provisions.
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned
JOSE J. FERRER, JR. VS. CITY MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015
FACTS
Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance,
Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, which will
collect 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of
Php 100,000.00. This shall accrue to the Socialized
Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government.
The special assessment shall go to the General Fund
under a special account to be established for the
purpose. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235
and S-2013 was enacted collecting garbage fees on
residential properties which shall be deposited solely
and exclusively in an earmarked special account under
the general fund to be utilized for garbage
collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City property owner,
questions the validity of the said ordinances.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
2. Whether the ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the
rule on double taxation.
RULING
1. The SHT is valid. The tax is within the power of
Quezon City Government to impose. LGUs may be
considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful
method. Herein, the tax is not a pure exercise of
taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied
with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power for the general welfare of
the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest.
On the question of inequality, the disparities between a
real property owner and an informal settler as two
distinct classes are too obvious and need not be
discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the
practical dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution.
Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist
even if the motive which impelled the legislature to
impose the tax was to favor one over another. Further,
the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot
be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since
the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA
actually allows. Even better, on certain conditions, the
ordinance grants a tax credit.
2. No. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the
proper exercise of its corporate powers under Section
22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is
empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions,
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall
share with the national government the responsibility
in the management and maintenance of ecological
balance within their territorial jurisdiction. The
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000, affirms this authority as it expresses that the
LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of its
to impose and collect such reasonable fees and
charges for services rendered. The fee imposed for
garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a
charge fixed for the regulation of an activity as
provided by the same. As opposed to petitioners
opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not being
a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double
taxation must necessarily fail.
MENESES VS. CA
FACTS: On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District
Land Officer of Los Baos, Laguna, issued to Pablito
Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT covering lots located
in Los Baos, Laguna.
Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a
Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed in
1975 in consideration of Bautistas love and affection
for and some monetary obligations in favor of
Meneses. After the execution of said document,
Meneses took possession of the land, introduced
improvements thereon, declared the land as his own
for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty
taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the land from his
aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces
ownership of their land as far back as 1919 when their
matriarch was issued an OCT covering a lot, with the
Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The
same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a
TCT in the names of her heirs, all surnamed
Quisumbing.
The Quisumbings applied for registration and
confirmation of title over an additional area which had
gradually accrued to their property by the natural
action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. The CFI of
Bian confirmed the Quisumbings title thereto.
In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of
Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Darum
and Almendral for nullification of the free patents and
titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that
Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using
his brother Pablito as a tool and dummy, illegally
occupied their private accretion land and
confederating with District Land Officer Darum and
Land Inspector Almendral, obtained free patents and
OCTs to the land.
In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding
that the lands registered by the Meneses brothers are
accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid
right as owners of the riparian land to which nature
had gradually deposited the disputed lots. (The lots
occupied by Meneses, as found by the court, are to be
accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion
land owned by the Quisumbings. )
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed
the to the CA, which affirmed in toto the lower courts
decision.The defendants-appellants filed two MRs of
the CA decision but it was denied, hence this petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON
1. The lands in question were not accretion lands but
lands of the public domain
2. Conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith
attended the issuance of the free patent and titles to
Pablito Meneses; and
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision CA is AFFIRMED
While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may
not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming
here, the two cases refer to the same accretion lands
northwest of the original land owned by the
Quisumbings.
The submersion in water of a portion of the land in
question is due to the rains falling directly on or
flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources.
Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due
to flux and reflux of tides it cannot be considered a
foreshore land. The land sought to be registered not
being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a
foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is
not a public land and therefore capable of registration
as private property provided that the applicant proves
that he has a registerable title.
Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will
govern in determining the natural bed or basin of the
lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters
of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to
creeks, streams, rivers and lakes by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands.
As pointed out by the lower court, no act of
appropriation is necessary in order to acquire
ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does not
require the same.
2. As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the
approval and grant of the free patents heirs
Quisumbing. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in
Meneses v. People, which held the petitioners therein
liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents
and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered
a decision finding the defendants guilty as charged.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed.
NOTES:
1. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence
of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual
and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
2. The task of fixing the amount of damages is
primarily with the trial court. While it is the appellate
courts duty to review the same, a reduction of the
award of damages must pass the test of
reasonableness. The CA can only modify or change the
amount awarded as damages when they are palpably
or scandalously and reasonably excessive.
3. A public official is by law not immune from damages
in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no
longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.
