SHELDON 1958 - The Rise of The Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan, 1600-1868

THE RISE OF THE MERCHANT CLASS
IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN, 1600-1868

ANINTRODUCTORYSURVEY
MONOGRAPHS OF THE ASSOCIATION
FOR ASIAN STUDIES
CHARLES DAVID SHELDON
THE RISE
OF THE MERCHANT CLASS
IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
1600-1868
AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY
Published for the Association for Asan Studies by
J. J. AUGUSTIN INCORPORATED PUBLISHER

LOCUST VALLEY, NEW YORK
The publication o/ this series is made possible
by the generous assistance o/ the Council /or
Economic and Cultural .A.flairs, the Ford
Foundation, Mr. and Mrs. Richard .A.dlo/f,
and M r. Charles S. Gardner
ALL RIGHTS RESBRVED

PRINTED IN GERMANY BY J. J. AUGUSTIN GLCKSTADT
1968
TO
MY WIFE, JACQUELINE
For her pa.tience and understanding during the long student years.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
l. The Historical Background and Development to the Ex-
clusion Edicts of 1638 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. The Social and Political Position of the Merchant Class in
the Early Tokugawa Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
III. The Quest for Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
IV. The Accumulation of Commercial and Usury Capital by
City Merchants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
V. The "Happy Society" of the Genroku Period (1688-1703) 85
VI. The Tokugawa Deadlock-Alternations in City and Feu-
dal Predominance (1703-1843) ..... . ................ 100
VIL Ideas of Samurai and Merchant Scholars about Commerce
and Merchants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
VIII. A New Challenge to the City Merchants: The Rise of Pro-
vincial Merchants .................................. 144
IX. Conclusion: The Significance of the Rise of the Merchant
Class . ........................... . ......... . ...... 165
List of Names of Persona with Dates when Known . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Glossary of Terms Used More Than Once . . .... .... .. .. . .... 178
Bibliography 182
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
vii
PREFACE
T relevantlittle
HEBE IS in the history of the Tokugawa period which is not
to the phenomenon of the rise of the merchant class.
The present study is an introduction to this vast subject. It is also
an introduction and survey of the very large literature of secondary
studies by Japanese scholars. There are several rival schools of Jap-
anese economic historians, some of whose work is marred by ide-
ological commitments. 1 have drawn more from the Kyoto school
(especially Honjo, Horie, Miyamoto and Kanno) than any other, as
1 found it the most lucid and objective, and the least affected by
ideological considerations. All material fromJapanese sources, wheth-
er primary or secondary, has been translated by the author unless
otherwise indicated.
This study was written first as a Ph.D. dissertation at the Univer-
sity of California. The chairman of my dissertation committee,
Dr. Delmer M. Brown, interested me in Japanese economic history
in my undergraduate days, and patiently guided my first studies in
this field. 1 should like to expresa my warmest appreciation to him.
1 wish to thank the two other members of the committee, Drs.
Toshio George Tsukahira and Denzel Carr, for their many helpful
criticisms, suggestions and corrections.
Also, 1 wish to expresa my gratitude to the administrators of the
Educational Exchange Service, U.S. Department of State, who
awarded me a Fulbright scholarship to do research in Japan during
the academic year 1953-1954, to the officers of the Ford Foun-
dation who very kindly granted me a supplemental award in the
forro of a Ford Foundation fellowship, and to the Association for
Asan Studies for undertaking the publication of this monograph.
My work in Japan was under the guidance of Professor Horie
Y asuz, then Chairman of the Faculty of Economics in Kyoto
University, one of the foremost Japanese economic historians.
IX
X PREFACE
Professor Horie gave me a desk in his prvate study and free access
to his excellent library. 1 am deeply indebted to him also for his
kind counsel both in seminars and in prvate discussions, and 1 am
glad to take this opportunity to acknowledge this indebtedness. 1
wish to thank Mr. Daniel Meloy of the Department of State for proof-
reading and helpful suggestions. While acknowledging the assistance
of the persone and organizations mentioned here, 1 take full respon-
sibility for all interpretations and conclusions, as well as for any
inadequacies and errors which may remain uncorrected.
NOTE ON JAPANESE NAMES
Japanese personal namesaregivenintheJapaneseorder, withfam-

ily name first, and with macrons to indicate long vowels. However,
in citing English works by Japanese authors, 1 have not attempted
to add macrons where they do not appear in such works. Also, 1 have
omitted the macrons in the names of the well-known cities of Tokyo,
Osaka, and Kyoto, except when they are part of the transliterated
title of a book or article.
ABBREVIATIONS
KSK - Keizai Ski Kenkyu

KUER - Kyoto University Economic Review
NKSJ - Nihon Keizai Ski Jiten
TAS J Transactions o/ the Asiatic Society o/ J apan
XI
INTRODUCTION
A rise of the moneyofeconomy

MONG STUDENTS Japan, it is a truism that the unprecedented
and the merchants who controlled it
signalled the decline of the feudal society and made an important
contribution to the fall of the Tokugawa regime. It is also generally
accepted that in the development of the modern state, the weakness
of the merchant class as compared to European counterparts meant
that the merchant class did not lead, but rather was led by circum-
stances into a compromise with feudal elements in the Meiji Resto-
ration, enabling the "former feudal leaders and the feudal outlook to
exercise far gres.ter influence than in most other modern societies. "I
A study of the process a.nd an analysis of the extent to which the
merchante, the lowest in the clase structure, gradua.lly achieved
power in a restrictive feudal society has yet to be done in a Western
la.ngua.ge. Even in Japa.nese, it has not received a treatment which
could be called definitive, 2 although literally thousands of trea.tises
and studies have been written by Japa.nese scholars during the la.st
three hundred years touching on this phenomenon and the problema
arising from it. The question of wha.t to do with the upsta.rt merchant
class which wa.s disturbing the feudal relationships was a problem
which exercised economic thinkers of the period, and was one which
defied solution in practice.
The main points which we have selected for a.n a.tta.ck on the
problem of the rise of the merchant class can be expressed in the fol-
lowing questions. The present study proposes to a.nswer them, in
ea.ch of nine cha.pters:
1 E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modem State (New York:

1940), 5.
1 The closest to a full study is the sma.11 volume, unfortunately only partia.lly
documentad, by Sa.ka.ta Yoshio ;f. mti . Ch0nin IBJ A [The Townsmen]
(Tokyo: 1939). It is a descriptiva essay rather than a historical treatment.
l
2 INTRODUCTION
1. How was the rise of the merchant class possible 1

2. What was the merchante' social and political position 1
3. How did the merchante organize themselves in their search for
security 1
4. How and to what extent did they gain financia! power 1
5. When did they achieve a degree of security, and what effect did
this have on J apanese culture and society 1
6. What was the historical development of the merchante after
this time 1
7. What did contemporary scholars (including merchant scholars)
have to say about this force which was proving subversive to
feudal interests 1
8. What was the new competitive mercantile force of the last years
of the Tokugawa period and what effect did it have 1
9. What significance did the rise of the merchant class have for
Japanese culture, society and economy 1
By dealing with these questions, it is our intention to outline the

history of the merchant class in the period. Economic and social
changes, usually gradual, do not lend themselves easily to chron-
ological treatment. We have therefore selected an essentially
topical approach within a roughly chronological framework, at-
tempting to maintain a historical perspective throughout.
The Tokugawa period was one of transition from a feudal political
structure, with feudal economic relations, towards a capitalistic eco-
nomic structure largely within the feudal system. It is therefore fill-
ed with paradoxes and confiicts. The post-Restoration period is by
no means unique in Japan for its confiicts between the old and the
new. To understand the changes which took place in Tokugawa
Japan, it is essential to understand the role of the merchant class
which was, as a class, the most important factor in these changes.
Modern Japan is a complex amalgam of the materials of traditional
Japan combined with, and greatly changed by, the multifarious in-
:fiuences of the modern West. In the present Japanese economic
system, with its close political ties, "feudal remains" - a term often
used but seldom clearly understood - are still very much in evidence.
A study of the pre-modern economy is of importance to an under-
standing of present problema, as well as for its contribution to a more
complete insight into the history of Tokugawa times.
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT TO

THE EXCLUSION EDICTS OF 1638
T throes of Europeans
HE FIRST to reach Japan in 1542 found her in the
an internal confct, a time of trouble known as the.
aengoku jidai ~ 11 ~ ft (the age of the country at war). War which
had been frequent before had become endemic since the outbreak of
the Onin war in 1467. The feudal lords were eager to establish com-
mercial relations with the Europeans, and an important new foreign
trade sprang up. Moreover, domestic commerce began to change in
organization and to take the first significant steps towards a nation-
wide commercial economy with the breakdown of old feudal barriera
by Nobunaga, whose policy of incorporation of large conquered ter-
ritories included the freeing of commerce from sorne of the existing
restraints. The unification of the country was carried further by
Hideyoshi and established on a atable basis by Tokugawa Ieyasu by
his victory in the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The ensuing "pax
Tokugawa" which lasted for 267 years, appropriately called "the
Great Peace, " 1 was of vast importance to the development of com-
merce and to the rise of the merchant clase.
In economic terma, commerce functions as a mediator to bring
producers and consumera together. The development of commerce,
then, requires a separation both in space and time of producer and
consumer. For commerce to exist as a separate activity, it is neces-
sary that there be a continuous excess in the production of goods. It
is very olear that this situation existed in both agriculture and indus-
try from the first years of the Tokugawa period, and there was a close
inter-relationship between the increase in production and the rapid
development of commerce. Different from the earlier self-sufficiency
1 Tenka Taihei "} r :!; p, a common expression of the time . .Akabori Mata
jir~$ tl\ 3(. ~ llB "Tokugawa. Jida.i no Sh~nin fi JI)~ ft (J) itlj A"
[The Merchante of the Tokugawa Period], Nihon Shnin Shi E
A 2, [A History of Japanese Merchante] (Tokyo: 1935), 188.
* itlj
3
4 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOXUGAWA JAPAN
of the feudal economy, where the bulk of the production not con-
sumed by the producers was bartered or sold directly to the con-
sumera, the Tokugawa period was one in which the bulk of pro-
duction went through the hands of merchante as intermediaries. This
development of "merchant commerce" 2 reached its height in the
famous Genroku era (1688-1703) and from then on maintained itseH
on a high level throughout the rest of the period.
The so-called "unification" of the country under the Tokugawa
which was of such great significance to commerce requires some
de:finition. It was by no means the political and economic integration
seen in a modern national state. In a sense it was a military truce with
elaborate safeguards, under an alliance between two powerful groups
of feudal lords (daimyo *
~), those who fought with Ieyasu at
Sekigahara and those who fought against him. The Tokugawa do-
mains (tenryo :R. fllt) covered about one-fourth the area of the
country and were distributed in 47 out of 68 provinces. The rest of
the a.rea was a checkerboard with squares assigned to the fudai
("inner") lords who had fought with Ieyasu and who were in heredi-
tary vassalage to the Tokugawa house, and with the other squares
assigned to the wzama ("outer") lords whose loyalty was somewhat
questionable.3 The feudal lords all enjoyed a considerable degree of
autonomy. In many aspects, the economy of the Tokugawa period
was not a single one, but two: that of the Tokugawa bureaucracy
(the Bakufu a/M') and that of the feudal lords. However, the
1 A term commonly used by J apanese economic historians to differentiate the
*
Tokugawa type of commerce from earlier commerce. Cf. Kanno Wataro
re,
1ff !f lU :!: tfB. Nih<m_ Shgyo Shi B ifj ~ [Commercial History of
8
Mata.ji *
Ja.pan] (Tokyo: 1930), 74, a.nd the volume underthe se.me title by Miya.moto
g 3{. ~ (Tokyo: 1943), 137.
See James Murdoch, A History o/ Ja;pan (London: 1926), I, 1-61 for a de-
ta.iled analysis of the Tokuga.wa political system. In 1602, there were 119
/udai and 72 tozama lords, as well as 4 colla.teral members of the Tokugawa
family. There were numerous changes, and in 1866, there were 145 /udai,
97 tozama, and 23 collateral houses. See Toshio George Tsuka.hira., The Sankin
Ktai System o/ Tokugawa Ja;pan (Unpublished Ph. D. Disserta.tion, Har-
see Honj Eijir, * ~ *

va.rd University: June, 1951) 27-8. For a list of daimyo with classifications,
* lfj tfB ed., Nihon Keizai Shi Jit,en 13
a!, 1$ :ft. [Dictiona.ry of Ja.panese Economic History] (Tokyo: 1940),
& M
975-991.
HISTORIC.AL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 5
unification was without doubt the most effective in Japanese history,

and herein lies perhaps the most basic difference between the Toku-
gawa period and earlier times.
The stabilization of economic life which resulted from the es-
tablishment of peace permitted an increase in population and a
greater increase in the amount of land under cultivation,' as well
as a. rise in agricultura! productivity. It is generally accepted that
there was more variation in crops and that there were important
improvements in agricultura! techniques at this time, notably the
increased use of iron implements6 and the use of tread-mills which
"in the early Tokugawa Period ... were generally popularized." 6
These factora combine to supply an economic explanation for the
migration from the country to the city which occurred in the years
before and during the Tokugawa period, and the resulting increase
in agricultura} production over population created excess goods for
commerce and an increase in the standard of living.
Paralleling the increase in agricultura! efficiency which freed
peasants from the land in the economic sense was an unprecedented
development of towns and cities. They existed on a comparatively
small scale during the early sengoku period, but expanded greatly in
the late sixteenth century in part due to the use of firearms which
necessitated the building of large castles and in part due to the larger
concentrations of fighting men around the fewer and more powerful
feudal lords who emerged in the sixteenth century. Previously,
'The area of land under cultivation was almost doubled in the period 1600
to 1730. Matsuyoshi Se.da.o ~ 'Jif j{ ~. "Tokugawa Bakufu no Kaikon
Seisaku Kanken fi Jll ;JJ J(.f (}) !m ~ i!( ft 'lf Jl [A Personal Interpre-
tation ofthePolicy for the Increase of ArableLand oftheTokugawaBalcu/u],
Keizai Shi Kenky. 1'!f 11!. JJf ~ [Studies in Economic History] (hence-
forth cited as KSK), XIII, 3 (Mar. 1935), 13-14. As for population, no census
figures are available for the years before 1721, but Ryoichi Ishii, in Popu-
lation Prusure and Economic 1Afe in Japan (London, 1937), 3, 8, quotes an
estima.te ofthe population in the period 1573-1591at18 million, and for the
Genroku period (1688-1703) at 26 million.
& Yosoburo (sic) Takekoshi, The Economic Aspects of the Oivilization of Japan
(New York: 1930), 1, 370.
41 Ta.ka.o Tsuchiya, An Economio History of Japan, Transactions ofthe Asia.tic
Society of Japan (hereafter cited as T ASJ), 2nd Series, XV (Dec. 1937), 155.
6 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA J.Al'AN
castles were generally built on mountains or hilltops, for purely

military reasons. Now, they began to be built on the plains where
transportation facilities were good. Commercial centers grew up
around these castles.7 The expansion of castle towns was accelerated
in the Tokugawa period by the migration of peasants, merchante
and artisans to the towns to provide the samurai with all the neces-
sities of life as well as military supplies. This separation of the
samurai from the small agricultura! community brought the merchant
into prominence as a mediator in trade and ushered in the period of
merchant commerce. The samurai crowded into the castle towns
found it difficult to barter their stipend rice for other goods. More-
over, "not only was the exchange value of rice extremely unstable,
but its use as money raised the problem of storage. Therefore, it
became necessary for them to exchange it for specie." 8 Ogyii Sorai
(1666-1728) described the samurai as living a "hotel existence."
Sorai deplored this situation: "As in hotel life one must needs huy
all things necessary for living, money is the most important thing for
travellers. Never in any age since the foundation of the country has
money been so indispensable to life as during the last hundred years. " 9
The ranks of the merchants and artisans in the castle towns were
swollen in large part by peasants, but also by samurai. Merchants
of samurai descent were particularly numerous and successful during
the last years of the sengoku period and the :fi.rst years of the Toku-
gawa. Some examples are the houses of Suminokura 1fJ ~ and Cha.ya
~ ~. who made their money in foreign trade. The Chaya were once
drapers and purveyors of silks for Tokugawa Ieyasu.10 Other families
7 For a standard study of castle towns but written in a difficult style, see Ono
Kin 1J' !f !!::J, Kinsei Joka-machi no KenkyfJ. jl!, iD: JJi ""f lllf (}) if ~ [A
Study of Castle Towns in the Early Modem Period] (Tokyo: 1928). For an
excellent e.nd suggestive study in English, see the article by J ohn W. Hall,
"The Castle Town and J apa.n's Modem U rbe.nization," Far Eaatem Quarterly
XV, 1 (Nov. 1955), 37-56.
8 Kanno, Nihon SMgyo Shi, op. cit., 84.
Taiheiaaku :k Zfi jt, in Nihon Keizai Soaho 13 * & M tF [Jape.nese

Economic Series] (Tokyo: 1914-17),III, 554-5,astranslated in Eijiro Honjo,
The Social and Econ0'1'11/,c Hiatory o/ Japan (Kyoto: 1935), 123.
10 Honjo Eijiro, ed., Nihon Keizai Shi Jiten, op. cit., 1055. Henceforth, NKSJ.
For the Suminokura, see ibid., 893-4.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 7
=
who have continued to fiourish are the Mitsui :1t:, Sumitomo it it
and Konoike ~ ld!.n Many of the merchants of Omi ~U. province
who played such a leading role in the commerce of the Tokugawa.
period were descended from samurai.12
People settled in the new castle towns not merely under the natural
stimulus of commercial opportunities. It was common for the feudal
lords to encourage this settlement actively. This was a notable feature
of Nobunaga's policy which was motivated by the military necessity
of providing food, shelter and a continuing supply of arms for large
concentrations of troops. It has been pointed out13 that the usual as-
sumption that Nobunaga was the protector of commerce should not
be accepted without asking the reason. It appears that from the first,
he compromised with new economic forces already fairly well en-
trenched in order to use them in forwarding his overriding ambition
to consolidate his military power. When he entered Kyoto in 1568,
he was o:ffered territories by the Shogun, but he rejected them for
direct control of Otsu and Kusatsu, both markets on the road to
Kyoto. Otsu was an important port on Lake Biwa, in Omi, in the fief
of the Sasaki family, who were the first to break down the established
monopolies and establish a free market (rakuichi ~ m) in 1539.14
Besides the Buddhist organizations which proved formidable
enemies for Nobunaga, there were several commercial towns which
had gained a considerable degree of autonomy during the Ashikaga
period and which had proved their fighting ability. The most striking
examples were those which combined foreign with domestic trade and
commissariat functions for the armies engaged in the wars of the
8engoku period. The most famous was Sakai, a port south of Osaka,
11 N KSJ, 1559-61 ; 892-3; 523-4. The first two are prominent za.ibatsu fa.milies,
the third, a. lesser za.ibatsu, operates one of the major banlcs, the Sanwa Ginko.
111 Kanno, Nihon SMgyo Shi, op. cit., 131. There is some doubt as to the validity
of Mitsui's cla.ims to samurai extraction.

18 Yoshimura Miyao tf # ~ _JJ, "Edo Jida.i ni okeru Shogyo no Seishitsu
U. Ji~ ft l: ~ ltj- ;tj ~O) tt Ji" [The Nature ofCommerce in the

Edo Period], Rekishi KyOiku JJ! ~ fic ff [History and Education], XI, 3
(1936), 196-7.
u lbi,d., 195. For rakivichi-rakuza ~ 1fl ~ ,,., free ma.rkets and guilds, see
NKSJ, 1669-71. Kusa.tsu wa.s a.t the junction of two important roads, the
Tokaido and the Nakasendo.
8 THE MEROHANT CLASS IN TOK.UGAWA JAPAN
whoee citizens opposed the feudal lorde eucceesfully, building bamboo

palisades and eurrounding themselvee with huge moats. 16 The arti-
eane of Sakai were the most famed makers of weapons, eepecially
gune, in Japan.16 Hakata in Kyeh and Ominato on Ise Bay were
largely eelf-governed. For a time, Nagasaki wae aleo self-governed.17
Kuwana, a port in Ise Bay, ehowed the deeire to be self-governing
when it disregarded feudal commande, only to be forcefully eubju-
gated:18 Lending large sums to feudal lords in return for privileges
was one source of strength. Also, the phenomenon of payment of
taxes in money and the contracting for taxes by established mer-
chante and residents of market cities became the powerful means by
which merchants liberated themselves from the lords. In addition,
constant changee of port towne from one feudal lord to another
during the Bengoku period gave opportunity for the development of
merchant-controlled administration, a neceeeity for order and conti-
nuity of government, as in the case of Muro (near present Tateuno,
in Hyogo Prefecture) whose power in the eixteenth century forced
other porte to admit Muro boats tax-free.19
Self-governing commercial towns began to flourieh just at the time
when decentralized feudalism was being centralized. The centralizers,
Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, all understood the importance of
economic power, and their encouragement of commerce and mer-
chants, although e:ffective in promoting their mutual intereste, was
not ultimately a policy to add to the merchante' freedom of action.
They encouraged merchante to settle in their cities and treated them
generously, but did not permit them to gain a political position com-
parable to the merchante of Sakai. Osaka and .Edo furnish the most
important examples of thie policy.
The so-called "three citiea" of the Tokugawa period were Edo,
Oeaka, and Kyoto. They were the chief cities controlled directly by
111
11 Takekoshi Yosaburo it ~ j l =
Miyamoto, Nihoif, Shgyo Shi, op. cit., 117.
*
llB Nihon Keizai Shi E tE
[The Economic History of Japan] (Tokyo: 3rd ed., 1936), ID, 274.
J1!
17 Takekoshi, Eecmomie Aaputa , I, 327.
18 Miyamoto, 177.
Takekoshi, Eeonomie Aaputa . , I, 359.
HISTORIO.AL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 9
the Balcufu. Others included Sakai, Nagasaki, Otsu, and Sumpu.

Kyoto, the Imperial city, had been important for centuries, but Edo
and Osaka were both new. Much of the economic history of the
Tokugawa period could be written about these two cities.20
At the beginning of the sengoku period, the town of Osaka consisted
of only a small branch temple with its commercial district (monzen
machi). In 1533 it became the headquarters of the Shin Sect, and grew
rapidly in size and power to 1580. It was in a strategic situation with
the Inland Sea on the west, and the Yodogawa, a most important
waterway to Kyoto, winding about in marshy fields on the other
three sides. 21 For ten years (1570-80), Osaka repelled various attacks
by Nobunaga, but finally capitulated. When Hideyoshi took over
poweratNobunaga's deathin 1582, he built (1583-6) thelargest castle
in Japan in Osaka and made it his capital, having selected it primarily
for its strategic position. Hideyoshi did not want nearby Sakai as a
military rival. However, he did not attack it, but was successful in
having its wide moats filled in. Then he encouraged ~ts merchants
to move to Osaka, many of whom did. 22 There were ample oppor-
tunities for merchante in Osaka, and many made fortunes. For ex-
ample, Yodoya Keian, a war contractor for Hideyoshi, became a
land speculator in Osaka, and founded one of the most famous of
Osaka merchant houses.23
Osaka under Hideyoshi became the major collection point for
troops and supplies for the Korean campaigns. Mter 1615, when the
fall of Osaka eliminated the last rivals of Ieyasu, Osaka was no longer
an important political center, but an important system of canals was
built, a number of merchante were brought from Fushimi, near Kyoto,
IO Cf. Koda. Shlgetomo *m IDt ~' Erlo to 0Baka lI p l * lit [Edo a.nd
Osa.ka] (Tokyo: 1934). Portions of this work a.re translated in Nea.l Skene
Smith, ed., "Ma.terials on J a.pa.nese Social a.nd Economic History: Tokuga.wa.
Ja.pan," TASJ, 2nd Series, XIV (June 1937), 35, 51-75; 7~116; 123-6;
137-47; 164-7. Sumpu is the present Shizuoka..
*1 Osa.ka Municipal Council (* (?i i1i. $. f), comp., Osaka Shi Shi
i1i j!, [History of the City of Osa.ka], 1, 93.
*lit
H Royal W a.Id, The Development o/ Osaka during the 16th Oentury (Unpublished
M.A. thesis, Univ. of Ca.lif., 1947), 57-8. The writer ha.a relied ma.inly upon
thls study for the summary of Osa.ka.'s ea.rly development given here.
sa Takekoshi, Economie Aspeets . . , II, 242, 246-7.
10 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
and it became the commercial center of Japan. The daimyo of the

Kanto and Ou districts built warehouses (kurayaskiki) in Edo, but
others built in Osaka. Temples and shrines did likewise, so that there
were five or six hundred such warehouses in Osaka, mostly built in the
early years of the Tokugawa. 24 Industry as well as commerce :O.ourish-
ed there, and as vast amounts of goods, including food, were col-
lected and processed for consumera all over the country, Osaka ca.me
to be called the "kitchen" of Japan. 25
Edo was a village of not more than a hundred houses of farmers and
townsmen when Ieyasu first saw it in 1590, but after the battle of
Sekigahara he made it his capital and began work on the castle and
on large scale land reclamation and canal projects. 26 He invited
merchants to Edo, offering free business sites.'n The traditional tax
on houses and lots upon which houses were built (ckiski-sen i& ::.. il)
was not levied in Edo until 1696.28 The townsmen of Osaka were
excused indefinitely from paying these taxes, and from time to time
residents of Kyoto, Nara and other towns were similarly favored. 29 In
addition, money gifts were even distributed by the Shogun among the
townspeople of the "three cities," on festive occasions.00
With this favorable combination of policies and natural economic
forces, the cities grew rapidly. Osaka's population (excluding samurai)
was 279,610, according to a census taken in 1625.3 1 In 1634, the first
H Yoshimura, op. cit., 198.
15 N KSJ, 141.
18 Ibid., 119.
t 7 Takekoshi, Economic Aspecta . . , I, 523.

18 Ibid., 538. For chiahi-Ben (also called jiahi-sen), see NKSJ, 1043. The con-
cessions and encouragements to Edo and Osaka townspeople before 1615

suggest a certain competition between Ieyasu and the remnants of the Hide-
yoshi adherente.
at Sakata, OMnin, 5-6. Nobunaga and Hideyoshi adoptad this policy on sever-
a! occasions. Ono, in his study of castle towns, op. cit., 54, has found ex-
amples of exemption from chiahi-sen before 1555, but early examples were
usually due to the fa.et that emergency exactions had been made.
Sakata, 5.
31 The method of census-taking seems to have been to count houses and to ask
the people how many lived in each house, a method which, according to con-
temporary accounts, left out large numbers. Matsuyo Takizawa, The Pene-
tration of Money Economy in Japan (New York: 1927), 52. The purpose of
the census was tax collecting. The samurai population were not included
figures available for Kyoto show a town population of 410,089. How-

ever, by 1721, when the first census was taken in Edo, the population
of townsmen had surpassed that of both Osaka and Kyoto, with &
recorded 501,394.82 Considering the fact that the samurai population
was far greater in Edo, its total population may well have reached
over 800,000.83 The econoruic needs of these large population con-
centrations spurred the development of transportation, the money
economy and commerce, as well as commercial credit among mer-
chants of the "three cities.,, lt put the cities in a position of de-
pendence upon the merchants who controlled this new commercial
economy. It was a degree of dependence totally unknown in earlier
times.
In the field of commodity circulation as well as in the establish-
ment and control of cities, the policy developed first to break up the
old system, and then to reform it into a new system. This was the
function of the rakuicki-lfakuza (free markets and guilds). Nobunaga,
no doubt leaming from feudal lords like the Sasaki of Otsu, carried
out a thoroughgoing program in his territories of denying the special
privileges of the existing trading and market guilds (za) and de-
creeing open access to ali types of markets and trading activities.
This policy, continued by Hideyoshi, created free fairs and markets
which were exempted from ali taxes, and the merchants were permit-
ted to deal with any disorders in the markets without interference
from the feudal lords.86 Merchants from other districts were permitted
to engage freely in business with free guilds (rakuza) and in free ports
(rakuskin ~ '$) where vessels could enter taxfree. Although pea.santa
because they were not ta.xed, and also because their numbers were military
secreta. Ono Takeo 1J' !f ~ ~. Naon Shakai Shi Ronk Jl # ijH: fl re.
& ~ [Discussions on the Social History of Peasant Villages] (Tokyo:
3rd ed., 1935), llO.
81 Honjl> Eijirl>, Jinko oyobi Jink Mondai A IJ "Ji. (JA IJ IDJ m [Popu-
lation and Population Problems] (Tokyo: 1930), 91.
:38 Smith, op. cit., 35, estima.tes the samurai popula.tion of Edo a.t the time of
the Reetoration a.t something over 400,000, since the nation-wide total of
samurai and their families in 1872 rea.ched a.bout two million.
u Miyamoto, Nihon Shgy Shi, op. cit., 177.
311 Yokoi Tokifuyu fi jt: ~ ~ Nihon Shgy Shi J3
History of Ja.pan] (Tokyo: 1926), 182.

* re.
J1'i ~ [Commercial
were prohibited from leaving their native provinces, merchante were

allowed to engage freely in commerce in other districts. It was com-
mon for daimyo to compete with one another in attracting trading
ships, domestic as well as foreign, to their ports.86 Towns where
merchante were predominant, like Nagasaki, Sakai, and Hirano of-
fered free access to merchante, and their number was swelled greatly
by the rakuichi-'fakuza policy of Nobunaga and other feudal lords.
Under the Tokugawa, Baku/u commercial centers afforded free access
to merchante, as did many of the castle towns of the daimyo. How-
ever, this policy of commercial freedom was far from complete from
the first. Both Nobunaga. and Hideyoshi granted monopoly rights to
certain new guilds, under their protection.37 The major change was
the elimination of old type guilds (za) under the protection of
temples, shrines and ancient noble families (kuge ~ ), and this
was a definite contribution to the freedom of commerce. At the same
time, the tendency from the first was for the feudal lords to incor-
porate new types of commercial organizations under their control
either by granting them special rights or merely by silent assent.as
Their desire for economic autonomy in their own domains (han il)
led them to restrict the number of towns and porta to which mer-
chante of other han were permitted free access.89
Barriera (sekisho fBJ Ji.Jf, or merely seki), erected as early as Nara.
times, multiplied during the Ashikaga period along the roads, rivers
and in harbors. There were three hundred and eighty along the Yodo
River and thirty along the coast of Ise.40 Sekisho were established
for military and economic reasons, and persona as well as goods which
ae Yokoi, Nilwn Shagyo Shi, 182.

87 NKSJ, 1670-1. These new guilds were still called za, but the new type of
guilds which evolved in the early Tokugawa ha.d different na.mes.
38 !bid.
89 In the ea.me way that the Bakufu limitad foreign trade to one port -Naga-
sa.ki - the daimyo fixed the number of porta in their territories (often de-
signating only one) where boa.ta from other han were permitted entrance.
Horie Yasuzo JJH\ U:~ a. "Tokugawa Jidai no Suijo Kotsii f1 J11 Jtl: ft
(J) 7]< J: ~Ji "[Water Tra.nsportation of the Tokugawa Period], KSK.
xiv, 1(July,1935), 83.
' NKSJ, 908. The YodoRiver, which :flows into the Inland Sea at Osa.ka from
the junction of the Katsura and the Uji, is only about 49 miles long.
passed through were taxed. They were important obstacles to com-

merce, and Nobunaga began in 1568 to abolish them in territories
under his control. Hideyoshi continued the process.41 This policy was
essential to the unification of the country, and was continued in the
Tokugawa period, when the priva.te construction of seki8ho was
prohibited, and the function of existing seki8ho specifically limited to
policing.42
The policy of abolishing sekisho and the change in their function did
much to clear the way for commercial goods to pass from one part of
the country to another. This did not mean, however, that there were
no more obsta.eles. Barriera were still maintained in many of the
feudaldomains (han), where, in the finalanalysis, the daimyo could do
as they wished. The movement of com.merce was really free only over
Bakufu territories and between Bakufu ports, as the feudal lords
restrained trade in various ways within their own domains while
pursuing their policies of maintaining a self-sufficient economy and
preventing the out:flow of money.43
Provincial economy a.rose in the middle a.ges with the establish-
ment of territories by the feudal lords. This was made possible by the
fa.et that the domains comprised a natural economic zone, as they
were generally centralized in one a.rea, not scattered about as were
the sMen ("manors") of the nobility and of the temples. During the
' 1Ka.nno, Nihon ShOgyo Ski, 75-79. Cf. Curtis A. Manchester, The Develop-
ment and Distribution of Sekisho in Jopan (Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ.
of Michiga.n, 1946).
"Horie Yasuz~, Kinsei Nihon no Keizai Seisak:u 3[i ilt 8 *O)
[Economic Policies of Japan in the Early Modem Period] (Tokyo: 1942),
al lJlf i.fC ft
113. By Kinsei Professor Horie means the Tokugawa period, but some
writers define it as beginning with the first coming of the Portuguese in 1542
or 1543, or with 1568, when Nobunaga. esta.blished himself in Kyoto as de
facto Shogun. Since the term is used to differentia.te it from kindai 3[i :;.
a.leo transla.ted "modem," these terms seem best transla.ted as "early mod-
em" and "recent modem."
43 Horie, . . Keizai Seisak:u, 60. Methods of preventing the movement of food
and other goods included: by sea (tau-dome 'i4t fi7), over county bounda.ries
(gun-kiri !IS-1;1)), over villa.ge bounda.ries (mura-kiri #-1;1)). Stoppage ofthe
transport of gra.in whenever discovered was calledkok:u-dome .ft fl. NKSJ,
1090. See a.leo E. Herbert Norman, "Ando Shooki and the Anatomy of
Ja.panese Feuda.lism," T ASJ, 3rd Series II (Deo. 1949), 63.
Edo period, although the territories under direct Tokugawa control

