which had already taken place when its aid was
invoked is no reason why it should countenance a continuance for such
disregard of plaintiffs rights.
Any continuing breach of a valid negative covenant is irreparable by the
ordinary process of courts of law. By irreparable injury is not meant
such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair or compensation in
damages, or great injury or great damage, but that kind of injury,
whether great or small, that ought not to be inflicted, of such constant
and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had
therefore in a court of law.
The injury done the business of a merchant by illegal or unfair competition
is exceedingly difficult to measure. A diminution of the volume of a
business may be due to so many different causes that it is often impossible
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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to demonstrate that it has in fact been caused by the illegal competition of
the defendant.
This is frequently the case in suit for the infringement of trademark rights,
in which the courts may enjoin the continued use of the infringing mark,
although unable to assess damages for the past injury.
WHEN DOES WPI END?
1. BUYCO vs. BARAQUIA
Petitioner: PURISIMO BUYCORspondent: NELSON BARAQUIA
G.R. No. 177486 December 21, 2009
Emergency: Baraquia filed in RTC Iloilo vs Purisimo and his brother (the two
substituted the both deceased Buycos couple) for establishment of a permanent
right of way on a private road closed, preventing access to the highway for his
poultry farm, with preliminary injunction. The court grants the injunction but
subsequently dismisses the case for absence of requisites for the establishment of an
easement. Pending appeal, Baraquia, through a motion, prays for Purisimo and his
bro to be held in contempt due to violating the preliminary injunction. Baraquia
claimed that the violation on march 1 2007 occurred before Purisimo received a
copy of the decision dismissing the case on March 13 2007 and that the case was not
yet final and executory. RTC held them in contempt but on MR set it aside claiming
that contempt cannot be granted on a mere motion. ADDITIONALLY, RTC claimed
that the lifetime of a preliminary injunction may continue even pending appeal. SC -
The present case having been heard and dismissed, the writ of preliminary
injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served,
the appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Unionbank v. CA - "x x x a dismissal,
discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary
injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or
temporary injunction," regardless of whether the period for filing an MR or appeal
therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal
is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction
terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action."
Facts:
1. Nelson Baraquia (respondent) filed before RTC Iloilo City a complaint
against Dominico Buyco and Clemente Buyco (Buycos), for the
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
establishment of a permanent right of way, injunction and damages with
preliminary injunction and TRO, to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a
private road within their property which he has been using to go to and
from the public highway to access his poultry farm.
2. The Buycos died during the pendency of the case, and were substituted by
Purisimo Buyco (petitioner) and his brother Gonzalo. (doesnt say how they
are related)
3. Iloilo RTC granted Baraquias application for preliminary injunction.
4. Feb 14, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to establish
the requisites for the establishment of an easement of right of way under
Articles 649 and 650 of CC. It accordingly lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction.
5. Baraquia appealed. Purisimo also appealed the non-award of damages.
6. Baraquia later filed with the trial court a motion to cite Purisimo and his
brother Gonzalo in contempt, for they closed off the subject road, thus
violating the writ of preliminary injunction on March 1 2007. The trial
court, by Resolution of March 13, 2007,4 noting that Purisimo received on
March 5, 2007 his copy of its decision (Baraquia received his copy on
February 21, 2007), and held that the February 14, 2007 decision had not
yet become final and executory, hence, the writ of preliminary injunction
remained to be valid, rendering petitioners act of closing the road an
indirect contempt of court.
7. MR trial court sets it aside by ruling that Purisimo and his brother cant be
held in contempt by mere motion and not a verified petition. On the
lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court held that it is
its "illumined opinion that the matter of whether a writ of preliminary
injunction remains valid until the decision annulling the same attains
finality is not firmly entrenched in jurisprudence, contrary to the
position of the defendants." It thereupon quoted a portion of the ruling in
the 2006 case of Lee v. CA:
a. the fact remains that the Decision of the CA annulling the grant of
preliminary injunction in favor of petitioners has not yet become
final on 14 December 2000. xxx The preliminary injunction,
therefore, issued by the trial court remains valid until the Decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling the same attains finality, and
violation thereof constitutes indirect contempt which, however,
requires either a formal charge or a verified petition.
(underscoring in the original decision)
Issue: w/n the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the
complaint is immediately executory, even if the dismissal of the complaint is
pending appeal. YES
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
21
1. A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.
2. The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed
of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere
incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.
3. It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that
there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is
committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that
will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy
before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
4. Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was
granted by the lower court upon Baraquias showing that he and his
poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject road. After
trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to
the easement of right of way prayed for, hence, the writ was lifted.1avvphi1
5. The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact
dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose
as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.
6. Unionbank v. Court of Appeals - "x x x a dismissal, discontinuance or non-
suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has
been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or
temporary injunction," regardless of whether the period for filing an MR or
appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases
where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the
merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule
applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action."
7. The lower courts citation of Lee v. CA is misplaced. In Lee, unlike in the
present case, the original complaint for specific performance and
cancellation of real estate mortgage was not yet decided on the merits by
the lower court. Thus, the preliminary injunction therein issued subsisted
pending appeal of an incident.
8. There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in
respondents favor, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on December
1, 1999 by the trial court was automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 26015.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated April 18, 2007 of the
trial court is REVERSED. The writ of preliminary injunction which Branch 39 of the
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Iloilo Regional Trial Court issued on December 1, 1999 was automatically dissolved
upon its dismissal by Decision of February 14, 2007 of Civil Case No. 26015.
2. TICZON vs. VIDEO POST MANILA
Petitioner: Paul Hendrik P. Ticzon, Michael Thomas S. Plana, and Omni Post
Respondent: Video Post Manila, Inc.
Date: June 15, 2000
Doctrine: A preliminary injunction in an action to enforce a contract, which
prohibits an employee from working in a competing enterprise within 2 years from
resignation, has the same lifetime as the prohibition 2 years. Therefore, upon
expiration of the said period, a suit questioning the validity of the issuance of the
writ becomes functus oficio and therefore moot.
Summary: Video Post hired Plana and Ticzon as video editor and computer graphic
artist. Both of them signed an employment contract which had a clause prohibiting
them from working in a business that was engaged in a similar business or might
compete with Video Post. The prohibition would last for 2 years from termination of
employment. In 1995, both resigned and in 1996, both were hired by Omni Post,
which prompted Video Post to file a Complaint for Damaging alleging breach of
contract with a Motion for Issuance of a TRO and Preliminary Injunction. RTC
granted. A contempt case for violation of the Injunction was filed alleging that they
continued to work for Omni Post. CA denied saying it was Moot and Academic. I: CA
erred? NO H: The question regarding the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was rendered moot by the expiration of the prohibition contained in
Clause 5 of the employment contracts. The period within which the Ticzon and
Plana were prohibited from engaging in or working for an enterprise that competed
with Video Post the very purpose of the preliminary injunction had expired.
Having outlived its purpose, it had already become functus oficio. This period began
in Nov. 1995 and ended Nov. 1997.
Facts:
1. Video Post Manila, Inc. purchased a computerized editing equipment
referred to as Henry. which was to be used for editing and post-
production. Michael Thomas Plana and Paul Hendrik Ticzon were hired by
Video Post as video editor and computer graphic artist. Both of them signed
an employment contract with a common clause (Clause 5) prohibiting
them, within 2 years from the termination of their employment, from
working in a business firm or corporation that was engaged in a similar
business or that might compete with Video Post.
2. In 1995, both resigned and in 1996, both applied for employment with
Omni Post, which hired them. So Video Post instituted a Complaint for
Damages alleging that Plana and Ticzon had committed a breach of their
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
22
contract. Video Post also filed a Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Plana and Ticzon from working with Omni
as video editors.
3. RTC granted: The employment contract involved is reasonable and,
therefore, valid. It appears that the effectivity of Clause 5 is limited in
duration in that it prohibits an employee only during his employment and
for only 2 years thereafter. Moreover, it does not prohibit an employee
from engaging in any kind of employment or business after his tenure.
4. A contempt case was also filed by Video Post against Ticzon and Plan for
violating the preliminary injunction. It alleged that they continued to work
for Omni despite the writ.
5. In denying the Petition before it, the CA declared that the questions raised
were rendered moot by the expiration of the period prohibiting petitioners
from seeking employment under Clause 5: There is no longer any rhyme of
reason for this court to decide on whether the respondent judge was in
error or not in granting the questioned writ, for even with it, the petitioners
are now released from any and all legal impediments which may have
barred their unfettered employment with whatsoever company they so
wish to become employed, and to exercise whatever skill, industry,
expertise or talent they may have acquired, from wherever they may have
acquired it.
Issue:
1. WoN the issue of the validity of the preliminary injunction is moot and
academic - YES
2. WoN the trial and the appellate courts prejudged the case - NO
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED
but we emphasize that the TC must conduct further trial on the merits in the main
case.
YES, MOOT
1. Petitioners contention is based on the notion that the CA had prejudged
the case before it was heard on the merits. However, it is clear from the
ruling of the CA that what was declared moot and academic was the issue of
whether the TC had erred in granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Hence, the CA held that there was no longer any reason to decide whether
the judge erred in issuing the Writ. It was that question, not the entire case,
that its Decision declared moot.
a. The question regarding the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was rendered moot by the expiration of the prohibition
contained in Clause 5 of the employment contracts.
2. The period within which the Ticzon and Plana were prohibited from
engaging in or working for an enterprise that competed with Video Post
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
the very purpose of the preliminary injunction had expired. Having
outlived its purpose, it had already become functus oficio. This period
began in Nov. 1995 and ended Nov. 1997. Even if we say that the injunction
was valid, it would be in vain, as Ticzon and Plana are now free to seek
employment wherever they want to.
3. Therefore, we hold that there is no actual case or controversy between the
parties insofar as the preliminary injunction is concerned.
