Evaluation of Baltimores Strategies for Reducing Gun Violence

Daniel W. Webster, ScD, MPH

Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research

METHODS

Research Design

The current study sought to assess the impact of each of Baltimores three strategies for
reducing gun violence under the U.S. Department of Justices Smart Policing Initiative (SPI). The
outcome evaluation for the Violent Crime Impact Section (VCIS) and Project Exile focused on those
programs impact on homicides and nonfatal shootings in the areas in which these interventions were
implemented. In addition, we also sought to assess the impact of the number of home checks of
individuals on the Gun Offender Registry (GOR) within police districts. To estimate each interventions
effects on gun violence, we used a quasi-experimental design in which the interventions were
implemented in selected hot spots for gun violence and areas not selected served as comparisons. For
VCIS and Exile call-ins, we had monthly deployment data at the post level and conducted most analyses
among the police posts that were in the top quartile for shootings and homicides during the 2003 to
2006 baseline period because non-intervention posts within these high-violence areas offer the most
similar comparisons to the areas where the interventions were focused. We also sought to estimate the
potential deterrent effects of officer home checks of offenders on the GOR on gun violence in the
neighborhood. Unfortunately, monthly data on GOR home checks were only available at the district
level, and analyses of GOR home checks were conducted for all police districts.

We also sought to assess the GORs effects on gun offenders risk of re-offending, with the focus
on committing offenses involving guns and/or violence. Since there is no contemporaneous comparison
group, we will use historical comparisons individuals who were convicted of gun offenses prior to the
establishment of the GOR who will be contrasted with the individuals required to register with the
GOR. For each registered gun offender, we will compile police records, gather data on age, gender,
race, prior and subsequent arrests and warrants, and incarcerations, including dates for all events in
their criminal history. The same data will be compiled for persons convicted of gun crimes during the
two years prior to the establishment of the GOR. GOR effects on risks of reoffending or reoffending on
an offense involving guns or violence will be estimated using binary logistic regression analyses that will
control for the baseline variables described above, the amount of time in which they could reoffend

1
(following incarceration, when relevant) based on when they were put on the GOR or when they were
convicted of a gun offense for the historical comparisons. These models will include an indicator for
whether the person was in the GOR or not to estimate program effects after controlling for other
factors. Due to delays in getting MOUs for data sharing and IRB approval, analyses on GOR effects on
offender recidivism will be included in a subsequent report.

Data and Analyses

Johns Hopkins received data from crime incident and arrest reports from BPD and assembled
monthly panel data for police posts for the period January 2003 May 2012. The key outcomes
examined were homicides and nonfatal shooting incidents per post per month. We analyzed crime
incidents rather than number of victims because a single incident with a large number of victims could
greatly skew the findings. We used negative binomial regression models and generalized estimation
equations to account for clustering of the data by police post to estimate intervention effects by
contrasting changes in violent crime in areas where VCIS units were deployed or Exile call-ins of
offenders were conducted with areas and months without the interventions. These models controlled
for other factors hypothesized to affect gun violence within police posts including: implementation of
Safe Streets a public health community prevention program that uses outreach, conflict mediation,
and attempts to promote nonviolent social norms with gangs and other high-risk youth); a
redevelopment of an area of East Baltimore just north of Johns Hopkins Medical Campus that began in
2011, and displaced many residents, mostly into neighborhoods just north of the redevelopment;
calendar month; police post fixed effects; and year fixed effects that estimate effects from unmeasured
conditions that coincide with a calendar year (e.g., city-wide changes in policing strategy, drug market
conditions, conflicts between gangs). Previously reported findings with data through 2010 which
focused more on the effects of Safe Streets on gun violence found no association between drug- and
weapon-related arrests within police posts and therefore these measures were excluded from the
analyses. This study also found no evidence that model errors were spatially correlated. 1 Coefficients
were converted so that they represent incident rate ratios (IRR) to aid interpretation.

It is worth noting that in addition to the interventions which were the focus of Baltimores SPI
project and evaluation, the city began broader initiatives to reduce gun crime in the city which were not
focused on specific areas, per se, and therefore were not amenable to study by contrasting changes in
gun crime across neighborhoods. When Fred Bealefeld was appointed Police Commissioner in 2007, he
attempted to shift the agencys resources and attention toward violent offenders with guns, while de-

2
emphasizing arrests for lower level drug crimes; though offenders with a history of violence and gun-
involvement were commonly arrested on drug charges. The Mayors Office also instituted GunStat, a
forum in which leadership from BPD and special units focused on gun crime attended along with
representatives from the States Attorneys Office, U.S. Attorneys Office, Maryland State Police, Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Parole and Probation, Department of Juvenile Services,
Governors Office for Crime Control and Prevention, and research partner, Dr. Webster from Johns
Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research. Through GunStat, law enforcement officials focused on
improving prosecution of gun offenders to increase convictions, prioritization of offenders on probation
or parole, prioritization of gun offenders for federal prosecution, and direction for the Gun Trace Task
Force (unit formed to investigate illegal gun sales and possession) and the Gun Offender Registry Unit.

