The Concept of 'Psychologism' in Frege and Husserl

Author(s): J. N. Mohanty
Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 30, No. 3, The Dialectics of Psychologism (1997), pp.
271-290
Published by: Penn State University Press
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The Concept of 'Psychologism' in Frege and Husserl

J. N. Mohanty

Both Frege and Husserl are well known to hve campaigned against a
philosophical position known as psychologism. I will begin this es-
say by focusing upon the nature of psychologism in generai and then
upon the spcifie sort or sorts of psychologism Frege and Husserl
were up against. Next, I will look at the arguments they pressed against
that position. Finally, I will ask if a radical antipsychologistic posi-
tion is a defensible one.

Psychologism: An ally of idealism or of naturalism?

It is time to recognize that Frege's attack on psychologism could not

hve been motivated by th idea of attacking (Hegelian) idealism.
Hegel's idealism had ceased to be a dominant philosophical theory
by the later half of the nineteenth Century, and some philosophers
even regarded psychologism as their way of correcting the alleged
excesses of Hegelian idealism. For example, as Frank Kirkland (1993)
notes, Jakob Fries's psychologism was advanced as an anti-Hegelian
position. In addition, Kirkland cites two passages from Hegel that
clearly show Hegel's extreme hostility and negative attitude toward
any intrusion of psychological considrations into logic. Not unlike
Frege and Husserl, Hegel insisted upon keeping Vorstellung and
Gedanke apart. Vorstellung, for Hegel, is pictorial thinking, which
should be kept apart from pure thought. Pictorial thinking is an ally
of naturalism, depending for its catgories on things outside of logic.
Pure thought drives its catgories from its own internai develop-
ment. Kirkland is therefore led to assert that Hegel's critique of
psychologism is an instance of his critique of pictorial thinking, which
is indirectly a critique of naturalism. It would seem, then, to be more
in order of things that Frege's critique of psychologism, instead of
being a critique of Hegelian idealism, was rather intended to be a
part of his overall rejection of naturalism. Confusion about this link
between psychologism and naturalism is muddied by Frege's accusa-
tion of Husserl, in his review of the latter's Philosophie der Arithmetik

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1997. Copyright 1997 The Pennsylvania
State University, University Park, PA.

271

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272 J. . MOHANTY

(1894), of reducing everything objec

psychologism is maintained as leading
Michael Dummett's linkage of psycho
now thinks was a mistake (1991, 80) -
alone by Frege's misleading review o
various other Statements by Frege. One
chological treatments of logic . . . lead
logical idealism. Since ail knowledge i
the objective is now broken off. This
remarkable in physiological psycholog
contrast to its realistic starting poin
serts hre is that psychologism leads n
jective idealism, but to "epistemological
that knowledge is confined to ideas and
outside of th mind, and so to a sort of
still for Frege is that psychologism can
logicai and mathematical cognitions f
nor mathematics has the task of invest
of consciousness whose bearer is an i
I will not, on this occasion, attempt t
a realist, as Dumme takes him to b
Hans Sluga takes him. But one thing is
is motivated by the goal of preserving
mathematical truths and of setting asid
with regard to any cognition. The sort
to hve thse ruinous consquences is, f
tic philosophy. Physiological psychol
ogy of the British empiricists are tw
Kantian nor the Hegelian idealism ha
ticular, not the Hegelian, which sought
logical contents entirely separate from

Types of psychologism

Many authors hve attempted a taxo

psychologism (see esp. DeBoer 1978,
and Cussins 1987). Without recalling th
by distinguishing 'naturalisti psycho
psychologism'. While Husserl general
former, he often, especially in the For
(1969; see esp. 254-55), used the latt

