Cases Digests Art. III Sec. 4-15

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Norieva de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017
Article III
Bill of Rights
Section 4. . No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
A. Prior restraint
1. EASTERN BROADCASTING V. DANS, JR. - 137 SCRA 628
D: All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule
that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. The clear and present danger test, however,
does not lend itself to a simplistic and all-embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
THE PROTECTION GIVEN TO T.V. AND RADIO BROADCASTS IS SOMEWHAT LESS IN SCOPE THAN THAT
ACCORDED TO PRINT MEDIA.The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost
of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy
high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the
indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over
the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different
I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to
monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the
radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.
BROADCAST STATIONS DESERVE SPECIAL PROTECTION.
N: Resolution on Petition for the opening of the Radio Station DYRE.
F: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due
process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station
violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through
its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner,
Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case.
I: Were DYREs closure is constitutional?
H: Despite the case becoming moot and academic as there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case,
the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters as this case. The court said that there was a violation of due process and freedom of
expression.
R: The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings
are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. CIR. The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station
may be closed.
Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 1 of 79

The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The
court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the
government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test
for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is
used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However,
Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right
to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most
accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due
process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
SC established the following guidelines:

(1) The due process requisites in administrative proceedings under Ang Tibay v. CIR (69 Phil. 635) should be followed
before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed
(2) While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which
government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case,
may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor,20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER RULEthat words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast
corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the
rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted
with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other
forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast
media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material
available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is
constantly tuning in and out. Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account.
The supervision of radio stationswhether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls
for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it.
Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the
same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if
broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most
convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special
protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
expression clauses of the Constitution.
2. TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE - 235 SCRA 630
D: The press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press
prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in
any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication, and RA. No. 7716 is none of these.

It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held
that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.
N: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
F: RA 7716 was enacted seeking to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the NIRC. Before RA 7716, the NIRC included on its list of transactions from VAT: Sec. 103(f): Printing,
publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular
intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.
RA 7716 removed these from its list of exempted transactions. Although the exemption was restored by Revenue Regulation
11-94. The Philippine Press Institute (PPI) question the constitutionality of RA 7716. PPI is a nonprofit organization of
newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. They claimed that it violated Sec.
4 of the Constitution because: Even though the exemption was restored, there is still a possibility that it may be removed;
and the required registration lays a prior restraint to the freedom of the press.
I: Whether the withdrawal of exemption of the press from VAT discriminates against the press and restraints freedom of
the press.
H: No. RA 7716 did not discriminate against the press and restrained freedom of the press.
R: Since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative.
The Supreme Court held that in the cases cited by the petitioner, the tax involved was a license tax, which unlike an ordinary
tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise
of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of
services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the
exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
freedom under the Constitution.
3. CHAVEZ V. GONZALEZ, GR NO. 168338, FEBRUARY 15, 2008
D: Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given
a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties.
In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system; it is only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be
capable of rendering enlightened judgmentswe cannot both be free and ignorant. Freedom of speech and of the press
means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to
official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. When
atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right belongs as wellif not moreto those who question, who do not
conform, who differ. The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those that are
conventional or acceptable to the majority.
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communicationit
protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular
field of human interest; The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideasthe protection afforded
free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative; While all forms
of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television
and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as
will be subsequently discussed.
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e.,
(a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been
established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;

(b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation of type of situation; and
(c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high. As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the
dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently,
we have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
F: On June 6 2005, DZMM aired the HELLO GARCI tapes involving the wiretapped conversation b/w PGMA and
COMELEC Commissioner GARCILLIANO on rigging the results of the 2004 election in favor of PGMA. Initially,
Presidential spokesperson BUNYE confirmed that the woman in the recording is PGMA but he denied it later on.
And because a lot of people (including media and private individuals) were claiming to have copies of the Hello Garci
tapes, Respondent Secretary of Justice GONZALES ordered NBI to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci
tapes for possible violation of the Anti-wiretapping Law.
On June 11 2005, NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for
the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.
Petitioner filed a petition to nullify the acts, issuances and orders of the NTC and GONZALES. One of the grounds raised
is that respondent's conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
I: Whether the NTC warning constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.
H: YES. Acts, issuances and orders UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
R: The rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution commands that
freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined
exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
The exceptions are: when expression may be subject to prior restraint such as: pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint
on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means it is absolutely protected from
censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the
ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.
While Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. If the
content-based prior restraint is directed at protected expression, courts will strike down the restraint as unconstitutional
because there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the
message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression.
A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without
any restraint on the content of the expression. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression which does not
touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the
courts.
In content-neutral prior restraint on protected speech, there should be no prior restraint on the content of the expression
itself. Thus, submission of movies or pre-taped television programs to a government review board is constitutional only if
the review is for classification and not for censoring any part of the content of the submitted materials.

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the
message of the Garci Tapes. The NTCs claim that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful
misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based.
The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing
categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political
expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC
Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.
Thus, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot
is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the
electoral process is one of the highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On
this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional.
The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing of the
Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping
laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected
expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.
Lastly, The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does not vest
NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations.
B. Subsequent punishment
4. PEOPLE V. PEREZ - 45 PHIL 599
D: The provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate
even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious.
The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power.
A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty.
Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the
ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders
it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution.
N: APPEAL from a judgment of Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.
F: Perez was convicted for violating ACT 292, or the Treason and Sedition Law. As he uttered seditious words against then
Governor-General Wood. He was contending that this was covered by the Freedom of Speech under the Bill of Rights.
"The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos,
for he has killed our independence."
I: Whether Perez may be penalized for the seditious words he said against the Governor General?
H: Perez has uttered seditious words.
R: Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the
Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording
immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the
Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used,

which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain
loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to
instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested
and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and
the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be
characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a violation of
section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that,
in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's
imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.
5. GONZALES V. COMELEC - 27 SCRA 835
D: At the very least, the speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint in the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages,
or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent.
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any
limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex
society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much, to
insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other social
values that press for recognition.
The test as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil of a substantive character that the
state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present.
The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with .the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance
questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The
danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
The Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to form
associations or societies when their purposes are contrary to law. How should the limitation for purposes not
contrary to law be interpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for
unless an association or society could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification
for abridging the right to form associations or societies. (Cf. Thomas vs. Collins, 323 U.S. 516) As was so aptly stated:
There is no other course consistent with the Free Society envisioned by the First Amendment. For the views a citizen
entertains, the beliefs he harbors, the utterances he makes, the ideology he embraces, and the people he associates with
are no concern to governmentuntil and unless he moves into action. That article of faith marks indeed the main
difference between the Free Society which we espouse and the dictatorships both on the left and on the right.
The case at bar raised the validity of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 4880 of the too early nomination of candidates
and limitation found therein on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity alleged by petitioners to
offend against the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. The prohibition of
too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in character. According to the act: It
shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political group to nominate candidates for any elective
public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an election, and for any
other elective public office earlier than ninety days immediately preceding an election. The right of association is
affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment
is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is
not unduly narrowed. Neither is there an infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such
purpose.
N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Declaratory relief with preliminary injunction.

F: Note: The Court did not reach the required 2/3 vote hence could not declare this unconstitutional but was of the view
that restrictions on political speeches was repugnant to freedom of speech
Gonzales as a voter and Manila Councilor Cabigao filed for Declaratory Relief and Injunction challenging the validity of
two new sections in the Revised Election Code (RA 4880) which took effect on June 17, 1967. Prohibiting the too early
nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. The law provides it
unlawful for any political party to nominate candidates for any elective public office earlier than 150 days immediately
preceding an election. Or for any other elective public office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding an election.
Petitioners alleged that the said sections are repugnant to the Constitutional prohibition that No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.
I: WON the prohibition against early nomination and campaigning are repugnant to the rights of free speech, free press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association
H: The Court did not reach the required 2/3 vote to declare RA 4880 unconstitutional.
It is the view of the Court that it is unconstitutional to prohibit of any speeches, announcements or commentaries for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of
campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party
Majority (thought not ) found unconstitutional on their face the provision on prohibited speeches inasmuch as they appear
to range too widely and indiscriminately across the fundamental liberties associated with freedom of the mind. At the very
least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action. (note guys, this case is under subsequent
punishment)
Freedom of expression is not absolute. There are other social values that press for recognition like the goal towards free,
honest, orderly and peaceful elections. Two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction.
Clear and present danger rule - Danger must not only be clear but also present. Clear seems to point to a causal connection
with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned
Dangerous tendency rule - Words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable.
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness.
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent. From early campaigning, violence and even death frequently occur because of the heat
engendered by such political activities. The opportunity for dishonesty and corruption, with the right to suffrage being
bartered, was further magnified. Under the police power then, with its concern for the general welfare and with the
commendable aim of safeguarding the right of suffrage, the legislative body must have felt impelled to impose the foregoing
restrictions.
C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process
6. SANIDAD V. COMELEC -181 SCRA 529
D: Anent Respondent COMELECs argument that Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar
petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may
do so through the COMELEC space and/ or COMELEC radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum
where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this
form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioners freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The peoples right to be informed and to be able to freely
and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including
the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions
on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. COMELEC spaces and COMELEC radio time may provide
a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because
they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. Accordingly, the instant
petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional.
N: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.
F: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into
law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The COMELEC, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution,
the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern
the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19
(Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
I: Whether columnists should be prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under COMELEC regulation,
during plebiscite periods.
H: No.
R: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the COMELEC was the power to supervise and regulate
the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period) can be construed to mean that the COMELEC has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate
the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. MEDIA
PRACTITIONERS EXERCISING THEIR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION DURING PLEBISCITE PERIODS ARE
NEITHER THE FRANCHISE HOLDERS NOR THE CANDIDATES. IN FACT, THERE ARE NO CANDIDATES
INVOLVED IN A PLEBISCITE. THEREFORE, SECTION 19 OF COMELEC RESOLUTION 2167 HAS NO STATUTORY
BASIS.
7. ADIONG V. COMELEC - 207 SCRA 715
D: The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except
in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985])
It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed
if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated
by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
N: PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.
F: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347, this resolution regulated the use of election propaganda, and limited
where such propagandas may be placed. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections

now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars
and other moving vehicles.
I: Whether the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit
their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. - NO!
H: The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in
designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
First the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
Second -- when faced with borderline situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on
the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local
officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the
State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them,
the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms in
order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called
balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more
difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections
to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger
be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled: xxx
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully
or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be
curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These
rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses,
endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his
car, to convince others to agree with him.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
8. ABS-CBN V. COMELEC - 323 SCRA 811
D: An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the
purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they
have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the
dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. We cannot support any ruling
or order the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. When faced with
borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know
is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom.
For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the States power to regulate should not be antagonistic.
There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know
are unduly curtailed.
True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe
and accessible. It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the
electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the peoples freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's
responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them.
These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to
study influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably
restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for
long-term research.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
F: Petitioners assail a COMELEC en banc resolution, which prohibits ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting exit surveys. ABS-CBN alleges that such prohibition violates the rights to freedom of
speech and of the press. Public respondent insists that the issuance was pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers
to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections; and to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot.
I: Are the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results protected under the right to freedom of speech
and of the press?
H: YES
R: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest,
orderly and credible elections.
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of
determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted
for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually
through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations,
the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the
dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. We cannot support any ruling or
order the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. When faced with borderline
situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked
against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate
analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the States power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and
honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and
accessible. It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral
process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the peoples freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's
responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them.
9. SWS V. COMELEC 357 SCRA 497
F: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting
surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard,
a newspaper of general circulation.

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA.
No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15)
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise
of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before
the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to
support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys.
No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from
writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason
for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the
manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It
contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a
rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from
manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be
prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e.,
the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit
election survey results but only require timeliness.
I: whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and
the press?
H: Yes, it constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press.
R: To summarize, the Supreme Court held that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression
of freedom of expression.
Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting the publication of election
survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national
election seven (7) days before a local election. Because of tile preferred status of tile constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. ANY SYSTEM OF PRIOR
RESTRAINTS OF EXPRESSION COMES TO THIS COURT BEARING A HEAVY PRESUMPTION AGAINST ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY. THE GOVERNMENT THUS CARRIES A HEAVY BURDEN OF SHOWING
JUSTIFICATION FOR IN ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH RESTRAINT. Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, 4
of the Constitution, which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for
the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like 5.4. For as we have
pointed out in sustaining tile ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C,
4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities "public information campaigns and forums among candidates."
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4? The United States Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. OBrien:
Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content-neutral regulations and is said to have
become canonical in the review of such laws. It is noteworthy that the OBrien test has been applied by this Court in at
least two cases.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated

to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is
greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
The Supreme Court held that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.
(1) The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and
substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for
a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local
election.
(2) By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might
undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators,
armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not
viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results.
(3) As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called dagdag-bawas.
Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental
right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. Thus, under the Administrative Code
of 1987, the COMELEC is given the power: To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any
unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. This is surely a less
restrictive means than the prohibition contained in 5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate
bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters.
10. DAVID V. ARROYO 489 SCRA 160
D: The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases, also
known under the American Law as First Amendment cases; A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conductit is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence.
Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribunes offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication;
third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was
conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth,
policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices. x x x The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4requires that a
search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof
or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime,
unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted
that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
The search violated petitioners freedom of the press. THE BEST GAUGE OF A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
RESTS IN THE DEGREE OF FREEDOM ENJOYED BY ITS MEDIA. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff this Court held
thatAs heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the Metropolitan Mail
and the We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and
sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is
in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental
law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The
search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune
offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary
of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less
than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.Undoubtedly, the The Daily
Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot
tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should
always be obsta principiis.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
F: Immediately, after the promulgation of PP 1017 and General Order No. 5, the Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of EDSA People Power I and revoked
the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of
Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented.
KMU marched from various parts of MM with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already
near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The police used truncheons, big fiber glass
shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants, citing
Presidential Proclamation 1017 and General Order No. 5 as the grounds for the dispersal of their assemblies. Rallyists
petitioners were arrested during the dispersal.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team
confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp
Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the
Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13 A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune
offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid
Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is meant to show a strong presence, to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government. The PNP warned that
it would take over any media organization that would not follow standards set by the government during the state of
national emergency. Director General Lomibao stated that if they do not follow the standardsand the standards are
if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and
Proc. No. 1017we will recommend a takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged
television and radio networks to cooperate with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He
asked for balanced reporting from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the
government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates
rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.
These 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari contended that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts
to defend and preserve democratic institutions, actually violated freedom of the press, speech and of assembly; Raiding of
National Tribune was a clear case of censorship or prior restraint. Petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as
freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her
election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
I: Whether such issuances violate the freedom of expression.
H: The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL

R: "Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is
a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous
restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government
authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and
not for the assembly itself, may be validly required. The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested
while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly, not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a
clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right.
11. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 205728, 21 JANUARY 2015.
F: Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in this petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente
M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop Navarra is also filing this petition in his individual and personal capacity as the questioned
orders are personally directed at him and also as a concerned citizen, as the issues raised herein are matters of paramount
and transcendental importance to the public which must be settled early given the far-reaching implications of the
unconstitutional acts of the respondents. Named as respondents are the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its
Election Officer of Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon. On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have caused to be placed
on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the message Conscience Vote
(Team Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin). The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the names of both Anti- and Pro-
Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates.
In their special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners sought the
nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the
supposed oversized Team Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to nullify the 27 February 2013 order
issued by the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin
and threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if he fails to cause its immediate
removal. On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
COMELEC and Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team Patay Tarpaulin.
I: Are the respondents orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin
unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioner's right to freedom of expression on their own private property?
H: YES. COMELECs orders are unconstitutional.
R: Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate
the tarpaulin. However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case. The tarpaulins are not election
propaganda that can be regulated by the Comelec, but social advocacy on the RH Law that only incidentally advocated
voting or not voting for certain candidates. Comelec may only regulate election material connected to candidates. The
message of petitioners in this case will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in their election
posters or media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes.
Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position
on this social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only
secondarily even almost incidentally will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
12. GMA NETWORK, INC. V. COMELEC 734 SCRA 88
F: Petition assailed the constitutionality of certain regulations promulgated by the COMELEC for the 2013 elections,
regarding the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties, as well as the
requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the sane, and the sanctions imposed for violations. Based on the
regulations, candidates only have a limitation of 120 minutes, and political parties only have 180 minutes for broadcast and
radio advertisements.
Broadcasting companies on the other hand, assailed the Section 7(d) which provides for a penalty of suspension or
revocation of offenders franchise or permit, in the event they sell airtime in excess of size, duration, or frequency authorized
in the new rules, as well as the definition of Aggregate-based airtime, which appears to be too restrictive and vague,
therefore violating Freedom of speech, press and of expression.
I: whether limiting the airtime allocations per candidates and political parties, violates freedom of expression, speech, and
of the press?
H:If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients,
with more reason should establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional
freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the
press.
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And
where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such dissemination becomes
with critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to reach
out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially
reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9(a) of the COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrain
the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Reason levelling the
playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government.
D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts
13. IN RE: EMIL JURADO - 243 SCRA 299
D: Freedom of expression, the right of speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the most zealously protected rights
in the Constitution. But every person exercising it is, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be
availed of to broadcast lies or half-truthsthis would not be to observe honesty and good faith; it may not be used to
insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disreputethis would not be to act with justice or
give everyone his due.
Protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is also a matter of public interest and must be
reckoned with as a factor in identifying and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of press freedom and free
speech.
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all
other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other.
And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm
which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The
norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the
reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort
to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or adjustment between
the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics
adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines.
If relying on second-hand sources of information is, as the Journalists Code states, irresponsible, supra, then indulging
in pure speculation or gossip is even more so; and a failure to present the other side is equally reprehensible, being
what in law amounts to a denial of due process.

The Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation, which tend to put it
in disrepute, obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance
of its functions in an orderly manner.
N: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Contempt.
F: Emiliano P. Jurado is a lawyer and journalist who writes for the Manila Standard. His column is entitled Opinion.
Between Oct. 1992 to March, 1993, Jurado had been writing about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary,
among his claims being:
That a group of judges, he calls Makatis Magnificent Seven, fixes drug-related cases;
That a group of justices, he refers to as the Magnificent Seven of the SC, voted as one;
That there are 12 judges, the Dirty Dozen, who acquired such reputation for graft and corruption.
That 6 justices, their spouses and grandchildren spent a vacation in Hong Kong, all expenses paid for by a public utility
firm (it was suspected that he was referring to PLDT because of a recent decision that had gone in PLDTs favor).
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order which created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the allegations. The
Committee extended an invitation to Jurado to appear before it to give information to assist it in its investigation. Jurado
failed to appear before the Committee. PLDT filed an affidavit denying the allegations. The Supreme Court then issued a
resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted
upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true.
I: Whether or not Jurado can invoke freedom of expression to justify his articles?
H: No. Jurado is held in contempt of Court.
R: Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression
needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One
of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community.
A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Freedom of
expression, the right of speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution.
But every person exercising it is, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
The law does not protect the law a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth; or that a newsman may escape
liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a person or entity, but recognizes no obligation bona
fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of such imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when challenged to
do so. In this case, it was found that Jurado had published the articles without first having talked to the parties concerned
to ascertain the veracity of his serious accusations.
Finally, contrary to the dissents, Jurado is not being called to account for declining to identify the sources of his news stories,
or for refusing to appear and give testimony before the Ad Hoc Committee. He is not being compelled to guarantee the
truth of what he publishes, but to exercise honest and reasonable efforts to determine the truth of defamatory statements
before publishing them. He is being meted the punishment appropriate to the publication of stories shown to be false and
defamatory of the judiciarystories that he made no effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being denounced as lies,
he has refused, or is unable, to substantiate.
14. PEOPLE V. GODOY - 243 SCRA 64
FACTS: A rape case was filed against Godoy by his student (Mia Taha-victim) in the RTC of Palawan presided by J. Gacott.
Eventually, Godoy was found guilty and was sentenced to Death Penalty. A complaint was filed by Judge Gacott, Jr. of
the RTC of to cite for indirect contempt Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva De Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial
board of the Palawan Times for the article written and published by them containing the ff:

Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy.
Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan
ang mga ito?
Meron ding "balita" ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya
ni Taha At kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit
ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit
na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa.
Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa
paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott,
base sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming
nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo." Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na
mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double
death penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan.
Complainant claims that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice;
that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does
not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice
objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the
article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.
Respondent claims that his article does not intend to impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because it was
published after complainant had promulgated his decision in the case, that the comments made therein were made in good
faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press; that while the article may contain unfavorable
comments about complainant, it cannot be considered as having the tendency to degrade or impede the administration of
justice. Lastly, that the article is a mere reaction to the TV interview by J. Gacott.
I: Whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature; Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications
can be the Subject of Contempt Proceedings
H: No
R: The subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes
fair criticism. The article only makes a justifiable query as to why Complainant does not file the appropriate charges if his
accusations are true. It should be noted that Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level
of contumely. Neither does the publication in question was intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be
capable of doing so.
A person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or publishing writings which are clearly
opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely invoking the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by
means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the
liberty of speech or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.
There are 2 schools of thought:

A. The English Doctrine: there can be contempt of court even after the case has been terminated.
B. The American Doctrine: the general rule is that defamatory comments on the conduct of a judge with respect to past
cases or matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt, even though libelous and reflecting on the integrity of the
judge and the court, however libelous or unjust, is punishable as contempt of court.
BUT, In the Philippine setting, these conflicting views on this issue should be reconciled. The Philippine rule, is that in
case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed.
However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by
either of these two circumstances:
1. where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court;
2. where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded.

15. RE: RADIO/TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA TRIAL 360 SCRA 248
F: KBP was requesting that the media be allowed by the SC to cover the Estrada Trial. Public interest, the petition further
averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.
I: W/N the SC has the power to exclude media coverage over the Estrada Trial.
H: YES,
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on
the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial.
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous
with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available
seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should
have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be
totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also
approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings
to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the
overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be
allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they do a former
President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting
phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must these events
be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do
not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into
even the business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing
rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are tasked
to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. A trial is not a free trade of
ideas. Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test truth in a courtroom.
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty
of any person in a hasty to bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns
heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
E. Libel
16. BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS - 301 SCRA 1
D: Fair commentaries (opinion pieces and columns) on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander.
F: Art Borjal used to write a regular column, entitled Jaywalker for PhilStar of which (Max Soliven was the publisher.)
Borjal wrote in his column a blind item about anomalous activities of an organizer of a conference without naming or
identifying anyone. Wenceslao, a civil engineer, businessman, was a technical adviser to Congressman Sison. He was also
Executive Director of First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT), which organizes seminars in order to
draft an omnibus bill for land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. FNCLT was funded through solicitations
from the public. In Jaywalker, Borjal alleged that the organizer is in fact doing extortion and have been name dropping
the President and DOTC secretary. Wenceslao felt alluded to and wrote a rebuttal in Stars Letter to the Editor. Wenceslao
filed criminal complaint for libel against Borjal and Soliven but was dismissed by the Fiscal. He filed another Civil
complaint for damages based on Libel complaint this time was granted by both RTC and CA. Ordering Borjal and Soliven
to pay 1M to Wenceslao.
I: Wenceslao should be awarded damages based on libelous column?
H: NO.
R: No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the
concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. Citing US jurisprudence, the Court deemed
Wenceslao, a public figure within the purview of the New York Times ruling as he was holding funds solicited from public.
When the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false alle gation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
Wenceslao was not identifiable in Borjals columns. He himself was unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack.
To maintain a libel suit:

1. It is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named.
2. It is Not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed
3. At least a 3rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication.
Revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came from Wenceslao himself when he supplied the information through
his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly
privileged.
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in
bad faith.
Example: parliamentary immunity of legislators
QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED: contain defamatory imputations BUT not actionable, unless found to have been made
without good intention or justifiable motive.
To this genre belong private communications and fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
The enumeration in Art. 354 of the RPC is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications, fair commentaries
on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the
nations penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. The concept
of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press.
17. VILLANUEVA VS. PDI, G.R. NO. 164437, MAY 15, 2009
F: Petitioner Hector Villanueva was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the 1992 elections. 2
days before the elections, respondent Manila Bulletin published a story that he was disqualified as the Lakas-NUCD
candidate for having been convicted in 3 administrative cases and harassment while he was OIC Mayor. The next day, PDI
also came out with a similar story.
He lost in the election. Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the stories, petitioner sued respondents
PDI and MB. He alleged that the articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide,
but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. Respondents

disclaimed liability they asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no
interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature.
I:
H: Petition dismissed.
R: Although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no proof respondents were not impelled by malice or
improper motive. There was also no proof that petitioners supporters junked him due to the reports, and that he would
win, making his action unfounded. While the questioned news item was found to be untrue, this does not necessarily render
the same malicious. It was incumbent on petitioner to prove this, which he failed. To fully appreciate the import of the
complaint alleging malice and damages, we must recall the essence of libel. Libel is defined as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead. The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances:
1. Private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty
2. Fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Articles in question are neither private communications nor true reports of official proceedings without any comments or
remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under
Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. In the instant case, there is no denying
that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. These are matters about which the public has the right to
be informed, taking into account the very public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media mileage
and drew public attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates. As one of the candidates, petitioner
consequently assumed the status of a public figure.
18. DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE - G.R. NO. 203335, FEBRUARY 11, 2014
F: The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can
connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him.
Petitioner claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate
certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order
into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
Sec. (c) (4): Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
RPC Provisions
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of
a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with
them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard
of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds
defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise
good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People even
where the offended parties happened to be public figures.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in
the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating
a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
SEC. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of
any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
I:
W/N Sec. 4 is unconstitutional? NO.
W/N Sec. 5 is unconstitutional? YES
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing"
it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin
board a small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster,
writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the
poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster.
He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or
Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel?
And, in the complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting
cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are
essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting.
Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of
responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who should go
to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
H:
Discussion on Sec. 4 of the Cybercrime Law:
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has
an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article
353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article.
Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture
associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart
in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply
options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to
other internet users. Whether these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the internet constitute aiding and abetting
libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is another matter that the Court will deal with next in relation to
Section 5 of the law.
Discussion on Sec. 5 of the Cybercrime Law:

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently
protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points
out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the
innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law
enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person's image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can
spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that
oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose,
which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person's reputation and peace of
mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress
otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should
provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any
government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-
protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on
social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their
level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1)
on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Sec. 7 of the Cybercrime Law states that:. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice
to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be
prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different
laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the
same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. With the exception of
the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of the correct
application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a
violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially
the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section
4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer
system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so as to
include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact already
covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.
F. Obscenity and indecency
19. PITA V. COURT OF APPEALS - 178 SCRA 362
D: The determination of what is obscene is a judicial function. The public respondents should have first obtained a judicial
determination that the materials in question were pornographic and obtained a search warrant in order to search and seize
the materials in question.
F: Pursuant to an Anti-Smut Campaign, the Mayor of Manila, assisted by different divisions of the police, seized and
confiscated Pinoy Playboy magazines along with other materials they considered to be obscene, pornographic, and
indecent. Later, they burned the seized materials. Plaintiff, one of the editors of Pinoy Playboy filed a petition seeking to
enjoin the Mayor and the police from confiscating more of its magazines, alleging that they are not obscene per se and are
protected under the Constitution under freedom of speech and of the press. The RTC denied the petition. The CA affirmed.
I: Whether or not the determination of what is obscene is a judicial function?
H: No
R: In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress
smutprovided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally
evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of
civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James
Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works are considered important literature today. Goyas La
Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the worlds most prestigious museums.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there were many conflicting decisions in the US that made it difficult to identify
a hard and fast rule when it comes to determining whether something is obscene or not.
It did say, however that: undoubtedly, immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although
not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a
clear and present danger that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the
burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . .
authorit[ies].
The Court was not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no quarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals.3 Neither do we. But it brings us back to
square one: were the literature so confiscated pornographic? That we have laws punishing the author, publisher and
sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969),3 is
also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the statute?
G. Assembly and petition
20. PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - 80 PHIL 71
F: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public
meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense
for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact
that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered
tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities,
which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated
police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace,
and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite

a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1
I: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
H: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the
City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly
or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is
subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount
to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must
be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented
is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify
its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
21. JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - 125 SCRA 553
F: Petitioner, retired Justice JBL Reyes sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2 to 5pm, from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a
short program would be held 2 speeches, a petition for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy so that it may be delivered
to the US Ambassador. There was likewise an assurance of a peaceful march and rally. Barely a week before the scheduled
rally, there was still no action on the request. Thus, he filed this petition for mandamus on Oct. 20. It turned out that on
October 19, request was denied on the ground of intelligence reports of subversive plans or criminal elements to disrupt
the assembly. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. Respondent Mayor Bagatsing
suggested, however that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any enclosed area where the
safety of the participants and the general public may be ensured.
I: Whether there was a violation of freedom of assembly.
R: YES. Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. Freedom of speech and peaceful assembly provides for a safety valve, allowing
parties the opportunity to give vent to their-views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For the
constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided to give free
rein to one's destructive urges is to call for condemnation.
Freedom of speech and peaceful assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent,
of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
In the instant case, there can be no legal objection since the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil is
absent to a legitimate public interest. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does
not suffice. There is therefore no valid reason for recommending another place because there is no showing that there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.
Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding
or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of 500ft from any foreign mission, in support of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the
embassy gate is less than 500ft. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent
Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be
argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly
presents itself.
22. MIRIAM COLLEGE V. COURT OF APPEALS - 348 SCRA 265
F: Respondent students of Miriam College, published in the school paper and magazine, articles that are sexually explicit.
Thereafter, they received a letter from the Chair of the schools discipline committee that they are conducting an
investigation regarding the matter and were asked to submit their answers. None of them submitted and instead, wrote to
the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through
with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions
some were suspended, dismissed, expelled.
I: Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board.
H: Miriam College Discipline Board has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases filed against its students. Section 5 (2), Article
XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself how best to attain its objectives free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the
institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students
to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it
does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, the of the Campus Journalism
Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when
such article materially disrupts class work involving substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. The power of
the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules
and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power,
like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed
by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against
respondent students.
23. JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS - 281 SCRA 657
F: Petitioners were public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila. Between Sept. 17 21, 1990, they incurred
unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions they staged. The DECS Secretary issued a Return to Work Order,
ordering them, in the interest of public service, to return to work in 24 hours, otherwise, dismissal proceedings shall be
instituted against them. The Return to Work Order was ignored resulting to the DECS Secretary issuing formal charges and
preventive suspension order against them. They were administratively charged with gross misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, etc. When Petitioner failed to file their answers or controvert the charges against them, the DECS Secretary found
them guilty of the charges and imposed the penalty of dismissal. Petitioners are now contesting the decision claiming a
violation of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. They
insist that their gathering was not a strike.
I: Were the petitioners right to peaceably assemble violated?
R: No. There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly, to petition the government for a redress of
grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in
peaceful concerted activities. As regards the right to strike, the Constitution qualifies its exercise with the proviso in
accordance with law. This manifests that the state may by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors
such right. EO 189 enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. While government employees may through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law, they may
not resort to strikes to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. In this case, the mass action or assembly staged
by the petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period.

The grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authoritiesessentially, their
employersto fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially, such as fringe
benefits, clothing allowance, and increase in minimum wage. Petitioners were not penalized for the exercise of their right
to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, they were found guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools
during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding
of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed
themselves of their free timerecess, after classes, weekends or holidaysto dramatize their grievances and to dialogue
with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the CSC or even this Courtcould have held
them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes
resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers.
24. BAYAN V. ERMITA 448 SCRA 226
F: Executive Secretary Eduarto Ermita released a statement ordering the PNP and LGU to strictly enforce the "no permit,
no rally" policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well
as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations pursuant to the BP 880 or the "The Public Assembly
Act of 1985," Because of this, a rally co-sponsored by KMU to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge was blocked by the
police along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members and
other rallyists were even arrested.
Petitioners were assailing the Constitutionality of the BP 880. Bayan, et al., argue that it curtails the choice of venue and is
thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. Jess del Prado, et al, argue that it is unconstitutional because it characterizes public assemblies without a
permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions. KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right,
the limits provided are unreasonable. Respondents argue that:
B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assemblys
time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue
interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit
on the basis of a rallys program content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept
of the "clear and present danger test."
I: W/N BP 880 is UNconstitutional?
R: NO. There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of
grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in
peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. These rights however are not
absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is
the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the
enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political
subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their
25. IBP V. ATIENZA - GR NO. 175241, FEBRUARY 24, 2010
F: In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the office of Manila
Mayor Jose Lito Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but
indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.

IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately went
to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a
violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila
Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for
staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his power; that freedom of
expression is not absolute.
Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal case against him on the
ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
I: 1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed against
him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienzas power to modify the rally permit without consulting with the IBP.
H: 1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari case. Under the
Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a
petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial
question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from
the civil action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place different from that applied
for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant some
time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) Section 6
of the Public Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant
must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically
changed the venue without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of
expression.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
A. Non-establishment of religion
26. AGLIPAY V. RUIZ - 64 PHIL 201
D: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however,
as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And,
in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
F: Act 4052 enacted by the Congress appropriated for P60,000 for the making and printing of postage stamps with new
designs. The Director of Posts was given discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps
would be "advantageous to the Government. The Director of Posts released new stamp design including one
commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress of the Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay Supreme
Head of the Philippine Independent Church (Aglipayan Church) filed a petition for prohibition to stop the Director of Posts
from issuing and selling the said postage stamps. Aglipay alleged that the issuance of the stamps is in violation of the
Constitutional provision on the separation of church and state and that "No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion
I: WON the postage stamps were violative of the said Constitutional provisions? - NO
H: The stamps were not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps
were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
given to that church. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view
The phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize
the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church
The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this
country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give
publicity to the Philippines and its people."
27. GARCES V. ESTENZO - 104 SCRA 510
F: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc Citywere passed:a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente
Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and
cash donations.b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor.
The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.These resolutions
have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the
Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the
barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition.Resolution No. 10 was
passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image.
Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that
Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
I: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
H: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in
connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such
as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made
available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that
were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if
they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public
money or property.
28. VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS - 59 SCRA 94
F: Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory,
Inc. (Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (Union) which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by
this Agreement.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee
presented his resignation to appellant Union. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter
to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer
was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment

membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic
Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No.
875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".
I: W/N Republic Act No. 3350 is constitutional?

Petitioners Contention: Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates
in favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is
now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
H YES. The constitutional provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship
of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, but
also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the
religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man
to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or
all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized
as being only indirect. But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
Aglipay v. Ruiz: The government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if
the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect.
The statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-
establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It
was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting
that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being
impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful
employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In
fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor
and capital and industry. More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection
to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the
collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to
a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of
the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of
closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the
benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially
aided.
29. ISLAMIC DAWAH V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 405 SCRA 497
F: The controversy in this case has to do with halal certification of food. Initially, petitioner Islamic Dawah Council of the
Philippines, Inc (ICDP) was engaged in providing halal certification as a service. However, pursuant to an EO issued by
then President GMA, the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) was given the sole authority to make halal certifications of food.
It was then published and communicated to food manufacturers that halal certification may only be secured from OMA or
else they would be in violation of the executive order. As a result, ICDP lost revenue. Petitioner filed a petition alleging that
the EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and state.
I: Whether or not classifying a food product as halal is a religious function?
H: YES
R: Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are
fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the
mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions. OMA deals with the
societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a national cultural community and not as a
religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure
that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the free exercise
of religion provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its
interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious
activity.
In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can
be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion
of the muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies
charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.
Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims.
30. IMBONG VS. OCHOA 721 SCRA 146
The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government in order to promote public welfare. However, when coercive measures are
found within the law, provisions must be removed or altered in order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution by
infringing on the rights of the people.
FACTS
Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No. 10354 as unconstitutional
Factual Antecedents
December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 also known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH LAW)
The presidents imprimatur and support for the said law lead to a range of petitions against the law leading to iuris controversy in
court. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were placed by numerous parties. All in all, 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention
were filed.
March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement of the law took place
March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues and arguments raised, the court issued Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which lead to
a 120 day halt on the implementation of the legislation
Due to further arguments and debates from opposing parties, the SQAO was extended until further orders of the court last July 16,
2013
Statute Involved:
Republic Act 10354, The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
Position of Petitioner:
o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354 are unconstitutional as they violate the rights to life, to health, to freedom of
expression and speech, to the privacy of families, to academic freedom, to due process of law, to equal protection, and against
involuntary servitude. They also intrude on the autonomy of local governments and the ARMM, and violate natural law. Furthermore,
they claim that Congress delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should be included in the EDL is invalid.
Position of Respondent
There is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination
Some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law
The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
ISSUES
Procedural
o Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy
o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule
Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
v Right to Life
v Right to Health
v Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
v The Family
v Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
v Due Process
v Equal Protection
v Involuntary Servitude
v Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM
v Natural Law
o Whether or not Congress delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should be included in the EDL is valid
HELD
Procedural
o Whether or not the court may exercise its power of judicial review - YES
v While the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. The following requisites for judicial review were met: (a) there mustbe an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; ( c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case
o Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy YES
v Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law
have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
v Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
o Whether the Court may apply facial challenge YES
v The scope of application of facial challenges extends to the regulation of free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights.
v Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech
and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
o Whether or not Locus Standi applies YES

v Regardless of whether the petitioners are directly injured of affected by the RH Law or not, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the
rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest." The RH Law falls under transcendental importance as it drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
o Whether or not the petitions are praying for declaratory relief - YES
v Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs, not declaratory reliefs, and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
o Whether the petitions violate the One Subject/One Title Rule NO
v In a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law, both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. Thus, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
had the intention to deceive the public regarding the contents of the said law.
Substantive
o Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
v Right to Life NO
Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to the time of fertilization and 2.) the protection of the unborn upon said
fertilization
Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those that kill a fertilized ovum)
Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg are thus permissible
It is the intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to prevent the enacting of a law that legalizes abortion.
RH law prohibits abortion
RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
RH law prohibits abortifacients
v Right to Health - NO
With the provisions of RA 4729 still in place, the status quo on the sale of contraceptives is maintained and the Court believes that
there are adequate measures that ensure that the public has access to contraceptives that have been determined safe following
testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA
v Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech NO and YES
RH law does not violate guarantee of religious freedom via the state-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene
the religious beliefs of the people including the petitioners. This is because in doing so, the state would be adhering to one religions,
making a de facto state religion which is contrary to religious freedom.
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable
There limits to the exercise of religious freedom (compelling state interest test)
Benevolent neutrality
RH law does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition (sec.7, 23, 24)
However, RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections
v The Family - YES
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which needs only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision in order to undergo
reproductive procedures intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as
the basic social institution. Not only that, but the exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which declares that the rearing of children by parents is a natural right.
v Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom UNDECIDED
The court decided that making a ruling on Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education, is premature. The Department of Education has not yet created a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education, thus the constitutionality of the specifics in such a curriculum still cannot be determined.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need

to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider
their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
v Due Process - NO
The definitions of several terms pinpointed by the petitioners in the RH Law are not vague.
Private health care institution = private health care service provider.
service and methods are also broad enough to include giving information and performing medical procedures, so hospitals run
by religious groups can be exempted.
incorrect information connotes a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead the public.
v Equal Protection - NO
It is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
v Involuntary Servitude - NO
The State has the power to regulate the practice of medicine in order to ensure the welfare of the public. Not only that, but Section
17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to give pro bono service; they do not incur penalties if they
refuse. Conscientious objects are exempt if their religious beliefs do not allow them to provide the said services.
v Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM NO
The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Under paragraph (c) of Section 17, unless a local government
unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided
by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services
within the jurisdiction of the LGUs. Not only that, but LGUs are merely encouraged and not compelled to provide RH services. Provision
of these services are not mandatory. Lastly, Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 deor the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
outlines the powers that may be exercised by the regional government and does not indicate the States abdication to create laws in
the name of public welfare.
v Natural Law disregarded
Natural law, according to the Court, is not recognized as proper legal basis for making decisions
o Whether or not Congress delegation of authority to the FDA in determining which should be included in the EDL is valid- YES
v Under RA 3720, the FDA, being the primary and sole premiere and only agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, has the power and competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods
Final Ruling
o Petitions partially granted. The RA 10354 is declared constitutional, and Status Quo Ante Order lifted with respect to provisions of
RA 10354 that have been declared as constitutional. However, the following provisions and their corresponding provisions in the RH-
IRR have been declared unconstitutional:
v Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents
or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s;
v Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
v Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;
v Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
v Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

v Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
v Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far
as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
v Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives,
as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.
B. Free exercise of religion
31. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V. CITY OF MANILA - 101 PHIL 386
F: Plaintiff American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation, distributing and
selling bibles (translated into several Philippine dialects) throughout the Philippines. On May 29, 1953, the City Treasurer
of the City of Manila informed plaintiff Society that it was violating several Ordinances (Ordinance 2529 and 3000) for
operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees
covering the period from 1945-1953.
Plaintiff contends that the Ordinances are unconstitutional as they amount to religious censorship and a restraint on the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and prays that judgment be rendered declaring the aforementioned
ordinances unconstitutional and ordering the refund of the sum paid under protest with legal interest and costs.
I: Whether such ordinances violate the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession.
R: YES. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. It may be true that in the case at bar the
price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the
same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit.
For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied
to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well
as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of
a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As
to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax
the business of plaintiff Society.
32. EBRALINAG V. SUPERINTENDENT - 219 SCRA 256
F: Petitioners are students from various public schools in Cebu who were expelled because as members of the religious
group Jehovahs Witnesses, they refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge pursuant
to RA 1265. They argue that these acts go against their religious beliefs on idolatry and cannot therefore be imposed on
them, thus violating their constitutional right to (1) freely practice any religion of their choosing, and (2) receive free
education from the state. Furthermore, they stress that while they do not participate in such activities, they do not engage
in external acts that offend their fellow countrymen in expressing their love of country through the performance of such
behavior.
I: Whether or not their being expelled is violative of their constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
H: Granted, violative of their constitutional rights. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled the highest
protection of a persons human rights. Here, the petitioners are only seeking exemption from the flag ceremony, and not
from the public schools where they may also learn other ways to show and practice patriotism toward their country. In
using the law to force a religious group to participate in a ceremony against their beliefs, this is violative not only of their
right to religious freedom, but also the right to free education of the state also protected by the Constitution.

33. IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. COURT OF APPEALS - 259 SCRA 529
F: Iglesia ni Cristo had a TV program entitled, Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and Channel 13
every Sunday. The program presents and propagates INCs religious beliefs, doctrines and practices oftentimes in
comparative studies with other religions. Several episodes of the program were given an X rating, not for public viewing,
by the Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
INC filed the present petition claiming violation of freedom to exercise religion.
I: Whether or not the Board violated INCs freedom to exercise their religion?
R: Yes. Freedom of religion is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect:
1. Freedom to believe
Absolute, as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
2. Freedom to act on ones beliefs
Subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
Religious liberty, not civil immunity.
o Freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.
o Ex: While one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice,
as that would be murder.
Exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of
some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding
interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
The Clear and Present Danger Test is applied to 4 types of speech:

1. Speech that advocates dangerous ideas;
2. Speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction;
3. Out of court contempt; and
4. Release of information that endangers a fair trial.
In this case, There was no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the episodes would bring about especially the gravity
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already
on ground An examination of the evidence shows that the so-called attacks were mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions.
34. ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR 408 SCRA 1
F: Complainant Estrada requested an investigation of respondent Escritor (court interpreter in RTC of Las Pinas) for living
with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein
as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful
and immoral conduct"
Respondent Escritor testified that she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive
but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. BUT as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.6 In fact, she executed
on, a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness."
For Jehovahs Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses
to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation

all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Escritor and Quilapios declarations were executed in the
usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovahs Witnesses. Solicitor General argued that religious beliefs and
practices should not be permitted to override laws relating to public policy such as those of marriage.
I: Whether respondent is administratively liable?
R: NO. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights "the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights,". Hence, it is not enough to contend that the states interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the
right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the
fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of
right by itself.
Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises
as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the
arrangement she had was "illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature
bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience, the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state, it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on
religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other than the two documents
offered as cited above which established the sincerity of respondents religious belief and the fact that the agreement was
an internal arrangement within respondents congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the records are bereft
of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling
interest is the least restrictive to respondents religious freedom.
Thus, in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very
fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
35. ROMULO VS. PEOPLE 728 SCRA 675
F: The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March
29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey and Claire, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the
latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to
a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
MTC = GUILTY
CA = GUILTY (AFFIRMED)
I: Whether petitioner solemnized the marriage. - YES

H: Petitioner contends that, Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in
ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the blessing into a
marriage ceremony.
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the blessing in good faith for purposes of giving moral
guidance to the couple.
We do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from qualifying
the church blessing into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioners allegation, this principle has been duly
preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective
marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of
the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a blessing, the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this blessing into a marriage ceremony as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
A. Liberty of abode and of travel
36. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS - 177 SCRA 668
D: The right to return to ones country is not among the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. But right to return may be
considered, as generally accepted principles of international law, and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land.
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,against being arbitrarily deprived thereof
F: After the 1986 Revolution, Marcos and his family lived in exile in Hawaii, USA, after causing more than 20 years of
political and economic havoc in the country. 3 years after, Mr. Marcos now in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philippines to die. Filed petition for mandamus against concerned government officials for the issuance of travel
documents. But Pres. Cory Aquino barred their return as it would further destabilize the government and the economy
which is just beginning to rise. The Aquino administration has also just fought off several coup d etats staged by pro-Marco
military loyalists, and at the same time is fighting against the NPA. According to the Marcoses, their return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under Sec. 6 of the Bill of Rights or the liberty of abode and travel, they likewise invoked the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stating rights to
freedom of movement and residence
I: Whether the prohibition for the return of the Marcoses is violative of their right to liberty of abode and travel? NO.
Liberty of abode and travel are different from right to return to ones country
H: The right to travel is not the right in issue in this case but the right to return to ones country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. The right to return to ones country is not among
the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (BOR. BOR treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,
but the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land. The Court cited international precedents of several deposed dictators in Latin America who
were prevented from returning to their own countries. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor
inflexible.
For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of
limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interest. The petitions of the Marcoses cannot
considered solely on the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, other things, the
national situation need to be considered. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. The Marcoses were prevented from coming back to the Philippines based on the
residual powers of the President, and on her role as protector of the peace. The power of the President to allow or disallow
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is considered bases on its impact on national peace and order. Such power cannot
be withdrawn from the competence of the Executive Branch to decide.
37. MANOTOK V. COURT OF APPEALS - 142 SCRA 149
F: Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc
Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain time. He went home to file a petition with SEC for
appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the
Commissioner of Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure, and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the
Commissioner. Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for estafa against
Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for permission to leave the country in each trial courts
stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactionsand opportunities." His
motion was denied. He also wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's
memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of the SEC, denying his leave to travel
abroad. The same was denied; hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as
a matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
I: Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
H: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence
of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach
of the courts.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
A. Right to information
38. LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION - 150 SCRA 530
D: Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. In
case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee
Availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a)
being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
F: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for
mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The CSC had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for
the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.
I: 1. Whether the right of the people to information can be invoked in a mandamus proceeding? 2.Whether the information
sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee?
H: Yes.
1. The constitutional provisions is self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be
enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need
for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized
that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become
operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a
mandamus proceeding such as this one.
CSC questions the personality of the petitioner to bring a suit. The Court said that when a mandamus proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
"Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. To say that only those who
have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of
inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction.
A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information
and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability
of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second
pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be
exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of
said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons
shall be assured.
2. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the
essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to
any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law". It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not
being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or
not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are
civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy
that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable,
and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive
examination.

Public office being a public trust, it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people
even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
39. VALMONTE V. BELMONTE, JR. - 170 SCRA 256

F: The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa
belonging to the opposition were able to secure clean loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986
election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
I: Whether or not the petitioners had a right to the information they sought?
H: YES
R: (1) MANAGEMENT OF GSIS FUNDS IS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. The public nature of the loanable
funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern.
It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected
to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions
were above board.
(2) INFORMATION SOUGHT IS NOT EXCLUDED BY LAW
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of
this petition. GSIS, like all other juridical entities, cannot invoke a right to privacy.
The Court cited ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices: the government, whether
carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of
the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Moreover, the intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered
into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary
or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS,
a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or
loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented
and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to access to official records, the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ
of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it
is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific. The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the
part of respondent to prepare the list requested.

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information
and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records
for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for
failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given
by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political
parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle
policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot
be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled
corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
40. GONZALES V. NARVASA 337 SCRA 733
F: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to theConstitution, and the manner of implementing them.
I: Whether the petitioner has legal standing to file the case NO; Whether Executive Secretary Zamora must be produce
appointment paper of public officials or answer petitioners letter dealing with matter of public concern - YES
H: 1. In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected
to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established
that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent
that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of
EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The
funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief
Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions
of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the
Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.
2. The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before
the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,wherein the Court classified the right to information
as a public right and when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses
the right. However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were
embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public
officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours,
subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.
Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano that [t]he incorporation of
this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There
can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they
are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of the times. The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning matters of public concern,
a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it
is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public.
Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional
and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is,
appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of
the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same
subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with
the information requested.
41. AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY V. AQUINO - GR NO. 170516, JULY 16, 2008
F: Petitioner Akbayan filed petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee
requested herein respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the
JPEPA. USec. Aquino did not heed the request, however. DFA explains that the Committees request to be furnished all
documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a work in
progress for about three years.
Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the Philippine government within December 2005, the present
petition was filed on December 9, 2005. The agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki
I: Whether the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right
to information.
R NO. This is an exception due to executive privilege. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it
is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of
public concern.
This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. We hold that
the balance in this case tilts in favor of executive privilege. It is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before a treaty is approved" the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable
to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality
would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but
with other foreign governments in future negotiations. But moot and academic since the full text of the JPEPA has been
published already.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
A. Government employees
42. SSS EMPLOYEES V. COURT OF APPEALS - 175 SCRA 686
F: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged
an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for
work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin
the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation
of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six
(6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances
and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the
SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices.
I: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
H: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission
that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B),
Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created
under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

43. UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION V. LAGUESMA - 288 SCRA 15
F: United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union is a union of supervisory employees. United Pepsi filed a petition for certification
election on behalf of route managers of Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. The petition was denied on the ground that
route managers were managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, which provides: Sec. 245: Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. -- Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organization of their own.
United Pepsi now question the constitutionality of the provision declaring managerial employees ineligible to form, assist
or join unions, contravenes Sec. 8, which provides: Sec. 8: The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
I: Whether or not the provision declaring managerial employees ineligible to form, assist, or join unions contravenes Sec 8?
R: No. The rights guaranteed in Sec. 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not contrary to
law. There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations.
Managerial employees are confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential
capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor
relations. If these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a union, the union would not be assured of
their loyalty to the union in view of evident conflict of interests. The union can also become company-dominated with the
presence membership.
In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, when Commissioner Lerum proposed to amend Sec. 8 by including
labor unions in the guarantee of organizational right, such was only towards the removal of the ban against security guards
and supervisory employees joining labor organizations. Route managers, by the job description, are managerial employees.
Unlike supervisors who merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route managers are
responsible for the success of the companys main line of business through management of their respective sales teams.
Such management involves the planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the
work of supervisors does not entail.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
A. Elements of "taking"
44. REPUBLIC V. VDA. DE CASTELLVI - 58 SCRA 336
F: RP filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondent de Castellvi (judicial administratrix of the estate of the late
Alfonso de Castellvi) over a parcel of land in Pampanga. After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands in
August 10, 1959 and lower court ordered that P10.00 pesos per square meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of
this action is fair and just. It also ordered RP to pay 6% interest. Republic filed an MR, one of the contentions was that lower
court erred in holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced upon the filing of this action.
Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement
between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should
the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should
be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos
constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of
permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national Security. Castellvi, on the
other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements,
entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and
devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Thus, argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease
from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly
rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at
the value at the time of occupancy."
I: When does taking takes place?
R: Upon the filing of the complaint. The "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered
to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. SC find merit in the
contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely:
(1) thae et thntrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not
present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
SC said that it cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent
right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land
in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand. Neither can it be said that the right of eminent
domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. Nor can it be accepted that the Republic would
enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract
of lease when all the time the Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate Castellvi's land if it wanted
to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease
in the absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. To sustain the contention of the Republic would in effect
sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of the property of
its true and fair market value at the time when the expropriation proceedings were actually instituted in court. The
Republic's claim that it had the "right and privilege" to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first
occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of
the lease agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at the
time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the "right and privilege" of paying the lessor what
it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the
lessee's performance of the undertaking to put the land in said condition.
The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not refer to the value of the property
if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the
lessee took possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase was never
intended by the parties to the lease contract
45. GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS - 102 SCRA 597
D: To constitute "taking for purposes of eminent domain the ff: circumstances must concur:
1) the expropriator must enter upon the private property;
2) the entrance must not be for a momentary period, that is, the entrance must be permanent;
3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5) the utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property
F: National Power Corporation filed a complaint for eminent domain with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, praying
that it be allowed to acquire right of way easements over the property of petitioners consisting of two adjoining parcels of
land (Lots Nos. 633 and 634) with a total area of 15.98 hectares.
NPC got possession of the land already, where the CA ordered payment of 0.07 cents per square meter. Petitioners were
alleging that the land should be bought at Php 15.00 per sq meter.
I: How much should the land me?
H: The final question involves the determination of the just compensation. Just compensation is the market value of the
property. It should be determined at the time of the taking. It is the price which it will command where it is offered for sale
by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of having it. The market value
must be determined as of the time the plaintiff takes possession. Thus when possession is ahead of the filing of the
complaint, the date of possession determines the market value.
We first determine the market value of Block 10 consisting of 6,190 square meters. The defendants' witnesses, namely,
Garcia Sandico (tsn., January 9, 1971 p. 27), Gonzalo Mapayo (tsn., Feb. 6, 1971), Igino Sason (tsn., Feb. 6, 1971), Igino Sason
(tsn., May 8, 1971), and Jose Angeles (tsn., May 15, 1975) all testified that the prices of the residential lots in the subdivision
as of 1971 was P15.00 to P20.00 per square meter. The contract to sell dated November 18, 1965 (Exhibit 5) shows that the
price per square meter is P15.00. Another contract to sell dated October 9, 1967 (Exhibit 5-A) shows a purchaser price of
P15.00 per square meter. A request for reservation date July 6, 1970 (Exhibit 6) shows a purchase price of P17.00 per square
meter. Other requests for reservation in 1969 and 1970 show a purchase price ranging from P15.00 to P17.00 per square
meter.
The 0.07 cents per square meter was assessed as the price based on tax declarations presented. However, the value on the
tax declaration was on year 1957, and the taking happened 1969. Therefore, the value should be 15 pesos per square meter.
I: Was there taking? YES HENCE, the need to pay just compensation because the taking happened before the expropriation
proceeding initiated by NPC.
H: A careful reading of this case and the cases mentioned therein shows certain material facts which are not Identical to
the case at bar, to wit: 1) the properties in question became the subject of expropriation proceedings initiated by the plaintiff
Government, and 2) that the possession or "taking" of the Government of the properties in question, whether it was made
before or after the filing of the complaint for expropriation was made for purposes of eminent domain or with the intent to
expropriate. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in reducing the amount from P15.00 per square meter to P0.07 per square meter,
made the value stated in the tax declaration of Block 19 in 1957 its basis on the assumption that in the said year 1957 the
private respondent had taken possession of the land for the purpose of eminent domain and on the further presumption
that subsequent thereto an action for expropriation was entered in court over this property.
To constitute "taking for purposes of eminent domain the ff: circumstances must concur: 1) the expropriator must enter
upon the private property; 2) the entrance must not be for a momentary period, that is, the entrance must be permanent; 3)
the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; 4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and 5) the utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property
46. CITY GOVERNMENT V. JUDGE ERICTA - 122 SCRA 759
F: QC government passed an ordinance requiring operators of memorial parks to set aside at least 6% of their properties
for donation to charity burial or burial of poor deceased persons. To implement said Ordinance, QC prohibited further sales
of memorial lots of companies which have failed to donate 6% of their memorial parks. Himlayang Pilipino filed petition
of declaratory relief, mandamus and prohibition against QC government from implementing said Ordinance for being
confiscatory and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Judge Ericta declared the ordinance null and void.
Defense of QC: valid and reasonable exercise of police power to promote general welfare. And that the land is taken for a
public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.
I: 1. QC ordinance constitutes taking of property without just compensation? YES

2. Or is it valid exercise of police power? - No
H: What the law and the QC Charter authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. Police Power usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in
order to promote the general welfare. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people
In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. In
expropriation, the owner is given just compensation. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
47. MERALCO V. PINEDA - 206 SCRA 196

Summary: In 1974, Meralco filed a complaint for eminent domain against 42 defendants for the purpose of constructing a
transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Pililia, Rizal, with a total area of 237,321 sqm, alleging that the parties failed to
reach an agreement. Private respondents in their motion to dismiss question Meralcos legal existence had expired in 1969
and the area sought is too excessive. Despite these however, the court authorized the expropriation. Thus, the private
respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of the amount they contend was due them pursuant to the expropriation, which
was denied. Later on, Meralco sold to NPC the powerplants and transmission lines traversing the respondents properties.
Because of this, Meralco lost its interest in the properties under expropriation but respondents filed another motion for
payment, which was granted. In this petition, Meralco strongly maintains that the court deprived it of due process in
formulating its own opinion, based on the motions of the private respondets, and without allowing the Baord of
Commissioners to hold hearings for reception of evidence, as provided in the ROC.
SC: Determination of just compensation violative of due process and ROC, remanded for determination of Board of
Commissioners. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons
as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in
expropriation cases.
Longer Version:
F: Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge
of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private
respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the
expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. The complaint alleges
that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal,
petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters.
Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach
an agreement.
The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just
compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of
the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent
court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of
its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the
reception of evidence.
I: Whether the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation
proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
R: Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real
estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects"
executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to
withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without
the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have not
proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not
been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an
expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the
submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to
ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases.
While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of
the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to
the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with
the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.

Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own
estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement
relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to
determine just compensation.
Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit
made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property
owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the
amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and
December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner,
without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error.
Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to
purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those parcels of land
which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXII), as well as those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp.
341-342). Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in
favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has
knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo, pp. 342-343). Hence, We find the
contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in
substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff.
All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment
of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated February 9, 1982 issued by the respondent judge insofar
as it finally determined the amount of just compensation is nullified. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the lower
court for trial with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners. Further, the National Power Corporation is impleaded as
party plaintiff therein.
48. NPC V. JOCSON - 206 SCRA 196
D: There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:

1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners whose
findings are deemed to be final.
F: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent judge in violation of
deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition
of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for
the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process.
However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the
eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued
an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The
petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said
lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank. Respondents landowners filed motion for
reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as
P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the
motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order
while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately
complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated
property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge hence this petition.
I: W/N Judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
H: Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and is otherwise either
unmindful or ignorant of the law: when he fixed the provisional values of the properties for the purpose of issuing a writ
of possession on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitioner may derive in violation or in
disregard of P.D. No. 42; in amending such determination in Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939 by increasing the same without
hearing; in directing the defendants to manifest within twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they are accepting and
withdrawing the amounts, representing the provisional values, deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as "final and full
satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic); " in declaring the provisional values as the final values and
directing the release of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to the defendants even if not all of them made
the manifestation; and in suspending the issuance of the writ of possession until after the suspending the amounts shall
have been released to and received by defendants.
In Municipality of Bian vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al., this Court ruled that there are two (2) stages in every action of
expropriation:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal
of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final
one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So,
too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before
the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or
heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to
be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the property involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires the petitioner, after due notice to the
defendant, to deposit with the Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or agencies, "an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation." This assessed value is that indicated in the tax
declaration.
B. Public use
49. SUMULONG V. GUERRERO - 154 SCRA 461
F: The NHA filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 hectares in Antipolo, including
lots owned by the petitioners. Petitioners challenge the validity of respondent Judge, which granted the expropriations, and
the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for
socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."
I: Whether or not socialized housing is a valid public purpose that justifies expropriation?
H: YES
R: As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the
constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands
to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The
lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide
housing facilities to low-salaried government employees.
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects
public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not
change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications.
A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once.
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be
taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad
faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and
leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner may not interpose objections
merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose.
The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the
common good. The Constitutional provisions on the subject are clear: The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development. (Art. II, sec. 10). The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments. (Art. XIII, sec. 1)
50. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. COURT OF APPEALS - 222 SCRA 173
F: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution authorizing
the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish
a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In
an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for
damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February
26, 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion
to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and
the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also
asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ
of injunction.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the
Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate
the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from
agricultural to non-agricultural land.

I: Whether the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
H: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural
lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use
of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the
land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use.
DIS: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it
(a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents'
property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines
Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property
from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended
motion to dismiss of the private respondents. SO ORDERED.
C. Just compensation
51. EPZA V. DULAY - 149 SCRA 305
F: Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving parcels of land in Lapu Lapu City, Mactan Island, Cebu for the
establishment of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). However, not all reserved area was public land. The
proclamation included among others, the land of private respondent San Antonio Devt Corp. EPZA offered to purchase
the land but they failed to reach an agreement so EPZA filed an action to expropriate. The court ordered EPZA to pay the
fair market value but EPZA argued that pursuant to PD 1533, just compensation should be the market value as declared by
the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
I: WON the determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a judicial function.
R: YES. Provision of PD 1533 is unconstitutional. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. The determination of just compensation in
eminent domain is a judicial function. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. The method
of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 is an impressible encroachment on judicial prerogative. It is violative of
due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax declaration is wrong.
52. MUNICIPALITY OF DAET V. COURT OF APPEALS - 93 SCRA 503
F: In 1962, the Municipality of Daet instituted expropriation proceedings against Li Sieng Giap & Co. for the purpose of
constructing a public park. Li Sieng Giap filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no genuine need, which the
RTC granted and dismissed mainly because there is no genuine need for expropriation. CA reversed and remanded the
case. Thereafter, the RTC fixed the provisional value and required the Municipality of Daet to deposit such amount and
appointed Commissioners. The Municipality of Daet failed to make a deposit and take action thereon for 17 years. Later on,
appealed, invoking PD 42 that just compensation is limited to the assessed value at the time of the filing of the complaint.
I: Was there just compensation and who determines its value?
H: Value must be from the judgment of the court. PD 42 does not limit just compensation to the assessed value. It only
fixes the provisional value of the property. This repealed Sec. 2 Rule 67. By not complying with the orders of the RTC and
CA, petitioner would benefit by its non-compliance and dilly-dallying in taking possession of the property if the value were
to be at the time of the filing of the complaint. Thus, the value should be fixed at the date of rendition of judgment in
conformity with the doctrines that the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of possession because the judgment
was rendered then and also, because the value is just, fair, and reasonable. When the taking is made before the institution
of condemnation, the value is fixed at the time of taking. When the taking coincides with or is subsequent to condemnation,
the value is fixed as of the filing of the complaint. Here, there has been no taking of the property prior to, coinciding with
or subsequent to the filing of the complaint. Upon the filing of the case, it must deposit immediately the ascertained
amount for 2 purposes: (1) Prepayment of expropriation is final. (2) Indemnity for damages if expropriation is dismissed.
53. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS - 129 SCRA 665
F: The National Power Corporation (NPC) negotiated with the spouses Esteben Sadang and Maria Lachica for the purchase
of a portion of the property owned by the spouses. This was for the purpose of constructing an access road to NPCs Angat
River Hydroelectric Project. Nov. 1961: Although negotiations were not yet concluded, NPC was granted permission by the
spouses Sadang to begin construction of the access road. Dec. 7, 1962: B.E. San Diego, Inc., a realty firm, acquired the
property at a public auction and was issued a title. Feb. 14, 1963: NPC instituted proceedings for eminent domain against
the spouses Sadant. Jun. 20, 1963: Petition was amended to implead San Diego.
I: At what point in time should the value of the land subject of expropriation be computed?
H: In this case, basis for due compensation should be the value at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated
by the Government.
Rule on Just Compensation:
When the government takes possession before the institution of Time of take of possession.
the condemnation proceedings
When the taking of the property coincides with or is subsequent Time of filing of the complaint.
to the commencement of the proceedings
In this case, NPC took the property on Nov. 1961, when it constructed the access road. The nature of the land at the time of
taking by the Government is the principal criterion for awarding compensation to the Ruling landowner. The convertibility
of the property into a subdivision is not controlling. It is the time of taking and not as potential building site that is the
determining factor. Since San Diego bought the land in question in the interim and was issued a title only on Dec. 7, 1962,
the taking as to it should commence only from said date. As regard the claim of damages, San Diego is entitled thereto in
the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the
government, 6% from Dec. 7, 1962 up to the time that payment is made by NPC.
54. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PRIMO MENDOZA - G.R. NO. 185091, 8
AUGUST 2010
F: Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner RP (the Republic) through the Department of
Education. PPS has been using 1,149 sqm of land 1957 for its school. But the property, were registered in the name of
respondent. The Mendozas caused the Lot to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows: As a result of
subdivision, the RD issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in
the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4. . PPS remained
in possession of the property.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had
relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the
property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government. The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that
although PPS sought permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it.
They allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time. When the Mendozas demanded that
PPS vacate the property, PPS refused. A case against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction was filed.
RTC ruled in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. CA affirmed the RTC decision and held that
Republics possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into
ownership.
I: Whether the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property that it
had used for a public school.
R: YES. Although, a decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic and all
its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or its notice. Indeed, title to the land,
once registered, is imprescriptible. The CA however erred in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it had held
as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the
property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for
tax purposes. And when they sought to have the bigger lot subdivided into 4, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing
1,149 square meters, for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the Mendozas
agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic,
way back but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should
be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just
compensation.
SC holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby
waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also
held in Eusebio v. Luis, the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering
a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas remedy
is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the
Court affirmed the RTCs power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It
held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for
recovery of possession of property or its value and damages.
As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit
of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
D. Judicial review
55. DE KNECHT V. BAUTISTA - 100 SCRA 660
F: DPWH got an order from the lower court approving expropriation. for construction of EDSA from taft to roxas blvd.
Petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition. (the case at bar)
I: Whether court decision is GADALEJ. - YES
H: DPWH wanted to construct EDSA, 2 alignments are suggested, CUNETA AVENUE and DELPAN STREET, DELPAN
STREET would affect petitioner. Human Settlements Commission considered conditionality social impact and cost on what
alignment should be done. Regarding the cost, DPWH claimed that the difference in the cost was 2M, but in the report, it
was only 260K+. The right-of-way acquisition cost difference factor is so minimal as to influence in any way the choice of
either alignment as the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard.
The factor of functionality states strongly against the selection of alignment while the factor of great social and economic
impact bears grieviously on the residents of alignment.
(IM NOT SURE, kasi magulo case, but i think the report of the commission was to expropriate CUNETA AVENUE and not
DELPAN.) The facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choice of
Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas
Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
56. REPUBLIC V. DE KNECHT - 182 SCRA 141
D: B.P. 340 is not a legislative reversal of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the above De Knecht vs. Bautista. Meaning,
the legislature did not reverse that adverse ruling of the Court in the above De Knecht case by enacting a law. There
were several supervening events in this case.
F: For the extension of EDSA to Roxas Blvd., the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation proceedings against
the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets among them Cristina De Knecht. De Knecht filed
a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness
of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties.
Lower court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought
to be condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just compensation for the lands involved in the
proceedings.
De Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition and directed against the order of the lower court
dated June 14, 1979 praying that the respondent be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the expropriation
action and from implementing said order. Certiorari and Prohibition was granted by the Supreme Court, where the
Republic was not authorized to take the properties. No other action happened. Subsequently, BP 340 was passed
Republic filed a motion to dismiss due to the enactment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same
purpose. The lower court in an order of September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the enactment of the said law.
Also, as opposed to the case above (which MJ digested) where there were many residents affected, here, only De Knecht is
the one and only resident whos standing in the way of EDSA extension. De Knecht opposed MTD of Republic as judgment
in the case is already final and executory.
I: WHETHER THE ENACTMENT OF BP. 340 IS THE PROPER GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE
EXPROPRIATION CASE? - YES
H: Republic acquired the needed properties through negotiated purchase starting with the lands from Taft Avenue up to
Roxas Boulevard including the lands in Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. It acquired through negotiated purchases about 80
to 85 percent of the lands involved in the project whose owners did not raise any objection as to arbitrariness on the choice
of the project and of the route. It is only with respect to the remaining 10 to 15 percent along the route that the petitioner
cannot negotiate through a sales agreement with a few land owners, including de Knecht whose holding is hardly 5% of
the whole route area. de Knecht is the only obstacle left in the Govt Project. BP 340 was enacted to expropriate his property.
B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court. And the trial court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the enactment of B.P. Blg.
340.
Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter (over two years later in
this case) making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking
the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case.
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield
to this subsequent legislative fiat.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
57. ORTIGAS & CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS - 346 SCRA 748
D: The general rule is laws are prospective in their application. An exception is when the law is enacted as an exercise
of police power. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people.
F: Petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an
area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, and covered by a TCT. The contract of sale
provided that the lot:
1. be used exclusively for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building will be
constructed thereon,
6. The BUYER shall not erect any sign or billboard on the roof for advertising purposes

11. No single-family residential building shall be erected until the building plans, specifications have been approved by the
SELLER
14....restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall
cease and terminate.
These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the
Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of
Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.
Private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp. The lease contract
did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building
for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the RTC of Pasig. The complaint sought the demolition of the said
commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from constructing the
commercial building and/or engaging in commercial activity on the lot.
Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly annotated on the title it
issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were
agreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
I: W/N the application of the MMC Ordinance violated Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution?
H: No. In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in
any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given
retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of
police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably
impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those
already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and
legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.
Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a
legitimate police power measure.
The trial court's reliance on the Co vs. IAC, is misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-
01 did not specifically provide that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over
lands located within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature, and stated with respect to
agricultural areas covered that the zoning ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The area in this case
involves not agricultural but urban residential land. Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively affected the operation of the zoning
ordinance in Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein as commercial.
Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations
annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue
from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in
March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed
lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance
and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law
between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void. Respondent court correctly
found that the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of or excess of jurisdiction
in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931. In resolving matters in litigation, judges are

not only duty-bound to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, they are also bound by their oath of office to apply the
applicable law.
58. PRYCE CORPORATION V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION - G.R. NO. 172302 ,

FEBRUARY 18, 2014
F: The present case originated from a petition for corporate rehabilitation filed by petitioner Pryce Corporation on July 9,
2004 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138. On September 13, 2004, the rehabilitation court gave due course
to the petition and directed the rehabilitation receiver to evaluate and give recommendations on petitioner Pryce
Corporations proposed rehabilitation plan attached to its petition.
The rehabilitation receiver did not approve this plan and submitted instead an amended rehabilitation plan, which the
rehabilitation court approved by order dated January 17, 2005. In its disposition, the court found petitioner Pryce
Corporation eligible to be placed in a state of corporate rehabilitation. The disposition likewise identified the assets to be
held and disposed of by petitioner Pryce Corporation and the manner by which its liabilities shall be paid and liquidated.
The order provides, among others, that the indebtedness to China Banking Corporation and Bank of the Philippine Islands
as well as the long term commercial papers will be paid through a dacion en pago of developed real estate assets of the
petitioner; all accrued penalties are waived; no interest will accrue during the pendency of petitioners corporate
rehabilitation.
China Bank and BPI both allege that the approved rehabilitation plan violates the non-impairment clause.
I: Whether or not the approval of a different rehabilitation plan (without the creditors consent) violates the non-impairment
clause?
H: NO
R: MR granted. This court has brushed aside invocations of the non-impairment clause to give way to a valid exercise of
police power and afford protection to labor. Corporate rehabilitation is one of many statutorily provided remedies for
businesses that experience a downturn. Rather than leave the various creditors unprotected, legislation now provides for
an orderly procedure of equitably and fairly addressing their concerns. Corporate rehabilitation allows a court-supervised
process to rejuvenate a corporation. Its twin, insolvency, provides for a system of liquidation and a procedure of
equitably settling various debts owed by an individual or a business. It provides a corporations owners a sound chance
to re-engage the market, hopefully with more vigor and enlightened services, having learned from a painful experience.
Necessarily, a business in the red and about to incur tremendous losses may not be able to pay all its creditors. Rather than
leave it to the strongest or most resourceful amongst all of them, the state steps in to equitably distribute the corporations
limited resources.
Rather than let struggling corporations slip and vanish, the better option is to allow commercial courts to come in and apply
the process for corporate rehabilitation.
Contracts are indeed sacred as the law between the parties. However, these contracts exist within a society where
nothing is risk-free, and the government is constantly being called to attend to the realities of the times.
Corporate rehabilitation is preferred for addressing social costs. Allowing the corporation room to get back on its feet will
retain if not increase employment opportunities for the market as a whole. Indirectly, the services offered by the corporation
will also benefit the market as [t]he fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from
[the constant entry of] new consumers goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, [and]
the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be

provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
A. Rights under Section 12: origins and rationale
59. MAGTOTO V. MANGUERA - 63 SCRA 4
F: No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the Court of First Instance
(Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of
Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declared admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases (Clemente Magtoto in GR L-
37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez,
Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First Instance
(Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused
in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and
to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions
for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.
I: Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.
H: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in
effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be
given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the
accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance with
the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not
informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because, no such right
existed at the time. The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added
by Republic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause
of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney or counsel,"
impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is untenable. The only right
granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a
request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time. The historical background
of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel
and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should
be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee
to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the acquittal
of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in many criminal cases where
confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force
although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it
equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.
B. When the rights become available