Due to BPD budget cuts, VCIS units lost detectives throughout the study period. By the end of
the study period in May 2012, there had been a 44 percent decline in the number of VCIS detectives.
Therefore, in addition to estimating the average effect of VCIS during the study period, we also
examined the effect of each VCIS detective deployed to a police post area on monthly homicides and
nonfatal shootings as sort of a dosage effect.

Examining the Effects of the Gun Offender Registry Ordinance on Reoffending

As mentioned above, in 2007, the Mayors Office convened monthly GunStat meetings with
BPD, state and federal prosecutors, parole and probation officials, in part, to track gun arrests and the
outcomes of these cases in terms of charges brought against offenders, bail, case disposition, and
sentencing. We used data collected for GunStat to compare case disposition and reoffending for gun
arrests in which the case disposition was determined in 2007, the year before the GOR Ordinance
became law, and gun cases in which the case disposition was determined in 2008. Those who were
convicted of gun charges in 2008 would have been required to be registered with the GOR upon their
release from custody.

Sample

Because the GunStat database includes different types of cases for different time periods, using
the entire dataset in our analyses would have introduced bias. Thus, we limited our analyses to cases
with either of the gun charges that were tracked from the inception of GunStat in 2007 (i.e., Firearm
Possession with a Felony Conviction and Handgun Violation or a Use of a Firearm in a Felony Violent
Crime). This excluded most cases in which illegal possession of firearms (carrying a firearm without a
permit) and illegal possession of a firearm and illegal drugs were tracked. We ran our analyses using
two groups of cases. First, we examined cases with one of the aforementioned gun charges but with no

3
additional non-gun-related primary charge. We then included all cases with one of the above gun
charges, including those with a gun charge and an additional primary charge. Thus, cases in which a
warrant was issued and an arrest was made later were excluded from our analyses, as were cases that
initially had lesser charges but were later charged with offenses that met the criteria for inclusion in the
GunStat database. We also omitted reverse waiver cases, sexual offenses, police shootings, and federal
cases because these cases were thought to be qualitatively different from most other GunStat cases or
were too few to assess trends.

We contrasted the GunStat cases for those convicted in 2008 versus 2007 with respect to
charges brought, whether the offender was convicted of a gun charge or a different charge, sentence
range after subtracting suspended time (< 12 mo., 1-2.9 years, 3-4.9 years, 5+ years), mean and median
number of prior arrests, and mean age. For offenders convicted of gun charge, we compared 2008
versus 2007 cases with respect to whether the offender was subsequently charged with any new crime
and whether the new charges were for crimes involving firearms and/or violence. To examine similar
follow-up times for cases convicted in 2008 versus 2007 in the bivariate analyses, we identified new
charges through the end of 2011 for offenders convicted in 2007 and new charges through 2012. We
used logistic regression to estimate the effects of being on the GOR on reoffending risks controlling for the
number of follow-up days (actual sentence in days subtracted from the difference between disposition date
and 12/31/12), age at index incident, number of prior arrests, and number of prior gun arrests.

RESULTS

Citywide Trends in Homicide and Nonfatal Shootings

Homicides and nonfatal shootings were relatively stable from 2003 through the middle of 2007,
when the VCIS units were deployed in key hot spots for gun violence and the city began its focus on, in
Commissioner Bealefelds words, bad guys with guns. Between 2007 and 2008, homicides dropped
from 282 to 234, a 17.7 percent decline (Figure 1), and nonfatal shootings dropped from 652 to 587, a
10.0 percent decline (Figure 2). Yearly changes in total homicides since 2008 have been less dramatic,
though the city did reach a low of 197 homicides in 2011, the fewest the city had recorded since 1977
and 30.1 percent lower than in 2007. Unfortunately, homicides increased to 217 in 2012. Nonfatal
shootings, however, continued to decline from 652 in 2007 to 372 in 2012, a 43 percent decline.

