Topic: Lis Pendens
2000. NOTE: BOTH CA DECISION ARE IN FAVOR OF FELONIA AND DE GUZMAN AND BOTH
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, Petitioner-Appellant, vs.
ASUNCION P. FELONIA and LYDIA C. DE GUZMAN, represented by MARIBEL
FRIAS, Respondents-Appellees. MARIE MICHELLE P. DELGADO, REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY and RHANDOLFO B. AMANSEC, in his capacity as
Clerk of Court Ex-Officio Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court, Las Pias City,
Respondents-Defendants
G.R. No. 189477 February 26, 2014
Facts: Felonia and De Guzman were the registered owners of a parcel of land (532
sq.m.) with a 5-bedroom house, covered by TCT No. T-402 issued by RD of Las Pias
City.
Sometime in June 1990, Felonia and De Guzman mortgaged the property to Delgado
to secure the loan in the amount of P1,655,000.00. However, instead of a real estate
mortgage, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with an Option to
Repurchase.
THE REFORMATION CASE
On December 20, 1990, Felonia and De Guzman filed an action for Reformation of
Contract (Reformation Case) before the Manila RTC.
RTC DECISION: On March 21, 1995, RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Felonia
and De Guzman based on the findings that it is very apparent that the transaction
had between the parties is one of a mortgage and not a deed of sale with right to
repurchase.
CA DECISION: Affirmed RTC Decision; decision became final and executory on
October 16, 2000.
THE CONSOLIDATION CASE
On June 20 1994, in spite of the pendency of the REFORMATION CASE in
which she was the defendant , Delgado filed a "Petition for Consolidation of
Ownership of Property Sold with an Option to Repurchase and Issuance of a New
Certificate of Title" (Consolidation Case) in the Las Pias RTC.
RTC DECISION: ordered the issuance of a new title under Delgados name,
proclaiming her as the absolute owner of TCT No. T-402 and ordered RD of Las Pias
to cancel such title and issue a new one in favor of Delgado.
Meanwhile, on June 2, 1995, Delgado mortgaged the subject property to
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank (HSLB) using her newly registered title. Three
(3) days later, or on June 5, 1995, HSLB caused the annotation of the mortgage.
On September 14, 1995, Felonia and De Guzman caused the annotation of a
Notice of Lis Pendens on Delgados title, TCT No. 44848.
On November 20, 1997, HSLB foreclosed the subject property and later consolidated
ownership in its favor, causing the issuance of a new title in its name, TCT No.
64668.
CA DECISION: On October 27, 2000, the CA annulled and set aside the decision
of the RTC, Las Pias City in the Consolidation Case. The decision of the CA, declaring
Felonia and De Guzman as the absolute owners of the subject property and ordering
the cancellation of Delgados title, became final and executory on December 1,
BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
THE INSTANT CASE
On April 29, 2003, Felonia and De Guzman, represented by Maribel Frias (Frias),
claiming to be the absolute owners of the subject property, instituted the instant
complaint against Delgado, HSLB, Register of Deeds of Las Pias City and Rhandolfo
B. Amansec before the RTC of Las Pias City for Nullity of Mortgage and Foreclosure
Sale, Annulment of Titles of Delgado and HSLB, and finally, Reconveyance of
Possession and Ownership of the subject property in their favor.
HSLB asserted that Felonia and De Guzman are barred from laches as they had slept
on their rights to timely annotate, by way of Notice of Lis Pendens, the pendency of
the REFORMATION CASE. HSLB also claimed that it should not be bound by the
decisions of the CA in the Reformation and Consolidation cases because it was not a
party therein. HSLB asserted that it was a mortgagee in good faith because the
mortgage between Delgado and HSLB was annotated on the title on June 5, 1995,
whereas the Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated only on September 14, 1995.
RTC DECISION: Ruled in favor of Felonia and De Guzman as the absolute owners of
the subject property (NOTE: RTC noted the previous decisions of CA cannot be
ignored).
CA DECISION: Affirmed RTC Decision but with modifications (on damages).
Issues:
1. Whether or not HSLB is a purchaser in good faith.
Ruling: No, it is not a purchaser in good faith.
Arguably, HSLB was initially a mortgagee in good faith. Citing Bank of Commerce v.