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 273

variety of psychologism that his rfutation in

28, 38) had left unaffected. It seems tha
psychologism' he has in mind th Kantian sort
forms of logic have their origin in th a priori
mind (so that pure transcendental logic has its
scendental psychology). I will return to this v
later in this essay, but for th prsent I will
that is, naturalistic psychologism.
The "naturalism" that underlies naturalistic
cording to Husserl, a metaphysical thesis th
consisting only of individuai things, cognizabl
perception, and the psychology based upon suc
undertakes the task of inquiring into causal r
dividuai mental contents and other mental con
tities. This naturalism can be held by realist
Levinas 1973, xxxvi, 97, 14-15). Naturalistic
be upheld by either phenomenalists or by psy
ers or by many other asserted varieties of psy
are founded upon a naturalistic world view
88-89). Both Frege and Husserl reject them
thories per se, but insofar as thse psycho
provide the foundation for logic and math
Husserl's case - insofar as they advance a theo
sciousness.

Under the generai rubric of 'naturalistic psychologism' can be

distinguished various types, which dpend upon the fundamental con-
cept to which the naturalistic psychology is being applied. Thus we
have

(A) logicai psychologism, i.e., psychologism with regard to logic;

(B) psychologism in theory of meaning;
(C) psychologism in theory of truth;
(D) epistemological psychologism; and
(E) psychologism applied to metaphysics.

In each case, there is a corresponding antipsychologism, and possi-

bly a strong antipsychologism and a weak one.
Frege was opposed to (A) through (C), and he possibly thought
he was opposed to (D), but as a matter of fact he was not. Husserl was
opposed to (A) through (D). Neither had anything to do with (E). In
this essay I will not be concerned with (E), which includes any at-
tempt to use a psychological category for understanding/interpreting

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274 J. . MOHANTY

th nature of reality. A good example o

acterizing Reality, the Kantian Ding
such attempts to ground metaphysics
let me briefly explain (A) through (D)
Logicai psychologism is the theory th
chology. As has been noticed by many
and a strong form of logicai psycholo
available of this distinction, I will m
Hanna (1993): according to strong logica
cai propositions (truths, principles, a
dent on the human mind, are necessarily
so that logicai objectivities are mental e
proposed by Hanna, the thesis may be s

(1) Necessarily (Vjc) (jc is a logicai prop

being & y thinks jc))

However, note that 'y thinks jc' (in

psychologistic reading, meaning that if
entity. If one rejects this reading and al
necessarily entail that jc is a mental enti
strong logicai psychologism. For even if
not a mental entity. So I would revise (1

(1*) Necessarily (V*) (jc is a logicai prop

being & is a content of y's mind))

Weak logicai psychologism, in Hanna's

(jc) (x is a logicai proposition . . . M($y) (y is a

Replacing 'y is a human being' in (1*)

in (2) has the advantage that, while (1*)
relativism with regard to a naturai kind
"structural" concept of a "rational think
Of Frege, we can say that he rejects
(2). Husserl certainly rejects (1), per
argued that he does not reject (2).
We hve noticed that 'y thinks jc' a
psychologistic, the other not. For one r
tent of y's mind"; for the other, it mea

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 275

ing'. One may want to point out that this con

retic psychologism'. To hold that 'y thinks jc'
y's mind' is to opt for a psychologistic theory
ings or thoughts, whereas to hold that 'y th
object of y's thinking' is to opt for a nonp
meaning. Both Frege and Husserl rejected iden
with images or any other mental entities, for b
entities that transcend th mental expriences
From psychologism with regard to meaning
psychologism with regard to 'truth'. Both Fre
keep th idea of truth secure from intrusions
because logic for him is an laboration of th
because for him psychologism leads to relat
and so is incohrent. Psychologism with reg
cording to Frege, to identifying 'true' with 't
he rejects but is not sure that he can rfute. H
enormous pains to rfute th position, but con
be able to persuade th psychologistic and r
F0llesdal 1994).
The ultimate constituents of 'truth', for H
and Object'. Meanings are, for his (and Freg
ties transcending th subjective life of pers
tion, are ontological. The adequacy of meani
Truth by itself is an ideal entity, not an indivi
or fact. Even if there are no intelligent cratur
truth remains in itself what it is, it retains its
of validity" in th timeless realm of ideas. As
truth is independent of human judgment. T
relativize being, for 'truth' and 'being' are
(Husserl 1928, pp. 129-32).
Can there be an epistemological psycholo
from ali th above three? If, as Kitcher (1979)
epistemological theory is psychologistic, and
troversial, his thses on logic, meaning, and
ogistic, then it would seem that one can
epistemological psychologism and th three
nizes that Frege's antipsychologism is restr
objectivity of truth; guarding against identify
jective ideas, as well as against taking mathe
and also rejecting th view that logic is con

