[G.R. No. L-11005. October 31, 1957.

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES, INC., Petitioner, v. FILEMON LUCASAN and Hon. W. M. ORTE

Orendain & Sarmiento for Petitioner.

Hon. Wenceslao M. Ortega in his own behalf.

Barrios, Barrios & Lucasan for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

2. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATORY DECISION, CONSTRUED. In construing confirmatory decisio

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch

". . . judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating to the Siari of Filemon Lucasan special
January, 1951 and to pay the cost of the proceeding. In addition, the defendant is here

With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of th

With regard to the three causes of action the counter-claim of the defendant, all of th

Upon petition by the intervenors, the intervention had been dismissed in a previous ord
After our decision had become final, the expediente was returned to the court below f
judge sustained Lucasans contention, this petition for mandamus and other auxiliary r

Knowing the extent and scope of our decision in said appealed case, we issued a prelim
"Therefore it is hereby affirmed with cost against appellant."cralaw virtua1aw library

Ordinarily the affirmed judgment is that contained in its dispositive part; in the said Si

It is true that in the opening statements our decision quoted the dispositive part of the

"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating to the Siari Valley Es

P40,000 plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the trial of this case in

With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of th

thereby omitting the portion regarding buffaloes. But observe that we used elliptical si

For that matter, would respondents maintain likewise that the last two paragraphs of t

We explained in Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil., 570, 44 Off. Gaz., 4306 that "the final jud

In construing confirmatory decisions of appellate courts the practice is to regard the w

The truth is, as may be verified from our decision itself, our statement omitted the por
THIRD DIVISION
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of t

The relevant facts are culled from the records.

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-001
second wife, petitioner Vilma.

On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portio

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
 2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PE

3. Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The decision became final on March 15, 2004.[4]

As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land co
subject land.[7] This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent M

The RTC denied the motion in an Order[9] dated August 30, 2005, for the r

The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement erec

A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced durin
 settled rule that the court can not give a relief to that which is not alleged and

To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on whic

In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be

The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgm

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari[12] where he sought

In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certio

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 200

SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same

Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding

The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons ot

The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect con

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initi

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a veri
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidatio

Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requiremen

 As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition t

This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedu
section.

xxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order o
xxxx

Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the

xxxx

The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical la
the requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts. At the on
 The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt pro
shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion sho

It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infir
disposition of the present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA decis
However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute be
squarely, here and now.

The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction
a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the estate of the
when they proposed in their letter of August 5, 2004, the following swapp

Sir:

Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and sim

However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for mor
 (1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.

(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.

x x x x.[22]

We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition fo

It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the comp
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. T

The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the hous

We are not persuaded.

 To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningle
subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house which is per

Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased.[24] Petitioners never controve
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on t

Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property.[29] Petitioners add that said ho

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by a

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its
family residence 20 years back.[31]

It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stand
 Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both s

The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heir

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immed
owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted un

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subje
partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to o

The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals[33] that a claim for except

To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subje
the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.

It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to th

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November

within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.point necessary to understand or decide the questions then before
The argument is advanced that in as much as the plaintiff "never claimed the buffaloes
specified in his pleadings." 6

The other argument addressed to the proposition that this Court shouldnt have, and c

All the foregoing shows the respondent judges mistake in declining to permit Siari Vall
committed contempt of court considering on the one hand that his ground of objection

Wherefore, the petition for mandamus is granted, the respondent judge, and whoever

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, R

Endnotes:

1. 97 Phil., 987.

2. It would be unorthodox, not to say illegal, thus to modify, since the litigants are ent

3. In the absence of words to the contrary.

4. The affirmance of a judgment makes it conclusive as to all matters actually adjudica

5. The effect of the confirmatory judgment as an adjudication is not controlled by gen

6. See section 9 Rule 35, Rules of Court; Iturralde v. Magcauas, 9 Phil. 599; Santos v. M

7. Cf. Rule 53 section 5 in relation with section 1, Rule 58.

8. He even managed to convince the judge of a superior court.

9. People v. Rivera, (91 Phil., 354) and other cases cited in Moran, Rules of Court (1957

10. Gamboa v. Teodoro, (91 Phil., 270) and other authorities cited in Moran, Rules of C

11. Gamboa v. Teodoro, supra.

[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997]
FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment
issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be
executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home
under the provision of said Code?
Statement of the Case
This is the principal question posed by petitioner in
assailing the Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals in
[1]

CA-G.R. SP No. 18906 promulgated on February 21, 1990

and its Resolution promulgated on March 21, 1991,
affirming the orders issued by the trial court commanding
the issuance of various writs of execution to enforce the
latters decision in Civil Case No. 53271.
The Facts
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli
[2]

purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-meter

residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of
P75,000.00. The property, located in Commonwealth
[3]

Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered

by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile,
Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of
P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and
his company entered into a compromise agreement with
private respondent, the salient portion of which provides:
c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of
P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but
expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be
collected. (sic)
On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment
approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It
enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in
good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a
motion for execution which the lower court granted on
September 23, 1986. However, execution of the judgment
was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several
vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In
partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels
were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale
were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a
motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop
the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground
that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged
that the compromise agreement had not yet matured as
there was no showing that they had the means to pay the
indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been
collected. They buttressed their motion with supplements
and other pleadings.
On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the
motion on the following grounds: (a) it was too late to
question the September 23, 1986 Order considering that
more than two years had elapsed; (b) the second alias
writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c)
petitioner and his company were in bad faith in refusing
to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that from
February 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had collected the
total amount of P41,664,895.56. On September 21, 1989,
private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner and
his companys addendum to the motion to quash the writ
of execution. It alleged that the property covered by TCT
No. 174180 could not be considered a family home on the
grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and
that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should
have been judicially constituted as a family home to
exempt it from execution.
On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the
motion to quash the writ of execution and the prayers in
the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his
company. Finding that petitioner and his company had
not paid their indebtedness even though they collected
receivables amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court
held that the case had become final and executory. It also
ruled that petitioners residence was not exempt from
execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home,
pursuant to the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioner and his company filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the lower courts
Orders of September 23, 1986 and September 26, 1989.
On February 21, 1990, Respondent Court of Appeals
rendered its now questioned Decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari. The appellate court quoted with
approval the findings of the lower court that: (a) the
judgment based on the compromise agreement had
become final and executory, stressing that petitioner and
his company had collected the total amount of
P57,224,319.75 but still failed to pay their indebtedness
and (b) there was no showing that petitioners residence
had been duly constituted as a family home to exempt it
from execution. On the second finding, the Court of
Appeals added that:
x x x. We agree with the respondent judge that there is
no showing in evidence that petitioner Maacops residence
under TCT 174180 has been duly constituted as a family
home in accordance with law. For one thing, it is the clear
implication of Article 153 that the family home continues
to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its
beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 actually resides
therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue as such family
home if none of its beneficiaries actually occupies it.
There is no showing in evidence that any of its
beneficiaries is actually residing therein. On the other
hand, the unrefuted assertion of private respondent is
that petitioner Florante Maacop had already left the
country and is now, together with all the members of his
family, living in West Covina, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion for
reconsideration of this Decision on the ground that the
property covered by TCT No. 174180 was exempt from
execution. On March 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals
rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion.
It anchored its ruling on Modequillo v. Breva, which held
[4]

