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Joanna Horton
In anthropology, the ontological turn refers to, in one basic sense, the reaction
against the writing culture trend of the 1980s onward. In the collection of
essays Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986), scholars of this new
movement advocated for a postmodern anthropology with a new focus on
culture as representation. They emphasized the constructed, artificial nature
of cultural accounts (Clifford 1986: 2) and concentrated on text-making as a
central part of anthropology. As a whole, the writing culture turn was
interested in the discursive aspects of cultural representation (Clifford 1986:
13)
One aspect of this approach was the assumption that anthropologists studied
(and, through their study, interpreted) cultural representations of reality. That
is, in order to capture difference widely recognized as anthropologys main
area of interest cultural anthropologists studied culture as differing
perspectives on an objective and universal reality. This is the conceptual point
at which the ontological turn constitutes itself through distinction. Rather than
acknowledging one world, many worldviews, an ontological approach
recognizes multiples worlds (Venkatesen 2010; Paleek and Risjord 2012).
Ontological anthropologists reject analyses that seek to explain difference by
way of representation, symbolism or belief, instead arguing that difference
is due to existence and participation in alternative realities.
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multinaturalism (rather than, for instance, materiality). This is partly because,
in a very abstract field, centering the discussion mainly on beings rather than
objects1 provides perhaps a less abstract way to think about ontology. It is
also because I see these concepts as the best way to articulate a reading of
the ontological turn through the question of difference, which is the main
approach of this paper.
Ins and Outs of an Ontological Approach: Language and the Body in the
Ontological Turn
1This is not to ignore arguments that question a distinction between beings and
objects, but rather acknowledge them as part of a slightly different debate.
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This example provides a useful way in to Viveiros de Castros theory in
several respects. Firstly, it reveals his views on the concrete existence and
operation of multiple ontologies. Possessing a different ontology means that
the jaguars do not believe that blood is beer. Neither does blood represent
beer. Rather, the blood is beer for them (Paleek and Risjorn 2012: 19).
Similarly, in his exploration of Cuban diviners relationship with a particular
powder (ache), Holbraad (2007) notably argues that powder far from being
a representation or metaphor for power actually is power. The principle
operating here that concepts are real and reality is conceptual (Henare,
Holbraad and Wastell 2006: 9) forms a key part of ontological anthropology.
Alberti (in Alberti, Fowles, Holbraad, Marshall and Witmore 2011: 905)
agrees, claiming that an ontological approach
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perspectivism (as it stands opposed to representation). As Viveiros de Castro
explains, representations are properties of the spirit, while the point of view is
in the body (2009: 39). Our body and its engagement, in other words,
determine the object associated with the words manioc beer. In this sense, it
determines difference. Importantly, as Swancutt (2007: 237) notes,
Bodily affects, in Viveiros de Castros sense of the term, are not just
physical characteristics, such as comportment, mannerisms or tastes
consistently ascribed to a given subject, they are also forces, energies
or talents which are taught, acquired and refined over time.
The body is thus a social entity, with the capacity to engage with other bodies,
affects, and the environment. Relationality between multiple bodies and the
environment is seen as the tool by which multiple realities are unlocked. As
Hage (2012: 299) explains,
If saying that crickets are the fish of the dead or that mud is the
hammock of tapirs is like saying that Isabels son Michael is my nephew,
then there is no relativism involved. Isabel is not a mother for
Michael, from Michaels point of view shes really and objectively
Michaels mother, and I am really Michaels uncle (2004: 110).
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The existence of, for instance, a son (or a jaguar, or a cricket, or mud) relies
on the relation of that object or being to another object or being. This, Viveiros
de Castro argues, is how we know that an objects existence is more than a
point of view onto reality, but a reality in itself. Following from this is the
ontological conception of culture as populations of beings connected through
a dense network of relationships, where different kinds of objects are
produced through networks of human interaction (Paleek and Risjord 2012).
Paleek and Risjorn (2012) claim that in collapsing the distinction between
objects and theories, the ontological turn leaves no space for ethnographic
interpretation. However, ontological anthropologists are in fact uninterested in
ethnographic interpretation, viewing it as unacknowledged misunderstanding
of issues that arise from fundamentally different ontologies (Holbraad 2010).
In dismissing interpretation, ontological anthropologists do not propose to
simply observe what is found in the field and record it as difference. Rather,
they suggest using that difference to inform a reversal of the conventional
relationship between analytical concepts and ethnographic data, allowing the
latter to transform the former where necessary (Holbraad 2010). Fowles (in
Alberti et al 2011) characterizes this as the difference between thinking
differently about things and having different things to think about.
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accepting that the theoretical and analytical concepts of our particular
ontology are perhaps insufficient to understand certain data where radical
alterity reveals itself. This is what Holbraad (2010: 184) means when he
invokes the famous example of the Nuer statement twins are birds in order to
argue that,
The mission, then, is to give a genuine voice to difference that goes beyond
our ontological understandings; to insist on taking it only on its own terms.
However, critics such as Heywood (2012: 146) claim that ontological
anthropologists fail to live up to this ambition, because they neglect to
acknowledge that insisting on the reality of multiple worlds commits you to a
meta-ontology in which such worlds exist. Holbraad answers this critique with
the assertion that the ontological turn avoids this trap by its very nature, as it
render[s] all analytical forms contingent upon the vagaries of ethnographically
driven aporia (2012: 263). Pedersen (2012) critiques Heywoods statement
from a different angle, arguing that the possession of a meta-ontology is (with
the right level of reflexivity) a beneficial necessity of anthropological analysis,
while accusations such as Heywoods in fact fail to recognize their own
theoretical ground.