were scattered, the domains of the various separate feudal lords were
generally centralized in one place. Among these feudal lords, the
domains of the fudai ("inner") daimyo often included some small
parcels of territory separate from their main domains, called tobi-chi
~ i&." The "outside" (tozama) fiefs, on the other hand, were strongly
centralized, and were generally more successful in their mercantilistic
policies.46
Improvement of transportation and communication facilities was
another factor of great importance to the development of commerce
and the rise of the merchant class. In order to make its rule e:ffective,
it was neceBBary for the Bakufu to improve existing roads,46 and to
build and maintain new roads and harbor facilities to provide a net-
work of roads and sea routes leading to Edo, where they had formerly
converged on Kyoto.47 Politically, the immediate need for roads was
to provide better means for official travel (e.g., for tax collectors), the
despatch of messages, etc. Econom.ically, the immediate necessity
was to facilitate the transport of food, especially tax rice from the
scattered Bakufu territories, and other essentials to Edo. Also, it
became increasingly necessary for the various daimyo to use the roads
for travel and to ship their excess tax rice and specialty goods to the
central markets.48
Five main highways were maintained during the Tokugawa period,
all leading to Nihonbashi in Edo.49 The most important was the
Tokaid(') from Edo to Kyoto, soon extended to Osaka, which became
" Tobi-chi were formed through the enlarging or the diminishing of the fiefs,
changing and incorporating them into others, etc., after they were granted
in the first place as feudal benefices. Horie, Keizai Sei8aku, 60. See a.Is<>
NKSJ, 1190.
' Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 60-1. Horie writes, "It is clear that the feudal lord
was the only master within the fief."
H Nobunaga had been "a pioneer in road construction in Japan, where there
had been nothing but narrow paths or Janes." Takekoshi, Economic As-
pects . . , I, 352.
0 Horie, "Tokugawa Jidai no Rikujo Kots f Jll llff ft O) IS.i J: ~ ~ [Over-
land Transportation of the Tokugawa Period], KSK, XI, 2 (Feb. 1934), 74.
" lbid. "Excess" rice was that which was left over after all local payments and
exchanges were made.
"' Smith, "Materia.Is . .," <>'P cit., 51.
HISTORIO.AL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 15
the scene of the bustling and colorful lile immortalized in the color
prints of Hiroshige and Hokusai. Relaying stations (shukueki ii 5')
were built at intervals of several miles each, and, as part of the Bakufu
police control through barriera, travel at night was prohibited. Fear
of highwaymen was practically eliminated. The police examinations
at the barriera were primarily for political control rather than control
of crime, but they served also to slow down traffic. Perhaps the most
important deterrent to efficient transport and travel was the lack of
technological development. There were some minor improvements in
palanquins and carta, but power was mainly manpower, and carta
were used only for short hauls,60 evidently dueto the dficulties of
fording the innumerable swt rivers. 51 In the rainy season, travellers
often had to wait days for the Oi River :floodwaters to recede. 62 Horses
were used more for travel, mainly by the samurai, and for the car-
rying of mail, than for transport. Bridge building seems to have been
limited by military considerations. There were only two permanent
bridges on the Tokaido, built in Ieyasu's time, and Iemitsu, the third
Shogun, seems to have been particularly opposed to bridge building,
thinking,no doubt, that bridges would facilitate an attack on Edo.68
But the natural dficulties of bridge construction over rivera which
often changed course and whose volume of :flow had great seasonal
variations may well have made the building of bridges with the means
at hand purely an academic question.M
The improvements in overland communications facilitated mainly
travel and itinerant trade, but not the transport of goods. 66 For bulky
50Horie, " .. Rikujo Kots .. ," 76; Kanno, Nihon Sh0gy Shi, 165. Inns at the
rele.ying ste.tions became almost indistinguishe.ble from houses of prosti-
tution, until a che.in of inns we.s orge.nized into a group called the Naniwa
Ko ~ ;J.E a.dvertising that member inns did not provide prostitutes,
so tired travellers could get some sleep. N KSJ, 1234-5.
n Horie, " .. Rikujo Kots .. ," 76.
H Jbi,d. Even with optimum conditions, delays could be caused by portera and
palanquin-bearers who "would not budge without being offered a tip"
above the official ratea for carrying travellers over the rushing waters.
Jbi,d. The word for tip, Bakate ' .::f., "aake money," reminds one of the
French pourboire. &:. Smith, "Materials .. ," op. cit., 55.
M Jbi,d. Horie, in his article on overland transportation, op. cit., 76, stresses
natural obstructions to bridge building, and does not mention any military
considerations. 115 Ka.nno, Nihon Shgy Shi, 165.
16 THE MERCHANT OLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
staples such as rice and textiles, it was far leas expensive to ship by
sea, and the waterways were used as much as possible.58
An attempt, not entirely successful, was made by the Tokugawa.
regime to standardize weights and measures. Standard weights and
measures were fixed by law and bureaus set up which, under author-
ized merchante in Edo and Kyoto, sold sea.les and measuring equip-
ment. This equipment was pronounced official and the use of unau-
thorized equipment prohibited. Despite these measures, at least
eighteen different shaku R., alinearmeasure, and tendifferentsM 71-,
a measure of capacity, persisted in use in the provinces. More success
seems to have been experienced in the standardization of weights,
perhaps beca.use of their relationship to coins. l7
The establishment of a standard currency system was another
policy of much importance in the stimulation of commerce and
the money economy. The currency situation was particularly chaotic
at the beginning of the Tokugawa period. Chinese copper coins
had been used since early times for commercial transactions, but
importation was not sufficient for the greatly increased need for
money accompanying the unprecedented commercial expansion in
the late sixteenth century.68 Fortunately, however, a number of gold
and silver mines were discovered at this time, and methods for more
efficient exploitation were learned from the Portuguese. 69 Feudal
lords coined various types of copper coins, mostly of poor quality,
and silver and gold coins as well, which began to be used as media of
exchange for the first time in J apanese history.60 All coins had to be
41 J ohn Henry Wigmore, ed., "Materia.Is for the Study of Priva.te La.w in Old
Ja.pan," TASJ XX (1892), Supplement 1, Introduction, 160. See also
Horie, " .. Suijo Kots .. ," op. cit. Ja.pa.nese pira.tes, for centuries the scourge
of the sea. la.nes, were eliminated a.fter Hideyoshi's conquest of Kysh in
1587. NKSJ, 210.
4 7 NKSJ, 1206-08; 1307. The officia.l burea.us were ca.lled hakari-za fil 5.
They were esta.blished in leya.su's time.
68 Delmer M. Brown, Momy Economy in Medieval Japan: A Study in the Use
o/ Ooins (New Ha.ven: 1951), 96.
Sa.wa.da Sho, "Fina.ncia.l Difficulties of the Edo Ba.kufu" (tra.ns. by H.
Borton), Harvard Jowma'l o/ A.siatic Studies, 1, 3-4 (Nov. 1936), 311; Ta.ke-
koshi, Eccmomic A.spects . . , 1, 546.
"T. Tsukamoto, The 01,d and, New Ooins o/ Japan (Osa.ka: 1930), 4.
HISTOBICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 17
scrutinized for quality and carefully weighed to determine their

value, a great inconvenience to commercial transactions.
As a logical part of his efforts to establish and stabilize the Toku-
gawa hegemony, Ieyasu soon turned to this monetary problem. In
1601, both gold and silver coins were being minted by the Bakufu
as standard coins, to establish an official monetary system. How-
ever, the predominance of Chinese copper coins posed a difficult
problem for the establishment of a standard Japanese copper coin.
The first step was to ban the use of the most important Chinese copper
coins, in 1608.81 Mter severa! experimentalmintings, astandardcoin
was finally produced in large quantities from 1636, a coin which was
most used in small everyday transactions and which was a force
stimulating the development of money economy, whether in the
cities or in the agricultura! communities.82
The establishment of a standard Japanese copper coin and the
abolishment of competing coins which became effective in time,
meant the removal of the inconvenience of determining their value.
However, this success was not extended to the entire currency
system. Gold coins functioned as a currency of numerical calculation.
Silver, on the other hand, was generally calculated by weight. Each
of the three coins was a currency with a fixed legal ratio to one an-
other. However, the legal ratios were seldom adhered to in practice,
and values were actually fixed in markets. In time, the values for the
country were established in Osaka for silver and in Edo for copper
(in terms of gold). 83
In Europe, where polymetallic standards existed and were effec-
tively enforced, there was an evolution toward a single gold standard
when world silver prices declined. In Ja.pan, where unification was
not complete, parities were not enforced. This failure to enforce the
currency ratios, paradoxically, made the monetary system workable,
1 Koji Ruien j !J M{ ~ [An Encyclopedic Collection of Historica.l Materials]
(60 vols., Tokyo: 1935-38 ed.), XXVI, 125. See also Hamamura. Shozaburo
j i # .JE ~ tQ) "Eiraku-sen no Kinshi wo Ronzu ;;}< I! ti (J) ~ JJ: i:'
Bt-Y" [Comments on the Prohibition ofEiraku-sen], KSK, XXVII (1942),
362-78.
1 Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 72-3.
"NKSJ, 367.
18 THE HEBCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA J.AFAN
but at the same time, it slowed the evolution towards a single stand-
ard, with anxi1iary coins.M
In the fields of domestic policy discUBBed here, both positive a.nd
negative aspects can be discerned. The policy of attracting mercha.nts
(and artisa.ns) to the castle towns and the related establishment of
free markets and guilds contributed to the stimulation of commerce
and the economic importa.nce of the mercha.nt, but not to his inde-
pendence of action. Improvements in transportation did much to
foater the developing nation-wide economy, but were inhibited by the
lim.itations of technology as well as military considerations. The
abolition of the barriera as deterrents to commerce was an importa.nt
forward step, but the lack of complete unification left ma.ny signif-
icant iala.nds of economic self-sufficiency. Even the attempted sta.nd-
ardization of weights and measures, and of the currency syatem,
which did much to further the development of commerce, was equally
limited by the incomplete nature of the national unification.
The sankin kOtai system was a positive factor in the development
of the commercial economy. It was a unique and essential part of the
Tokugawa system as a political control which the Bakufu could wield
on a nation-wide basis. It required ali feudal lords to attend the
Shogun's court at periodical intervals, a.nd to leave their wives and
children in Edo as hostages while they were in their own territories.
It existed to some extent in Ieyasu's time, but was regularized and
made entirely compulaory in 1634.
Forced thus to live a double lile, the daimyo had to pay for their
residence in Edo and the expenses of travel for themselves and large
numbers of retainera in specie which they themselves had no right to
coin. Further, with an increased standard of living, ultimately they
came to require credit from the wealthy merchante of the "three
citiea." For security and to pay these loa.ns, they had to ship their
excess rice and other products out to a central market. a& Although
the feudal lords did their best to maintain economic autonomy,
"complete independence from nation-wide economic intercourse was
"Cf. Ta.kimoto, Seiichi ll*M-,NihonKaheiShi f:I *itffi!. [AMone

tary History of Japan] (Tokyo: 1929), 73-4.
u Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 65.
HISTORIOAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 19
but a wished-for ideal. " 66 The sankin kotai system drew the feudal
lords into the nation-wide economy. It was a political measure which
had vast significance for the economy. In the words of Professor
HonjO, "It contributed to the prosperity of Edo and made for its great
expansion; it impoverished the feudal lords; it stimulated the devel-
opment of commerce and industry, and did much to further the spread
of the money economy and to form the basis for a nation-wide eco-
nomy. "67
An element in the economic history of the time which was of spe-
cial importance in the early years of the Tokugawa period was for-
eign trade. Hideyoshi granted licenses to the ships of the great mer-
chante of Kyoto, Nagasaki and Sakai to push an aggressive trade in
the commercial centers of south China and the South Seas.es Ieyasu
continued this policy of encouragement to foreign trade, giving
licenses to merchante of Osa.ka and Edo as well, and to some of the
feudal lords, as well as to some individual samurai retainers. Since
both risks and profits were great, this overseas trade gave rise to a
type of bottomry called "nagegane" tt tl, literally "throwing silver,"
arranged among capitalista and trading merchants.69
Ieyasu also continued to welcome foreign ships to Japanese porta.
No duties were imposed on the foreign trade at Nagasa.ki.70 However,
88 lbid., 62.
7 NKSJ, 660. The impoverishment of the daimy was in line with the policy
of weakening them fin.ancially to prevent their rising against the Tokugawa.
See also Honji5's article, "Sankin Ki5tai Seido no Keizaikan aft IJl ~ ft
1fitj Jt O) & IJl'' [An Economic View of the Sankin Ki5tai System] Keizai
RO'IUlo & M & it [Essays in Economice] III, 6 (Dec. 1916), 828-841; IV, 4
(Oct. 1917), 55-74. See aleo Toshio George Tsukahira, Phe Sankin Kotai
System of Pokugawa Jopan (1600-1868), op. cit.
" These ships in the official trade were the well-known Shuin-sm .* :p M
See NKSJ, 765-8. Four interesting pictures of Japanese ships of Western
design can be seen on page 767.
Shiba Kentari5 ~ ti .:;k f4B, "Nagegane to wa nani, Kaiji5 Kashitsuke ka,
Kommenda Tnshi ka Tti I! }:, ti fiiJ, ifi J: 1l # fp :2 :..- ,;l :..- V~ ff "/J>
[What was "Nagegane" ? A Marine Loan, or Commenda Investment ?],
KSK 45-7 (July-Sept., 1933), 617-634; 14-27; 123-145. Aleo, NKSJ 1228.
Bottomry is a contract by which a ship is hypothecated as security for re-
payment for the financing of a voyage. Commenda was an early type of
bottomry.
' Takekoshi, Eoonomic Aspects . . , I, 378.
he beca.me increa.singly suspicious tha.t the Europea.na were looking

for a.n opportunity to gratify their territorial a.mbitiona, using reli-
gious propa.ga.tion as a. device, and he a.ttempted, a.e ha.d Hideyoshi,
to separa.te tra.de from religion. This proved unfea.sible except with
the Dutch, a.nd from 1633 restrictiona were placed both upon the
number of foreign ships entering Japa.nese porte a.nd the number of
Ja.panese ships going out. In the most definitiva of the exclusion
edicts, the Portuguese were expelled in 1638 and the death penalty
provided for Japanese who left the country or, having left, should
retum. To prevent ocean voyages, the building of vessels of more than
500 koku (roughly 2,500 bushels) capacity was forbidden. By 1641,
the system of exclusion under which Ja.pan wa.s to live for more than
two hundred years was completed, with a limited tra.de with the
Dutch at Deshima. in Naga.sa.ki harbor and with Chinese tra.ders who
were permitted in Naga.saki itself.71
The motivations for the closing of the country were mainly political,
and no doubt based primarily on the fear of a coalition of powerful
outside clans (particularly Mri and Shimazu) aided by Europea.ns
who were trading with them and who could supply guns and ships
against the Tokugawa.72 Economic factora appear to ha.ve played a
part. As Professor Horie concludes, "No doubt an important rea.son
was the desire to restrict the free economic activities of wealthy
merchante by bringing commerce entirely under feudal control, and
to halt the increa.se in the power gained through tra.de by the
western feudal lords. This point is little more than conjecture, but
the fa.et remains that commercial policy found itself placed in this
position, mainly by political considerations."7
It remains to a.asesa the effects of the policy of the closed country
on commerce and the merchant clase. lt should first be pointed out,
as is well known, that the exclusion was not complete. A restricted
trade, which tended to become more restricted towards the end of the
seventeenth century, continuad to exist under Bakufu supervision
71 Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 116; George B. Sansom, The Weatern World and
Japan (New York: 1950), 177-8.
n Cf. Sa.nsom, The Weatern World . ., 178-9.
7 Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 116.
HISTORIC.A.L BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 21
with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki.'1' Trade was carried on in

Tsushima with the Koreans, and by Shimazu in the Ryky Islands,
but due to its very small scale, it had the "silent assent" of the
Bakufu.76 In addition, there seems to have been a certain amount of
smuggling, despite Bakufu attempts to eliminate it.76
Besides the fact that foreign trade, although restricted, continued
after the exclusion, another reason why the exclusion was not a major
blow to the economy of the time was the one-sided nature of the
Nagasaki trade. The main importa were Chinese raw silk, piece goods
and medicines, and the major exporta were copper and other precious
metals, especially silver.77 Other exporta paid for only 25% of the
importa in the Chinese and only 29 % in the Dutch trade in the period
from 1657 to 1662, a situation apparently not greatly different from
the pre-exclusion period.78 A beneficia! by-product of the limitation
of importa which accompanied the exclusion was a "great stimulation
of domestic production of formerly imported goods, particularly raw
silk and woven silk goods. "79
The implications of the "closed country" for the present were not
nearly as great as for the future. Professor Nomura summarizes ita
immediate significance as follows :80
How was it possible to close the country1 An important reason was
that European capitalism had not matured .and had not reached the
stage where it could exploit the markets of the Far East. On the
other side, Japanes~ merchante had no organized power to oppose the
74 See Takekoshi, Economic Aapects . . , II, 378-392, far fragmentary estimates
of the amount of trade, taken mainly from the researches of the German
historian, N a.chod.
n Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 118.
78 Bal-ufu officials themselves were sometimes implicated in this smuggling.
Takekoshi II, 158-185.

77 Takekoshi, Economic Aapects . . , II, 148, 411, 414-5. Far the export of copper,
see John W. Hall, "Notes on the Early Ch'ing Copper Trade with Japan,"
Harvard Jourruil of ABiatic Studiea 12 (1949), 444-61.
78 Takekoshi, II, 377, 380.
711 Miyamoto, Nihon ShOgyo Shi, 139.
80 Nomura Kanetaro !f # ~ :;t: llJ), "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo fil J11
M iJ! fljlj }:, f?lj ~,, [The Tokugawa Feudal System and Commerce] Shakai
Keizai Shi Gaku Jfd: fr ~ M J1!. $ [ Studies in Social and Economic History],
VI, 10 (Jan. 1937), 120.
22 THE MEBCHA.NT OLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JA.PAN
militariatic policy of the Tokugawa. Also, the foreign trade of the

time had no close connection with basic domestic production, and
from thia it can be concluded that local domestic markets were the
main object of commerce. The spirit of bold enterpriae which arose
in the late Ashikaga period found a partial outlet in secret trade and
on the other hand shifted towards domestic commercial development
accompanying the political stability.
The exclusion had wide and important implications for the future.
It denied Japan a source of food in times of famine, and to a large
extent put her farther outside the stream of world events and world
progreBB. From the standpoint of the development of commerce and
the rise of the merchant class as well, there is much to be se.id on the
debit side. First, the Nagasaki trade, although one-sided, might well
ha.ve continued to develop, especially with Europea.ns of diHerent
nationalities competing for the trade. However, not only was the
trade limited, but it was placed under feudal (Bakufu) control, with
monopoly privileges granted to special merchants. Second, prohi-
bition against J apanese going overseas was perhaps more important
in limiting commercial development in a field where there was more
acope for independence on the part of merchants.81 It closed the door
to an active development overseas. In a general sense, the exclusion
policy limited industrialdevelopment to thenarrow acope of domestic
demand.
81 It appears to have been more important because, judging from trade con-
ditions from the middle aixteenth century on, the expansibility of the trade in
J apaneae porta waa limited. It was limitad by the volume of goods and
money which the J apanese could provide for foreign goods. Merchandise
played a small part in J apanese exporta, and the copper and other precious
metals which the J apanese could mine, and which found their wa.y to China,
whether by Chinase or European vessels, also had limita. Moreover, the
limita were felt more and more in the seventeenth century with the marked
decrea.se in the production of Japanese mines. Horie, . . Keizai Seillalcu,
101-2; Ta.kekoshi, Economi.c Aapeeta . . , II, 230, 305. The Japanese who
went oversea.s, on the other hand, were learning from the Europeans not only
how to make money in the carrying trade, but how to build more efficient
ships and guns. Sansom permita himself to conjecture on this point: "Japan
would no doubt have suffered from further civil war, and it is just possible
that after an interval she herself would have followed the European e:mmple
and, with a rapid development of ahipbuilding and the manufacture or
ordnance, ta.kan a part in the struggle between trading powers that began
to develop in the Pacific after 1600." The Westem World aftd Japa:n., 179.
The exclusion policy and the foreign trade policy under the ex-
clusion served to maintain peace and to prolong the feudal control of
the Tokugawa regime.82 This was an important achievement in itself,
but it was made at a sacrifice. Although in the short run there ap-
peared sorne stimulation of domestic industry and commerce, the
result ultimately was the restraint of future industrial and commer-
cial development.83 lt also meant the decline of the type of independ-
ent merchants of Hakata and Sakai, as well as the new foreign trade
capitalista of Nagasaki.84 Professor Miyamoto concludes, "Having
lost the seas and unable to stride freely about the earth, a spirit of
retrogression and conservatism set in . . . the merchants inevitably
reflected this spirit. They ca.me to lack competitive spirit and progres-
siveness, and were quite content to keep their customers and a fixed
share of the distribution system, repeating over and over the same
kind of transactions. "86
From the exclusion of 1638 onwards, the remarkable changes of
the late sengoku and early Tokugawa periods were brought to a halt.
The "refeudalization" procesa was being completed and theTokugawa
political system had taken its unique shape. The rise of the merchant
clase before 1638 was given impetus first by the natural consequences
of the unification of the country and the ensuing peace: increased
population, land under cultivation and agricultura! productivity,
and the freeing of peasants to go to the fast-growing cities and towns.
81 Tsuchiya Takao ,li ti argues that the Bakufu, "by restricting the
infiow of foreign, particularly European, goods, retarded the development
towards disintegration." Nih<m Keizai Shi Gaiy 8 *

of commercial and industrial capital, the factora leading the feudal society
fE iJlf 1f!. ~ [An
Outline of Ja.panese Economic History] (Tokyo: 1934), 1, 167. Endo Masa.o
JE !JJ believes this is only a partial exple.nation. He suggests that
usury would ha.ve served as a strong competitor for foreign trade capital,
Hattatau Shi Ron 8 * *

retarding the development of foreign trade. Nihon Kinaei Shgy Shihon
j/j_ ilJ: 1ftj ~ jf ~ ~ ~ Q> [An Essa.y on the
History of the Development of Commercial Capital in Ja.pan in the Early
Modem Period] (Tokyo: 1936), 25.
88 Horie, . . Keizai Seillaku, 119.
86 Miyamoto, Nihon Shgy Ski, 138-9, points out that when trade was forced
into the narrower channels of domestic trade, there was a marked decline of
such towns as Ha.ka.ta and Sakai.
85 !bid., 139.
24 THE MERCIIANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAI'AN
Then, government policies contributed to conditions favorable to

the merchant class: the encouragement of merchante and artisans to
settle in the castle towns; the establishment of free markets and
guilds; the breaking down of the barriera (sekiah-0); the improvements
in transportation, and the standardization of weights and measures,
and of the currency system. On the other hand, none of these policies
could be complete due to the incomplete nature of the unification
itself. There were three factora in particular which militated against
an increase in merchant influence and independence: the tendency for
the feudal ruling classes to bring commercial activities under their
control so far as they could; the existence of provincial economies
which opposed the development of a nation-wide economy, and the
exclusion policy which barred the path to economic power through
foreign trade-a path which in Europe by 1600 had already proved
of such importance in the rise of the merchant class.
CHAPTER II
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITION OF THE MERCHANT

CLASS IN THE EARLY TOKUGAWA PERIOD
I restrictions accompanying
N THE FIRSTyears of the Tokugawa period, the merchants felt the
the "refeudalization" process which
was completed with the stabilization of the regime. Then, as a re-
sponse, they gradually achieved, in the next century or century and
a quarter, a degree of security and de facto economic power, although
despised as the lowest in the social structure, and still in a weak
position, with no real legal or political powers or rights. Since the
rise of the merchant took place within the unusual feudal society of
Tokugawa Japan, we must :first look at the development of the social
structure, in order to understand the merchant's position in it. Socio-
logically, it was a status society based on occupation. The class dis-
tinctions which had evolved during the late middle ages had been
placed into a rigid form by Hideyoshi, who, as a means of stabili-
zation and control, defined the classes as samurai, peasants, artisans
and merchante (skinkosM .ll I (fj), with samurai at the top,
merchants at the bottom.1 This social hierarchy, generally accepted
by Confucian scholars and statesmen, was adopted as a basic ingre-
dient of the Tokugawa feudal system and was insisted upon as the
correct arrangement of society.2 It was based upon a physiocratio
1 Sa.kata., OhOnin, 2. Also see Honjo's a.rticle, ShinkshO, in NKSJ, 727-9.

The court nobles (kuge ~~), Buddhist a.nd Shinto priests, as well as out-
ca.sts (eta fil$ a.nd hinin ~A> were compa.ra.tively sma.11 in number and
not included.
2 A representa.tive Confucia.n point of view was expressed by Y a.maga. Sok~
(1622-1685), who justified the existence of the four ele.ases by pointing out
the necessa.ry division of labor among farmers, artisa.ns a.nd merchants, and
the necessity for a fourth class, the ruling class, to prevent the covetousness
*
of the other classes from finding expression in banditry and war. Y amaga
Gorui tlJ B}! m. '-fi, in Yamaga Sok Sh tlJ B}! f i . [Collection of the
Writings of Ya.maga Soko], Kinsei Shakai Keizai Gakusetsu Taikei (Tokyo:
1935), 171-2. Professor Horie comments, "In a feudal society which has such
a structure, the uncha.nging is thought of as the ideal. Therefore the com-
26
26 THE :MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
view of society common to the agrarian states of Asia. Agriculture

was considered the only source of production. The peasant, whose
occupation was the only truly productive one, was the pillar of the
state. Artisans merely changed the form of goods already produced
by the peasants. Merchante were ranked below the artisans because
artisans did provide goods for the samurai class, especially weapons
and military supplies. Merchants, on the other hand, were entirely
unproductive and therefore dispensable.
Tokugawa legislation and policies were based on the felt necessity
of maintaining the social structure intact and class lines rigid. How-
ever, the four-class arrangement was part of a military organization
of society better adapted to times of war than to peace, and from the
first was more of an ideal than a reality. In actual practice, there
were three types of deviation from the norm. In the first place, the
occupational functions of the people did not fall into strict speciali-
zation. Second, there was a considerable degree of social mobility,
especially in the early years, and third, the actual treatment of the
various classes was not in accord with the theory but tended to be in
terms of immediate interest.
There was a considerable overlapping in occupational functions.
For example, there were two types of artisans: those retained by the
Bakufu or feudal lord.a, and those who manufactured commercial
goods for sale. The latter were commonly called "artisan-merchants"
(shoku-akindo lfft j(fj A), since their occupation placed them into both
categories.
It was quite common for peasants to supplement their meager
incomes by handicraft work done in their homes. Although the au-
thorities did their best to see that this domestic industry did not
interfere with the peasant's prim.ary task of cultivation of the fields,'
this type of cottage industry eventually surpassed the output of ar-
tisans in the castle towns and cities.5 Some peasants even engaged in
mon basic viewpoint wa.s concem for the ma.intenance of sta.bility. How was
this to be done ? First, by guarding rigidly the distinctions of social status
and function ofthe four classes." . . Keizai Seisaku, 173.
3
6
Horie, . . Keizai Seiaaku, 47-8.
Horie Yasuzo, Nihon Shihon Shugi no Seiri,tsu B * *
' Ibid., 46.
tf" ~ t O') Wt "JI.
[The Formation of Capita.lism in Ja.pan] (Tokyo: 2nd ed., 1948), 32. Samurai
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITION 27
trade in the countryside. Prohibitions of both commercial and manu-

facturing activities in agricultura! villages were common, and mer-
chants were often specifically forbidden to reside in the countryside
as "useless and harmful persone. " 8 But despite regulations, peasants
sometimes engaged in trade in their villages, and merchante carne
from the towns to sell commercial goods. As legal restraints proved
most difficult to enforce, there were cases where trade in specific
commercial commodities such as candy and tobacco-pipes (lci8eru)
was legally permitted. In sorne domains (han) the authorities merely
looked the other way, or justified the existence of merchante in the
villages by calling them peasants. It is true that in many cases they
were part-time peasants.7
Actual changes of status were quite common among the lower
three classes during the first hundred years of the Tokugawa period.
Cases of commoners attaining samurai status, on the other hand, were
rather exceptional until the la.ter years of the period. The movement
downward of samurai to merchant, airead.y referred to, tended to
become rarer after the closing of the country.8 Artisan-merchant
changes were quite frequent, and were hardly noticed by the authori-
ties. Changes of peasants to cMnin constituted the major factor in
the increased population of the towns and cities, and apparently
were not actively opposed by the feudal authorities until later in the
seventeenth century. Attempts to bind the peasants to the land are
often cited, such as the law of 1643 preventing alienation of land and
the series of laws beginning from 1673 specifically restricting peasants
to their land. It should be noted that these laws were conspicuously
ineffective.9 Also,it is rather surprising to find evidence that the Balcu-
families also ca.rried on ha.ndicraft work in their homes, but this is a devel-
opment characteristic of the Iater years of the period.
Miyamoto Mate.ji, "Kinsei no Sonraku to Shogyo jli iJt O) # f !, itlf "
[Villages and Commerce in the Early Modem Period], Hikone K08M R<mBO
a
.il f.1j (( 3* il [Journal of Hikone Higher Commercial School], 29 (J une,
1941), 171. This article is reprinted, with a few cha.nges, in Miyamoto's
Kinsei Shgy Keiei no Kmky llf fit itlf & O) if ~ [Studies in Com-
mercial Operations in the Early Modem Period] (Kyoto: 1948), 173-208.
7 Miyamoto, "Kinsei no Sonraku to Shogyo", 160-2.
a Miyamoto, Nt.hon Shiigy Shi, op. cit., 177-8.

Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 116, 118; Sakata, Ohnin, 2.
fu at one time actually gave legal a.ssent, although probably no en-

couragement, to pea.santa to lea.ve their villa.ges and change their
occupations. In a regulation of 1637, there is an item which rea.da as
follows: "Any person who lea.ves his native place to go into service
(Mko-* ~) or commerce must give prior notice to the local courts
(rakuchaku-sho ~ PJT) through the office of the local headman (Shoya
ffi ~) and the five-family asaociationa (gonin-gumi -:ti. A *11.)."1 After
about 1735 the infiux of pea.santa into the cities ca.me to a virtual
halt, and the population of cities beca.me generally quite atable. This
was apparently due not to the prohibitions againat peasants' leaving
their native places, but to the lack of employment in the citiea.u
The official policy towards the lower classes was not consistent
with the four-claaa theory. It muat be taken up here in some detall>
in order to show what type of restraints were applied to the three
lower classes. We ha.ve already discussed attempts to bind the pea.s-
anta to their land. The economic burdens piled on the pea.santa were
extremely heavy. The very high rate of land tax12 of 40% or 50% of
yield which waa generally levied during the sengoku period to pay the
high costa of war was maintained during the Tokugawa period, and
farmers continued to be pressed down to a very low level of liveli-
hood.13 The usual "four to the lord, six to the people" was formally
Tokugawa Kinrei Ko fil JIJ ~ ~ :1$"
1 [A Commentary on Tokugawa Prohi-
bitory Regulations] (Tokyo: 1932 ed.), V, 231. Persona in "service" (MkO) in-
cluded unskilled day laborera, persona entering apprenticeships, and re-
tainers of samurai. NKSJ, 1498.
11 Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . . , 4 7. Horie points out that during the first century
of the Tokugawa period, there were many large construction enterprises in

the cities which supplied work for peasants who had left their villages, but.
after that time it became increasingly difficult to find work, and "this ex-
plains why the only alternativas left to these poor peasa.nts were to rise in
rebellion or to resort to limitation of the population." !bid.
11 N engu ~ Jt, literally, "yearly tribute". It was not a land tax in the modern
sense, but was more of a land rent levied as a tax in kind, usually paid in rice.
Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . ., 3. For the various uses of the term, see N KSJ, 1273.
13 Sakata Yoshio, "Meiji Ishin to Tempo Kaikaku lfJJ ilt tJi' t, '} .fl ijf( 1fi."
[The Meiji Restoration and the Tempo Reform] Jimbun GalcuhO Aj:$ fil
[Journal of Humanistic Science], Il (1952), 3. Nomura, op. cit., ll8, writes,.
''It seems that almost everyone who treats the economic e.nd social history
of this period cites the words attributed to Ieyasu that peasa.nts should be
taxed to the point where they will neither die nor live." Nomura feels this
changed to five and five during the administration of Yoshimune

(1716-1745), but local practices continued to vary considerably.1'
()onsidering the very small land holdings of each peasant family, this
left only a bare subsistence even in the best years. u
should not be representad as a typical attitude of the feudal ru1ing classes.

Ibid.
The scholar-statesmanKumazawaBanzan 'fm 1' l.IJ (1619-1692) states
the position this way: "If you take too emall an amount in land tax, then
the people will neglect the cultivation of their fields in their love of pleasure
and comfort. If you take too much, then they will lack strength in the misery
of famine and cold. There is no limit to their production of the five grains
when they are neither neglectful nor hungry ." Shgi W asho 1i ltl fF, in
Nihon Rinri Ihen E *fil J:I ~ 1i [Collection of Japanese Works ofMoral
Philosophy] (Tokyo: 1901), I, 427.
" Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . . , 35. According to Prof. Horie, official statistics
are misleading in this regard because peasants were usually succeSBful in
hiding sorne 10% or more of their crops from the officials. Officials could
also be bribed to overlook sorne of the yield. Appa.rently it was rather rare
that the land tax was as much as half. For the method of crop measuring
by sample a.nd determination of land tax, usua.lly haphazard and unfair, see
NKSJ, 471-4:.
11 There is a difference of opinion among social and economic historians as to
the exact position of the pea.santa. Sorne describe them as serfs, as do End~,
. . SMgy Shihon . . , op. cit., 30, and Tsuchiya, An Economic Hiatory o/
Jo;pan, op. cit., 145-6. Sansom follows Honjo very closely in painting a
rather dark picture of the restra.ints put on the peasants. On the other hand,
Nomura (for exa.mple, in his article cited above, p. 118) has reservations in
regard to this interpretation. Asa.kawa, the noted authority on J a.panese
feudalism, stresses the degree of self.government enjoyed by the peasants
and their rights of tenure, protected by the feudal auiihorities. The evidence
already given in the present study showing a degree of legal assent to peas-
ant changas of occupation serves to rule out the use of the term "serf'' in
the legal sense, and restrictions on social mobility were ineffective in pra.c-
tice. Professor Horie clarifies the position in this way: "The social status of
the peasants was a.ctua.lly rising during the Edo period, as seen in the change
of their relationship to the land and in the nature of peasant oorve. How-
ever, this improvement in eta.tus was not a.ccompanied by any economic
improvements; on the contrary, their burdens became heavier." Horie,
. . Shihon Shugi . . , 43. It should perhaps be added that the "peasants"
actua.lly comprised two distinct groups: (1) landholders, many well-to-do,
of higher social status, often tracing ba.ck to warrior ancestors, and (2) poor
tenants and servants (genin r A> See Thomas c. Smith, "The Ja.panese
Village in the Seventeenth Century," Jouma/, o/ Economic Hiatory, 12, 1
(Winter 1952), 1-20.
Peasants were often called "stupid people" in Tokugawa edicts

which strove to regulate their lives in the most minute matters. They
were exhortad to rise early in the moming, not to huy sake or tea, not
to use tohacco, not to eat rice hut to eat coarse grains, and to divorce
any wife who drank tea.18 These provisions, emhodied in a procla-
mation of 1649, and often repeated, reveal an extraordinary contempt
and lack of sympathy for the peasant.
The rationalization for this treatment was that the pea.santa were
economically secure. They were guaranteed their source of income,
the land. Another argument often advanced hut of little relevance in
peacetime was that the peasants should pay well for their freedom
from military duties. 17 However, it is ohvious that their own economic
interests led the samurai overlords to oppress the peasants and to
despise them in practica, although maintaining that their status in
society was second only to the samurai themselves.
Real treatment of the merchante and artisans was vastly better
than that of the peasants, although in theory the merchante were
scomed as beneath notice. In the colorful words of Professor Honjo's
translators, merchants were viewed "as a class of people who indulged
in the despicable enjoyment of life; who were shamelessly devoted to
a life of profit-making through exchange of goods; and who would
resort to any dubious method in order to coax others to huy high-
priced goods, thereby stimulating a hahit of luxury."18 There was no
real distinction made between artisans and merchante, in practice.
They were popularly lumped together in the term "chnin" (towns-
people), a word often found in sumptuary legislation, and pea.santa.
certainly had no privileges which chnin did not share.19 Actually,.
18 NKSJ, 1068, an article on chnin by Prof. Honjo which brings together in
concise forro some of the scattered remarks that can be found in his Social
and Economic Hiatory o/ Japan. George B. Sansom, in Japan, a Short
Cultural Hiatory (New York: 1943), 466, cites the proclamation of 1649
ordering peasants to "abstain from tea and tobacco." However, in regard
to tea, the wording of this proclamation was, "Sake, cha wo kai nomi mosu
ma.jiki soro," literally, "It is forbidden to buy a.nd drink salce and tea," with
emphasis on the buying. Apparently no efforts were ma.de to prevent.
pea.santa from consuming products produced by themselves.
i1 Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 116.
18 Social and Economic Hiatory o/ Japan, 253. 111 Sakata, Ohnin, 2~
Bakufu attitudes towards the chonin appear almost magnanimous,

when compared to the attitudes towards the peasants, and even
towards the daimyo whom they kept in a state of impoverishment
and controlled with the ingenious set of complicated and despotic
controla which were the work of the political genius of Ieyasu. Inter-
ference in the lives of the chnin did not constitute a heavy burden.
They were prohibited, for example, from wearing silk, using para.sois,
hair ornamenta, house furnishings of raised lacquerware; from selling
vegetables out of season, and taking advantage of current fads to
make unusual profits. However, they were not regularly taxed, and
were required to make regular monetary contributions only after the
time of Yoshimune (1716-1745). 20
The explanation for this difference in treatment can be found in
immediate economic interest rather than in the principies of proper
social relations avowed by the authorities. In the early days of the
Tokugawa period, the cMnin were not considered as producers of
wealth but rather as essential servants of the economic needs of the
samurai in the castle towns and cities. Moreover, cMnin were thought
to be in a very insecure position due to their dependence upon the
:fluctuating conditions of trade and production. The insecurity of the
samurai arose from the fact that "any morning" he might be called
upon to sacrifice his life for his lord. It was only the peasant who could
enjoy security, safe from military service and confirmed in his land-
holding, "so long as he paid his ta.xes." The higher these taxes, the
larger the number of merchants and artisans to fulfill the economic
demanda of the samurai, and the more a.bundant the materia.Is of life
for the samurai. Conversely, it was only the samurai who could in-
crease and maintain the maximum in tax yield, and therefore he was
in a controlling position. With the merchants generally brought under
feudal political control in the cities and towns, the feudal ruling
classes were confident that they would never be in a position to be-
come a problem to them.21
The samurai's contempt for commercial activities was pa.rt of his
boast of separa.teness and moral superiority. Besides, this attitude
to Sake.ta, Ohiinin, 10; NKSJ, 1068.
11 Se.ka.ta, Ohiinin, 10.
32 THE MEBCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
was legally reinforced. Samurai were absolutely forbidden to engage

in any kind of commerce. 22 The actual result of this was to give to the
merchants a special and exclusive right to manage commercial enter-
prises: Although despised by the samurai, the merchant had a far
freer and wider area for his activities than the samurai himself. The
social relations of townspeople were tied together by money and com-
merce which had no direct relation to land. The principies of prerog-
ative and obedience and of feudal obligations and service were as
meaningless between samurai and merchant as among merchants.
Moreover, the activities of merchants were free in that they were not
necessarily tied to the economy of a single feudal territorial unit.
Another advantage enjoyed by the merchants was that in a society
where the distinction between master and servant was rigidly main-
tained, and where the blood inheritance system was equated with
social order, the merchant and artisan classes alone were able to
select men of ability and put them in charge of their family and their
family enterprises. This gave them a flexibility anda protection a-
gainst ruin by a worthless or dissolute heir not enjoyed by the samurai
class, and it was one of their sources of strength.23
Despite these obvious advantages, it must be remembered that the
merchants were in a position of political impotence. They had to
operate within a feudal society in which the old military spirit was
still strong. We have already discussoo the process by which the
feudal lords brought the merchants under their political control. One
-further example may be cited to show how the merchante gained
certain economic advantages while losing elements of independence
which they may have enjoyed in the political realm. It will also serve
to introduce the subject of the role of merchants in town adminis-
tration during the Tokugawa period. Otsu was a point of key econo-
mic importance. Located on Lake Biwa only one stop from Kyoto on
the Tkaid, it was the main market as well as the collection and dis-
tribution point for the province of Omi.24 Otsu itself had a long
hlstory of an enterprising and independent merchant class, and was
ss Sa.kata, Ohnin, 10. aa Ibid. 12, 69; Horie, . . Shilwn Shugi . . , 43.
.2t tf. jl[. As a. province, it was perha.ps the moet economica.lly a.dvanced, well
known far ite industries and itinerant tra.dere.
the location of a free ma.rket as ea.rly as 1539.16 After his victory at

