INTRO LAW CASES II The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

CASE 1: ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN VS ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.
FACTS: A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability.
In a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer
A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary.
which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667, Ms. Ma. Theresa
A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke with
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
to Atty. Simbillos wife and claimed that her husband was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will
Respondent, himself, admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. And
not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo even discussed her while he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, he continued to advertise
husbands charge fee of P48, 000, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and
his legal service claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Such acts of
the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. Similar advertisements were also
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority. What adds
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment
issue of The Philippine Star.
of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the
stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
profession:
Court.
Simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence
Respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation
address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing
per se are not prohibited acts and prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against
the same brief data, are permissible.
him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
Ordinary professional/calling card which contain only a statement of his name, the
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.
name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced is permitted.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and was
found guilty of violating Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
ISSUE: Have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law.
Whether or not, advertisement and solicitation is prohibited act for lawyers. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
RULING:
likewise allowable. {Include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names
of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
Practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The duty to public
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in
who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
 reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.}
Respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR.
CASE 2: EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ VS ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA
FACTS:
Complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC). They chose Atty. Padilla to represent them in
the case. Complainant claims that respondent ignored the CA Resolution (dismissal of the
appeal) and failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse
decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent several times about the
status of the appeal, but despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response to the damage
and prejudice of the spouses. And was only informed of the Resolution sometime in July
2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.
Thus, respondent acted with deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law.
Complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the
following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral
damages in the amount of 350,000.
However, respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant and claimed
that he never met the complainant because it was her husband who had personally
transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband despondently pleaded to
prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA
was to lapse within two or three days. Thus, respondent claims that he filed a
Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that it is this pleading which was
required. And before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband
to settle the case and the latter allegedly gestured approval of the advice. After the
husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or
heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled
the case.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated
Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that
respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla showed negligence in handling the clients case.
RULING:
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant, however, a perusal of the
Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel
for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her husband. Moreover, it
was claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainants
husband cannot be treated as a client-lawyer relationship since it never contacted him
after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was
very unusual if he really believed that he engaged the formers services. But complainant
pointed out that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her case and an
acceptance fee in the amount of 7,000.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives
rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is
that lawyers duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has
failed to fulfill this duty.
When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records
of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know
this procedure.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in
the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation
to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they
may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure
to file the proper pleading was that he did not have enough time to acquaint himself
thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case. But the court held that respondents plea for
leniency should not have been granted. The supposed lack of time given to respondent to
acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer from
the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently
study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the
pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainants husband only two days
before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have
filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever
pleading he could come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the
wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by
the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CAs Order. He claims that he was under the
presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he
had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latters Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of but
because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing. Second, respondent,
as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. The failure of
respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is
negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling
the clients case.
Respondent, Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as
well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED.
CASE 3: QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE ON THE PROHIBITION FROM
ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.
FACTS:
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b) (2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as
amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
This provision places a limitation on public officials and employees during their
incumbency, and those already separated from government employment for a period of
one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession.
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2)
above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February
1, 2008. Thereafter, she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private
counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she
could engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her
appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as
former Clerk of Court of that Branch. And in view of the OCAT findings and
recommendations, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon
reported the 4 appearances made by Atty. Buffe.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private counsel before RTC-Branch
81 of Romblon within the 1 year prohibition.
RULING:
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust;
and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government
transactions between a former government official or employee and his or her former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors. Parenthetically, in the case of court employees,
Section 7(b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon
3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the
definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an incumbent court official or court
employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of
the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the
courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not
incompatible with the performance of the court personnel's duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that
court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools,
review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of
government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside
employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not
accept outside employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7
(b) (2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. A clerk of court
can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service
and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6713. The clerk of courts limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within
one year before the office where he or she used to work with.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffes approach to Section 7 (b) (2) is her awareness of the law
and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law.
We find it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. Again we find
this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffes part and, to our mind, only emphasize her own willful