Estimates of the Impact of the Violent Crime Impact Section and Project Exile Call-ins on Neighborhood
Gun Violence

4
 The downward shift in homicides and nonfatal shootings observed citywide around the time
that the VCIS units and Project Exile call-ins began is consistent with the hypothesis that these
interventions may have contributed to reduced gun violence in Baltimore. However, if these
interventions did reduce gun violence, reductions in gun violence should be concentrated in the areas in
which these interventions were applied.

Figure 1. Annual homicides in Baltimore City, 2003-2012.

Homicides
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Figure 2. Annual nonfatal shootings and homicides in Baltimore City, 2003-2012.

700

600

500

400
NFS
300 Homicides

200

100

0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

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Estimating the Impact of Efforts to Reduce Gun Offending

The primary analyses designed to assess the effects of VCIS deployment and Project Exile call-ins
were based on the 39 police posts with the highest rates of gun violence during the baseline period
(2003-2006) because these posts were where the interventions were deployed, or were comparison
areas most comparable to the posts that received the interventions. Across all 39 of these high-risk
police posts, there was a mean of 0.25 (SD = 0.51) homicides per month during the period before
Baltimores focused efforts to combat gun crime and a mean of 0.17 (SD = 0.43) during January 2008
through May 2012 when all components were in place, a 32% decline. The decline in nonfatal shootings
between these two periods in high-risk posts was even greater, from 0.57 (SD = 0.79) before the
interventions to 0.28 (SD = 0.56) after, a 51% decline.

Model estimates indicate that VCIS deployment was associated with a statistically significant
27.3% reduction in homicide incidents in the posts affected (IRR = 0.727, z = -2.02, p = .043); however,
none of the three Exile call-ins were associated with changes in homicide incidents in the areas targeted
(Table 1). The point estimate for deploying VCIS in a police post indicated a potential beneficial effect of
15.1% lower risk for nonfatal shooting incidents, but the association was not statistically significant (IRR
= 0.84.9, z = -1.61, p = .108), and the Exile call-in conducted in Northwest Baltimore was associated with
a 39.8% reduction in nonfatal shooting incidents (IRR = 0.602, z = -3.23, p = .001; Table 2). When the two
outcomes were summed into a single measure of the number of homicide and nonfatal shooting
incidents, VCIS deployment was associated with a statistically significant 17.8% reduction in risks (IRR =
0.822, z = -2.47, p = .013)and the Exile call-in in Northwest Baltimore was associated with a 29.4%
reduction in gun violence (IRR = 0.706, z = -4.52, p <.001). The pattern of findings was similar when the
effects of VCIS were measured in terms of the marginal effect of each VCIS detective deployed within a
police post. Each additional VCIS detective deployed reduced homicide risks by 3% (IRR = 0.97.1, z =-
2.32, p = .020), but did not immediately impact nonfatal shootings (IRR = 0.999, z = -0.06, p = .949).

Findings for the direct and spill-over effects of each Safe Streets intervention were similar to
those reported in a prior study of that programs impact on gun violence in Baltimores most dangerous
neighborhoods, which examined data through the end of 2010.1 Briefly, two of the four Safe Streets
intervention sites were associated with significant reductions in homicides and one with the briefest
intervention period was associated with an increase in homicides. Two of the four intervention sites
had significant program-related reductions in nonfatal shootings in the intervention areas and in posts
bordering the Safe Streets sites.

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Table 1. Model estimates for effects of gun violence prevention interventions on homicide incidents.

Homicide incidents IRR Robust Std. Err. z P>|z|

VCIS deployed 0.727 0.115 -2.02 0.043
Northwest District call-in 0.867 0.252 -0.49 0.624
Western District call-in 1.045 0.193 0.24 0.811
Eastern District call-in 0.955 0.262 -0.17 0.866
East Baltimore redevelopment 1.489 1.119 0.53 0.596
Northeast Baltimore displacement 0.823 0.164 -0.98 0.327
Safe Streets - McElderry Pk 0.794 0.082 -2.24 0.025
Safe Streets - Ellwood Pk. 1.127 0.106 1.27 0.204
Safe Streets - Madison-East End 3.034 0.622 5.41 <.001
Safe Streets - Cherry Hill 0.658 0.065 -4.26 <.001

Table 2. Model estimates for effects of gun violence prevention interventions on nonfatal shooting
incidents.