Sekigahara (1600), leyasu left the town administration in the hands
of a wealthy Otsu merchant, but placed a. Bahu/u official91 in Otsu
to oversee the mechanics of a.dministration. This continued until
1602, when Otsu was brought under a council of five Bahufu deputies
and two city elders (machi doshiyori lllT ltf), and five-family
associations were organized throughout the town as a means of
control. Simultaneously with this action, the payment of augmented
town property taxes97 was waived, a clear exa.mple of giving some-
thing with one hand while taking a.wa.y something with the other.
In 1617, Otsu was brought under direct Bahufu control and the a.d-
ministra.tion was reorganized to make it conform more or less to other
Bahufu city a.dministrations.28
Not only in the towns and cities controlled directly by the Bahufu,
but in the towns of the various han, it was common pra.ctice to exer-
cise control over townsmen through councils of important merchante.
Practices differed a.ccording to local custom. Edo and Osa.ka give
good examples of this. In all Baku/u-controlled oities a.nd towns, the
offioial who held the real power was the town magistra.te (machi
bugyo). This Baku/u-a.ppointed officia.l of samurai clase held ad-
ministrative, judicial and police powers. 211 Under his jurisdiction
were councils of c'Mnin, variously na.med. In Edo, the highest body
of cMnin was a hereditary council of city elders (machi doshiy<Jri) who
were the heads of three fa.milies (Ta.ru #,Na.raya* Jl Ji., and Kita-
mura. 5 $ #) first a.ppointed in 1590, when Edo, still a sma.11 villa.ge,
wa.s selected by Ieya.su as his future capital. They were permitted
to wear swords, and in times of stress exhibited a feudal loyalty to the
Shogun.30 Under them were the nanwiki (~ ~, headmen), aleo
hereditary, of whom there were 263 in l 722.a1
sa See above, page 7.
si Bugyo .$ ;fj, an elastic term for various types of functionaries which could
be translated "commissioner" or "magistrate."
97 Augmented to pay special temple and shrine expenses. N KSJ, 236.
18 NKSJ, 152.
lbid., 1537. Machi Bugyo were often of hatamoto rank, "banner knights"
below daimyo rank.
" N KSJ, 124-5. At one time (1693) theprivilege of sword-wearing was revoked.
.ai NantuJhi had charge of from one to more than ten machi (streets or dis-
34 THE MERCH.ANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
In Osaka, the council which corresponded to the Edo machi

dOBkiyori was called the so toskiyori 4i! ~ ~, or "supervisory town
elders." They were also hereditary, and were twenty-two in number
at first, but gradually dwindled to twelve. Under them were the
machi doskiyori who corresponded in function to the nanuski of Edo,
but their positions were neither fully paid nor were supposed to be
hereditary. House owners in each machi elected one candidate from
their group. One third of these candidates were selected for the
council.32 Even this elective office, however, tended to become he-
reditary.83 The machi doshiyori of Osaka, different from any other
city or town, were permitted to continue managing their own busi-
nesses, and were paid only a nominal fee (literally, rnoney for kakama.,
a skirt worn over the kimono). As they had little time to go to the
town office and meeting place (machi kaisko PIJ ft Jilf}, they deputized
clerks to handle the day-to-day business. Osaka townsmen do not
seem to have welcorned the position, although it did carry sorne
honor with it.34
In order to have sorne idea of the political importance of the
rnerchants, we should look at the functions of these semi-official
rnerchant functionaries. It appears that their rnajor duty, both in
Edo and Osaka, was to transmit Baku/u orders and regulations down
to the next lower echelon. In Edo, for exarnple, the "chain of corn-
rnand" was machi doskiyori-nanushi-gonin gumi. The machi doskiyori
in Edo, besides overseeing the nanuski, had special responsibilities.
These changed sornewhat with time, but the rnost important appears
tricts). Until 1668 they were e.U permitted to he.ve sumames and to wea.r
swords, but aft.er tbat date they could wear swords only when on duty as
official purveyors (yotatsu) in ce.aes where they were engaged as such. Ibi.d.,
124-5.
81 It is interesting to note that they were selected on a point system "so tha.t
there would be no complaint." The pont system was be.sed on age, years of
residence, amount of wealth, etc. Those selected on this be.sis were then
subjected to a "hitogara-mi A tfl Ji", or determination of cha.racter by the.
so toshiyori before their names were submitted to the machi bttgy for ap-
pointment. NKSJ, 1536.
aa Se.ka.ta, Ohnin, 4.
141 NKSJ, 1536; Takigawa Masa.jiril 11 JI) JE?}{ m Nihon Shakai Shi l3
if: fr i!, [A Social History of Japan] (Tokyo: 3rd ed., 1948), 311.
*
to have been eupervision of the water eupply. The responeibilitiee of

the nanUBki were: (1) tranemiseion of orders downward; (2) pre-
vention and extinction of :6.res, and (3) ceneus ta.k.ing. In Osa.ka, the
80 toBkiyori had severa! additional responsibilities, including: (1) col-
lection of certain fees on behalf of the machi bugyo; (2) appointing
of lesser town functionaries; (3) before the granting of official ap-
proval, the 80 toBkiyori approved new literary works before printing,
and all petitions made by women.a6 Osa.ka was excepted from the
payment of chiBki-aen, a tax on housee and city lots. However, house
owners paid a city tax whose amount wae fixed by the machi do8kiyori
and disbursed by them under the supervision of the so toBkiyori. This
tax was meant to ma.ke the city administration entirely self-sup-
porting, and all city officers, even the machi bugyo, were paid from
these funds.81
In Osaka., the city of cMnin, it might be imagined that these fiscal
functione, together with the much la.rger number of duties performed
by the Osaka merchant councils, would have given them a share of
political power. But if their duties are closely examinad, it will be
seen that they were all in the nature of services for the Baku/u of-
ficials. Although they looked in some ways like self-governing bodiee,
there apparently was very little room for initiative. As a general
principle, no matter how deepotic and authoritarian a government
ma.y be, there must be a degree of social assent and feeling of partici-
pation or representation on the part of the ruled if the regime is to
achieve any real stability. It is no doubt true that such councils of
townspeople, like the correeponding councils in the agricultura! vil-
lages, by the mere fact of their existence acted as a check on absolut-
ism. However, it can be stated as a historical fact that the town
councils were subservient to their feudal masters. Even in Osa.ka,
where the merchant officials were the most important of their type in
Japan, their positions were considered honorary, were not particular-
ly welcomed, and, as one authority puts it, "Their positione existed
only as a convenience to the Bakufu, a.nd this fact greatly limited
their independence. "87
16 NKSJ, 124-125; 938. ae NKSJ, 1538.
37 Sakata, Ohnin, 61. It would appear that well-to-do peasants who were
It is clear that the merchant class enjoyed no real political in-

:0.uence, and this lack of political power played an important role in
turning their rise to economic power into almost an underground
movement, a contrast with the development of the merchant class
in Europe which has colored all subsequent Japanese history and
has no doubt played a role in the formation of the Japanese character.
The merchants' political impotence was in marked contrast to their
economic potential. They enjoyed a monopoly in commercial ac-
tivities and money transactions at a time when the commercial and
money economy had entered a period of unprecedented expansion.
The feudal political power based on the land was separate from the
power based on the new commercial and money economy. This sepa-
ration was to grow to such vast proportions that it . eventually
threatened the whole feudal structure.
In the first years of the Tokugawa period, however, the only threat
to the power of the Shogun was from potential feudal rivals, a threat
which was most skillfully met and eliminated. In the economic realm,
the feudal lords were kept in an impoverished condition which ruled
out the possibility of rebellion. The economic position of the Bakufu
was strong. The Tokugawa domains covered about one fourth the
entire land surface producing more than one fourth of the rice of the
country, and the Bakufu treasury was filled with gold and silver as no
Japanese treasury had ever been before.38 Control of all mines and
appointed as toshiyori and headmen (shOya) * ffi ~. shya, nanushi, etc.)
in the villages attained more real power in their role of assistants to the
feudal rulers than did the merchant councils in the cities. Village headmen,
for example, were consulted in sorne cases about policy. Sword-wearing
shya even functioned as daikan, an office usually monopolized by samurai.
However, the village headmen do not seem to have used their influence on
behalf of ordinary pea.santa. On the contrary, they often had to be disci-
plined for using their privileges to oppress their fellow peasants. NKSJ,
831-2.
88 Even after gaining Hideyoshi's huge atores of gold and silver, Ieyasu had
economized in order to atore up more riches, and in 1605 when he retired
and transferred the office of Shogun to his son, Hideta.da., there was enough
in the treasury to huy five million koku ";;fi of rice, with a purchasing power
of one ry ptij of gold equal to two koku of rice at the time. Takekoshi,
Economic Aspects . . , I, 550. Ieyasu retained a large amount in his personal
trea.sury, and a.fter his dea.th in 1616, a la.rge atore of foreign goods, in ad-
minting operations was another significant source of revenue for the

Baku/u during the first years of the period while the mines were still
very productive.89
With its economic position secure, with no precedent either in
Japanese or in Chinese history of economic power ha.sed on com-
merce undermining a government,40 and with the merchant cl888
apparently well under control, there was no reason to fear that com-
merce would ever break down the feudal system. Indicativa of this
confidence was the continuation by the Baku/u of the policy of
freedom of commerce begun by Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu as
part of their unification of the country. The cities in which the
merchants lived were enveloped in the feudalistic government and
social organization, and did not develop into seli-governing cities as
in Europe. Accordingly, fixed boundaries were drawn about the free
development of commerce. However, within these boundaries, the
policy and attitude of the Baku/u was one of commercial freedom
from the first.n
dition to 50,000 kan J{ of silver and 940,000 ryo of gold, was faund there
and added to the Bakufu treasury. Sawada, op. cit., 313. According to the
market quotations far 1616, 50,000 kan of silver was equivalent to 925,000
ry. NKSJ 367. The ry of the time has been estimated to have corres
ponded roughly to S10 in 1938 (William A. Spurr, "Business Cycles in Japan
befare 1853," Joumal of Political Economy, XLVI, 5 (Oct. 1938), 653),
or about $20 in 1958. Therefare, if we are to accept these figures, the Bakufu
treasury must have held something like the equivalent of $87 ,300,000
in gold and silver.
311 There was a sharp decrease in output of gold and silver after 1627, while copper
continued to be mined in quantities far sorne time. Takekoshi, Economic

Aspecta . . , II, 230, 305. For methods of operation and reasons far decreaae
in productivity, see Horie, . . KeizaiSeisaku . . , 100-2; NKSJ, 179, 502. The
Bakufu monopoly of mining and minting was not entirely effective. Forsecret
mines in the provinces, see NKSJ, 1090, and secret minting, ibid., 464.
40 Chinese history was considered a handbook for statesmen. In China, the
Confucian bureaucracy had been remarkably successful in controlling the

merchant clase. Cf. Karl Wittfogel, "The Foundations and Stages of Chinese
Economic History," Zeitachrift fr Sozialforachung IV (1935), 26-60, and my
article, "Sorne Economic Reasons for the Marked Contrast in Japanese and
Chinese Modernization, as Seen in Examples from 'Pre-modem' Shipping
and Trading by Water," Kyoto UniverBity Economic Review (hereafter cited
as KUER), XXIII, 2 (Oct. 1953), esp. pp. 57-60.
n Cf. Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 114.
38 THE MEROHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
The principie of freedom of commerce was conaistent with Con-

fucian teaching. The Confucian ideal was not a feudal, but a bureau-
cratic state. However, there is no doubt that Confucian teachings
were useful for the maintenance of the feudal society, and provided a
theory for feudal di:lferentiation of status. In addition, the Confucian
argument which gave emphasis to the productive power of land was
useful as a philosophy to maintain the feudal society. Especially, the
Confucian spirit of government made control from above its funda-
mental basis, professing this control to be both benevolent and
virtuous. It made the people dependent upon it while keeping them
in ignorance. It was for these reasona that the Tokugawa made Con-
fucianism the official orthodox.y. However, on the other hand,
Confucianism contains anti-feudal elements, for example, the "K.ingly
way" 3: iB: thesis of Chu Hsi, its equalitarian doctrine, as well as the
argument for facilitating commerce. This last was to become a
particular problem. In the first years of the Tokugawa period, trade
was free. Restrictions were applied by degrees, not as a denial of com-
merce itseH, but due to policy conaiderationa in interna} control.'2
The official policy of freedom of commerce of the early Tokugawa.
period was a great advantage to the merchants. However, it should not
be concluded from this that the Bakufu policy towards merchants was
a benign one. Sir George Sansom's well-known formula, "Statesmen
thought highly of agriculture, but not of agriculturalists, " 43 could,
in quite another context, apply to commerce and merchants. Not
only could an unfortunate merchant be cut down with impunity
for some imagined o:lfenae,44 but merchants had virtually no political
rights, and in addition, their property was denied any semblance
of legal protection.45 The inaecure position of the merchant in the
61 Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 117. Nomura explains that
closing the country did not imply a denial of the advanta.ges of trade itself.
The two chief economic justifica.tions put forward were both ex post fado
by almost a hundred yea.rs: They argued (1) self sufficiency, no need for
foreign trade; (2) a loss to the country to export gold, silver and copper.
lbid., 117-8.
" lbid., 462-3. This was the notorious kirisute-gomen .f;JJ
for samurai to cut down and leave without further ado.
*m
u Japan, a Short Cultural History, 465.
~. permission
65 John W. Hall, "The Tokuga.wa. Ba.kufu and the Merchant Clase," Occasional
Papera, Center for Japanese Studies, University ofMichiga.n, No. 1 ( 1951), 27.
early Tokugawa period is interestingly revealed in an incident which

occurred in 1608, at the time the use of the Chinese coins, Eiraku-sen,
was prohibited." Eirak'Ur8en were the most highly prized of copper
coins, and they were held in large amounts by prosperous merchante,
especially in Edo, while coins of poor quality were held mainly by
leas prosperous people. The prohibition, which relegated the Eiraku-
8en to "mere pieces of metal"47 was disastrous to these merchante,
but was applauded by the day laborera and other poor people. Of-
:ficials of the Bakufu {even including the met8Uke ~ Fft, censors and
spies in the provinces) quickly paid their bilis in Eirak'Ur8en before
the order was issued, taking advantage of foreknowledge. When this
happened, some of the merchante guessed that there would be a
prohibition, and feverishly tried to unload their Eiraku-sen, but too
late, and many were forced into bankruptcy.48
The insecurity of the merchante' position in Tokugawa society led
them into a search for security. Enmeshed in the feudal society and
denied the meansof achieving a degreeof political power, they natural-
ly turned to economic means. As individuals they could try to ingrati-
ate themselves with of:ficials and daimyo in order to gain specia]
privileges. They could also form themselves into new types of organ-
izations which were protective in nature, and in which they could
lose themselves in anonymity. It is to this development which we
shall now turn.
41 Cf. above, page 17, and Hamrunura, "Eiraku-sen no Kinshi wo Ronzu," op.
cit., 370-1.
' 7 Hamamura, "Eiraku-sen no Kinshi wo Ronzu," 367.
48
in Dai Nih<m Shiry * *

TOdaiki 'I' ft 'j~ [Contemporary Record] (covering the period 1565-1615),
f:1 Jl! f1- [M.aterials of J apa.nese History] (Tokyo:
1902-43), Series 12, V, 972.
CHAPTER III
THE QUEST FOR SECURITY
Dfound a numberinitialof roads

ESPITE THEm legal and political disabilities, the merchants
to security in the peculiar conditions
of the first century of Tokugawa rule, while the new economy was
developing and expanding. They elaborated complex systems of
transportation, commerce and finance, and monopolized economic
life through organizations which prevented competition, cemented
merchant class solidarity and furnished needed protection. But this
was not done ali at once, and from the first, the merchants relied on
borrowed strength. In return for protection and privileges granted by
the ruling classes, the merchants furnished essential economic services.
There were innumerable ways in which the merchante could be of
service to the samurai class. Their economic lives came to be closely
intertwined. Rice as a medium of exchange was being replaced by
coins and becoming a commercial commodity. In the cities and towns,
this change had already taken place in the early years of the period.
Most excess rice was tax rice and reached the market, together with
other agricultura} products in increasing amounts, through the hands
of the samurai class, where it was converted into money.1 Under
such conditions, the merchante did not function merely as providers
of commercial goods, which is their usual role. As an additional
function, they performed the important service of converting tax
rice and other commodities collected as taxes into the money which
the samurai class needed to huy the commodities required for every-
day life, and also the luxuries to which this huge non-productive class
was becoming more and more accustomed. 2 As a third function,
1 Takizawa., TM Penetrati<m of Money Economy in Japan, op. cit., 7, empha-
sizes the importa.nce of this cha.nge: "No period in the whole economic
history of Ja.pan is more significa.nt tha.n the period of tra.nsition from
natural economy to money economy."
2 One might be tempted to use the term "leisure class" to describe the samurai,
but many samurai were sala.ried administra.tora, all ordinary samurai were
4:0
QUEST FOR SECURITY 41
merchante engaged in these services made advances on the security

of the tax rice and became the creditors of the samurai class.
It was common for merchants to ingratiate themselves, sometimes
with gifts and bribes, with the daimyo and Baku/u officials, receiving
protection and special privileges from them. Permission to participa.te
in the foreign trade at Nagasaki was generally obtained in this
manner, and merchants later often bid for the privilege of joining this
favored group.8 It is interesting to note that it was privileged (or
protected) merchants (goyo sMnin i11 m
tB A)4 rather than samurai
functionaries or professional artisans who managed the many huge
construction projects which characterized the early Tokugawa period,
when many castles, temples, warehouses (kurayashiki), and daimyo's
residences with samurai quarters (yashiki) were built.5
There were a number of dferent types of merchants who achieved
privileges from the Bakufu and the daimyo. Merchant dishonesty
was common, and almost expected, when transactions were not on
a regular basis, 6 and people preferred to do continuous business with
a particular merchant whom they could know and hold responsible.
Besides, it was an old feudal habit to engage merchant "retainers."
required to undergo certain milita.ry training and exercises, and many had
specia.l military duties to perform. It is indisputable, however, tha.t the
8 Ke>de. Shigetorno, Nihon Keizai Ski Kenky E *

duties of the ordinary samurai rested lightly on their shoulders.
& lJ!f Jil! liJF ~ [Studies
in Ja.pa.nese Economic History] (Tokyo: 1928), 508-11.
' The term goyo denotes official or government business. When e.pplied to
persona hired to ca.ter to the government, it often connotes a "toe.dy," in
present usage.
1> Ke.nno Watare>, "Tokugawa Jide.i Shonin no Chifu ti Jll ~ ft IBj A O)!(
-g" [The Accwnula.tion of W ealth by Merchante of the Tokugawa Period],
Hikone KoshO Ronso, 8 (Dec., 1930), 36. This article is reprinted, with sorne
ela.bora.tions, in Kanno's Nihon Kaisha Kigyo Hassei Shi no Kenky E *
fr if: ~ 1l ft- ~ Ji1! O) liJF 1f [Studies in the History of the Origination
of Cornpany Enterprises in Ja.pan] (Tokyo: 1931), 42~99.
e !bid., 20; Miyarnoto Mata.ji, "Waga Kuni Kinsei ni Okeru She>gye> Rijun no
Tokushitsu ~ IJ il_ i1f: l: ~ ~1 1.> IBj 1l ~j fil O) ~ Ji'' [The Special
Chare.cteristics of Commercial Profits in Our Country in the Early Modero
Period], KSK, 17, 1 (Jan. 1937), 155. This article is conta.ined, with sorne
changes, in Miyarnoto's Kinsei SMgyo Soshiki no Kenky il_ ilt IBj ~ *-6.
M O) liJF ~ [Studies in the Organization of Commerce in the Early Modero
Period] (Tokyo: 1939), 96-119.
The Bakufu and the daimyo appointed special merchants as purveyors

(yotatsu)1 to provide specific goods. But among goyo s'/Wnin, the most
important were those who gathered about the warehouses (kuraya-
8kiki) of the Bakufu and feudal lords. In Osaka, where there were the
largest number of these warehouses, each han at first appointed a kan
official of samurai rank to supervise, called kurayakunin 8 fi A
(literally, "warehouse official"). His duty waa purely cuatodial in
natura, and the business of the warehouse was transacted by mer-
chants.8 Merchants with well-established credit succeeded in having
themaelves appointed as kuramoto j i JC and kakeya :nt- ~ (in Edo,
the so-called fudasaski ~:L :2! corresponded in function to the kakeya).
The kuramoto was, in principie, in charge of the warehoused goods
and the kakeya in charge of financia} duties such as receiving money
for goods sold, keeping it in custody, keeping recorda, etc. In many
cases the kuramoto performed both duties. These merchant function-
aries were treated much the same way as were the daimyo's chief
retainers, receiving rice stipenda.9
The crucial question is, why did the daimyo entruat these important
functions to merchants ? The answer appears to lie in the fact that
the merchants could offer them services at low fees which they could
not possibly provide for themaelves by appointing samurai who knew
nothing about the complicated and to them despicable workings of
commerce and finance. In the first place, only two daimyo had permia-
sion from the Bakufu to own property and to build warehouses in
Osaka. All the others found themaelves in the anomalous position of
having to buy and build in the name of sorne local merchant, from
whom they could later claim to "rent."1 Then, as we have seen, the
actual building of warehouses was usually under the supervision of a
merchant. Thus, the daimyo were actually dependent upon merchants
for the very exiatence of their Osaka warehouses. However, the reason
why merchants were retained by the daimyo and given an important
role waa that they could offer essential commercial and financia!
' NKSJ, 11, 1648. Also callad goykl.t8u.

8 !bid., 422.
Honjo, Social and Economic Hiatory o/ J01pan, 125.
-10 NKSJ, 422.
QUEST FOR SEOURITY 43
services. Most of the daimy marketed their excess tax rice and other
products in Osaka, the central market. In exchange they received
.specie, most of which they had to spend in Edo and on their constant
trips back and forth between Edo and their domains. For these ex-
penses they needed money throughout the year. However, tax rice
and other agricultura! products were marketed at :fixed times, after
the crops were gathered and sent to Osaka. This was not convenient,
for example, for paying expenses in Edo. Also, it was costly and in-
<Jonvenient to transport large amounts of silver to Edo, where (for
large transactions) gold was used primarily.11 It waa quite natural
that the Osaka merchants whose credit was well established issued
billa of exchange (tegata ~ M) whenever the daimy needed money
in Edo. Accounts between Osaka and Edo could be settled almost
entirely by billa of exchange because Edo merchants bought much of
their goods from Osaka. Therefore they owed Osaka merchante, while
Osaka merchants owed the daimy in Edo. 12 N ot only was silver heavy
to transport, but the use of billa of exchange obviated the neces-
sity of weighing and determining the quality of coins. Besides, there
was an increasing scarcity of specie from the last yeara of the aeven-
teenth century. Professor Nomura refera to these inconveniencea when
he writea, "The development of a credit system where billa of exchange
were used among different localities to an extent beyond imagination,
when compared to the developing money economy, was by no means
the reault of a pure credit system, but was because the monetary
ayatem itaelf fell far short of the demanda placed upon it."13 The
necessity of using bilis of exchange served to enhance the importance
of the merchante, particularly the various rice brokers and the oper-
ators of the money exchanges.
11 NKSJ, 229. Silver wa.s most used in the Osa.ka area, gold in Edo. NKSJ,
1102-3
.11 J ohn Henry Wigmore, ed., "Materials for the Study of Private Law in Old
Japan," TASJ, XX (1892), Supplement 1, Introduction, 179-81. Bilis of
exchange were issued by the first Osaka excha.nge house operated by Ten-
nojiya Gohei in the Keich~ period (1596-1614). Matsuyoshi Sadao ft 'jf
:x.
Jt Nih<m Ryogae, Kin'y Shi Ron 13 *m ~~M re. ..
Japanese Money Exchange and Money Market] (Tokyo: 1932), 11.
[History of
11 Tokugawa Holeen Shakai no Kenky ti Jll j.t JI if: fl ([) fF 1f [Studies
in Tokugawa Feudal Society] (Tokyo: 1941), 488.

Using this means of transmitting funds to the daimyo in Edo, the

kakeya in Osaka could make himself indispensable by sending money
at regular times, and when needed. He could also provide an imme-
diate advance if the market price was low. The next etep, an inevit-
able one because the daimyo' s incomes were fixed but their expenses
were continually increaeing, was for the rice brokers to provide
loans at high interest secured by tax rice and other products. The
fees for handling the sale of rice and remitting the proceede in cash
were low. The kakeya drew up statenients of account at the end of the
year, usually charging 2%, sometimes 3% or 4% of the total proc-
eeds.14
In Edo, the pattern was similar. More than three fourths of the
rice received from the domains directly controlled by the Bakufu
was converted into money .16 The ordinary samurai were in the eame
position as their lords, and had to convert their rice into money. All
carne to depend on merchant agente for this service and, more and
more, for advances in the form of loans at high interest. K uramot<>
and kakeya were found in the castle towns of the provinces as well
as in the cities.1s
Once having achieved the privileged position of a rice broker or
purveyor, a merchant not only enjoyed it during his lifetime, but
was in most cases able to hand it down to his heir, and the majority
of these positions remained in the family throughout the Tokugawa
period.17 It should be pointed out that the protected merchante of
Osaka and Edo both attained considerable infiuence, but those of Edo>
the political center and largest single market for consumera' goods,
were far more dependent upon protection than were those in Osaka,.
u NKSJ, 229.
18 End, Nihon Kinsei ShOgyo Shihon Hattatsu Shi Ron, op. cit., 11.
17 Charts in NKSJ, 420-441, give the names of privileged merchante retained
by 125 han with warehouses in Osaka. For the period 1744-1868, of 103
lcuramoto whose names are now known, 56 succeeded in maintaining the
position in the family throughout this period; of 87 kakeya, 61, and of 77
purveyors, 60 were simila.rly successful. Sorne of the changes, moreover,
were merely shifts from one position to another, as kakeya to kuramoto, or
vice versa, so the general situation was one of a great deal of stability and
security.
the commercial center. In Osaka, the infiuence of the merchants was

based on their legitima.te and important commercial functions which
were of a nation-wide nature and upon their organizations of whole-
sale dealers (toiya fUJ .li, ton'ya in Edo dialect), trade associations
(nakama 1"1 flU) and their various financia! organs.18
About 1720, the Confucian acholar Ogyii Sorai (1666-1728) wrote:
"The power and prosperity of the merchants is such that, organized
together throughout the entire country, prices are maintained high,
no matter whether in remote districts or in the castle towns, and it
is impossible to oppose so many millions of merchants so closely
organized together. Prices will continue to rise, no matter how many
inspectora are placed in the castle towns to watch them.'' 19 This is of
significance before 1720 to show the change in the economic position
of the merchante since the early years of the Tokugawa period, and
it is of considerable interest for the period after 1720, when various
attempts to control prices and the merchants ultimately failed and
proved Sorai's prediction. For the present, however, we are interested
in how the merchants achieved this new position. The clue is to be
found in Sorai's references to organization. For the sake of con-
venience, we will discuss first the organization of the commercial
distribution system and then take up the subject of protective and
monopolistic guilds and trade associations.
During the late Ashikaga period, "sedentary" selling in established
markets began to flourish. Markets beca.me towns, market distri-
bution a.reas extended, and specialization followed. The distribution
pattern of (1) producer to (2) periodic market or fair to (3) consumer
tended to change to (1) producer to (2) wholesaler to (3) retailer to (4)
consumer.20 Specialization and complexity in the organization of
18 Saka ta, Ohnin, 17. As most English works use ton' ya, this forro is adopted
here.
19 Seidan ii:fC ~ [Talles on PoliticalEconomy], in Ogy Sorai Sh e 1: fil~
[A Collection of the Works of Ogyii Sorai], in Kinaei Shakai Keizai Gakmetau

Taikei, op. cit., VI, 83. He refers here only to the merchante' infiuence
through commerce. Merchante mostly began in commerce, then used
e:x:cess capital in usury and investment, topics which we will treat in the
ne:x:t chapter.
so Miyamoto, Nihon SMgy Slvi, 176.
commerce reached a high point during the Tokugawa period. This

was in part because of the development of established retailers whe>
required the services of middlemen and wholesalers to supply them.
It was also dueto the great increase in the importance of central mar-
kets such as Osaka, where goods were brought from ali over the coun-
try to be sold in the population centers, and the great increases in the
physical distances between the sources of supply and the consumera.
With the development of the nation-wide economy and the involve-
ment in it of even the semi-autonomous feudal lords, there was a de-
velopment of geographical specialization in products which mirrored
the increased standard of living so often labeled luxury by Confucian
moralista of the time. For example, the famous Nishijin fabrics of
Kyoto came into demand with the various daimyo and Bakufu offi-
cials; the superior sake of Ikeda, Itami and Nada was transported
to Shimonoseki, which became a very important collection and
distribution point, and sent from there north to various points in
Hokuriku and Thoku along the Japan Sea coast and south to Ky-
sh. This sake also made its way around to Edo, where it was much
prized. Similarly, rape seed produced in large quantities in the Kinai
district was made into oil and sent to various parts of the country,
including Edo; bleached linen of Nara, cotton of Kawachi, candles
of Aizu, salted salmon of Tango, and other well-known specialty
products of the provinces were ali collected in the "three cities"
and distributed throughout the country.21
In the first years of the Edo period, there were already wholesale
dealers (ton'ya) in Osaka for salted sardines, lumber, cotton and oil~
who carried on transactions embracing Kinai and western Japan, as
well as Edo.22 These wholesale houses were at the hub of commercial
activities during the Tokugawa period. They specialized both in
function and in goods handled. In production areas there were pur-
chasing ton'ya, loading ton'ya and ship-owning ton'ya, and in the
distribution points there were unloading ton' ya. In regard to commo-
11 Honjo Eijiro, Nihon Shakai Keizai Shi B * ft if &;

economic History of Japan] (Tokyo: 1928), 365. The Kinai
Jil!. [A Socio-
f1 p.j are the
five provinces around Kyoto.
QUEST FOR SECUBITY 47
dities ha.ndled, there were general ton' ya which tended to develop

into specialized ton' ya, and specialized ton' ya which usually cha.nged
from handling goods on commission to buying goods outright a.nd
storing in anticipation of better prices. There were also various bro-
kers or intermediary traders (nakagai i~ Ji) and middlemen (naka-
dackinin i~ JI. A). A typical pattem of the fiow of commercial goods
from individual producers to consumera was: (1) fisherma.n or farmer
to (2) middleman to (3) loading ton'ya; when the goods reached the
market such as Osaka, goods would ordinarily be ta.ken over by (4)
unloading ton' ya. If they were sold without dela.y, they went through
a (5) middleman again, then to the (6) retailer and to the (7) consumer.
(if not sold immediately, goods went first to a atora.ge ton' ya, involv-
ing an additional step.) If the goods were reshipped to another mar-
ket such as Edo, they could go from (1) producer to (2) middleman
to (3) loading ton'ya to (4) unloading ton'ya to (5) middlema.n to (6)
storage ton' ya to (7) ton' ya for the other market to (8) middlema.n to
(9) retailer to (10) consumer. The pattem for rice and other goods
which were collected as taxes differed in the collection phase but
differed but little in the distribution phase.28 This gives some idea of
the complexity of the distribution system and the number of ha.nds
through which commodities often had to go before reaching the con-
sumer.
There are a number of reasons why there were so many steps in
collecting and distributing goods. Distances were great, consid-
ering mea.ns of transport, between production, collection a.nd con-
sumption points, and these distances beca.me greater with the devel-
opment of the nation-wide economy. In a period when mea.ns of
communication were insufficient, middlemen were required to bind
together these organs of distribution. The trading boa.ta a.nd boat
captain-owners who connected the ton' ya of the production points
with the ton'ya of the collection points are examples of this. Inter-
mediaries among the orga.nizations which collected goods from pro-
ducers, those which relayed the goods to major collection points, and
those who dispersed them to consumption centers were required "to
u Miyamoto, Nihon SMgyo Shi, 168, 175. Nakagai often were brokers e.nd in
these cases the term can be translated "middleman."
48 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOX.UGAWA JAPAN
smooth and make possible the proper relationships of producer and

ton'ya, ton'ya and naka.gai, and between nakagai and retailer." 24 It
was safer to have a regular go-between in a period when the methods
of manufacture and quality of commercial goods were not standard-
ized, when special skills were required in trading, and when speciaJ
knowledge of the market was advantageous. Also, in a period when
there was no really e:ffective advertiSing medium, it was impossible
to stimulate demand in an aggressive manner, and there was no better
way than merely to ha.ve a go-between handle marketing or purchas-
ing in a negativa manner. Middlemen were employed as agents for a
fee, and it was often impossible to carry on business without them. 25
The "sedentary" organization of business made necessary a pleth-
ora of special services, to move, store, weigh and value goods. In
addition, with such a complex distribution system and with so many
middlemen, there is no wonder that prices in the cities were high, one
of the perennial complaints of the samurai class. Prices were particu-
larly high in Edo, as the observant German physician Kaempfer
noticed in 1691: ''The city of Jedo is a nursery of artista, handicrafts-
men, merchants and tradesmen, and yet everything is sold dearer
than anywhere else in the Empire, by rea.son of the great concourse
of people, and the number of idle monks and courtiers, as also the
difficult importing of provisions and other commodities."2 Kaempfer
was particularly impressed by the large number of atores in the cities
selling all conceivable kinds of goods. Of Kyoto he wrote, "There are
but few houses in all the chief streets, where there is not something
to be sold, and for my part, 1 could not help admiring, whence they
can have customers enough for such an immense quantity of goods."27
u Miyamoto, Nihon ShiJgyo Shi, 202.
u Ibi.d., 153, 194-204; NKSJ, 1146. Ingenious mercha.nts did hit on sorne
very effective a.dvertising techniques. Mitsui retail atores, for example, gave
out free umbrellas marked in large characliers with the Mitsui na.me to
customers who were ca.ught in their atores during a. shower. Kinokuniya.
Bunza.emon used a "singing commercial'' to advertise a boa.tloa.d ofthe rst
mandarin oranges of the sea.son, a song ( "Mikan Bune") still sung in
Ja.pan. Oland D. Russell, The HOU8e of Mitaui (Boston: 1939), 76.
18 Engelbert Kaempfer, Hiatory of Japan, 1690-1692 (New York: 1906 - first
published in English 1727-8), 111, 76.