or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. By acting in a manner that,
R.A. No. 6713 brands as unlawful, Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does
not necessarily require the element of criminality. Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her
lawyers oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
she blatantly and unlawfully practiced law within the prohibited period by appearing
before the RTC Branch she had just left. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse,
particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after ones
separation from the service. Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent
attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query.
Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe is GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the
amount of P10, 000.
CASE 4: SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA VS ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA
FACTS:
Atty. Antoniutti K. Palana represented to the petitioners that he has an alleged parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that he needs an
amount of Php 100,000.00 so that he could reconstitute the torrens title. Petitioner spouses
shall earn an amount of P70, 000.00 from the P100, 000.00 they had financed and would be
paid within three months and was evidenced by a written agreement. After respondent
lawyer gotten the amount from the petitioner spouse, he had intentionally evaded the
performance of his due, just, legal and demandable obligations to petitioner spouses. And
turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, reconstitute the same and
deliver an amount of P170, 000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent representations
on his part or else were only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner spouses of their hard
owned monies. Petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent but respondent has failed to
settle his obligation. Petitioners however, failed to present evidence to show that
respondent fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Antoniutti K. Palana committed misconduct upon failing to settle his
financial obligation to the spouses.
RULING: {Violation of his sworn duty as a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7}
A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of
the bar. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the
profession. Indeed, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its
members.
In the instant case, respondents unjustified withholding of petitioners money years after it
became due and demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is
further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. Instead of
meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer nor did he
participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.
Respondent knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for
reconstitution in 2001 was only PhP 3,145, and other expenses including the publication of
the filing of the petition could not have cost more than PhP 20,000. It is clear that he
employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard earned money and the
latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his
misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar. Moreover, when he failed
to pay his just and legal obligation, he disobeyed the provisions of the Civil Code which is
one of the substantive laws he vowed to uphold when he took his oath as a lawyer. Lastly,
to aggravate his misconduct, he totally ignored the directives of the IBP to answer the
complaint when he fully knew as a lawyer that the compulsory bar organization was
merely deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against
lawyers, among which is the instant complaint. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in
reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as respondent is
aware or at least is assumed to know, that lawyers like him cannot disobey the orders and
resolutions of the Court.
Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and is ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses Amador and Rosita
Tejada within two (2) months.
CASE 5: ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO VS ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO
FACTS:
Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter and
went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784,
had already been remanded to the court of origin. It must be noted that respondent was
not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a
certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve
as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. He then turned and left the
office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so
loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking
place. Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her
office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her
credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full
respect from her staff.
In the proceedings, complainant was the only one who appeared and respondent later on
filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was
still recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the
required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets. He also expressed his public
apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation. Complainant filed a Manifestation
expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of respondents public
apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she
accepted.
RULING: {Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02}
Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will
enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is
unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either
the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of
court. Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case
No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of
record of that case. Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil
Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice
at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-
mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of
her subordinates.
The penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however,
that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact
remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence,
he should bear the consequences of his actions. The highest reward that can be bestowed
on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily
created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite
conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the
honorable performance of professional duty.
Premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED P10, 000.00 with a warning that any
similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.
CASE 6: JUDGE RENE B. BACULI VS ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG
FACTS:
I. Judge Baculi claimed that during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil
Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised
him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice.
When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted; Then
cite me! Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The
respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you! Judge Baculi
ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct
contempt of court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the
courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening
tone. Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued
shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he shouted
back at him. But after hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that, it was Atty.
Battung who shouted first at the complainant. Respondent should not have shouted at the
presiding judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be
tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the Office of
the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act according to the norms
of judicial conduct.
II. According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640,
an ejectment case. Judge Baculi rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he
modified and became final and executory. The respondent filed a motion to quash the
previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a
lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter
was merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is insufficient
to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the
ends of justice.
RULING:
Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during
court proceedings in the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The
respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many
witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge
Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the
latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent
returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not
only against the person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as
well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by
the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to
the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the
court that he represents. It is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the
judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latters role,
stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and
brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law
against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is
a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under
the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the
courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
Atty. Battungs violations are no less serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the
course of judicial proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court,
and before the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to
the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial
system itself.
Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
CASE 7: CLARITA J. SAMALA VS ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA
FACTS:
Clarita J. Samala filed a disbarment case against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia on the following
grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b)
knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating
numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of