San Pablo, Jr., the Court said:
There is, however, a situation where, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the
owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract
and any foreclosure sale arising there from are given effect by reason of public
policy. This is the doctrine of "the mortgagee in good faith" based on the rule that
all persons dealing with property covered by the Torrens Certificates of Title, as
buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of
the title. The public interest in upholding indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as
evidence of lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a
buyer or mortgagee who, in good faith, relied upon what appears on the face of
the certificate of title.
When the property was mortgaged to HSLB, the registered owner of the subject
property was Delgado who had in her name TCT No. 44848. Thus, HSLB cannot be
faulted in relying on the face of Delgados title. The records indicate that Delgado was
at the time of the mortgage in possession of the subject property and Delgados title
did not contain any annotation that would arouse HSLBs suspicion. HSLB, as a
mortgagee, had a right to rely in good faith on Delgados title, and in the absence of
any sign that might arouse suspicion, HSLB had no obligation to undertake further
investigation.
However, the rights of the parties to the present case are defined not by the
determination of whether or not HSLB is a mortgagee in good faith, but of whether or
not HSLB is a purchaser in good faith. It is not a purchaser in good faith.
A purchaser in good faith is defined as one who buys a property without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property and pays full and
fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
other persons in the property. When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and
circumstances as to arouse his suspicion, he must take precautionary steps to qualify
as a purchaser in good faith.
In Spouses Mathay v. CA, SC determined the duty of a prospective buyer:
XXX it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would
put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being
sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is of course,
expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status
or nature of possession of the occupants Should he find out that the land he
intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this
case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to
verify the extent of the occupants possessory rights. The failure of a prospective
buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and
would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in
good faith.
In the case at bar, HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions. At the time
the subject property was mortgaged, there was yet no annotated Notice of Lis
Pendens. However, at the time HSLB purchased the subject property, the
Notice of Lis Pendens was already annotated on the title.
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means, "a pending suit or a pending
litigation" while a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that
a real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that anyone who acquires an
interest over the property does so at his/her own risk, or that he/she gambles on the
result of the litigation over the property. It is a warning to prospective buyers to take
precautions and investigate the pending litigation. Its purpose is to protect the
rights of the registrant while the case is pending resolution or decision so
that he could rest secure that he/she will not lose the property or any part
thereof during litigation.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the Courts
jurisdiction until the judgment or the decree have been entered.
Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had actual knowledge
of the annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead of heeding the same, HSLB
continued with the purchase knowing the legal repercussions a notice of lis pendens
entails. HSLB took upon itself the risk that the Notice of Lis Pendens leads to.
As correctly found by the CA, "the notice of lis pendens was annotated on 14
September 1995, whereas the foreclosure sale, where the appellant was declared as
the highest bidder, took place sometime in 1997. There is no doubt that at the time
appellant purchased the subject property, it was aware of the pending litigation
concerning the same property and thus, the title issued in its favor was subject to the
outcome of said litigation."
This ruling is in accord with Rehabilitation Finance Corp. v. Morales, which
underscored the significance of a lis pendens, then defined in Sec. 24, Rule 7 now Sec.
14 of Rule 13 in relation to a mortgage priorly annotated on the title covering the
property. It was held that: [w]hile the notice of lis pendens cannot affect petitioners
right as mortgagee, because the same was annotated subsequent to the mortgage,
yet the said notice affects its right as purchaser because notice of lis pendens
simply means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as a notice
to the whole world that one who buys the same does so at his own risk.
The subject of the lis pendens on the title of HSLBs vendor, Delgado, is the
"Reformation Case" filed against Delgado by the respondents. The case was decided
with finality by the CA in favor of respondents. The contract of sale in favor of
Delgado was ordered reformed into a contract of mortgage. By final decision of the
CA, HSLBs vendor, Delgado, is not the property owner but only a mortgagee. As it
turned out, Delgado could not have constituted a valid mortgage on the property.
Article 2085 (2) of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and
mortgage:
(2) That the pledgor or mortagagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or
mortgaged.
Hence, for a valid mortgage to exist, ownership of the property is an essential
requisite.
Philippine National Bank v. Rocha (cited in Reyes v. De Leon), pronounced that "a
mortgage of real property executed by one who is not an owner thereof at the time of
the execution of the mortgage is without legal existence." Such that, there being no
valid mortgage, there could also be no valid foreclosure or valid auction sale.
We go back to Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo, Jr. (cited above) where the doctrine of
mortgagee in good faith, upon which petitioner relies, was clarified as "based on the
rule that all persons dealing with property covered by the Torrens Certificate of Title,
as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of
the title. In turn, the rule is based on "x x x public interest in upholding the
indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of lawful ownership of the land or of
any encumbrance thereon."