u Ibi.d., 111, 23.
The gres.ter distances between producer and consumer, 88 well 88

the larger scale of commercial transactions in the main collection and
distribution centers gave rise to markets in which merchante met
with other merchante for the purpose of buying and selling. Large
speculative markets existed in goods which were bought and sold in
large quantities and which could e88ily be stored. For example, gold,
silver, rice, oil and cotton exchanges were set up in Oaska, where
sales on a large sea.le were conducted very much 88 they are in a mod-
em exchange. There were speculative markets in Osa.ka, Nagoya,
Otsu, Fnshimi, Shimonoseki, Edo and elsewhere, but the most fa-
mous was the rice exchange at Dojima in Osa.ka, where speculation
in futures m&de and broke fortunes in a single da.y. Prices of rice for
the entire K.inai district around Osa.ka were determined at this
exchange, and pricea as far away as Edo were strongly influenced.
Smaller non-speculative markets in perishable goods such as fresh
fish and vegeta.bles were very common, and there were aleo important
non-speculative markets for timber and various textiles. 28
With this sketch of the organization of the commercial distribution
system to give some idea of its complexity and specializa.tion, we
tum to another major factor reaponsible for the changed economic
position of the merchant clase circa 1720, the organization of monop-
olistic guilds and tr&de associations. The tr&dition of protected
merchant organizations had a. long history before Tokugawa times.
To a large extent, Nobunaga and Hideyoshi eliminated the old
type guilds (za) with their policy of free markets and guilds (rakuichi-
rakuza). However, they themselves created certain new guilds under
their protection, and sorne of the old guilds persisted in the provinces
under the protection of the daimyo.
In the early Tokugawa period, it appears that the protected guilds
(za) in Bakufu territories were mostly semi-official in nature, such as
the guilds for the minting of coins29 and the manufacture and distri-
Miyamoto, Nih<m Shgy Shi, 159-161; Endo, Nih<m Kinaei Shgy Shihon
Hattat8u Shi Ron, 9; also see Smith, "Materials .. ", op. cit., 123-137, for
many details about the Dojima exchange.
The Kinza ~ .JM, for gold, established in 1595, the Ginza fl .JM, for silver, in
1598, both by Ieyasu, and theZemza ti JM, for copper coins, in 1636. NKSJ,
50 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAFAN
bution of scales and measures. In 1609 a cinnabar guild was author-

ized and given the monopoly of manufacture and sale as a reward to its
operator who had secretly leamed the procesa in China and introduced
it in Japan, but this appears to have been rather unusual. Later,
during the administration of Yoshimune, official za to handle im-
ported medicinal products were set up, both to check dishonest
practices of substitution and adulteration and to give the Bakufu an
additional source of revenue.90
With the exception of these guilds which were mainly semi-official
in nature, the policy of the Bakufu continued throughout the early
Tokugawa period to oppose monopolistic guilds. The Bakufu was
particularly vigilant against any attempts to comer a market, and
any collusion among merchants and officials to make big profits. In
1642, a group of wealthy Edo merchants conspired with the highest
Bakufu financia! official, the Kura Bugyo, and more than ten other
important Bakufu officials, comered the Edo rice market, raised prices
and made a huge profit. This struck directly at feudal interests, and
the Bakufu executed ali their children, exiled the merchants and con-
fiscated their wealth.31 As early as 1622, the Bakufu had prohibited
ali types of merchant combinations in a proclamation for Kyoto,
explaining it as a necessary means to secure freedom for the merchante
of all parts of Japan.82 In a general proclamation in 1657, only certain
types of combinations in specified trades are prohibited, and no men-
tion is made of freedom for merchants, but it appears to have been
no change in basic policy.83 Similar regulations appeared in 1629,
1666 and 1684.84 The prohibitions of 1657 and 1684 complain of the
abuses of excluding merchants from the organizations, exacting
entrance fees, comering markets and carrying on other monopo-
listic activities. The motivation for these prohibitions was not so
376, 377, 915. Guilds for the monopoly of other metals a.ppeared la.ter: for
copper, in 1738; iron and brass, in 1780. Jbid., 1154, 1111, 1780.
80 lbi4., 606; 779; 1206-8; 1264; 1307.
81 Sa.kata, Ohnin, 14.
aa Tokugawa Kinrei Ko, op. cit., VI, l.
88 lbi4., v. 351.
" Miyamoto, Nihon Shgyo Shi, 205; Nomura., "Tokugawa. Jidai Hoken Sei to
Shogyo," 119-21.
QUEST FOB SECUBITY 51
much a desire to free trade as it was the Bakufu's hatred for such
monopolistic combinations, shared wholeheartedly by samurai and
peasants.85
The trade associations or guilds (nakama i~ lm) which grew up in
this atmosphere of official hostility were the be.sic monopoliatic or-
ganizations of the Tokugawa period. Another important organization
was the group (kumi 11.). These groups existed either as divisions
within a nakama or as a supra-organization made up either of nakama
or, more commonly, ton'ya. The ton'ya themselves, although their
function wa.s wholesaling, were organized in a manner quite similar
to the nakama.ss
The units of these organizations were single family enterprises,
usually of small sea.le, individually owned and managed. Companies
organizad along modem linea did not exist, and partnerships were
apparently unknown, but two types of plural enterprises were created
during the middle and late periods of the Tokugawa era. One wa.s the
large family enterprise with a me.in house and a number of branch
families limited by the family constitution. Property was owned in
common and profits and losses equally distributed, an e:ffective means
of achieving stability and security in the operation of a large enter-
prise. The Mitsui, Ono, and Shimada family groups are examples of
this type.117 It was common for these larger enterprisers to place one
person in a nakama in each of the more important markets, skillfully
linking them up and organizing a considerable nationwide infiuence.88
Another type of plural enterprise developed in the late Tokugawa.
period to capitalize and mana.ge multifarious and fairly large sea.le
commercial enterprises. These were anonymous combinations of Omi
81
11
Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to ShogyO," 120-3.
NKSJ, 413; Miyamoto, Nihon Kinaei Ton'ya Sei no Kenky 13 * ll.11t
PIJ ~ jfjlj (J) JJF _1l [Studies in the Ton'ya System in Japan in the Early
Modern Period] (Tokyo: 1951), 4.
17 Kanno, Nihon Kaiha . . , op. cit., 19. See also Honjo, Social, cmd Economic
Hiatory of Japan, 304-5. These family group enterprises were also known as
"kumi." The Mitsui, for example, let themselves be known as Mitsuigumi
only after 1721, when Bakufu policy was no longar hostile to such groups.
NKSJ, 1559.
18 Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," op. cit., 133.
merchante who owned enterprises known only by the name of one of

the members.89
Ea.ch nakama member owned one kabu 1*, or membership privilege.
Kabu has often been translated as "share," but this is not quite ac-
curate, as ownership was hereditary and the nakama could restrict
transfer. The only entrance to an established nakama was through
inheritance, the purchase of kabu which ha.d been "vacated" by
bankruptcy or lack of an heir, and through the apprentice system, all
subject to the approval of the nakama itself.
The apprentice system is one of much interest. It ca.me into fullest
use during the Tokugawa period, and began to disappear only gra.d-
ually, after some 25 or 30 years of the Meiji period. Both merchant
and artisan families took in apprentices of about ten years of a.ge who
were either related to them or recommended by relatives, customers
or sometimes by employment agents. The nakama limited the number
of apprentices to two per house, in most cases. It was the policy of
large marchant houses to give precedence to children of branch em-
ployees. At first they were used to watch the master's children and do
cleaning and other household chores, as well as to help the master in
various m.inor ways. As the apprentice grew older, he was entrusted
with errands. He was not called by his original na.me but merely called
"child," "hoy," or "shop-boy" (kodomo, bOzu, koz). At the age of
15 or 16, he was given a name and permitted to help in more impor-
tant duties. The master took responsibility for the apprentice's food,
lodging, clothing, education, supervision, and treatment when ill. In
return, the apprentice served without pay, except that he was provided
with sma.11 gifts and new clothes twice ayear, at New Year's and at
the Buddhist festival for the dead (bon} . The lower apprentices were
forbidden toba.eco, sake, and anything except simple cotton clothing.
89 Cf. Kanno, "Tokugawa Jidai no Tokumei Kumiai fil Jll pij: ft O) Ifl ~ *1f.
{}" [Anonymous Combinations of the Tokugawa Period], KSK 9 (July,
1930), 38--46. Essentially the same material me.y be found in Kanno's
Nihon Kaiaha Kigyo Hassei Shi no Kenky, op. cit., 22-32. Kanno considera
both these types of plural enterprises as forerunners of modern companies.
Western type organiza.tion of companies wa.s known in the late Tokugawa.
period by scholars of Dutch, who recommended it, but the first completely
Western type company was established in 1867 by Konoike. NKSJ, 524.
But these restrictions were lifted when the apprentice was given the
rank of tedai ~ ft at the time of bis coming of age ceremony, when
hewas 16or 17.ltthen required from Sto 14 years forhimto becomea
bant. Abantwasthehighestranking apprentice andcould beentrusted
with the shop and also put in charge of the other apprentices. Then,
after a number of years of satisfactory service, he could sometimes
establish a separate house (bekke Jg *}. These separa.te houses were
semi-independent, but still performed services for the main house,
and the master-servant connection continued from generation to
generation. With some capital from bis master, the banw could begin
bis own business and eventually become entirely independent, after
paying off the loan. With the loan paid off, bis duty to bis
master came to be more symbolic than real, and it was common for
him. to pay formal visits to bis master on the :first and fifteenth of
each month to inquire about bis health. He was still e:xpected to help
bis former master in case of emergency. With the development
of larger businesses, the bant were often retained in the master's
house and given better treatment and remuneration, but the hope
of establishing their own businesses gave meaning and motivation
to the apprentice system.
In peacetime, feudal loyalties among the merchante had a stronger
real ha.sis than the more idealized loyalty of the samurai to bis lord.
An example of the loyalty of a Mitsui "chief clerk" (banw} could be
cited here. The bant was sent on the difficult mission to explain an
"unfortunate incident" to a daimyo who, if displeased with the
explanation, could have forced the house of Mitsui "out of exist-.
ence." He took a dagger with him. "If bis testimony should fail to
satisfy the lord he was to disembowel himself on the spot and offer
bis life as a price for exoneration of bis master and bis house." For-
tunately, the explanation was accepted, and a modero member of
the Mitsui family writes, "The papera that tbis clerk took with him
on this occasion are preserved to tbis day and bear testimony to the
spirit with which he was serving bis master."' Apparently it did
' Mitsui Taka.haru, "Chonin's Life under Feudalism," Cultural Ni,ppon 8, 2
(June 1940), 82-3. Forthe apprentice system, seeNKSJ 1112, 1109, 1356-7,
1485, and Smith, "Materials .. ," 165-7.
54 THE llrlERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
not occur to them to send on this mission a member of the Mitsui

family itseH.
The nakama were different from the medieval za both in purpose
and in organization. They grew out of the rakuicki-1-akuza. Guild
organization was a habit of long centuries and was a type of organi-
zation, according to Miyamoto, "inherent in the feudal system and
strengthened by the closing of the country. '''1 The nakama ca.me to
embrace a.11 phases of economic activity. Not only artisans and traders,
but those engaged in financia! activities, transportation and com-
munications, hotels and restaurants formed themselves into guilds
and trade associations of persons engaged in the same activity. The
most important were those of the merchants.'2
There were two underlying emotions which appear to ha.ve mo-
tivated these organizations: the feeling of need for mutual protection
and the feeling of group solidarity, augmented by religious solidarity.
As Professor Miyamoto puts it :43
The underlying tone was a religious, protective and collective spirit
which contained some elements of the uneconomic and irrational. The
feeling of understanding and singleness of clase status was deep. This
understanding and unity was not merely an agreement or pact
concluded among them, but a harmony of spirit which is most dif-
ficult to expresa in words.
The nakama maintained a meeting place with regular paid clerks,
elected officers, provided for mutual aid and protection, and in some
cases owned property in common. There was a feeling of fratemity
among people engaged in the same economic activity, especially as
they often lived in their own separate quarter of a city, where oppor-
n N ihon Shgyo Shi, 206.
u Miyamoto, ibid. According to Professor Allen, the guilds of artisans "bore a
fairly close resemblance to the European craft guilds." George C. Allen,
A Short Economic History of Modem Japan, 1867-1937 (London: 3rd impres-
eion, 1951), 13. As a matter of convenience, nakama may be tranelated aa
guilds in the case of artieane e.nd as trade associations in the case of mer-
che.nt nakama, if such a dietinction is desired.
' "Tempo Kaikaku to Kabu Nakama '} ~ ijt ~ ~ ~ fiJs RO" [The Tempo
Reform and Kabu Nakama], KSK, XV, l (Jan. 1936), 88. Nomura, "Toku-
gawa Hoken Sei to Shogy," 131, doubts the strength of religious spirit as a
motivating factor. It seeme to us the.t the religious epirit no doubt did
reinforce the feeling of eolidarity.
tunities for common social activities such as pilgrimages, outings, and

banquets were plentiful. They often made group pilgrimages to Shinto
shrines, made donations as groups, built shrines, donated stone lan-
terns, etc., and frequently named clubs within the nakama for the
god of commerce or the god of wealth."
Professor Miyamoto points out that if nakama were interpreted
merely as economic organizations, many of their activities become
illogical.46 However, immediate economic needs were no doubt of
primary importance in stimulating the extraordinary proliferation of
these organizations. As might be expected in a generally pre-capi-
talistic economy where an industrial revolution had not been ex-
perienced and where agriculture was predominant, there was appa-
rently little idea of an expanding economy. Each merchant wanted to
make secure for himself and his family and heirs his own share of the
market. The merchant who was perhaps himself a fugitive from the
rice paddies or whose ancestors probably were, did not like to see
country bumpkins coming to the cities to engage in commerce, com-
peting and taking business from the established merchants. The
'IUlkama did their best to limit the number of merchants engaged in
a particular trade, using methods of withholding from non-mem-
bers both credit and sources of supply controlled by nakama or kumi.
However, until nakama achieved official recognition and backing,
they no doubt had more success in controlling their own members
and preventing competition among them than in preventing compe-
tition from outside. The nakama made themselves and their members
as inconspicuous as possible by settling their differences among them-
selves without reference to public authority."
The nakama fixed prices monopolistically, and met possible com-
petition by enforcing standardization of quality and procedures, and
prohibiting dishonest practices on the part of members, as well as it
"Miyamoto, Nih<m Shgy Shi, 207-8.
46 lbid., 208. Miye.moto has written in great detall on nakama and kabu nakama
{their name when officially recognized and cha.rtered). See his Kabu Nakama
no Kenkya l* 1'11 f10 <l) if ~ [Studies in Chartered Guilds and Trade As-
sociations] {Tokyo: 1938). a larga collection of essays first published in
various periodicals.
" Miyamoto, Nih<m Shgy Shi, 208; Sakata, Chimin, 31.
could. Profits likewise were roughly standardized by means of the

concept of "fair price. ,,,7 As an organization embodying the sum of
the economic power of its members, and with close connections
with other nakama, it was able to perform important services for its
members. It was vigilant against infringements of agreements with
members by persona outside the nakama, and protected members
against non-payment of bilis and loans owed to members. The prim-
ary weapon appears to ha.ve been black-listing.48
But the most important service which the nakama could render
was to establish and protect the credit of members. Since most single
family enterprises were small, there was a problem in establishing
credit. However, for members of a nakama this problem was solved.
The nakama enforced responsibility upon ita members with the threat
of expulsion for dishonest practices and non-payment of just obli-
gations. Once established, credit was usually carefully guarded, as
merchante generally recognized that the success of the family business
was not made up of separate deals but consisted of establishing con-
tinuous business relations based on credit and good will.49 The cor-
porate morality enforced by the nakama made possible the develop-
ment of a highly complex system of commercial credit. Severa} dif-
ferent types of bilis of exchange circulated widely among merchants
very much as if they had been cash. The system of monthly billing
among merchante was usual when business was continuous. Sales by
sample, transactions in futures, and buying on margin, all of which
were common in the speculative markets,60 also resulted from the
mutual confidence and trust among merchants whose credit had been
established and was guaranteed by the nakama, ton' ya and kumi
organizations.
To a very large degree, the individual liberties of merchants who
joined nakama were absorbed into the collective will of the organ-
ization, and duties were inherent in membership. This collective will
"Miyamoto, Nihon Shgy6 Shi, 159, 209; Miyamoto, "Waga Kuni Kinsei ni
Okeru Shligyli Rijun no Tokushitsu," op. cit., 155.
' Miyamoto, Nihon Shgyo Shi, 209-10; Wigmore, "Ma.terials .. ," op. cit., 193.
"' Miyamoto, Nihon Shgyo Shi, 209-10; Sakata, Ohnin, 31.
50 Miyamoto, Nihon Shgyo Shi, 160-1, 202; Smith, "Ma.terials .. ," 123-137;
End, . . Shgyo Shihon . . , 9.

was formed at meetings &nd drawn up into agreements of various

kinds.n This surrender of individual to group interest was done
voluntarily, in order to gain a security not otherwise obtainable.
Merchants joined organizations which were virtually underground
during the first part of the Tokugawa period due to official hostility.
Most members were necessarily conservative and careful, and quite
willing to subordina.te themselves. However, there were more restless
epirits who were experts in getting around regulations in order to
make extra profits. Dishonest practices, carefully covered up, meant
immediate profits. Also, the use of ingenuity and farsightedness in
such complicated maneuverings as transactions in futures and buying
on margin, as well as the collection of fees for financia} services, etc.,
brought additional profits.62
There is no doubt that the nakama played an important role in
the eettling down of businessand its attainment of a degreeof respect-
ability, at least among merchante. This settling down, however, was
evidently a natural product of the times, and the formation of nakama
often a result of the merchante' fear that their field of activity was
becoming overcrowded. An example of this can be seen in the develop-
ment of money exchanges in Edo. In the early days of Edo, money
exchangers gathered every day in one section of the city with a few
kammon of copper coins, to exchange for gold and silver. It was
common practice to mix in bad coins with the good, but one of
the more enterprising exchangers opened a permanent office and
gained a reputation for honesty, putting the business of money
exchanging on a more responsible basis. At first, there were no more
than fourteen or fifteen dealers, but when the number increased to
seventy, they met, in 1679, to forma closed nakama to monopolize
the business and to formula.te the rules. 53
N akama were not always a ble to exclude non-member merchants
effectively from participating in their trade. Therefore, official rec-
ognition and backing were desired. However, official policy was
61Miyamoto, "Tempo Kaikaku to Ka.bu Nakama," op. cit., 88.
H Miyamoto, "Waga Kuni Kinsei ni Okeru Shogyo Rijun no Tokushitau,"
op. cit., US5.
" Takekoshi, Economic Aapects . . , III, 20. A kammon was 1,000 cop_p er coins.
generally hostile. The Bakufu did permit certain monopolies by nalca-

ma for the purposes of policing and control. For example, except for
a period from 1655 to 1672, the foreign trade at Nagasaki was carried
on from Ieyasu's time by privileged groups of merchants. To assist the
police in tracing stolen goods, chartered trade associations (kahu
Ttakama) limiting the number of houses were permitted for pawn shops
(in Osaka, 1642; in Edo, 1692), and for secondhand dealers (Osaka,
1645; Edo, 1702). Also for policing purposes, kabu nakama were per-
mitted for public bath houses in Edo about 1650, and for peddlers and
hairdressers in Edo in 1659. Each kabu nakama was required to pay
a small annual fee (myoga-kin Jt :1JD ~). and each new member was re-
quired to pay this fee to the Bakufu upon entrance. Other nakama
must have looked with sorne envy on these few privileged organi-
zations, but they were not to achieve this status until 1721.64
Under this system of guilds, trade associations and groups, tech-
niques were standardized, practiced and improved; credit operations
and the transmittal of funds were made possible; production was
fostered and protected, dishonest practicas and the manufacture and
handling of goods of poor quality were minimized, and business re-
lations generally stabilized. 66 Since we have had to do a great deal of
generalizing in this sketch of commercial organization in the Toku-
gawa period, it seems advisable at this point to take a closer look at
commercial organization and operation through the example of the
shipping business in the Osaka-Edo trade, one of the keys to the com-
mercial history of the Tokugawa period.66
At the beginning of the period, with small boats hugging the dan-
gerous coastline, without charts and without marine insurance, ship-
ping was a hazardous business, but profits were extremely good for
"NKSJ, 261-2; Smith, "Materials .. ," 95-6; Tsuchiya, An Economic History
o/ J apan, 177. This event and the circumstances surrounding it will be discus-
sed in Chapter VI.
n Miyamoto, Nihon SMgyo Ski, 214.
68 The material presentad here on the Osaka.-Edo trade has been published in
different form in my a.rticle in the Kyoto Univet'aity Economic Review,
"Soma Economic Rea.sons for the Marked Contrast in J apa.nese and Chinase
Modernization .. ," op. cit., 31-4, and is used here with the kind permission
of the Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University, as is the material on pages
152-160 of this monograph.
QUEST FOB SECUBITY 59
boat captains who were both skilliul and lucky, as re:flected in a com-
mon sa.ying of the time, "A boat captain three years, anda. secure
future. " 67
The trade between Edo and Osaka was predominant throughout
the Tokugawa period, especia.lly before a.bout 1750. The size of the
boats participating in this trade during the early years of the period
ra.nged from 200 to 400 koku capacity. A company called the Higaki
Kaiaen ~ i ~ M was organizad among succeBSful boat captains
and began ofiering shipping services in regularly scheduled runa
in 1624. Business increased, but losses for the owners of shipped
goods (the shippers) were high, due to market price :fluctuations,
damage and shipwreck settlements, and dishonesty of boat captains.
Therefore, in 1694, a monopolistic shippers' ton'ya was organizad in
Osa.ka with ten groups (kumi) embracing all the major shippers of
goods to Edo, and at the same time a purchasing ton' ya was organized
in Edo with ten groups, called the tokumi don'ya +
M. IBJ J;I. The
two ton' ya federated together to supervise a.11 settlements of losses,
diatributing them equally among the members. The number of groups
was increased in 1716 to 22 in Edo, 24 in Osa.ka. Federation was
facilitated by the fa.et that many of the Edo kumi were begun as
branches by Osa.ka merchante, and the result was a type of coopera-
tiva marine insurance. With this proteotion, the shipping business
ilourished.58 In addition, this made possible a close liaison which
precluded the possibility of dishonesty on the part of boat ca.ptains.
If the responsibility for loss to goods had been assumed by the owners
of the goods, it might well be asked what reason there was for
the shipping company and their captains to provide safe, efficient
and speedy service. The answer was the development of the ban11en
.. M' system which will be described later. The problem of :fluctuating
market prices was dealt with by a monopolistic regulation of supply
through the ban11en system.
7 Akabori Matajir6, Tokugawa Jidai no SMnin op. cit., 204.
68
Nihon Kor Shi no Kenkya f3 *

NKSJ, 1360. A more detailed treatment may be found in Honj6 Eijiro, ed.,
~ B J1! (/) jf ~ [Studies in the History
of Ja.panese Tra.nsporta.tion] (Tokyo: 1929), 14-20. Lega.lly, it would a.ppea.r
tha.t the Osa.ka ehippers a.nd the Edo purcha.sers who ha.d contracted for the
goods were considerad joint owners.
The exclusion edicts of 1638 limiting the size of vessels left room
for exceptions in the case of merchant boats, so that vessels of 1,000
koku and larger could be used on some routes. 69 The Higa.ki Kaisen
and other shipping enterprisers built vessels with capacities up to
1,000 koku. 60 The company owned 160 vessels in the 1770's, and
specialized in the shipment of cotton, cotton textiles, oil, paper, sugar>
medicines, iron, wax, and dried bonito, holding contracta with the
monopolistic Osaka and Edo kumi which handled these commodities
as part of the ton' ya organization.61 One authority describes the or-
ganization of the Higaki Kaisen as "similar to the present-day
Nippon Ysen Kaisha (N.Y.K. Lines)," and adds, "There was no
trouble about trans-shipment due to the long-term loading contracts
with the owners of the goods."62
Sake was a commodity of great importance to all classes in Edo>
casks (taru >

whether fun-loving merchant, artisan or samurai. It was shipped in
from Osa.ka in the boats of the Higa.ki Kaisen until
1730, when the sake dealers broke away and formed their own ship-
ping company, called the Taru Kaisen l!'J ~' which competed with
the Higaki Kaisen, at first carrying only sake, but then adding other
commodities. In 1772, however, the two companies amalgamated>
agreeing to fix the number of membership privileges (kabu) and to
continue operating under their own names. At this time the Taru
Kaisen owned 106 boats, making a totalof 266 boats between them.
Rates for shipment of sake from Osaka to Edo were quoted year by
year, and were thus not on the haggling basis so common at the time.64
u Horie, "Tokugawa Jida.i no Suijo Kotsii," op. cit., 85.
eo Akabori, Tokugawa Jidai no SMnin, 202; NKSJ, 1360.
81 N KSJ, 142. For the shipping of ta.x rice, bids covering whole provinces were
received by the authorities from contra.ctors who hired priva.te boats. Freight
charges were paid on delivery of the rice, a.nd elaborate regulations provided
for every possible contingent. Cf. Wigmore, "Materia.Is .. ," op. cit., 182-6.
111 Akabori, op. cit., 202. ea NKSJ, 142, 1360.
" Wada Atsunori ~ Wji Bansen to Seishu Torihiki no Kanrei ti~ !,
rrf lft ~ ij 1O) 'fl iJIJ [The Customs of Ba.nsen a.nd Transa.ctions in Refinad
Sa.ke], in HonjO, ed., Nihon Kots Shi no Kenky, op. cit., 433-4. Available
records show a gradual rise in ratee from 1726, almost doubling by 1835.
1726 and 1835 a.re the first and last dates available. The rise was from 45 to
82 momme silver per horse load (about 300 lbs.), but this rise may ha.ve been
la.rgely a function of inflated currency.
In the ea.rly days of the Higaki Kaisen, there was a great demand
f or salce, cotton and cotton textiles in Edo; largely unfulfilled until the
new crop was harvested each year. It was difficult for producers in
the Osaka area to meet the demand, and the result was that some
produced inferior products in their haste to beat their competitors
to the Edo market with the first cotton textiles or salce of the season.
This was unsa.tisfactory to a.U, beca.use hastily made goods of poor
quality had the initial advantage, and the bulk of the production was
dumped on the Edo market within a short period of time, with a re-
sultant lowering of prices. There was also an overburdening of boat
facilities during the rush periods. Therefore, the major producers
decided to coopera.te for mutual advantage. When the crops were in,
an agreement was made which fixed an adequate amount of time for
production, alloted to ea.ch producer a certain number of boa.ta of
simila.r size and type, and set a da.y and hour for the first fleet of the
sea.son to set sail for Edo from Nishinomiya harbor, near Osa.ka.
There was great interest in the race. It took about three days and
nights for the fastest boa.ta, with favorable winds, to go the distance
of some 400 miles. The first boat to rea.ch Uraga was given a plaque
inscribed with the date and numbered "first boat" (ichi ban sen - t i
M). All boa.ta were numbered as they ca.me in, and for this rea.son were
called bansen. The owners of the first boat's cargo benefited, as Edo
purchasers paid a premium for "first goods." The winning boat
capta.in was presented with a haori (a silk cloak) anda bonus, but
most important, he gained such prestige that he never had to worry
about customers to load his boat with goods. As a matter of fa.et,
there was such competition among owners of goods to secure the
services of the boats and captains with the best records that the ship-
ping company had to limit the size of their cargoes. The number of
boa.ta in each race varied from five to :fifteen, and the re.ces were care-
fully spaced to avoid the disadvantages of any oversupply in Edo.
This was the bansen system, which proved so satisfactory for cotton
and salce to both shippers and the shipping companies that it ca.me into
quite general use, and in 1847, both the major companies put all their
boa.ta on the bansen system, no matter what the goods to be shipped.66
This account is condensed from Wada, "Bansen . ," 420-29. He has found
62 THE :MEBCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA J.APAN
The Higaki Kaisen and the Taru Kaisen are e:xamples of the devel-
opment of pure shipping enterprises. However, they sometimea
supplemented this business by acting as agents for shippers. In the
case of Bake, the producers did not maintain an a.gent in Edo, a.nd
relied upon the Taru Kaisen to sell the Bake for a commission in ad-
dition to the regular shipping fees. W ad.a says, "The Edo Bake trade
from the first did not escape certain defects, 66 but it cannot be over-
looked that it a.chieved a major and effective role during this period.
It is perhaps enough to know how far trade had progressed, by
realizing that airead.y at this time such a large commercial enterprise
was carried out on the basis of trust." 67
The bamen system served to develop highly skilled boat capta.ins
and crews with considerable pride in their efficiency. The safety of
their boats was in their own and their company's interest, and the
safety of the goods shipped part of their pride in their efficiency.
Speed, of course, was a basic ingredient of the system. The system
persisted well into the Meiji period, when the old companies were
pradually replaced by the steamers of such modern companies as
Mitsubishi and Mitsui. It "provided for co-e:xistence and mutual
benefit, and was a good solution to problema of the time." 68
The merchant class in the seventeenth century was very energetic.
Kaempfer noticed this during his two years in Ja.pan between 1690
and 1692. He observed that it was "scarce credible, how much trade
and commerce is carried on between the severa! provinces and
parte of the Empire ! how busy and industrious the merchante are
everywhere ! how full their ports of ships ! how many rich and flourish-
ing towns up and down the Country ! There a.re such multitudes of
people along the coasts, and near the sea-ports, such a noise of oars
and sails ... that one would be apt to imagine the whole nation had
documenta.ry evidence of the existence of the bamen system in 1738, but it.,
a.ctually existed quite a number of years before that date. Ibid., 420. In
1809, and probably earlier, banaen sbipment could be obta.ined for an extra.
fee.
H Sorne of the vicissitudes of both shipping companies are relatad in Smith,.
"Materials .. ," 113-16.
1 Wada, <>'P cit., 447-8.
418 Ibid., 447.
settled there, and ali the inland parte of the Country were left quite
deeart [sic] and empty."69 Not only were the merchante extremely
active, but they were certainly ingenioue in creating new commercial
and financia! proceduree and organizations and elaborating old ones
to an unprecedented degree. In the process, merchante found a con-
siderable degree of security, :first, by making the samurai dependent
upon them in a score of ways, and second, by forming themselvee
into protective and monopolistic organizations. These organizatione
made the merchante inconspicuous and more acceptable to the ruling
clasees by enforcing a kind of corporate morality which etabilized their
commerce, their position in eociety and their economic power. In
addition, the extreme complexity of the organization of the distribution
eystem worked for the advantage of the merchante who controlled
it, because it was quite beyond the samurai clase to fathom, and all
their later attempts to control it were doomed to failure.
History of Japan, 1690-1692, op. cit., 31~17.