being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
A. On serving as counsel for contending parties.
In Civil Case No. 95-105-MK entitled Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of
rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as
counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation
and Compliance before the RTC. In Civil Case No. 98-6804 entitled Editha S. Valdez and
Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband for ejectment, respondent
represented Valdez against Bustamante one of the tenants in the property subject of the
controversy.
Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act
of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK. But in Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK, entitled Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to
Marikina City, respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the
Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against expense of truth.
Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that C. On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-
Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of
MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos.
the tenants. Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804
00-4439 and 01036162 both entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion,
and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the
respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-
husband, because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the
4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to
property and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. But, while
dwelling.
claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he
already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As
estafa.
payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the
same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.
B. On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment,
aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact
the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly
that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
Respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he
came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court
D. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. Respondent further avers that
Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
rescission was filed in 2002. who are all over 20 years of age while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he
has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. Respondent further admitted that
provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. It matters not that the
does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the latter as
trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of
his second family. He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two
Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 dismissing the complaint for
houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.
ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court
by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable
new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba. on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He
even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do
and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter; he does not consider them as
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a
his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
commissioner that he has two houses in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in
to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
Marikina, where Lagmay lives. It is of no moment that respondent eventually married
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it
Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up
in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are
to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.
entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the
degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community. Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a
lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community. That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his
wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia is GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
years.
CASE 8: DANIEL LEMOINE vs. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR
FACTS:
Complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company, the
insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered problems in pursuing his
claim, his friend, a certain Jesus Jess Garcia arranged for the engagement of respondents
services.
Respondent advised complainant, whom he had not before met, that for his legal services
he was charging 25% of the actual amount being recovered, payable upon successful
recovery; an advance payment of P50,000.00 to be charged and to be deducted from
whatever amount would be successfully collected; P1,000.00 as appearance and conference
fee for each and every court hearings, conferences outside our law office and meetings
before the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be also charged to our 25%
recovery fee; and legal expenses such as but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and
postage expenses and other miscellaneous but related expenses, to be charged to
complainants account which would be reimbursed upon presentation of statement of
account.
The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorneys fees does not bear complainants
conformity, he not having agreed therewith.
Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainants claim and respondent
confirmed his acceptance of its offer to settle the claim of complainant in an ex-gratia basis
of 75% of his policy coverage which is 525, 000.00. When complainant left for France, he, on
the advice of respondent, signed an already prepared undated Special Power of Attorney
authorizing respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance
for the satisfaction of complainants claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash
and received payment from it. The Special Power of Attorney was later dated December 23,
1998 on which same date Metropolitan Insurance issued a Chinabank Check payable to
complainant in the amount of P525,000.00 as full settlement of the claim. The check was
received by respondent.
When complainant returned to the Philippines, on inquiry about the status of his claim,
Garcia echoed to complainant what respondent had written that the claim was still pending
and it was still subject of negotiations in which Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle it
for P350, 000.00 representing fifty percent thereof. However, when the complainant
personally visits the office of Metropolitan Insurance, he was informed that his claim had
long been settled via a December 23, 1998 check given to respondent the year before.
Respondent thereupon faxed to complainant a letter wherein he acknowledged having in
his possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained, however, as
attorneys lien pending complainants payment of his attorneys fee, equivalent to fifty
percent (50%) of entire amount collected.
Respondent even declared that on the representation of Garcia that he had talked to
complainant about respondents retention of fifty percent (50%) of the insurance proceeds
for professional fees less expenses, he gave Garcia, on a staggered basis, the total amount
of P233, 000.00 which, so respondent averred, is the amount of insurance claim
complainant is entitled to receive less attorneys fees and expenses. Explaining why no
written memorandum of the turnover of various payments to Garcia was made, respondent
alleged that there was no need therefor since he very well knew Garcia who is a co-Rotarian
and co-attorney-in-fact and whom he really dealt with regarding complainants claim.
Respondent refused to turn over the proceeds of the insurance claim and to acknowledge
the unreasonableness of the attorneys fees he was demanding, complainant instituted the
administrative action at bar.
RULING:
Under Canon 16, a lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he
may come to possess. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer
such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client as
well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon demand.
Respondent breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainants
insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or
to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant. In fact,
long after respondent received the check, he, by his letter to Garcia, had even the temerity to
state that the claim was still pending and recommend acceptance of the 50% offer which is
P350, 000.00 pesos. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit
prevarication, documented at that, on the mere request of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the
benefit of his client, he committed professional misconduct. Such misconduct is
reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the
release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived
of the use of the proceeds thereof. A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings
with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the clients cause
but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did not relieve him
of his duty to account for it. The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes
that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case of
disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however,
the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees.
He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the
proper court to fix the amount of such fees.
Respondent stubbornly and in bad faith held on to complainants funds with the obvious
aim of forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an
appalling abuse by respondent of the exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no
means is an absolute right and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of
money and property to his client when due or upon demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorneys fee. After he
received the check and after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was already
asking for 50%, objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why respondent had
to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the while he has been
in custody of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any rate, it smacks of
opportunism.