that all existing family residences at the time of the

effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to this case, the
Court of Appeals explained:
The record of the present case shows that petitioners
incurred the debt of P3,468,000.00 from private
respondent corporation on February 18, 1982 (Annex `A,
Petition). The judgment based upon the compromise
agreement was rendered by the court on April 18, 1986
(Annex `C, Ibid). Paraphrasing the aforecited Modequillo
case, both the debt and the judgment preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Verily,
the case at bar does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari arguing that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Modequillo. He contends that there was no need for him
to constitute his house and lot as a family home for it to
be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of
the same property from the time it was levied upon and
up to this moment.
The Issue
As stated in the opening sentence of this Decision, the
issue in this case boils down to whether a final and
executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution
issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be
executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.
The Courts Ruling
We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error. On the contrary,
its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and
applicable jurisprudence.
No Novel Issue
At the outset, the Court notes that the issue submitted for
resolution in the instant case is not entirely new. In
Manacop v. Court of Appeals, petitioner himself as a
[5]

party therein raised a similar question of whether this

very same property was exempt from preliminary
attachment for the same excuse that it was his family
home. In said case, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. filed a complaint
for a sum of money. As an incident in the proceedings
before it, the trial court issued a writ of attachment on
the said house and lot. In upholding the trial court (and
the Court of Appeals) in that case, we ruled that
petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Hence, petitioners family home was not exempt from
attachment by sheer force of exclusion embodied in
paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in
Modequillo, where the Court categorically ruled:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before
extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who
owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from
the time of the constitution of the family home as such,
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of
petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law only under
Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted
as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered
a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner
and his family in 1960 is not well-taken. Under Article 162
of the Family Code, it is provided that `the provisions of
this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed
to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of
the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was
incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March
16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. [6]6

(Underscoring supplied.)
Article 153 of the Family Code Has No Retroactive
Effect
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding
that his residence was not exempt from execution in view
of his failure to show that the property involved has been
duly constituted as a family home in accordance with law.
He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require
simply the occupancy of the property by the petitioner,
without need for its judicial or extrajudicial constitution as
a family home. [7]

Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family

Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
[8]

property became his family home under the simplified

process embodied in Article 153 of said Code. However,
Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the
Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other
words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated
by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to
[9]

be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof

that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws
protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner.
Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the
assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3,
1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the
benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
List of Beneficiary-Occupants Restricted to Those
Enumerated in the Code
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to
address the other arguments of petitioner other than to
correct his misconception of the law. Petitioner contends
that he should be deemed residing in the family home
because his stay in the United States is merely
temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the
house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited
this country, she stayed in the family home. This
contention lacks merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family
home either by the owner thereof or by any of its
beneficiaries must be actual. That which is actual is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or to something which is
presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy,
[10]

however, need not be by the owner of the house

specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
beneficiaries enumerated by Article 154 of the Family
Code.
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of the family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for lead support.
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the
family home is constituted jointly by the husband and
wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and
[11]

overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated

by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home
by an overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case is
[12]

insufficient compliance with the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter
lack of merit. This Decision is immediately executory.
Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and
Francisco, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

PERLA G. PATRICIO, G.R. No. 170829

Petitioner,
Present:

Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario,
JJ.
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF Promulgated:
APPEALS, Second Division,
Respondents. November 20, 2006

x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005 [1] in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition
filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was

survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two
sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino
G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon
situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao,
Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of
Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755)
square meters, more or less.[2]

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private

respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V.
Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was
cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of
petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised
private respondent of their intention to partition the subject
property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent
refused to partition the property hence petitioner and
Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.

On October 3, 2002,[3] the trial court ordered the

partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla
G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the
property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may
put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should
be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.[4]

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration

which was denied by the trial court on August 11, 2003, [5]
hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied
the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9,
2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19,
2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by
petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that
the family home should continue despite the death of one or
both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof.
The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate
court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is
a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G.
Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.[6]

Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005
WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION
AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

II.

COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN APPLYING
ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154
OF THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY HOME
INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP.[7]

The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is

proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such
partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in
the said home.
 Private respondent claims that the subject property
which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor
beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son,
who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as
the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as
such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent
insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date
of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July
1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the
family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family
home, still resides in the premises.

On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject

property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of
the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was
the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner
argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private
respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the
death of their father,[8] hence there is no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and

is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones
lifetime.[9] It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or
by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on
which it is situated.[10] It is constituted jointly by the husband
and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. [11] The
family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.[12]

The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home

either by the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must
be actual. That which is actual is something real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house
specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code,
which may include the in-laws where the family home is
constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law
definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the
beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.[13]

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the

beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or
an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in
the family home and who depend upon the head of the family
for legal support.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must

concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated
in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the
head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the
family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of
10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the
heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where

death occurs to persons who constituted the family home. Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of one or
both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the
continuing existence of the family home:

Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the
constitution of his or her separate property as family home, the property
will remain as family home for ten years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left at
the time of death, we believe the family home will be dissolved
or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If
there are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it
will continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family
home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.

After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs.
May the heirs who are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by
not partitioning the property after the period provided by this article?
We believe that although the heirs will continue in ownership by
not partitioning the property, it will cease to be a family home. [14]
(Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159
in this manner:

The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of
its continued existence is dependent upon whether there is still a
minor-beneficiary residing therein . For as long as there is one
beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are
already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts. 153,
159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years
and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except
when there are compelling reasons which will justify the
partition. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property or
who constituted the family home.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be

expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive
and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years,
unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.

It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a

general rule, the family home may be preserved for a
minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the
unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of
the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her
separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor
beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be
preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of
majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect
the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age
and would now be capable of supporting himself. However,
three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is
entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family.

Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino

Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can
be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family
Code.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family

home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person
who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants contemplates
all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the
family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private
respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased
Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.

As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be

actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also
known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of
the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family
home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario

IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he
has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability
for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law
first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders
of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is
the obligation imposed on the grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support

not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite
residing in the family home and his being a descendant of
Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be
considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent
on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he
is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his
own family home separate and distinct from that of his
parents, being of legal age.

Legal support, also known as family support, is that

which is provided by law, comprising everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.[16] Legal support has the
following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family
ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is
intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be
compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6)
It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.[17]

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot

demand support directly from their grandparents if they have
parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the
order of support under Art. 199.[18] We agree with this view.