CHAPTERIV
THE ACCUMULATION OF COMMERCIAL AND USURY

CAPITAL BY CITY MERCHANTS
NE IS OFTEN
history1
reminded in the English literatura on Japanese
that the city merchante in the Tokugawa period ac-
cumulated great fortunes and attained great financia! power, mostly
establishing themselves before the Genroku period (1688-1703). The
question left largely unanswered is, exactly how did they achieve
this ~ And, having achieved it, how did they use their accumulated
capital~ lt is the purpose of this chapter to trace this development.
Fortunas were founded in many different ways. A few examples
Can be cited here. The greatest of the zaibatsu houses, Mitsui, got its
:start about 1620 in Matsuzaka, !se province, brewing aake, operating
a pawn shop and lending money. With capital thus accumulated,
Mitsui Hachirobei opened a dry goods store in Kyoto. This being
highly successful, he began a famous dry goods store in Edo a few
years la.ter, in 1673, hanging out the sign "Cash payments and a
single price." Both these policies were astonishing innovations for the
da.y, and proved most successful.2
As Mitsui purchased most of his materia.Is in Kyoto, the next logi-
-cal step was for him to establish a money exchange in Edo (1683) to
handle bilis of exchange. With the expansion of business, he estab-
lished money exchanges in Kyoto (1686), where by that time he was
operating a silk wholesale house (ton' ya), and in Osaka (1691). lt was
1 Especia.lly in Honjo's Soci,al and Ec~ Hi.story of Japan, Takizawa's The

Penetration of Money EconomyinJapan, and Takekoshi's E~ Aspect8 . ,
op. cit.
s NKSJ, 1559; Russell, The HOtuJe of Mitsui, op. cit., 73-4. The government
sa.w a.n advantage in this system of a single price. La.ter, injunctions were
issued exhorting merchante to ma.intain the same prices for stra.ngers as for
regular customers, in an effort to combat the traditional personalistic a.nd
particularistic prices which were disadvantageous to the samurai class.
Robert N. Bellah, Tolcugawa Religion, The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan
{The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill.: 1957), 27-8.
64:
ACCUMULATION OF COMMEBCIAL AND USUB.Y CAPITAL 65
in 1691 that he came under official Bakufu protection to handle

transfers of official funda by means of bilis of exchange.8 In con-
nection with this official task, the Mitsui created a fast post system
for official mail.
Retail merchante as a rule were particularly cautious and con-
servative, but dry goods, rice, cake and candy atores often expanded
into very large enterpriaea.' Mitsui's Edo atores employed more than
1,000 men and women in the eighteenth century, under a pater-
naliatic policy regulating their lives in minute detall.5
Most money exchanges made loans to daimyo on a large sea.le, but
with the exception of two or three daimyo with whom the family
had long-established and special relations, the Mitsui house was
prohibited by the family constitution from making such loans. An
additional source of income was the ownership of land through rec-
la.mation, with official approval.8
Another zaibatsu family with roots deep in the Tokugawa period,
the Sumitomo, a.ttained prominence in quite a different way.
According to the family hiatory, the founder of the merchant house,
NKSJ, 1559; Mitsui Takakore ,=:;JI: jtlj tll "Edo Jidai ni okeru Tokushu
Shogyo to shite no Gofukuya to Ryogaeya U p ~ ft l:. ~ l-j"
~ t L. "C Q) ! i [i t Pfi tf ~" [The Dry Goods Business a.e a Spe-
*"
~ jffj
cial Type of Commerce in the Edo Period, and Money Exchanges], Shakai
Keizai Shi Gaku [Studies in Social and Economic History], II, 9 (Sept.
1932), 57-62, shows the very close connections between the Mitsui dry goods
business and their money exchanges.
'Miyamoto, Nilwn Shgyo Shi, 181.
6 Russell, The Houae of Mitaui, 75, describes this paternalistic system in these
words: "[lt] permitted a certain a.mount of profit-sharing among the higher

classes of employees, and strict rules governing rest periods, health, sani-
tation and hygiene for all others. Dormitories were set up, and the private
lives of the employees were carefully looked after. They were coached in
proper speech and required to be neat and olean in attire." This sounds
re.ther like the "honorable kindness" professed by the owner of the Omi
Mills whose 1954 strik.e made international news. Hie paternalism included
dormttoriee, free schooling, libraries, and S 10 a month for thousande of girls
to work in his silk mills. But it a.leo meant that "officials penned them up in
their dormitories, opened their mail, blocked romance, forced them to attend
Buddhist services and recite such ca.techisms as: 'All this day I shall be
happy to pour a.U my body and soul into an all-out effort.'" Time Magazine,
September 27, 1954, 35.
NKSJ, 1559.
66 THE MERCHANT CLA.SS IN TOKUG.A.W.A. J.APAN
Masatomo (c. 1585-1652), gave up bis samurai status and opened a.

shop selling books and ironware, and also selling medicines on the
side. His son-in-law was the son of a Kyoto copper merchant who had
learned how to extract gold and silver (mostly silver) from raw copper
in the refining procesa. This secret, which he had learned from some
Europeans at Hirado, became a monopoly of the Sumitomo family,
which made a fortune in copper mining and refining.7 It was the most
prominent of the merchant familias which the Bakufu permitted
after 1691 to operate mines, in the hope of increasing output.8 The
Sumitomo house was particularly active and successful in discovering
new mines and operating them effectively.9
The founders of the present-day Daimaru Department Stores, the
Shimomura family, began as modest dealers in secondhand clothing
in Fushimi (near Kyoto) in the early seventeenth century. Hearing
that a new theater section and gay quarters were being built in
Nagoya, the headof the house decided to move there in the 1720's.
He set up a clothing and tailoring shop near the gay quarters and
:flourished, establishing stores in Kyoto, Edo and Osaka in addition
to the one in Nagoya. Generally, the policy of the Daimaru-ya was
very traditional.10 However, the Shimomura were untraditional to
the extent of adopting the Mitsui policy of fixed prices "as marked,'~
and this proved very successful. 11
One of the most important of the Osaka merchant houses was that
of Konoike. The founder, Konoike Shinroku, gave up bis samurai
7 NKSJ, 893.
e Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 101-2.
NKSJ, 893. They sent agente throughout the country looking for copper,.
silver and gold deposita. Ibid.
1 For example, the duty of the boy apprentices was to greet customers and
see that they were comfortable. In summer they fanned them with a large
fan, and in winter they tended the hibachi (charcoal brazier) to see that custo-
mers were warm while a bantO (head apprentice) showed goods. Banto were
trained to ask the age of the customer in order to know what type of cloth-
ing was appropriate. They were also instructed to a.ccept the most unreason-
able demanda and, if required, to bring veritable mountains of goods from
the warehouse to suit the most difficult customer's taste. This tradition was
continued without change until 1904. NKSJ, 973.
11 lbid.
.A.CCUMULATION OF COMMEBCIAL AND USURY CAPITAL 67
status before the Tokugawa period and went into sake brewing. He
shipped his sake to Edo and sold it for good prices, as sake was often
in short supply in the boom town of Edo, in its early years. Family
tradition claims that he introduced innovations in the industry and
was the first to brew "refined sake m
in." When the sankin kOt,ai
system, which required the daimyo to ship goods to Osaka and Edo,
was in ita infancy, he saw his opportunity, and launched into the
shipping business for daimyo in the western part of the country. This
close association with the daimyo gave the Konoike house the op-
portunity to Iend them money, and in 1656 it established an ex-
change house in Osaka. It became a member of the famous Ten
Exchange Houses (Junin Rygae) +A PR .), selectedin 1663from
the Osaka exchange houses to supervise them and act as the official
financia! agent of the Bakufu in Osaka. Konoike was appointed
huramoto and kakeya for a number of daimyo, thirty-two in the
Genroku period (1688-1703). About this time the Konoike began
to participate in land reclamation projects, and by the end of the
Tokugawa period, there were 121 families (750 persons) living on
Konoike Iand.12
An equally fa.mous Osaka merchant family was that of Yodoya.
The first Y odoya moved to Osaka when Hideyoshi established it as
his capital. He was for a time a purveyor for Hideyoshi, and dealt in
real estate in Osaka. After Hideyoshi's time, he beca.me a prominent
timber purveyor .18 He was the first Osaka merchant to receive per-
mission from Ieyasu to participate in the N agasaki trade. But he
beca.me most important as the most prominent of the rice brokers,
a kuramoto and kakeya for no leas than thirty-three daimyo. Rice
11 NKSJ, 523. Membership in the Junin Ryiigae occaeionally changad, and

dropped as low as five in 1843. Ibid., 771.
18 Takekoshi, Economic Aspecta . , JI, 242, 246-7. The building of cities offered
an opportunity for protected merchants to ma.ke money as purveyors of

timber and by supervising large construction projects. Koda, Nihon Keizai
Shi Kenky., op. cit., 508-9, points out that Kumazawa Banzan deplorad
the system by which only merchants were enriched by these building proj-
ects. On the other hand, Arai Hakuseki (1666-1725), writing le.ter, main-
tained that not only merchants, but officials also made money by accepting
huge presenta from merchants which he callad bribes.
68 THE HEBCH.ANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
merchants' gathering at Yodoya's spacious headquarters to huy and

sell was the beginning of the famous Dl>jima Rice Exchange.14
Ingenuity and foresight were conspicuous among wealthy mer-
chante. An example of these qualities can be seen in the lile of
Kawamura Zuiken (1618-1700). He began lile as a coolie pushing a.
wagon in Edo. One day he saw a quantity of melons and eggplants
bobbing about in the water near the shore at Shinagawa.16 He gave
a few coins to some beggars to gather them for him. He took the load
home, pickled and sold them to da.y laborera congregated at the
official public works and construction office in Edo. An official there
talked with him, was impressed, and hired him. Zuiken showed much
ability a.nd enterprise, and before long the official put him in charge
of the day laborera. He was a very clever trader, and made himself
wealthy by arranging many ingenious commercial deals. He became
quite famous and was often consulted by merchante on how to get
rich. The day in 1657 when the great Edo fire began, he did not wait
to eee it demolish almost the entire city. He traveled post haste to
K.iso, the major source of timber, and bought up all he could. This he
sold in Edo at very high prices. Finally, the Bakufu put his talents to
work, giving him the task of working out the best routes by which
goods could be brought to Edo. He carefully surveyed all the pos-
sible alternatives himself and accomplished the mission very euc-
cessfully, formulating the detailed regulations for the efficient organ-
ization of rice shipments. He wae then put in charge of canal building.
Taking advantage of his positions, he built up a considerable fortune. 16
The examples given are of unusual succese, and cannot be said to
be entirely representative. However, they do show that there was
much opportunity in the seventeenth century for men, whether of
samurai or of far more humble origin, to prosper through the use of
ingenuity, farsightednese and a certain enterprising epirit, coupled
sometimes with a rather antisocial selfishness. Protected merchante
in the seventeenth century founded the most spectacular fortunes.
H NKSJ, 1661.
u It was a custom to float them down the river during the festival for the dead
(bon). NKSJ, 295.
is NKSJ, 295.
ACCUMULATION OF COMMERCli.L AND USURY CAFITAL 69
Of the six examples given, five fall into this category. The
variety of economic activities which these enterprising merchants
took up is a striking characteristic of the period. It should be re-
membered that the seventeenth century was an era of economio
expansion through domestic trade, and it was mainly in commerce
that fortunes were founded. In the years that followed, the main
effort was to hold what was gained, and the adventuresome spirit of
commercial enterprise declined.
It would appear that whenever samurai or peasants had economic
relations with merchante, the merchants took the lion's share, taking
advantage of their clients' general lack of knowledge and under-
standing of commerce. This was quite easy, as prices (especially
retail prices) generally varied with the customer.17 Samurai were
often oharged higher prices than commoners. Merchants who had
direct dealings with samurai took every possible advantage of their
"blindness to the way of the abaous (soroban)."18 The author of the
Seji Kemmon Roku,19 a famous contemporary work, complains,
"Because everyone from the greatest feudal lords on down to the
lowest samurai uses money, the merchants make huge profits. In
prosperity they far outstrip the samurai class, and enjoy far more
conveniences and amenities of life. Without moving an inch, they
supply the necessities to all the provinces, they act as official agents
of the ruling classes down to the lowest samurai, changing money,
handling rice and all other products, even military equipment, as
well as providing facilities for travel, horses and trappings, etc., and
merchants are indispensable for any kind of ceremony. " 20 It has been
suggested that those who were most successful in exploiting the
17 KOda, Nihon Keizai Shi Kenky, 516; Shof Katei :ft ,1\, 1' ~ Zeniya
Gohei Shinden if li_ 3J.* #j !'t ifJ. [A True Biography of Zeniya Gohei]
(Kyoto: 1930), 84. Merchante used a great variety of secret codee to prevent
customers from knowing market prices.
18 Kanno, "Tokugawa Jidai Shonin no Chifu," 37.
19 ilt $ ~ JJ8 f!k [Record of World.ly Affaire].
so This work has an introduction by Buyo lnshi ~ 9t l!I probably a pseu-

donym, written in 1816. It can be found in Kimei Shakai Keizai Sosho
~ ilt il: fr & M il [Social and Economic Series, Early Modem Period]
(Tokyo: 1926), Vol. l. The above quotation is on page 157.
samurai were merchante of samurai origin, due to their under-

standing of the samurai and their confidence in dealing with them.2 1
The wealthy merchants of the "three cities" were made up mainly
of: purveyors and protected rice merchants and brokers (lcuramow
and kakeya; in Edo, the fudaBaBki); the money exchange merchants
(ryogae-ya), and the wholesale (ton' ya) and trade aBSociation (nakama)
merchants. Outside the "three cities," the wealthy merchants were
mainly purveyors and han-protected merchante, the privileged silk
merchante of N agasaki, and the itinerant merchante of Omi. The
merchante who were in the most advantageous position were those
who had the closest connections with the feudal ruling classes. All
those listed above fall into this category, with the one exception of
the Omi merchante, who were not always under feudal protection.
As they were a particularly influential force in the economic history
of the time, and in many cases carne to be important city merchante,
they should be discuSBed briefly.
The development of the money and credit economy gave great
impetus to itinerant trade. Itinerant merchante were able to go
greater distances, on foot, carrying only goods for sale, since they
sold for cash which they did not carry with them in large amounts,
as they could send money home frequently by means of bills of
exchange. Peddlers penetrated inland, carryingspecialtyproductssuch
as medicines, candles, textiles, dried fish, etc., and linked even the
outlying islands by sea. As early as Hideyoshi's time, Omi mer-
chante were carrying on a. lucrative tradein Yezo (Hokkaido), selling
textiles and other products to the Ainu and bringing back mainly
dried fish products. 22 One of the characteristics of the Omi mer-
11 Kanno, "Tokugawa Jidai Sh~nin no Chifu," 17. Contemporary record.a list

48 of 250 important Edo merchant houses as of samurai or rOnin descent
and over half of the most important merchants of Kyoto. Edo Machi Kata
Kakiage l [p PIJ-Ji _b in Tokugawa Jidai ShOgyo Sosho ti Jll ~ ft
;Bj 11ll1f (Tokyo: 1913-14). I 196-357. No doubt sorne of these warrior
e.ncestors were acquired for prestige purposes.
11 Kanno, "Tokugawa Jidai .. ," 18. Kanno has written an important mono-
graph on the Omi mercha.nts, Omi SMnin no Kenky ~ l [ j(fj A O) ;iJf ~
[A Study of Omi Merchante] (Tokyo: 1941), a collection of articles published
in various journals.
.ACCUMULATION OF COMMERCI.AL .AND USURY CAPITAL 71
chanta was a rare combination of caution, daring, and farsight-

edneBB. They generally built up their businesses slowly and patiently,
taking care not to injure their credit. However, this is not true of ali
of them. The common saying, "Omi robber, Ise beggar" had sorne
basis in fact. Omi merchante were notorious, for example, for sell-
ing mosquito nets made in Omi which had no tops, a discovery made
only after the peddler was a safe distance away. 23
Beginning with itinerant trade, Omi merchants tended to become
sedentary, establishing branches ali over the country, a.nd with com-
merce a.s a. base, entered and attained great importa.nce in industry,
fisheries and finance. Nihonba.shi in Edo, Hommachi in Osaka and
Sanjo in Kyoto were lined with Omi atores, ali managed by men sent
from Omi who left their families at home. The general policy wa.s for
ali employees to live in back of the atores a.a was (and still is) custom-
ary. 24 According to the Seji Ke:mmon Roku, "Most of the merchante
here in Edo are from Omi, Ise or Mikawa. Those from Mikawa ha.ve
not been so successful, but those from Omi and Ise ha.ve ali ma.de
their fortunes. There a.re now many varieties of businesses called
either 'Omiya.' or 'lseya.', ra.nging from pawnbrokers a.nd money
exchangers to Bake dealers. One after another, branches are set up
a.nd prosper. Often the owner remains in his home province, sets up
branches in Edo, a.nd gathers in the profits without getting his hands
wet (i.e., without much effort)." 25 The epithets "Omi robbers" a.nd
"lse beggars" a.ppear to ha.ve origina.ted in Edo, where other mer-
chants were envious of their success.26
Monopoly pricing was one ofthe objects ofthe nakama, ton' ya, and
Jcumi organiza.tions, and beca.me an increa.singly important source of
profits. The chartered trade a.ssociations (kabu nakama) which multi-
plied after 1721 were a.ble to exclude competition fa.irly effectively,
with Bakufu support. To a. certain extent, nakama and ton' ya func-
sa Miyamoto, Nihon SMgyo Shi Gairon B * Jfi ~ ff!t lir [An Outline of
Japanese Commercial History] (Kyoto: 1954), 202-3.
u Miyamoto, Nihon Shagyo Shi Gairon, 200.
16 In Kinaei Shakai Keizai Sosho, op. cit., 1, 17~.
11 Miyamoto, Nihon SMgyo Shi Gairon, 203. The Mitsui were originally from
Omi, then moved to Matsuzaka in Ise, so they would qualify both as "robbers"
a.nd ''beggars.''
tioned a.a price-determining organs, but the existence of retail ma.rkets

for such commodities as fresh :6.sh, vegetables, timber a.nd textiles,
meant that they did not have monopolistic control of such ma.rkets.
The countryside wa.s poor, a.nd tra.ditiona.lly self-sufficient, except for
sa.lt water fish, meta.Is, sa.lt, medicine, and miscella.neous commodities,
so that the major ma.rkets in the provinces were the castle towns,
where nakama or kahu nakama, according to Professor Miyamoto,
controlled prices monopolistically. ?:1
The nakama in the cities and towns h&d little jurisdictional trouble
in dividing ma.rkets a.mong themselves as long as they sold their goods
in a single ma.rket or ma.rket a.rea. It is true that demarca.tion disputes
sometimes a.rose when the types of goods handled by different nakama
overlapped. An example of this is where the Osa.ka. fresh fish nakama
quarreled for years with the dried and sa.lted fish nakama over which
was to handle half-dried fish.28 However, this a.ppears unusual, and
boundaries were generally carefully defined. But difficulties did arise
when nakama sold in markets outside their own city or town, and
ca.me into competition with nakama of other areas. This ge.ve rise to
a type of cartel a.rra.ngement. For example, the clothing merchants
of Kyoto and Omi found themselves in competition for tr&de in the
province of Kii, especially in W akayama. They therefore formed a
cartel ca.lled the Sumiyoshi Ko 1t ti j i in the l 770's.29 This cartel
a.rrangement was only a combination of merchants with a mutual
agreement which was neither public nor legal. For this rea.son, there
were viola.tions of the agreement, a.nd competition a.gain rea.red its
ugly hea.d. Therefore, in 1832 the cartel wa.s revived under a. new
name, and solemn pledges given to abide by it. The a.greement was
binding only for sales in Wakaya.ma a.nd had no other purpose. It
la.ter increased in numbers of participants &nd a.reas affected.80 Other
nakama which a.re known to ha.ve formed cartels were the suga.r
17 Miyamoto, Nihon ShOgyo Shi, 159-160.
is Smith, "Ma,teria.ls .. ,'' 91.
K.anno, "Tokugawa Jida.i Sh~nin no Chifu," 29. The term kO wa.s used ma.inly
for religious groups of both temples a.nd shrines, sometimes temporary
groups for pilgrimages, but was adoptad by merchante to acreen their
monopolistic arrangements. NKSJ, 494.
K.anno, "Tokugawa Jida.i Sh~nin no Chifu," 29-30.
.ACCUMULATION OF COMMEBCIA.L .AND USURY CAPITAL 73
nakama of Osaka, the innkeepers' nakama, and the twenty-four group

shippers' ton' ya in Osaka.. Th.e Baku/u tried to control them, a.nd the
Shogun Y oshimune banned them in 1716. After this, several prohi-
bitions were issued, but they continued to function secretly.81
Frequent shortages were conducive to profiteering and monopoly
pricing. Any alert mercha.nt could ta.ke a.dvanta.ge of them, a.nd they
were a grea.t boon to the itinerant tra.dera. Shortages ware often quite
pressing, as was the need for timber in Edo a.fter the great fire, which
was an opportunity for profiteering for people like Kawamura. Zuiken.
The goods involved were often eaaential consumera' goods, even food.
Edo was pa.rticula.rly aubject to ahorta.gea of va.rious kinds, and there
is no doubt that this ge.ve merchante opportunitiea for unusual ge.in.
Utilizing their monopolistic position, merchanta could increase ex-
isting shorta.ges, a.nd perhapa even crea.te them. Th.e practice of ne-
machi, waiting for a price, wa.s common,82 and the ton'ya were in a
particul&rly good poaition to withhold goods from the market, as they
were a.ble to affect the price. Th.e monopolistic regul&tion of supply
from Osa.ka to Edo through the bansen system alrea.dy described is a.
good example of this, a.nd Kaempfer'a obaervation that Edo pricea
were higher than anywhere else in J apa.n is evidence of it.38
The mconvenience of communice.tion was an a.id to monopolistic
pricing. Consumera ha.d no opportunity to lea.rn wha.t pricea were in
other pa.rts of the country. Th.e mercha.nt enjoyed a.lmost a monopoly
of this knowledge, a.nd wa.s a.ble to ma.ke a good thing of it.84
Th.e inconveniencea of tra.nsporta.tion also helped in monopolistio
pricing. Th.e experience of an Omi peddler, Kawashima Ma.ta.hei, is a
good exa.mple of this.86 "Once he wa.s tra.velling on the Kiso roa.d,
approa.ching the fa.mous U aui it :1r peak. He and bis companion were
both ca.rrying hea.vy loada of more tha.n 80 pounds ea.ch. It wa.a
1 NKSJ, 495.
81 Smith, "Materials .. ," op. cit., 87; Takizawa, The Penetratm of Money
Economy in Ja;pan, 106.
88 See above, p. 47.
84 Kanno, "Tokugawa Jidai Shonin no Chifu,'' 22.
811 This anecdote is taken from Hachiman Shogyo Gakko i\ 1(11 jffj 1.t ~.
comp., Omi Shiinin jfi, U jffj A [Omi Merchante], 312-4, quoted in Kanno,
"Tokugawa Jidai Sh<inin no Chifu," 22.
midsummer, and a.lthough a time of intense heat, tha.t da.y a cool

breeze ca.me up in the morning. lt wa.s a cloudless sky, and everywhere
the scenery wa.s of surpa.ssing beauty. They kept climbing, forgetting
the fatigue of their legs, gazing about and giving voice to their a.dmi-
ration of the scene. By the time they were haJf way up the mountain,
the sun wa.s high, and it wa.s unbearably hot. Mata.hei turned to his
compa.nion and a.sked why they should not take a rest on the gra.ss,
since the sun wa.s very hot and they ha.d gone far. Before he could finish
saying it, his friend, a.lrea.dy very tired, had put down his pack and
wa.s complaining, with la.bored brea.th, tha.t since the fleeting world
wa.s wide and offered grea.t variety, it would be better even to labor in
the fields with a light hea.rt like a. peasant than to carry such a. load up
mountain paths in such heat, a task not even fit for an ox or a horse.
Matahei listened sadly and replied tha.t he himself ha.d been stifling
pa.inful sighs, but tha.t he disagreed entirely with him, beca.use if there
were five or six ta.11 mountains like this one, the profit would be a.11
the more, and he thought it most regrettable that there was only one.
'If it is so bad that you wa.nt to give up being a. mercha.nt and become
a peasant a.11 beca.use of a. single mounta.in, if happily there were five
or six, then I would be the only one to cross them and tra.de on the
other side. Thus I could carry on a flourishing trade by myself, I
could prosper greatly, hand down to my sons and grandsons a thriving
trade, and my house would long prosper. I am sorry there are not
many such steep mountains,' he sa.id, emphatically." The Omi
peddlers enjoyed a special position as long-range distributors, while
overla.nd transportation conditions remained poor. Under the much
improved transportation system of the Meiji period, they lost this
position and were una.ble to continue making money as in the pa.st.
The very na.me of "Omi merchant" passed out of current usage.36
Capital accumulated through commerce and money transactions
was often put back into the enterprise. The establishment of bra.nches
is a. very common example of this type of capital utiliza.tion. Some-
times capital was used to branch out into other fields. Mitsui's setting
up of money exchanges is an example of this. Besides this, excess
commercia.l and money tra.nsaction capital could be turned into (1)
88 Ka.nno, "Tokugawa Jidai Shonin no Chifu," 23.
ACCUMULATION OF COMMERCIAL AND USURY CAFITAL 75
usury capital, or (2) it could ta.ke an importa.nt a.dditional step, and

penetra.te into production through investment or speculation in such
economic a.ctivities as reclaimed land, sake making, textile enter-
prises, mining, fiahing a.nd lumber industries.37 These two roles of
commercial capital were of the gres.test mea.ning for the Tokugawa.
feudal society.
Of these two alternatives, there is no doubt that loa.ns a.t high
interest attra.cted by far the greater amount of capital. When excess
capital which rema.ined in the cities was used, it a.lmost a.11 went into
usurious loa.ns.38 Before the Tokuga.wa. period, the bulk of money
lending was done by temples and shrines, but this function was taken
over increa.singly by secular merchante in the Tokugawa period and
wa.s grea.tly multiplied by the development of the money economy.
The two types of money lending were pawning, where ownership in
goods was transferred at the time the loan was ma.de, a.nd loa.ns made
on security, where ownership was transferred only in case of default.
The most common security offered by the samurai and feudal lords
wa.s future delivery of ta.x rice. As perma.nent alienation of land was
prohibited, it wa.s illegal to use officially recorded land and temple
or shrine land as security. However, this left large amounts of land
which could be mortgaged under certain conditions,39 and there were
a number of ways of getting around the non-alienation laws.40
Usury was the quickest method of piling up capital. The great
money exchange houses of Osa.ka such as Konoike, for exa.mple, ma.de
a specialty of loa.ns to daimyo and never participated in usual com-
mercial :fi.nancing. This is true also, for example, of the fudasashi of
Edo, who specialized in loa.ns to hatamoto and go-kenin (direct va.ssals
ofthe Tokuga.wa house).41 Although most rice merchants and brokers
as well a.s money exchanges lent money to daimyo, it wa.s considered
a dangerous business. Towards the end of the seventeenth century,
Mitsui Ta.ka.fusa. warned tha.t it wa.s possible to ma.ke money for a
time, but bankruptcy wa.s never far away, a.s daimyo often defaulted
37 Endo, . . SMgyo Shihon . . , 12; Miyamoto, "Waga. Kuni Kinsei ni Okeru
Shogyo Rijun no Tokushitsu," op. cit., 149.
88 Endo, . . SMgyo Shihon . , 12. 38 NKSJ, 391.
' Takizawa, The Penetration of Money Economy in Japan, 73, enumerates

severa!. ' 1 Endo, . . ShOgyo Shihon . . , 23.
on loans.' 2 It is true that a. num.ber of merchant f&milies failed through

loa.ns to daimyo, but the fa.et remains that fa.r more capital went into
loa.ns at usurious interest rates than into industry. The close inter-
relationship between commercial capital and usury is a. speci&l char-
a.cteristic of Japanese economic development.
The daimyo were continually in need of loa.ns. The penetration of
the money economy gradually undermined their economio position,
as well as that of the Tokugawa themselves. The impoverishment of
the daimyo was ha.stened by the demanda of the sankin kmai system,
the Bakufu policy of shifting the positions and lands of daimyo as
rewards or punishments, as well as the policy of ordering the daimyo
to undertake the construction of ca.stles, dams a.nd emergency public
works. The process of becoming indebted to merchant usurera began
early. Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691) wrote, "lt is rare for a samurai
these days, whether ordinary samurai or feudal lord, not to ha.ve
borrowed large sums of money." He estimated that the total amount
of the daimyo's debts wa.s a. hundred times the amount of ca.ah in the
country." There is no doubt considera.ble exaggeration here, but it
gives some idea of the immensity of the debt.
The first and perhaps the most important of the merchants lending
money to the daimyo were the various protected rice merchants and
brokers (kuramoto and kakeya), both in the cities and in provincial
towns. The large money exchanges also were important, especia.lly in
Osa.ka and Edo. Their loa.ns to daimyo, at usurious interest re.tes, were
only part of their many functions, including exchange of gold, silver
and copper coins; receipt of deposits, issuance and collection of bills
of exchange, transfers of official funds, creation of credit, etc., func-
tions very like those of modern banks.46 There was hardly one of the
41 OMnin Koken Roku PJT A ~ Ji ti [A Record of Observations ofTowns-
men (or, more freely) A Townsman Looks at Townsmen], in Nihon Keizai
Sosho 13* & ~ iiit [Japanese Economic Series], Vol. 15, 55.
68 Endo, . . ShOgyo Shihon . . , 24. The legal position and the historical devel-
opment of the feudal-merchant struggle over loans will be discussed in

ChapterVI.
"Shgi Gesho . ~ IF in Nihon Keizai Sosho, Vol. 33, 234, quoted in
Takiza.wa., The Penetration of M oney Economy in J apan, 94.
4 & Endo, . . ShOgyo Shihon . . , 26. The la.ck of a single monetary standard with
auxiliary coins gave rise in the :first place to the money excha.nges, but it
ACCUMULATION OF C01'41'4EBCIAL AND USUBY CAPITAL 77
import&n.t money exchanges which did not mak.e loans to daimyo.

::Besides their exchange &etivities, they sold rice &n.d other com-
modities of their daimyo clienta, thereby &ecumula.ting capital from
three sources, all very closely inter-rel&ted: commerce, money trans-
actions, &n.d usury.46 For the fwl.aaashi of Edo, usury w&s a fa.r more
import&n.t source of capital th&n. for the money exchanges, &s the fees
which the fwl.aaaski collected for handling rice, their only other
activity, were small.'7
Although in the cities the bulk of money lending was to the samurai
class, lo&D.S to small merch&n.ts &n.d other commoners also comprised a
big business. The most important types were: (1) "Blind money".
The Bakufu gave specia.l privileges to the blind money-lenders'
'lllJkama due to their physica.l handicap, permitting them to call their
money "of:ficial money" and to collect high interest on it. They were
most import&n.t in Edo, but similar nakama existed in Osaka. and
Kyoto &s well. Interest rates in Edo were 10% to 12%, with ma.xim.um
time for repa.yment usually three months. Using the protection of
the Baku/u, they a.lso extra.cted "thank money" by discounting it
from the principal a.t the time the loan was ma.de, thus adding greatly
to the interest ra.te. They were most arbitra.ry in collecting loa.ns,
often on a da.y's notice. When a loa.n w&s overdue, they were k.nown
to gather in a group, go to the debtor's house, push their way in, and
ata.y da.y and night shouting insulta in order to force payment.48 The
blind money lendera could usually depend on the machi bugyo to give
them &n. adva.ntageous decision if cases were brought to litigation.
There were about 3,000 members in the 'TUJkama in Edo, a.nd it was
common for unscrupulous ca.pitalists to use the blind men &s a front
while actually operating their businesses from behind the scenes.49
was the great growth in commercia.l transactions and credit which increased
their importa.nea a.nd ca.usad their expansion. Horie . . Keizai Seisaku, 55.
"Endo, . . SMgyo Shihon . . , 27.
"Ild. Outside ofEdo, the copper coin exchanges (zeni ryogae) were the main
lendera to ordina.ry samurai. Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 57.
A practica not entirely unknown toda.y. It is used, for example, to get
unwanted tenante out of a house.
" NKSJ, 255; Honjo, "Tokuga.wa. Jida.i no Kin'y Seido Ga.isetsu," flt JI)
~ ft O) ~ M ff;IJ 1f a; aJt [An Outline of the Credit System in the Toku
gawa Period], KSK, 10 (Sept., 1930), 62.
(2) "Crow money." These were loa.ns me.de one da.y, to be pa.id ba.ck
the next morning. They were ca.lled "crow money" beca.use the loan
ha.d to be pa.id back when the crows began to caw at dawn. Interest
was discounted when the money wa.s lent, and a.mounted to well over
5% per month. Restaurants, thea.ters and tea houses often used this
temporary mea.ns of keeping their businesses operating.
(3) "Morning to night money." A person would borrow 100 mon
(copper coins) in the morning, and had to return 101 mon in the
evening. Loa.ns at this very high interest were a.lways very sma.11, a.nd
made mainly to peddlers who used the money to buy their wares this
wa.y every morning. Lik.e "crow money,'' these loa.ns did not require
a.ny written instrument, but did require a. third pa.rty to gua.ra.ntee
the loan ora.lly.
(4) "Dissipation money." Money lenders were only too happy to
lend money a.t very high interest to the sons of fa.milies of wea.lth who
spent their time inga.y quarters and needed to be tided over from
time to time. The usurers knew the fa.mily would pay a.nd that the
son would do his best to pa.y to keep his fa.mily from knowing of his
follies. 60
(5) "Double on death." Some money lending arrangements com-
bined a specula.tive feature. lba.ra Saikaku (1642-1693), the fa.mous
Osa.ka novelist, has described a.n ingenious scheme where the money-
lender made secret loa.ns to the sons of merchante to be paid back
double when they ca.me into their inheritance.61
If the borrower were a mercha.nt, he was a.ble to use his borrowed
money to buy a considerable amount of goods, he wished. For
example, he could buy goods for 300 mon, then borrow 250 mon
with these goods as security, huy 250 mon worth of goods and
MI NKSJ, 255.
61 Howa.rd S. Hibbett, "Sa.ika.ku as a Realist," Harvard Journa/, o/ Asiatic
Honchii Niju Fuko *

Sttuliea, 15, 3-4 (Dec. 1952), 4ll. This description is to be found in Saikaku's
-t
tlJ .::: ~ ;J!j.. The term "double on death" (ahini-
Whibai) is certainly a ca.se of ca.lling a spa.de a spa.de. Except with Osa.ka
townspeople, who were (and are) exceedingly forthright, words for death were
generally shunned, if not tabooed. Even now, a common rejoinder, when
business is ba.d, to the tra.ditiona.l Osa.ka greeting, "Mokarimakka? (Making
money ?),"is "Shini-ahini! (Dying, dying!)"
ACCUMULATION OF COMMERCIAL AND USURY CAPITAL 79
repeat the process. He could buy a total of 920 mon of goods by

this method.62
Pawnbrokers also carried on flourishing businesses. The Edo pawn-
brokers' nakama, organized first in 1642, became a. chartered tra.de
association (lcabu nakama) in 1692. In 1723 there were 253 groups
(kumi)with2,731memberhouses.In0saka,thepa.wnbrokers,forminga.
kabu nakama a.s ea.rly a.s 1642, ha.d 2,420 member houses in the 1850's.
In Kyoto the kabu nakama was orga.nized in 1699 with 628 members.
Pa.wnbrokers were pa.rticula.rly numerous in the countryside due to
the fact tha.t the usual method of borrowing money wa.a to place
la.nd in pa.wn.S
There were a number of la.ws governing usury, including va.rious
limitations on the interest ra.tes. In 1736, for example, a ma.ximum of
15% per annum wa.a fixed, but in 1842, it was lowered to 10%. How-
ever, these restrictions were unrealistic and not followed. M Actual
interest wa.s no doubt considerably higher tha.n 15%, not only be-
ca.use la.ws were paid little attention, but because it was common
practica to assess a.dditiona.l fees, usually in the form of "thank
money." 66
Why did money-lending ta.ka the form of usury 1 One reason was
that borrowing wa.s mainly for the purpose of essential comsumption.
The feudal classes-the daimyo, samurai and pea.sants-were forced
H Sakata, OMnin, 17. A similar expansion of credit was effected by means of

tegat,a (bilis of exchange}, where 60,000 or 70,000 ryo in tegat,a could be issued
with a capital of only 10,000 ryo, a "dangerous expansion of commercial
credit." Matsuyoshi, Nihon Ry0gae Kin'y Shi Ron, op. cit., 289-90.
18 Honjo, "Tokugawa Jidai no Kin'y Seido Gaisetsu," 61; NKSJ, 708.
"Honjo, "Tokugawa Jidai no Kin'y Seido Gaisetsu," 63. Fifteen percent
would he.ve been considered rather low during most of Chinase history, and
very low in India. J apanese writers tend to draw European rather than
Asian analogies, perhaps beca.use they feel Japanese economic development
has more in common with European than Asian experience, and also
beca.use they he.ve been trained almost exclusively in European economics.
111 Organiza.tions for cooperative credit did exist. They were called mujin kO 1ll
l'i or simply mujin. Members pe.id a membership fee, making up a lottery
fund used for (l} gambling, (2} charity, (3} loanstomembers. Gambling was
legally prohibited, but went on secretly, often posing as charity. Use for
loe.ns seems to he.ve been much lesa frequent than for gambling. NKSJ,
495-6; Wigmore, "Materia.Is .. ," op. cit., Supplements 3--4, 322-3.
to borrow, even at high interest, beca.use of their impoverished con-

ditions. Also, risk of non-collection wa.s a.n important factor. There
wa.s much risk of non-pa.yment, whether loa.ns were me.de to the
samurai cla.ss or to the lower classes.
The two principa.1 a.1.ternative uses for ca.pita.l were commerce a.nd
usury. Profits from both were high. The fa.et tha.t sma.11 merchante
were willing to borrow a.t usurious re.tes in order to ca.rry on their
businesses gives proof of this. Economic conditions were compara.ble
to those in Europe which h&d given rise to usury. The close and per-
sistent inter-rela.tionship between commercial capital and usury
capita.1 in Ja.pa.n is the key, according to End<5, to the question of
why commercia.l capital did not ha.ve a.n independent development
as ca.pita.l either for commercial or fine.ncia.l transactions, and why it
wa.s una.ble to develop into the type of industrial capital seen after
the Meiji Restoration. 66
There wa.s only one factor which operated in favor of the debtor,
and tha.t wa.s infiation. The rise in prices during the seventeenth
century wa.s stea.dy, a.lthough relatively modera.te. Between 1616 a.nd
1695, the da.te of the first currency deva.luations, rice prices increa.sed
about three a.nd a ha.lf times. 67 Other prices tended a.lwa.ys to follow
rice prices up but seldom down, crea.ting a problem for the feudal
ruling cla.sses, especially when fluctua.tions in rice prices beca.me
violent, a.fter about 1710.68 The general trend continued upwa.rd,
however, ha.stened by the currency devalua.tions, and by the middle
of the nineteenth century, the ryo had fallen to a.n estima.ted one
H End~, . SMgy Shihon . . 24.
17 Honj~, *
Tolcugawa Baku/u no Beika Ohsetsu fl JJI t} Jff (J) 11 i'J fP [The
Regu.lation of Rice Prices by the Tokugawa Bakufu] (Kyoto: 1924), 408-10.
An analysis of how this infla.tion was possible during a period of increasing
specie scarcity will be found in my unpublished M.A. thesis, Monetary
Proble'm8 o/ Seventeenth Oentury JQl>an (University of California, 1951),
especially 63-95. The majar factora were the dra.ining of feudal treasuries,
putting specie into circulation, and, more important, moneta.ry expansion
through the issua.nce in the han of pa.per currency (genera.lly convertible),
and Bakufu currency deva.lua.tions, and, perha.ps most important of all, the
expa.nsion of credit by the merchante. Increa.sing monopolistic pressures
comprised a.nother factor.
DI Horie, . . Keizai Seiaaku, 128. See the cha.rt in Sa.nsom, J<Ypan, a Short
Cultural Hiatory, 470, which shows these violent fluctuations.
ACCUMULATION OF COMMERCIAL AND USURY CAPITAL 81
eighth ofita purcha.sing power in 1661.69 This means a price increase

of something like eleven times since 1616.
"Pla.ced in the strea.m of the price increa.se, money beca.me ca.p-
ita!. "80 N ot only did it stimula.te oommerce in the form of commercial
ca.pita.!; it took a.n importa.nt step in the direction of industria.!
ca.pita.!.81 Ordina.rily, medieval commercia.l capital did not touch the
organization of production, a.nd it wa.s cha.ra.cteristic for it to be in-
crea.sed through profits in the distribution procesa alone.82 The pene-
tra.tion of capital followed the penetration of the money economy into
the tra.ditionally self-sufficient farm communities. It began first in
area.s near the cities, and spread gra.dually to the more remote a.rea.s, 88
first reaching those places a.dapted to a particular type of production,
for exa.mple, fishing villages and mining villa.ges, orto those pla.ces
unusually rich in farm products, especially a.reas where cotton was
produced and those where fruit trees were oultiva.ted. M
Exa.mples of the system of loa.ns on future production a.dva.nced
58 A. Andreades, Lea Financu de l'Errvpire Japorwill et leur Eoolution, 26, cited

in G. C. Allen, A Short Economic Hilltory of Japan, 1867-1937, op. cit., 20.
eo Miyamoto, Nihon Shgyo Shi, 144.
ei During a period of steady price rise, capital is ordinarily more attracted by
investment in productive enterprises because of the hope of higher prices
by the time the resulting production is ready to market. Simple loans, on
the other hand, are relatively unattractive because the money repaid may
not be as valuable as the money lent. During the long inflationary period of
the so-callad "price revolution" in Europa between about 1550 and 1650
stimulated by the infiow of precious metals from the New World, there was
an important shift from usury to investment in productiva enterprises. Cf.
G. N. Clark, The Wealth of Engl.and (London: 1946), especially 57 ff.
11 Horie, . . Keizai Seillaku, 127. This was true in Europeas well as in Japan.
Horie argues that industrial capital does not necessarily arise from commer
cial capital as the next and inevitable "stage." He pointa out that histori-
cally, it has followed effective national unification, and cites the examples
of the U. S. a.fter the Civil War, e.nd the le.te arrive.l of industrial capital in
Ite.ly and Germe.ny. . . Shihon Shugi . ., 3-4. The incompleta natura of the
Tokuge.wa. unification could be cited here as an obste.ele to industrial capital
development.
P Sa.ikak:u, in one of his Honch Niffuko stories, is surprised a.t the infiuence
of money even in the remotest mountain village "where they think dried
sea-bream grow on trees, and where no one knows how to use a.n umbrella."
Quoted in Hibbett, "Saikak:u as a Realist," <Y!' cit., footnote, p. 412.
" Horie, . . Keizai Seiaaku, 70-1.
82 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAl'AN
by the city ton'ya can be seen alrea.dy in the first hundred years of
the Tokuga.wa period. For example, the Osa.ka salted sa.rdine 't<>n'ya
lent silver to the fisheries in various p&rts of the country for them to
purcha.se materials for fish nets, a.nd established an interest through
kahu (membership privileges) in new fisheries and new fish net pro-
ducers. The sardines which were caught were salted and sent to the
't<>n'ya. The cotton ton'ya of Osa.ka, a.s another ex&mple, desiring to
monopolize the purchase of cotton, secretly a.dva.nced enough silver
so tha.t when shipments arrived, they could claim them. The loa.ding
't<>n'ya, having direct conta.ct with producers, were the first
to introduce the system of ad.vanees so tha.t they could ha.ndle
the commodities produced. Either 't<>n'ya or money lendersopera.ting
essentially wholesale enterprises sometimea lent money to small
producers in the cities and towns a.nd to samurai whose fa.milies did
ha.ndicra.ft work at home, but the bulk of these loa.ns went to pro-
ducers in agricultura! communities. This was beca.use there was little
room for commercial ca.pita.! to enter the handicraft industries in the
cities. In contra.et to usury, thia type of lending was crea.tive of new
production, but, like usury, these ad.vanees ca.rried quite high interest
ratea, and ca.me to absorb most of the producers' profits. 85
Ma.ny merchante, rather than adva.ncing loa.ns to producers, ma.n-
aged their own productive enterprises. The most common example is
the manufacture of aake. 66 Another important example is the manage-
ment of a.griculture on reclaimed fields (shinden .ti' m), which ma.de
great strides from the eighteenth century onwa.rds.67 By 1853, it has
been estima.ted tha.t 30% of cultiva.ted land was controlled by these
owners of new land.88 In the exa.mples of successful merchante given
86
Osa.ka no Kogyo U p ~ ft <l) *

Horie, . . Keizai Sei8aku, 58, 70; . . Shihon Shugi . . , 31; "Edo Jida.i no
~ O) I ~,, [Osa.ka Industry in the
Edo Period], Keizai R<YnBo, 51, 5 (Nov. 1940), 128-147.
11 Almost all the aake breweries in the Kanto (Edo area) were originated by
Omi merchante. Miyamoto, Nihon ShOgyo Shi Gairon, 202.