Insofar as the HSLB is concerned, there is no longer any public interest in upholding
the indefeasibility of the certificate of title of its mortgagor, Delgado. Such title has
been nullified in a decision that had become final and executory. Its own title, derived
from the foreclosure of Delgado's mortgage in its favor, has likewise been nullified in
the very same decision that restored the certificate of title in respondents' name.
There is absolutely no reason that can support the prayer of HSLB to have its
mortgage lien carried over and into the restored certificate of title of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Topic: Lis Pendens
ARLYN PINEDA, Petitioner, vs. JULIE C. ARCALAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170172 November 23, 2007
Doctrine: Levy on execution duly registered takes preference over a prior unregistered
sale. A registered lien is entitled to preferential consideration. Registered writ of
attachment was a superior lien over that on an unregistered deed of sale this is so
because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property,
enforceable against the whole world.
FACTS: Subject property originally owned Spouses Lateo covered by a transfer
certificate of title consists of 3 Lands. These properties were bought by Victoria
Tolentino from Spouses Lateo. Sometime later, Civil Case No. Q-96-27884, for Sum of
Money, was instituted by Arcalas against Victoria Tolentino. This case stemmed from
an indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note and four post-dated checks later
dishonored, which Victoria Tolentino owed Arcalas (respondent).
RTC: rendered decision in favor of Alcalas and against Victoria Tolentino.
To execute the judgment, the Quezon City RTC levied upon the subject property and
the Notice of Levy on Alias Writ of Execution dated 12 January 1999 was annotated as
Entry No. 315074, in relation to Entry No. 319362, at the back of TCT No. T-52319.
Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda (petitioner) filed with the Deputy
Sheriff of the Quezon City RTC an Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim. Pineda
alleged that he bought the subject property from Victoria L. Tolentino that upon
payment of the purchase price, she took possession of the subject property by
allowing a tenant, Rodrigo Bautista to cultivate the same. However, Pineda failed to
register the subject property under her name.
Arcalas filed a motion to set aside Pinedas Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim.
[Arcalas] showed that her levies on the properties were duly registered while the
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale between the defendant Victoria L. Tolentino and Analyn
G. Pineda was not. The levies being superior to the sale claimed by Ms. Pineda, the
court rules to quash and set aside her Affidavit of Title and Third Party Claim. Thus,
The Affidavit of Title and Third-Party Claim is set aside to allow completion of
execution proceedings.
After the finality of the Order of the Quezon City RTC quashing Pinedas third-party
claim, Pineda filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna another Affidavit
of Third Party Claim and caused the inscription of a notice of adverse claim at the back
of TCT No. T-52319 under Entry No. 324094
Arcalas and Leonardo Byron P. Perez, Jr. purchased Lot No. 3762 at an auction sale
conducted by the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City. The sale was evidenced by a Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale issued on the same day and registered as Entry No. 324225 at the
back of TCT No. T-52319. Arcalas then filed an action for the cancellation of the entry
of Pinedas adverse claim before the Laguna RTC. The Laguna RTC ordered the
cancellation of the Notice of Adverse Claim annotated as Entry No. 324094 at the back
of TCT No. 52319 on the ground of res judicata.
Pineda appealed the Order of the Laguna RTC before the Court of Appeals under Rule
44 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution dated 25 January 2005
CA: dismissed the appeal and considered it abandoned when Pineda failed to file her
appellants brief.
Pineda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein it was plainly stated that Pinedas
counsel overlooked the period within which he should file the appellants brief.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-96-27884 MAY
EXEMPT THE PORTION BOUGHT BY [PINEDA] FROM VICTORIA TOLENTINO
NOTE: Procedurally, the case must be discussed for Pinedas failure to file an
appellants brief. This is in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court,
which imposes upon the appellant the duty to file an appellants brief in ordinary
appealed cases before the Court of Appeals.
As provided by the Rules of Court, failure of the appellant to file his memorandum
within the period therefor may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. Reason is
because appellants brief is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the
decision of the appeal on the merits. This is because on appeal only errors specifically
assigned and properly argued in the brief or memorandum will be considered, except
those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical errors.
Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no power to resolve an unassigned error,
which does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, save for a plain
or clerical error.