The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and

Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the relatives, the
stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support
under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support
is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and
only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer
relatives and so on.

There is no showing that private respondent is without

means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to
prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing
to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal support. On the
contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property
which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since
there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year
period ended in 1997.

With this finding, there is no legal impediment to

partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals
as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the
instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every available
opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these
situations from arising.

As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,[19] no co-owner ought to be

compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may
insist on partition on the common property at any time. An
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property.[20]

Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the

court a quo should have ordered a partition by commissioners
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Not more
than three competent and disinterested persons should be
appointed as commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party
in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court
shall direct.

When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real

estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great
prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may order it
assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same,
provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of
money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the
parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being
so assigned, in which case the court shall order the
commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly.[21]

The partition of the subject property should be made in

accordance with the rule embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil
Code.[22] Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow
and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share
as that of each of the children. However, since only one-half of
the conjugal property which is owned by the decedent is to be
allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to
be given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal
share of the property), the widow will have the same share as
each of her two surviving children. Hence, the respective
shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate
succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino
Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.

In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held that an

action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-
ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court
after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the
parties, the court may and should order the partition of the
properties in the same action.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated
December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY
COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of
the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie
therein, in the following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6;
Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three
(3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine
the technical metes and bounds of the property and the proper
share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in
accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is
made to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the
interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to
one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to
the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties
interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the
commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter
distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share
of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, G.R. No. 185920

ALMA RAMOS WORAK,
MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA
R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, Present:
ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA
R. LIM, CARPIO MORALES, J., Chair
Petitioners, BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
DANILO PANGILINAN,
RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO
BAUTISTA and ROLANDO
ANTENOR,
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 20, 2010

x------------------------------------------
- - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J. :
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint[1] for illegal
dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned
by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein
petitioners. By Decision[2] of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter
ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the aggregate amount of P1,661,490.30
representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay
& service incentive leave pay.
 The Decision having become final and executory and no
settlement having been forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter
issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution [3] which the
Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name
covered by TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila
(Pandacan property).

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family

home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment
award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of
execution.[4] Respondents, however, averred that the Pandacan
property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in
Antipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact served as the
companys business address as borne by the companys
letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the
Pandacan property was indeed the family home, only the value
equivalent to P300,000 was exempt from execution.

By Order[5] of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied

the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed
to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Order.

Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of

Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was
substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also filed before
the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a Manifestation
questioning the Notice to Vacate issued by the Sheriff,
alleging that assuming that the Pandacan property may be
levied upon, the family home straddled two (2) lots, including
the lot covered by TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be
asked to vacate the house. The Labor Arbiter was later to
deny, by Decision of May 7, 2009, the third-party claim,
holding

that Ramos death and petitioners substitution as his

compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at auction of the
Pandacan property. And the NLRC[6] would later affirm the
Labor Arbiters ruling, noting that petitioners failed to exercise
their right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one 1
year period or until January 16, 2009. The NLRC brushed
aside petitioners contention that they should have been given a
fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos death on July
29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the property, holding
that to do so would give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better
right than the Ramos.

As to petitioners claim that the property was covered by

the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as such only
Ramos share can be levied upon, the NLRC ruled that
petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase
in the TCT indicating the registered owner as Ernesto Ramos,
married to Juanita Trinidad, Filipinos, did not mean that both
owned the property, the phrase having merely described
Ramos civil status.

Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the

NLRC erred in ruling that the market value of the property
was P2,177,000 as assessed by the City Assessor of Manila
and appearing in the documents submitted before the Labor
Arbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan property was
constituted as the family home in 1944, its value was way
below P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code was
applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or
extrajudicial constitution.

In the assailed Decision[7] of September 24, 2008, the

appellate court, in denying petitioners appeal, held that the
Pandacan property was not exempted from execution, for
while Article 153[8] of the Family Code provides that the
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence, [it] did not mean that
the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code.

The appellate court went on to hold that what was

applicable law were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code,
hence, there was still a need to either judicially or
extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners
family home before it can be exempted; and as petitioners
failed to comply therewith, there was no error in denying the
motion to quash the writ of execution.

The only question raised in the present petition for

review on certiorari is the propriety of the Court of Appeals
Decision holding that the levy upon the Pandacan property
was valid.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real

right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to
enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.[9]

Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.[10] lays down the rules

relative to the levy on execution over the family home, viz:

No doubt, a family home is generally

exempt from execution provided it was duly
constituted as such. There must be proof that the
alleged family home was constituted jointly by
the husband and wife or by an unmarried head
of a family. It must be the house where they
and their family actually reside and the lot on
which it is situated. The family home must be
part of the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with
the latters consent, or on the property of the
unmarried head of the family. The actual value of
the family home shall not exceed, at the time
of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in
urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
 Under the Family Code, there is no need
to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by
operation of law. All existing family residences as
of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and
are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded
to a family home under the Family Code.

The exemption is effective from the

time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3,
1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior
to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home
must be shown to have been constituted either
judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the
Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction

must be made as to what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must be complied with by
the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the

effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then
it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and
233 of the Civil Code.[11] Judicial constitution of the family
home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts
and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of
Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile,
extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242[12]
of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public
instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of
Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two
modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing
of the privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no
need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially , and the
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154[13]
actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should
belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or
if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been
with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption
does not apply as provided under Art. 155[14] for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988.

And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the

Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.
This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.[15]

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the

family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as
early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated
by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as the Ramos family home, the laws protective mantle cannot
be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show
that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment
but failed because Ramos bank accounts[16] were already
closed while other properties in his or the companys name had
already been transferred,[17] and the only property left was the
Pandacan property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004]
CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS,
respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 15, 1996
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which
[1]

in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge
private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate
son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P
500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition
and support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her
minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the
mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting
the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in
the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros
Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as
petitioners household help. It was while working there as
a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to
Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel
and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to
support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying
petitioners child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The
sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San
Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was
pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner
instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he
rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted
by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City,
she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He
testified that he was a sugar planter and a businessman.
Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a
servant at home. During the course of her employment,
she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon
and return to work the following morning. This displeased
petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for another
job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from
petitioner to go home and spend New Years Eve in Cadiz
City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for
San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were
eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner
offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the
night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While
doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her
about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of
her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another
household, went to petitioners house hoping to be re-
employed as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was
in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioners wife
noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about
the father of the unborn child. She told petitioners wife
that the baby was by her husband. Because of her
condition, she was again told to go home and they did not
see each other anymore.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was
served on him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding
support for private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He
insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He
denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at
the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with
her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to
the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her
husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private
respondent, the trial court declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court
is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance
of the child then there can never be a doubt that the
plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-
minors mother, Florencia Regodos.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the
Court finds the evidence of the plaintiff in support of the
claim to be meritorious; defendant admitted having a
sexual intercourse with the plaintiffs mother, Florencia
Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was
presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide
this case, based on the personal appearance of the child,
then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is
the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother,
Florencia Regodos. [2]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:

The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition
that she was a widow should not prejudice the right of
petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even
where a witness has been found to have deliberately
falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required
that the whole of her testimony be rejected (People vs.
Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly reasonable to
believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some
facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People
vs. Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is therefore no
reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse
with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9)
months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to
appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit A).
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the
evidence adduced before the trial court and there being
no evidence that the latter had overlooked or
misappreciated, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
trial courts findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. [3]

Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[4]
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual
findings of the two lower courts. As a general rule, factual
issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual
findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooks certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a
different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
The Court is convinced that this case falls within one of
the exceptions. [5]

The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between

petitioner and private respondent was based on the
testimony of the childs mother and the personal
appearance of the child.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard
of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
[6]

order for recognition and support may create an

unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family
or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence. [7]

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and

175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and
baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was
without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
[8]

In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal

certificate may be considered a public document, it can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of
the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus,
[9]

certificates issued by the local civil registrar and

baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence
as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. [10]

Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that

petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod
City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof
of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony.
Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside
the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for
recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed
the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her
testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband
is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born
within that marriage is legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
[11]

presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a

declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
[12]

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid

(DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical
resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as
evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts
of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec.
Proc. No. 88-C is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondents petition for recognition and support is
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-
Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA
ALMONTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical
immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.
[1]

In case of assault on his rights by those who take

advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will
rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of
upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and
private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child
named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage,
[2]

they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon

City. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma.
[3]

Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. [4]

Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be

short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo
filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine
[5]

years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10,

1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage
was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario
[6]

was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon

City.
[7]

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was
twenty years old. She, however, averred that the
marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario
at all. [8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario
was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and
annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It
declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a
result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. [9]

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo

had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for
the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the
reconsideration of the above decision INSOFAR ONLY as
that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the
petitioner so-called visitation rights between the hours of
8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday. She
[10]

argued that there was nothing in the law granting

visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose
[11]

Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to

Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an
illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation
rights and the retention of Concepcion as Jose Gerardos
surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial
court denied Ma. Theresas motion and made the following
observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their
son to get at or to hurt the other, something they should
never do if they want to assure the normal development
and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing
that the minor needs a father, especially as he is a boy,
who must have a father figure to recognize something
that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court
believes that the emotional and psychological well-being
of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to
maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one
way or the other on this matter, the Court invokes the
provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education
and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration
has to be, as it is hereby DENIED. [12]

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,

assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting
visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the
continued use of Gerardos surname (Concepcion) despite
the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared
illegitimate and should therefore use her surname
(Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. [13]

On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was

nothing in the law that granted a putative father
visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate
court affirmed the best interest of the child policy invoked
by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the
childs welfare and not the convenience of the parents
which (was) the primary consideration in granting
visitation rights a few hours once a week. [14]

The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child

cannot use the mothers surname motu proprio. The child,
represented by the mother, should file a separate
proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.
[15]

Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of

the adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed
a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she
could better ventilate the issues involved in the
controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective
counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved the
motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling
and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma.
Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in
this case that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to
Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a
lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-
called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was
[Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In
other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to
Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on
December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo
under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario
Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child
of the void and non-existent marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the
child of the legitimate and existing marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code).
Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that
[Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights
over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot
impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without
legal basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate
child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to
destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and
Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment
between the married couple, and would mean a judicial
seal upon an illegitimate relationship.[16]

The appellate court brushed aside the common admission

of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their
son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate
showing that he was born a little less than a year after
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that
various evidence exist that appellee and the appellant
have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural
child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact
that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring
ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a
minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on
the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much
less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the
law determines who are the legitimate or
illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even
the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for
the information contained therein are merely supplied by
the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be
what the law says and not what a parent says it is.
(Emphasis supplied)
[17]

Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a

reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
[18]

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.

Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is
[19]

conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is

legitimate. [20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his
[21]

status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code

provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be
made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale
[22]

of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of

Appeals :
[23]

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a

declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code.
[24]

He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the

status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario
or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the
[25]

legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.

[26]

Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal

right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. [27]

Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void

from the very beginning, he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual
union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis
[28]

of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown

beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that
could have enabled the husband to father the child. [29]

Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal

access is not disproved, unless such presumption is
rebutted by evidence to the contrary. [30]

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted

only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus
between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child.
[31]

To rebut the presumption, the separation between the

spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy
impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they
[32]

reside in different countries or provinces and they were

never together during the period of conception. Or, the
[33]

husband was in prison during the period of conception,

unless it appears that sexual union took place through
the violation of prison regulations.
[34]

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa

were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was
living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City.
Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four
kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the
same city but also that no evidence at all was presented
to disprove personal access between them. Considering
these circumstances, the separation between Ma.
Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not
such as to make it physically impossible for them to
engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence
sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented
by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in
favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer [35]

to the petition for annulment of marriage that she never

[36]
lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that
there was never any sexual relation between her and
Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that
Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her
illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an
avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is
the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of
the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion
by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it
does not mean that there was never an instance where
Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that
there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them.
All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She
never claimed that nothing ever happened between
them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in
Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos
conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility
of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only
serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility
of physical access was never established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is
to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively
lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A [37]

mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity

is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted
[38]

by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

 Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a
married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse
with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. [39]

The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in

favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of
the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. [40]

Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo

was never an issue both in the trial court and in the
appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both
Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose
Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in
effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the
Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be
tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration
against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the
denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her
husband. These are the very acts from which the law
seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise
on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child
[41]

will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to

exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth
certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this
case because it was not offered in evidence before the
trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider
any evidence which has not been formally offered. [42]

Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a

child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of
[43]

birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence

of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is
[44]

determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary

only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned,
or when the status of a child born after 300 days
following the termination of marriage is sought to be
established.[45]

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child

was not under attack as it could not be contested
collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of
proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and
uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima facie
[46]

evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be

rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not
conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of
the statements made therein by the interested parties. [47]

Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie

evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-
conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter
shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also
more conducive to the best interests of the child and in
consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos illegitimacy while
claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart.
The law, reason and common sense dictate that a
legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the
eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred
and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames
of both his father and mother, full support and full
inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is
[48]

bound to use the surname and be under the parental

authority only of his mother. He can claim support only
from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of
that of his legitimate counterpart. Moreover (without
[49]
unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him),
in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as
bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state,
the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose
Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a
pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons
who were passionately declaring their concern for him.
The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly
for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time
already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child
is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when
these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all
this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The
law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy
which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the
presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right
to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma.
Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames. A persons surname or family name
[50]

identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on

from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
[51]

surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law,

not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and
effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil register
regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed
out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants
visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of
his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural
right of both parent and child to each others company.
There being no such parent-child relationship between
them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit
Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child.
Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions
regarding the care, custody, education and property of
the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is
similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. Through its
[52]

laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even

their own parents, to the end that their eventual
development as responsible citizens and members of
society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by
family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in
this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at
their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., no part.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his
mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET
L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 which reversed the decision of
[1]