17 Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . . , 30. An important study of 8hin<:len has been made
by Matsuyoshi, Shinden no Kenky .fi' W O) Jf 3'f [A Study of Reclaimed

Fields] (Tokyo: 1936).
18 Toyoda Shiro f'- W llQ llfS, Nihon Shihon Shugi Hattatau Shi 13
,3: if ~ [A History of the Development of Capitalism in Ja.pan]

* *
ff
(Tokyo: 1950), 17.
ACCUMULATION OF COMMEROIAL AND USURY CAPITAL 83
above, it has been noted that both the Mitsui and Konoike bega.n in
Bake brewing a.nd used excess capital extensively in esta.blishing l.a.nd
ownership through Ia.nd recla.mation.89
Another significant development was the "putting-out" system,
when city mercha.nts ma.de ad.vanees of raw materia.Is and equipment
rather than money to the producers. The tendency was to employ
more a.nd more workers rather than to rely on middlemen, thus making
their own links with the producers. Provincial mercha.nts, who were
often of peasa.nt origin, or who remained peasant landholders, also
a.dopted the "putting-out" system. The larger mercha.nts or pea.sa.nt
landholders a.nd usurera expa.nded in some a.reas to the extent of
industria.lizing the farm communities with subcontra.ctors supervising
the subsidiary ha.ndicraft work done there. In tra.des where opera.tions
were both complex a.nd numerous, the mercha.nts a.ssumed responsibil-
ity for dividing the work in its va.rious ata.ges a.mong the producers.
This system produced large a.mounts of ra.w silk, cotton a.nd silk
textiles, paper, mats, lanterna, etc., by the end of the Tokuga.wa.
period.70 As with capital adva.nces to industry, the ton'ya wa.s like-
wise most importantin the "putting-out" system. The ton' ya beca.me
an instrument through which production was controlled by commer-
cial capital, both by providing capital for production a.nd by putting
out the raw materia.Is. It was through this controlling position that
the ton'ya organizations were a.ble to limit production a.nd set mono-
polistic prices on the goods they ha.ndled. 71
For city merchants, purchase of houses offered another source of income. At
first, houses were allotted to townspeople, but the authorities were unable
to keep people from acquiring a.nd renting houses. Sorne well-to-do mercha.nts
owned large numbers of houses and hired managers to take cara of them.
By the early 18th century, it was said that 60% ofthe houses in the large
cities were rented. Kobata Jun .1J' j i Wf!j:, "Kimei Keizai no Hatwtsu
il, 1lt & 1'lf Q) '1 il [The Economio Development of the Early Modem
Period], in Kimei Shakai il, ilt if: fr [The Society of the Early Modem
Period], (Vol. IV of Shin Nihon Shi Paikei) (Tokyo: 1954), 295.
70 Miyamoto, Nihon ShOgyo Shi, 201; Allen, A Short Economi,o Hi8tory of
Jopan, op. cit., 13. Thomas C. Smith, in Politiool, Ohange and lndustri,al,
Development in Jopan: Govemment Enterprille, 1868-1880 (Sta.nford Univ.
Press: 1955) stresses the importance of well-to-do peasants in the creation
of a class of rural industrialista.
n NKSJ, 1147.
This penetra.tion of commercia.l capital into the procesa of pro-

duction mea.nt its conversion into industrial ca.pita.1, the extent a.nd
mea.ning of which has been for yea.rs a. bone of contention a.mong
Ja.pa.nese economic historia.ns.72 It aJso resultad in the development,
on a. sma.ll sea.le, of a. factory system. Professor Horie writes on this
question, "A development from the ton' ya system of cotta.ge industry
to a. system of manufacture in fa.ctories without power-driven
machinery can be seen in the la.st yea.rs of the Tokuga.wa. period ...
Putting a.side as a. question of definition the problem of whether or
not this development mea.nt tha.t Ja.pan ha.d entered the sta.ge of
industrial capital, it must be concluded tha.t commercia.l capital
simply did not ha.ve the strength ofits own to ma.ke a. rapid transition
beca.use of fixed limits which prevented its further development. " 73
As has been suggested in the la.st chapter, most mercha.nts first
a.chieved wealth through commerce carried on either under direct
feudal protection or within the protective waJls of a. monopolistic
orga.nization like the nakama. The money thus accumulated wa.s to
some extent hoa.rded74 or spent for legally forbidden luxuries and
high life, especially in the gay qua.rters. However, such employment
of capital has more releva.nce for social tha.n for economic history.
Mercha.nts used their capital in two very importa.nt economic wa.ys:
lending money a.t usurious interest rates, a traditiona.l role for excess
capital, a.nd a mea.ns to gain long-ra.nge security which wa.s diffi.cult
through commerce alone; and investing in productive enterprises,
including la.nd. Such investment was a new role for commercia.1
capital which meant an important shift in the direction of industrial
capital. All these uses of capital were destructive of the feuda.l society.
71 See the short article by Nobutaka Ike, "The Development of Capita.lism in

Japan," Pacific Affaira 22, 2 (June, 1949), 185-90, devoted to the "manu-
facture controversy. ''
73 Shih<m Shugi . . , 45--6. The limite referred to here will be discussed in
ChapterIX.
7' Sansom, Japan, a Short Cultural Hiatory, 472, describes the great wealth
hoarded by Yodoya.
CHAPTERV
THE "HAPPY SOCIETY" OF THE GENROKU PERIOD

(1688-1703)
The period called Genroku may be looked upon as the zenith of

Tokugawa prosperity, and perhaps even the justification of feudal
rule, for here was pea.ce and plenty and a great flourishing of the
arts - a happy society as human societies go.1
After me.ny years of active effort to achieve a degree of security in
a hostile feudal atmosphere, the mercha.nt class finally emerged into
an era of prosperity a.nd confidence. The merchants were favored by
the sa.murai's contempt for commerce, the softening, with years of
pea.ce, of the he.rshness of military rule and feudal discipline, and the
increased standard ofliving and luxury enjoyed by a large percentage
of the population, particularly in the cities.
The fact tha.t the standard of living wa.s increa.sing throughout the
century which cnlminated in the Genroku period seems to be subject
to little doubt. It wa.s a period of free spending and thriving business,
and the merchants whose services were indispensable to their "bet-
ters" profited in increa.sing numbers from the lavish spending of the
Shogun and his reta.iners, of the daimyo, and, to a. lesser extent, of
the ordina.ry samurai. By the Genroku period, everyone was involved
in the flourishing moneyeconomy, 2 a.nd even the downtrodden pea.santa
who did not follow their brothers to the cities in sea.rob of a better life,
seem to ha.ve come in for a. sma.11 share in the prosperity.8 Muro Kyiiso
(1658-1734), an influential Confucianist, in an essa.y written in 1711,
said that no one tied his ha.ir up in paper corda as ha.d always been the
custom, but bought aloes-wood oil for the he.ir and many fancy oma-
ments. Husbands even gave these things to their wives and children,
to make them ha.ppy, showing that commercial enterprises had been
1 Sansom, The Weatem World and Japan, 197.

1 Takizawa, The Pemtration of Money Eoonomy in Japan, 49.
8 Cf. Tsuchiya, An Economic Hiarory of Japam,, op. cit., 158, who states, "Food
wa.s better a.nd the farmers' incomes increased."

85
86 THE MEBCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA J.APAN
formed to sell ma.nufactured goods to pea.sa.nts.4 There were well-

to-do peM&nts in the a.gricultura.l villages, often concemed with local
a.dministra.tion, who lived a. life whose a.menities were ha.rdly less
tha.n those of the upper sa.mura.i a.nd the well-to-do mercha.nts. It wa.s
natural tha.t the common pea.sa.nts were a.ffected by the exa.mple of
this prosperity a.t such clase ha.nd, a.s well a.s news a.bout the ga.y life
of the cities. The a.uthorities looked u pon this a.s ra.mpa.nt luxury,
but, according to Horie, "it should rea.lly be thought of a.s a. rise in the
standard of living."li
The infia.tion seems to ha.ve been gra.dua.l enough not to ha.ve
created grave ma.la.djustments. Honjo has shown how the factor of
higher or lower prices of rice did not a.ffect the Bakufu a.nd samurai
fin.anees really adversely until the fluctua.tions beca.me sharp, a.fter
the Genroku period, and tha.t the poverty of the samurai beca.me
extreme only a.fter the middle of the Tokuga.wa. period.6 Moreover, it
should be remembered that the poverty of the samurai class wa.s only
compa.rative, and was on a different level from that of the pea.sants.
The samurai never ha.d to worry a.bout obta.ining sufficient food. 7
By the beginning of the Genroku period, evidence of the increasing
standard of living can be seen in the flood of specialty products
reaching the city markets a.nd in the a.ppea.ra.nce in the cities of ma.ny
shops selling things formerly ma.de by women in their homes. Ex-
a.mples are split-toe socks (tabi), paper cords for tying the ha.ir
(motoyui), and other a.rticles of personal a.nd household use.8 During
the general economic expa.nsion of the ea.rly Tokuga.wa. period, there
is no doubt tha.t the increa.sing standard of living began among
all the city dwellers, whether chonin or samurai, and then ex-
tended even to the agricultura.! communities.9
. KeizaiSeisaku, 70, citing NihonZaiseiKeizaiShiryo B *MM( & 1;l ~ fl-
[Ma.terials of Japanese Financia.! a.nd Economic History] (Compiled by the
Finance Ministry, Tokyo: 1922-3), VII, 861. Aloes-wood produces en aro-
matic oil. The reference to paper corda (motoyui) is a.n e:xaggeration, as they
remained in common use.
' Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . . , 31-2. "Luxury" meant living beyond the standard
assigned to the classes by the feudal rulers. Horie, . . Keizai Seiaaku, 80.
1 The Social, and Economic History of Japan, 217, 281-3.
7 Sakata., Ohnin, 96.
8 Miyamoto, Nihon Shgyo Shi Gairon, 188. Horie, . Keizai Seisaku, 80.
THE "HAPPY SOCIETYn OF THE GENROKU PERIOD 87
The samurai cla.ss pa.rticipa.ted in this increa.sed standard of living

only by going into debt to the mercha.nt cla.ss. The Bakufu policy of
keeping the daimyo in an impoverished state was para.lleled by a.
policy of actuaJly encoura.ging luxury a.nd extravagance on the part
of the outer kan a.nd their retainers, as part of the policy of weakening
potential enemies, while ta.king strong mea.sures to discourage it in
their own direct retainers and in the inner kan. Ironica.lly, the first
policy wa.s as successful a.s the second was unsuccessful. The inner kan
and the reta.iners of the Tokugawa house were quite una.ble, and cer-
tainly unwilling, to rema.in outside the tendencies of the time. Fur-
thermore, a.s if to heighten the irony, natural disa.sters, a fina.ncial
system created under the assumption of unchanging conditions, and
spendthrift Shoguns combinad to exha.ust even the Bakufu trea.sury.
Ieya.su understood the power of money and piled up a considerable
trea.sure. Hideta.da, Shogun from 1605 to 1622, wa.s conserva.tive a.nd
economical, but the third Shogun, Iemitsu (1622-1651), the fourth
Shogun Ietsuna (1651-1680) a.nd the fifth Shogun Tsuna.yoshi (1680
to 1709), for a variety of reasons, aJl spent a great deal more than the
income of the Bakufu. During the reign of Iemitsu, the construction
of the Nikko ma.usoleum, the reconstruction of the Imperial Pala.ce
at Kyoto and of the Edo ca.stle after its destruction by fire, a.s well
as the cost of the Shima.ba.ra Rebellion of 1637-8, took much of the
accumula.ted reserves. In addition, Iemitsu ge.ve lavish gifts in money
to relatives and feuda.l lords.10 ,
During the time of letsuna, Edo wa.s almost wiped out in the
fa.mous Meireki fire of 1657, a.nd much money wa.s expended in re-
building and in lending to the sufferers.11
But it wa.s not until the reign of Tsuna.yoshi that the impoverish-
ment of the Edo government beca.me more and more pronounced.
Tsuna.yoshi wa.s a lover of luxury and extravagance a.nd spent
tremendous amounts of money in charity, music and public works,
and, a devout Buddhist, he spent large a.mounts of money for the
10 Sawe.da, "Financia.! Difficulties of the Edo Bakufu," op. cit., 314:. For ex-
ample, in 1632, he gave away 288,050 ryo in gold and 17,200 kan in silver,
as a memento of his father, Hideie.da. Takekoshi, Economic Aapeot8 . . , 11,
217. 11 Sawe.da, 314:.
construction of temples and monasteries.12 To aggravate the :6.nancial

embarrassment of the govemment, there were frequent earthquakes
and conflagra.tions, requiring the expenditure of a vast amount of
money for relief and reconstruction, and corrupt officia.ls increased
the govemment's difficulties.13
In principie, the Tokugawa govemment was very much the s&me
&s the governments of the va.rious han, and financing was of the
"fa.mily" type, the expenditure :fixed according to income, in contrast
to modem govemments. For this rea.son, when the Bakufu tre&sury
was found una.ble to meet a demand for 100,000 ryo for Tsunayoshi's
proposed pilgrimage to Nikke5, in 1695, the Bakufu turned in despera-
tion to a policy of devaluation of the currency through recoinage.1'
This impoverishment of the Bakufu as well as the han meant that the
money formerly in their treasuries found its way permanently into
the control of the mercha.nts. The Genroku period saw the completion
of this process. This reckless spending had important effects other
than to encourage general extravagance. It strengthened the foun-
dations of the commercial money economy, permitted the sound
establishment of the credit system, and the resultant increase in the
material standard of living had a lasting effect in stimula.ting pro-
ductive power.15
The Genroku era was the critical period in the development of the
merchant class, beca.use it wa.s during this time that it consolidated
its economic strength, and emerged as a force which the feudal ruling
classes could no longer overlook. In the procesa of this consolidation,
the merchant for the first time seemed to feel a security for which he
ha.d long strived. The security of the merchants of Osa.ka was estab-
lished earlier, wa.s of longer duration and was more solidly ha.sed on
their essential nation-wide commercial and :6.nancial functions a.nd
ingenious organizations. That of the merchants of Edo was of a dif-
11 Honjo, The Social and Economic Hi,story o/ Jopan, 271; Sawada., 314.
18 Honjo, The Social and Economic History o/ Jopan, 271.
u Recoinage was resorted to ma.ny times to sta.ve off bankruptcy. The han
policy analogous to this in both cause and effect, was the issuance of paper
money (hansatBu). See Horie's article on hansatBu in NKSJ, 634-44, or my
Master's Thesis, op. cit., 69-76, and 84-5 on similarities to the recoinages.
111 Sakata., Ohnin, 40.
THE "HAPPY SOCIETY" OF THE GENROKU PERIOD 89
ferent kind. Living in a samura.i-dominated city, they were devoted

to the ta.sk of furnishing the samurai with money or wha.tever could
be ha.d for money. For this reason, they were far more dependent
upon their samurai clienta, a.nd their security wa.s to prove of a more
ephemera.l sort.
Although the Genroku period wa.s one of certain important a.nd
perma.nent gains for the merchants, to the extent tha.t these ga.ins
stemmed from the Bakufu's extra.vaga.nea a.nd financia.l cha.os, they
were unna.tura.l and unhea.lthy. The protected merchants of Edo were
in the best position to bene:fit from the overspending of the Shoguns.
Those who benefited most directly were the timber mercha.nts a.nd the
mercha.nts of the gold and silver mints (Kinza and Ginza). Kinokuniya.
Bunza.emon a.nd Na.raya. Moza.emon are nota.ble exa.mples of protected
merchants who me.de their fortunes in timber during the Genroku
period, in part from Tsuna.yoshi's fondness for building ma.gnificent
temples and other buildings, for example, the one to house his large
harem. The protected merohants of the gold a.nd silver mints who
proposed a.nd ca.rried through the devalua.tion me.de huge illega.l profits
from it.16
The so-ca.lled "Genroku style" wa.s set by the protectedmerchants
of Edo. They made money ea.sily and spent it with prodiga.lity. They
were a.ble to ingratia.te themselves with the samurai burea.ucrats
mainly by a liberal use of money, a.nd to win concessions from them.
They spent large amounts of money in the gay quarters without the
slightest compunction. The daimyo, bound by mora.1 conventions
(a.nd, perha.ps more, by lack of funds) usually stayed a.wa.y from the
gay qua.rters, but the mercha.nts were under no such restrictions. A
contemporary observer described the Genroku ga.y quarters as "a.
splendorwhich wa.s by da.y like paradise and by night like the pa.lace of
the dragon king. Luxuries from every part of the country are brought
:first to these bad places. Unusual perfumes fill onehouse after another,
11 This comparison of Osaka and Edo merchante derives mainly from Sakata,
Ohnin, 17, 22-23, 2~26, 40. Firee, alwa.ye frequent a.nd deetructive in the
crowded tinderbox of Edo, were especially eo during the Genroku era, and
timber merchante pro:fited accordingly. Tsuchiya Ta.kao, Nihon no Seililw
*O)
13 ifk (fj [Politica.l Merchante of Japa.n) (Tokyo: 1956), 51.
90 THE MERCHA.NT CLASS IN TOKUG.A.WA JAPAN
there are entertainments of aJl types, and guests rival each other in
spending. When one spends a hundred, another spends a thousand."11
The operation of courtesan establishments came to be an important
business in itself, and was a significant factor in the building up of
la.rge fortunes. 18 The existence of prostitutes in Japan in pre-Nara
times is established historically, but the development of the gay
quarters did not rea.ch completion until the Edo period.19 ProfeBBOr
Sa.k.ata. gives credit to the clevemess of the opera.tora of the famous
Edo gay quarters, the Yoshiwa.ra, for preserving a strict hierarchy
a.mong the courtesa.ns, to cover the ma.rket. Those of the highest rank
were popularly caJled the pla.ythings of daimyo.m Much of the popular
litera.ture of the Genroku period, especiaJly the metrical romances
caJled J0ruri ti JI. depicted life in the gay quarters, and most of
the woodblock prints of the ukiyo-e school pictured the colorful
worlds of the theater and the gay quarters, where the townsmen
were supreme.111
There was a. clear connection between the mercha.nts' new-found
oonfidence be.sed on their economic position a.nd their development
of new artistic forms. Norman writes, "The nascent merchant class
growing confident in its economic position was creating rich and
sensual art forms, liberating the theatre from the stiff conventions
of the pa.st, breathing life onto the ata.ge so that drama. ena.cted not
only the ra.ncorous feuda of warriors, but the lives a.nd loves of
common citizens."112 The new a.rt forma me.de their a.ppeara.nce and
matured in Osa.ka, where the townspeople were the first to atta.in
security a.nd the leisure to devote themselves to culture. As one cul-
17 Waga Koromo ~ ":;li by Ei Bisn _!l JI Ji, in Emeki Ji88hu ~ 1'J + li
Vol. I, 141-2, quoted in Se.ka.ta, Ohnin, 25. This is a tree.tise devoted mainly
to the evolution of clothing e.nd ha.ir styles, with comments sbout what
we.s considered proper.
18 Tsuchiys, An Eoonomic Hilltory of Japan, op. cit., 267-8, note 72.
11 Ta.kige.wa, Nihon Skakai Shi, op. cit., 327.
10 Se.ka.ta, Oknin, 19-20. Prof. Tsuchiya compares the Yoshiwara. with the
mackiai (a.ssignstion houses) of le.ter years as a useful place for the "politicsl
merchante" of Edo to e.rrange desls and, by lsvish spending, to compete
in ge.ining contracta. Nihon no SeilJM, op. cit., 56.
11 Ta.kige.ws, Nihon Skakai Shi, 327.
u "Andn Shneki e.nd the Anstomy of Jspanese Feudalism," op. cit., 68.
tural historian has noted, "lt ca.n besa.id of aJl the townspeople tha.t
they ha.d desire for money, ambition for power, and love for culture.
They differed in the different cities, with Osa.ka. people emphasizing
money, Edo people, power, a.nd Kyoto people, culture."23 The Os&ka
mercha.nt is well described by the fa.mous Osa.ka novelist Ib&ra Sai-
ka.ku (1642-1693), the most representative of Genroku writers. Ac-
cording to Saika.ku, the Osa.ka. mercha.nt's sole a.im a.nd special
privilege in society was to make money. Once this wa.s a.chieved, he
was expected to turn to the cultivation of the a.rts, poetry, music, tea
ceremony, archery, to participa.te in incense meetings, and to lose
his vulgar speech.21 A kind of merohant nobility a.ppeared ea.rly in
Osa.ka. When the family business wa.s firmly esta.blished, sometimes
after two or three genera.tions, it wa.s common for the hea.d of the
fa.mily to retire a.ta compara.tively early a.ge, putting an a.ble man,
usuaJly his heir, in charge.26 In the mercha.nt society, hea.ds of im-
porta.nt merchant houses were a.t the top of their social hiera.rchy, and
were the objects of the personal loyaJ.ty a.nd service of a.pprentices,
shop supervisora a.nd branch house hea.ds, aJl brought up in the pater-
nalistic tra.dition of the apprentice system. The retirement or semi-
retirement of the heads of houses did not da.mage their position, but
ra.ther gave them more prestige a.nd increased their infiuence. The
devotion of importa.nt Osa.ka meroha.nts to culture wa.s a.n important
stimulus to the development of the brillia.nt Genroku culture.26
The expansive a.ir of the Edo merchant who spent his money with
abandon and was alwa.ys rea.dy to risk his money in some new a.nd
promising venture wa.s much a.dmired among the Edo townspeople.
However, this "expa.nsive a.ir" wa.s too often his only distinctive
a.ttribute, and compa.red to the merchants of Kyoto and Osa.ka, un-
13 -tm,
Ishida. Ichiro ';;fi W Kinaei Bunkarw Tenkai jli. iiJ:3C {t (J) JA mJ [The
u Quoted from Saikaku's Nihon Eitaigura B *

Unfold.ing of the Early Modero Culture], in Kinaei Shakai, op. cit., 409.
;;k ft [A Warehouse of
Wealth], in Sakata., Chwin, 30. Incense meetings (Ko-awa.se .ff fr) were
genteel conteste in identifying various incenses.
Sli Ibid., 70.
911 Ibid. This culture ha.e been skillfully described by Sir George Sa.nsom in
Japan, a Short CUltura/, Hiatory, 471-93, a.nd in The Western World and
J~. 192-4.
92 THE MERCHA.NT OLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
leavened by the influence of culture and education. Thia was the

major difference between Edo merchante and those of the Kansai
region. The expa.nsive Edo mercha.nt wa.s a. chance product of the
unusu&l atmosphere of Genroku society. Osaka. merchants, on the
other hand, ha.el a. long and natural growth ha.sed on the social a.nd
economic development of Osa.ka. They me.de their money more by
commercia.l ingenuity and ability tha.n by chance killings in specu-
lative schemes. ~
The culture of the Osa.ka. mercha.nt stemmed from the towns-
people's culture crea.ted in Sa.kai, a.nd was on a far higher ple.ne than
tha.t of the Edo merchante. The Sakai merchante, after assimila.ting
the culture of the court nobles of nearby Kyoto, ha.d gone on to crea.te
their own specia.l culture. But with the appea.rance in Osa.ka. in the
Genroku period of the two grea.t literary figures, Saika.ku and Chik.a-
matsu, there was bom a culture which ca.me directly from the towns-
people of Osa.ka. a.nd can properly be c&lled Osa.ka. culture.28
A striking feature of Genroku culture was the awakening of a. new
and deep interest a.nd concem for people. It is natural tha.t a com-
moner's art for commoners would depict their lives. For the first time~
common people appea.r in literature a.nd in a.rt portrayed with sym-
pathy. For example, in Saikaku's KoBkoku Nidai Otoko jf -!i=
ft JJ [Two Generations of Men who Loved Love], the hero, on the
point of dea.th due to his dissolute life, is visited by a prostitute rather
tha.n by a Bodhisa.ttva from hes.ven. According to Professor Ishida,
this scene evokes not only sympathy but a contempt for any feeling
of superiority, and revea.Is Saikaku's feeling that man's life is entirely
in this world. 28
Among Confucia.n schools, the recognition of the human person-
ality was emphasized most by the School of Ancient Leaming
(kogaku-ha ti~ flj{), the only important Confucia.n school of the
period which represented a Japanese re-interpretation of the classics.
The ma.in members of this school, Ya.maga. Soko (1622-1685), lt
Jinsai (1627-1705) a.nd Ogyii Sora.i (1666-1728) ali rejected the Chu
n Se.ka.ta, OIWnin, 17, 28.
18 Ibid., 98-9.
Kimei Bunka no Tenkai, op. cit., 377-81.
Hsi concentration on knowing heaven, and shifted the emphasis to

knowing man. Sora.i expressed this idea when he wrote, ''The way is
not in heaven nor in earth, but in man," and went on to point out
that it does not come to man from a superior person, but through
self-cultivation.30 The nativist school (kokugahu-ka), although anti-
Confucian, continued the humanistic emphasis of the Confucia.nists.
Their main motivation from their first beginnings in the Genroku
period was to discover the "pure feelings" of the Ja.panese person-
ality, while still untainted by the infiux of foreign ideas, particula.rly
Buddhist and Confucian. Their works a.bound in such phrases as "the
sincerity of human feelings" and "peoples' cherished desires," and
they sought to liberate huma.n na.ture from unnatural restra.ints, and
to enha.nce the interest in human persona.lity. Ishida emphasizes the
close rela.tionship which existed between the lcogahu-ka and the
kokugahu-ka a.s seen in the fact tha.t Kamo Mabuchi (1697-1769) a.nd
other kokugakuaha began as members of the lcogahu-ha.31 Kokugaku
has been described as "a na.turalistic ideological system ... opposed
to the feudal society, ha.ving a.s its point of origin the consoiousness
of a new way of life on the part of townspeople. "3S
Rela.ted to the new huma.nism stimula.ted by city life was a feeling
of individua.lism seen throughout Genroku life a.nd culture. Money
consistently dema.nds rea.lism a.nd ra.tionality, and, according to
Miyamoto, although the merchante were strictly limited status-wise
in their rela.tions with superiora, they gradua.lly began to acquire a
certain individualistic sense of the equality of all men, through re-
peated contracta and transactions which were essentially of a levelling
nature among the parties.38 In art, an expression of the rise of indi-
vidual consciousness ca.n be seen in the portraya.l of individual per-
ao Ishida., Kinaei Bunka no Tenkai, 382-3. Chu Hsi :* l{ (1130-1200) was
the chief founder of the Neo-Confucia.n school which became the orthodox
Bak'Ufu echool.
si lbid., 383-4. Kamo Ma.buchi a.nd Motoori N orina.ga, the most famous Kok'U-
H Ya.mamoto Masahide llJ *

gaJcU1ilw, were both of mercha.nt stock.
.iE 3'j a.nd Wata.nabe Sh lJl i! 3'f, Kokugak'U
Ron iJ j l [An Essay on Kokugaku], Vol. 19 of Nihon Rekishi Zenaho
(Tokyo: 1939), 9. A short summary of kokugak'U ideas ca.n be found in Bellah,
Tokugawa Religion, op. cit., 99-102.
11 N ihon Shgy Shi, 141.
94 THE MERCHANT OLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JA.PAN
sonality in the ukiyo-e. For the :first time a.n art depicted the personal-
ities of mere commoners, especia.lly those prostitutes a.nd a.ctors who
were the most fa.mous and admired of the time. Pictures of fa.mous
courtesan beauties a.nd portraits of actors in fa.mous scenes a.tta.ined
grea.t popula.rity, in pa.rt beca.use they often depicted actue.l persons.
In sculpture, there was a shift from religious a.nd "monumental" art
to the carving of small and remarkably intrica.te a.nd expressive
objects for individual use a.nd a.ppreciation. 84
The fads which swept through the cities are interpreted by Ishida.
as illustra.tive of the feeling of individualism of the period. Many of
these fads ca.me from the gay quarters, such as kimono styles a.nd
ha.ir styles like the "Shimada," or from the theater.35 The sa.murai
author of the Seji Kemmon Roku lamented the fa.et that the kahuki
set the style and inHuenced the behavior of people: "All the women
in the cities, married or unmarried, take no gres.ter pleasure tha.n in
the kahuki. No one is more idolized than the kahuki a.ctors, and
women never cea.se in their constant infatuation with them. The pla.ys
no longer imita.te society, but society imita.tes the pla.ys as models
for life. " 36
But there is a. sense of frustration and restriction in the avenues
open to the merchant class for self-expression. There is in Saikaku's
novela, a.ccording to Norman, "a yea.rning for grea.ter social or cul-
tural opportunities, for a. wider arena in which to spend energy and
develop ta.lent. " 37 There is a. certain a.ir of futility in the a.lmost
frenzied competition in conspicuous consumption typioa.l of the be-
ha.vior of the mercha.nts in the ge.y qua.rters. Professor Honjo has de-
scribed38 the protected Edo timber mercha.nts, Kinokuniya. Bun-
34 Ishida, Kinsei Bunka no Tenkai, 395-6. Prof. Ishida stresses the depiction
of actual persona by such artista as Suzuki Harunobu (1718-1770) as a.
unique and meaningful aspect of Genroku and later art. It should be kept
in mind, however, that perhaps the majority of the people depicted in
ukiyo-e art were idee.liza.tions or stylizations of types (or in the ca.se of actors~
the Kabuki style) rather tha.n a conscious and realistic representation of
individua.Is.
aD Ishida, Kinaei Bunka no Tenkai, 395.
31 In Kinsei Shakai Keizai S08ho, op. cit., I, 242.
a7 Norman, "Ando Shoeki and the Anatomy of Japanese Feudalism," 74.

as The Social and Econ<J'lrl.-0 H iatory o/ J wpan, 262-4.
za.emon and Na.raya Moza.emon and others gaining the a.dmiration of

all in the gay quarters by throwing a.way money with an a.ir o ut-
most nonchalance, the wives o Edo and Kyoto merchants pa.rading
their expensive clothes in the streets, and the sumptuous mansion of
Y odoya. in Osa.ka. where ca.re seems to have been ta.ken to viola.te
every regula.tion prohibiting the use of la.cquer furnishings, gold, silk,
etc.39 These merchants expended their energies in "endless sexual
adventures, in continua.} experiment with luxury a.nd extra.vagance;
this is the only field in which the new chonin cla.ss could express its
increa.sed power with impunity. "'
But even in the a.morous adventures a.nd in the luxuries in which
the mercha.nts could indulge and which were the rewa.rds o money-
making, there were certa.in da.ngers a.ga.inst which the elder merchants
often wa.rned. Many mercha.nt fa.milies were ruined by spendthrift
sons who frequented the gay quarters, referred to in merchant fa.mily
constitutions as "ba.d places" (akusho ~ .J9f). Sons were wa.rned
aga.inst spending time there, not so much from moral considera.tions,
but a.s a viola.tion o the rugality insisted upon by the merchant
code. However, the principie of subduing the desires wa.s at od.ds with
the principie of making money. The mercha.nts seldom denied them-
selves pleasure. "Up to thirteen, a hoy does not know it; up to
twenty-four or twenty-five, he is under his parents' direction, but
from then on, to a.ge forty-five, he establishes his own fa.mily and is
free to pursue plea.sure to his utmost."41
39It is interesting to compare his description of Y odoya's mansion with the
regulations found on page 255 of Honjo's Soci,aJ, and Economic Hi.Btory o/
Jopan. Many a.necdotes about throwing awa.y money a.re probably mythical.
Tsuchiya, however, is ready to believe sorne of them, such as the story
about Kinokuniya's disturbing Naraya's enjoyment of a snow scene by
throwing coins into the snow and watching gleefully while a mob tra.mpled
and scattered the snow in frantic searching. Nihon no SeiBM, op. cit., 56.
'Norman, "Ando Shoeki and the Anatomy of Japanese Feudalism," 74-5.
During the Genroku period, the Bakufu ha.d not yet declared war on mer-
chant extravagance. It only "checked the more brazen displays of eroticism
and luxury not so much on moral grounds as to protect from contagious
exposure the Spartan spirit of the samurai class, unaware a.11 the time that
the power and prestige of this class were being undermined by causes far
beyond the reach of legislation or exhortation." Ibid., 76.
n Se.ka.ta., Ohimin, 36, quoting Saikaku's Nihon Eiwi,gura.
96 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JA.PAN
The merchant code evolved as the result of years of experience by

Sa.ka.i a.nd Osa.ka. merch&nts, expressing the commonly a.ccepted
mercha.nt morality. Modero Ja.pa.nese writers ca.11 this codethe "wa.y
of the mercha.nt" (chonin do l8'J A ili). The most importe.nt rules
were to revere the fa.mily enterprise and to practice economy in a.11
things. This wa.s a personal code empha.sizing the virtues of h&rd
work a.nd sincerity a.s well a.s fruga.lity, ha.nded down in fa.mily in-
structions a.nd constitutions. There was a. social side to this code
as well. Particularly in Osa.ka., mercha.nts generally recognized that
success was not ma.de up of separa.te des.Is but of continuous business.
Therefore, good will a.nd credit were strongly emphasized, a.nd this
emphasis was ma.de effective la.rgely through merchant organiza.tions,
especia.lly the nakama.42
Within the fa.mily enterprise, rela.tions between employers a.nd
employees were strictly a.s superior to inferior. Loyalty of a. feudal
type was expected of a.U inferiors towa.rds their superiors, a.nd ulti-
mately to the master of the enterprise. This loya.lty wa.s a.n integral
part of the merchant code. It was a.n emotion cultivated throughout
the a.pprentice system, a.nd together with the pa.tem&listic benevo-
lence expected of the superior to the inferior, it was a.mong the
mercha.nts "exa.ctly the same phenomenon as the reciproca.! feeling
between lord a.nd vassa.l which wa.s seen, very much a.live, in the
Kama.kura a.nd sengoku periods, in the samurai cla.ss." All the pa.r-
ticipa.nts in a mercha.nt family enterprise, from the lowliest a.ppren-
tice up, formed an organic unit, a.nd the economic success of the
enterprise mea.nt success for all its members. This ga.ve the mercha.nt
code a. real motivation not seen in pea.cetime in the code of the wa.rriors
{bUBhid).44
A discussion of the Osa.ka. mercha.nt code, however, is insufficient
without looking a.t their a.ctun.l mode of life. Although there wa.s a.
la.rger degree of security a.nd sta.bility in their lives, a.nd a. prima.ry
empha.sis of their oode was frugality, they sought pleasures in muoh
,. Se.ka.ta, Ohnin, 31.