60. PEOPLE V. TAYLARAN - 108 SCRA 373
F: Petitoner Taylaran went to Atup his grandmother-in-law, a quack doctor, for the treatment of his snake bite. After
entering the house of Atup, petitioner stabbed the latter with his bolo several times. He then went to the house of Atups
son and his wife to kill them as well but they refused to let him enter. Thereafter, he surrendered himself to the police and
declared that he killed Atup because the latter vowed to kill him through witchcraft. The policemen used this statement at
the trial and Taylaran objected to the admission in evidence of his statement.
I: Whether there was a violation on the petitioners right on custodial investigation.
R: NO. The evidence is admissible. The constitutional rights are not available when he surrendered as he is not yet under
custodial investigation. Rights under custodial investigation are not available upon surrendering. Also, what was testified
was only that he told the police why he is surrendering, which is just natural. Under such circumstances, he is not yet under
investigation within the meaning of the Constitution as no written confession was presented as a result of formal
investigation. If he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because of this that he surrendered, his right to silence
and counsel may not be invoked.
61. GALMAN V. PAMARAN - 138 SCRA 295
F: PD 1866 was promulgated to determine facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of Ninoy Aquino.
Pursuant to this, a fact finding committee was formed, known as the Agrava Board. The board conducted hearings for
investigation, and private respondents Gen. Ver, et al. testified as witnesses against themselves before the board. The pcs.
Of evidence and testimonies obtained by the board were used in the prosecution. The private respondents opposed the
prosecutions offer of evidence as such would be violative of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and the
right to remain silent as they were all suspects in the assassination.
I: Petitioners contend that since they did not invoke these rights before the Agrava Board, they cannot now invoke it.
H: They were deprived of their constitutional rights and hence, inadmissible in evidence. These constitutional rights are
available not only to criminal prosecutions as the creation of the board was also for the purpose of determining the
culprit.
It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently
been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon
a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, the right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied
to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be
given by him, hang on the balance.
In the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal
to testify or produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional
rights not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent.
62. PEOPLE V. JUDGE AYSON - 175 SCRA 216
F: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of PAL. It was alleged that Ramos was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane ticket. Ramos was notified of an investigation to be conducted against him in accordance with PALs Code of Conduct
and Discipline and the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
On the day before the investigation, Ramos gave his superiors a handwritten note reading stating that: ... he is willing to
settle irregularities allegedly charged against him in the amount of P76,000, subject to conditions as may be imposed.
During the investigation, Ramos answers, which were taken down on writing, were to the effect that he had misused
proceeds from ticket sales and that he was willing to settle the obligation, offering a compromise to pay on a staggered
basis.

No compromise agreement was reached resulting to an information being filed, charging Ramos of estafa. PAL offered
into evidence Ramos handwritten note and written answers to the investigation, wherein he admitted having misused the
proceeds of sales tickets. Judge Ayson rejected the evidence offered, declaring them inadmissible since it does not appear
that the accused was reminded of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have counsel nor did it appear that such
rights were waived with the assistance of counsel, in violation of Sec. 20, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution.
Sec. 20: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible.
I Whether or not the evidence offered was inadmissible?
R: The evidence was admissible. The right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right are only available
to persons under custodial investigation.
2 Rights provided in Sec. 20:
1. Right against self-incrimination
Right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Now provided in Sec. 17, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
Accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings.
2. Rights of a person under custodial investigation
Rights of every suspect under investigation for the commission of an offense.
Now in Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which includes:
i. Right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
ii. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him.
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA PROVIDED THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR A PERSON IN POLICE CUSTODY,
IN CUSTODY INTERROGATION:
i. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded
to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him. (Unlike the right against self-incrimination however, these rights apply only to persons under
investigation for the commission for the commission of an offense.)
i. It only applies to suspects under investigation by police authorities.
In summary, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court
have the following rights:

C. Police line -ups: paraffin test: signature
63. GAMBOA V. JUDGE CRUZ - 162 SCRA 642
F: Petitioner alleges that, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, he was brought to Precinct 2, Manila
then detained therein together with several others. The following day, the lineup of 5 detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other
detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being
interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her.
An information for robbery was filed against the petitioner. Later on, he was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held and
prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. Lower court dismissed the motion to acquit. Hence, this petition.
I: Whether police line up was violative of his rights to counsel and to due process?
Before the case filed in court 1. Continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
Or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary informed thereof;
investigation) but after having been taken into 2. Not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or
custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any other means which vitiates the free will; and
some significant way, and on being 3. To have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected.
interrogated by the police.
After the case is filed in court 1. To refuse to be a witness;

2. Not to have any prejudice whatsover result to him by such
refusal;
3. To testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by
the prosecution
4. While testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for
which he is then prosecuted.
R: NO. The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, just like when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver
shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
As correctly observed however, Solicitor General, the police line was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner
was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard
and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit
after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
64. PEOPLE V. DIMAANO - 209 SCRA 819

In the instant case, when the appellants were identified by the complainants at the police line-ups the former had not yet
been held to answer for the criminal offense for which they have been charged and convicted. The police could not have,
therefore, violated their right to counsel as the confrontation between the State and them had not yet begun. As held in the
case of Gamboa v. Cruz (supra), police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest, hence, the appellants were not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
The defendants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and multiple frustrated
homicide. They were arrested by Pat. Mario Pablo, a member of the Anti-Narcotcis Unit of the QC Police Station, who
testified that at the night in question, he had been given a tip by an informant that a robbery was about to be committed at
Amparo Village, and that the robbers would be using a Galant car, greenish gray in color, with the exact plate number. The
patrolmen stationed themselves at the village and saw the vehicle described pass by. They cornered the car and ordered
those inside to disembark from the vehicle. After being frisked, a hand grenade, two guns, and a fan knife were found. A
radio cassette, a hair dryer, cassette tapes and a reading glass were likewise found inside the said car.
In the instant case, when the appellants were identified by the complainants at the police line-ups the former had not yet
been held to answer for the criminal offense for which they have been charged and convicted. The police could not have,
therefore, violated their right to counsel as the confrontation between the State and them had not yet begun. As held in the
case of Gamboa v. Cruz (supra), police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest, hence, the appellants were not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel.
65. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MUSA -G.R. NO. 170472, JULY 3, 2009
F: RTC found Jojo Musa, Robert Cario, August Dayrit, Cesar Domondon, and Michael Garcia guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. They held up at gunpoint Nancy Bonifacio who was with her boyfriend Harold Herrera
on board a jeepney. Harold was shot and taken to the hospital and died several days after. Harold and Nancy identified
the six persons who held them up from among the many pictures shown to them in the hospital. Nancy went to the Marikina
Police Station on June 16, 2001 after the police informed her that arrests had been made in connection with the hold-up.
It took her some time to go to the police station because Harold would not allow her to leave his side. At the police station,
she recognized her co-passengers who were then in a detention cell, and she identified them as the persons who had robbed
them. The defense of the accused were alibi. That they were sleeping or where in other places at the time of the holdup.
They also assail the reliability and integrity of their out-of-court identification by Nancy. They argue that when she went to
the police station, her mind was ready to accept that the persons she would identify were the suspects in the June 11, 2001
robbery. Nancys testimony in Court was corroborated by another co-passenger
CA affirmed RTC finding them guilty
I: WON the RTC erred in admitting the seriously flawed out-of-court identification by the witnesses?
H: Out-of-court identification done in several ways:

1. Show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification.
2. Mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect
3. Line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the TOTALITY
OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST:
(1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
In applying this test, Nancys out-of-court identification is reliable and, hence, admissible.
1. Nancy testified that she was seated on the first seat of the jeepneys left rear side. From this vantage point, she had
a good view of the faces of the four persons clinging to the jeepney as well as the two who were seated inside.

2. No competing event took place to draw her attention from the hold-up. Nothing in the records shows the presence
of any distraction that could have disrupted her attention at the time of the robbery or that could have prevented
her from having a clear view of the faces and appearances of the robbers.
3. The identification took place within five days after the robbery; she sufficiently explained why it took her five days
to go to the police station.
4. She described the suspects to a police inspector prior to identifying them in the police station on June 16, 2001.
5. Nothing persuasive supports the appellants contention that their identification at the police station was the result
of an unduly suggestive procedure.
D. Right to counsel
66. PEOPLE V. DE JESUS - 213 SCRA 345

67.
3 unidentified men flagged down the tricyle of Leonardo Garcia. After a few minutes ride, Leonardo was stabbed 17 times
on the neck, trunk and on the extremities, causing his death. His meager earnings that day of P40.00 was taken from him.
Police officers looked for a certain Eddie and another surnamed Tupaz in connection with Leonardos death. Upon finding
the two, they were asked if they had knowledge of the stabbing incident, to which they allegedly answered in the
affirmative.
Eddie, accused Edgardo de Jesus, then surrendered to the officers two bladed weapons: one ten-inch dagger and one
eleven-inch stainless knife. Eddie and Tupaz, herein appellant Carlos Tupaz, were brought by the officers to police
headquarters, where they were turned over to Pat. Lorbes. The two were then interrogated by Pat. Lorbes without the
assistance of counsel. On September 10, 1987, Pat. Lorbes fetched a lawyer from CLAO, Atty. Oscar Saldivar, and in the
latters presence, reduced the statements of the two accused to writing. Both accused signed their respective statements.
Carlos Tupaz alleges that while he was tending his stall at the Public Market in Pasig, three men in civilian clothes entered
his stall, poked a gun at him and begun searching the place. After which, he was mauled and was forced to board a jeep.
While inside the jeep, he continued receiving blows until they reached the Police Headquarters of Pasig. At the police
headquarters, appellant was placed in one of the detention cells. Around midnight, he was taken out of his cell by Cpl.
Limpoco and brought to a room where he was handcuffed and blindfolded by Cpl. Limpoco. Cpl. Limpoco then began
mauling him, all the while forcing him to admit killing somebody at the market. After three hours, appellant was returned
to his cell. The following day, September 10, 1987, appellant asked to see a doctor, but was refused by the jail guard. He
denied furnishing the answers in his alleged statement, but admitted it was his signature which appeared thereon.
In the course of their investigation of the stabbing of a tricycle driver, police officers asked the De Jesus and Tupaz if they
knew anything about the incident. They answered in the affirmative. One of them surrendered a dagger and a knife. They
were brought to the police headquarters and were interrogated without the assistance of counsel. The next day, the
investigator fetched a lawyer from the Citizens Legal Aid Office and in the presence of the lawyer, the statements of De
Jesus and Tupaz were reduced in writing.
SC: They were denied their right to counsel. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i. e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or confession or admission from the accused. Thus, there
was a violation of the right of the accused and the statements are inadmissible as evidence.
68. PEOPLE V. LUCERO - 249 SCRA 4253
D: In custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the accused.
F: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide. Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others
remained at large. Trial proceeded only as against the three.
Prosecutions Version Accuseds Version

Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2)
of the suspects. He declared that even before the months after the commission of the crime. He said he was
investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while
participation in the crime and that he was the one who shot he was walking towards his house. They chased him,
Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep.
He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where
In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers. Later,
investigation. He informed Lucero of his constitutional rights he identified one of the men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS
to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that Special Operations Group. The next day, he learned he was
he had no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was
Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer. In due time, not informed of the offense for which he was being
Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the
at around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer who complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent
was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the latter's brought him to a clinic inside Camp Crame. The doctor saw
whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was. the contusions on his body. He advised that he be treated.
The CIS agent refused and they left the clinic.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero
of his constitutional rights. He explained to Lucero that he Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers
has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give and the other accused in this case. He said he only met Dr.
any statement to the investigators, and that even if he has Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was
already given a statement, he may refuse to sign it. He made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified
observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta him on the fourth time.
gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty.
statement. When the investigator started asking the preliminary Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not
questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. present during his actual custodial interrogation.
Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of
need, he could be reached at his residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS

agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of
Lucero, was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed
by Lucero. In the presence of the two CIS agents, Atty. Peralta
examined Exhibit "C" and explained to Lucero its Legal
implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the
statements voluntarily. Lucero replied in the affirmative.
Atty. Peralta then signed Exhibit "C".
RTC Decision: Balbido and Bienvenido Echavez were acquitted. Lucero was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
I: Whether Luceros extrajudicial confession can be the basis of his conviction?
H: NO. The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided
with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other
undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them
inadmissible. We take pride in constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other countries have desisted from
elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without
any apology.
The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed, it did not impose a rigorous
respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial" compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. This
is far from the intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of
appellant, arrived at the CIS Office on the 2nd night of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office
at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction
from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the
custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude
did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the
commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounseled confession. They tried
to cure his uncounseled confession for the next day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house.
In the presence of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it
voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. Atty. Peralta was satisfied
and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel was not infringed. We disagree.
We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and
vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling
from Atty. Peralta. In People v. De Guzman, we held that in custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the
moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and
confessions or admissions from the accused. In this case, at the crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty.
Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounseled extrajudicial a
confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot convict.
69. LENIDO LUMANOG, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES-, 7 SEPTEMBER 2010
F: The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence
and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla
(Abadilla), who was ambushed in broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. Police
officers claimed that appellants were apprehended as a result of hot pursuit activities on the days following the ambush-
slay of Abadilla.
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any
information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent counsel,
preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one (1). However,
Joel was only presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall the day after his arrest. He had stayed overnight
at the police station before he was brought to said counsel. Joel then executed an extrajudicial confession and identified his
co-conspirators in the presence of Atty. Sansano. Joel also alleges that the lawyer secured by the police from the IBP-Quezon
City chapter violated his right to counsel preferably of his own choice.
I1: Whether or not Joels constitutional right to counsel was violated? YES
I2: Whether or not Joels constitutional right to counsel preferably of his own choice was violated? NO
R1: A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons
under custodial investigation. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right
in writing and in the presence of counsel. P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel began in the morning
of June 20, 1996, the first time said suspect was presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he was brought to the
IBP Office for the taking of his formal statement.
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his statement before Atty. Sansano on
June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to
constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of
any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.
R2: The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense.
Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of
counselor where the preferred lawyer is not availableis naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the
final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators
is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsels appointment during the
course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer.
We held that the modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses
the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed
judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel
necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary
rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed
innocent.
E. Right to be informed
70. PEOPLE V. PINLAC - 165 SCRA 675
F: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his
conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by
force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance
of counsel.
I: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.
H: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the
authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his
constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the
extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are
merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel,
it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police
officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell
the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. Short of this, there
is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights.
The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer. As it is the
obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so
it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation.
Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in
evidence.
Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused during custodial investigation
was inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that
the prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was
sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accused.
Going to the instant case, we find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional
rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of

counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that
the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
A. Right to bail or recognizance
71. PEOPLE V. NITCHA - 240 SCRA 283
F: One evening, Jojo went out of his house to buy some cigarettes in a nearby store. Before Jojo could buy the cigarettes,
Doro Nitcha arrived, uttered the words "Isa ka sa kanila!", then started mauling him. Jojo fought back. May, Joselito,
Agustin and Nenet, arrived and tried to pacify the two. The fighting stopped upon the arrival of Doro's sister Victoria who,
upon seeing the commotion, dragged Doro away from the fight and brought him home.
Nenet, Agustin, May and Joselito proceeded towards their house located in front of the store where the incident occurred.
While they were walking toward their house, Florestan Nitcha, brother of Doro, arrived at the sari-sari store brandishing a
gun, shouted at them, and fired his gun hitting May at the back of her head. Appellant then aimed his gun at Joselito but
missed. May died on the way to the hospital. Nitcha went back to his mother's house before proceeding to the police station
where he surrendered. He was charged with and convicted of murder. He then filed a petition for bail during the pendency
of his appeal.
I: WON bail should be granted.
R: NO. Bail should not be granted. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted
by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt
is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have likewise ruled that the
accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Thus, an
accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to
bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his
guilt of the offense charged is strong.
72. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, ETC. VS.

FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. 521 SCRA 470
F: The PH and HK signed an Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. Muoz was charged before
the HK Court with 3 counts of bribery and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.
Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted. The DOJ received from the HK-DOJ a request for the provisional
arrest of Muoz. NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The CA & SC declared the Order
of Arrest void. HK filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Muoz. Muoz filed a petition for bail
which was opposed by HK. RTC denied the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that Muoz is a high flight risk. The RTC judge inhibited himself and the case was raffled to
respondent Judge Olalia, who granted the petition for bail on MR. HK now contends that bail cannot be granted in
extradition cases.
I: May the right to bail be validly invoked in extradition cases?
H: Bail can be granted in extradition cases. The PH is a signatory to treaty obligations concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II. Thus, the PH is under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These

remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding but administrative, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law. Temporary detention may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Muoz had been
detained for over 22 years without having been convicted of any crime, a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While
our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Failure to comply with the extradition treaty to HK
is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the PH should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which
the Philippines is a party. Court cannot ignore the modern trend in public international law, which places a primacy on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While the universal declaration of human rights is not a
treaty, its principles are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.
B. Waiver of the right
73. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO - 198 SCRA 130
F: An information was filed charging Rodolfo Salas, alias Commander Bilog and his co-accused with rebellion, under
Art. 134 in relation to Art. 135 of the RPC. Having earlier escaped from military detention, Salas and his co-accused were
arrested and were in military custody. The accused filed a petition for habeas corpus, which was later dismissed, because
of an agreement of the parties wherein: Salas was to remain in legal custody to face trial before the court over his person
while his co-accused would be released but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
Salas filed a petition for bail which was opposed on the ground that since rebellion is a capital offense, with a penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, Salas is not entitled to bail as the evidence of his guilt is strong. Pending decision on the petition
for bail EO 187 was issued which restored the original penalty for rebellion, the original penalty being prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000. Judge Donato granted bail. Hence the present petition, claiming that Judge Donato committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting bail: That the Judge did not take into consideration of circumstances, such as that the
accused had escaped military detention, indicating that the accused does not intend to appear in court for trial, if released;
and that Salas had already waived his right to bail when he agreed to remain in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody of his person in consideration of the release of his co-accused.
I: Whether or not Salas should have been granted bail?
R: Although Salas had the right to be granted bail, rebellion being a bailable offense, he had nevertheless, waived such right
when he agreed to remain in legal custody. Bail may be matter of right or of discretion:
Bail as a matter of right When the offense is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
Right is absolute.
Bail as a matter of discretion. If the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Bail shall be denied, if the evidence of guilt is strong.
But, once the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
Therefore, bail may be a matter of right in cases of capital offenses if the evidence of guilt is not great.
In this case, as rebellion was punishable by prison mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000, lower than reclusion perpetua,
bail cannot be denied to Salas. However, the right bail may be waived.
The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is person to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. A person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege
is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy.
In this case, Salas waived his right to bail when he agreed to remain in legal custody provided his co-accused would be
released. Note: On Oct. 24, 1990, RA 6968 increased the penalty of rebellion to reclusion perpetua. However, it was not
applied to Salas as such was not favorable to him.
C. Excessive bail
74. DE LA CAMARA V. ENAGE - 41 SCRA 3
F: Petitioner (De La Camara) Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on and detained at the
Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co. A case for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder was subsequently filed against him.
Petitioner applied for for bail premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident.
Respondent Judge, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part
of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond
at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00. Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent
a telegram to respondent Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either
in cash or property, would be reasonable. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition.
I: whether the Bail was excessive?
R: YES Although, fact that this case is moot and academic (because the accused escaped from prision) should not preclude
this Court from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges
to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such
a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a
regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond he realm of probability, however, that
a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. As
construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence
at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill thus purpose is
"excessive"
There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an
exorbitant sum. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be
unable to resists thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the
same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty
would be beyond his reach.
In the case Villaseor v. Abano: The guidelines in the fixing of bail was summarized. The ff should be considered:
1. Ability of the accused to give bail;
2. Nature of the offense;
3. Penalty for the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Health of the accused;
6. Character and strength of the evidence;
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bonds;
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases."
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable.
A. Military tribunals
75. OLAGUER V. MILITARY - 150 SCRA 144
F: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created
a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal case against petitioners. They were charged with
the following offenses: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President
and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted
murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition
to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further action on their case for the tribunal should be considered null and void.
Respondents invoked that the creation of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case Aquino
v. Military Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners contend that such ruling
must be overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military commissions
have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. They also
maintain that the proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their
constitutional right to due process of law. The Military Commission No. 34 passed sentence convicted the petitioners and
imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.
I: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be abandoned and/or modified in so far as the case at bar
is concerned?
H: Yes.
R: First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the case is still pending, military tribunals,
which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court
relied on the dissenting views of some justices in AQUINO V. MILCOMM, stating that Civilians like the petitioner placed
on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or military
processxxx..Judicial power exist only in courts. Moreover, the Court emphasized that Reverence for precedent, simply
as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which
should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. After all, more important than
anything else is that this Court should be right.
B. Due process
76. SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT STORE V. MICALLER - 99 PHIL 762
D: The Court of Industrial relations is not bound by the rules on evidence
F: Nena Micaller was a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store in Escolta, Manila. Store was owned and operated by Yu
Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her
employers alleging that she was dismissed because of her membership in the National Labor Union.

Defense of employers: dismissed due to misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co-employees that
several criminal charges were filed against her with the fiscal. Findings from 1950-1952, Micallers bonus was higher that
her coworkers. She was also awarded most cooperative and most honest employee. In 1953, Micaller organized a union.
Employers received the demands of the Union. Hence they tried to extricate from Micaller the names of the Union members
but Micaller would not budge. Union filed Notice of Strike, dismissed all employees and hired temporary employees. Court
of Industrial Relations (CIR) found Scotys guilty of ULP asked to pay P100 and to reinstate Micaller
I: Whether the industrial court is justified in imposing a fine of P100 on Scotys?
H: NO.CIR has no jurisdiction, only ordinary courts can impose penalty as CIR is confined only to civil matters and exercises
quasi-judicial functions (Note: Main issue in this case is due process, as a different procedure is observed in criminal
procedure versus the procedures in courts of industrial relations)
The law creating the Courts of Industrial Relations states that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts is not controlling in
proceeding before CIR. The Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. CIRs shall not be bound solely by the
evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of other means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections
and questioning of well-informed persons which results must be made a part of the record".
In CIRs, an accused may be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely on
preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt. This is against the due process guaranteed by our
Constitution. But this is what the law on procedure in CIR says and Court cannot amend.
It may be contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the
rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending
the law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our Government.
C. Presumption of innocence
77. UNITED STATES V. LULING - 34 PHIL 725
F: Luling was a wharf watchman of the customs. He received Php 100 from Rufino Elord to ensure the facilitation of the
importation of large quantity of opium. According to section 316 of Act 355, the reception of a gift by any officer or
employee in the Philippine customs service from any importer or exporter, either directly or indirectly, shall prima facie
be deemed to be a violation of the provisions of this section. Luling contends that Sec. 316 of Act no. 355 insofar as it
requires the accused to prove his innocence is unconstitutional.
I: Whether receipt of gift by customs officer from any importer or exporter which creates presumption of violation of
customs law, violations right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
R: Constitutional. While presumption of innocence is the rule, it is established also that certain facts only shall constitute
prima facie evidence and that then the burden is on the defendant to show that his acts are not criminal. In case of statutory
crimes (such in the case in the Philippines), no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the
state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that the burden is shifted to the
defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
78. PEOPLE V. MINGOA - 92 PHIL 856
D: The legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence
of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational connection between that facts proved
and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.
F: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable
to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, the defendant Aquino Mingoa
was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the CFI Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged
and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the CA. But that court certified the case here on the ground
that it involved a constitutional question. The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books

and accounts on September 1, 1949, defendant, as accountable officer, was found short in the sum above-named and that,
required to produce the missing fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to the examining officer that some days before
he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to show and that he forgot it on his seat and
it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor.
It is now contended, that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation the trial court convicted defendant on mere
presumptions, that is, presumptions of criminal intent in losing the money under the circumstances alleged and
presumptions of guilt from the mere fact that he failed, upon demand to produce the sum lacking. Defendant questions the
constitutionality of article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
I: Whether the presumption of criminal intent in losing the money violates the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved?
H: NO. See doctrine.
The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of public
officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer
has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has
received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a
natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present
evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.
We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption
of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing. As His Honor observes, if the money was
really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for
release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse
that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further as the prosecution
points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts,
and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their
salaries, there is good ground to believe that defendant had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about
its loss was pure invention.
D. Right to counsel
79. PEOPLE V. HOLGADO - 86 PHIL 752
F: During the arraignment, the judge asked the defendant: Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? The
defendant replied I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
I: Whether or not the right to counsel was violated?
H: YES
R: Under the provision of section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court
has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned; (2) after giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) if
he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and (4) if the accused
desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the
accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire
whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to assign an attorney
de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?"

Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but,
what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion f from the court
that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained
in our Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law," and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not
enough for the court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires
the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the
accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel.
80. PEOPLE V. SIMBEN - 98 PHIL 138
IN A NUTSHELL: The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon Sim Ben does not mean that he is not
guilty of the crime he is being charged; A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render the sentence
void of the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out a penalty which is provided by law.
Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating paragraph 3, Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibited cinematographic films of indecent or immoral scenes inside his
establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a
plea of guilty to the information without the aid of counsel.
The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called for trial, the appellant
was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid of one. He replied that he did not.
Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His
answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the
translation he entered a plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as
provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on his plea
of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the
defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his right were fully protected and safeguarded. The Court
implied with its duty when it informed the appellant that it was his right to have the aid of counsel. And before pronouncing
the sentence the Court took pains to ascertain whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered.
Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty
to the information.
Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine would be imposed. The
recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant seems to bear out his claim; But such
recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A
promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the
recommendation and metes out to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.
The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the Appellant.
81. DELGADO V. COURT OF APPEALS - 145 SCRA 357

F: Delgado, along with three others, were charged with Estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents for
deceiving Rueda in arranging travel to the United States. Having pleaded not guilty, Delgado was assisted by her counsel
de parte. However, her counsel failed to appear on the date set for presentation of evidence for the defense and sent a
telegram requesting for a postponement. The request was denied by the fiscal believing it was a dilatory tactic because
several postponements were made in the past.
The trial court waived her right to present evidence and considered the case submitted for decision. They were found to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Believing there was an irregularity in sending
notices and copy of the decision as she was not notified by her counsel on record, she filed an Urgent motion to set aside
entry of Judgment. Later, she filed an MR on the ground that she only came to know that her counsel was not a member
of the Philippine Bar but was denied.
I: Whether there was a violation on Delgados right to counsel.
R: YES. Delgado was deprived of her right to counsel. An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the
bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great
danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in
the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.
E. Right to be informed
82. PEOPLE V. REGALA - 113 SCRA 613
D: Right of accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Crime of assault, although established
by the evidence of the prosecution without objection of the accused, cannot cure defects in information Moreover, the
fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution without any objection on the part of the
accused cannot likewise cure the aforestated defect in the information so as to validly convict the accused thereof; because
to do so would be convicting the accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
F: Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority for the
killing of Sgt. Desilor. During the town fiesta, while Sgt. Desilor was on duty, he pushed Delfin Flores and admonished him
not to get through the exit gate. Regala was enraged and as such, stabbed him several times, resulting in his death. RTC
convicted them of the complex crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
H: Assault upon person in authority cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. The information filed against
Regala did not allege the essential elements of assault, that he knew that before or at the time of the assault, the victim was
an agent or a person of authority. Such defect cannot be cured because there are no allegations of facts which can be implied
that the accused knew of such fact and even if it was established by the prosecutions evidence as that would be convicting
the accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information in violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. However, since it was established by evidence and was in
uniform at the time of the incident, as stated in the case of Rodil, it could be proven as an aggravating circumstance. Hence,
convicted of homicide aggravated by in contempt or with insult to public authorities.
83. ENRILE V. SALAZAR - 186 SCRA 217
F: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested on the strength of a warrant, which in turn, was issued
because of an information charging him, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, allegedly committed during the failed coup attempt from Nov.
29 to December 10, 1990. Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional right
in being, or having been held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books. He claimed that
rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof.
I: Whether Enriles constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him had been violated?

