1.

People VS Chua 03/10/10

FACTS:

Within the period of 29 July 2002 up to 20 August 2002, accused personally met the complainants
individually and on separate dates where she represented herself to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport the complainants as Filipino Overseas Workers, particularly Taiwan. She
personally received various amounts as placement fees in consideration for their overseas
employment and personally issued receipts to the complainants. Accused represented herself that
she is an employee of Gate International (Golden Gate) Office located in Paragon Tower, Ermita,
Manila. She also assured them that the earlier complainants would be able to pay their placement
fees then the earlier that they could leave. After the complainants completed payment of their
placement fees, they were made to sign a contract containing stipulations as to salary and
conditions of work. On several occasions thereafter, they returned to appellants office to follow-up
on their application. After several visits, however, they noticed that all the properties of Golden
Gate in its Paragon Tower Office were already gone. Thus, the complainants filed a complaint for
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against the accused. During trial, accused denied that she was the
one who recruited the complainants and that she is merely a cashier of Golden Gate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the crime of Illegal
Recruitment and Four (4) Estafa

HELD:

Yes, the accused cannot escape liability by conveniently limiting her participation as a
cashier of Golden Gate. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 are
unequivocal that illegal recruitment may or may not be for profit. It is immaterial, therefore,
whether appellant remitted the placement fees to the agencys treasurer or appropriated them. The
same provision likewise provides that the persons criminally liable for illegal recruitment are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. Just the same, therefore, appellant can be held liable as a
principal by direct participation since she personally undertook the recruitment of private
complainants without a license or authority to do so.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.

However, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the third
and fourth elements of estafa as to the case of private complainant Ursulum. While Ursulum
claims that he delivered to the accused some amounts, he failed to produce receipts to substantiate
the same. Instead, Ursulum relies only on ten text messages allegedly sent by the accused as
evidence of their transaction. Said text messages alone does not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was able to obtain an amount from Ursulum as a result of her false
pretenses.

Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a clear
showing that the offended party parted with his money or property upon the offenders false
pretenses, and suffered damage thereby. In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation
of the accused.32 It is imperative, therefore, that damage as an element of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) be proved as conclusively as the offense itself. The failure of the prosecution to
discharge this burden concerning the estafa allegedly committed against Ursulum warrants the
acquittal of appellant on the said charge.

2. People VS Gallo 06/29/10

FACTS:

Accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and promises in assuring Dela Caza and
the other victims that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers were
waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally talked to
accused-appellant and gave him the money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof
of his payment.

ISSUE:

Whether Gallo and others are guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa.

LAWS INVOLVED:

Articless 13 (b) and 34 of the Labor Code.

RULING:

In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A.
8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a
promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from
Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys purported
power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in the
guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.1[ In
this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and the rest of
the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the
active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single purpose to divest
complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution
evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their papers
for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a
Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company. Then,
here comes accused-appellant who introduced himself as Mardeolyns relative and specifically told
Dela Caza of the fact that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even
showed several workers visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-
appellant signed and issued an official receipt acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza.
Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the
other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence,
conspiracy is evidently present.
3. CLAUDIO S. YAP, Petitioner, vs. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and
INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 179532, May 30,
2011
Facts: Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August
2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. for
a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his
job as electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. Yap, along with
the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will
be scrapped.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus.
However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month
basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract
since he was illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer
but none was made.

The Labor Arbiter

Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and
Attorneys Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by
respondents. LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners contract was
less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion
of his contract for a period of nine months.

The NLRC

Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.The NLRC affirmed the LAs
findings that petitioner was indeed constructively and illegally dismissed. However,
the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner
was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided under Section 108 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning
Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Finding merit in petitioners arguments,
the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only
three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of
unexpired term which this can be applied."

The Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC that petitioner was constructively
and illegally dismissed. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs
interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this regard, the CA relied on the clause
"or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.

Issue: Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally
dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less" is unconstitutional.YES

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months
backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired
term" threshold.-YES

The Supreme Court

In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared as
unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in the
case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. on March 24, 2009. This case should not be
different from Serrano.

The said provision of law has long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant
workers; and that said provision violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution because, while illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor
Code of reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld
from them up to their actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with
an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs
or local workers with fixed-term employment.

Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our pronouncement of unconstitutionality
should not apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals
with the rights and obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal of a migrant worker and is
not merely procedural in character. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no
retroactive application of the law in this case.

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.The
doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law.

Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the aforementioned
exception. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in
effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may
violate an OFWs security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit
from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance should be excluded from the
definition of the term "salary."
Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,
pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not categorized
as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic
salary of petitioner.

A final note.

We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs. In Olarte v. Nayona, this Court
held that:

Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest
sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an
environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with
difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious
employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands
just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept
salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

4. People VS Panis

FACTS:

Serapio Abug was charged with illegal recruitment. His defense was that the informations filed
against him did not constitute an offense because in each of the four informations filed against
him, each denote that he was only recruiting one person whereas the statute requires two or more
persons

ISSUE:
Determination of the proper interpretation of Art 13(b) of PD 442/ Labor Code:
b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

HELD: The specification of two or more persons is not to create a condition prior to filing but
rather it states a presumption that the individual is engaged in recruitment in consideration of a
fee, however the number of persons is not an essential ingredient to the act of recruitment or
placement, and it will still qualify even if only one person has been involved.

5. Transaction Overseas Corp VS HON. Sec of Labor

FACTS:
A group of individuals sought employment as domestic helpers and paid placement fee
ranging from P1,000 to P14,000 but Transaction Overseas Corporation failed to deploy them.
Their demands for refund proved unavailing, thus they were constrained to institute complaints
against petitioner for violation of Art. 32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
 Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents and
averred that the companys employee whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants
and was not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Petitioner maintains that it even warned
respondents not to give any money to unauthorized individuals.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has Jurisdiction to cancel or revoke
the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.

HELD:
Yes, the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment is vested upon the secretary of Labor and Employment under Art.35 of the
Labor Code as amended. This is in connection in the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp.
v. Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor has also the authority conferred by Section 36, not
only to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement of activities of all agencies, but also to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions
governing said activities.

6. Republic VS Principalia management

FACTS:
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, upon a finding that Principalia Management and Personnel
Consultants, Inc., collected from Alejandro Ramos excessive placement fees in violation of Section 2(b), Rule I, Part
VI of the 2002 Rules and Regulations, a serious offence, ordered the cancellation of Principalias license on June 24,
2009. To stay the enforcement of the cancellation order, Principalia filed with the RTC of Mandaluyong City a
Complaint for Injunction with Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction, contending that the immediate cancellation of its license not only
deprived it of due process, but endangered the deployment of hundreds of OFWs. That same,the Executive Judge
issued a 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order. Principalia also appealed the cancellation order to the Office of the
Secretary of DOLE on July 8, 2009. Contending that Principallia failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
committed forum shopping, POEA moved to dismiss the injunction case. It also argued that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to appeals of POEA orders for cancellation of licenses.

ISSUE: Wither or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the injunction case

HELD:

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that that it has jusridiction to entertain injunction cases pursuant to
Section 21 Of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691; the case falls under the exception to exhaustion of administrative
remedies as it appears Principalia may suffer irreparable damage as a result of the cancellation order; there is not
forum shopping because there is no identity of parties nor identity of relief between the injunction case and the appeal
to the DOLE. POEA moved to reconsider, but it was denied. Hence, it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The
latter sided with the RTC. Contrary to POEAs arguments, the injunction case is meant only to determine the legality
or propriety of the immediate cancellation of Principalias licences; the provisions of the 2002 POEA Rules on which
the Republic relies heavily cannot deprive the regular courts of jurisdiction to entertain an injunction complaint; the
RTC had not even ruled on the merits of the injunction complaint.

7.

8. Stolt- Nielsen Transportation Group Inc. v. Medequillo

FACTS:

Medequillo filed a complaint before the POEA against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and
failure to deploy. On 06 November 1991, he was hired by Stolt Nielsen on behalf of its principal
Chung-Gai Management on board the vessel Stolt Aspiration. While the vessel was docked at MV
Stolt Aspiration, he joined the crew for nearly three months. However, he was ordered by the
ships master to disembark the vessel and he was repatriated back to Manila for no reason or
explanation.