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276 J. . MOHANTY

process of thinking. However, accor

antipsychologistic doctrines are comp
theory whose basic framework was taken
of sources of knowledge and types of c
priori, a posteriori). To the extent th
not presuppose a naturalistic world view
of Frege's epistemology, I would add, is
about which we are now talking.
Husserl also wanted to avoid a natural
expresses th basic idea of a naturalistic
it "places subject and object in the same
and studies their relation as a relation o
had to reformulate the problem of know
Frege's was closer to Kant's while Husse
generai sens, rejected the Kantian id
of cognition and the Kantian taxonom
intentionality, meaning fulfillment, v
both his epistemological problem and
flavor of psychologism, though of a no
Both Frege and Husserl were aware
cussion within the neo-Kantian circle, e
Cohen had rejected psychologism in f
knowledge. Cohen's program was to g
jectively. Natorp, in a well-known
subjektive Bergrndung der Erkenntn
ority of objective grounding of the scie
ing, the object being what is valid ind
The object, for Natorp, equals the law,
cess of scientific objeetification. The
inasmuch as appearances are governed b
tion of science lies in the Gesetzlichkeit
tive foundation lacks "fundamental scie
principles." While Natorp had welcom
aecount of logic in the Prolegomena,
give a phenomenological foundation for
as amounting to a reversai to psycholog
It is important to ask in what way th
or antipsychologism are mutually inter
For Husserl they are all of a piece. Lo
of words and sentences, and, insofar as
truth, too, must be objective. Rejecting

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 277

areas of problems, one can possibly stili

psychologism in epistemology as one does w
epistemological problem in terms of justificat

The antipsychologistic arguments of Husse

Husserl gives th most wide-ranging and p

psychologism that is to be found in th philos
bulk of this critique is concentrated in chapte
Prolegomena, but there are also criticisms else
Untersuchungen. For a criticism of a psycholo
ing, one should turn to investigation 1 of th
Husserl argues for th distinction between psy
ages, accompanying intuitions, and/or feeling
derstanding or of meaningfully using express
their logicai contents; also between acts of me
intended, between judging and the proposit
between acts of inferring and the syllogism,
and the concept entertained. Terms such as 'id
mation', 'dniai', and 'inference' are said to be
chologically slanted," playing no rle in any p
asserts propositions, but says the propositions
premises are propositions, and so are his con
Inv. 1, 29). To sum up: "Ail theoretical scienc
tive content, of one homogeneous stuff : it is
ings," and meanings are "ideal unities of va
they constitute (29). We can then say that if
be a theory, it must consist of such ideal m
propositions) and contain no "psychological
For Husserl's criticism of a psychologistic t
should refer to th Prolegomeni sections 2
thse places, while refuting relativism, indivi
Husserl takes psychologism to imply) and whi
"anthropologism" (of Sigwart and Erdmann), h
relativism cannot be cohrent. I will return t
ence later in this essay. For the prsent, I wo
"no truth is a fact, i.e. something determined
Husserl is not denying that there are chang
itself is, however, raised above time, i.e. it ma
temporal being to it, nor to say that it arises o
true that it is raining in Ambler at time tv t