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that ontological critics could ever possess a meta-ontology, which renders
further critiques on this basis rather meaningless.
Far more rich and significant, in my view, is another matter raised by the
inversion of the relationship between data and analytical concepts that is,
recognition of our own ontology. Acknowledgment of the particular standpoint
from which we theorise others difference allows us to go beyond them and
arrive at us. We can view their subjectivities while simultaneously viewing our
own, ultimately recognizing that we are natives too; our judgments about
what is real or natural involves our own ontological categorizations (Harris
and Robb 2012: 668). Hage (2012) agrees, arguing that the ontological turn
represents critical anthropological thought, which enables us to reflexively
move outside of ourselves such that we can start seeing ourselves in ways we
could not have possibly seen ourselves, our culture or our society before
(2012: 287). The critical awareness that ours is not the only way of being will
logically give rise to awareness of other possible ways of being in Hages
words, the prospect that we can be radically other than what we are (2012:
289).
In turn, this provides groundwork for the realm of radical politics, where, as
Hage points out, catch cries such as the Seattle anti-globalization movements
Another world is possible draw explicitly on the concepts of radical alterity
that critical anthropology seeks to engage with. Importantly, however, this way
of proposing alternative ontologies draws not only on difference, but also on
similarity. In engaging with other ways of being, we simultaneously recognize
their difference and feel haunted by their familiarity. Thus, Fowles (in Alberti
et al 2011) is not entirely correct in asserting that the ontological turns
dismissal of interpretation only makes unfamiliarity more unfamiliar. Accepting
difference on its own terms, rather than trying to fit it into our terms, can also
lead to recognizing a degree of genuine similarity. Through this recognition,
we can realize the possibility of shifting between realities, a potential that
holds great implications for the quest of radical politics to find the ever-
possible other world.
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The Alterity Problem
I wish to draw out a certain set of ideas about the nature of social life in
Melanesia by pitting them against ideas presented as Western
orthodoxy. My account does not require that the latter are orthodox
among all Western thinkers; the place they hold is as a strategic position
internal to the structure of the present account.
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Strathern demonstrates how ideas of difference are used not as literal
statements, but rather analytical tools to draw out certain points within a
conceptual structure. Furthermore, using axes of differentiation to
conceptualize difference between social groups may lead to the recognition
that such axes also apply within social groups (Godelier and Strathern 1991:
xiv). Using alterity in this flexible manner actually allows for a move away from
the notion (often found in culturalist accounts) of bounded, coherent cultural
packages of difference (Candea 2010). Thus, difference can be a useful
conceptual tool that neither assumes nor proves notions of essentialism.
Some scholars, such as Candea (2010), suggest using difference in this way
in order to conceptualise different ontologies while avoiding meta-contrasts
grounded in essentialism. However, Hage approaches a defense of
essentialism on its own terms, seeming to accept it as perhaps necessary to
the comparison of difference that forms a crucial part of critical anthropology
(Viveiros de Castro 2004). He argues that the ethos of primitivist anthropology
(that is, looking for examples of difference that are useful to think with) is
necessary for the critical anthropology associated with the ontological turn, as
the critical anthropologist seeks out the minor and invisible spaces or realities
that are increasingly showing up in the cracks of western modernity (2012:
305). In making this argument, he does not seek to defend himself within the
generally established standards of the debate, but proposes a radical change
to those standards. It is thus not particularly useful to compare his solution to
the alterity problem to that of Stratherns, as his is not a solution so much as
a denial of the problem. In responding to the essentialist criticism thus, Hage
initiates a new sub-debate around the ways in which ontological
anthropologists should approach difference. However, he also opens himself
to further criticism, as he fails to substantially address the arguments of those
opposed to essentialism.
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people from different cultures can understand each other and communicate.
Similarly to Hages defense of essentialism, the ontological turns response to
this criticism reframes the terms of the question rather than directly answering
it.
Conclusion
The ontological turn, as a reaction against the popular writing culture trend in
anthropology, represents a radical reframing of multiple anthropological
concepts. This reframing is based largely on the ontological focus and
conception of difference, which has been the main exploratory basis of this
paper. By putting forth the idea of multiple ontological spaces (as opposed to
multiple worldviews on a single reality), the ontological turn conceptualizes
alterity as ultimate and definitive. This leads to a critical rethinking of the
anthropological use of ethnographic data, where accepting instances of
difference on their own terms allows the anthropologist to use this difference
in transforming insufficient analytical concepts.
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Critiques of the ontological turn are also often framed around the issue of
difference. In seeking useful comparisons of alterity, the ontological
anthropologist is accused of a return to essentialist notions that dichotomize
people according to ontology. While some scholars suggest avoiding
essentialism and dichotomization by using difference in less literal terms,
Hage (2012) proposes a disciplinary reconsideration of a primitivist ethos that
privileges difference. Essentialism and dichotomization may be a part of this,
but, Hage seems to suggest, this is not the unforgivable sin that it is imagined
to be. Similarly, Viveiros de Castro questions the assumed value of cross-
ontological communication, arguing instead for equivocation as a way of
indicating difference rather than overcoming it. In both instances, the
ontological turn queries the implicit assumptions the ontological
suppositions, perhaps in the critiques leveled at it. This suggests a kind of
correspondence between medium and message where ontological
anthropologists propose an acceptance of difference on its own terms, so too
do they advocate for a similar acceptance of the concepts used to draw out
that difference. By rethinking heuristic devices in a way that proposes a new
way of doing anthropology, the ontological turn proves its worth as a new
school of thought within the discipline.
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