He was transferred to Stolt Pride under a second contract, with approval of the POEA. Despite the
commencement of the second contract, he was not deployed despite follow-ups from Medequillo.
When he sought for the return of his passport, seamans book and other papers, he was made to
sign a document that he cannot seek for employment with other agencies.

LABOR ARBITER: The Labor Arbiter found that Medequillo was constructively dismissed. He
found that the first contract entered into by and between the petitioner and Medequillo had been
novated by the second contract. Petitioners appealed that Medequillo cannot be considered as
having been illegally dismissed because he had not even been deployed yet.

NLRC: The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified terminal

ISSUE:

Whether or not the first employment contract between the petitioner and Medequillo is separate
and distinct from the second one.

What is the consequence of the non-deployment of the respondent?

RULING:

YES. With the finding that respondent was still employed under the first contract when he
negotiated with the petitioners on the second contract, novation became an unavoidable
conclusion.

The POEA Standard Employment Conract provides that employment shall commence upon the
actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire. Thus, the contention
of the petitioners of the alleged poor performance of the respondent while on board the first ship
cannot be sustained to justify non-deployment. Under the POEA Rules, failure of an agency to
deploy a worker within the prescribed period without valid reasons shall be a cause for the
suspension or cancellation of license or fine.

9. PEOPLE VS DELA PIEDRA

FACTS:

Dela Piedra was charged with illegal recruitment in a large scale. In an information filed against
her, without any POEA license, she allegedly offered and promised for a fee employment in
Singapore to Modesto, Amanita and Timbol, such that Modesto had already advanced the amount
of Php2,000.00. Dela Piedra was arrested in her home after an investigation was made by Atty.
Erlina Ramos, a lawyer of the POEA, who pretended to be an applicant, which led to an
entrapment operation of the PNP-CIS for Region IX.

ISSUES:

Is Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement void for vagueness?

Whether herein appellant committed the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

RULING:
NO. Section 13(b) is not overbroad. It encompasses what appellant apparently considers as
customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral.

NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of
illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only
two persons, Amanita and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by the appellant.

10. Estate of Nelson Dulay VS Aboitiz

FACTS:
Nelson R. Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-petitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. since 1986.
He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19,
2000, Nelson was detailed in petitioners vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.
After the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia.
At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), GCIs collective bargaining agent.
Nelsons widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI.
However, the grievance procedure was declared deadlocked as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. Merridy
Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits
and damages.
The amount claimed by Nelsons widow is $90,000 however GCI awarded P20,000 in favor of the deceaseds brother. Merridy claims the
remaining amount less the P20,000 her brother-in-law received.
Respondent on the other hand refused to award the same on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between GC
and Nelson at the time of his death. His contract with respondent was already completed upon his death.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering respondents to pay the $90,000 death benefits less the P20,000 already received.
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter during appeal. When the matter was brought before the Court of Appeals for certiorari,
the CA granted the petition and referred the case to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for the designation of the
Voluntary Arbitrator. The CA ruled that since the case involve interpretation of the CBA, the Voluntary Arbitrator has jurisdiction and not
the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case. YES, the Voluntary Arbitrator must take cognizance of the case.

RULING:
The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the
specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern. Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary
arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements.

In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA
entered into by and between respondent GCI and AMOSUP, the union to which petitioner belongs, provides as follows:

The Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this
Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration.

In the same manner, Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean
Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provides as follows:

Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures. In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a
collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators.

It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with their counterparts in the respective committees of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers
wherein the parties are covered by a CBA, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
It is only in the absence of a CBA that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case.

11.

12. HON. STO TOMAS VS REY SALAC

 In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections
29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be
deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042
was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have
stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to
Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the following provisions of RA
8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is vague as it fails to
distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties for simple violations against RA 8042,
i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a
fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file the criminal case where he or she resides
or at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court
which provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the crime or any of its essential elements were
committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of RA 8042 shall
be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI
claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary
Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons
who engage in canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that
section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section
6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of
the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that the rule on venue when it
comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative
venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their
company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
conduct of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents received insurance benefits from the
OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines
that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with
damages from the recruitment and placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen was negligent in investigating the true
cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to
Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene. They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic. However, the SC reconsidered
its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that
they were personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.
13. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT VS CABILES