RP VS. SANTOS
FACTS:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more
than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III
(Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The
property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by
Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos,
Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque
River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in
the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio
Ivan.
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his
application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr.
as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership
of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was
already classified as alienable and disposable by the
Government. They cite as proof of the classification as
alienable and disposable the following notation found
on the survey plan, to wit:
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO.
007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued
by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.
On May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the application for
land registration.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land property survey inside L.C.
Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 by the Bureau of Forest
Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968 is classified as alienable and
disposable by the Government.
HELD:
NO. The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals; DISMISSES the application for
registration.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the
Government, such as a presidential proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a
legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on
the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the
effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did
not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as
alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents
could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot
4988-B.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not
be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the
Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
continue to belong to the State as its property of public
dominion, unless there is an express law that provides
that the dried-up river beds should belong to some
other person.
PARANAQUE VS EBIO
Property; Ownership; Alluvial Deposits. In case you
ever wondered who owns land formed by alluvial
deposits, wonder no more. The ownership of such land
is governed by Article 84 of theSpanish Law of Waters
of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article
457 of the Civil Code. Article 84 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over
alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. According
to this article, accretions deposited gradually upon
lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes,
by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof,
belong to the owners of such lands. In this regard,
Article 457 of the Civil Code states that [T] o the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters. It is therefore
explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial
deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of
the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to
which it may have been added. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
REPUBLIC v. CA (132 SCRA 514)
Facts: Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes,
Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT
T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an
application for the registration of 3 lots adjacent to
their fishpond property (Psu-131892: Lot 1, 33837
sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq. m.) On 5
April 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.
Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed
a written opposition to the application for registration.
On 6 March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial
withdrawal of the application for registration with
respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by
the Court. On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered
withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded
only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-
131892. On 26 June 1976, the lower court rendered a
decision granting the application on the finding that
the lands in question are accretions to the Tancincos'
fishponds covered by TCT 89709. On 30 July 1976, the
Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19
August 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower cost; without
costs. Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the
decision of the CA. The Supreme Court granted the
petition, reversed and set aside the decision appealed
from, and ordered the private respondents to move
back the dikes of their fishponds to their original
location and return the disputed property to the river
to which it belongs. 1. Power to review vested in the
Court; Binding effect of the findings of facts by lower
court not absolute The rule that the findings of fact of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. The Court
retains the power to review and rectify the findings of
fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the
court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee (Carolina Industries Inc.
v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., 97 SCRA 734). 2. No
accretion to speak of as the transfer of dikes is man-
made and artificial; Article 457 NCC There is no
accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil
Code because what actually happened is that the
private respondents simply transferred their dikes
further down the river bed of the Meycauayan Rivers,
and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, man-
made and artificial and not the result of the gradual
and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the
river. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that
to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters." 3. Accretion,
requisites Article 457 requires the concurrence of three
requisites before an accretion covered by this
particular provision is said to have taken place. They
are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current
of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. 4.
Alluvion as exclusive work of nature indispensable The
requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must
be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the
addition to the said property was made gradually
through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers; but there is evidence that the
alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made
and not the exclusive result of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not because of the sole effect
of the current of the rivers but as a result of the
transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching
upon it. 5. Reason in giving riparian owner the right to
any land or alluvion deposited by a river The reason
behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to
any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to
compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers
because of the location of his land. If estates bordering
on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils
produced by the destructive force of the waters and if
by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject
to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is
proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the
owners thereof should be compensated by the right of
accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). In
the present case, the riparian owner does not acquire
the additions to his land caused by special works
expressly intended or designed to bring about
accretion. When the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were
meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect
their property from the destructive force of the waters
of the river. 6. Adjudication of land in question as
private property is null and void The conclusion that
can be made from said alleged accretion being
declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 is that
areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed
only after the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in
1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is
really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan
river by reclamation. Thus, the lower court cannot
validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the
names of the private respondents. These lots were
portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are
therefore classified as property of the public domain
under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They
are not open to registration under the Land
Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in
question as private property in the names of the
private respondents is null and void.
REYNANTE v. CA
Facts: More than 50 years ago, Jose Reynante was
taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, over a
fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan with an area of 188.711 sq. m. (TCT 25618,
Land Registry of Bulacan). During the tenancy,
Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his
family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan)
he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of
5,096 sq. m. and 6,011 sq. m. respectively. These lots
are located between the fishpond covered by TCT
25618 and the Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River.
