Title: Rimando vs Emission Testing Center, Inc.

July 23, 2012 GR 198860

Ponente: Reyes, J.:

Facts:

The CA held that t he petit ioner m ay not be held li able f or damages sin ce hi s action or in action, for that matter,
was done in th e per f orm ance of of ficial duti es that ar e legall y protected by the presumpti on of good fait h.
Th e CA li kewise str essed that t he civil action f il ed against the peti ti oner had al r eady become moot and
academic upon th e expir ation of hi s term as the mayor of N aguil ian, L a Uni on.
The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its
President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time material to
the case, was the sitting mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, LaUnion. The petition prayed for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor of the respondent.
In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which
formerly belonged to the national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had
operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed
an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees therefor.
The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent executes a contract of
lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to signing such contract subject to some
proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the petitioner. The parties did not reach a common
ground hence, the petition for mandamus.

Issue:

WON the petition for writ of mandamus is sufficient to compel respondent mayor to issue a business permit in
favor of petitioner.

WON the tax declaration on the subject lot is sufficient to prove ownership of the city.

Held:

No petition for writ of mandamus will not prosper.

No it is not sufficient. (It must be proven by clear and convincing evidence).

Ratio:

More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the
same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.

As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local
Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x

I ndeed, as corr ectly r ul ed by the RTC, the peti ti on f or m andamus fi led by the respondent i s incompetent to
compel the exercise of a mayors discretionary dut y to i ssue business permi ts.

Title: Tatel vs Municipality of Virac

March 11, 1992 GR 40243

Ponente: Nocon, J.:

Facts:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes filed
by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products against
the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing
Resolution No 29 1of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said
municipality a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months
from receipt of the said resolution.

It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on
March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the
warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious
odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate

the matter. houses,

residential The committee
so muchnoted theancrowded
so that nature
accidental fire of the neighborhood
within the warehousewith narrow
of the roadsoccasioned
petitioner and the surrounding
by the
continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the
lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the
warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil
Code.
Respondent mun icipal of fici als contend that peti ti oner' s warehouse was constr ucted in viol ation of Or din ance
No. 13, ser ies of 1952, prohi bit ing the constru ction of war ehouses near a block of h ouses either i n th e
poblacion or bar r ios with out mai ntai ni ng the necessary di stance of 200 meters fr om said bl ock of hou ses to
avoid l oss of l ives and properti es by accidental f ire .
On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and
equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

Issue:
 WON petitioners warehouse is a nuisance underArticle 694(Civil Code). A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes petitioners warehouse is a nuisance underArt.794 of the Civil Code.

No the said ordinance is not unconstitutional.

Ratio:

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish
and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the
Administrative Code, which reads:

The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must
also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and
basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal or din ance (1) mu st not contr avene the
Constit uti on or any statute (2 ) mu st not be unf air or oppressive (3) mus t n ot be parti al or discr imi natory (4) must not
proh ibit bu t may regulate tr ade (5) mu st be general and consistent wit h publ ic poli cy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its
purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for
anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the
danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there
can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.
Title: Technology Developers, Inc. vs CA

January 21, 1991 GR 94759

Ponente: Gancayco, j.:

Facts:

Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a
letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of

the operation
likewise of thePlant
requested petitioner's
Managerplant
Mr.located
Armandoat Guyong,
Manese Sta. Maria,
to bring Bulacan,
with until
him to the further
office order.
of the The on
mayor letter
February
20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its representative, undertook to comply
with respondent's request for the production of the required documents. In compliance with said undertaking,
petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
Permit," although among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a
"Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control
Commission (now Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental
Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of
petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the
mayor to secure the same but were not entertained.

On April 6, 1989,
Municipality's without
station previoustoand
commander reasonable
padlock notice upon
the premises petitioner,plant,
of petitioner's respondent acting mayor
thus effectively ordered
causing the the
stoppage of its operation.

Issue:

WON the orders of respondent mayor to padlock the premises of the factory thus resulting in the cessation of its
operation and the issuance of the writh of preliminary injunction by the respondent judge is proper.

Held:

YES.

Ratio:

No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of
the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then
National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as
much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control
and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. 4The alleged NBI finding that some of the
signatures in the four-page petition were written by one person,5 appears to be true in some instances, (particularly as
among members of the same family), but on the whole the many signatures appear to be written by different persons. The

6 must be because the

certification of the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received any complaint on the matter
complaint was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.
 The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in
her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding
houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.

Title: Asilo, jr. vs The People of the Philippines

March 9, 2011 GR 159017-18

Ponente: Perez, J.:

*Medio mahaba talaga facts nito

Facts:

Respondent A ngeles and mayor died in th is case, and the issue of their liabi lit ies is ir relevant to the topic. Bu t
only the mayors civil liability remained as it survived after his death and his criminal liability is extinguished.
When A ngeles died ther e was yet t o be any fi nal ju dgment thus hi s civi l and cri min al l iabil it y was exti nguished .