RULING: No. Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, provides that the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and
in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies. Art 52 of PD 1529
also provides that before a purchaser of land causes the registration of the transfer of
the subject property in her favor, third persons, such as Arcalas, cannot be bound
thereby. Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a
persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed. As the deed of sale
was unrecorded, it operates merely as a contract between the parties, namely Victoria
Tolentino as seller and Pineda as buyer, which may be enforceable against Victoria
Tolentino through a separate and independent action. On the other hand, Arcalass
lien was registered and annotated at the back of the title of the subject property and
accordingly amounted to a constructive notice thereof to all persons, whether or not
party to the original case filed before the Quezon City RTC.
The doctrine is well settled that a levy on execution duly registered takes preference
over a prior unregistered sale. A registered lien is entitled to preferential consideration.
SC also ruled that that a registered writ of attachment was a superior lien over that on
an unregistered deed of sale This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem.
It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world.
In the case at bar, the attachment in favor of respondent appeared in the nature of a
real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said
lien was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien.
Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of his
title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not absolute but
a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondent, a right which is
preferred and superior to that of petitioner.
Topic: Levies on Execution
[G.R. No. 168655. July 2, 2010.]
J. CASIM CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner vs. REGISTRAR OF
DEEDS OF LAS PIAS OF DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, respondents
INTESTATE ESTATE OF BRUNEO F. CASIM INTESTATE ESTATE OF BRUNEO
F. CASIM, intervener
DOCTRINE: When the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction cancels a notice
of lis pendens pending before another court, according to the SC, the notice of lis
pendens is under the control of the court that has taken a cognizance of the main
case. This is because a notice of lis pendens is only an ancillary remedy. So another
regular court cannot exercise jurisdiction to have the notice of lis pendens cancelled
except the court hearing the main case.
FACTS: Petitioner, represented herein by Rogelio C. Casim, is a duly organized
domestic corporation in whose name TCT No. 49936, covering a 10,715-square meter
land was registered. Sometime in 1982, petitioner Casim acquired the covered
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and as a result the mother title, TCT
No. 30459 was cancelled and TCT No. 49936 was issued.
On March 22, 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 an
original petition for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as of all the
other entries of involuntary encumbrances annotated on the original copy of TCT No.
49936. Petitioner claimed that its owner's duplicate copy of the TCT was clean at the
time of its delivery and that it was surprised to learn later on that the original copy of
its TCT , on file with the Register of Deeds, contained several entries which all
signified that the covered property had been subjected to various claims.
To justify the cancellation, petitioner alleged that:
1. The notice of lis pendens, in particular, was a forgery judging from the
inconsistencies in the inscriber's signature as well as from the fact that the
notice was entered non-chronologically, that is, the date thereof is much
earlier than that of the preceding entry. In this regard, it noted the lack of
any transaction record on file with the Register of Deeds that would support
the notice of lis pendens annotation.
2. Petitioner also stated that while Section 59 of Presidential Decree (P .D.) No.
1529 requires the carry-over of subsisting encumbrances in the new
issuances of TCTs, petitioner's duplicate copy of the title did not contain any
such carry-over, which means that it was an innocent purchaser for value,
especially since it was never a party to the civil case referred to in the notice
of lis pendens.
3. Lastly, it alludes to the indefeasibility of its title despite the fact that the
mother title, TCT No. 30459, might have suffered from certain defects and
constraints.
The Intestate Estate of Bruneo F. Casim, representing Bruneo F. Casim, intervened in
the instant case and filed a Comment/Opposition in which it maintained that the RTC
of Las Pias did not have jurisdiction over the present action, because the matter of
canceling a notice of lis pendens lies within the jurisdiction of the court before which
the main action referred to in the notice is pending. In this regard, it emphasized that
the case referred to in the said notice had already attained finality as the Supreme
Court had issued an entry of judgment therein and that the RTC of Makati City had
ordered execution in that case.
In response to petitioners allegation, and as opposed to petitioner's claim that there
was no carryover of encumbrances made in TCT No. 49936 from the mother title TCT
No. 30459, the latter would show that it also had the same inscriptions as those
found in TCT No. 49936 only that they were entered in the original copy on file with
the Register of Deeds.
Also, as per certification issued by the Register of Deeds, petitioner's claim of lack of
transaction record could not stand, because the said certification stated merely that
the corresponding transaction record could no longer be retrieved and might,
therefore, be considered as either lost or destroyed.