Reynante harvested and sold said nipa palms without
interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did
the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant
the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and
appropriate them as his own. After the death of Don
Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a written
agreement denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng
Pagsasauli ng Karapatan dated 29 November 1984
with Reynante whereby the latter for and in
consideration of the sum of P200,000 turned over the
fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme
Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as
caretaker or "bantaykasama at tagapamahala.
Pursuant to the said written agreement, Reynante
surrendered the fishpond and the 2 huts located
therein to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos. The heirs of
Leoncio and Dolores Carlos, and the heirs of Gorgonio
and Concepcion Carlos thereafter leased the said
fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Reynante continued
to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and
2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted
therein. On 17 February 1988, the heirs formally
demanded that Reynante vacate said portion since the
latter had already been indemnified for the surrender
of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof,
Reynante refused and failed to relinquish possession of
lots 1 and 2. On 22 April 1988, the heirs filed a
complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory
injunction against Reynante with the MTC Meycauayan
Bulacan (Branch 1, 3rd Judicial Region, Civil Case
1526) alleging that the latter by means of strategy and
stealth, took over the physical, actual and material
possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the
kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting
off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent
thereto. On 10 January 1989, the trial court rendered
its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that
Reynante had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2.
The heirs appealed to the RTC Malolos Bulacan (Branch
8, 3rd Judicial Region) and on 8 August 1989 it
rendered its decision in favor of the heirs, and
reversed the decision of the lower court. The Court
ordered Reynante to restore possession of the piece of
land, together with the sasa or nipa palms planted
theron; without pronouncement as to attorney's fees,
and each party bearing their respective costs of the
suit. From said decision, Reynante filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for review. On 28 February 1990,
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision (CA-GR
19171), affirming the decision of the lower court in
toto, and thus denied the petition seeking to issue a
restraining order. On 5 November 1990, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Reynante. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 28 February 1990 and
reinstated the decision of the MTC Meycauayan,
Bulacan (Branch I). 1. Action for forcible entry An
action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process
and actual title of the property is never determined. A
party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his prior possession, if he has
in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria (German
Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498,
499). On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove
prior physical possession, he has no right of action for
forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the
owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil. 469
[1942]). In the present case, the Court of Appeals
could not legally restore the heirs' possession over lots
1 and 2 simply because Reynante has clearly proven
that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2. 2.
Reynante in prior possession Reynante was in
possession of the questioned lots for more than 50
years. He was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by
the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and
that he constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond
and planted nipa palms therein. This fact is bolstered
by the "Sinumpaang Salaysay " executed by Epifanio
Lucero, Apolonio D. Morte, and Carling Dumalay, all of
whom are disinterested parties with no motive to
falsify that can be attributed to them, except their
desire to tell the truth. Moreover, an occular inspection
was conducted by the trial court dated 2 December
1988 which was attended by the parties and their
respective counsels. The court observed that the
controversial premises is beyond the titled property of
the plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan,
Meycauayan River it being a part of the public domain.
On the other hand, the heirs based their claim of
possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on the written
agreement signed by petitioner whereby the latter
surrendered his rights over the fishpond. There is
nothing, however, on the document that the tenant
was giving other matters not mentioned in the
document. Neither was there any mention of the hut
and nipa palms for such to be included in the
subsequent least to de la Cruz, a a circumstance that
gives the impression that said hut and palms do not
belong to the heirs. 3. Disputed lands not included in
TCT 25618 The disputed lots involved in the present
case are not included in TCT 25618 as per verification
made by the Forest Management Bureau, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. That tract of
land situated at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in
the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer
Restituto Buan for Reynante falls within Alienable and
Disposable Land (for fishpond development) under
Project 15 per B.F.L.C. Map 3122 dated 8 May 1987. 4.
Requisites of accretion Accretion benefits a riparian
owner when the following requisites are present: (1)
that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
it resulted from the effects of the current of the water;
and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984, 132
SCRA 514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA
218). 5. Accretion does not automatically become
registered land Granting without conceding that lots 1
and 2 were created by alluvial formation and while it is
true that accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become
the property of the owner of the banks (Article 457),
such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person
through prescription. In Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al. (GR L-17652, 30 June 1962,
115 Phil. 521) it was held that "an accretion does not
automatically become registered land just because the
lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing; registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining a river is governed by
the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Act does not vest or
give title to the land, but merely confirms and,
thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third
parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws,
wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided." In the present case, assuming that the heirs
had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question),
by accretion, still their failure to register said accretion
for a period of 50 years subjected said accretion to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
JAGUALING v. CA
Facts: A certain parcel of land is located in Sta. Cruz,
Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental with an area of 16,452 sq.
m., forming part of an island in a nonnavigable river,
bounded by the Tagoloan river on the north, south,
and east and by the portion belonging to Vicente Neri
on the west. Janita Eduave claims that she inherited
the land from her father, Felomino Factura, together
with his co-heirs, Reneiro Factura and Aldenora
Factura, and acquired sole ownership of the property
by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale.
