De Castro vs De Castro
They executed a false affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge
Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
Respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married
to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child.
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that
their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated
by a fake affidavit. He also averred that they never lived together
as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural
father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. The
Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration
of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties
marriage.
Issue is whether the marriage is valid or not.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render
the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the
evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have
a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years. However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she
was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain
and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.
Santiago vs People
Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang, asked petitioner
to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then,
married Santos. Four months after the solemnization of their
marriage, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while
her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.
Petitioner asserted that she could not be included as an accused
in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief
that Santos was still single when they got married. She also
averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second
marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but
in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the
lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first
wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged
that she had met petitioner on which occasions the former
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied
this allegation and averred that she met Galang only or after she
had already married Santos.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied. On
appeal, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses'
narration.
Issue: Is the second marriage of Santiago valid, for there to be a
conviction for bigamy?
YES. It is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos
took place without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of
Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under
Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from
the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
the celebration of their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of
this fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted
an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago,
contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they
were eligible to contract marriage without a license.
Petitioner now seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her
illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license
despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no
less than her marriage contract.
Petitioner was held guilty of bigamy.
 Republic vs Nolasco
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in
England. After that, she lived with him on his ship for 6 months.
After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment
contract and left the province. Later on, Nolasco received a letter
from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son,
she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned
home in November 1983.
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of
its port calls. He wrote several letters to the bar where he and
Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet.
Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-
General, appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court
erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco
had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for
such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue is: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that
his wife is already dead.
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement under the Article 41 of the Family Code, the
existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for
judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter
standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It
requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can
be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to
ascertain about Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of
seeking help of local authorities or of the British Embassy,
secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to
give any information about her was too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he took
him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave
from his captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he
inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the
returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he
was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities
to find his wife.
Calisterio vs Calisterio
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the
respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of
land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William
Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace
in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of
Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958
without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds
presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a
petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and
that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly
bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her
after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due
to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was
solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was
the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in
August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.
Unlike in the Family Code, the New Civil Code does not
necessitate a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee
spouse as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death
is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7
consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry
then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore
she has a right and can claim portion of the estate.
 Valdez vs Republic
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She
gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly
because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her
child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her
parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from
Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed
to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the
last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married
Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application for
naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage
with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed
a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid
despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios
death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and
not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is
only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio
and their marriage is legal and valid.
Republic vs. Estrada and Olemberio
On 2008, Teresita J. Olemberio filed a Petition for Declaration of
Absence and Presumption of Death of her husband Diego before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay. Teresita alleged she
married Diego in Bukidnon. Sometime in December 1976, Diego
left their residence and never came back.
He failed to communicate with her for the past 32 years and
never made contact with any of their children or immediate
relatives. She alleged that she exerted all efforts to reach her
husband but failed. She filed the present petition to declare her
husband presumptively dead so that she could contract another
marriage without any impediment.
On 2009, the RTC Malaybalay granted her petition and declared
Diego for all legal intents and purposes presumptively dead in
accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Petition for Certiorari contesting the
grant of petition. On 2013, the appellate court denied the
petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Before this Court, OSG is alleging error on the part of the lower
courts in their appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the
death of Diego as well as the insufficiency of efforts of Teresita
in locating Diego's whereabouts which let her to form a belief
that the latter is already dead. This petition was dismissed.
In this case, Diego's absence for more than 30 years, which far
exceeded the law required four years of absence, is more than
enough to declare him presumptively dead for all legal intents
and purposes. Further, it can be clearly gleaned from the totality
of evidence that Diego had already died due to the prevalence
of New People's Army in Malaybalay.
Thus, declaration of presumptive death is granted and petition
of OSG is denied.
 Santos vs. Santos
Upon prior petition by Ricardo that his wife, Celerina, be
declared presumptively dead, the RTC of Tarlac City granted it on
July 27, 2007. According to Ricardo, he and his wife were married
in 1980; they first lived in San Juan, but after a year moved to
Tarlac City. Due to business reverses, Celerina convinced him to
allow her to work as domestic worker in Hongkong, She applied
in an employment agency, and left in February 1995, never to be
hard again. He exerted efforts to locate Celerina, but the same
proved futile; he inquired from his relatives but no one gave him
any information; 12 years had since passed between the time
she left abroad and the filing of the petition.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment
of the RTC decision declaring her presumptively dead with the
Court of Appeals.
According to her, she learned about Ricardos petition only in
October, 2008, and she could no longer avail of appeals, motion
for reconsideration or new trial. She was deprived of her day in
court when Ricardo alleged she was a resident of Tarlac City,
when her true residence was in Quezon City, their conjugal
home; Ricardo left the conjugal home in May, 2008. She also
never left abroad as a domestic worker.
The court also did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition since
it was never published in a newspaper of general publication; the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor s
Office was also not notified on the petition.
The Court of Appeals however dismissed her petition for being
the wrong remedy. It ruled that Celerinas remedy was to file an
affidavit of reappearance before the local civil registry in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. Her motion for
reconsideration denied by the Court of Appeals, she elevated her
case to the Supreme Court; she argues that an affidavit of
reappearance is appropriate only when the spouse actually
disappeared. It would be incongruous to file an affidavit of
reappearance when she did not actually disappear or were
absent; a petition for annulment of judgment is the appropriate
remedy when the declaration of presumptive death was
obtained fraudulently.
The Courts ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Courts judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in
Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to
be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the
acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It
is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of
the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or
from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair
submission of the controversy
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals
sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on
November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the July
27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a
month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The
petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed
by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred
by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of
jurisdiction.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina
at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with
them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with
the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an
admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage
to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was
declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that
the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is
subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of
fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance;
and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or
judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does
not always immediately cause the subsequent marriages
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead
spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage
only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are
present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the
absent or presumptively dead spouses reappearance (1) if the
first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a
nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not
recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or
(4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of
law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of
reappearance.
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes
of determining the status of the second marriage and the
liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other
spouse was absent.
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed
his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he
contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element
of well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code,
which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous
marriages to apply.
 The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy
to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not
preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact,
recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated
by filing an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination
of the subsequent marriage.
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not
a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage
under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and
the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be
the same as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage
conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate.
Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense
against prosecution for bigamy.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the
subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy. However, a
Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who
stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to
nullify the second marriage,[20] this remedy is not available to
her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the
subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage,
mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice.
Celerinas choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the
petition.