Nonfatal shooting incidents IRR Robust Std. Err. z P>|z|

VCIS deployed 0.849 0.086 -1.61 0.108
Northwest District call-in 0.602 0.095 -3.23 0.001
Western District call-in 0.859 0.140 -0.93 0.353
Eastern District call-in 0.957 0.236 -0.18 0.859
East Baltimore redevelopment 0.512 0.265 -1.29 0.195
Northeast Baltimore displacement 1.072 0.290 0.26 0.798
Safe Streets - McElderry Pk 1.047 0.057 0.85 0.398
Safe Streets - Ellwood Pk. 0.655 0.045 -6.15 0.000
Safe Streets - Madison-East End 0.594 0.069 -4.52 0.000
Safe Streets - Cherry Hill 0.913 0.070 -1.20 0.231

Estimates of the Impact of Gun Offender Registry Home Checks on District-Level Gun Violence

After an offender is placed on the Gun Offender Registry (GOR), officers in in the GOR Unit
notify the offender, confirm the conviction and the sentence given, and explain the conditions under the
ordinance. When the offender comes in for the required initial meeting with officers, he is registered,
photographed, and relevant background information is placed into the database. Information provided
from offenders is verified through comparison with information in court, police and MVA records and

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other relevant databases. GOR officers also debrief offenders at registration and disseminate
intelligence to appropriate units, including the VCIS. A database is maintained with the offenders
personal information, firearm information, and relevant intelligence obtained through debriefing or
provided by other units, such as patrol and VCIS. The unit updates information on each offender at each
required six-month appearance. The GOR Unit also does spot checks on addresses to ensure offenders
are in compliance, and coordinates information with Parole and Probation if an offender is out of
compliance.

The focus of this report is to examine whether home checks of individuals on the GOR living in
Baltimore City reduced gun violence in the neighborhoods where the gun offenders lived. Close
monitoring of GOR offenders was part of BPDs overall strategy of focusing their attention and resources
on gun offenders. This monitoring included home checks conducted primarily by officers assigned to
the posts in which the offenders live and secondarily by the GOR Unit. Unfortunately, there was not
consistent reporting of home checks conducted by patrol officers, and data on these home checks was
only tallied at the District level rather than by the smaller sub-unit of posts. There was noteworthy
variation in home checks by District during the study period (Figure 3). There were more than three
times as many GOR home checks of offenders residing the Northwest District than for offenders living in
the Northern District. Although the Eastern District has very large numbers of GOR registrants, it had
among the fewest home checks. There were also significant changes in GOR home checks over time
(Figure 4). During the first two years of the program, the number of monthly home checks fluctuated
around 25, then gradually increased through the third quarter of 2011, and peaked at 219 in April 2012.

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Figure 3. Gun offender registry home checks in Baltimore, Jan. 2008 Dec. 2012 by District.

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0
Cent SE East NE North NW West SW

Figure 4. Number of Gun Offender Registry Home Checks by Month.

250

200

150

100

50

0
A-08

A-09

A-12
F-08

F-09

F-10

A-10

F-11

A-11

F-12
N-08

N-09

N-10

N-11
M-08

M-09

M-10

M-11

M-12

We analyzed monthly data at the District level to assess whether there was any association
between the frequency in home checks within a police post in the month of the checks and homicides
and nonfatal shootings. The models controlled for the number of VCIS detectives deployed, Safe Streets
operating within the District, as well as the effects of the large redevelopment project in East Baltimore.
Because the models for monthly homicides would not converge, we analyzed quarterly homicide counts

9
in relation to GOR home checks. This model indicated no significant association between quarterly
home checks within a District and homicide risks (IRR = 1.004, z = 1.39, p = .163; Table 3). Contrary to
expectations, we found that home checks of GOR registrants was positively associated with monthly
nonfatal shootings within a District, each home check linked with a 0.5% increase in the risk of homicide
in that month within a District (IRR = 1.005, z = 4.16, p <.001; Table 4). It is worth noting that these
district-level analyses produced estimates of the effects of VCIS detectives as having protective effects
against both homicides and nonfatal shootings. For each VCIS detective deployed, there was a 0.5%
decrease in homicides per quarter and a 0.4% decrease in nonfatal shootings per month.

Table 3. Estimates of Gun Offender Registry home checks on homicide incidents in police districts.

Homicide incidents IRR Robust Std. Err. Z P>|z|

Number of GOR home checks conducted 1.004 0.003 1.39 0.163
VCIS detectives deployed 0.995 0.002 -2.03 0.043
Safe Streets 0.899 0.103 -0.92 0.356
East Baltimore redevelopment 0.799 0.086 -2.09 0.037

Table 4. Model estimates of Gun Offender Registry home checks on nonfatal shooting incidents
within a police district.