4. Contempt: Such contempt case may proceed independently.
5. Damages: The main issue of damages being sought by Video Post should be
taken up during the trial on the merits when the allegation of the parties
may properly be addressed. A remand of this case is necessary.
NO PREJUDGMENT HERE (you dont need this)
1. We find no basis for petitioners claim that the CA prejudged the entire case
when it applied Del Castillo v. Richmond. As far as it was concerned, the case
was already moot. It referred to Del Castillo only to affirm the TCs
preliminary finding that Clause 5 was valid and could thus be the basis for
the issuance of the Writ.
2. In the same vein, we find no prejudgment on the part of the TC. What is
abundantly clear is the provisional nature of its finding on the validity of
Clause 5 which, it clarified, was for purposes of the resolution of the
application for preliminary injunction.
3. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN vs. VILLANUEVA
GR 128203
March 9, 2010
Petitioner: National Electrification Administration (NEA)
Respondent: Val L. Villanueva
Recit-ready
Villanueva was appointed as President of the Liga ng mga Barangay while serving as
a member of the Board of Directors of ANECO. NEA said that Villanueva is no longer
qualified to serve the Board. Thus, Villanueva filed a case for injunction to enjoin
NEA and ANECO from dismissing him. SC said that since NEAs guidelines provides
that once elected as President of the Liga, the electric cooperative official should be
deemed automatically resigned, then Villanueva can no longer claim his position. As
to the issue on injunction, the TRO issued by the RTC was challenged as it remained
effective for more than 20 days. The SC said that the TRO is valid for the first 20
days, but was subsequently invalidated after the 20th day.
Facts
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
23
Villanueva was an elected member of the Board of Directors of Agusan del Norte
Electric Cooperative (ANECO). While serving in the Board of ANECO, he was elected
as Barangay Chairman of Brgy 12, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. He was also
elected as President of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Cabadbaran, and as virtue of
that presidency, he sat as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Cabadbaran.
The General Manager of ANECO then sought the opinion of petitioner NEA, as to w/n
Villanueva is still qualified to sit in the ANECO Board, to which NEA answered no, he
may not. Villanueva then sought the opinion of DILG, which said that it has no
jurisdiction to give such opinion.
Villanueva then filed a review of the opinion of NEA, but NEA did not reconsider.
Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, against ANECO and NEA. The RTC issued a TRO, enjoining ANECO and
NEA from disqualifying Villanueva as a member of the ANECO Board, and granting
him of all the benefits of being a Board Member. Thereafter, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued.
Non-provrem-related issue/Held: W/N Villanueva can sit as a member of the
BoDNo, not anymore.
Provrem-related issue/Held: W/N a writ of TRO was validly issuedBoth yes and
no! Lol. See ratio for the reason
Ratio
First, Villanueva should have exhausted all administrative remedies
first [not really important for class]
o The order of NEA should have been appealed first to the Office of
the President, as it exercises the power of supervision over it
o Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal
the orders or acts of petitioner NEA, the failure of respondent to
undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to a judicial
suit.
o Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such
administrative remedies have first been exhausted.
If remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before recourse can
be made to courts.
The party with an administrative remedy must not only
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to
obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
to give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
o The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is
one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of
the complaint.
Villanueva can no longer be a member of the Board of Directors of
ANECO
o According to the Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric Cooperative
District Elections issued by NEA, those who hold elective offices in
the government, or appointed to an elective position above the
level of a Brgy Captain may not be a member of the Board of
Directors of an electric cooperative
o Also, in another Memo issued by NEA, all coop officials who have
taken oath as President of Liga ng mga Barangay shall be deemed
to have automatically resigned his post.
o Thus, in consonance with these, Villanueva can no longer serve in
the Board of Directors
On the issue of the validity of the TRO
o The TRO was issued by the RTC on December 2, 2003, but
remained in effect until January 5, 2004.
o Under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the RoC, a TRO has a limited life of
only 20 days from the date of issue.
If before the expiration of the 20-day period the
application for preliminary injunction is denied, the TRO
would be deemed automatically vacated.
If no action is taken by the judge on the application for
preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the TRO
would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer
force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being
necessary and the courts having no discretion to extend
the same.
o The rule against the non-extendibility of the 20-day limited period
of effectivity of a TRO is absolute if issued by an RTC
Hence, the RTC committed error when it ruled that
the TRO it issued on December 2, 2003 was effective
until January 5, 2004, a period way beyond 20 days.
This does not mean, however, that the entire TRO was invalidated.
o The same remained valid and in effect, but only within the 20-day
period, after which it automatically expired.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
24
4. YAP vs. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK
GR No 175145 | Mar 28, 2008 | Chico-Nazario
Petitioners: Spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap
Respondents: International Exchange Bank, Sheriff Renato Flora and/or Office of
the Clerk of Court, RTC Makati City
Summary: The properties of Go were subject of an auction sale due the failure to
pay his liability with iBank. Spouses Yap filed for annulment of the sale and prayed
for the issuance of a WPI against the respondents. An order was issued granting the
application of the WPI. This was case was elevated to the CA and the SC and both
courts ruled that the Judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or,
otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said order. Notwithstanding
this, iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the RTC Pasig City an Omnibus Motion (To
Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) praying that their
pending Motion for Reconsideration which seeks for the dismissal of the case be
resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved.
With this Omnibus Motion, the trial court issued the Order recalling and dissolving
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned on the filing of a P10M counter-bond.
I: May the trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite
the rulings of the CA and the SC that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion? YES. R:
The trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it
previously issued. The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its
dissolution. As long as the party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary
injunction can prove the presence of any of the grounds for its dissolution, same
may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court previously ruled that its issuance
was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 2 conditions must concur: first, the
court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction
would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a
counter-bond. The Order of the trial court is based on this ground. The well-known
rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to
the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action shall not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or, otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court
that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the
circumstances may warrant. We find no reason to disturb the same.
Facts:
International Exchange Bank (iBank) filed a collection suit with application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Alberto
Looyuko and Jimmy Go in the RTC Makati. The trial court rendered a
Decision in favor of iBank and found Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go
liable, ordering them to pay the amount of pesos P96M plus penalty.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Writs of Execution on the judgment against Looyuko and Go were
implemented. Sheriff Flora issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale where
properties allegedly owned by Go will be sold at public auction. Said public
auction did not push through.
Spouses Yap filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for TRO and/or
Preliminary Injunction with the RTC Pasig. They sought to stop the auction
sale alleging that the properties involved are already owned by them by
virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Go in their favor.
A second Notice of Sheriffs Sale was issued by Sheriff Flora scheduling a
public auction for the afore-mentioned properties. The public auction did
not happen anew. Thereafter, a third Notice of Sheriffs Sale was
issued.
RTC: Denied petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction. As
scheduled, the public auction took place for which the Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale in favor of iBank, subject to the third-party claims of
petitioners.
Spouses Yap filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant case for Annulment
of Sheriffs Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale with a prayer
for issuance of TRO and/or WPI against iBank, the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of RTC Makati City, and Sheriff Flora.
o An Order was issued by Judge Janolo granting the Spouses
application for issuance of a WPI. Thus defendants and their
representatives are enjoined from proceeding further with the
execution, including consolidating title and taking possession.
Upon posting a P3M bond, Judge Janolo issued the WPI.
An Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court certifying that the
resolution dismissing the case had become final and executory.
Subsequently, iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the RTC Pasig City an
Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve
Injunction) praying that their pending Motion for Reconsideration which
seeks for the dismissal of the case be resolved and/or the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved. With this Omnibus
Motion, the trial court issued the Order recalling and dissolving the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction conditioned on the filing of a P10M counter-bond.
The Spouses Yap argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered the dissolution of the WPI, the propriety of its issuance having
been affirmed by both CA and the SC. There Order of the dissolution of said
writ is a clear defiance of this Courts directive.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the trial court has the
authority and prerogative to set aside the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. They add that since petitioners Deed of Sale was not duly
notarized, the latters application for preliminary injunction is devoid of
factual and legal bases. They assert that, not being public documents, the
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
25
subject deeds of sale are nothing but spurious, if not falsified,
documents. They add that the continuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction would cause them irreparable damage because it continues to
incur damage not only for the nonpayment of the judgment award, but also
for opportunity losses resulting from the continued denial of its right to
consolidate title over the levied properties.
Issue/Held: May the trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it
issued despite the rulings of the CA and the SC that its issuance was not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion? YES.
Ratio:
At the outset, it must be said that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
by the trial court has not yet been actually dissolved because respondents
have not posted the required counter-bond in the amount of P10M. The
dissolution thereof is primed on the filing of the counter-bond.
The trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary injunction
it previously issued. The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different
from its dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Sec 3, Rule 58 while the
grounds for its dissolution are contained in Sec 6. As long as the party
seeking the dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the
presence of any of the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved
notwithstanding that this Court previously ruled that its issuance was not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Under Sec 6, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after
hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or
restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, would cause
irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can
be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former
files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of
the injunction or restraining order.
2 conditions must concur: first, the court in the exercise of its discretion,
finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage
to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter-bond.
The Order of the trial court is based on this ground.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court,
and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated
that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or, otherwise,
in grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court that issued such
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances
may warrant. We find no reason to disturb the same.
Upon the posting by respondents of the counter-bond required, the trial
court is directed to issue the Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction.
5. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs. NASIPIT INTEGRATED
G.R. No. 174136, December 23, 2008
Petitioners: PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, represented by OSCAR SEVILLA,
General Manager, BENJAMIN CECILIO, Assistant General Manager and SISALI ARAP,
Port Manager
Respondents: NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES,
INC., represented
Summary: The PPA, through its Pre-Qualification, Bids, and Awards Committee
(PBAC) accepted bids for a ten-year contract for cargo handling services at the Port
of Nasipit. NIASSI was declared as the winning bidder. However, the contract was
never executed. NIASSI filed a petition for injunction with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against PPA. It later
amended its petition to mandamus with prayer for the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The RTC granted the
petition then surprisingly dissolved the injunction. The CA decided in favor of
NIASSI and stated that RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dissolved the writ
of preliminary injunction. The SC agreed with the CA because as observed, the RTC
failed to observe the procedural requirements when it dissolved the preliminary
mandatory injunction without the benefit of a hearing, because it is an indispensable
requirement. The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he dissolved
the subject Writ without conducting a hearing to assess the prevailing
circumstances and without requiring the respondents to file a counter-bond as
required in Section 6 of Rule 58 of the ROC.