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278 J. . MOHANTY

occur in time; the truth is timeless. Th

render, Husserl thinks, any relativistic,
of truth absurd. But why this should b
Once meanings and truth are shown
not real things (individuated by time an
son), it becomes, for Husserl, easier to
gard to logic. The criticism shows tha
Husserl was searching for a middle g
and antipsychologism while conceding t
antipsychologistic side (1928b, 20). C
ries of arguments and counterarguments
out that the antipsychologistic logic
thought that they could rfute psychol
the normative conception of logic (which
arguments against psychologism) (Fre
fact, it might seem as though Husse
psychologistic logicians' response that
the psychologistic logician, taking logic
that no technology can ignore causal co
uses "ought prsupposes is" to maintain
pline prsupposes a theoretical discip
"An A ought to be B" prsupposes the t
is not is a bad A." In this sens, norm
logic." From Frege's point of view, it is
between the ideal and the normative. H
tinguishes between them, but, by grou
ideai, more successfully overcomes ps
Chapter 4 of the Prolegomena draw
psychologism. First, as psychology is
cannot be exact, cannot help being v
laws, in contrast, are exact. Psycholog
hve the absurd consquence of rend
and inexact. Second, no naturai law ca
are established by induction. Logicai laws
established by "apodictic vidence" (a
later in this essay). This distinction would be obliterated by
psychologism. Third, psychologism construes logicai laws such as
the well-known principle of noncontradiction as naturai laws gov-
erning human thinking in a rather causal manner. However, one can-
not establish a causal law by apodictic vidence. Moreover, in order
to exercise a causal influence on thinking, th law must be a judg-

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 279

ment or a cognition, itself a mental entity, bu

already confuses th distinction between th l
or cognition of th law. Stili more pertinent,
th distinction between th law as a term in causation with th law as
th rule of causation. To bring out this latter confusion, Husserl imag-
ines an ideal person whose thinking entirely proceeds "as logicai laws
require," or even a computer whose procedure would be causally ex-
plained by appealing to the initial arrangement regulated by naturai
laws that agre with those of arithmetic. But neither th ideai thinker
nor the machine thinks in accordance with th laws. Finally, no logi-
cai law prsupposes the existence of persons with mental expriences
such as judging. The laws are about truths, but truths are not facts
(Prolegomena 23).
In chapters 5 and 6, Husserl considers some spcifie attempts
(especially by Mill and Sigwart) to give psychologistic renderings of
principles of logic - of the principle of noncontradiction and the prin-
ciples of syllogism in particular - and argues that thse renderings
should be rejected. For example, Husserl wants to know if the prin-
ciple of noncontradiction is taken to be the empirical, psychological
law that it is impossible for us to believe in an explicit contradiction,
what is meant by impossible in this statement and what are the cir-
cumstances under which opposed beliefs cannot coexist? One per-
haps would say something like "in a single consciousness," or "in a
normal consciousness," or "in a reasonable person's mind," each of
which is too vague to enter into the formulations of a law. Basically
what the psychologistic rendering does is replace "not-both-being-
true of two contradictory propositions" by "incapacity to entertain
contradictory beliefs."
Chapter 7 interprets psychologism as leading to relativism; dis-
tinguishes between two kinds of relativism, individuai and spcifie;
and undertakes to rfute each. Spcifie relativism becomes anthro-
pologism if one restricts the species to the human kind. Regarding
individuai relativism, Husserl recognizes that one cannot rfute it,
for "rfutation prsupposes the leverage of certain self-evident, uni-
versally valid convictions," and yet proceeds to argue that the con-
tent of th relativisti assertion (that 'true' is always 'true for me')
contradicts "what is part of the sens or content of every assertion"
(namely, that if true, it is true for every one) (1928b, 35). Is this then
intended to be a rfutation? What if th individuai relativist does not
accept the absolute validity of the principle of contradiction, or the
claim that every assertion carries the claim that if true it is true for

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280 J. . MOHANTY

every one? What if the relativist of th

concept of a proposition at ail?
As against spcifie relativism, Husse
the thesis is in conflict with its own sen
for this, e.g., the human species' is an a
gives th words true and false new mea
for granted precisely what the relativis
means 'absolute truth'. The anthropolog
such constitution (viz. the human), th
garded by Husserl to be absurd insom
is no truth' is quivalent to 'There is a t
while the antcdent is the ngation of
surd. Thus, the thesis deduces an absurd
cdent.