Nonfatal shooting incidents IRR Robust Std. Err. Z P>|z|

Number of GOR home checks conducted 1.005 0.001 4.160 <.001
VCIS detectives deployed 0.996 0.001 -3.680 <.001
Safe Streets 0.803 0.031 -5.690 <.001
East Baltimore redevelopment 0.734 0.019 -12.030 <.001
Northeast Baltimore displacement 1.101 0.042 2.490 0.013

Estimates of Effects of Gun Offender Registry on Reoffending Risks

To understand if and how the Gun Offender Registry might affect reoffending risks and public
safety in Baltimore, it is useful to understand what type of offenders get onto the registry and when
they are added to the registry. Tables 5 and 6 present the types of convictions which led to offenders
going onto the registry by year for those who were once on the registry and then went off of the
registry 1 and for those who are still active in the registry. Among both the offenders who had previously
been on the registry and were no longer on it, the majority (62%) of the gun convictions were for illegal

1
Offenders go off the registry as a result of going three years without another gun conviction, death, or for other
reasons such as incarceration for non-gun offenses.

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wear, carry, or transport of a firearm (carrying a concealed firearm without a permit), 27% were for
being a prohibited person (felon, violent misdemeanant, youth under age 21) with a firearm, and only
2.6% were for committing a crime with a handgun (e.g., armed robbery, assaults). Among offenders
who are currently on the GOR, 42% had been convicted of wear/carry/transport offenses, 39% were
persons who were illegal to possess firearms, 6.6% were for crimes committed with firearms, and 5.8%
were for simultaneously possessing illegal drugs and firearms. Although many offenders convicted of
illegally possessing firearms may have histories of violence, very few are put onto the registry as a result
of committing a crime with a firearm and the majority of the GOR offenders in the early years of the
registry did not have prohibiting convictions (felonies or misdemeanor crimes of violence). It is also
evident from these data, that very few violent crimes committed with a firearm result in the offender
ending up on the GOR. Overall recidivism for crimes involving firearms among the 1,903 offenders
during the time they were on the registry was low. Ninety-two (4.8%) were subsequently charged with a
gun offense and 38 (2.0%) were charged with a violent crime committed with a firearm.

Table 5. Convictions leading to offenders going onto Baltimores Gun Offender Registry by year for
offenders no longer on the registry.

Gun offense conviction 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Wearing, carrying, or transporting handgun 147 146 130 11 0 0
Use of handgun in commission of crime 3 6 7 0 2 0
Illegal possession of an assault pistol 0 0 0 0 0 0
Use of machine gun in crime of violence 0 0 1 0 0 0
Controlled dangerous substances crime and 4 3 8 0 0 0
use of firearm as separate crime
Firearm crimes (5-622) 3 9 4 0 0 0
Felon in possession of regulated firearm 21 28 31 0 1 0
Possession of regulated firearms by person 9 10 19 1 0 1
convicted of misdemeanor crime of violence
Possession of regulated firearm by person 13 35 17 1 3 0
under age 21 years
Sale, transfer, disposal of stolen firearm 0 0 0 0 0 0
Removal or alteration of identification mark or 0 3 1 0 0 0
number on firearms
Possession of short barreled rifle or short 4 5 5 0 0 1
barreled shotgun
Possession of rifle or shotgun by person with 1 0 1 0 0 0
mental disorder
Carrying long barrel firearms 0 1 0 0 0 0
Discharging firearm 0 0 6 0 0 0

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Table 6. Convictions leading to offenders going onto Baltimores Gun Offender Registry by year for
offenders on the registry as of August 2013.

Gun offense conviction 2010 2011 2012 2013

Wearing, carrying, or transporting handgun 56 179 184 91
Use of handgun in commission of crime 4 24 34 17
Illegal possession of an assault pistol 0 0 1 0
Use of machine gun in crime of violence or 0 0 3 1
aggressive purpose
Controlled dangerous substances crime and 6 21 26 16
use of firearm as separate crime
Firearm crimes (5-622) 3 7 11 9
Felon in possession of regulated firearm 15 55 62 47
Possession of regulated firearms by person 13 45 80 62
convicted of misdemeanor crime of violence
Possession of regulated firearm by person 10 35 26 23
under age 21 years
Sale, transfer, or disposal of stolen regulated 0 1 1 1
firearm
Transporting regulated firearm for unlawful 0 0 1 0
sale or trafficking
Removal or alteration of identification mark or 0 1 2 1
number on firearms
Possession of short barreled rifle or short 1 7 3 2
barreled shotgun
Possession of rifle or shotgun by person with 0 0 0 0
mental disorder
Manufacture or sale of handgun 0 0 0 0
Carrying long barrel firearms 0 5 2 0
Discharging firearm 0 4 1 2