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila,

Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao
and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan,
Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize
and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir
of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all
successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the
suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by
his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943
before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child
of the late William Liyao against herein respondents,
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later
[2]

amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in

continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the
child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime."[3]

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living
separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10)
years at the time of the institution of the said civil case.
Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965
up to the time of Williams untimely demise on December
2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons
two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a
succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila.
This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga,
from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao.
Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far
East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William
were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and
Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon
Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed
to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with
him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice
of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at
the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the
name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr.
at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her
three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited
and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr.
(Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and
clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs.
Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth
certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank
account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited
[4]

therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office,

[5]

introduce him as his good looking son and had their

pictures taken together. [6]

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were

taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon
together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William
Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in
Baguio. Corazon also presented pictures in court to
[7]

prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao

while attending various social gatherings and other
important meetings. During the occasion of William
[8]

Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the

Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly
acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz,
Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, look I am
still young, I can still make a good looking son." Since
[9]

birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and

enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or
acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct
and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for
his food, clothing and other material needs. However,
after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon who provided
sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La
Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal
belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings
and laminations at the house in White Plains where he
shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that
she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who
were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two
children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo,
namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with
some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao
as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some
other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples
residence and cook for the family. During these
occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in sleeping
clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974,
was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited
her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and
later on in White Plains where she would often see
William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at
the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of
Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and
knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend
Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money
for household expenses and matriculation fees for the
two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During
William Liyaos birthday on November 22, 1975 held at
the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy
and told everybody present, including his two (2)
daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is my son,
very guapo and healthy. He then talked about his plan
[10]

for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to

make it engrande and make the bells of San Sebastian
Church ring. Unfortunately, this did not happen since
[11]

William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita

attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his
clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue
and gray which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph as well
[12] [13]

as another shirt of lime green as belonging to the

[14]

deceased. A note was also presented with the following

inscriptions: To Cora, Love From William. Maurita
[15]

remembered having invited the couple during her

mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures
taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one
another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to
Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor
is Corazon legally separated from her said husband.
However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao
with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or
any other man in the house when she usually visited
Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty
parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her
neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter
being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at
Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the
Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see
Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the
couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from
1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao
was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage
so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play
mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to
play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and
sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among themselves.
Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented
house, paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He
also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that
Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo
although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo
with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon
lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from
his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter
abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was
about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live
with them up to the time of the latters death on
December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and
fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as
well as in the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated
by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the
various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not
have been superimposed and that the negatives were in
the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different
picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents,
William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally
married. Linda grew up and lived with her parents at
[16]

San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got

married; that her parents were not separated legally or in
fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents
would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her
father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and
came home regularly. Even during out of town business
trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her
father would change his clothes at home because of his
personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had
trouble sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described
him as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He
believed that no amount of success would compensate
for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very
tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not
give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal
attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He
suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974
and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in
the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy
and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move,
walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and
her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled
the collection of rents while her sister referred legal
matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and
had personally changed. He was not active in business
and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a
milder stroke during the latter part of September to
October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3)
days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however,
and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the
office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his
family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still
married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally
separated from her husband and the records from the
Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple
obtained any annulment of their marriage. Once in
[17]

1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up

Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately
after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas
office for the return of the formers alleged investments
with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a
parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added
that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company,
was able to take out documents, clothes and several
laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There
was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs.
Yulo is leaving and taking out things again. Linda then
[18]

instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office

upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon
Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing
which belonged to her father after having been shown
three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear,
sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally
married and had never been separated. They resided at
No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up
to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. [19]

Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests

(CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack
sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and
hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2)
to three (3) months under strict medication, taking
aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by
Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol
level control. Tita Rose testified that after the death of
[20]

Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One

Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her
investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita
Rose also stated that her family never received any
formal demand that they recognize a certain William
Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William
Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the
company, Tita Rose did not come across any check
signed by her late father representing payment to lessors
as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita
Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by
Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the
deceased which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was
Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao
from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for
work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at
8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the
evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took
over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and
May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month
that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr.
Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly.
Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from
another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver
and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter
among which was buying medicine for him like capasid
and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was
called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his
employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr.
Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to
the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs.
Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first
to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to
be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket.
People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office.
One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the
office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who
was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself
as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything
about the claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the
information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic
Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty.
Quisumbing when he went to the latters law office. Being
the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said
that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao,
Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty.
Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers
wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he
does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to
Baguio or for activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as
the guardian ad litem of the minor William
Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased
William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl
Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian
Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor
William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the
deceased William Liyao, entitled to all
succesional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was
convinced by preponderance of evidence that the
deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the
latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia
cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed
that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by
direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the
birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential
secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly
acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing
sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his
legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the
trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather
than the illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of
legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof
that marital intimacy between husband and wife was
physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in
relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code. The appellate
court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses
for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo
who were still legally married and have not secured legal
separation, were seen in each others company during the
supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased
William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the
birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William
Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not
sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of
any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a
hand in the preparation of said certificates and
considering that his signature does not appear thereon.
The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family
pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With
regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence
for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there
was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by
William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since
William Liyaos signature and name do not appear
thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and
respondents have raised a number of issues which relate
solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late
William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have
consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation:
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to
claim from the estate of his supposed father, William
Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived
during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. [22]

The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only

flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy.[23]

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is

not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New
Civil Code provides:
[24]

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty

days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
 separately in such a way that access was not
possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had
been living separately for ten (10) years from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with
the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for
her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when
petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of
Separation, executed and signed by Ramon Yulo
[25]

indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any

property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.
[26]

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately

from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child
mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be
invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs
under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the
Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
[27]

strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional

cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the
one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It
[28]

is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to

contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none -
even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory. [29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by
Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor,
herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents
of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of
the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a
child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate
even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present
[30]

petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that

only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his
heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a
valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be
the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot
choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour.
On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
husband who successfully defeated the presumption. [31]

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the

undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo,
in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation
of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional
cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest
the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the
records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed
away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the
time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the
case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his
mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and
Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period
limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss
the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties
on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late
William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent
and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his
alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000]
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon
adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a
certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-
four years old at the time of the child's birth and which
was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the
supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are
adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is
a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of
the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Courts consideration is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
[1]

seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision of the

[2]
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming
[3]

the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special

Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA,
a.k.a. Teofista Guinto."
[4]