Pierre Adler (1993) has distinguished between two kinds of criti-

cism Husserl advances against psychologism-cum-relativism. One of
them is what Adler calls 'the ontological critique' according to which
psychologism confuses between the real laws and ideal laws. The
other he calls 'linguistic critique', which may also be called 'prag-
matic critique', for the incohrence Husserl brings out is not logicai,
but linguistic-pragmatic. I think Husserl has two varieties of criti-
cisms under this heading, one of which is logicai ('Logic being a
theory of ail thories cannot presuppose another theory viz. psychol-
ogy') and the other pragmatic ('The relativist cannot assert his thesis').
One thing seems to be clear from the above exposition. Husserl's
critique of logicai psychologism, even if its strength is undeniable,
does make use of an ontological dualism between the real and the
ideal that Husserl has not yet, in the Prolegomena, established. That
is why to a careful reader he gives the impression of begging the
issue, that is, of making use in the premises the very distinction be-
tween psychology and logic that he wants to prove. In th first logi-
cai investigation, he shows why meanings hve to be ideal entities;
later, in the third and the fourth investigations, he shows why logicai
laws hve to be analytic (and in what precise sens). I think Husserl's
strongest arguments are those that point out an incohrence in the
psychologistic and relativistic positions. The arguments are still valid
against a psychologism that does not make use of the empiricistic
psychology of the sort Husserl (and Frege) had in mind. Husserl's
point that if mathematics is fundamentally based upon logic, any psy-
chology that, like the modem cognitive science, makes use of math-
ematics cannot provide the foundation of logic would still be valid.

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 28 1

Nevertheless, it must be conceded that in th Lo

Husserl has refuted not all forms of relativism, b
consquences of th sort of psychologism wit
cerned.

Responses to Husserl's antipsychologism

Before briefly recalling th responses to Husserl's antipsychologism,1

I will note that th important distinction between logic and psychol-
ogy was first made not by Frege or Husserl, but by Kant: "Die reine
Logik . . . keine empirische Prinzipien" and "nichts . . . aus der
Psychologie schpft" (Kant 1787, B78). Kant also writes, "Nhmen
wir die Prinzipien aus der Psychologie, d.h. aus der Beobachtungen
ber unseren Verstand . . . dies wurde also zur Erkenntnis bloss
'zuflliger' Gesetze fhren. In der Logik ist aber die Frage nicht nach
zuflligen, sondern nach notwendigen Regeln; nicht, wie wir denken,
sondern, wie wir denken sollen" (Kant 1800, p. 334). Here Kant makes
recourse to a normative conception of logic. Earlier, I referred to
Hegel's rejection of psychologism. Herbert and Lotze are th two major
philosophers after Hegel who also rejected psychologism. Thus writes
Herbert: "In der Logik ist es nothwendig, alles Psychologisches zu
ignorieren, weil hier lediglich diejenigen Formen der mglichen
Verknpfung des Gedachten sollen nachgewiesen werden, welche das
Gedachte selbst nach seiner Beschaffenheit zulsst" (1891, 68). As
regards Lotze, it is well known that Husserl acknowledges Lotze's
influence on him insofar as his overcoming of psychologism is con-
cerned (Husserl 1938, 128f.).
Among Husserl's contemporaries - leaving aside those who
greeted the Prolegomena with unqualified enthusiasm - the
antipsychologism was received with mixed feelings and several kinds
of criticisms. Some found his conception of psychology defective,
and others critiqued his conception of logic. Some greeted his
antipsychologism, but wished that, after logic and psychology had
been separated, Steps should have been taken to bring them into a
satisfying connection. Others found his arguments against
psychologism defective. Still others lamented Husserl's own relapse
into psychologism. There were also philosophers who were criticized
by Husserl as being psychologistic, but who rejected this character-
ization.

To this last group belonged such men as Brentano and Schuppe.