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement

agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal)
on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately report to their
office to get her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy
claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LAs decision. CA affirmed the
ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and
awarding her three months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and
attorneys fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondents salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
ruled that the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no

rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all.
 The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of
any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus,
when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity
cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law
or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.The Court observed that the
reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed
to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

14. IPMS VS ARIOLA

FACTS:

PETITIONER Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is a local placement
agency duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers &
Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin), a Canadian company with business interests in several countries,
is the principal of IPAMS. Respondent Alberto Arriola, a licensed general surgeon in the
Philippines, was hired by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS, as a safety
officer in its Ambatovy Project site in Madagascar. Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, vacation and sick leave pay before the
Labor Arbiter (LA). The petitioners asserted that Arriolas employment documents were processed
in Canada, not to mention that SNC-Lavalins office was in Ontario, so that the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was applicable. They relied on a copy of the Employment Standards Act (ESA) of
Ontario, which was duly authenticated by the Canadian authorities and certified by the Philippine
Embassy

ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT CANADIAN LAW GOVERNS THE CONTRACT.

HELD:

No. Granting arguendo that the labor contract expressly stipulated the applicability of Canadian
law, still, Arriolas employment cannot be governed by such foreign law because the third requisite
is not satisfied. A perusal of the ESA will show that some of its provisions are contrary to the
Constitution and the labor laws of the Philippines. First, the ESA does not require any ground for
the early termination of employment. Article 54 thereof only provides that no employer should
terminate the employment of an employee unless a written notice had been given in advance.
Necessarily, the employer can dismiss any employee for any ground it so desired. At its own
pleasure, the foreign employer is endowed with the absolute power to end the employment of an
employee even on the most whimsical grounds. Second, the ESA allows the employer to dispense
with the prior notice of termination to an employee. Article 65 (4) thereof indicated that the
employer could terminate the employment without notice by simply paying the employee a
severance pay computed on the basis of the period within which the notice should have been given.
The employee under the ESA could be immediately dismissed without giving him the opportunity
to explain and defend himself. The provisions of the ESA are patently inconsistent with the right to
security of tenure. Both the Constitution and the Labor Code provide that this right is available to
any employee. In a host of cases, the Court has upheld the employees right to security of tenure in
the face of oppressive management behavior and management prerogative. Security of tenure is a
right which cannot be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis. Not only do
these provisions collide with the right to security of tenure, but they also deprive the employee of
his constitutional right to due process by denying him of any notice of termination and the
opportunity to be heard. Glaringly, these disadvantageous provisions under the ESA produce the
same evils which the Court vigorously sought to prevent in the cases of Pakistan International and
Sameer Overseas. Thus, the Court concurs with the CA that the ESA is not applicable in this case as
it is against our fundamental and statutory laws. In fine, as the petitioners failed to meet all the
four requisites on the applicability of a foreign law, then the Philippine labor laws must govern the
overseas employment contract of Arriola (Mendoza, J.; SC Second Division, Industrial Personnel &
Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS), SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors, Inc. And Angelito C.
Hernandez vs. Jose G. De Vera And Alberto B. Arriola, G.R. No. 205703, March 07, 2016).

15. SUNACE INTL MNGT VS NLRC

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace

International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was
made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract,
Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and
her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges
that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-
year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace.
Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National
Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Hence,
the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made with the
knowledge and consent of Sunace
HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and
entered into a new and separate employment contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to
Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was
aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The
message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker
communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean
that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that
Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction
was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it
was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to
appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the
complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace]
cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
[Montehermozos] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a
misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner"
cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency
is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly
with third persons.
16. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE. LIMITED, and
JESUS AGBAYANI,Petitioners, vs. TORIBIO C. A VESTRUZ,* Respondent.