The land is declared for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration 26137 with an area of 16,452 sq. m. Since
the death of her father on 5 May 1949, Eduave had
been in possession of the property although the tax
declaration remains in the name of the deceased
father. The entire land had an area of 16,452 sq. m.
appearing in the deed of extrajudicial partition, while in
tax declaration the area is only 4,937 sq. m., and she
reasoned out that she included the land that was under
water. The land was eroded sometime in November
1964 due to typhoon Ineng, destroying the bigger
portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut
tree. In 1966 due to the movement of the river
deposits on the land that was not eroded increased the
area to almost half a hectare and in 1970 Eduave
started to plant banana trees. In 1973, Maximo and
Anuncita Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn
and bananas provided that they prevent squatters to
come to the area. Eduave engaged the services of a
surveyor who conducted a survey and placed concrete
monuments over the land. Eduave also paid taxes on
the land in litigation, and mortgaged the land to the
Luzon Surety and Co., for a consideration of
P6,000.00. The land was the subject of a reconveyance
case, in the CFI Misamis Oriental (Branch V, Cagayan
de Oro City, Civil Case 5892), between Janita Eduave
vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura, which was the subject of
judgment by compromise in view of the amicable
settlement of the parties, dated 31 May 1979. The
heirs of Antonio Factura had ceded a portion of the
land with an area of 1,289 sq. m., to Janita Eduave in
a notarial document of conveyance, pursuant to the
decision of the CFI, after a subdivision of the lot 62
Pls-799, and containing 1,289 sq. m. was designated
as Lot 62-A, and the subdivision plan was approved as
Pls-799-Psd-10-001782. Eduave also applied for
concession with the Bureau of Mines to extract 200 m3
of grave, and after an ocular inspection the permit was
granted. Eduave, after permit was granted, entered
into an agreement with Tagoloan Aggregates to extract
sand and gravel, which agreement was registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds. Maximo and
Anuncita Jagualing assert that they are the real owners
of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000
sq. m. During the typhoon PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS
(5TH WEEK,ART.457465) Ineng in 1964 the river
control was washed away causing the formation of an
island. Jagualing started occupying the land in 1969,
paid land taxes as evidenced by tax declaration 26380
and tax receipts, and tax clearances. Actual occupation
of the land by Jagualing included improvements and
the house. Rudygondo and Janita Eduave filed with the
RTC Misamis Oriental an action to quiet title and/or
remove a cloud over the property in question against
Jagualing. On 17 July 1987 the trial court dismissed
the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by
preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership
over the land in litigation. The court found that the
island is a delta forming part of the river bed which the
government may use to reroute, redirect or control the
course of the Tagoloan River. Accordingly, it held that
it was outside the commerce of man and part of the
public domain, citing Article 420 of the Civil Code. As
such it cannot be registered under the land registration
law or be acquired by prescription. The trial court,
however, recognized the validity of Jagualing's
possession and gave them preferential rights to use
and enjoy the property. The trial court added that
should the State allow the island to be the subject of
private ownership, the Jagualings have rights better
than that of Eduave. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the court found that the island was formed by
the branching off of the Tagoloan River and
subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial
deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of
the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court, declared Eduave as the
lawful and true owners of the land subject of the case
and ordered Jagualing to vacate the premises and
deliver possession of the land to Eduave. Hence, the
present petition. The Supreme Court found no error
committed by the appellate court, denied the petition
for lack of sufficient merit, and affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals; without pronouncement as to
costs. 1. Evidence not properly appreciated by trial
court; CA properly applied Article 463 The appellate
court reversed the decision of the trial court because it
did not take into account the other pieces of evidence
in favor of the private respondents. The complaint was
dismissed by the trial court because it did not accept
Eduaves explanation regarding the initial discrepancy
as to the area they claimed (4937sq.m. v. 16452
sq.m.); because it favored the theory that Eduave
became interested in the land only in 1979 not for
agricultural purposes but in order to extract gravel and
sand, which is belied by other circumstances
tantamount to acts of ownership exercised by Eduave
over the property prior to said year (e.g. the payment
of land taxes thereon, the monuments placed by the
surveyor whose services were engaged by Eduave, the
agreement entered into by Eduave and Tagoloan
Aggregates to extract gravel and sand, which
agreement was duly registered with the Register of
Deeds); because it disregarded the testimony of 2
disinterested witnesses (Gergorio Neri, as to metes
and bounds of the property and the effect of the
typhoon; and Candida Ehem, as to the caretaker
agreement between her and Eduave) without
explaining why it doubted their credibility. From the
evidence thus submitted, the appellate court had
sufficient basis for the finding that the property of
Eduave actually existed and was identified prior to the
branching off or division of the river. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the
Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of
land separated or isolated by river movement to be
retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation
or isolation. 2. Island formed in a non-navigable and
non-floatable river; Article 465 The parcel of land is
part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and
non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or
segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present
size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of
alluvial deposits. The Court of Appeals did not err in
applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this
provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land
along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or
more accurately, because the island is longer than the
property of Eduave, they are deemed ipso jure to be
the owners of that portion which corresponds to the
length of their property along the margin of the river.