48 lbi,d., 61, 68-9.
" lbi,d., 70-1. Like chnin do, the term is the cree.tion of modern Je.pe.neee
writere.
THE "HAPPY SOCIETY" OF THE GENROKU PEBIOD 97
the same wa.y as their Edo counterpa.rts. They ha.d as much enthu-
sia.sm for the theater a.nd the gay quarters as the Edo merchants. The
Yoshiwa.ra. of Osa.ka. w&s Shimmachi, opened up in the 1620's, where
prostitutes were gra.ded in a. strict hiera.rchy a.nd those of the highest
ra.nk were as a.dmired as in Edo.45
According to Professor Sa.ka.ta, the Edo merchants viola.ted the
merchant code completely. But it wa.s considerad a foreign thing, as
it ha.d been formula.ted in Sa.ka.i a.nd elaborated in Osa.ka.. The Edo
mercha.nts, strongly influenced by the samurai, ha.d a code of their
own, in which the most important element was manly spirit (kylci
fJE i\.). They separated the moral from the economic life, whereas the
Osa.ka meroha.nt oode integrated them. This a.ttitude was never con-
sciously formulated by the Edo merchants as was the Osa.ka mer-
cha.nt code. It was emotiona.l rather than theoretica.1. In actual prac-
tica, this idea of sepa.ra.tion beca.me vulgarizad into the expedient
view that a person should concem himself a.bout ethics only after he
was well fed a.nd well clothed. This did not mean tha.t the Edo mer-
cha.nts ha.d no idea.Is, but tha.t if they did, they were apt to be a.t war
with reality.'8
The merchant code which emerged from the long experienoe of the
Osa.ka mercha.nts contributed to their success and to their feeling of
security, importance and integration in the feudal system. Ca.lling
themselves "merchants ofthe empire" (tenkanoskonin-: r O) jffj A),
they actually ha.d a. certa.in pride in being merchants beca.use they
considered themselves as unique in the country. The Edo mercha.nts,
on the other hand, ha.d no such important position a.nd no such sta.-
bilizing code, and were seldom a.ble to achieve any la.sting success.
They were alwa.ys hard pressed by the activities of the kamigaf4
merchants'7 who established branches in Edo a.nd whose influence,
always strong, continually increased. Besides, Edo, the consumption
center, was a.lways under a huge debt to Osa.ka, the supply center.
The Edo mercha.nts ha.d no chance of bea.ting the Osa.ka. mercha.nts
in this economic ba.ttle, and in Edo, they ha.d to content themselves
with hurling insults at them and a.t other kamigaf4 mercha.nts. The
11 lbid., 34. 411 Sakata, OMnin, 125-6.
J: j. From the KyotoOsa.ka a.rea, including Omi and Ise.

47
.
epithets "Omi robbers" a.nd "lse begge.rs" were most current a.mong
Edo mercha.nts.48
Generalizing a.bout the mercha.nt mentality of the Tokuga.wa. pe-
riod, Professor Miya.moto sees both positive a.nd nega.tive a.spects. As
positive a.spects, Miya.moto lists frugality, careful calculation of profits,
a.nd resourcefulness. These quaJ.ities were seen in varying degrees in a.U
merchants, a.nd most strikingly exemplified by such mercha.nt fa.milies
as Mitsui, K~noike a.nd Sumitomo. The frank profit-seeking of mer-
cha.nts has been despised by ma.ny Ja.pa.nese writers, both contem-
pora.ry a.nd recent, but Miya.moto believes it wa.s not so much for
themselves or merely for the sake of profit itself, but for their fa.m-
ilies.49 As negative aspects, he points out tha.t a.11 merchants lived in
a. feudal society and na.tura.lly reflected the prevalent concepta of the
duty of service to superiora, honor (or "fa.ce," taimen ftl ifii), and
the recognition of the limita.tions of social position. These concepts
permea.ted the mercha.nt mentality. The respect a.nd obliga.tion (on A)
felt by the samurai who received la.nd in fief from feudal lords wa.s
pa.ralleled a.mong mercha.nts who generally thought of participa.tion
in commerce as a privilege granted from a.hove. This wa.s a.n idea es-
pecia.lly strong a.mong members of cha.rtered tra.de a.ssociations (kabu
na/cama), where this privilege was expressed concretely in the member-
ship privileges (kabu) which they held. The first sentence in naka11UJ.
regulations almost always expressed this feeling, a.nd pledged a.bsolute
a.dherence to la.w. As for "fa.ce," this feeling was as strong as among
samurai.60 The limitations of social position were strongly felt. One of
the ha.sic official instructions of the Tokugawa period was, "Know
your place !"61 This emphasis on knowing the limita.tions of status
reinforced precedent a.nd fa.mily tra.dition a.nd opposed innovations,
discoveries, inventions, a.ggressive competition, new markets, and
new types of tra.nsa.ctions.52
'8 Sakata, OMnin, 128-9. " Nihon ShOgyo Shi, 186-8. MI !bid., 184-5.
u Mi no hodo wo ahire, written in kana so that everyone could read it, it was
known as the seven-character instruction. Akabori, Tolcugawa Jidai no
SMnin, 191.
111 Miyamoto, Nihon SMgyo Ski,' 186. These points are elaborated in Miyamoto's
Kinsei SMnin Iahiki no Kenkyu jl( iU: 1Ji A ~ ffl O) JJF ~ [Studies in
the Mercha.nt Mentality of the Ea.rly Modem Period] (Tokyo: 1941), 27-42.
THE "H.APPY SOCIETY'' OF THE GENROKU PERIOD 99
The general prosperity and increa.sed standard of living experienced

in the Genroku period meant a. great increa.se in the ma.nufa.cturing
and sale of commercial goods. Not only did the mercha.nts benefit
from this, but the Genroku period saw the draining of feudal trea.s-
uries into merchant coffers. The daimyo and ordinary sa.mura.i alike
beca.me more deeply indebted to the mercha.nt money lendera. This
ga.ve the mercha.nts a. high degree of economic security a.nd permitted
the development of a type of merchant nobility with the leisure and
inclina.tion not only for amusements but for experimenting in or
pa.tronizing new artistic and litera.ry forma. These new cultural forms
which sprang from the new city society a.nd which colored and glorified
for the :first time the lives of townspeople were doubtless factora in the
stimula.tion of certain huma.nistic and individua.listic trends in
thought seen, for example, in the kogaku-ha and the kokugaku-ha. But
Genroku culture wa.s more the expression of a.n emotional than an
intellectual emancipa.tion. Thea.ters a.nd gay qua.rters could flourish,
a.nd fa.da could sweep the cities. Merchante could win the admira.tion
a.nd envy of lesser townspeople with their a.morous adventures and
by their indulgence in extra.vagance for the sa.ke of extrava.gance,
la.rgely within the narrow confines of the gay quarters.58 However,
this did not mena.ce the prerogatives of the feudal rulers, but instea.d
provided harmless outlets for ambition and energy, and the Bakufu
did not attempt to suppress it.
The elder a.nd wiser merchants cautioned against extrava.gance,
and insisted on conformance with the "way of the merchant." This
mercha.nt code wa.s most effective in Osa.ka. However, it combined
with the essentially conservative mentality of the great ma.jority of
the city mercha.nts of the period, a feeling fostered by their privileged
economic position, their close and advanta.geous connections with the
samurai cla.ss, a.nd an understa.nda.ble fea.r of arbitrary reprisals from a.n
ea.sily a.roused tyranny. The self-expression of the merchante bloomed
spectacularly, much like a hothouse flower, in the special conditions
of the Genroku period, but this combination of conserva.tive forces
was sufficient to prevent it from ta.king a. da.ngerous antifeudal turn.
11 Te.kige.we., Nihon Shakai Shi, 327, ce.lls the theaters e.nd the gay quarters
the "hee.vens of the townspeople."
CHAPTER VI
THE TOKUGAWA DEADLOCK-

ALTERNATIONS IN CITY AND FEUDAL PREDOMINANCE
(1703-1843)
T HE "HAPPY SOCIETY" of the Genroku period wa.s bound to be

tempora.ry. The limita of the economic expa.nsion of the first
century of Tokugawa. rule were reached a.nd could not be extended
fa.r without be.sic changes. The increa.se of the popula.tion of the cities
which ha.d been so rapid bega.n to slow down a.fter the Genroku period
a.nd by about 1735 ca.me to a virtual sta.ndstill.1 Opportunities for
employment in the cities for peasa.nts escaping from the countryside
disappeared a.fter the construction boom which Tsunayoshi had ex-
tended with his fondness for lavish building.2 The a.rea of la.nd under
cultivation continued to increa.se somewhat due to la.nd recla.mation,
but total a.gricultural production ma.de but small ga.ins a.fter a.bout
1730.8 The peasants, subjected to increa.sing exploitation, a.nd vir-
tua.lly denied the recourse of flight to the cities, resorted to two des-
pera.te methods of a.llevia.ting their extreme poverty: limitation of
popula.tion by birth control, abortion a.nd infa.nticide-a. nega.tive
mea.ns, a.nd pea.sant uprisings-a positive mea.ns.' The result wa.s a.
general stagnation of both popula.tion and production levels.
Markets were a.lm.ost entirely limited by the exclusion policy to
domestio markets, which expanded grea.tly during the first hundred
years largely dueto the great increases in city and ca.stle town popu-
lation. When these increa.ses slowed to a. virtual halt, there was little
room for further expansion of ma.rkets due to the very low purchasing
power of the agricultural villa.ges. Through the application of capital,
provincial production could gradua.lly be increased, but the actual
1 Horie, .. Shihon Sh'IJ{J'i .. , 4 7.
1 Ibid.
8 Matsuyoshi Sadao, "Tokugawa Bakufu no Kaikon Seisaku Kanken,"
op. cit., 14.
Shihon Shugi Hattatsu Ski 3:.

"Horie, . . Shihon Sh'IJ{J'i . . , 47; Takahashi Kamekichi ~ti & tf, Nihon
a* Ji"* & ~ Al!, [A History of the
Development of Capitalism in Japan] (Tokyo: 6th ed., 1939), 10 ff.
100
THE TOKUGAWA DEADLOCK 101
expansion w&s smaJl.6 The issuanoe by the kan of pa.per money (kan-
satsu) and the Bakufu ourrenoy deva.1.ua.tions served to expa.nd the
limita ofthe ma.rkets somewhat, but only tempora.rily. From the first,
the development of monopoliatio nakama and especia.lly kahu nakama
by the meroha.nts ge.ve rise to a.n artificial limita.tion of the ma.rkets.
The inefficiencies of tra.nsport ha.mpered the expa.nsion of ma.rkets
and aided monopoliatic merchant orga.niza.tions in securing a.nd
holding their own markets aga.inst competition. 8 Most mercha.nts,
having achieved monopoliatic control of a. particul&r market, were
content with it, and did not strive to expa.nd it. Also, their policies of
controlling production by a.dva.ncing capital or through the "putting-
out" system led to a.n a.bsorption of the producers' profits which dis-
couraged a.n increa.se in purchasing power in the countryside.7
The f&ctors which contributed to the economic contra.ction did not
arise full blown a.fter the Genroku period. They a.re evident in the
Genroku period, but beca.me gr&duaJly more and more prominent a.s
the eighteenth century progressed. With this development ca.me a.
change in the attitude of the samurai towa.rd the merchant class.
During the Genroku period, the samurai displayed irritation at the
luxury of a. cla.ss supposed to be the lowest in the social hierarchy.
Townsmen, especially mercha.nts, spent money which the samurai
felt should rightfully belong to them, and which they felt wa.s ta.ken
from them by dishonest mercha.nts. The samurai were especiaJly in-
censed a.t high interest re.tes on loa.ns a.nd monopoliatic control of
prices by the merchante. As these conditions undermined the se.m-
ura.is' economio security, irritation at the merchants deepened into
enmity,8 anda. struggle ensued.
It is possible to trace, in very genera.1 terma, a. constant altemation
11 Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," op. cit., 124; 128-9.

8 lbid., 124, 129.
7 Horie, . . Shihvn Shugi . , 31.
8 Takahashi, Nihon Shihon Shugi Hattat8u Shi, op. cit., 10, lista four sources
of social dislocation: (1) Kuge (court nobles) and the court age.inst the
Baku/u, (2) Baku/u a.nd allies against the outer han, (3) Upper class samurai
against lower class samurai, and (4) Samurai age.inst peasa.nts and townsmen.
Ali of these inherent hostilities increased with the decline of the feudal
institutions a.nd the rise of the money economy.
throughout the Tokuga.wa. period between feuda.l a.nd city influences

in the position of cultural a.nd economic predominance:
l. 1600-1687 First years of the period Feudal
2. 1688-1703 Genroku period City
3. 1716-1735 "Kyoho reform" (Shogun Yoshimune) Feudal
4. 1751-1786 "Tanuma period" City
5. 1787-1793 "Kansei reform" (Councillor Matsudaira) Feudal
6. 1804-1829 Bunka-Bunsei periods City
7. 1841-1843 "Tempo reform" (Councillor Mizuno) Feudal
Neither won a definite victory. In the final a.nalysis, the feudal rulers,
always politicaJly predominant, were able to require the cities a.nd the
merchants to conform to their rules, while the cities and the mer-
chants were able to exist and fiourish only by relying upon the
existing feudal relationships.9 It was an uneasy kind of coexistence
of closely interdependent but a.t the same time incompatible forces.
The :first period was definitely one of feudal predominance, when
the feuda.! a.uthorities often asserted their prerogatives and the mer-
chant class, aware of the dangers inherent in their position, were
nonetheless a.ble eventuaJly to achieve a considerable degree of se-
curity, working almost underground. The Genroku period wa.s the
:first and most striking period of city a.nd merchant predominance in
the cultural and economic spheres.
In the struggle which followed the Genroku period, the first blow
was struck in 1705 by the Bakufu when it accused the house of Y o-
doya, the most prominent in Osa.ka, of ostentatious luxury not be-
fitting a member of the merchant class, and confiscated its entire
wealth. The successive heads of the house of Y odoya enjoyed rice
stipends, wore swords as the agents of some thirty-three daimyo, and
lived in a mansion which was more luxurious than those of most of
the daimyo themselves.10 This was enough to give a pretext for the
confiscation. However, the Yodoya family could not be accused of the
type of conspicuous consumption practiced in Edo by such protected
mercha.nts as Kinokuniya. and Na.raya.. Moreover, Yodoya's mode of
life was duplica.ted by such protected Osa.ka mercha.nts as Konoike,
e Ishida, Kinaei Bunka no Tenkai, op. cit., 414.

NKSJ,
1 1661, 469; Honjo, The Social, and Eecmomic; Hiatory o/ Japan, 264.
Tenn~jiya and Hiranoya.11 Also, the head of the house of Yodoya

wa.s a mere boy of eighteen and wa.s not personaJly culpable. The real
rea.son for the confiscation wa.s the fa.et that Yodoya had come to
control the finances of many of the daimyo of Kysh a.nd western
Honsh who found themselves in &n intolerable situation, so deeply
in debt to Yodoya as to ha.ve lost their freedom of &ction in fina.ncial
affairs. According to Matsuyoshi, "There is no doubt that it wa.s a
resolute action taken to break this financia! a.nd economic stale-
mate. "11
The confiscation not only served to cancel the huge debts owed
Yodoya. by the daimyo, but it gave the Bakufu a nice profit, esti-
mated by & contempora.ry source a.t no less than 121,867,610 ryo,u
proba.bly a.n exa.ggera.tion, but even a fraction of this a.mount would
ha.ve been &fa.bulous sum for the time. Saburoomon, the unfortunate
hoy who had come into this fortune not long before, wa.s imprisoned.
He wa.s later permitted to spend the rest of his life under house arrest
in a Shinto shrine which had made a plea for him, but it wa.s the end
of the house of Y odoya..1'
It wa.s the Yodoya. incident which reminded the merchante for-
cibly that they were only merch&nts, just &t the time when they were
ga.ining a new degree of independence a.nd infiuence. The blow had
faJlen where it wa.s perhaps lea.st expected, on the well established,
honored a.nd compa.ratively conserva.tive house of Y odoya., not only
the gres.test of Osa.ka merchant fe.milies but known for its cultural
activities a.nd great interest in the arts, especia.lly in linking verses
(renga) a.nd in the tea ceremony.15 The confiscation made a deep im-
11 Kanno, "Tokugawa Jidai Sh~nin no Chifu," 44.
11 NKSJ, 1661-2.
18 Takigawa, Nihon Shakai Shi, 244. It included "fifty pairs of gold screens,
three hundred and sixty carpeta, innumerable precious stones, mansions,

granaries and storehouses, and gold pieces by the hundred thousand."
Sansom, Ja.pan, a Short C'liltura/, Hiatory, 472. A complete inventory can
be found in Takekoshi, Eoonomic Aspe.eta . . , II, 251-5.
H NKSJ, 1662. Confiscation (keasho 1&51 Wf) was connected with pnnishments
for all types of crimes, and variad in extent with the gravity of the crime.
NKSJ, 469. It always accompanied ba.nishment, a pnnishment often meted
out during the smgoku period. The Baku/u made use of this tra.d.ition.
Takigawa, Nihon Shakai Shi, 325. 16 NKSJ, 1661.
104 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUG.A.W.A. J.A.P.A.N
pression on the mercha.nts of the entire country. It ha.d a sobering

effect even on the nouveaux rickes of Edo, and underlined the wa.rn-
ings of the elder merchants. It threw a sha.dow over the more im-
portant merchant families in the cities and forced them to be more
careful.18
The complete subjection of the merchants to the politica.l power
of the Bakufu and their impotence in the fa.ce of confiscation empha.-
sizes the separation between politica.l and economic power. The
separation becomes more striking with the increase in mercha.nt
wealth a.nd the attendant impoverishment of the ruling cla.sses, be-
ca.use needless to say, such isolated events as the Yodoya confiscation
did not change the trend of the times.17
The first of the "three great reforms" of the Tokuga.wa period was
that of Yoshimune in the Kyoho period (1716-1735). They were
undertaken not to improve the national economy but primarily to
lift the Bakufu out of its financia! impoverishment and, as a secondary
purpose, to restrain the merchant cla.ss. Considering these limited
aims, they all achieved a degree of success, but none of them remediad
the ha.sic conditions which ge.ve rise to these pressing problems.18
Looking back at Ieyasu's time when the feudal power ha.sed on the
land was as yet unchallenged a.nd the financia! position of the Bakufu
a truly enviable one, Yoshimune set in motion a "back-to-Ieyasu"
movement, emulating his great ancestor by first economizing on
Bakufu expenses. As part of this effort, he suspended all construction
projects and prohibited new contracta for a time. The first to feel the
brunt of Yoshimune's economic retrenchment were the protected
merchants of Edo. The Edo merchants lived primarily by supplying
the economic needs of the samurai class for consumera' goods. Their
livelihood was almost entirely dependent upon these needs of the
samurai. The wealth of the Edo merchants was due largely to pro-
te Sakata, OMnin, 37.
17 !bid., 38. Sakata calla this aeparation of econom.ic and political power one
of the be.sic "contradictions" (mujun j f Ji) of the Tokugawa aociety, a
term in common use among J apaneae writera on Tokugawa J apan, even
though not of Marxiat orientation.
18 Theae three reforma are treated in a series of articles in the KSK, XV, l
(Jan. 1936), 1-111.
tection and the corruption of the political power. When this pro-
tection was withdra.wn a.nd the politica.l power reverted to its original
form, their specia.l privileges were destroyed.19
Under Yoshimune, the samurai went even further into debt. Yo-
shimune a.ttempted to discourage samurai from borrowing money by
exhorting them to fruga.lity while enforcing strict economy in the
Baku/u itself. He a.lso legisla.ted aga.inst the ea.mura.is' pra.ctice of ex-
trica.ting themselves from financia! distress by selling their sa.mura.i
status to rich mercha.nts or peasa.nts. This wa.s obviously destructive
of the feudal system. It was etfected usua.lly by a.dopting a commoner
as heir (often marrying a da.ughter to him), for a. la.rge sum of money.
Although no doubt rare in Yoshimune's time, it beca.me more fre-
quent towa.rd the end of the Tokuga.wa. period, with the accelera.ting
deca.y of the sa.mura.i's fina.nces, integrity, a.nd pride.m
Some schola.rs a.dvoca.ted tha.t the mercha.nts be thoroughly sup-
pressed. Ogy Sora.i, for exa.mple, blamed the mercha.nts for the lack
of order in society, a.nd he h.ad the ea.r of Yoshimune. His a.ttitude is
seen in his Seidan, 21 written a.bout 1720: "The samurai a.nd pea.santa
ha.ve no mea.ns of subsistence besides their la.nd. They a.re consta.nt
factora in government a.nd it is the duty a.nd be.sic prinoiple of gov-
ernment to see a.lwa.ys to their well-being. Mercha.nts, on the other
ha.nd, carry on a.n insignifioa.nt occupa.tion ... it should be no concem
of government if they ruin themselves." No doubt influenced by this
kind of advice, Yoshimune decided tha.t the Baku/u officia.ls should
stop a.ccepting litiga.tion conceming loa.ns to members of the sa.mura.i
class by mercha.nts in Baku/u cities.21
This policy of refusing resort to litiga.tion by mercha.nts wa.s not
without precedent. The Baku/u ha.d refused in 1685 a.nd in 1702 to
hea.r ca.ses brought by /udaaaaki a.ga.inst katamoto a.nd go-kenin as a.
mea.ns of a.ssisting their direot va.ssa.ls.23 Even without this official
11 Se.ka.ta, Ohiinin, 45.
10 Sansom, Japan, a Short Cultural Hiatory, 521; Honjo, 'l'he Social and Eco-
nomic History of Japan, 204-6. Prices of samurai status eventually fluctu-
ated with changas in economic conditions, like any commodity bought
and sold.
11 In Nihon Keizai S0sho, op. cit., ID, 427.
11 Se.ka.ta, Ohnin, 54. 11 NKSJ, 322.
policy, officie.ls sometimes found means to dismiss ca.ses a.ga.inst

samurai. For exa.mple, a. samurai who owed a. hea.vy debt to a. mer-
chant money-lender absconded. His lord decided his family na.me
should be ended, but the authorities decided the heir should begin a.
"new" samurai fa.mily with the same na.me which would not be
subject to the debt. They a.rgued tha.t the heir knew nothing a.bout
the loa.ns a.nd should not be burdened with them. 21 When daimyo re-
fused topa.y debts and the mercha.nt money-lender a.ppealed to the
Bakufu, the Bakufu often a.rranged for pa.yment by insta.llments over
a long period, they did not wish or could not find justifica.tion for
dismissing the ca.se. In the final ana.lysis, the Bakufu "could not force
the ba.nkruptcy of a daimyo dueto debts." 25 In Edo, excuses were
often found for refusing to hea.r complaints. In one case, the house of
Mori refused to repa.y a Kyoto money excha.nge a loan of 10,000 ryo.
The excha.nge was forced to close, and the hea.d of the house went to
Edo to appeal to the Bakufu, only to be told that since he ha.d once
received a rice stipendfrom theMori house, it would be ''unprincipled
a.nd unpardona.ble" for him to bring a. suit a.gainst his master. The
daimyo who most frequently refused to repay loa.ns in the early
Tokuga.wa period were Shima.zu of Sa.tsuma. a.nd Hosoka.wa ofHigo.28
The finances of the various daimyo were tempora.rily a.ided by Y o-
shimune's policies, but as there wa.s no longer a.ny gua.ra.ntee a.ga.inst
defa.ulting on loa.ns, they found it more difficult to get loans.27 The
decision to stop a.ccepting litigation was a blow principally felt by the
:financiers who specie.lized in loa.ns to daimyo, but it disturbed the
financia! world genera.Uy. Those who suffered most were the money
exchanges (ryogae-ya) who had used deposita collected from mer-
cha.nts to lend to daimyo.~
In 1722, as part of his effort to improve Bakufu finances, Yoshi-
mune levied a ta.x on a.11 feuda.l lords of one hundredth of their a.nnua.l
s4 Wigmore, "Materials .. ," op. oit., Supplements 3-4, 333-337. Also see ibid.,
9-10; 210; 301-303; 370-378 for other cases, in which the officials seem to
have been quite conscientious, and did not decide in favor of samurai
without sorne justification.
'llo Takigawa, Nihon Shakai Shi, op. cit., 322.
u !bid., 324, citing the Ohfrnin Koken Roku of Mitsui Takafusa.
s 7 Saka.ta, Ohnin, 73. as Saka.ta., OMnin, 48.
rice incomes. At the same time, so that they could pay this, he re-
duced by half the required period of residence of daimyo in Edo. This
reform la.sted for nine years, but was abolished under the criticisms
of Muro Kyuso (1658-1734) and other schola.rs who believed in main-
taining the aankin kOwi system intact for stra.tegic reasons. While
it la.sted, it decrea.sed the expenditures of the daimyo and likewise the
profits of the merchants.
In a.n a.ttempt to bring down usurious interest rates and help out
his direct va.ssals (the kawmoto a.nd go-kenin), Yoshimune limited the
number of fudasaaki to 109 in 1724, giving them & monopoly of the
business, and at the same time set a ceiling on interest ratea of 15%
per annum. Not wishing to be limited to a mere 15%, the fudasaaki
appeaJed on the grounds tha.t there wa.s a tendency for financia.!
backers to repay loans negotiated by the fudaaaaki in order to mini-
mize the interest cha.rges, thus decreasing the income of the fudasaaki.
This wa.s only a. pretext, however, and the a.ppea.l conta.ined a. refer-
ence to the willingness of the fudaaaaki to provide the Bakufu with
loa.ns (goyo-kin) .., The Bakufu reply to the appea.l was so a.mbiguous
as to mean silent a.ssent to higher interest rates a.nd a victory for the
judasaaki. 81
For mercha.nts who ma.de loa.ns to members of the samurai cla.ss,
the honor which the samurai cherished wa.s importa.nt security. How-
ever, in ca.ses where samurai defa.ulted, merchants had had the right to
& hearing from Bakufu officials, if they resided in a Baku/u-controlled
area.. This ha.d been their la.stand very important recourse, a.lthough to
take a case to court required of the merchant a. good dea.l of coura.ge
and the firm conviction of being in the right. 82 As the daimyo beca.me
NKSJ, 13. This ta.x on daimyo was called agemai J: W ::*
tltJ JJJ ~ These were loa.ns to feudal rulers with no necessa.ry obligation for
repa.yment. This term. is usua.lly tra.nsla.ted "forced loa.ns." They were often
"requested" by the feudal a.uthorities.
ai Se.ka.ta., OMnin, 113.
32 In the first place, settlement out of court wa.s alwa.ys a.ttempted, and
exha.ustive efforts at concilia.tion were ma.de before resort wa.s ha.el to the
a.uthorities. Even then, judgments were la.rgely personal ones, as written
la.ws were (no doubt purposely) vague. It wa.s the rule of man ra.ther tha.n
the rule of law. Another deterrent, perha.ps, for a mercha.nt petitioner, wa.s
the requirement tha.t he crawl on ha.nds a.nd knees from the door of the court
108 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAl"AN
more and more impoverished, the number of merchante forced into

bankruptcy due to defaulting daimyo increased, even with this Ba-
kufu protection. The daimyo sa.w this as merely a hard necessity, a.nd
when the Bakufu under Y oshimune abolished this recourse to liti-
gation, the daimyo were freed from ultima.te legal responsibility.
Loans to daimyo beca.me far more da.ngerous, and the weak position
of the mercha.nt in the face of political power was once more revealed.
However, at the same time the basically unsound fina.ncial policy of
the Baku/u was not to be changed by Yoshimun~'s policies. This was
the weakness of the samurai clase and the strength of the merchant
class.88
The Edo merchante were dealt a serious blow by Y oshimune's
economic retrenchment, but the failure of some of the protected
merchante in Edo was no real loes to the economy, as these mer-
chante were the temporary creations of a period of reckless spending.
With them disappeared the "expansive atmosphere" of the Genroku
period, and merchante reverted to their pre-Genroku type.M A con-
temporary observer describes it this way: "lnstead of a merchant
spending 100 a.nd his companion 1000, now, the first spends 10 and
his companion 5, and they go home. " 36 The Osaka. merchante, on the
other hand, protected by their essential soundness, scarcely were
touched by the economic retrenchment.
Although many of Y oshimune's policies were dis&dvanta.geous to
the merchant class, he gave the nakama organizations just what they
had wanted for many yea.rs--official recognition. Y oshimune not only
recognized existing nakama and me.de provisions for chartering them
as kahu nakama, but he actually took steps to ha.ve merchante a.nd
to the judgment room to present his case. See Dan F. Henderson, "Some
Aspects of Tokugawa Law," Washington Law Review 27, 1 (Feb. 1952),
especially 96, 98-102.
as Sakata, Ohanin, 50-1.
a& !bid., 45-6.
a& Waga Koromo, in Enselci Jisshu, I, 142, quoted in Sakata, OhOnin, 45. This
source goes on to say, "For the men of the Genroku period, bad places
(akusho) were places to throw away money. Those who had not the heart
to throw a.way money did not enter there . . . for the men of toda.y, they
risk being laughed at ifthey set their foot inside such a place."
artisans who were not members join them.88 Speculative e:x:cha.nges

were given officia.l a.pproval for the first time, ton' ya were recognized
as well, a.nd all types of lcabu could be lega.lly bought a.nd sold a.nd used
as security on loa.ns.87
The orga.niza.tion of ton'ya a.nd nakama into lcabunakama ga.ve the
members exclusive rights a.nd the mea.ns to protect them. If infringe-
ments of these rights were discovered, the kohu nakama would a.ppea.l
to the a.uthorities. These requests, often compla.ining, "We a.re being
hindered by the a.ctions of non-members," would usually be supported
by the officia.ls.88 This ga.ve to the ton' ya in particular immense pres-
tige to inspire confidence a.nd a.lmost unlimited credit. Its exclusive
position ena.bled members to sta.bilize their fa.mily enterprises. Profits
from monopoly pricing enriched kaJJu nakama members, and there
was no fea.r of ba.nkruptcy. Ma.na.gement of the fa.mily enterprise
could usually be pa.ssed on from genera.tion to genera.tion without
trouble, although there were ca.ses where fa.milies split, brought in
-0ther fa.milies, sometimes selling kaJJu or increa.sing their number.
However, these cha.nges were ma.de only a.fter a strict investiga.tion
and discussion by the kaJJu nakama a.ssembly, a.nd permitted only
when the credit or a.bility of the fa.mily ma.na.gement wa.s a.t a. very
low ebb. Also, these ca.ses a.rose seldom beca.use wea.k enterprises were
not a.ccepted into membership, a.nd business sta.bility of members
plus the supervision of the experienced mercha.nts of the kaJJu nakama
38 Nomura, "Tokuga.wa. Hoken Sei to Shogyo," op. cit., 126. Non-members

were required to report to the authorities if they wished to enter an orga.ni-
za.tion. This did not mean they were prohibited from participa.ting in an
enterprise outside a nakama, but "it would appear that if those who neither
entered a nakama nor reported to the authorities did not make some ar-
ra.ngements themselves, they were made for them. Since the prohibition is
not specific on this point, it is impossible to know what arrangements were
made, but it probably meant ultimately tha.t they were forced to enter.
However, in actual fact, merchante and artisans proba.bly found it possible
to carry on enterprises without entering." In principie, it was possible for
outside merchante to form new competing kabu nakama, but it was probably
almost impossible in practice. Ibid.
37 Yoshimura, "Edo Jidai ni okeru Shogyo no Seishitsu," op. cit., 199; Nomura,
"Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 127.

as Smith, "Materials . .," 90.
110 THE MEBCllANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPA.N
made it almost difficult to lose money.81 In short, it was a most com-

forting kind o security.
The recognition o these eSBentiaJly monopolistic organizations was
a reversa.l of the policy of non-interference and it created the con-
ditions under which commerce was to develop until 1843. For this
reason, it requires some discussion. Early in the Tokugawa period,
when commerce was considered a serv&nt of the feudal order rather
than &danger to it, the Confuci&n theory of free circulation of goods
was genera.lly accepted. Later, however, adapting to the conditions,
the policy changed to simply &n emphasis on the abolition of monopo-
listic combin.&tions. However, repeated prohibitions had little effect
on the organization of monopolistic nakama, and a change of policy
was inevitable. Since the Bakufu was una.ble to abolish the nalcama,.
it decided to utilize them. By granting official recognition, the Ba,-
lcufu meant to regula.te prices through the cha.rtered trade associations
(lcabu nakama) thus created, a.nd was &ble to utilize them for the
tra.nsmission and enforcement of orders to the merchants.40
Besides the mea.ns of control which this policy provided to the
Bakufu, the policy of recognition provided a new source of revenue.
Ch&rter fees c&lled unjo-hin were required when the lcabu nakmn.a
were first orga.nized,'1 and regular contributions were aleo required,.
ca.lled myi)ga-lcin.42 The amount of these fees was usua.lly determined
by discussion between the town ma.gistrate (machi bugyo) and repre-
sentatives of the nakama, on a price-haggling basis. The merchante.
88 Miyamoto, Nihon Kinsei Ton'ya Sei no Kenk'!J', op. cit., 367.
' Nomura, "Tokuga.wa. Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 123. Miyamoto, Kabu Nakama
no Kenk'!J', op. cit., 252.
u Unj-kin m J: ~ (or simply unjo), "thank money," was collected on oc-
ca.sions other tha.n cha.rtering. These fees were known from the first of the
Tokuga.wa period, but used regularly only from the Genroku era., when
Ogiwara levied one on aake. Periodic unjo were connected with goods in
the Nagasa.ki foreign trade a.nd gold and silver foil before Yoshimune's time.
Se.ka.ta, OMnin, 58.
u Ji: 1JD ~ (or myga). Generally, there were two types: (1) collected from
kabu nakama, sometimes ca.me to be a. fixed amount ea.ch year, a.nd (2) col-
lected from individual enterprises, be.sed roughly on the amount of pro-
duction in the ca.se of aa~, soy sauce, and pressed ol. From inns which
fumished prostitutas on request, and from pawn shops, amounts were de-
termined separately for ea.ch establishment. NKSJ, 1577-8.
usua.lly succeeded in keepingthesefees quite low. Nevertheless, they

were a new source of revenue, although a comparatively minor one.
This reversa! of policy indicates a rea.Iistic reappraisal of the role
of the nakama. The objective situation, namely, the Bahufu's failure
in its attempt to prohibit the nakama, was admitted, and the
fUJkama used as a means to control prices and production and a.lso as
a. source of revenue. Group control of both merchant and a.rtisan
enterprises spra.ng first from the merchants and artisans themselves,
and the Bahufu ca.me to recognize the nakama for a variety of
rea.sons, always as a. matter of immedia.te convenience. This wa.s a.lso
genera.lly true in the va.rious han. From the first, fUJkama or kabu
nakama, besides providing security to their members, prevented the
production of inferior goods, and provided a cert&in standardiza.tion
and gua.ra.ntee of qua.lity. In this wa.y they were a.dva.nta.geous to the
consumers. The officia.l policy of utilizing them wa.s a rea.sonable
means of sta.bi1izing economic rela.tions genera.lly. However, fUJkama
prohibited competition both within the orga.nization, among mem-
bers, and outside, preventing free entry to tra.de." This disoouraged
individual initia.tive and the expansion of individual enterprises. For
exa.mple, members of the Osa.ka guild of ha.nd-opera.ted la.the workers
limited themselves volunta.rily to no more tha.n two la.thes for ea.ch
house.'6 This type of limita.tion of commercial goods wa.s in harmony
with Y oshimune's policy of frugality, a.nd the 17 21 order recognizing
and encouraging kabu nalcama specifica.lly forbids the manufacture
u Smith, "Materia.Is . .," 91. For exa.mple, as a result of such a discussion,
which "beca.me rathertroubleeome," it wa.s decided that the 24-group ton'ya
of Osa.ka, the largeet in the country, would pe.y only 300 ryo the first year.
100 ryo in following years, "with the prospect of eome increasee in le.ter
yea.rs." lbid., 112. Thie is an indication of the influence of the Osa.ka mer-
chante. The Tok:umi Don' ya of Edo was not nearly so lucky, paying at one
time 10,200 ryo in myaga-kin annua.lly. Yoshimura, "Edo Jida.i . .," 200.
" The idea of economic competition wa.s so strange to the Japa.nese in pre-
Restoration de.ye tha.t scholars translating Western economic works into
Japaneee could find no word for "competition." Fukuza.wa Yukichi, the
famous Westernizer, coined the word kyoBo lt ~. combining the worde for
"re.ce" and fight," and has related "how shocked his collea.guee were by such
harsh terminology.'' Sansom, The Weatem World and J<J!J><m, 235.
" Horie, . . Keizai Seiaa'ku,, 107. Theee lathes were used for making a variety of
goods, including pottery.
of "new things." The control of prod.uction which was one of the

objects of the recognition and encouragement of kabu nakama in a
way a.ssisted prod.uction at first, but in time the limit&tion of supply
and the control of prices restricted prod.uction."
Besides its role as a st&bi1izing factor in the economic field of pro-
duction and prices, the nakama wa.s recognized as & means of making
Baku/u cla.ss policy more effective. The nakama built up the appren-
tice system, and entrance came to be genera.lly limited to heredity
a.nd completion of apprenticeship, in both industrial a.nd commercial
enterprises. Also, the number of apprentices wa.s limited and they
were almost always chosen from relatives of members. This left little
opportunity for pea.santa who had fled their native places to get into
trade except outside the nakama, &nd this was made even more dif-
ficult by the policy of recognizing the nakama and giving them tighter
monopolies. The recognition policy undoubtedly contributed to the
rigidity of class lines and helped to discourage pea.santa from going
to the cities and ca.stle towns.
Y oshimune's economic policies, although unpopul&r with samurai,
whose stipends were reduced, as well as with merchants, restored the
solvency of the Baku/u and the social baJ.a.nce generally which had
existed before the Genroku period.47 His period. as Shogun is a.n im-
porta.nt one in economic history beca.use most of the economic policies
of the middle and late Tokuga.wa were originated by him or took defi-
nite form under his regime.cs Y oshimune was more nearly successful
in his attempts to restore a.n effective feudal rule than any of his suc~
cessors. However, the merchant class had been successful in gaining
a real a.nd perm.a.nent influence during the Genroku period, a.nd once
this ha.d ha.ppened, the principies of feudal rule were no longer va.lid.
u Horie, Keizai Seisaku, 107.