FACTS:

petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. (Maersk), on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner
A.P. Moller Singapore Pte. Ltd. (A.P. Moller), hired Avestruz as Chief Cook on board the vessel
M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six (6) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$698.00.
Avestruz boarded the vessel on May 4, 2011

Captain Charles C. Woodward (Captain Woodward) noticed that the cover of the garbage bin in the
kitchen near the washing area was oily. As part of Avestruzs job was to ensure the cleanliness of
the galley, Captain Woodward called Avestruz and asked him to stand near the garbage bin where
the former took the latters right hand and swiped it on the oily cover of the garbage bin, telling
Avestruz to feel it.Shocked, Avestruz remarked, "Sir if you are looking for [dirt], you can find it[;]
the ship is big. Tell us if you want to clean and we will clean it." Captain Woodward replied by
shoving Avestruzs chest, to which the latter complained and said, "Dont touch me," causing an
argument to ensue between them. Captain Woodward summoned and required Avestruz to state in
writing what transpired in the galley that morning. Avestruz complied and submitted his written
statementon that same day. Captain Woodward likewise asked MessmanJomilyn P. Kong (Kong)
to submit his own written statement regarding the incident, to which the latter immediately
complied. On the very same day, Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that he would be
dismissed from service and be disembarked in India.

he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of his contract,
damages, and attorneys fees against Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Jesus Agbayani (Agbayani), an
officer14 of Maersk. He alleged that no investigation or hearing was conducted nor was he given
the chance to defend himself before he was dismissed, and that Captain Woodward failed to
observe the provisions under Section 17 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) on disciplinary procedures. Also, he averred
that he was not given any notice stating the ground for his dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not procedural due process, as provided in the rules, were followed? thatThe
Court finds that there was no just or valid cause for his dismissal, hence, he was illegally dismissed.

HELD:

petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent by Captain Woodward, both dated June 22,
2011, and time-stamped 10:07 a.m. and 11:40 a.m., respectively, which they claim chronicled the
relevant circumstances that eventually led to Avestruzs dismissal.

The Court, however, finds these e-mails to be uncorroborated and self-serving, and therefore, do
not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence as would sufficiently discharge the burden of
proving that Avestruz was legally dismissed. On the contrary, petitioners failed to prove that he
committed acts of insubordination which would warrant his dismissal.

Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of
at least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.

, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that Avestruz was not accorded procedural due process,
there being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the POEA-SEC as above-cited,
which requires the "two-notice rule." As explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira: An erring
seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the
reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and
existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but
just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial
evidence of the findings.

there is dearth of evidence to show that Avestruz had been given a written notice of the charge
against him, or that he was given the opportunity to explain or defend himself. The statement75
given by Captain Woodward requiring him to explain in writing the events that transpired at the
galley in the morning of June 22, 2011 hardly qualifies as a written notice of the charge against
him, nor was it an opportunity for Avestruz to explain or defend himself. While Captain Woodward
claimed in his e-mail76 that he conducted a "disciplinary hearing" informing Avestruz of his
inefficiency, no evidence was presented to support the same.

Neither was Avestruz given a written notice of penalty and the reasons for its imposition.Instead,
Captain Woodward verbally informed him that he was dismissed from service and would be
disembarked from the vessel. It bears stressing that only in the exceptional case of clear and
existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices may be dispensed with,
and, once again, records are bereft of evidence showing that such was the situation when Avestruz
was dismissed.

17. GAGUI VS DEJERO

Facts:
Respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo obtained a favorable decision in their separate
complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of transportation expenses, and
attorneys fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc. and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes. The issued Writ of Execution and
subsequent Alias Writ of Execution were returned unsatisfied. Respondents filed a Motion to Implead respondent
Pro Agency Manila, Inc.s Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtors, including petitioner as its Vice-
President/Stockholder/Director, which was granted. Another two (2) Alias Writs of Execution were issued which
resulted to the garnishment of petitioners bank deposit and levying of her two (2) parcels of land respectively.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the third Alias Writ of Execution followed by a Supplemental Motion to Quash
Alias Writ of Execution which were both denied. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which was likewise denied; the CA
affirmed NLRCs ruling. Petitioner filed two (2) Motions for Reconsideration which were both denied. Hence, this
Petition for Review.

Issue: WON the Petition for Review was filed on time?

Ruling:
Yes. The Petition for Review was filed on time.

The SC agree with petitioner that starting from the date she received the Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days within which to appeal to the SC. The matter has already been
settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, as follows:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.

Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two Motions for Reconsideration only on 16 March 2011,
she had another 15 days within which to file her Petition, or until 31 March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March
2011, fell within the prescribed 15-day period.