3. Land formed by accretion belongs to riparian owner,
even without a specific act of possession over it; Land
however may yield to adverse possession of third party
if riparian owner fails to assert claim Lands formed by
accretion belong to the riparian owner. This
preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted the
owners of the land located in the margin nearest the
formed island for the reason that they are in the best
position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of
the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over
the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian
owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may
yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as
indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens
system must itself still be registered. 4. Doctrine of
acquisitive prescription The property may be acquired
by adverse possession for the required number of
years under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription.
Jagualings possession cannot be considered in good
faith, however, because they are presumed to have
notice of the status of Eduave as riparian owners who
have the preferential right to the island as recognized
and accorded by law; they may claim ignorance of the
law, specifically Article 465 of the Civil Code, but such
is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of the same code, an
adequate and valid defense to support their claim of
good faith. Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good
faith, they may acquire ownership over the island only
through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period
of thirty years. By their own admission, Jagualing have
been in possession of the property for only about 15
years, and thus, the island cannot be adjudicated in
their favor. 5. Origin of island not tackled as case is
not between opposing riparian owners but between a
riparian owner and one in possession of the land There
is no need to make a final determination regarding the
origins of the island, i.e., whether the island was
initially formed by the branching off or division of the
river and covered by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in
which case there is strictly no accession because the
original owner retains ownership, or whether it was
due to the action of the river under Article 465, or
whether it was caused by the abrupt segregation and
washing away of the stockpile of the river control,
which makes it a case of avulsion under Article 459, as
the case is not between parties as opposing riparian
owners contesting ownership over an accession but
rather between a riparian owner and the one in
possession of the island. 6. Quasi in Rem; Judgment
conclusive upon the parties and does not bind the
State and other riparian owners The Court is not
prepared to concede that the island is a delta which
should be outside the commerce of man and that it
belongs to the State as property of the public domain
in the absence of any showing that the legal
requirements to establish such a status have been
satisfied, which duty properly pertains to the State.
Since the petition is an upshot of the action to quiet
title brought by Eduave against Jagualing, it is thus not
technically an action in rem or an action in personam,
but characterized as quasi in rem, which is an action in
personam concerning real property. Thus, the
judgment in proceedings of this nature is conclusive
only between the parties and does not bind the State
or the other riparian owners who may have an interest
over the island involved herein.
CELESTIAL V. CACHOPERO
FACTS:
They had a dispute over a piece of land which was a
dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to obtain a
Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) alleging that he had been the owner of that
land whereon he built a house and other
improvements. However, Celestial protests that she
has preferential right over the land because it is
adjacent to and is the only outlet from her house.
According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute
was a creek and is therefore outside the commerce of
man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain another
MSA which was granted by the DENR. Due to
conflicting interests of the parties, the land in dispute
must be sold in a public auction.
Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the DENR with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC.