Our estimation of the effects of the GOR on recidivism focused on a comparison of cases
monitored through GunStat with dispositions in 2007 (just before the GOR ordinance went into effect)
and 2008 (the first year the GOR was in effect) in which the actual sentence was less than five years (and
therefore was significant time to examine recidivism risks). Note that GunStat did not track cases in
which the most significant gun charge was for possessing a firearm without a permit. Table 7 compares
these two groups for their baseline characteristics. More than 70% of offenders charged with
committing a violent crime with a handgun were not convicted of a gun charge. Table 8 shows the
subset of cases that were not convicted of gun charges and their offenses. Over half (54.4%, 62 of 114)
of these cases involved offenders who were charged with crimes of violence.

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Table 7. Characteristics of sample from GunStat database (n=309).

2007 (n=98) 2008 (n=211)

Gun Charge N % N %
CDS Possession of firearm 0 0 1 0.5
CDS Distribute, etc. w/firearm 0 0 1 0.5
Firearm possession w/ felony conviction 45 45.9 106 50.2
Firearm/drug traffic crime 0 0 4 1.9
HGV Use in felony violent crime 53 54.1 99 46.9

Convicted of gun charge (n=155) *

Yes 14 28.0 27 25.7
No 36 72.0 78 74.3

Actual sentence
<12 months 32 32.7 52 24.6
1 2.9 years 14 14.3 34 16.1
3 4.9 years 7 7.1 20 9.5
5+ years 45 45.9 105 49.8

Number of prior arrests Mean Median

Median 5.8 4.0 6.0

Number of prior gun arrests Mean Median

Median 0.7 0 0

Mean age (years) 24.7 26.7

*Includes those with actual sentences of less than 5 years (n= 50 for 2007; n= 105 for 2008)

Table 8. Primary charge for those not convicted of gun charge with less than 5-year actual
sentence (n=114)

2007 (n=36) 2008 (n=78)

n % N %
Armed robbery 16 44.4 27 34.6
Armed carjacking 2 5.6 1 1.3
Aggravated assault 0 0 4 5.1
Assault and (armed) robbery 3 8.3 7 9.0
Attempted murder 0 0 2 2.6
Breaking and entering 1 2.8 0 0
CDS violation 5 13.9 16 20.5
Handgun violation/felon in possession 6 16.7 20 25.6
Open container 0 0 1 1.3
Robbery 2 5.6 0 0
Theft over $500 1 2.8 0 0

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 Table 9 presents the bivariate comparison of reoffending for the group eligible for the gun
offender registry (2008) and a similar group convicted of gun crimes prior to the GOR ordinance for
similar follow-up time (through 2011 for the 2007 group and through 2012 for the 2008 group).
Reoffending for any type of charge was twice as high in the 2007 disposition comparison group
compared with the 2008 disposition GOR group (32.1% vs. 14.2%, p=.008). Similarly, the likelihood of
the 2008 GOR group being charged with a subsequent gun offense was much less common than was the
case for the 2007 comparison group (2.8% vs. 13.2%, p=.011). Both of these differences in reoffending
risks were statistically significant. Fitting with this pattern, the 2008 GOR group was less likely than the
comparison group to be subsequently charged with a crime of violence (7.6% vs. 15.1%, p=.136). While
the difference was substantial, due to the relatively small sample size, it was not statistically significant.

Table 9. Charged with subsequent offense among those with for those not convicted of gun
charge with less than 5-year actual sentence (n=159)

2007 (n=53) 2008 (n=106)

p-value
n % n %
Charged with subsequent offense
Any offense 17 32.1 15 14.2 p = .008
Violent offense 8 15.1 8 7.6 p = .136
Gun offense 7 13.2 3 2.8 p = .011

The regression analyses we performed controlled for potential confounders that could bias
these bi-variate associations including follow-up time. Estimates of GOR effects and the effects of
control variables are expressed in terms of adjusted odds ratios (aOR) the odds of reoffending in the
group of interest (e.g., 2008 dispositions and GOR eligible) relative to the odds of reoffending in the
reference group (e.g., the 2007 disposition group) after adjusting for other variables in the model. The
95% confidence intervals for the aOR reflects the range of the true aOR that is being estimated that
would be correct 95% of the time. The findings from these analyses confirm and strengthen the findings
from the simple bivariate comparisons. The aOR for the 2008/GOR group relative to the 2007
comparison for any reoffending indicates that the GOR group offended at a rate that was 23% as high as
the comparison group. Put another way, adjusting for confounders, the GOR group was 77% less likely
to be charged with a subsequent crime than the comparison group. As expected, reoffending risks were
positive associated with younger age, more prior arrests, and more prior gun arrests (Table 10).