NO man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission
when we require him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked
as a favor. Walang taong nasa ibabaw o nasa ilalim ng batas; hindi hinihiling ang
pahintulot ninuman upang sundin ito. Ang pagsunod sa batas ay hinihingi bilang
isang karapatan, hindi isang pakiusap.
Facts
NIASSI is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws with office address at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. It
has been operating in the stevedoring business for at least 15 years.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
26
PPA is a government agency charged with the management and control of
all Philippine ports. It is primarily tasked to carry out an integrated
program for the planning, development, financing, and operation of ports
throughout the country.
The PPA, through its Pre-Qualification, Bids, and Awards Committee
(PBAC) accepted bids for a ten-year contract for cargo handling services at
the Port of Nasipit. NIASSI was declared as the winning bidder. A Notice of
Award of the cargo handling contract was sent by fax to NIASSI.
o It expressly stated that: (1) A ten-year cargo handling contract is
awarded to NIASSI in accordance with the terms and proposals
contained in its bid; (2) NIASSI must enter into and execute the
formal contract with PPA after its compliance to the documentary
requirements.
The contract was never executed. Instead, PPA issued several hold-over
permits to enable NIASSI to legally operate its cargo handling services at
the Nasipit port. The last of the hold-over permits was issued on October
13, 2004, which was set to expire on April 13, 2004, or six months after its
issuance.
o Yet, barely two months after, PPA revoked the hold-over authority
entrusted to NIASSI. Through a letter, PPA informed the
stevedoring company that it would take over the management and
operations of the cargo handling services at the port of Nasipit
starting December 10, 2006.
The PPA, through its Port Services-Special Take-over Unit, directly
undertook operations at the Nasipit Port. However, this composite group
continued to utilize NIASSIs manpower and equipment.
At the onset of the PPA takeover, NIASSI filed a petition for injunction with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
against PPA. It later amended its petition to mandamus with prayer for the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining
order.
o The amended petition sought to compel PPA to execute or cause
the final execution of the cargo handling contract with NIASSI. It
likewise prayed for the return of the management and operations
of the cargo handling services at the Nasipit port to NIASSI.
RTC Dispositions
The RTC issued a resolution granting the petition. It recognized the need to
protect NIASSIs right to continued cargo handling operations.
o The RTC held that the continued takeover of PPA would work
injustice and cause irreparable damage to NIASSI. To serve the
better ends of justice, the court declared that the state of affairs be
maintained prior to the takeover until the main action is resolved.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
However, surprisingly, on April 11, 2005, the RTC issued the assailed
resolution which, inter alia, dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it
earlier granted NIASSI.
o In dissolving the writ, the trial court held that the State has the
power to revoke the temporary permits issued to arrastre and
stevedoring operators whenever there is a need to promote the
public interest and the welfare of the stevedoring industry.
Whatever right a private operator may have acquired on the basis
of the temporary permit issued to it shall yield to the States valid
exercise of police power.
CA Dispositions
NIASSI filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.It alleged that the RTC gravely abused its discretion
when it dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued and
did so without the benefit of a hearing. It also pointed out that the second
resolution contained orders that were immediately executory which was
contrary to law and prejudicial to its interests.
The CA decided in favor of NIASSI by granting the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction.
Issue: Whether or not IN ORDERING THE RESTORATION OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT, THE CA
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION. NO
Ratio:
PPA avers that the failure of NIASSI to file the necessary motion for
reconsideration before it could resort to the remedy of certiorari is
fatal. This contention is flawed.
o This Court held that there are notable exceptions to the general
rule that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before
resort to certiorari can be availed of. This rule has been applied in
a plethora of cases. A motion for reconsideration is no longer
necessary when other special circumstances warrant immediate
and more direct action.
The RTC issued the questioned resolution containing orders that were self-
executory and harshly prejudicial to NIASSIs interests. NIASSI stands to
lose valuable revenue and investment upon execution of the orders
preventing it from engaging in stevedoring operations at the Nasipit
port. This is true most especially after it has already received a notice of
award and has started complying with the additional documentation
requirements given by PPA.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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Although a MR has often been considered a condition precedent for
granting the writ of certiorari, this rule finds exception in this case where
execution has been ordered and the need for relief is urgent. Otherwise, MR
of the contested order would have served no purpose.
In Gonzales, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court said:
o As a general rule, certiorari will not lie, unless an inferior court
has, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to him. This, however, admits exceptions, namely:
(1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public
interest is involved; and (3) in case of urgency.
Too, the RTC failed to observe the procedural requirements when it
dissolved the preliminary mandatory injunction without the benefit
of a hearing.
o xxx It may further be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it
appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the
injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance
thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to
the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former
files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he
will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial
or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it
appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction or
restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified. (Sec 6,
Rule 58, ROC)
The provision is clear. A hearing is indispensable before an injunction
or restraining order may be dissolved. It is during the hearing that a
determination may be made whether or not the continuance of an
injunction would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined.
The CA took note of the procedural lapses committed by respondent judge
when he granted the respondents MR.
o The respondent judge did not require the filing of respondents
affidavit nor allow petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit
opposing the dissolution of the writ in question.
o Likewise, no hearing was conducted to enable the respondent
judge to determine whether the continuance of the writ of
injunction may cause irreparable damage to the respondent. And
while it may conceded that the court a quo set the hearing on
respondents motion for reconsideration on 01 April 2005, the
same was reset to 06 April 2005 for the purpose of receiving
evidence on the new allegations that respondent failed to present
at the hearing on the application for injunction. We have gone
over the minutes of the proceedings held before the court a quo
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
but there is nothing in the records to show that a hearing was ever
conducted on 06 April 2005 or at anytime thereafter to determine
the grounds for nullification of the order granting the writ
application and the propriety of dissolving the writ previously
issued by the court a quo. Such fatal omission notwithstanding,
the respondent judge gratuitously issued the resolution granting
the motion for reconsideration that resulted in the dissolution of
the mandatory injunction.
The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
dissolved the subject Writ without conducting a hearing to assess the
prevailing circumstances and without requiring the respondents to
file a counter-bond as required in Section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The records are bereft of any order which required PPA to submit an
affidavit in support of the injunction relief it sought. Neither was NIASSI
given any chance to oppose the petition through a counter-affidavit. More
importantly, no hearing was conducted to determine whether the writ of
injunction earlier issued, indeed, caused irreparable damage to PPA.
The deprivation of NIASSIs right to due process taints the proceedings
against it. The courts order which was immediately executory render the
matter as one of extreme urgency. The situation easily falls under one of
the recognized exceptions to the rule that a motion for reconsideration
should first be availed of before filing a petition for certiorari.
Be that as it may, when the rules of procedure are rigid and strict in
application, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, the Court is empowered to suspend them.
It would be in the interest of justice to reinstate the preliminary mandatory
injunction the RTC has earlier issued in favor of NIASSI. The stevedoring
company has proven that it stands to suffer irreparable injury with PPAs
continued use of its facilities and takeover of the port. Even though PPA is
a governmental arm, it does not stand above the law in the guise of
protecting the public interest.
It should also be noted that an arrastre contract is not an ordinary
agreement involving merely parties therein, as it affects the public in
general. In all contracts, the law must protect all parties in securing fair
play and equity to prevail.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RECOVERY ON INJUNCTION BOND
1. LIMITLESS POTENTIALS, INC. vs. CA
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
28
GR No. 164459 | April 24, 2007
Petitioners: Limitless Potentials, Inc.
Respondents: CA, Crisostomo Yalung, and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor
Summary: The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with application of a writ
of preliminary injunction, to restrain MeTC from hearing the third party complaint
of Limitless due to a contractual dispute. The writ was issued against the MeTC of
Makati,. However, the writ was subsequently dissolved. Feeling aggrieved, Limitless
filed a motion for judgment against the bond (note that before the writ is issued, the
applicant must post a bond), to satisfy the damages it incurred because of the
issuance of the writ. It alleged that attorneys fees, costs of litigation, and damages,
are covered by the bond. It also alleged that malice and bad faith is not a necessary
element of the bond. On this part, the court agreed with Limitless. All the
aforementioned fees are covered by the bond, bond as long as it can be shown that
said expenses were sustained by the party seeking recovery by reason of the writ.
Malice and bad faith on the part of the applicant (respondents in this case) are not
needed to be proved for Limitless to recover from the bond. However, the court still
denied recovery in this case because Limitless was not able to show that it actually
sustained damages by reason of the writ.
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Facts
Digital Networks (Digital) and Limitless Potentials entered into a Billboard
Advertisement Contract. Limitless was to construct one billboard ad for
Digitals products for one year.
o Terms: 60k per month rental fee, total of three months advanced
deposit upon signing and upon completion.
However, the billboard was destroyed by unknown persons. Hence, the
contract was considered terminated.
Digital sought for the recovery if its two months advanced deposit (120k).
Limitless does not want to return the money, alleging that the loss was due
to a force majeure and that any cause of action must be directed to the
persons responsible.
Because of this, Digital commenced a suit before MeTC of Makati 3 praying
for a return of the deposit. It was docketed as CivCase No. 55170.
Consistent with its defense, Limitless commenced a Third-Party Complaint
against Macgraphics Carranz International Co. and herein private
respondents Bishop Yalung and Villasor.
o It alleged that it entered into a contract of lease with Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) represented by Yalung and
Villasor.