It bears noting that for close to five long years, respondent has been in possession of
complainants funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies that
he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his receipt of
the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner point to his
lack of good moral character. Worse, by respondents turnaround in his Supplement to his
Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to complainants friend Garcia the amount of
P233, 000.00 which, so respondent claims, is that entire complainant is entitled to, he in
effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn over to complainant. Such incredible
position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainants funds, and gives rise to the
conclusion that he has misappropriated them.
Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in
the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED.
CASE 9: JOSELITO F. TEJANO vs ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA
FACTS:
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former
to take possession of his property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judges
court. The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession and
damages filed by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The lot
was wholly owned by Tejanos family, but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access
road stretching from the provincial highway in the east to the provincial governments motor
pool in the west without instituting the proper expropriation proceedings.
Four judges would hear the case before Judge Arquelada became the branchs presiding
judge in 2001. Prior to his appointment to the bench, however, Judge Arquelada was one of
the trial prosecutors assigned to Branch 21, and in that capacity represented the Province
of Ilocos Sur in Civil Case No. 4046-V.
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in the formers bid to
take possession of their property and was collecting rentals from squatters who had set
up their businesses inside the whole of Lot [No.] 5663. In support of his accusations,
Tejano attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-430045. As to his counsel,
Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina miserably failed to advance [his] cause. Specifically,
Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina:
Failed to object when the trial court pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had
waived their right to present evidence after several postponements in the trial
because his mother was ill and confined at the hospital.
Manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the
order declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do
so.
Not only failed to file said motion for reconsideration, but also declared in open
court that they would not be presenting any witnesses without consulting his
clients.
Failed to comply with the trial courts order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.
Atty. Baterina explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he
received a copy of the complaint and his failure to comply was not at all intended to show
disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal. Atty. Baterina also denied the
allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the Tejano case. He explained that the
reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after the initial presentation of
the plaintiffs case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for two years.
He alleged that this fact was made known to Tejanos mother and sister. However, the trial
court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another lawyer. On the contrary, it
proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the
termination of the case. Atty. Baterina instead points to the displayed bias and undue and
conflict of interest of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejanos predicament.
IBP INVESTIGATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
First, it appears that respondents failure to appear in representation of his clients was due
to his two-year suspension from the practice of law in 2001. While this is a justified reason
for his non-appearance, respondent, however, manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC
of this fact. That way, the RTC would have, in the meantime, ordered plaintiffs to seek the
services of another lawyer. Respondents contention that the fact of his suspension was
nonetheless circularized to all courts of the Philippines including the RTC is unavailing. Still,
respondent should have exerted prudence in properly informing the RTC of his suspension
in order to protect the interests of his clients. Moreover, while he relayed such fact of
suspension to his clients, there is no showing that he explained the consequences to them,
or that he advised them to seek another counsels assistance in the meantime. Clearly
therefore, respondents inaction falls short of the diligence required of him as a lawyer.
Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the plaintiffs therein to
submit their formal offer of evidence. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total
disregard of the RTCs Order. Respondents bare excuse that he remembers making an oral
offer thereof deserves no merit because the records of this case clearly circumstances cannot
be countenanced.
It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for two (2) years, and be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00),
considering that this is his second disciplinary action.
RULING:
Atty. Baterinas duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the
very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that
he would be unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another counsel.
A lawyer even one suspended from practicing the profession owes it to his client to not
sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty. The client should
never be left groping in the dark and instead must be adequately and fully informed about
the developments in his case.
Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its
course without any effort to safeguard his clients welfare in the meantime. His failure to
file the required pleadings on his clients behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and renders him subject to disciplinary action.
Moreover, Atty. Baterinas reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is
unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for
rules, court processes, and even for the Courts disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to
follow the trial courts orders in his clients case, he even disregarded court orders in his
own disciplinary proceedings.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, are particularly called upon to obey
court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives being themselves officers of the court. As such, Atty. Baterina should know
that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied
with promptly and completely.
The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after being
found guilty for gross misconduct. Atty. Baterinas repeated failure to comply with the
resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility tantamount to willful disobedience to the lawful orders of
the Supreme Court. These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of
neglecting his duty to his clients, as well as a propensity for disrespecting the authority of
the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated among the
members of the Bar.
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years.
CASE 10: VINSON B. PINEDA VS ATTYS. CLODUALDO DE JESUS, CARLOS AMBROSIO AND
EMMANUEL MARIANO
FACTS:
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her
visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal
was accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their
agreement. This was approved by the trial court and, the marriage between petitioner and
Aurora Pineda was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated. They, including
their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioners
dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional legal fees
amounting to P16.5 million which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner
issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million as full payment for settlement. Still not
satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court a motion for payment of lawyers fees
for P50 million. On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty.
de Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500, 000 to Atty.
Ambrosio and P500, 000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:

Whether or not, respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

RULING:

Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the
properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding
was additional payment for legal services rendered in the same case. The professional
engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle of
quantum meruit which means as much as the lawyer deserves. The recovery of attorneys
fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the
payment of attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.

Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and
should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.

In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of their lawyers fees was not meant to
collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an
act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.

As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable

profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents despicable behavior
which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The practice of law is a
decent profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere
incident.

Respondents claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge
petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The
payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioners business all of
which were not denied by respondents more than sufficed for the work they did. The full
payment for settlement should have discharged petitioners obligation to them.

The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys fees cannot be
denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of
administering justice. When they took their oath, they submitted themselves to the
authority of the Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial control.

The award of additional attorneys fees in favor of respondents is hereby DELETED.