14
Table 10. Adjusted odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regression models for
being charged with any subsequent offense. (n=159)
aOR 95% CI
Year of conviction
2008 (vs. 2007) 0.23 0.89, 0.60**

Age at index incident (vs. 30+ yrs.)

15 17 yrs. 4.79 2.04, 65.26
18 20 yrs. 5.56 0.98, 31.55*
21 24 yrs. 2.55 0.52, 12.50
25 29 yrs. 1.35 0.32, 5.64

Number of prior arrests (vs. none)

12 1.88 0.32, 11.14
35 2.24 0.46, 11.05
6 or more 3.79 0.63, 22.88

Number of prior gun arrests (vs. none)

1 0.97 0.29, 3.32
2 2.73 0.44, 16.89
3 or more 11.54 2.04, 65.26**
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 11. Adjusted odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regression models for being
charged with any subsequent violent offense. (n=159)
aOR 95% CI
Year of conviction
2008 (vs. 2007) 0.47 0.13, 1.75

Age at index incident (vs. 30+ yrs.)

15 17 yrs. 85.21 1.50, 4839.32*
18 20 yrs. 24.91 0.71, 870.59
21 24 yrs. 0.33 0.22, 4.81
25 29 yrs. 0.35 0.04, 3.40

Number of prior arrests (vs. none)

12 0.54 0.02, 13.06
35 0.54 0.03, 9.53
6 or more 2.31 0.07, 74.96

Number of prior gun arrests (vs. none)

1 13.63 0.85, 218.49
2 108.78 2.66, 4441.51*
3 or more 181.16 5.16, 6356.98**
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

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Table 12. Adjusted odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regression models for
being charged with any subsequent violent offense. (n=159)

aOR 95% CI
Year of conviction
2008 (vs. 2007) 0.08 0.01, 0.59*

Follow-up days 1.00 1.00, 1.00

Age at index incident (vs. 30+ yrs.)

15 17 yrs. 2.18 2.04, 65.26
18 20 yrs. 0.68 0.98, 31.55
21 24 yrs. 1.05 0.52, 12.50
25 29 yrs. 0.08 0.32, 5.64

Number of prior arrests (vs. none)

12 6.94 0.39, 122.91
35 12.93 0.98, 170.75*
6 or more 1.02 0.03, 40.67

Number of prior gun arrests (vs. none)

1 1.91 0.23, 15.61
2 22.16 0.50, 982.74
3 or more 38.36 0.91, 1623.36

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

The regression analysis indicated a negative association between having a 2008 gun conviction
and GOR eligibility and subsequent violent offending with the odds of violent offending being
roughly half as high as would have been expected without the GOR; however, the difference
was not statistically significant (Table 11). However, after controlling for confounders, the
2008/GOR gun offense convicts were 92% less less likely to subsequently be charged with
another gun offense (aOR = 0.08; 95% CI = 0.01, 0.59). Younger offender age and increasing
number of prior arrests and number of prior gun arrests were predictive of heightened risk for
subsequently being charged with crimes involving guns and violence.

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DISCUSSION

Beginning in the spring of 2007, Baltimore began shifting its crime fighting strategy to focus
more of its resources on reducing gun violence, through greater focus on the arrest and successful
prosecution of gun offenders, and deterring illegal gun possession and sales. The focus of the current
study is on the effects of three key pieces to that strategy 1) the deployment of the Violent Crime
Impact Section, units of detectives instructed to focus on gun offenders and illegal gun possession,
deployed to hot spots for shootings; 2) Project Exile call-ins of high-risk offenders in high-risk
neighborhoods where these offenders were warned of federal prosecution and provided services and
encouragement to turn away from crime; and 3) the Gun Offender Registry created by a city ordinance
effective January 1, 2008 on neighborhood gun violence. In addition to these strategies, the city also
created a new unit the Gun Trace Task Force to investigate and make arrests for illegal gun
possession and transfers, and instituted GunStat to coordinate law enforcement efforts to combat gun
violence in the city with a special emphasis on improving the prosecution of gun crimes. The overall
trends for homicides and nonfatal shootings in Baltimore suggest that these strategies may have
contributed to reductions in gun violence in Baltimore. Homicide and nonfatal shootings both declined
sharply beginning in 2008. Nonfatal shootings continued to decline and were 43% lower in 2012 than in
2007. Declines in homicides since 2008 have been more gradual and unsteady, but the number of
homicides in 2012, though above that of 2011, was 21% lower than the number of homicides in 2007.