3 Presided by Judge Estela Perlas-Bernabe
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
o The subject of such contract is over a space in Guadalupe Viejo,
Makati City, over which the said billboard was erected.
o Petitioner averred that private respondents maliciously
dismantled and destroyed the subject billboard and prevented its
men from reconstructing it.
o Thereafter, petitioner learned that Macgraphics had "cajoled and
induced" RCAM, through the private respondents, to destroy the
subject billboard to enable Macgraphics to erect its own billboard
and advertising signs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, but was denied.
They then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
RTC of Makati assailing the dismissal of the MtD.
RTC Makati granted the writ, upon posting of P10k bond. Hence, MeTC was
enjoined from hearing the Third Party Complaint (filed by Limitless) in
CivCase 55170.
However, the RTC dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was also DISSOLVED.
Because the writ was dissolved, Limitless then filed a Motion for Judgment
against the Bond and in compliance with the directive of the RTC, the
petitioner filed a pleading specifying its claims: (a) attorneys fees in the
sum of P74, 375.00; and (b) moral damages for the tarnished good will in
the sum of P1,000,000.00.
RTC DENIED. Writ was not wrongfully obtained.
CA again ruled against Limitless, hence this petition.
Issue/Held:
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not Limitless may claim against the Injunction Bond NO
Breakdown of this main issue:
o WON petitioner may recover damages from the bond YES,
BUT
o WON petitioner was able to substantiate the damages NO!!
Note: Sub-issues that sir might ask during recit (This will be answered as we go
through the ratio)
Is malice or bad faith a condition sine qua non for liability to attach on the
injunction bond? NO
Are attorneys fees, litigation costs, and cost of delay by reason of the
injunction covered by the injunction bond? YES
Ratio
Petitioners Contentions
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
29
Malice or lack of good faith is NOT an element of recovery on the bond.
The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in
good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully
obtained and a right of action on the injunction immediately accrues.
Respondents Contentions
Petitioner is not entitled to collect damages on the injunction bond, because
the preliminary injunction was directed not against the petitioner, but
against the MeTC. Petitioner was not restrained from doing any act. What
was restrained was the hearing of the Third Party Complaint, in order to
preserve the status quo and not to render the issue therein moot and
academic.
The fact that the decision is favorable to the party against whom the
injunction was issued does not automatically entitle the latter to recover
damages on the bond.
They also argued that it was petitioner who was benefited by such writ of
preliminary injunction, because the injunction left Digital unable to
prosecute Civil Case No. 55170 against herein petitioner.
SCs Ruling
GENERAL BACKGROUND ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to
in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the
pendency of an action.
It is an order granted at any stage of an action, prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to perform or to
refrain from performing a particular act or acts.
A preliminary injunction is merely temporary, subject to the final
disposition of the principal action.
It is issued to preserve the status quo ante, which is the last actual,
peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy, in
order to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. It
should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely
maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.
o The status quo should be existing ante litem motam, or at the time
of the filing of the case.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to
establish the following requisites:
o a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected
o a violation of that right
o that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
THE BOND
It is to be noted that the posting of a bond is a condition sine qua non for
the writ to be issued.
o It is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided
that the injunction ought not to have been granted. Its principal
purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned
accordingly.
o The damages sustained may be recovered from the injunction
bond.
o The following provision is relevant with regard to the recovery of
such bond:
SEC. 20, Rule 57, 1997 CivPro. Claim for damages on
account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment. -
An application for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the
trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party
and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing
his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such
damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and
shall be included in the judgment on the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the
party against whom the attachment was issued, he must
claim damages sustained during the pendency of the
appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with
notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was
issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the
appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court
may allow the application to be heard and decided by the
trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against
whom the attachment was issued from recovering in the
same action the damages awarded to him from any
property of the attaching party not exempt from execution
should the bond or deposit given by the latter be
insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.
MALICE OR BAD FAITH NOT NECESSARY FOR RECOVERY
There is nothing from the aforequoted provision of law which requires an
enjoined party, who suffered damages by reason of the issuance of a writ of
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
30
injunction, to prove malice or lack of good faith in the issuance thereof
before he can recover damages against the injunction bond.
o Aquino vs. Socorro - To require malice as a prerequisite would
make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The dissolution of the
injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith,
amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully
obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately
accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction
bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of petitioners main
cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of
recovery upon the bond.
COVERAGE OF THE INJUNCTION BOND
The rules clearly provide that the injunction bond is answerable for all
damages.
The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may
sustain no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be
dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account
to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or costs and
reasonable counsels fees, incurred or sustained by the latter in case it is
determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued.
Likewise, the posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary injunction
does not operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any and
all responsibility for damages that the writ may thereby cause. It merely
gives additional protection to the party against whom the injunction is
directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse against either the applicant
or his surety or against both.
Hence, the contention of the petitioner in this issue is TENABLE. Attorneys
fees, litigation costs, and costs of delay can be recovered from the
injunction bond as long as it can be shown that said expenses were
sustained by the party seeking recovery by reason of the writ of
preliminary injunction, which was later on determined as not to have been
validly issued and that the party who applied for the said writ was not
entitled thereto.
PROPER PARTY TO CLAIM: METC or LIMITLESS? LIMITLESS!
It is also erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not
entitled to claim damages from the injunction bond simply because the
preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and not against the
petitioner.
The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages from the injunction because it
has no interest or stake in the Petition pending before it.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Damage or loss is suffered by the party whose right to pursue its case is
suspended or delayed, which in this case, is the petitioner. It is the
petitioner who has the right to recover.
LIMITLESS MAY HAVE STANDING TO CLAIM DAMAGES, BUT FAILED TO
SUBSTANTIATE
SC agreed in the findings of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
findings of the RTC, that the petitioner did not sustain any damage by
reason of the issuance of the writ of injunction.
In the case at bar, petitioner is claiming attorneys fees in the sum of
P74,375.00 it allegedly paid to defend itself in the main case for certiorari,
which it would not have spent had the private respondents not filed their
nuisance Petition and secured a writ of preliminary injunction. Likewise, by
reason of the unfounded suit, the good will of the petitioner was brought to
bad light, hence, damaged.
The damages being claimed by the petitioner were not by reason of the
injunction but the litigation expenses it incurred in defending itself in the
main case for certiorari, which is definitely not within the coverage of the
injunction bond.
o Thus, this Court is not convinced that the attorneys fees in the
amount of P74,375.00 as well as the moral damages for the
tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00 were suffered by
the petitioner because of the issuance of the writ of injunction.
2. BATACLAN vs. CA G.R. No. 78148 July 31, 1989
APOLINARIO BATACLAN, ELEAZAR BATACLAN, NAPOLEON BATACLAN,
HERMINIA BATACLAN, MARTIN BIN, LORENZO LAGWAN, ROGELIO LAGWAN,
JOSILYN A. CORPOZ, ELIZABETH AGARIN, ESTRELLA AGARIN, EDITHA AGARIN,
and JIMMY CLARO vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TEODORO KAPANGYARIHAN, BONIFACIO SARAGOZA,
REYNALDO VELLETA, FRANCISCO ANAHAW, NESTOR N. COTONER, BASILLO
ASTELLO, ABDON CAPILI, ERNESTO ACOSTA, FLORENTINO MEDINA and
FRANCISCO SAYAMAN
Summary:
Pedro Caragao and his wife filed a case against the Bataclans in the RTC Tagaytay for
the reconveyance or cancellation of title over the parcel of land. A judgment by
default was rendered by the trial court and a writ of execution pending appeal was
issued. Caragao spouses were placed in possession of the land. Petitioners filed in
the CA a petition for certiorari with injunction to annul the aforesaid judgment by
default and the writ of execution issued pending appeal which was subsequently
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
31
granted. Caragaos then filed a petition for review on certiorari but said petition was
subsequently denied in a resolution by the SC. Disregarding the restraining order,
Pedro Caragao sold to Raymundo Lucido the sugarcane planted by petitioners.
Apolinario Bataclan filed several criminal complaints against Castor Caragao et al.
and some were charged with robbery, grave coercion and grave threats. Trial court
issued a writ of execution to restore possession of the land. Cagarao filed a certiorari
case with CA assailing the said writ of execution denied. Thus, another writ of
execution was issued to enforce the decision of CA, by reason of which possession of
the land eventually reverted to petitioners. The trial court, therefore, gravely abused
its discretion in ordering the ejectment of respondents. A writ of preliminary
injunction is primarily intended to maintain the status quo between the parties
existing prior to the filing of the case. The status quo for respondents as tenants,
either as tillers, cultivators, or occupants, should consequently be maintained until
the issue on their status as such shall have been determined after trial.
Facts:
Petitioners are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land in Cavite.
Private respondents are the occupants and cultivators of said land.
Pedro Caragao and his wife filed a case against the Bataclans in the RTC
Tagaytay for the reconveyance or cancellation of title over the parcel of
land.
A judgment by default was rendered by the trial court and a writ of
execution pending appeal was issued.
By virtue of said writ, the Caragao spouses were placed in possession of the
land. At that time, the land was planted to sugarcane crops which were
already nine months old.
Petitioners filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with injunction to annul
the aforesaid judgment by default and the writ of execution issued pending
appeal.
Take note: It has also been alleged that three of the respondents, namely,
Teodoro Kapangyarihan, Bonifacio Saragoza and Abdon Capili, entered
upon the land as tenants of Caragao.
CA issued a restraining order and declared null and void the judgment by
default rendered and the writ of execution issued pending appeal.
Caragaos then filed a petition for review on certiorari but said petition was
subsequently denied in a resolution by the SC.
Pedro Caragao (in disregard of the restraining order issued by the CA) sold
to a certain Raymundo Lucido the sugarcane planted by petitioners and, by
virtue of said sale, respondents cut and took away the sugarcane without
the knowledge and consent of petitioners.
Apolinario Bataclan filed several criminal complaints against Castor
Caragao and seven other persons for theft of sugarcane.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
The Dasmarias Integrated Police also charged Castor Caragao and several
other persons, including some of the private respondents with robbery,
grave coercion and grave threats.
Trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued a writ of execution to restore
possession of the land to them.
Cagarao filed a certiorari case with CA assailing the said writ of execution.
Upon the denial of said petition, another writ of execution was issued to
enforce the decision of CA, by reason of which possession of the land
eventually reverted to petitioners.
Respondents filed a complaint for damages with injunction against
petitioners before RTC.
o Petitioners are the tenants, tillers, cultivators and occupants of a
parcel of land
o Respondents helping one another, without authority and with use
of armed men believed to be members of the INP, Dasmarias,
Cavite, destroyed, uprooted, cut into pieces, plowed petitioners'
plantations.
o Respondents have no right and authority to destroy the
plantations as CA sustained the execution order issued by RTC.
Petitioners claimed that they went to the premises to clean the place after
the sheriff of the trial court restored to them the possession and denied
that respondents are the tenants and they being mere workers of Pedro
Caragao.
Trial court issued a restraining order after which the case was heard on the
prayer for preliminary injunction. Court a quo issued an order denying the
prayer for preliminary injunction.
On a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against said order,
CA rendered its challenged decision on the propriety of a writ of
preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo until the status of private
respondents as alleged tenants shall have been determined in a hearing on
the merits of the case.
Issue/Held:
Whether or not the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is proper under the
factual situation obtaining in this case. - YES
SC:
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may
only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or
interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal
action.
In the issuance thereof, the courts are given sufficient discretion to
determine the necessity for the grant of the relief prayed for as it affects the
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
32
respective rights of the parties, with the caveat that extreme caution be
observed in the exercise of such discretion.
o Court should not just summarily issue an order of denial without
an adequate hearing and judicious evaluation of the merits of the
application.
o A perfunctory and improvident action would be a denial of
procedural due process and could result in irreparable prejudice
to a party.
In the case at bar, it is patent that petitioners did not intend to forthwith
oust respondents from the contested lot.
o In their answer, petitioners merely sought to dismiss the
complaint and, by way of counterclaim, to recover damages.
The trial court, therefore, gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
ejectment of respondents.
o In effect, it disposed of the main case without the requisite hearing
on the evidence to be presented. The denial order is adjudication
on the merits of the case, in gross violation of the constitutional
mandate that a party shall have the right to be heard and to
present evidence.
o A writ of preliminary injunction is primarily intended to maintain
the status quo between the parties existing prior to the filing of
the case.
o The status quo for private respondents as tenants, either as tillers,
cultivators, or occupants, should consequently be maintained until
the issue on their status as such shall have been determined after
trial.
The trial court in denying the prayer for injunction held that respondents
have no right to the possession of the subject lot primarily on the basis of
the resolution decided by the SC, which it opined was the proper forum to
define the tenancy rights of private respondents. unmeritorious
o A mere perusal of the SC resolution shows that what was
determined was mainly the propriety of the acts and the
jurisdiction of the provincial fiscal in the prosecution of
respondents for robbery, theft, grave coercion and grave threat,
sans a determinative holding on respondents' rights as tenants.
The contention of petitioners that the writ of possession issued against
Pedro Caragao covers respondents is untenable.
o Petitioners openly recognized whatever rights were vested in the
respondents when the former acknowledged in their motion for
reconsideration that the writ of execution sought by them would
not in any way affect the latter's right to stay in the premises.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
The source of respondents' present possessory rights is no longer
Caragao's claim to the property but petitioners' express consent to such
continued occupation of the land until the former's rights shall have been
threshed out and adjudicated in the proper forum.
3. VALLEY TRADING Co. vs. CFI
G.R. No. L-49529 March 31, 1989
Petitioner: VALLEY TRADING CO., INC.
Respondent: CFI OF ISABELA, BRANCH II; DR. CARLOS UY (in his capacity as Mayor
of Cauayan, Isabela); MOISES BALMACEDA (in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer
of Cauayan, Isabela); and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN of Cauayan, Isabela
Emergency: Valley Trading seek to annul a section of the Cauayan Isabela Revenue
Code claiming that it imposes a percentage tax on sales which is prohibited under
the Local Tax Code. The City claims that it is a annual fixed business tax whuch was
upheld by the Sec. of Finance. Along with the complaint was a prayer for preliminary
injunction. CFI Isabela denied the prayer for the writ stating that collection of taxes
cant be enjoined. Valley Trading argue that a hearing is mandatory before an action
be taken on the issuance of the writ. SC On this particular case, no hearing is
needed. SC provided if the ground is the insufficiency of the complaint, the same is
apparent from the complaint itself and preliminary injunction may be refused
outright, with or without notice to the adverse party. In fact, under said section, the
court may also refuse an injunction on other grounds on the basis of affidavits. It
would be different, of course, it there is a prima facie showing on the face of the
motion and/or pleadings that the grant of preliminary injunction may be proper, in
which case notice to the opposing party would be necessary since the grant of such
writ on an ex parte proceeding is now proscribed. It does not follow, however, that
such a hearing is indispensable where right at the outset the court is reasonably
convinced that the writ will not lie. What was then discouraged, and is now
specifically prohibited, is the issuance of the writ without notice and hearing. For
this particular case, the SC took into consideration the ruling of the Sec of finance,
the fact that the injury is not irreparable since Valley can just seek a refund, and
that taxes are the lifeblood of the govt. FYI, I just used Respondent since the SC
referred to them as a city and not individually.
Facts:
1. The records show that petitioner Valley Trading Co., Inc. filed a complaint
in the court a quo seeking a declaration of the supposed nullity of Section
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
33
2B.02, Sub-par 1, Letter (A), Par 2 of Ordinance No. T-1, Revenue Code of
Cauayan, Isabela, which imposed a graduated tax on retailers, independent
wholesalers and distributors; and for the refund of P23,202.12, plus
interest of 14 % per annum thereon, which Valley Trading had paid
pursuant to said ordinance. Valley Trading likewise prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the collection of
said tax. Defendants in said case were Dr. Carlos A. Uy and Moises
Balmaceda, who were sued in their capacity as Mayor and Municipal
Treasurer of Cauayan, Isabela, respectively, together with the Sangguniang
Bayan of the same town.
2. Valley Trading takes the position that said ordinance imposes a "graduated
fixed tax based on Sales" that "in effect imposes a sales tax in contravention
of the Local Tax Code which prohibits a municipality from imposing a
percentage tax on sales.
3. Respondents, on the other hand, claim in their answer that the tax is an
annual fixed business tax, not a percentage tax on sales, They cited the
ruling of the Acting Secretary of Finance, upholding the validity of said tax
on the ground that the same is an annual graduated fixed tax imposed on
the privilege to engage in business.
4. October 13, 1978, CFI Isabela issued an order terminating the pre-trial and
reset the hearing on the merits for failure of the parties to arrive at an
amicable settlement. In the same order, the trial court also denied the
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that "the
collection of taxes cannot be enjoined".
5. Valley Trading moved for reconsideration, contending that a hearing is
mandatory before action may be taken on the motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, but the court below denied said motion.
6. Valley trading supports its contention by invoking Sec. 7, Rule 58 which
provides that "(a)fter hearing on the merits the court may grant or refuse,
continue, modify or dissolve the injunction as justice may require." Valley
trading maintains that Section 6 of Rule 58 relied upon by respondents
refers to the objections that might be interposed to the issuance of the writ
or the justification for the dissolution of an injunction previously issued ex
parte, but that nowhere is it mentioned that a hearing is not necessary.
Issue: w/n a hearing on the merits is necessary before a motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction may be denied. NOT ALL THE TIME/SOMETIMES
1. While it correctly pointed out that Section 6 of Rule 58 provides for the
grounds for objection to an injunction, Valley Trading ignores the
circumstances under which these objections may be appreciated by the
trial court. Thus, if the ground is the insufficiency of the complaint, the
same is apparent from the complaint itself and preliminary injunction may
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
be refused outright, with or without notice to the adverse party. In fact,
under said section, the court may also refuse an injunction on other
grounds on the basis of affidavits. In the foregoing instances, a hearing is
not necessary.
2. The reliance on Section 7 of Rule 58 is misplaced. This section merely
specifies the actions that the court may take on the application for the writ
if there is a hearing on the merits; it does not declare that such hearing is
mandatory or a prerequisite therefor. Otherwise, we may have a situation
where courts will be forced to conduct a hearing even if from a
consideration of the pleadings alone it can readily be ascertained that the
movant is not entitled to the writ. In fine, it will be unnecessary waste of
judicial time.
3. It would be different, of course, it there is a prima facie showing on the face
of the motion and/or pleadings that the grant of preliminary injunction
may be proper, in which case notice to the opposing party would be
necessary since the grant of such writ on an ex parte proceeding is now
proscribed. A hearing should be conducted since, under such
circumstances, only in case of extreme urgency will the writ issue prior to a
final hearing. Such requirement for prior notice and hearing underscores
the necessity that a writ of preliminary injunction is to be dispensed with
circumspection both sides should be heard whenever possible. It does not
follow, however, that such a hearing is indispensable where right at the
outset the court is reasonably convinced that the writ will not lie. What was
then discouraged, and is now specifically prohibited, is the issuance of the
writ without notice and hearing.
4. Unlike the NIRC, the Local Tax Code does not contain any specific provision
prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. Such
statutory lapse or intent may have allowed preliminary injunction where
local taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and
requirements under Rule 58.
5. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the present case, as in
any other case, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the movant
which should be protected.
6. The circumstances required for the writ to issue do not obtain in the case at
bar. The damage that may be caused to the petitioner will not, of course, be
irreparable; whatever it shall have paid is easily refundable. Besides, the
damage to its property rights must perforce take a back seat to the
paramount need of the State for funds to sustain governmental functions.
The policy of the law is to discountenance any delay in the collection of
taxes because of the oft-repeated but unassailable consideration that taxes
are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need.
7. Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
34
preliminary injunction which, in effect, would dispose of the main case
without trial. In the present case, it is evident that the only ground relied
upon for injunction relief is the alleged patent nullity of the ordinance. If
the court should issue the desired writ, premised on that sole justification
therefor of Valley Trading, it would be a virtual acceptance of his claim that
the imposition is patently invalid or, at the very least, that the ordinance is
of doubtful validity. There would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main
case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof.
8. Furthermore, such action will run counter to the well settled rule that laws
are presumed to be valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in
clear and unequivocal terms. A court should issue a writ of preliminary
injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case
of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of validity, aside from a showing of a clear
legal right to the remedy sought. The case before Us, however, presents no
features sufficient to overcome such presumption. This must have been
evident to the trial court from the answer of the respondents and the well
reasoned ruling of the Acting Secretary of Finance.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING this petition and
SUSTAINING the validity of the questioned orders of the trial court.
CASES WHERE WPI IMPROPER
1. ROLDAN vs. ARCA
Petitioner: Hon. Arsenio Roldan, Jr., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner,
Philippine Fisheries Commission, and The Philippine Navy
Respondent: Hon. Francisco Arca, as Presiding Judge of the CFI of Manila (Branch
1) and Morabe, De Guzman & Company
Date: July 25, 1975
Summary: MDC filed a civil case with preliminary injunction against Fisheries
Commissioner Roldan for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI, which had been
seized and impounded by Roldan through the Philippine Navy dismissed but
vessel remained with Roldan because of the injunction. Roldan then requested the
Philippine Navy to apprehend Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, which were both owned
by MDC, for dynamite fishing. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed the
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan against MDC. CFI of Palawan ordered Philippine Navy to
take the boats in custody. Thereafter, MDC filed a complaint with injunction against
Roldan, from which Judge Arca granted injunction upon filing of MDC of a bond for
the release of the 2 boats. I: Judge Arca erred? YES H: When Judge Arca issued the
challenged Order and the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, the fishing
vessels were already under the jurisdiction of the CFI of Palawan upon motion of the
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Provincial Fiscal directing the Philippine Navy to detain said vessels. The
jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan CFI cannot be interfered with
by another CFI. The Orders of the Palawan CFI expressly direct the Philippine Navy
to hold in custody the 2 vessels and that same should not be released without Order are hereby SET ASIDE as NULL AND VOID, with costs against private
prior order or authority from this Court.
Facts:
1. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing his order and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
2. Morabe, De Guzman & Company (MDC) filed with the CFI of Manila a civil
case against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio Roldan (Roldan) for the
recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and
impounded by Roldan through the Philippine Navy.
a. MDC prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction denied
b. CFI set aside its order and granted writ of preliminary injunction
MDC took possession of the vessel.
c. CFI dismissed the civil case for failure of MDC to prosecute as well
as for failure of Roldan and the Philippine Navy to appear on the
scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, however, remained in the
possession of MDC.
3. Thereafter, Roldan requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels
Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III for alleged violations of some provisions of
the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
a. The 2 fishing boats were seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found
aboard
4. Roldan then requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal
charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels. The Fiscal filed an
ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore
evidence of the crime and cabled Roldan to detain the vessels. CFI of
Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody.
5. MDC filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction with the CFI of Manila against petitioners and alleged that at the
time of the seizure of the fishing boats, the same were engaged in legitimate
fishing operation; and that by virtue of the offer of compromise from MDC
to the Secreaty of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous
violation of the Fishery Law, if any, by the crew members of the vessels
were settled.
6. Judge Arca issued the challenged order granting the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon
the filing by MDC of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the 2 vessels.
ISSUE: WoN Judge committed GADALEJ in issuing the assailed Order YES
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
35
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of Respondent
Judge, the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued thereunder and the
respondent
1. When Judge Arca issued the challenged Order and the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, the fishing vessels were already under the
jurisdiction of the CFI of Palawan upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal
directing the Philippine Navy to detain said vessels. The jurisdiction over
the vessels acquired by the Palawan CFI cannot be interfered with by
another CFI. The Orders of the Palawan CFI expressly direct the Philippine
Navy to hold in custody the 2 vessels and that same should not be
released without prior order or authority from this Court
2. It is basic that once court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders or
decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having
equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction; because if coordinate
courts were allowed to interfere with each others judgments, decrees or
injunctions, the same would obviously lead to confusion and might
seriously hinder the administration of justice.
3. It is immaterial that the vessels were in the Philippine Navy base in Manila;
for the same in no way impugns the jurisdiction already vested in the
Palawan CFI.
4. The Dismissal of the first Civil Case by the CFI of Manila had the necessary
effect of automatically dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued
therein, directing the return of the fishing vessel Tony Lex VI. Such a
preliminary writ cannot survive the main case of which it was but an
incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force
and effect after the dismissal of the main petition
5. Petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of MDC
for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses
by virtue of RA 3512, which empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry
out the provisions of the Fisheries Act.
6. When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner,
apprehended the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, these vessels
were found to be without the necessary license in violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure, and illegally fishing with
explosives and without fishing license required by the Fisheries Law
7. The 2 fishing boats were apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing
with dynamite, which violations MDC sought to compromise by offering to
pay a fine of P21,000.00 for all said prior violations. Such previous
violations rendered the said vessels subject to forfeiture under the
Fisheries Act.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
8. The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources cannot be invoked by MDC because the said compromise
referred to about thirty violations of the fisheries law. The violations by the
2 vessels of MDC by reason of which these vessels were apprehended and
detained by the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner of
Fisheries, were committed after. Moreover, the power to compromise
would exist only before a criminal prosecution is instituted.
2. Liwayway Publications v. PCWU, 108 SCRA 161
GR No. L-25003 | October 23, 1981
Plaintiff: Liwayway Publications Inc
Respondents: Permanent Concrete Workers Union (affiliated with the National
Association of Trade Unions); Hermogenes Atrazo; Aquilino Distor; Benjamin
Gutierrez; Jose Ramos; Tiburcio Mardo; Ernesto Almario and Domingo Leano
Recit-ready version:
LPI rents a portion of the compound of Permcon, where it has a newsprint bodega.
One day, LPI was prevented by strikers of the PCWU, a union of Permcon workers,
from entering its premises. LPI alleged that even its managerial employees were
threatened and intimidated. Thus, LPI filed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction with the CFI of Manila. PCWU opposed, saying that the CFI has no
jurisdiction, as the case involves a labor dispute (and since its a labor dispute, the
Court of Industrial Relations has exclusive jurisdiction over it). The SC said that,
preliminarily, the right to strike is not an absolute right, and may be curtailed
(through injunction) if the rights of an innocent bystander are invaded, which
happened in this case. Also, while the general rule is that if an unfair labor practices
case had already been filed with the CIR, it is the CIR that can issue an injunction,
such general rule will not apply in this case, as LPI has absolutely no connection
with the ongoing labor dispute between PCWU and Permcon. Since LPIs right to
enter the premises was invaded, and there being no labor-related connection
between LPI and labor dispute, the CFI had jurisdiction to issue the injunction. Thus,
the injunction was validly issued.
Facts
Liwayway Publications Inc. (LPI) is a second sublessee (the first lessee being
someone named Ramon Roces) of a part of the premises of Permanent Concrete
Products Inc (Permcon), located in Sta. Mesa, Manila. The premises of LPI is
separated by a barbed wire fence from that of Permcon, and that LPI has its own
entrance to its portion, separate from the entrance of Permcon. LPI has a newsprint
bodega in its sublet portion.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
36
In 1964, members of the Permanent Concrete Workers Union (PCWU), who are
also employees of Permcon, declared a strike. For unknown reasons and w/o legal
justification, PCWU strikers picketed, stopped and prohibited a truck owned by LPI
from entering the compound in order to load newsprint. The strikers also prohibited
the general manager, personnel manager and other employees of LPI from entering
the compound.
LPI made repeated demands to the strikers not to intimidate and threaten its
employees with bodily harm and not to blockade, picket or prohibit LPI's truck from
getting newsprint in their bodega. The strikers refused and continued to refuse to
give in to the demands of the LPI.
During the strike, LPI rented another bodega, and incurred bodega rental expenses,
as well as additional transportation expenses.
LPI then went to the CFI of Manila and filed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, which the court issued. The writ enjoined the strikers from threatening
and intimidating LPIs employees and managers, as well as ordered the strikers not
to blockade and/or picket the compound and LPIs gate.
The PCWU moved to dismiss the complaint, stating that basically the case is one of
unfair labor practice, which gives the Court of Industrial Relations the exclusive
jurisdiction (and not the CFI); and that LPI is not the real party in interest, as it
should be Permcon who must file the case.
LPI opposed the motion, contending that since there is no employer-employee
relationship between LPI and PCWU, it is the CFI that has jurisdiction.
PCWU argued that even if there was no employer-employee relationship, still the
CFI would have no jurisdiction to issue an injunction, citing several cases holding
that there could be a labor dispute regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in proximate relation of employer and employee and that peaceful picketing is an
extension of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, a fundamental
right granted to labor which cannot be enjoined. In addition, PCWU contends that
LPI should sue Ramon Roces instead, pursuant to the lessor-lessee relationship
provision of Art. 1654 of the Civil Code.
The CFI denied PCWUs contentions and dismissed its motion to dismiss, ruling that
there is no labor dispute between PCWU and LPI. Thereafter, the court declared
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction and ordered PCWU to pay damages
and attorneys fees.
Issues/Held:
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
W/N the CFI has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction,
considering the labor dispute between Permcon and PCWU for alleged
unfair labor practicesYES
W/N LPI is a third party or an innocent bystander, whose right has been
invaded and is entitled to protectionYES
Ratio
A. On the right to picket
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute
is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution.