Husserl, of course, resisted offending his teacher by characterizing

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282 J. . MOHANTY

his position as psychologistic in the pejo

Brentano had to dfend himself again
Brentano suspected Husserl's secret inte
had already said in 1 879 that the tas
pure Gedankenelemente not only from
from acts of thinking (2d ed., 1910, 1-3
characterization of his position as be
Erdmann, referring to Husserl's criticis
some of the criticisms were justified in
correctly state his views and had distin
ogy in a rather unsatisfactory manner. N
had totally misunderstood him, so that
was right in this case, he would rather
der jungen Generation" (1907, Bd. 1,
The most negative response came f
begins by conceding that he does not
"Psychologism," but regards the name "
rcent. Wundt then traces psychologism
regarding logicism as being as old as
Husserl's program, he continues, is to e
from logic, but also from psychology (5
ally aims at is a rationalistic psycho
Husserl's concept of mental phenome
ception of act to be completely form
accuses Husserl of using "scientifically
gar psychology" (579). Like his "descr
pure logic is scholastic and concerned w
so-called ideal meanings are his cration
meaning. The only compliment he pays
dent, is that he is an excellent critic, su
seinesgleichen" (608). But he hardly sub
except by appealing to vidence; but
and so a psychological phenomenon.
Sigwart (191 1), whom Husserl criticiz
dfends himself against Husserl's critic
cism that according to Sigwart 'truth
thinks it true, Sigwart contends that tru
of those words, can be ascribed only to
that an assertion or an opinion neces
mind. To hypostatize propositions into
up a mythology (24 fn.). If a judgmen
the Law of Gravitation before Newton

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 283

false. Sigwart asks rhetorically, "Kann man vo

Menschen sagen er gesund ist, weil er gar nich
krank?" (24-25).
Sigwart also asks a question (which I will ret
essay), namely, if the process of psychological
to logicai cognition, how then do we acqui
Husserl's position leads to two consciousnes
tual (which must be completely independent o
ideal (which apprehends the nontemporal t
the one reach the other? Husserl, he points ou
chology that studies mental life under caus
only vague generalities. It does not analyze
discover in it consciousness of logicai necessity
mill," "gegen die er kampflustig seine Lanze
25). Yet Husserl also says that th certaint
Erlebnis. Is not an Erlebnis an empirical ps
an vidence a state of the mind that we expr
Natorp (1977), in his review of Husserl's b
the value of Husserl's antipsychologistic ar
whether philosophically one can rest with Hus
tion between the real and the ideal, the psych
While agreeing with Husserl's conception of p
tions if pure logic has to be formal. In his vie
be material, as Kant's transcendental logic sho
needs to recali that Husserl's pure formal a
on pure logicai grammar, which is not merely
tax, but also has to rule out material counters
green"; for this last purpose, pure logicai gram
account which material concepts go together a
must appeal to the way the world is structure
recognize in the Formal and Transcendental Lo
Husserl to task for finding psychologism in
ogistic authors, remarking, "One who wants t
cal, will find it every where, also in Husserl."
of insight and vidence. Natorp, of course, re
ogistic reading of Kant, as though Kant's so
psychology (of faculties of the soul)" is al
Natorp's main criticism of Husserl is this: H
lematic in an unsatisfactory state.
After having separated logic from psycholo
to relate the two. Otherwise, the material, em
that is, the real remains "an uncomprehended,

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284 J. . MOHANTY

1977, 65). Husserl has to explain "why [i

tigation into the constitution of objecti
jectivity into considration" (66).