This study sought to isolate the effects of VCIS, Project Exile call-ins, and home checks of GOR
offenders on neighborhood gun violence. The evaluation produced mixed findings on these strategies.
On the positive side, the deployment of VCIS detectives to hotspots for shootings appeared to have a
protective effect against homicides, lowering risks of homicides within a post by 27.3%. Post-level
analyses of VCIS effects on nonfatal shootings estimated a 15.1% decrease associated with VCIS
deployment, though the effect was not statistically significant. District-level analyses, however, did
indicate that having more VCIS detectives deployed did significantly reduce nonfatal shootings, as well
as homicides. Because offenders do not commit gun violence exclusively within the narrow police posts
in which they reside or spend time, the overall benefit of VCIS deployment may be understated by these
analyses, which assume that VCIS effects would be exclusive to the police posts in which they were
deployed. These findings are consistent with other studies showing beneficial effects of deployment of
special police units focused on gun offenders to gun violence hotspots. 2

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 The estimated effects of the Project Exile call-ins indicate that only one of the three that were
implemented during the study period had an impact on gun violence. Specifically, the initial call-in in
Northwest Baltimore was associated with a rather large (40%) reduction in nonfatal shootings and a
nonsignificant reduction in homicides. There was no evidence of beneficial effects for the call-ins
conducted in the Eastern and Western police districts. As with VCIS deployment estimates, Project Exile
call-ins may have broader effects beyond the police posts from which offenders were drawn which
would bias our estimates of the effects of call-ins toward the null. So-called focused deterrence
strategies in other cities have consistently been shown to lower violent crime. 3

Our analyses revealed a positive correlation between the number of home checks of GOR
offenders and nonfatal shootings within a District and no association with homicides. But our ability to
estimate the impact of GOR home checks on neighborhood gun violence was greatly diminished by the
lack of more micro-level data on which specific offenders were visited within which specific posts, as
well as what we believe is nonstandard methods of recording home checks across police districts and
over time. Both of these limitations would likely understate the protective effects of GOR home checks.
Furthermore, commanders may order more home checks of GOR offenders during times when gun
violence is spiking and thus, explain the positive association between home checks on nonfatal
shootings. Additional research is underway in Baltimore to estimate GOR effects on offender recidivism
using offenders convicted of gun offenses just prior to the GOR ordinance becoming effective in 2008.
Preliminary evidence is encouraging. Over 1,000 offenders have been released into the community and
only 6 percent have subsequently been arrested for gun crimes.

Our analyses of records from BPDs Gun Offender Registry Unit on the background of GOR
offenders as well as our examination of the GunStat database created to track offenders arrests for
serious gun offenses reveal that very few offenders become eligible for the GOR as a result of a
conviction for a violent crime committed with a firearm. Similarly, the vast majority of offenders who
commit violent crimes with guns are convicted for charges other than violent crimes committed with a
firearm. That is not to say that offenders on the GOR do not represent a potential threat to public
safety, but that the most violent offenders with the greatest risk of reoffending are getting lighter
sentences for convictions on lesser crimes that do not result in their being monitored via the GOR. This
may also explain the lack of evidence that home checks of GOR are not associated with lower rates of
violence in the areas in which GOR offenders live.

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 The data presented pertinent to the GORs effects of reoffending were quite encouraging.
Despite increased police monitoring as a result of being on the GOR that could heighten risks of being
charged with a subsequent crime independent of actual criminal offending, being on the GOR reduced
the risks of offenders being charged with any subsequent offense by 77% and reduced the risk of being
subsequently charged with a gun crime by 92%. It is worth noting that our examination of the effects of
the GOR on recidivism was limited to GunStat cases which excluded the least serious gun crimes (e.g.,
carrying a firearm without a permit) as well as the other end of the continuum offenders who were
sentenced to five years or more for a gun crime. These omitted groups represent a large proportion of
GOR offenders. Subsequent research will examine the effects of the GOR on reoffending across the
broad spectrum of gun offenders.

1
Webster DW, Whitehill JM, Vernick JS, Curriero FC. Effects of Baltimores Safe Streets Program on gun
violence: a replication of Chicagos CeaseFire program. J of Urban Health 2013;90:27-40.

2
Braga A, Papachristos A, Hureau D. Hot spots policing effects on crime. Campbell Systematic Reviews
2012 8.
3
Braga A, Weisburd D. The Effects of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime.
Campbell Systematic Reviews 2012; 6.

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