If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of
employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one.
o While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of
free speech, courts are not without power to confine or localize the
sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the
labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate
establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute.
o Thus, the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or
"innocent bystanders," if it appears that the inevitable result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which
they have no connection or interest exists between them and the
picketing union, or to constitute an invasion of their rights.
o In one case decided by the SC (not mention of which case), the SC
upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from
blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the compound
of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute.
o In one American case, a picket by a labor union in front of a
motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute
was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the
main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other
stores operated by third persons were located.
B. On jurisdiction
It is conceded that a labor dispute exists between PCWU and Permcon.
Citing PAFLU v. Caluag: The general rule is that where the Court of Industrial
Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over unfair labor practices cases,
the CFI can no longer issue a writ of preliminary injunction, as it is the CIR
who can.
o However, such rule is inapplicable, as the facts of PAFLU and of this
case are essentially different.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
37
o Interpreting the PAFLU ruling, the SC said that it is necessary to
determine the nature of the controversy in order to see if the PAFLU
ruling can apply.
o In this case, there is absolutely no connection between PCWU and
Permcon on one hand, and LPI and its employees/managers on the
other.
o The only connection is that both LPI and Permcon occupy the
same compound, but still that does not mean that LPI has been
interwoven in the unfair labor practice case between Permcon and
PCWU, which had already been filed with the CIR
Being the innocent bystander in this case, LPIs right to enter and work in
its premises was invaded by the strikers. And since there is no connection
between LPI and the unfair labor practice case filed with the CIR, the CFI had
jurisdiction to issue the injunction. Thus, the injunction was valid.
C. On the issue of trespass [not important]
Art. 1654 of the Civil Code provides:
o The lessor is obliged xxx To maintain the lessee in the peaceful
and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract.
Such provision is not in point, mostly because the lessor shall not be
obliged to answer for the mere fact of a trespass (simple trespass or
perturbacion de mero hecho) made by a third person in the use of the
estate leased, but the lessee shall have a direct action against the trespasser.
o Thus, pursuant to Art. 1664: The lessor is not obliged to answer
for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the
use of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action
against the intruder.
o The obligation of the lessor under Art. 1654 to maintain the lessee
in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
duration of the contract arises only when acts, termed as legal
trespass (perturbacion de derecho), disturb, dispute, object to,
or place difficulties in the way of the lessee's peaceful enjoyment
of the premises that in some manner or other cast doubt upon the
right of the lessor by virtue of which the lessor himself executed
the lease, in which case the lessor is obliged to answer for said act
of trespass.
The act of trespass committed by PCWU were considered by the SC as
simple trespass, and thus LPIs act of filing a case against PCWU (and not
against Ramon Roces) was correct.
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Facts:
1. Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235
GR No L-20266 | Jan 31, 1967 | Sanchez
Petitioner: The Commissioner of Customs
Respondents: The Honorable Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch Vi, and Herminio Teves
Summary: Teve entered into an agreement with NARIC where he will act as its
agent in exporting rice and importing collateral goods. Due to shortage of staple
products in the country, the President suspended all rice exportations. Teves
requested that he be allowed to perform his contractual commitments. The
President and his cabinet gave him the authority to do so. In accordance therewith,
Teves imported 22 shipments or more of merchandise. Economic Coordinator wrote
Commissioner of Customs requesting for the CoC to hold goods coming in as
importations, using the name of NARIC and same should only be released after
clearance by the NARIC. Thus, shipments of Teves were withheld. He asked to have
the imported goods delivered to him, because of the deteriorating nature of some of
them, upon the filing of surety bonds. The Justice Secretary acceded. Teves
subsequently sued for prohibition and mandamus in the CFI of Manila. Also, Teves
moved the court to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering the
Commissioner to cancel and/or cause to be cancelled the bonds heretofore recited
covering the 22 shipments or more. I: W/N the CFI has jurisdiction NO. R: duty of
the Commissioner to first cause an inquiry into the facts before he releases the
bonds is quite apparent. He must look into the legality of the importation. Nothing
extant in the record would show that the Commissioner, by a formal decision, had
ruled on the legality of the importation. It is only after a decision adverse to him is
rendered that Teves may summon the aid of the corresponding court. The
disposition of the Commissioner will not come under the Court of First Instance on
appeal. Such appeal should be addressed to the Court of Tax Appeals. I: Assuming
that the CFI has jurisdiction, W/N Judge Cloribel committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction YES. R: Sec 1,
Rule 58, expressly provides that a court, at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, may "require the performance of a particular act, in which case it shall be
known as a preliminary mandatory injunction." But, it is but a provisional remedy to
which parties may resort "for the preservation or protection of their rights or
interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action."
More than this, as a mandatory injunction "usually tends to do more than to
maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to
the final hearing." The writ issued by the judge does not maintain the status quo.
Had the bonds not been posted by Teves, the goods he imported would not have
been released. The purpose of injunctions i.e., to restore the original situation of the
parties, is here absent. Not being present, the writ itself can hardly be sustained as
equitable.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
38
Herminio Teves entered into an agreement with the National Rice and Corn
Corporation. (NARIC) By virtue thereof, Teves was authorized "to act as
Agent" of NARIC "in exporting" rice "as well as in importing the collateral
goods" that will be brought in "thru barter under the NARIC Chapter and
the arrangements with other government agencies, as presently authorized
and to buy the aforementioned collateral goods."
Shortly after the execution of the contract, due to acute shortage of staple
products that cropped up in the country, the President suspended all
projected rice exportations including that of Teves.
o Teves, representing that he already had contractual commitments
here to supply third parties with the goods he intended to import,
and likewise abroad for the barter of local rice with foreign
products, sought authority from the President and his cabinet to
import ahead of the exportation the collateral commodities
supposed to have been bartered under his agreement with the
NARIC namely, 40% essentials, 20% semi-essentials and 40%
non-essentials.
o President and his cabinet granted the authority requested. The
license of Teves to import was revalidated "for a period of 120
days", "Provided the importation of such collateral commodities
shall be limited only to the extent of his contractual commitments
with foreign suppliers as of September 14, 1960" and that "the
existence of such contractual commitments shall be verified by the
Administrator of Economic Coordination."
In accordance therewith, Teves imported 22 shipments or more of
merchandise consisting largely of Toyopet cars, several bags of synthetic
rubber and resin, medicinal preparations, and radio and electronic parts
and motors, and other items. Customs duties and taxes therefor were paid.
Economic Coordinator wrote Commissioner of Customs stating "as per
agreement with the Chairman-General Manager of the NARIC we are
requesting that you hold goods coming in as importations, using the name
of NARIC and same should only be released after clearance by the NARIC,
through the Office of Economic Coordination.
o Because of this, the shipments of Teves were withheld by the
Commissioner, pending compliance by Teves of said directive.
Teves asked the Justice Secretary and the Commissioner to have
the imported goods delivered to him, because of the deteriorating
nature of some of them, upon the filing of surety bonds. The
Secretary of Justice acceded. Teves then posted surety bonds,
accepted by the Commissioner: some issued by Meridian
Assurance Corporation, the rest by Fieldmen's Insurance
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
Company. The importations were thus released under these
bonds.
Teves subsequently sued for prohibition and mandamus in the CFI of
Manila. Also, Teves moved the court to issue a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, ordering the Commissioner to cancel and/or cause
to be cancelled the bonds heretofore recited covering the 22 shipments or
more, which arrived prior to January 12, 1962. Then, Teves asked that,
after hearing, all injunctions be declared permanent.
Judge Gaudencio Cloribel made out an order granting the injunctions
prayed for, including a preliminary mandatory injunction. The next day, the
writ was issued, upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by Teves.
Hence, the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition. The SC
granted, without bond, the preliminary injunction prayed for, restraining
respondents from proceeding or enforcing the lower court's order and the
writ of preliminary injunction thereupon issued.
Issues/Held:
1. W/N the CFI has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the case NO.
2. Assuming that the CFI had jurisdiction, did the Judge Cloribel abuse his
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction YES.
Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction
The duty of the Commissioner to first cause an inquiry into the facts before
he releases the bonds is quite apparent. He must look into the legality of the
importation. Nothing extant in the record would show that the
Commissioner, by a formal decision, had ruled on the legality of the
importation. It is only after a decision adverse to him is rendered that
Teves may summon the aid of the corresponding court.
But, the disposition of the Commissioner will not come under the Court of
First Instance on appeal. Such appeal should be addressed to the Court of
Tax Appeals. The CTA exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review
by appeal decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving
liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention
or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed
in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or
other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs.
The authority to rule on the legality of the importation still rests with the
Customs authorities; appeal from the decision of the Commissioner is to the
Court of Tax Appeals. We, accordingly, hold that the Court of First Instance
of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the civil case filed by Teves.
Committed grave abuse of discretion
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
39
Sec 1, Rule 58, expressly provides that a court, at any stage of an action
prior to final judgment, may "require the performance of a particular act, in
which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction." But, it
is but a provisional remedy to which parties may resort "for the
preservation or protection of their rights or interests, and for no other
purpose, during the pendency of the principal action."
More than this, as a mandatory injunction "usually tends to do more than to
maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction
prior to the final hearing." Per contra, it may issue "in cases of extreme
urgency, where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful
and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of
the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting
continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted
by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.9 Indeed, "the writ should
not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from
doubt and dispute."
The Commissioner believes that Judge Cloribel abused his discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Because, if the surety
bonds posted by Teves are already cancelled before trial has ever begun,
"there would be no more subject matter of Civil Case No. 51296, as the
respondent Judge would have in effect granted complete relief to Teves,
and the government would be completely without any protection for
whatever claims and interest it might have in the importations which were
released, except to go after the bond of petitioner in the small sum of
P5,000.00 as compared to the amount of the bonds sought to be cancelled
in the total sum of P264,620.25."