RTC: On April 14, 2005, the trial court, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over the
action, resolved to dismiss the petition and declared that the action must have been
filed before the same court and in the same action in relation to which the annotation
of the notice of lis pendens had been sought. Anent the allegation that the entries in
the TCT were forged, the trial court pointed out that not only did petitioner resort to
the wrong forum to determine the existence of forgery, but also that forgery could
not be presumed merely from the alleged non-chronological entries in the TCT but
instead must be positively proved.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has jurisdiction in an original
action to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the subject title of petitioner.
RULING: No. RTC of Las Pinas has NO jurisdiction in an original action to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated on the subject title of petitioner.
Lis Pendens which literally means pending suit refers to the jurisdiction, power or
control which a court acquires over the property involved in a suit, pending the
continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and
necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power
of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the
judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the
whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one
who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. A notice of lis pendens,
once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial court before which the
action involving the property is pending (decision has not attained finality
yet). This power is said to be inherent in the trial court and is exercised
only under express provisions of law.
Accordingly, Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the
trial court to cancel a notice of lis pendens where it is properly shown that the
purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated. Be that as
it may, the power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under
exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to
the party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly
prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of several
continuances procured by petitioner; where the case which is the basis for
the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non prosequitur on the part of
the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who
caused such annotation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso facto pending to the effect that the case has already been finally decided by the
cancelled. court, stating the manner of the disposal.

Petitioners contention in theorizing that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has
the inherent power to cancel the notice of lis pendens that was incidentally registered
in relation to Civil Case No. 2137, a case which had been decided by the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 62 and affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal, petitioner
advocates that the cancellation of such a notice is not always ancillary to a main
action. This argument fails. From the available records, it appears that the subject
notice of lis pendens had been recorded at the instance of Bruneo F. Casim (Bruneo)
in relation to Civil Case No. 2137 one for annulment of sale and recovery of
real property which he led before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 against the
spouses Jesus and Margarita Casim, predecessors-in-interest and stockholders of
petitioner corporation. That case involved the property subject of the present case,
then covered by TCT No. 30459. At the close of the trial on the merits therein, the
RTC of Makati rendered a decision adverse to Bruneo and dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. Aggrieved, Bruneo lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54204, which reversed and set aside the trial court's
decision. Expectedly, the spouses Jesus and Margarita Casim elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 151957, but their appeal was dismissed for
being filed out of time. A necessary incident of registering a notice of lis pendens is
that the property covered thereby is effectively placed, until the litigation attains
finality, under the power and control of the court having jurisdiction over the case to
which the notice relates. In this sense, parties dealing with the given property are
charged with the knowledge of the existence of the action and are deemed to take
the property subject to the outcome of the litigation. It is also in this sense that the
power possessed by a trial court to cancel the notice of lis pendens is said to be
inherent as the same is merely ancillary to the main action.
SEC. 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgement in favour of the defendant or other
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff
in an to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in
the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled
upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action
or proceeding was pending stating the manner disposal thereof.
All told, the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has committed no reversible error in
issuing the assailed Resolution and Order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the petition
for cancellation of notice of lis pendens led by petitioner, and in denying
reconsideration,

Clearly, the action for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in this case must have
been filed not before the court a quo via an original action but rather, before the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 62 as an incident of the annulment case in relation to which its
registration was sought. Thus, it is the latter court that has jurisdiction over the main
case referred to in the notice and it is that same court which exercises power and
control over the real property subject of the notice. But even so, the petition could no
longer be expected to pursue before the proper forum inasmuch as the decision
rendered in the annulment case has already attained finality before both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court on the appellate level, unless of course there
exists substantial and genuine claims against the parties relative to the
main case subject of the notice of lis pendens. There is none in this case. It
is thus well to note that the precautionary notice that has been registered relative to
the annulment case then pending before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 62 has
served its purpose. With the finality of the decision therein on appeal, the notice has
already been rendered functus officio. The rights of the parties, as well as of their
successors-ininterest, petitioner included, in relation to the subject property, are
hence to be decided according the said final decision.

But petitioner is not altogether precluded from pursuing a specific remedy,

only that the suitable course of action legally available is not judicial but
rather administrative.

Section 77 of P .D. No. 1529 provides the appropriate measure to have a notice of lis
pendens cancelled out from the title, that is by presenting to the Register of
Deeds, after finality of the judgment rendered in the main action, a
certificate executed by the clerk of court before which the main action was