The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision

reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements of the Court, judgment is
hereby rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista
Guinto as null and void 'ab initio';
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan
to cancel from the registry of live birth of
Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as
Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil Registrar
of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for
private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to
counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of
Appeals in this wise:
"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as
PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan
City, a petition for the cancellation of the
entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter
referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry
of Iligan City. The case was docketed as
 Special Proceedings No. 3046.
"From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted 'that she
is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa,
who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a
baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house
of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera
and without the knowledge of said spouses,
Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a
housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of
her child, by simulating that she was the child
of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old
and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by
forging her signature x x x; that petitioner,
then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and
personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth
to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by
'hilot'; that the birth certificate x x x of
Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was
totally a simulated birth, signature of
informant forged, and it contained false
entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear
as the legitimate child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa,
when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is
falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c)
The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is
GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real
 mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an
illegitimate child; The natural father, the
carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent
Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab
initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth,
since it is clinically and medically impossible
for the supposed parents to bear a child in
1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariosa
Babiera, was already 54 years old; b)
Hermogena's last child birth was in the year
1941, the year petitioner was born; c)
Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the
void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista
Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of
petitioner who inherited the estate of
cancelled and declared void and theretofore
she prays that after publication, notice and
hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring x
x x the certificate of birth of respondent
Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and
ineffective and ordering the respondent local
civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the
registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
"Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the trial court issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and
the date of hearing thereof 'in a newspaper,
the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the
office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and
TEOFISTA.
"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
'the petition states no cause of action, it
being an attack on the legitimacy of the
 respondent as the child of the spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa
Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to
file the instant petition pursuant to Article
171 of the Family Code; and finally that the
instant petition is barred by prescription in
accordance with Article 170 of the Family
Code.' The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss.
"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla
appeared and filed an answer/opposition in
behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera,
[who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili
as counsel for private respondent.'
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was
always known as Teofista Babiera and not
Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the
truth of the matter [is that] plantiff
Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant]
Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood.
Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother
Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate of
Baptism, x x x Student's Report Card x x x all
incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special
and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the
petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as
the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition
 pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code;
and finally that the instant petition is barred
by prescription in accordance with Article 170
of the Family Code."[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced
during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological
child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no
evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became
pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was
already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted
that the supposed birth took place at home,
notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its
concomitant medical complications. Moreover,
petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local
civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was
purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from
her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code, which stated that only the father could
impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not
subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions
contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his
heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In
this case, the action involved the cancellation of the
childs Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the
ground that the child did not belong to either the father
or the mother.
Hence, this appeal. [6]

Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does
not have the legal capacity to file the special
 proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-
56031 subject matter of this review on
certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-
56031 is improper and is barred by [the]
statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division
utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public
record of petitioner's birth is superior to the
self-serving oral testimony of respondent."[7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to
sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code states that
[8]

the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or,

in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the
legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite
standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest
is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit." The interest of respondent in the civil status of
[9]

petitioner stems from an action for partition which the

latter filed against the former. The case concerned the
[10]

properties inherited by respondent from her parents.

Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the present case. A close reading of this provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision,
however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In
other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latter's child at all.
Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioners
filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first
place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled
[11]

thus:
"Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles 164,
166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the
case at bench cannot be sustained. These
articles provide:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that
they do not contemplate a situation, like in
the instant case, where a child is alleged not
to be the child of nature or biological child of
a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern
a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for
him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his
child; (3) that in case of children conceived
through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent
was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence.
 Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should
file the action impugning the legitimacy of
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court
did not err when it refused to apply these
articles to the case at bench. For the case at
bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not
his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to
Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA
451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code
[now Art. 170 of the Family Code]
is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because
this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal
heirs of their childless deceased
aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is
an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the
decedents child at all. Being
neither [a] legally adopted child,
nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction
 of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is
not a legal heir of the
deceased." (Emphasis supplied.)
[12]

Second Issue: Prescription

Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her
status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has
already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family
Code which provides the prescriptive period for such
action:
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the
civil register, if the husband or, in a proper
case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city
or municipality where the birth took place or
was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not
reside at the place of birth as defined in the
first paragraph or where it was recorded, the
period shall be two years if they should reside
in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If
the birth of the child has been concealed from
or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,
the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the
child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier."
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action
involves the cancellation of petitioners Birth Certificate; it
does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive
period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not
apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate
does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab
initio.
[13]
 Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth
Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented,
especially Hermogenas testimony that petitioner was not
her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of
regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as
petitioners Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of
regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar,
as well as the totality of the evidence presented during
trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there
were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate
itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More
[14]

important, the Court of Appeals observed that the

mothers signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of
petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real
mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogenas
pregnancy, such as medical records and doctors
prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In
fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy
of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of
her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old.
Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such
a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her
own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper
medical care normally available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the
deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she
did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not
hers nor her husband Eugenios. The deposition reads in
part:
"q.....Who are your children?
a.....Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q.....Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your
legitimate child with your husband Eugenio
Babiera, what can you say about that?
a.....She is not our child.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
q.....Do you recall where she was born?
a.....In our house because her mother was our house
helper.
q.....Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista
Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a.....Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from
time to time.
q.....Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever
assert[ed] her as your daughter with your
husband?
a.....No, sir."
[15]

Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth

Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence
other than the said document to show that she is really
Hermogenas child. Neither has she provided any reason
why her supposed mother would make a deposition
stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the
factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts that
petitioner was not the child of respondents parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29,
1992. 1

The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel
died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on
November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio
and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of
San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of
private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so,
that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-
deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-
judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants
whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised
and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She
alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez
and capable of administering his estate. The parties further
exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's
heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
(2) Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and
Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late
Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4)
School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said
spouses reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove,
mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then
thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their
primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late
Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically declared that
2

petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who
were unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters
and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of
the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed
on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The
dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and
another one entered declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez is
not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a
legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to
the petition for the appointment of an administrator of the
intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently,
DENIED; said petition and the proceedings already conducted
therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with
the hearing of Special proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance
with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred
in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and
misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions,
more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code
in this case and in adopting and upholding private respondent's
theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or
impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still
the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence
of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and
demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth and
sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial evidence
of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way
not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the supreme
Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166,
170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be
sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife
with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise
legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that
both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the
child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been that of the husband except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at
the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was
recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of
the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the
child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article only in
the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived
through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles
to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the
heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his
child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner
was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased
aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that
petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate
court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as
follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's
evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and
blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on
record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said
couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a
child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere
while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting
her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their
own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she
herself had believed that she was really their daughter and
entitled to inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the
following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian
never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian,
admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years
and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten
or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to
the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent
obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who
treated his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the
testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez,
Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he
being the only boy and the youngest of the children of their
widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente and his
wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to
adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked
for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys
but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up
unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home
a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the
baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already
77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San
Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding
judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in
Paraaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak
physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria
Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as
one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would
hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be
expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There
were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule,
Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this
case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday
especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house,
but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year
appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her
birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also
true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico,
Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair
once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she
did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that
Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby
Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the
latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the
baby came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by
Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29,
1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with
child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be
hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby
at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a
baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36
(the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of
that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente
O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and
suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years
old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother
of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should
the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced,
skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr.
Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by
Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and
even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth
certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a
midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a
practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense
and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as
their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez,
though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if
not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court
proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents
of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to
legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not
come around doing so either because he was too busy or for
some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child
in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents
is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status
of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr.
Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in
the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs
of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without
descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness
stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty.
Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he
signed the same only because the latter told him to do so (p. 24,
tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such a
statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is
not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant and,
therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr.
Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document
without understanding completely the meaning of the words
"descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we
cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who
has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, 1990).
Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee,
the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as
against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez
is really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death,
would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my
child or only daughter will inherit what is legally my own property,
in case I die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her
husband
that any inheritance due him from my property when he die
to make our own daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not mean
what he legally owns or his inherited property. I leave him to
decide for himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write
and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since
Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously,
Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her husband to
give appellee although without any legal papers her properties
when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the
properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well
knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be
their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria
Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because
that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It
is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the
mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it
is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by
Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth
date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the
evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not negated
by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most
notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3")
purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered
on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the
deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil
Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As
related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the
private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content
of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence,
the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on
July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized
document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without
descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente
Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The
repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed
petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988

VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO
BIJON FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA
GOLEA, MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA
MAYUGBA BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO
FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA
FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all surnamed
FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V.
VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf and as Guardian ad litem
of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN,
all surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.
Ethelwoldo R. de Guzman for petitioners.
Tomas B. Tadeo, Sr. for private respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the
protagonists are her sisters and the children of her deceased brothers on one hand, and the
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child.
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao,
and the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision dated October
25, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which affirmed the trial court's
decision finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the off-
spring, hence, not a legal heir of the late Esperanza Cabatbat.
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-
Cabatbat, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841), praying for the partition of
the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without
issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in the
business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the
possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of
the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband,
Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta,
Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her deceased
brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the private
respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of
Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses
Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported
her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption
proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to
Esperanza Cabatbat were: 1) the absence of any record that
Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta
was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter
was born; 2) the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta
Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was
supposedly born; 3) certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil
Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of Violeta
Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in
Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16, 1977 of
Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the
Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza
Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents; 5)
testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital on May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who
delivered a child there and that she became acquianted with a
patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948
to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are the evidence of
herein petitioners consisting of. 1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record
which was filed on June 15,1948 showing that she was born on
May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she
is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza
Cabatbat; 2) testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his
child with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza; 3) testimony of
Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is
that child; 4) the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao
where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride; 5) Deed of
Sale dated May 14, 1960, wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat,
then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra.
Esperanza Cabatbat; and 6) another Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and
represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat.
Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that
Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses Esperanza
and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a legal heir of
the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive portion of the
trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Finding that defendant VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM is not a child by
nature of the spouses, decedent Esperanza Frianeza and
defendant Proceso Cabatbat, and not a compulsory heir of the
said decedent;
(2) Declaring that the heirs of the decedent are her surviving
husband, defendant Proceso Cabatbat and her sisters, plaintiffs
Consorcia MARIA, BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and BONIFACIA alias
ANASTACIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA her brothers deceased
DANIEL FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse, Adela Vda.
de Frianeza, and their children, Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and
Daisy Glen, all surnamed FRIANEZA and deceased DOMINGO
FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse Decideria Q. Vda.
de Frianeza and their children, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and
Decideria, all surnamed FRIANEZA
(3) Finding that the estate left by the decedent are the thirty
properties enumerated and described at pages 13 to 19 supra
and an equity in the Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum of
P37,961.69 of which P13,221.69 remains after advances obtained
by the deceased during her lifetime and lawful deductions made
after her death;
(4) That of the real properties adverted to above, three-fourth
(3/4) pro- indiviso is the share of defendant Proceso Cabatbat, as
the surviving spouse, one-half () as his share of the conjugal
estate and one-half () of the remaining one-half as share as heir
from his wife (decedent's) estate, while the remaining one-half
() of the other half is the group share of the heirs of the brothers
and sisters of his wife and of the children of the latter if deceased,
whose names are already enumerated hereinbefore in the
following proportions: one-sixth (1/6) each pro-indiviso to
Consorcia Maria, Benedicta alias Jovita, and Bonifacia alias
Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6) to Adela B. Vda. de Fraineza Darlene,
Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, as a group in representation of
deceased brother DANIEL FRIANEZA and one. sixth (1/6) to
Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and
Decideria as a group in representation of deceased brother
DOMINGO FRIANEZA
(5) That of the balance of the equity of the deceased in the
CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY in the sum of P13,221.69, three-fourths
(3/4) or P9,916.29 is the share of Proceso Cabatbat as surviving
spouse and as heir of his deceased wife, and the remaining one-
fourth (1/4) to the plaintiffs under the sharing already stated in
the preceding paragraph; (a) but because defendant Proceso
Cabatbat has overdrawn his share he is ordered to return to the
estate the sum of P796.34 by depositing the same with the Clark
of Court; and (b) defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, not being an
heir, is ordered to return to the estate the sum of P2,931.13 half
of what she and her codefendant Proceso Cabatbat withdrew from
the equity of the deceased under Exhibit 29, receipt dated April
30, 1977;
(6) Ordering jointly defendant a Proceso Cabatbat and Violeta
Cabatbat Lim to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00, the
sum of P4,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and Pl,000.00
from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, and litigation expenses in
the sum of Pl,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and
P200.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, to the plaintiffs,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 236-239, Record on Appeal.)
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 25, 1984.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied
by the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Petitioners have elevated the decision to Us for review on
certiorari, alleging that the Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of Prospers and
Esperanza Cabatbat;
2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of
Court;
3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil
Code;
4. In disregarding Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11 of petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim
Petitioners' first and fourth assignments of error raise factual
issues. The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual
finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is
conclusive upon Us. Well entrenched is the rule that "factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to
great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs.
IAC, 144 SCRA 705). Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which provides that: "Where a private writing is more than thirty
years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and
authenticity need be given" does not apply to petitioners' Exhibit
"5," the supposed birth registry record of defendant Violeta
Cabatbat showing that she was born on May 26,1948, at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, and that her
father and mother are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza,
respectively. In rejecting that document, the trial court pointedly
observed:
This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of
admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza
was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza
was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case before or
after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15,
1948 (Stipulation of Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23, 1977, Record
on Appeal, p. 117).
On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged
to have been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that only one
woman by the same of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos
Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an illegitimate child
who was named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as Baby Girl
Lastimosa (Exhibit S. Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p. 39, Record on
Appeal, pp. 117-118). Furthermore, the record of birth certificates
of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948
does not carry the birth certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat
and the only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates of the
hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose
mother's name is Benita Lastimosa. (pp. 3-4, CA Decision, pp. 13-
14, Record on Appeal.)
Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a
cloud on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5.
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not
well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of
their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but
that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed
decision is affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4
of the dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the widows Adela
B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, who are
not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating
with their children and the surviving sisters of the deceased in the
one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under
Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997]