Celestial contends that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over Cachoperos petition for certiorari as it
is in the nature of an appeal falling within the
jurisdiction of the CA and that the Cachopero has not
exhausted all administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one
of the parties when it is classified as outside the
commerce of man
RULING:
A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not
susceptible to acquisitive prescription
As for Celestials claim of ownership over the subject
land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse
possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966,
when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
It is only after the Government has declared the land
to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
BAES V. CA
Facts: In 1962, the government dug a canal on a
private parcel of land (Lot 2958, with area of 33,902
sq.m.) to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek. This lot
was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in
his name under TCT 10990 and then had it subdivided
into 3 lots (Lot 2958-A, 28,889 sq.m, TCT 11041.; Lot
2958-B, 3,588 sq.m, TCT 11042.; and Lot 2958-C, 452
sq.m., TCT 11043). In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which
was totally occupied by the canal, the government
gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area as Lot
2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property
dated 20 June 1970. The property, which was near but
not contiguous to Lot 2958-C, was denominated as Lot
3271-A and later registered in the name of Felix Baes
under TCT 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was
used to fill up the old bed of the creek. Meanwhile,
Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A
designated as Lot 1, Blk. 4, resurveyed and
subdivided. On 12 January 1968, he submitted a
petition for the approval of his resurvey and
subdivision plans, claiming that after the said lots were
plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found that
there were errors in respect of their bearings and
distances. The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved
by the CFI Pasay City in an order dated 15 January
1968. As a result, the old TCTs covering the said lots
were canceled and new ones were issued (Blk. 4: Lot
1- A, 672 sq.m., TCT T-14404; Lot 1-B representing
the increase in size after the resurvey, 826 sq.m., TCT
T-14405; Lot 2958-C-1, 452 sq.m., TCT T- 14406; and
Lot 2958-C-2 representing the increase after resurvey,
2,770 sq.m., TCT T-14407). Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-
C-2 were later consolidated and this time further
subdivided into 4 lots (Lot 1, 147 sq.m., TCT 29592.;
Lot 2, 950 sq.m., TCT 29593; Lot 3, 257 sq.m., TCT
29594; and Lot 4, 1,868 sq.m., TCT 29595). In 1978,
the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot 1-B
(TCT 14405) on which the Baes had erected an
apartment building, covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay
Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of the Tripa de
Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C (TCT 29592 to
29595), with an increased area of 2,770 sq.m. after
resurvey and subdivision, had been unlawfully
enlarged. On 17 November 1982, the Republic filed a
petition for cancellation of TCT 14405 and 29592 to
29595 with the trial court (Civil Case 0460-P). Baes did
not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT
29592, 29594 and 29595 and was not able to prove
during the trial that the government utilized a portion
of Lot 2 under TCT 29593. The trial court therefore
decreed that the original Lot 2958-C (452 sq.m.) be
reverted to its status before the resurvey-subdivision
of Lot 2958-C. Baes appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court,
declaring TCTs 14405, 29592, 29593, 29594, 29595,
and TCT 29593's derivative titles TCTs 124725,
124726, 124727 and 124729, ordering the Register of
Deeds for Pasay City to cancel them and issue new
ones in their stead in the name of the Baes after
segregating from TCT 29593 452 sq. m., the actual
area of Lot 2958-C (covered by cancelled TCT 11043)
belonging to Felix Baes, and dismissing the
counterclaim. Baes appealed to the Supreme Court by
way of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the
petition, with costs against Baes. 1. Article 461 of the
Civil Code applies to a natural change in the course of
the stream; If change of course is due to works,
belongs to concessioners if not to owners of land
covered by the waters Article 461 of the Civil Code
provides that River beds which are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters
ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area
lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the
old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by
paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed
the value of the area occupied by the new bed. Article
461 refers to a natural change in the course of a
stream. If the change of the course is due to works
constructed by concessioners authorized by the
government, the concession may grant the abandoned
river bed to the concessioners. If there is no such
grant, then, by analogy, the abandoned river bed will
belong to the owners of the land covered by the
waters, as provided in this article, without prejudice to
a superior right of third persons with sufficient title. 2.
Riparian owner entitled to compensation if change in
the course of river by artificial means If the riparian
owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or
loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all
the more reason to compensate him when the change
in the course of the river is effected through artificial
means. Baes loss of the land covered by the canal was
the result of a deliberate act on the part of the
government when it sought to improve the flow of the
Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to
compensate the Baeses for their loss. 3. Ownership of
dried up portion of creek in addition to fair exchange of
similar lots by parties a double compensation Baes has
already been compensated as there has been a fair
exchange of Lot 3271-A belonging to the Government
and Lot 2958-B belonging to Baes, which were similar
in area and value, through a Deed of Exchange of Real
Property which the parties freely entered into. Baes
cannot claim additional compensation because allowing
Baes to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of
the creek would be a clear case of double
compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of
the state. The exchange of lots between the petitioners
and the Republic was the result of voluntary
negotiations. If these had failed, the government could
still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of
eminent domain, upon payment of just compensation,
as the land was needed for a public purpose.Agustin v.