On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De
Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P.
Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property
comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan,

Laguna,
15 Marchin1998,
favorextendible
of the respondents mother
for another for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until
20 years.
The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property which
must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be
given preferential rights.
Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984. From then on up to January 1993,
Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits.1
Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions request for inspection on 15
May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and
Highways, Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This
finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993.
On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a lette r12 from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store
within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.

15613 dated 30 August 1993 and a Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo
of Laguna.
The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:
NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador to
enforce and order the Coronados to demolish the building constructed on the space previously rented to them in
order to give way for the construction of a new municipal market building.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an
Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project
if the Coronados continuously resists the order.
On 3 September 1993, Vi sitacion wr ote a reply letter to M ayor Comendador saying th at: (1) th e lease contr act
was sti ll exi sti ng and l egall y bin din g; (2) she was wil li ng to vacate the stor e as long as same place and area
woul d be given to her i n th e new publi c market; and (3) i n case her pr oposals are not acceptable to Mayor
Comendador, f or th e latter to j ust f il e an u nl awful detainer cas e against her pursuant to Sa ngguni ang Baya n
Resolu ti on No. 156.

On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her to
vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; else, a
court action will be filed against her.
 On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor
Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of the
Resolution reads:
Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA: Ang pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay
Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang anumang istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na
pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.15
On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a lette r16 to Visitacion
informing her of the impending demolition of her store the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a
reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court order and
that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an appropriate unlawful
detainer case against her. She further replied that if the demolition will take place, appropriate administrative,
criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the
demolition.
On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and
156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.
Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished
property as amounting to P437,900.00.

Issue:

WON the acts of petitioners in demolishing the market stall was clothed with legal authority.

WON the respondents market stall constituted as a nuisance notwithstanding the events after the fire.

Held:
No, petitioners acted in grave abuse of discretion in demolishing the said market stall.

No, even the municipality attested to the condition of the market stall/building that it was unharmed and not
affected by the fire that burnt down the public market.

Ratio:

Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding a
restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which
apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the
two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accus ed the authority to demolish plaintiffs store.

"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
36
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will . [It] contemplates a state of mind
37
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.

It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith in performing the demolition.

First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents structure is a public nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance
38
without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se
. Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and
39
under any circumstance, regardless of location and surroundings . In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a
nuisance per se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was
40
certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office . To quote:

An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial establishment) cited above and found out the following:

1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.

2. It is located within the market site.

 3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.

41
4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being exposed to fire
.

42
Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor law , the present
43 44
Local Government Code does not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance. And even assuming that the power
to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the accused public officials were under the facts of this case, still
devoid of any power to demolish the store.A cl oser look at th e contested resolu ti ons reveals th at M ayor Comendador
was onl y author ized to fi le an unl awfu l detain er case in case of r esistance to obey the or der or t o demol ish the bui ldin g
usin g legal means. Clear ly, th e act of demoli ti on wi thou t l egal or der in th is case was not amon g those provided by the
resolu ti ons, as in deed, it i s a legall y im possible provi sion.

Title: LTO vs City of Butuan

January 20, 2000 GR 131512

Ponente: Vitug, J.:

Facts:

Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the Operation of
Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing
Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the
payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle,
and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof.

Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred
to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor
vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration and license for driving tricycles has been devolved to
LGU's.

Issue:

WON the registration of tricycles was given to LGUs, hence the ordinances is a valid exercise of police power.

Held : No, the city ordinance is invalid.

Ratio:

Based on the-" Gui deli nes to I mplement the Devolu tion of L TF RBs F ranchi sin g Author ity over T ri cycles-F or-
H ir e to Local Gove r nment uni ts pur suant t o the L ocal Govern ment Code" - th e newly delegated power s to LGU ' s
pert ain to the fr anchising and r egulatory powe r s exercised by the L TF RB and not to the fun ctions o f the LT O r elati ve
to the registr ation of motor vehicl es and issuance of l icenses for th e dri vin g thereof. Corol lari ly, the exercised of a
poli ce power must be thr ough a vali d delegation . I n th is case th e poli ce power of r egistering tr icycles was not delegated
to the LGUs, but remained in the LTO.
 Cl earl y un aff ected by the L ocal Gover nment Code are the power s of L TO under R.A. No.4136 r equi ring the
registr ation of all kin ds of motor ve hi cles " used or oper ated on or upon any pub li c highway" in the countr y.

The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine and inspect such
motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped,
or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and other infrastructures.
The LTO is additionally charged with being the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.

Adds the Court, the reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units, specifically
under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential.

Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share
with local government units by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for
a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public
good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its
existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does
not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and
distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character, scopes and limitations.

To construe the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result in the repeal to that extent of
LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the law could have just said so in
Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the Local Government Code in the same manner that the specific devolution of
LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is not favored.

The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to
regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax
provisions of Section 133 (1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the
express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose
basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of
drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be
taken in harmony with the extant body of laws.

LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the
operation thereof, and not to issue registration.