The Commissioners view deserves assent. For, Teves has not made out "a
clear case, free from doubt and dispute". True, there is no question as to the
legal authority of NARIC to engage in barter transactions. But there are
doubts, still unresolved, as to the legality of how such barter authority was
here exercised. On this score alone, Teves' right to import purportedly as
an agent of the NARIC and ahead of rice exportation is not so clear that
he can ask for the cancellation of the bonds he posted to secure the release
of his importations even before a hearing on the merits.
The writ issued by the judge does not maintain the status quo. Had the
bonds not been posted by Teves, the goods he imported would not have
been released. The purpose of injunctions i.e., to restore the original
situation of the parties, is here absent. Not being present, the writ itself can
hardly be sustained as equitable.
To enforce the writ is to practically decide the case in favor of Teves. To
proceed with the case below on the merits would then be a useless
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
ceremony. Because, Teves would have gotten what he precisely wanted in
that suit cancellation of the bonds. And, the government shall have lost
its last hold on the shipments of Teves and literally shall have been left
"holding the bag". By all notions of equity, this cannot be sanctioned.
We concede that the issuance of preliminary injunctions rests upon the
sound discretion of the court. Nevertheless, as the Court pointed out in a
recent case, "sound judicial discretion, however, is no license to undo the
law by defeating its objectives." A clear case of abuse of discretion is here
present.
2. Capitol Medical Center Inc. v. CA, 178 SCRA 493 (1989)
Capitol Medical Center Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. L-82499 October 13, 1989
Petitioners: CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and DRA. THELMA NAVARRETE
CLEMENTE, THE Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. IGNACIO SALVADOR, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region (Quezon City), MONINA REYES-VALENZUELA, PABLO L.
DAMASO, LINA M. ABLANG, MA. TERESITA ROQUE, AMBROSIO LAZOL, DIOSDADO
YAP, FLORDELIZA SINGSON, SARAH P. PELOBELLO JOEL H. GILLEGO, AGNES A. DE
VEGA, NORAIDA Y. MAGALONG, AUGENCIO PAPA, IMELDA SIMBILLO, MAXIMO
CALDERON and ROSALIE FLORIDA C. ILAGA
Summary: 15 students and parents purporting to represent the 900 students of the
CMCC filed a class suit against "Capitol Medical Center College" and Dr. Clemente, in
the RTC of Quezon City praying for the reopening of the CMCC which had been
closed effective at the end of the first semester of the school year 1987-1988. The
lower court granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and directed the
defendants "to reopen (the) school and allow plaintiffs students to enroll in their
respective courses" It fixed the plaintiffs' bond in the sum of P50,000. This was
affirmed by the CA. Our issue here is whether or not the school may be forced to
reopen. NO. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial
court not to restore that status quo, but to restore conditions preceding the status
quo, i.e., to reopen and resume the holding of classes which the private respondents
themselves by their mass actions had disrupted. In issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction for that purpose, the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion for
it allowed the writ to be used by the plaintiffs to undo the mischief that they
themselves had initiated. The contract between the college and a student who is
enrolled and pays the fees for a semester, is for the entire semester only, not for the
entire course. Since their contracts with the school were terminated at the end of
the first semester of 1987, and as the school has already ceased to operate, they
have no "clear legal right" to re-enroll and the school has no legal obligation to
reopen and readmit them.
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
40
Facts:
Some fourteen (14) years ago, the Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (or CMCI), a
hospital corporation, organized, opened, and operated the Capitol Medical
Center College beside its hospital, the Capitol Medical Center in Quezon
City. It offered a four-year nursing course, a two-year midwifery course,
and a two-year medical secretarial course. In the first semester of the
school year 1987-88, 900 students were enrolled in various courses in the
college.
Half-way through the first semester in 1987, the college faculty, led by the
Dean of Nursing, demanded that they be granted vacation and sick leave
privileges similar to those enjoyed by hospital personnel. Dialogues were
held but no agreement was reached between the faculty and the school
administration, headed by the president, Dr. Thelma Navarette-Clemente,
who was concurrently also the chairman of the CMCI Board.
Dr. Clemente reported the deteriorating relationship between the CMCC
administration and the teachers, which, from a simple disagreement, had
degenerated into open hostility. She feared that the situation may give rise
to mass action by the students, because the faculty, exercising their moral
influence over the students, had enlisted the latter's sympathy and support
for their cause.
The Board resolved to authorize her, as president of the College, to close it
at the end of the first semester if the antagonism of the faculty and students
toward the college administration should become uncontrollable.
THE CASE
15 students and parents purporting to represent the 900 students of the
CMCC filed a class suit against "Capitol Medical Center College" and
petitioner Dr. Clemente, in the RTC of Quezon City praying for the
reopening of the Capitol Medical Center College which had been closed
effective at the end of the first semester of the school year 1987-1988.
As the complaint prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, the court set the hearing of the application. As
agreed at the hearing, an opposition was filed by CMCC.
The lower court granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
directed the defendants "to reopen (the) school and allow plaintiffs
students to enroll in their respective courses" It fixed the plaintiffs' bond in
the sum of P50,000.
CMC filed a motion for reconsideration but the court denied their motion.
CMC elevated the order to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction. The CA issued a restraining order and directed
the respondents to comment on the petition.
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]
o CA rendered a decision holding that the respondent RTC Judge did
not abuse his discretion in issuing the order of preliminary
mandatory injunction because the petitioners had no right to
suddenly close the school for the enrollment of the students
created a binding contract between them and the school for the
latter to continue operating until the former shall have finished
their courses.
CMC filed a motion for reconsideration and re-hearing. Nevertheless, the
CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether a school that, after due notice to the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports, closed at the end of the first semester of the school year 1987-1988,
because its teachers and students declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and take
examinations, may be forced to reopen by the courts at the instance of the striking
students. NO
Ratio:
The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which
preceded the controversy. It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It should only be
granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto.
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain
the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to
the final hearing.
o It may, however, issue "in cases of extreme urgency; where the
right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience
bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and
unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the
effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and
maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties,
recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to
establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the
complainant when he makes out a clear case free from doubt and
dispute."
The questions that we might ask are:
What was the status quo before the private respondents filed their
complaint "for specific performance"? Do the private respondents have a
clear legal right to demand the reopening of the school?
AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.
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The status quo was that the school was already closed. CMCC was closed
effective at the end of the first semester, i.e, the first week of November
1987.
What was the status quo prior to the closure of the school? There were no
classes. The school was deserted. The teachers and students were on strike;
they refused to attend classes and held noisy rallies in front of the CMC
hospital instead.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court
not to restore that status quo, but to restore conditions preceding the status
quo, i.e., to reopen and resume the holding of classes which the private
respondents themselves by their mass actions had disrupted.
o In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction for that purpose,
the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion for it
allowed the writ to be used by the plaintiffs to undo the
mischief that they themselves had initiated.
The teachers, by refusing to teach, and the students, by refusing to attend
classes, made the continued operation of the CMCC futile and untenable.
The college had no reason to remain open under the situation which the
private respondents themselves brought about.
Did the private respondents have a clear legal right to reopen the school
and to be readmitted therein?
The CA answered that question affirmatively on the theory that "the initial
enrollment" of the students (meaning their enrollment in the first year of
their chosen courses) created "a binding contract" between the students
and the school, by which the latter became "legally and morally bound to
continue operating the school until such enrollees shall have finished their
courses.
However, there is no contract between him and the school for the latter to
remain open for the entire duration of his course. Section VII, paragraph No.
137, of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides:
o 137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he
is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and
secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate course.
xxx
The contract between the college and a student who is enrolled and pays
the fees for a semester, is for the entire semester only, not for the entire
course. The law does not require a school to see a student through to the
completion of his course. If the school closes or is closed by proper
authority at the end of a semester, the student has no cause of action for
breach of contract against the school.
Thus did this Court rule in "Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business
Administration, Quezon City Branch, et al.," a case which involved some
students and teachers who had participated in mass actions and rallies in
 [PROVREM DIGESTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION] 42

the respondent school and who were respectively denied re-admission for teachers in spite of their refusal to desist from continuing their disruptive
enrollment, and re-appointment to teaching positions in the school: mass actions against the school.
o It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph Held: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated May
137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college 15,1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 13626 is hereby set aside. The
student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling order and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Regional Trial
for the entire semester. The school cannot be compelled to enter Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-52429 are hereby annulled and
into another contract with said students and teachers. The courts, set aside. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.
be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no
power to make contracts for the parties.' Doctrine of RELATIVE CONVENIENCE/HARDSHIP
A. Significantly, in Alcuaz only some students and teachers left their
classrooms to hold rallies in the school premises. The majority remained in
the classrooms. The school did not cease to operate. In this case, however,
all the teachers and students struck and abandoned their classes.
B. In Alcuaz, the mass assemblies and barricades were held for three days.
In the CMCC case, the "strike" began on October 14 and continued until the
end of the semester.
C. In Alcuaz, the school did not close but it nevertheless refused to re-admit
the offending students and teachers. In this case, the school has closed
completely.
We, therefore, hold that the lower court gravely abused its discretion
in compelling the CMCC to reopen and re-admit the striking students
for enrollment in the second semester of their courses.
o Since their contracts with the school were terminated at the end of
the first semester of 1987, and as the school has already ceased to
operate, they have no "clear legal right" to re-enroll and the school
has no legal obligation to reopen and readmit them. Indeed,
neither is there a law or rule that obligates a student who has
enrolled in a school, to remain there until he finishes his course.
On the contrary he may transfer at any time to any school that is
willing to accept him.
But even if it can be supposed that the enrollment of a student creates an
implied "binding contract" with the school to educate him for the entire
course, since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the
obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a corresponding
obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and
regulations of the school. When students breach that supposed contract by
refusing to attend their classes, preferring to take to the streets to mount a
noisy demonstration against their school, the latter may cancel the contract
and close its doors. Its action would neither be arbitrary nor unfair.
It was the trial court that acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the school to reopen and re-admit the striking students and

AQUINO.DEGUZMAN.GERONA.GILTENDEZ.MEER.PINEDA.TAYLO.