IAC Facts:
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on
the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of
Cagayan. In 1919 the lands east of the river were
covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, OCT
5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River
owned by Eulogio Agustin. As the years went by, the
Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing
silt on the western bank. The shifting of the river and
the siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands
west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre.
Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana
Cadastre were Pablo Binayug and Maria Melad.
Binayug was in possession since 1947 of Lots 3349,
7875 to 7879, 7881 to 7885, 7891 and 7892. It is has
an area of 8 hectares planted to tobacco and corn and
another 12 hectares overgrown with talahib. Binayug's
Homestead Application W-79055 over this land was
approved in 1959 and his possession recognized in the
decision in Civil Case 101. On the other hand, as a
result of Civil Case 343-T, Macario Melad, the
predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo
Melad, was issued OCT P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad.
293 on 1 June 1956. Through the years, the Cagayan
River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its
eastern bank among which was Agustin's Lot 8457,
depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land
possessed by Binayug on the western bank. However,
in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed
its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the
process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo
Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima
Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or
Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots
they had to cross the river. In April 1969, while the
Melads, Binayug, Urbina and their tenants were
planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side
of the Cagayan River, Agustin, the Heirs of Baldomero
PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(5TH WEEK,ART.457
465) Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of
Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and
drove away the Melads, Binayug and Urbina from the
premises. On 21 April 1970, Maria and Timoteo Melad
filed a complaint (Civil Case 343-T) to recover Lot
3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare
accretion. On 24 April 1970, Pablo Binayug filed a
separate complaint (Civil Case 344-T) to recover his
lots and their accretions. On 16 June 1975, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case 343-T, ordering
Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and
Octavio Bancud, their representatives or agents to
vacate Lot 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its
accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and
9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and to restore ownership
in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the
only interested heirs of Macario Melad. The trial court
likewise ordered, in Civil Case 344-T, Justo Adduru,
Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan,
Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo
Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong
Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio
Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan
Langoay, their representatives or agents to vacate Lots
3349, 7875 to 7879, 7881 to 7885, 7891 and 7892,
together with its accretion and to restore possession to
Pablo Binayug and Geronimo Urbina. Without
pronouncement as to damages which were not
properly proven and to costs. Eulogio Agustin appealed
the decision in Civil Case 343-T, while Eulogio Agustin,
Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir),
Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed the decision in
Civil Case 344-T. But upon motion of the Melads,
Binayug and Urbina, the trial court ordered on 15
August 1975 the execution pending appeal of the
judgment in Civil Case 344-T against Cagurangan,
Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was
dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the
trial. On 29 November 1983, the Intermediate
Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto
the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the
Agustin, Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay. Hence, the
petition for review. The Supreme Court denied the 463 provides that whenever the current of a river
petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the decision of divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or
the IAC, now CA; with costs against Agustin, et.al. 1. part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeal conclusive with ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
the Supreme Court The finding of the Court of Appeals separated from the estate by the current.
that there had been accretions to the lots of the
Melads, Binauyg and Urbina who did not lose the
ownership of such accretions even after they were
separated from the principal lots by the sudden change
of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is
conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by
Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides that "to
the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters. (366)" 2.
Conditions for accretion to benefit a riparian owner
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following
requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of
a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514). In the
present case, the accretion on the western bank of the
Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to
1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and
imperceptible. Only when Lot 3351, with an original
area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that
was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was
resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6
hectares had been added to it. Lot 3351, covered by a
homestead patent issued in June 1950 to Pablo
Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by
an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the
Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These
accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands
the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). 3.
Reason for the principle of accretion benefiting a
riparian owner The reason for the principle is because,
if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods
and other damage due to the destructive force of the
waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is
only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice
the owners thereof should in some way be
compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City
of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). 4. Ownership of accretion not
lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the river The'
ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost
upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of
the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it
reverted to its old 1919 bed), and separated or
transferred said accretions to the other side (or
eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the
New Civil Code apply to this situation. Article 459
provides that whenever the current of a river, creek
or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a
known portion of land and transfers it to another
estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated
portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided
that he removes the same within two years." Article