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R.
DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO,
respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the
judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on
June 30, 1995 which affirmed the Order of December 3,
[1]

1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,

Branch 98, granting herein private respondents Demurrer
to Plaintiffs Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054
pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for
reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein
private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil
Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house
and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by
the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and
Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of
the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister
of petitioners father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her
husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
Petitioners father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed
on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole
[2]

heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the
name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin
Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent
Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 374012 was issued in the latters name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently,
herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on
November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were
presented by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the
nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of
representation from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must
reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the
estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of the
defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral
and exemplary, plus attorneys fees for the willful and malicious
refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in
the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing
fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said
deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be
considered as conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.[3]
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
presented as the lone witness, with the following
documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners
filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family
picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and
Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of
birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death
certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo
Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date
and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint
affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting
to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin
and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners thereafter rested their
[4]

case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to

which a Comment was filed by herein private
[5]
respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to
Plaintiffs Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her
alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated
and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of
proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to
establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of
the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit
executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to
the date, place of birth and parentage of herein
petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the
affiants were never presented for cross-examination. [6]

On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order

granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the
complaint for reconveyance . [7]

In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals

declared that the documentary evidence presented by
herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates,
family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and
insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this
appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondents demurrer
to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to
meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the
Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There
are two points for consideration before us: first is the
issue on petitioners legitimacy, and second is the
question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence
adduced by petitioners, taken separately and
independently of each other, are not per se sufficient
proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to
note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the
case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption
that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be
validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and,
in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus
probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their
filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent
appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There
is no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason
than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of
[8]

legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for these rules has been explained in this
wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties,
and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which
provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint
before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void. This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy.
This action can be brought only by the husband or his
heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170,
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no
longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer
be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to
prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being
in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to
force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity
of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter,
which must necessarily be facts occurring during the
period of the conception of the child, may still be easily
available.
xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
[9]

The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the

legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be
properly controverted in the present action for
reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further
consideration that private respondent is not the proper
party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor
of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in
this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein
petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in
their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing
the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient
cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution
before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It
would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as
the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the
party in whose favor the presumption exists does not
have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in
any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party
denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the
presumption. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong
[10]

that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of

persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. And in
[11]

order to destroy the presumption, the party against

whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible
evidence to the contrary.
[12]

Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to

the contrary, and unless or until it is rebutted, it has
[13]

been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of

evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a
[14]

presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This

is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie
proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus
established prima facie by the legal presumption of its
truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.[15]

Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to

present countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence
instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such
fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential
rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions,
relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the
facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as
duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding
petitioners relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero,
whose estate is the subject of the present controversy,
requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly
of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal,
death and marriage certificates, the various certifications
from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint
affidavits executed by third persons all of which she
identified and explained in the course and as part of her
testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodoras
niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration
[16]

about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to

the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the
subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only
before the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and
fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third
element, that is, whether or not the other documents
offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her
lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present
evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be
made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be
proved by the very declaration itself, or by other
declarations of said declarant, and when it must be
supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set
up a claim through, but not from, the declarant and to
establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding
claimants pedigree, he may not do so by declarants own
statements as to declarants relationship to the particular
family. The reason is that declarants declaration of his
own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly
there must be precedent proof from other sources that
declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of
the particular family; otherwise the requirement to
admissibility that declarants relationship to the common
family must appear is not met. But when the party
claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim
directly from the declarant or the declarants estate, the
situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. In such case the declaration of the decedent,
whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the
one who claims his estate, is admissible without other
proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the
declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground
for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their
evidential value from that consideration, although it is a
useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to
which the declarations belong. The distinction we have
noted is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the
declarations are self-serving, in the other they are
competent from reasons of necessity. (Italics ours.)
[17]

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party

claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to
both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarants estate, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself. There must be some independent
proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that
[18]

there be other proof than the declarations of the

declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is
sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and
not merely to establish a right through his declarations to
the property of some other member of the family. [19]

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the

present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed.
Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her
niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of
such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was
no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being
that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of
the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure
of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case
[20]

an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that

declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely
concluded, on the sole basis of the decedents declaration
and without need for further proof thereof, that
petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. As held in one case, where the subject of the
[21]

declaration is the declarants own relationship to another

person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for
the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact
which the declaration is offered to establish. The
preliminary proof would render the main evidence
unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would
nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not
strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are
however of the considered opinion that the same may be
admitted by reason of private respondents failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they
were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an
[22]

objection shall be made at the time when an alleged

inadmissible document is offered in evidence, [23]

otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, [24]

since the right to object is merely a privilege which the

party may waive. [25]

As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., it has been

[26]

repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest

or objection against the admission of any evidence must
be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed
to have been waived. The proper time is when from the
question addressed to the witness, or from the answer
thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the
inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does
not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions
of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness
must be made at the time the question is asked. An
objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of
incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given,
is too late. Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol
[27]

evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a

position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.
[28]

The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for

private respondent unreservedly cross-examined
petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary
evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of
the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis
for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private
respondents counsel elicited answers from the witness on
the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said
documents: The observations later made by private
respondent in her comment to petitioners offer of
exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already
apparent at the time these documents were being
adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised
therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal
consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein
private respondents failure to object thereto, the same
may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove
the facts therein asserted.
[29]

Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S)

wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora
Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as
the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller (Exhibit
[30]

H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect

the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia
Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of
Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were
made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his
daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo
Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove
that herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes
Dezoller -- these can be deemed to have sufficiently
established the relationship between the declarant and
herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that
a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight
proof of the relationship is required. Finally, it may not
[31]

be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial

evidence the fact that both the declarant and the
claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear
the surname Dezoller. [32]

III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for

the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be
divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters
of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter
by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of
the subject property was automatically reserved to the
surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided
between the widower and herein petitioners who are
entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin
Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided
three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein
private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the
proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-
fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the
demurrer to plaintiffs evidence should have been, as it is
hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no
longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the
mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which provides that if the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. [33]

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of

respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent
are declared co-owners of the subject property with an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
therein, respectively.

SO ORDERED.