Some rcent appraisals

Among more rcent commentators, I w

one side, there are Dallas Willard and
interesting reading of Husserl to show
use of an act-based theory of meaning,
ing psychologism. On the other side
Dummett finds Husserl's act-based th
leading to psychologism (which he, in a
but also as giving rise to several serious
Willard (1977) first formultes what h
cai psychologism" that arises out of t
th logicai truths are about and appl
inferrings, and so on, of particular per
derive their vidence from examination
ticular persons. Husserl's solution con
entities as propositions (in generai, idea
lar acts (of judging, for example, in w
entertained) as the species Redness rel
red color. Propositions, then, are not ob
what Willard calls "complex referential
acts." The solution of the paradox then
primarily about, not acts themselves, b
of those acts. The truths, therefore, ap
from examination of those acts - while
In a later essay, Willard writes, "For Hus
the object in the act. . . . Rather, it is th
erty of the act or expression" (1994,
towards the sens, but exemplifies it.
Barry Smith (1994) develops a similar
(Note that both Willard and Smith pref
Husserl had in the first dition of the
that he abandoned very soon afterward
cept of the noema.) Comparing the com
Husserl for overcoming psychologism
for both: First, how do the mind-indepe
chological acts of the mind? Second,

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 285

senss? His answer to thse two questions li

conceives of the relation of senss to mental acts. Mental acts are

complex events that can be sliced into dpendent parts in many ways.
Apart from such parts as sensory contents and Auffassungsmomente,
there is also an act-part, which is none other than the act's object-
directedness. A sens is the universal species that is instantiated in
such act-parts (of many diffrent acts directed toward the same ob-
ject in the same way). The mental acts therefore are necessarily sub-
ject to the laws obtaining among such species, just as geometrical
laws govern real spatial figures.
Dummett (1991) is not convinced that Husserl's act-based theory
of meaning can explain how logicai truths are grasped and how logic
applies to mental acts. Recalling Frege's well-known exaspration
regarding th "mystery" surrounding th idea of "grasping" a thought,
Dummett concdes that "it is in taking thoughts as objects of mental
acts that Frege goes astray (253). Frege should hve said that they are
rather ways in which things are given to us. This is certainly an im-
portant improvement upon Dummett's earlier view, namely, that Frege
avoids psychologism while Husserl gets caught in it because of Frege's
attention to language (and Dummett's Wittgensteinian view of lin-
guistic practice) and Husserl's concern with acts. Dummett should
hve recognized that making meanings dpendent upon linguistic
practice would hve led to what Husserl calls "anthropological" or
"spcifie" relativism. But Dum2mett now recognizes that "where both
Husserl and Frege failed was in drawing an absolute line of spara-
tion between th psychological and th logicai." They thereby "de-
prived themselves of the means to explain what it is to grasp a thought"
(256).
As regards the claim by Willard and Smith that the theory of
meaning developed by Husserl in the first dition of the Logische
Untersuchungen solves this problem about "grasping," we should ask,
if the act instantiates a sens, how can it grasp the universal instanti-
ated? Husserl's obvious answer is "by reflection." The prereflective
act is object-oriented; it grasps the sens only by reflecting upon its
objeet-directedness. It does not initially grasp the sens. Hre
Husserl's formulation was more cautious than Frege's.

Problem of logicai cognition

The problem of what is called 'logicai cognition' is not merely the

problem of how it is possible to grasp such ideal (or abstract) entities

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286 J. . MOHANTY

as propositions (with which Frege was c

and Willard find a cogent reply in Huss
how logicai truths are apprehended. Hus
rectly with the latter problem than wit
obvious that the latter prsupposes the f
to grasp propositions in reflection be
truths, for logicai truths are either pro
propositions. With regard to the second
perhaps the best aecount and dfense of
in Hanna's paper "Logicai Cognition: H
Truth in Psychologism" (1993).
Hanna takes Husserl to have rejeet
ologism, but not weak logicai psycholog
cai psychologism (which, in Hanna's for
Husserl held),

(2) (Vfic) (jc is a logicai proposition z> M (3y

& : is an objeet of y' s thinking) (allowin
in [2] earlier)).