R: No. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
People v. Hernandez: Under the allegations of the amended information that the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by the perpetration of said offense or rebellion;
the Court held that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies.
The claim that Enrile is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as that
rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric.
The information does indeed charged Enrile with a crime defined and punished by the RPC: simple rebellion.
84. PEOPLE V. ORTEGA - 276 SCRA 166
F: Appellants were charged with Murder by State Prosecutor based on an Information which provides that appellants
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with abuse of superior strength and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE
MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.
One of the prosecutions witnesses, is Diosdado Quitlong, he claims that while having a drinking spree with the Masangkay,
Masangkay went at the back of the of the house to answer the call of nature, Ortega followed. Garcia (Ortegas cousin) also
followed and they found Ortega on top of Masangkay and stabbing her several times. Garcia helped Ortega carry the body
of Masangkay, throw it into the well and buried it to conceal the body.
On cross-examination, he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was presented as witness in this case
Garcia denied the allegations and insist that after drinking, he went home immediately to attend her sick daughter. Ortega
on the other hand claims that it was Masangkay who stabbed him after he denied when asked where his sister was.
Quitnong came and chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the well.
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial
in due course, the court promulgated a decision finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
trial court was convinced that in lifting, carrying and dumping the victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and
breathing inside the deep well filled with water, head first and threw big stones/rocks inside the well to cover the victim is
a clear indication of the community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar Masangkay
I: Whether Garcia can be convicted of an offence not charged in the complaint or information?
H: NO. Garcia should be acquitted.
The autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died
subsequently of drowning. That drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the muddy
particles found in the victims airway, lungs and stomach.
Although, the drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that Appellant Garcia had intended
to commit; it is covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of
homicide although he had no original intent to kill In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held
liable as principal in the crime of homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an
accessory as prayed for by appellants counsel himself.
The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of attacking,, assaulting, and stabbing repeatedly with
a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA. The prosecution's
evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega.
His responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay.
The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged
in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of
this constitutional right.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in concealing x x x the body of the crime,
x x x in order to prevent its discovery, he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19,
par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega. Such
relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code.
F. Right to speedy trial
85. CONDE V. RIVERA - 45 PHIL 650
F: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less than five
informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than
on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as
far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
I: Whether there was a violation of the speedy trial requirement under the Constitution.
H:
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and
compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is
palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could
have settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have
prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought then we had pointed
out the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power
to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources,
but fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands
which should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under
a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the
custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the
trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained
of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S.
vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial
District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute the
accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending
before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append
to our order the observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will
take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may not recur. So
ordered.
G. Right to impartial trial
86. MATEO, JR. V. VILLALUZ - 50 SCRA 18

D: Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
F: In 1971 the American Express Bank in Cavite was robbed and an American serviceman was killed. The information was
filed against Mateo, et al. for robbery in band with homicide. 1 suspect, Martinez filed a motion to dismiss but Judge Villaluz
deferred it until after the prosecution has presented evidence.
Meanwhile, another suspect Rolando Reyes was arrested and he executed an extra-judicial statement signed and sworn to
before Judge Villaluz implicating Martinez, Mateo, etc. Despite the pending action on the motion to dismiss, the prosecution
filed a motion to present additional evidence and was allowed to do so again by the Judge. When Rolando Reyes testified,
he repudiated his statement executed and sworn to before the same judge. On the ground of intimidation of a govt agent,
with all these being made of record in the case, Mateo, et. al., filed a Joint Motion to disqualify judge. Judge Villaluz refused
to inhibit.
I: Judge Villaluz should inhibit?
H: Villaluz is disqualified to hear the case
R: Reyes subscribed before respondent judge an extra-judicial statement, which he later repudiated on the ground that it
was a product of intimidation by government agents. He in effect ruled that such extrajudicial statement was entered freely.
This clearly negates the objectivity required in the Constitution. The judge passed on a question that by implication has
already been answered by him. He refuses to act on the motion to dismiss since he was inclined towards the extra-judicial
confessions earlier made by Reyes.
H. Right to public trial
87. GARCIA V. DOMINGO - 52 SCRA 143
F: There are pending criminal cases consisting of charges and counter- charges against 2 respondent policemen Calo and
Carbonel for allegedly employing physical injuries, maltreatment and slander in effecting an arrest of private petitioner for
a traffic violation. All 14 trial dates were held in the chambers of petitioner Judge Garcia. Calo & Carbonel filed with
respondent Judge Domingo a petition for certiorari for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging that they
were denied their right to public trial. Respondent judge issued a TRO on the ground that the constitutional and statutory
rights of the accused have been violated because the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers
and not in the court room open to public.
I: Whether holding the trial only in chambers of the Judge complies with public trial requirement of the constitution?
H: SC: TRO not valid, they were not denied their right to public trial. The constitutional provision that trial must be public
possesses the character that when anyone is interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment.
But there is the well-recognized exception that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be
characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
Here, there is no showing that the public was excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this
right. Justice Black said that it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends,
relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Also, at least 14 hearings were already
conducted in the chambers of Judge Garcia without any objection on the part of the policemen, which implies lack of weight
as to their contention.
I. Compulsory process / confrontation
88. FAJARDO V. GARCIA - 98 SCRA 514
F: Petitioners contention is that medical testimony from a doctor who could testify on the wounds inflicted on them during
the incident in question would be crucial to their defense. Unfortunately for them, however, the doctor had left the
Philippines and was then residing in the United States. Since under the circumstances, compulsory attendance would not
be feasible, their counsel relying on the constitutional provision, sought from respondent Judge Himerio L. Garcia to send
written interrogatories on the aforesaid doctor in his residence in the United States.
According to the SolGen: Service of written interrogatories is not a compulsory or coercive process. It is merely the delivery
to a proposed deponent of a set or series of questions, the answers to which will constitute his deposition. Service of written
interrogatories by itself, does not obtain for the person utilizing them the twofold objectives specified in the constitutional
guarantee which are a) to secure the attendance of witnesses and b) to secure the production of evidence in behalf of the
accused. It merely apprises the proposed deponent of the questions which he is requested to answer. He may decline to
give the deposition, which ultimately will be submitted as his testimony. Clearly, therefore, service of written
interrogatories is completely different or worlds apart from the compulsory process that is established in the constitution
and accorded as an inviolate right of the accused
I: W/N written interrogatories, constitute compulsory process necessary to resolve the case?
H: PREMATURE TO DECIDE ON. This Court, after careful consideration of the matter, however is of the thinking that it
would be premature, at the very least, to conclude that such a fatal infirmity has infected the proceeding. The fact that the
petitioners were treated in the hospital by a doctor in question could be testified to by other witnesses, including the nurses
who must have been present. It cannot be assumed that there would be an insuperable objection to the presentation of the
mechanical indicate as to the wounds alleged to have been inflicted, as they could very well show traces of such
maltreatment. Even the length of their stay in the hospital could be verified by its records.
Precisely, the constitutional rights granted an accused are intended to assure a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to
meet what in the end could be a baseless accusation. Moreover, at the stage of the trial reached, there was an element of
prematurity to this proceeding. At any rate, the presumption to be indulged is that a trial judge can fairly weigh and
appraise the evidence submitted by the respective parties. Petitions of this character certainly deserve no encouragement
from this Tribunal. Nor must it be forgotten that, according to the facts, the prosecution was not oblivious to the demands
of fairness when the evidence offered by it disclosed that petitioners at the time of their arrest were suffering from wounds
inflicted on various parts of their bodies.
In the light of what has been stated, it becomes obvious why as of now, there is no need to make a definite pronouncement
on the scope of the expanded concept of the constitutional right to secure not only the attendance of witnesses but the
production of evidence.
89. PEOPLE V. MIYAKE - 279 SCRA 180
F: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in Makati RTC. In addition,
she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court. As part of its evidence, the prosecution did not
offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in a previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered,
admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was a previous
decision in an estafa case decided by MeTC Paraaque. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the
lower court adopted the previous decision of Branch 78 of the MeTC Paraaque as a basis for the judgment. It, therefore,
adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the
conviction in the case before it.
I: Whether or not the Makati court could validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Paraaque court to show
that illegal recruitment was committed by the accused?
H: NO
R:A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted
of a crime. IT MAY NOT BE USED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF A CRIME CHARGED IN A
SUBSEQUENT CASE, IN LIEU OF THE REQUISITE EVIDENCE PROVING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, AS
SAID PREVIOUS DECISION IS HEARSAY. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case
would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
The right of confrontation has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the
judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who
has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece
of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious.
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does
not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization
of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or
judgments.
The Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Paraaque court must be rejected. Every
conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before
it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only
its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based.
90. PEOPLE V. SENERIS - 99 SCRA 92
D: While the right of confrontation and cross-examination are fundamental rights, they can be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right; If the party was given the opportunity to confront or cross-
examine a witness but failed to take advantage of it, he forfeits the right and the testimonies given in direct examination
will be received or ed on record; Where the prosecution witness was partially cross-examined but prior to the next hearing,
he dies, his testimony cannot be stricken off the record.
F: This petition stems from an earlier case filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga City against herein private
respondent Pilar Pimentel, Mario Nemenio and Salim Doe as principals by direct participation and Moises Andaya, with
the murder of Eduardo Pimentel, husband of Pilar Pimentel. Upon the filing of the case, private respondent Pilar Pimentel
was granted a separate trial from her other co-accused, while the other co-accused were eventually found guilty of murder.
After the judgment, Mario, 1 of her co-accused agreed to testify in the trial of private respondent Pilar Pimentel. Defense
counsel meanwhile also was able to begin cross examination, but due to lack of time requested for a continuation which
did not push through as Mario was shot dead while trying to escape from prison. Herein public respondent Jude Seneris
ruled that the testimony of Mario was inadmissible on the grounds that the defense was not able to complete its cross-
examination of the witness. Petitioner now questions the decision of the lower court arguing that the Judge Seneris gravely
abused his discretion in ruling that the testimony of Mario was inadmissible, saying that even if counsel for the defense
was not able to continue its cross-examination, the pertinent details related to the case were already covered by both
prosecution and defense during previous court sessions.
I: Whether testimony is admissible.
H: YES. Admissible.
R: The testimony of a witness can be stricken if it is proven that the defense was not given adequate time to cross-examine
that witness. However, the direct testimony of a witness who dies before conclusion of the cross-examination can be stricken
only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination. In this case, the pertinent data were already covered prior to the death
of Mario. As such, inability to be present in court as a result of his death is not reason enough to strike out his testimony.
Such absence is not violative of private respondents constitutional rights to confront the witness especially because even if
the cross-examination of the defense was not completed, the necessary information pertaining to the case were already
covered, thus not necessitating further examination.
Where the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part through the fault of the cross-examiner, then the testimony on
direct examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to cause attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
J. Trial in absentia; right to be present
91. CARREDO V. PEOPLE - 183 SCRA 273

F: Petitioner Elias Carredo was charged with malicious mischief before the MTC of Cebu, to which he deposited a cash
bond for his provisional liberty and pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. He likewise filed a written waiver of
appearance during the trial or any stage thereof resulting in a trial in absentia in which he also admitted that he could be
identified by witnesses who were testifying at the time that said accused was not present.
During the hearing, the prosecution moved for the recall of its principal witness in order to identify the accused because of
petitioners absence. The hearing was then rescheduled. A subpoena was issued against the accused but he failed to appear.
Thus, the judge ordered the arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of the cash bond despite the objection of petitioners
counsel pursuant to the waiver executed. He now contends that the court order is improper as he already filed a written
waiver.
I whether the court may compel his attendance even after the execution of the waiver of appearance.
H: YES, Court order is proper.
R: 1973 Constitution permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled
to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open
court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial.
If allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify
him in court, he may say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to
an acquittal. Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not know the name of the culprit but can identify him if he
sees him again. His statement in the waiver is that he admits he could be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution
even in his absence is not such unqualified admission - EXCEPTION IS WHEN THE ACCUSED "UNQUALIFIEDLY
ADMITS IN OPEN COURT AFTER HIS ARRAIGNMENT THE HE IS THE PERSON NAMED AS DEFENDANT IN
THE CASE ON TRIAL - petitioner only admits that he can be identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence. He
did not admit that he is the very person named as defendant in the case on trial. His admission is vague and far from
unqualified.
Also, waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is deprived of its right to require the
presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses, which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such
waiver does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so
required. The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court. Thus, he can still be ordered
arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons.
SECTION 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva de Vega

1. EASTERN BROADCASTING V. DANS, JR. - 137 SCRA 628

BROADCAST STATIONS DESERVE SPECIAL PROTECTION.

N: Resolution on Petition for the opening of the Radio Station DYRE.

I: Were DYREs closure is constitutional?

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 1 of 79

SC established the following guidelines:

2. TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE - 235 SCRA 630

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 2 of 79

N: MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.

3. CHAVEZ V. GONZALEZ, GR NO. 168338, FEBRUARY 15, 2008

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 3 of 79

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

H: YES. Acts, issuances and orders UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 4 of 79

4. PEOPLE V. PEREZ - 45 PHIL 599

N: APPEAL from a judgment of Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.

H: Perez has uttered seditious words.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 5 of 79

5. GONZALES V. COMELEC - 27 SCRA 835

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 6 of 79

C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process

6. SANIDAD V. COMELEC -181 SCRA 529

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.

7. ADIONG V. COMELEC - 207 SCRA 715

N: PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 8 of 79

8. ABS-CBN V. COMELEC - 323 SCRA 811

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

9. SWS V. COMELEC 357 SCRA 497

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 10 of 79

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 11 of 79

10. DAVID V. ARROYO 489 SCRA 160

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

I: Whether such issuances violate the freedom of expression.

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 13 of 79

H: YES. COMELECs orders are unconstitutional.

12. GMA NETWORK, INC. V. COMELEC 734 SCRA 88

D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts

13. IN RE: EMIL JURADO - 243 SCRA 299

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 15 of 79

N: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Contempt.

H: No. Jurado is held in contempt of Court.

14. PEOPLE V. GODOY - 243 SCRA 64

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 16 of 79

There are 2 schools of thought:

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 17 of 79

16. BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS - 301 SCRA 1

I: Wenceslao should be awarded damages based on libelous column?

To maintain a libel suit:

Example: parliamentary immunity of legislators

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 19 of 79

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 20 of 79

Discussion on Sec. 5 of the Cybercrime Law:

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 21 of 79

F. Obscenity and indecency

19. PITA V. COURT OF APPEALS - 178 SCRA 362

I: Whether or not the determination of what is obscene is a judicial function?

G. Assembly and petition

20. PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - 80 PHIL 71

Mackoy Kolokoy Reviewer Page 23 of 79

I: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

21. JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - 125 SCRA 553