Note that a 'logicai proposition' hre i

or any thought the mind can grasp, bu
generalize the thesis to any proposition
is a thought, then it is necessarily possib
thinker who thinks it.) According to
only nonempirical or rational insight y
is rationally conclusive for belief in
self-evidence, as Husserl states in the P
not guarantee the truth of a propositio
then it necessarily must be possible for
the exprience of self-evidence about it
tingent factual truth, the exprience of
with empirical perception; if the propo
the exprience of its self-evidence must
nonempirical insight. That is, ali logicai
rational insight - but there does not ne
who has rational insight into it. Husser
cist claim that ail knowledge is justified
eralization on the basis of empirical
inadequate to account for modal know
What is important is that the appeal
to psychologism; it does not amount to

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 287

psychological exprience. For th same reaso

cai truths on empirical perception does not am
First, it is taken to be not a theory of truth,
logical theory of exprience of truth, so there
truth itself is being psychologized. Second, th
be a conceptual truth and not a contingent tru
(Husserl 1928b, 50). It is not intended to be
zation.

Husserl's problems

Husserl needs to

(1) hve a satisfying way of Connecting th logicai and th psy-

chological after th ideality of th logicai has been secured;
(2) hve an account of our cognition of th logicai;
(3) hve an account of how th logicai truths apply to mental acts
of judging, inferring, etc.;
(4) develop a nonpsychologistic theory of vidence (and so of
cognition and truth); and
(5) be able to overcome naturalism in a more radicai way than he
does in th Prolegomena.
(fi) He should also take Kant's transcendental psychologism more
seriously and be able to show why and how it is that objectivity
is constituted in subjectivity just as there is no subjectivity
without objective directedness. For this purpose, he needs
(7) a satisfactory theory about th re-lation between th transcen-
dental and th empirical. He needs also to argue
(8) that th subjective is not eo ipso psychological (or even neu-
rophysiological), that th psychological is only a certain inter-
prtation of th subjective life of consciousness. Psychologism
can be overcome only when th origin of this interprtation
is identified.

It is no wonder that in his writings after th Prolegomena, Husserl

searches for a deeper way of both understanding and overcoming
psychologism. Such an overcoming would be refuting it not merely
by showing its logically (or pragmatically) incohrent consquences,
but also by showing the historical origin of such a naturalistic inter-
prtation of the mental life. In th fifth logicai investigation (1928a,
Inv. 5, 27), he speaks of "psychological apperception," which has to

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288 J. . MOHANTY

be overcome through a phenomenologic

the sort of exprience that is being inv
the second dition of the sixth investig
tesque reproach" that he had fallen b
that the critics had not carefully read th
Authentic and Inauthentic Thinking" (1
At this place, Husserl maintains that th
corresponding categorical intuition of t
and serve as norms for inauthentic thin
to do with 'our' mental organization.
sences of the act-species and act-form
patible in specie, cannot be brough
compatible in empirical instances" (19
Again in the Formal and Transcenden
the "bogy of Psychologism." The logi
had established the objectivity of ideal
logically "re-interpreting" them (1969
in the Prolegomena psychologism pure and simple was never
"thematized." Rather the discussion concerned a psychologism with
a quite particular sens, namely the psychologizing of the irreal sig-
nifications that are the thme of logic. He concdes that at that time
he had not entirely overcome "a universal epistemological psychol-
ogism." Now he is in a position to radically overcome "the problem
of transcendental psychologism."
I will not in this paper prsent Husserl's solution of thse prob-
lems. But one may venture the suggestion that the subsquent devel-
opment of his thought into a transcendental phenomenology - with
th method of epoche, the idea of noesis-noema corrlation, and the
idea of constitution - was occasioned by various attempts to solve
the problems raised in connection with the problem of psychologism
and to establish a satisfying connection between real mental life and
ideal meanings.

Department of Philosophy
Temple University

Notes
1. Kusch gives a wide-ranging survey of responses to Husserl on this issue in his
"The Criticism of Husserl's Arguments against Psychologism in German Philosophy
1901-1920" (1994).
2. For Brentano's alleged psychologism, see Chisholm's "Brentano's Descriptive
Psychology" (1977, esp. p. 98).

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 FREGE AND HUSSERL 289

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