1 Sakata, OMnin, 55.
' The most important of these new policies were: encouragement of agriculture,
land reclamation, and local specialty products; the general recognition a.nd
fostering of kabu nakama; the regula.tion of the price of rice a.nd other com-
modities, a.nd, in addition to these e:fforts to stimula.te production, Yoshi-
mune a.ttempted to decrea.se consumption by continuing Ara.i Hakuseki's
policy of strenuous fruga.lity which wa.s urged upon a.11, a.nd a.ctua.lly prac-
ticad by the Shogun himself. Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 168-9.
The time had alrea.dy come when social and economic forces could
not expand without breaking through the feuda.l structure. At the
same time, Y oshimune wa.s una.ble to push back the forces which ha.d
evolved for more tha.n a hundred years, forces which were not under-
stood by the feudal rulera beca.use of their newness in Japanese
history and beca.use of their complexity. Even they had been under-
stood, any real remedy would have been the very denia.l of the feudal
ha.sis of the Tokuga.wa regime.
It is probably true, as Professor Se.ka.ta suggests, that the over-
spending of the Bakufu in the middle and late seventeenth century,
especia.lly during the Genroku period, me.de further development of
an enlightened feudal regime almost impossible. This "inexcusable"
policy mea.nt tha.t the role of rea.ction fell to Yoshimune, who wa.s
forced to stop the spending policy a.nd revert to feudal simplicity."
It would appear, though, tha.t the overspending of the Bakufu
merely ha.atened the tendencies towards a dea.dlock between feudal
and money power. Yoshimune's a.ttempts to restore the old balance
were futile, a.lthough he did a.chieve a temporary success in restoring
Bakufu solvency, a.nd in increasing production and decrea.sing ex-
penditures. His policy towa.rds nakama me.de them an a.dditional,
although rather small, source of revenue, but failed ultimately as a
mea.ns for price regula.ting. The price regula.ting function of the kahu
nakama worked in the one direction of raising prices. The practice of
shting the burden of the Bakufu fees to the consumer intensified
this tendency. The nakama monopolies, moreover, were me.de secure
and this eventually began to restrict the development of the economy.
Yoshimune's economic retrenchment eliminated many of the pro-
tected merchante of Edo, especially those connected with lumber and
the building tra.des. His refusal of litigation for ca.ses of money lendera
against samurai wa.s hard on the city money lenders.60 However, the
merchants found mea.ns to protect themselves. Denial of the right of
litigation forced the merchant money lendera to insist upon security
" OMnin, 40.

MI The fact that this principie was repeated in adiete of 1736, 1746, 1797 and
1843 makes one wonder if there were lapsas, as there often were with
Tokugawa exhortatory legislation. NKSJ, 322.
114 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA J.APAN
for most loans51 and to make a principie of not lending to members of

the samurai class who ha.d defa.ulted on loans in the past. Members
of nakama undertook not to lend to anyone who ha.d broken his con-
nection with another nakama member unless the consent of the latter
was obtained, anda.U a.rrears due him. repaid.52 Other pressures were
applied. According to Professor Honjo, "In the Kyoho era (1716 to
1735) aJrea.dy, there were cases of reprisa.ls adopted by aggrieved
cMnin against samurai. It often happened in Edo that ch-Onin insulted
the samurai who had failed either to pay their debts or to pay for
articles bought, by planting paper banners or putting up defamatory
placards at the doors of the defaulters."53 It was the fear of boycott
that Gamo Kumpei (1768-1813) described in his oft-quoted lines,
"The anger of the wealthy merchants of Osaka strikes terror into the
hearts of the daimy. "M
After his death in 1751, Yoshimune's unpopular policies were re-
versed, in part as a natural reaction from the moralistic repression of
the Yoshim.une period. 55 The so-called Tanuma period (c. 1751-1786),
named after the able politician and official, Tanuma. Okitsugu (1719
to 1788), was characterized by bribery (or gift-giving for a more or
lesa definite purpose) and other official corruption on a large scale.56
During the period of Tanuma Okitsugu's dominant position in the
Baku/u, an unprecedented number of monopolistic rights were
granted to merchants and merchant organizations in return for the
payment of unj and myga. As an example, houses of prostitution
n Se.ka.ta. "Meiji Ishin to Tempo Ka.ikaku," op. cit., 6.

fil Wigm.ore, "Materials .. ," 193.
11a A Social and Eoonomic Hi.story of Jopan, 125-6.
" In a memorial contained in Nihon Keizai Soaho, XXXIV, 528. The spectacle
of a daimyo a.fraid that mere merchants would not grant him a loan was such
an anomaly and so far from the feudal ideal as to excite a. statement like
this which no doubt uses exaggeration for effect.
55 Yoshimune was Shogun from 1716 to 1745, almost thirty yea.rs. Like leya~
he resignad in favor of his son.

H An interesting example of this gift.giving as evidence of official deca.dence is
often cited by Japanese writers. Dolls me.de in Kyoto (Miya.ko mngyo) were
justly fa.mous, and me.de popular gifts. In one case, a. Miya.ko singing girl
was purchased, dressed in beautiful kimono, put in a box and presentad as a
gift to a high official, together with a. memorial. Se.ka.ta, OMnin, 56.
were legalized by paying unjo, and signa put up indicating their

official status. In many ways the payment of unjo wa.s by no means
a disadva.ntage. It made monopolistic prices possible, and the unjo
fees were pa.ssed on to the consumera. 67
The Tanuma period revived the Edo merchants. Their influence,
especially that of the fudasashi, reached its highest peak, as the
samurai, high and low, were at the time particularly addicted to
ples.sures a.nd extravagances.158 For the samurai in Edo, money was
something to use, and no sooner did the samurai get his hands on
sorne than he poured it into the outstretched hands of the Edo
merchants. This gave rise to the expression, "They scom money
left over from the night before. " 69 Merchants always dealt indirectly
with the daimyo in lending money, but they dea.lt directly with the
lower samurai. Since sorne of the samurai in this period resorted to
force against the merchants, the merchants retaliated by actually
hiring r0nin (masterless samurai) and samurai hangers-on to protect
their e3tablishments. With the protection of these hired ganga, the
fudasashi tended to display a particular type of arrogance known
popularly as the kuramae-fu ilt 1ifJ Jit, litera.lly, "the warehouse front
style," an imitation of the Genroku style, but rather less agreeable. 60
With a series of natural disa.sters unprecedented even in the Toku-
gawa period, the Bakufu finances which Y oshimune had bolstered
fell again into dire straits. Tanuma not only utilized the methods
originated by Y oshimune--especially the encouragement of all types
of k<ibu nakama in order to collect unjo a.nd myi5ga-but he moved
cautiously towards the development of semi-official monopolies. 61
Here he took the initiative in setting up new monopolies for the sale
of silver and copper where the Bakufu before had controlled the mines
and the minting only. He minted brasa and iron coins for the :first
7 lbid., 57. Temples which kept prostitutas were aleo taxed. John W. Hall,
Tanuma Okitsugu, Foremnner o/ Modem Ja;pan (Ha.rvard University Presa:
1955), 80.
11 Sakata, Ohanin, 60; 114.
11 Jbid., 120. Yogoshi no kane wa t.mkawanu ft ~ l., O)~ ti {f ti f.l, still
used, often for Tokyo people.

' Sakata, Ohnin, 114; Kda, Nihon Keizaiski Kenky, 52.
e1 NKSJ, 1026-7.
116 THE MERCHA.NT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
time, and set up similar monopolies for these metals, in this case
pa.ying a regular handling fee to a. ton'ya for wholesa.ling. He en-
coura.ged domestio production of ginseng a.nd other medicinal herbs
by setting up monopolies, a.nd ge.ve monopoly privileges to a.n Edo
mercha.nt to ha.ndle all the cement for the city. In no case did he break
precedent and put officia.ls in control, and pa.y mercha.nts regular
wages so that the Bakufu would rea.p a.U the profits. This would be
going into business a.nd would ha.ve excited great opposition. He relied
on fees from these various monopolies to help bolster fina.nces, and
the merchants took both the risks, which were very small, and the
profits, which were usua.lly very good.sz
Tanuma has been called the most realistic of Tokuga.wa a.dminis-
tra.tors, but his schemes sometimes showed little understanding of
economics. For example, oil prices went very high in 1781 and there
was much discontent in the cities, particularly in Edo, where large
a.mounts were used for lighting purposes. Ta.numa set up a new mo-
nopoly of Osa.ka merchants, exhortad producers to greater pro-
duction, and then ordered them to send all their oil a.nd oil seeds to
Osa.ka, without selling anything in their own provinces or on the way,
and without hiding a.ny. The idea wa.s that so much oil coming to the
Osa.ka exchange would send prices down. But Tanuma evidently did
not consider the great inconvenience a.nd expense of sending oil first
to Osa.ka and then back to the provincial buyers and the increase in
the gap between supply and demand dueto the loss of time. The
arrangement was more violated than followed and it did not, of
course, serve to bring prices down, so producers in the provinces were
fina.Uy given specific permission to produce and sell their own oil. 68
In 1781, Tanuma attempted to control the sale of silk by sending
officials to the market to record sales and collect a high tax from
62 Tsuji Zennosuke :i ff z JJfJ, Tanuma Ji.dai W1B ll::f R; [The Tanuma.

Period] (Tokyo: 1936), 190-198. This book seems to have been written
ma.inly to disprove the facile genera.liza.tion propounded by genera.tions of
Confucian mora.lista a.nd uncritical historia.ns, that thedeca.denceofhisperiod
wa.s caused entirely by Tanuma.'s corruption and his fra.nk lave of money
and gifts. A recent monograph by John W. Hall, Tanuma Okiteugu, Fore-
runner of Modern Ja;pan (op. cit.), lends further weight to Tsuji's thesis.
ea Tsuji, Tanwma Ji.dai, 199-201.
buyers. Mitsui, Da.ima.ru, a.nd other large huyera simply deoided to

sta.y awa.y from the ma.rket when it was opened. The pea.santa who
ha.d brought their silk to market were despera.te as they were una.ble
to sell anything. Led by some old men who ''would soon die a.nywa.y,"
a orowd of some one thousand aroused peasa.nts demolished the house
of the unfortuna.te person who ha.d suggested this new system. The
leaders were taken as bosta.ges, but were :6.na.lly released, a.nd the new
system wa.s abolished soon a.fterwa.rds."
Tanuma. was willing to experiment to :6.nd new souroes of revenue
for the Bakufu, and was untra.ditional enough even to consider the
genera.l question of foreign tra.de. He seems to ha.ve disoussed it with
other of:fioials, who were opposed to a.nyinorease. Theprospeot oftrade
relations with the Russians wa.s oonsidered seriously. Seoret trade with
the Russi&ns wa.s oa.rried on in Y ezo (Hokka.ido) and the Kuriles under
the pe.trona.ge of the <laimyo of Ma.tsumae proba.bly as early a.a 1777,
with Osa.ka meroha.nts participa.ting. Word got around tha.t 12 ryo
of goods were tra.ded for goods whioh could be sold for 100 ryo in
Osa.ka., and the opening of trade wa.s disoussed at length in Bakufu
circles, the argument being brought forward tha.t it would be better
for the Bakufu to benefit from this trade tha.n some of the <laimyo.
Conserva.tives oontinued to a.rgue tha.t Ja.pan did not need foreign
tra.de, and in a.ny event, the matter was dropped with the fa.U of
Tanuma. a.nd his replacement by Matsudaira. Sadanobu (1758-1815)
who was entirely opposed to foreign trade. During Tanuma.'s period
in power he increased the trade in N aga.sa.ki a.nd encouraged the pro-
duotion of goods to replace precious meta.Is a.a exporta, by lifting the
unjo and other fees from the produotion of sea. foods a.nd other com-
modities for which there wa.s a. demand in foreign trade. 65
Violence, which was seen already in Yoshimune's time, beca.me
more frequent during the Ta.numa. period. Peasa.nt uprisings were in-
creasing in number in the countryside, with the a.buses a.nd ma.1-
administration which cha.ra.cterized the period,66 a.nd in the towns
"Tsuji, Tanuma JWi, 204-7.

H ]bid., 296, 30~313, 328.
Hugh Borton, "Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period,"

TASJ, Second Series, XVI (May, 1938), 49.
and cities, uprisings usually k.nown as uchi-kowashi ~1 fa ("smashing

up") beca.me more frequent. 67 It is here th&t the antisocial nature of
the merch&nts is most stri.kingly revealed. In times of shortage, espe-
cially when there were bad crops, merchants held their rice and other
food products in the expectation of higher and higher prices. This
occurred in 1733, when the Bakufu wa.s forced to issue severa! decrees
between January and May ordering all ton'ya to sell out all their
stored rice directly to retailers so that it would not pass through the
hands of middlemen, increasing its price, and that "if anybody held
rice, the whole street should accuse him and his rice should be for-
feited. "68 In many cases the hungry townspeople took direct action.
Mobs of impoverished townspeople, including lesser tradespeople,
driven to desperation by shortages and sudden increases in rice prices,
attacked and often demolished the eatablishments of rice and sake
dealers and pawn shops, as well as those of merchants k.nown to be
wealthy. The victima were sometimes forced to sell their rice and
other products to the mob at very low prices, and usually the shops
were stripped of a.U valuable belongings. These disturbances were
directed against the monopolista who were popularly regarded as
cauaing the price risea.69 The first major rising in Edo was in the first
month of 1733, when a plague of locusts in the western pa.rt of the
country had caused a bad harvest the previous fa.U a.nd greatly in-
creased rice prices. Most of theae risinga were associated with bad
h&rvests due to various natural catastrophes, increasing in fre-
quency towards the end of the Tokugawa period. The worst occurred
in the last years of Tanuma'a regime, in the Temmei era (1781-8},
when great fa.mines swept the country.70 The worst year of these riots
e7 They were also called chiJnin ikki PIJ A - ~. uprisings of townspeople.

118 Quoted in Takizawa, The Penetration o/ Money Economy in Japan, op. cit.,
106, from Kofi Ruien, IX, 582. "Whole street" would be better transla.ted
"whole district" (chch PIJ s:j:r).
They were therefore quite different from the peasant uprisings which were
generally directed against the feudal authorities.
70 NKSJ, 90-91. The people who broke into rice markets and shops for food
were largely laborera a.nd "back-room rentera," who rentad rooms in the
back of shops a.nd eked out abare living selling vegeta.bles, old pa.per, etc.,
and hiring themselves out as da.y laborera. Takigawa, Nih<m Shakai Shi, 315.
wa.s 1787, a year of the most widespread f&mine when most of

the la.rge towns and cities were terrorized for da.ys by looting
mobs.71
Pressed by the Bakufu'a deteriorating finances, Tanuma. broke
a precedent and levied forced loa.ns (goyo-kin) from wealthy merchante,
a new emergency source of funda which wa.s used sixteen times by the
Bakufu, more and more frequently towards the end of the Tokugawa
period. In 1761, he asked 305 Osa.ka merchants for 1, 703,000 ryo, as
rice prices were low and this sum was needed to make up the loas in
income of the Bakufu and its retainers. The merchants then offered
to supply 700,000 ryo. The actual amount provided is not known'
but it probably wa.s close to the figure offered by the mercha.nts.72 In
principie, goyo-kin were to be repaid, but appear in most cases not to
With unemployment in the cities a.nd people still coming from the country-
side because of worsening conditione there, the Baku/u me.de use of the
traditional punishment of ba.niehment, rounding up vagrants from time to
time and sending them back to the place of their birth, where they were
placed on the ceneus rolla, because in the cities they constituted a mena.ce
to public pea.ce. Those whom they could cha.rge with minor offences were
placed in la.borer's barra.cks and set to manual labor, manufa.cturing work,
etc. (The simila.rities with the trea.tment of the poor in England under the
Eliza.betha.n Poor Laws a.re quite striking here.) Many ofthose committed to
workhouses were petty ga.mblers who loitered around the gay qua.rters a.nd
thea.ters and were called "kabuki fellows" (kabuki mono). There were cases
where unscrupulous officials used them or their women for their own pur-
poses, a.ccording to the Seji Kemmon Roku, in Kinsei Shakai Keizai Si58ho,
I, 211, cited in Takigawa, 326.
:n Takigawa, Nihon Shakai Shi, 315; NKSJ, 91. Aleo see Honjo, A Social and
Eoonomic History o/ Japan, 56-8. Merchante were not the only antisocial
creatures to withhold food during periods of fa.mine. For example, a con-
temporary account records tha.t in 1783, "in a year of severe famine the lord
of the Nambu clan whose income was 200,000 koku of rice ayear, a.nd the
lord of Hachinohe of 20,000, had their godowns packed with rice so that not
only the higher feudal authorities but even the castle samurai who received
rice stipends were a.ble to make a handsome profit from the high price of
rice." Norma.n, "And6 Sh6eki a.nd the Anatomy of Japa.nese Feudalism,"
63, citing Kiaai Ryokan fJL it (ta [A Trea.tiee on How to Survive the
Years of Great Famine] (Hachinohe: 1926), 11 et seq.
-zs NKSJ, 596-7. The largest in Tokugawa times, in 1843, rea.ched something
overa million ryo. Takigawa, Nihon Shakai Shi, 325. Goyo-kin had previ-
ously been levied by daimyo, but not by the Baku/u.
120 THE MEBCHANT OLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JAI'AN
h&ve been. T&num& levied two more goyo-kin, in 1785 and 1786,73 &nd
a.fter this time both the Bahufu and daimyo ueed them as both &n
emergency and eometimee even as a. regula.r eource of revenue. There
wa.s a. feeling, no doubt, &s in the payment of my0ga-kin, th&t the
right to engage in tr&de w&s granted by the ruling cl&seee and th&t
the recipiente of this privilege ehould be grateful for it, as they ehould
also be grateful to the military clase for h&ving eeta.blished the peace
&nd order in which the merch&nt clase could proeper. At the e&me
time, it w&s generally thought tha.t the usual burden on the well-
to-do merchante wa.s very light, a.nd it was no more tha.n just to ma.ke
up :fina.ncia.l deficits by ordering them to ma.ke emergency contri-
butions.7'
Ta.num&'s policiee were both a.dva.nta.geoue a.nd disa.dvanta.geous
to the mercha.nts. As was the case with all Tokuga.wa a.dministratore,
his policies towa.rd them were motiva.ted prima.rily by the need to
bolster Bahufu :financee. He encouraged certa.in enterprisee by grant-
ing monopoly righte in order to collect fees from them. This served
to ma.ke the monopolista' position more secure. On the other ha.nd, he
introduced a new type of imposition-forced loa.ns-which ha.el quite
a different effect. Unjo a.nd my0ga fees were fixed for some years at a.
time by discussion a.mong officials a.nd merchante, and the merchante
could opera.te their enterprises ma.king a.llowa.nce for these regular
fees. Forced loa.ns, however, could be imposed at a.ny time, and the
amount w&s not fixed. Therefore, merchante were always ara.id of
them a.nd had to be prepared. When a forced loan was ordered, the
merchante paled with fear, according to Takigawa.76 This fear cer-
73 NKSJ, 596-7. Requests for large sums were always made, and the mer-
chants then made an offer of a much sma.ller amount, always securing re-
ductions. Osaka merchants were most often required to furnish "loans."
Eight of the seventeen Balcufu requests were to Osa.ka merchants alone.
and they were included in three others, a.long with other city merchants.
lbl., 597.
" Horie, . . Keizai Sei8alcu, 141>-6.
71 NihO'll Shakai Ski, 325. Takigawa, writing in 1928, cautioned those who
complained about the arbitrary power of the Mitsui, Sumitomo and other
ca.pitalists not to forget that they had to go through almost three hundred
years of ordeal. lbl.
THE TOKUGAWA DEADLOOK 121
tainly contributed to the extreme carefulness which was character-

istic of the established mercha.nts of the time.
A powerful opposition faction headed by Matsudaira Sadanobu
(1758-1829), horrified a.t the corruption of the Ta.numo. regime a.nd
at his innovations, :finally accomplished the feat of overthrowing him
when, in the midst of the unprecedented natural disasters of the l 780's,
new sca.ndals ca.me to light.78 Sada.nobu presided over a reaction
which attempted to put the merchant back in his place. He believed
that the organiza.tion of commerce was good, and the method of
exercising control through merchant organizations, collecting fees
and seeing that goods were standardized and improved (Yoshimune's
policy) wa.s also good. He a.ttributed the rises in prices entirely to one
cause, the selfishness of the merchants.11 He set about restricting the
influence of the merchants, enaoting strenuous frugality mea.sures,
dissolving some of the monopolies created by Tanuma, attempting to
control prices, a.nnulling some of the contracts for foreign trade in
Na.gasaki, and retracting the privilege of sword-wearing for certain
merchants.78 Sadanobu's regime lasted from 1786 to 1793, and was
78 One of the scandals involved a friend of Tanuma. This friend had a. concu-
bine who happened to be the sister of a concubine of Tanuma's. The friend
was appointed as magistrate of Fushimi, with Tanuma's help. He spent so
much money in gay qu.arters that he had to pawn a famous family heirloom.
An important official requested to see it. He agreed to show it la.ter, but he
did not have the necessary 2,000 ryo to get it back from the pa.wnbroker.
The concubine suggested a very easy solution - merely assess a forced loan
on the merchante of Fushimi. Overjoyed at this simple way to get out of his
predicament, he soongot the money and was e.ble to show theheirloom. But the
story got out, and the fe.et that Tanuma took no steps when informed of this
misuse of forced loa.ns (goyo-kin) was naturally held against him. Tsuji,
Tanuma Jfui, 222-3. Sadanobu was so incensad at Tanuma. that he plot-
ted severa! times to assassinate him, but fina.lly thought better of it, not
because he thought it would ha.ve been wrong, but, as he explained in a
secret memorial, beca.use he decided it would be disloyal to the Shogun who
had appointed Tanuma. lbid., 224. This from the Confucian moralist whom
Sansom describes (with considerable justification) as a "benevolent states-
man" ! Japan, a S'hort Oultural Hiatory, 494.
77 Tsuji, Tanuma Jfui, 213.
78 Hall, "The Tokugawa Bakufu and the Merchant Class," op. cit., 31; Taki-
gawa, Nihon Shakai Ski, 325.
called the Kansei reform. He issued one goyo-hin arder, in 1788,79 but
the /udasaahi bore the brunt of his a.ttack on the mercha.nts. In 1789
all 109 of them were ca.lled together, given a. tongue-la.shing for their
immora.l a.nd gra.sping commercia.1 conduct, a.nd told tha.t all old debts
owed to them which ha.d been incurred before 1784 were ca.ncelled,
a.nd tha.t interest on a.U loa.ns contra.cted since tha.t time must hence-
forth be less tha.n 12% per a.nnum.80 The ca.ncella.tion of debts (hien)
completed the arsenal of economic wea.pons which the ru1ing cla.sses
could use a.gainst the merchante, including confiscation (ke&aho),
forced loa.ns (goyo-hin), refusa.l to pe.y debts (o kotowari :b- 8i 9) plus
refusa.l to hea.r cases involving debts, a.nd now ca.ncella.tion of debts
(hien).81
The /wlaaaahi a.re sa.id to ha.ve lost more tha.n 1,187,000 ry in these
old debts which were cancelled. Since it was "not politic" for the
/udaaaahi to bea.r this loss by themselves, Sa.danobu gra.nted them a.
loan of 10,000 ryo (a.bout 92 ryo a.piece), to be repa.id in twenty
yea.rs, with a. ten-yea.r dela.y in the beginning of pa.yment. At the
se.me time, he esta.blished with a.nother 10,000 ry the Sa.ruya.-cho
Ka.isho lt ~ lllT fr ~Ji" a.s a. lending orga.n to /udaaashi who needed
loa.ns.82 The rea.son why Y oshimune, Sa.da.nobu a.nd other Baku/u
administra.tora took such pains to protect the fina.ncia.l position of
n Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisei =* t

Ufc '1fi. .ftt ift" [The Three Great
Reforms and Finances], KSK, XV, 1 (Jan. 1936), 32.
80 Sakata, Ohnin, 115. It will be remembered tha.t Y oshimune had set a ceiling
of 15%, which was not effective. See above, p. 107. The cancellation of debts
(kien tft) issued by the Bakufu a.ffected only the territory under direct
control, and only debts which the hat.amot,o and go-kenin owed to the fuda8a8hi.
This was not e. general cancellation of samurai debts, as Hall interpreta it
(The Tokugawa Bakufu and the Merchant Clase," 31), although it is true
that sorne of the han issued similar cancella.tions of their sa.murais' debts.
For example, Kaga issued four, in 1785, 1786, 1837 and 1838, and Tosa,
Saga., and Tsu a.re aleo known to have issued them. NKSJ, 322.
s1 Takigawa, Nihon Shakai, Shakai, Shi, 322.
81 Horie, "San Da.i Kaika.ku to Za.isei," op. cit., 37. Interest was 12%, 1 % to
go to opera.ting expenses, 5 % to pay off the Bakufu in 20 yea.rs, 3 % to add
to the principal as interest, the rema.ining 3 % to the fudasaahi who were to
operate the agency. Ibid. This a.id to the injured fudasaahi implies an ad-
mission that the retainers of the Bakufu would continua to depend on them
in financia! matters.
the katamoto and go-kenin is not ha.rd to find, as the Bakufu took
ultimate responsibility for the debts of these direct retainers. The
/ci,en of Sadanobu was indirectly a lightening of the Bakufu's own
burden of debt.sa
AB the result of the lcien, the fudasaski beca.me very careful in
making loa.ns, and often refused them. Those katamoto a.nd go-kenin
who were badly in need of funds also suffered from this policy. Some
resorted to sending persuasive mercha.nts or energetic ranin as go-
betweens who would sometimes threa.ten violence if refused. The
fudasashi again hired bodygua.rds, and the atmosphere wa.s very
tense. The Bakufu tried to assure them tha.t no other kien would be
issued, but the fudasashi were still wary. No doubt this promise wa.s
recalled when forty-three yea.rs la.ter, a second lcien was preparad by
Mizuno Tad&kuni and issued immediately after his resignation.M
Although Sadanobu's fina.ncial mea.sures were not nea.rly so sucoess-
ful as Y oshimune's had. been, they did sucoeed in giving the Bakufu
treasury a surplus. Sadanobu himself was in power for ba.rely seven
yea.rs (1787-1793), but his influence wa.s felt for severa! yea.rs, a.nd
the treasury excess reached a total of something like 338,000 ryo,
aooording to a contemporary source, in 1797.85 But people soon be-
ca.me tired of such excesses of fruga.lity a.nd strict Confucian morality
which ran counter to the social and economic forces of the time a.nd
to the people's enjoyment of pleasure. A popular song hea.rd in the
ea Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisei," 38. Having set up one loan agency,
Sasanobu la.ter, in 1791, organized another to lend money to poor people.
This was callad the Edo Machi Kaisho i.I Ji IBJ ir P,Jf, and was a semi-official
organ run by nine appointed merchants. It was not successful and almost
never roa.de a loan to "poor people" evidently beca.use of na.meless abuses
which spre.ng up. Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisei,'' 29. Some of Sadanobu's
other mea.sures were to atore grain for emergencias; to prohibit gambling,
the new construction of houses of prostitution, intermingling of the sexes
in public baths; to censor literatura by destroying the blocks of licentious
novela and plays; and to encourage children to be filial, wives to be chaste
and servants to be loyal, by offering prizes. He established a workhouse
for unemployed persona and prisoners, and closed the avenues to official
positions to all who did not accept the official Chu Hsi Confucian orthodoxy.
NKSJ, 310-11.
8' NKSJ, 322.
81 Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisei," 32; NKSJ, 311.
cities during Sa.da.nobu's time reflects the opinion of townspeople of

this period :86
In the White River's pure wa.ters, the fish ca.n live no more;
They long for the muddy waters of the pa.ddy fields** of yore.
Shirakawa - one of Sadanobu's na.mes:
Tanuma
The reforms of Sa.da.nobu threw a. sha.dow over the "wa.rehouse front

style," but this was only as long as he lived. The fudasashi soon re-
covered after his death.87 After Sadanobu's time, Bakufu income was
not equal to expenses, and treasury shortages yea.r by year had to be
ma.de up by recoinages and by squeezing the mercha.nts.
The period between Sa.danobu's Kansei reform a.nd the Temp
reform of Mizuno Ta.dakuni was one of city predominance. It was
during this period (especia.lly during the Bunka-Bunsei periods, 1804
to 1829) that the center of popular litera.ture shifted from Osa.ka to
Edo,88 and Edo culture which was in its forma.tive sta.ge during the
Tanuma period reached its full maturity.89 Perhaps due in part to
censorship and feudal displeasure with the eroticism of Genroku
culture, the trend of the more highly cultivated Osa.ka. townspeople's
culture was towards a "life of taste" after passing through a "life of
pleasure." The trend in ali the major cities was from a concentra.tion
on eroticism (iro -e) to the wider and more universal field of human
feelings (jo !'#).90
88 This song, which plays cleverly on the two na.mes, is quoted by most everyone
who writes on this period. It can be found in Tsuji, Panuma Ji.dai, 341-2;
Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisei," 33, e.nd in NKSJ, 1027: "Shira.kawa.
no kiyoki ni sakana. mo sumikanete, Moto no nigori no Ta.numa. koishiki."
87 Sakata, Oh6nin, 116. According to Sakata, Sadanobu was universally re-
cognized as a true samurai, and "In the presence of a true samurai, the
merchants were nothing but mercha.nts." In their dealings with the hatamoto
e.nd go-kenin, however, the fuda8althi did not consider them as real samurai.
!bid.
88 !bid., 103. Se.ka.ta is careful to point out, however, tha.t the center of ehinin.
culture still remained in Osa.ka.
811 Tsuji, Panuma Jidai, 289.
80 Sakata, Oh6nin, 100-103; Miyamoto, Nihon ShOgyo Shi, 191.
The Tempo reform (1841-3) of Mizuno Taclakuni (1794-1851) was

the third and last attempt a.t reform, a.nd followed the tra.dition of
Y oshimune and Sada.nobu. It was still possible to put some order in
the Tokugawa. house, but the martial virtue and feudal frugality of
the samurai class ha.d rea.ched such a level of deterioration as to be
most difficult to reform, a.nd the social and economic structure wa.s
more complex tha.n that which existed in the time of Y oshimune and
S&da.nobu, whose heroic efforts to turn ba.ck the clock were Ta.da.-
kuni's ideal. When the Shogun Iena.ri died, a reform wa.s long overdue
and the feudal society a.s well as the continuad existence of the Bakufu
were a.t stake. Tada.kuni bega.n his reform immediately after Ienari's
dea.th with a. new exhortation to frugality, in the tradition of Yoshi-
mune and S&danobu. Sa.da.nobu, for example, had told people to serve
dried fish ra.ther tha.n sea-bream (tai, a delicious but expensive fish)
on special occa.sions. Tadakuni took the next logical step and ordered
that no fish be bought at a.11 on these occasions. Instead, the amount
that would ha.ve gone to buy sea.-bream should be offered as a gift to
the Shogun.91
Besides enforcing fruga.lity, the major objectives of Tadakuni's
reform were to bring down prices of commodities other than rice,91
and increase Bakufu income. All these policies were doomed to disma.l
failure. The first step in Tadakuni's campaign against high prices wa.s
a dra.stic one. He ordered the dissolution of the ton' ya and kabu na-
kanna, whose monopolistic activities were blamed for the increa.sing
commodity prices, and called for freedom in buying and selling. With
this, he attempted to restore the conditions previous to 1721, and
combined an attack on the interests of the merchants with an attempt
11 Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisei," 33. The great dema.nd for tai on festiva
days was (and still is) an artificial one, and fish dealers could easily take
advantage of it. Tada.kuni confisca.ted the property of merchants and other
townspeople who violated any of hismanyprohibitionsagainst luxury. Healso
reenacted many of Sadanobu's purita.nical mea.sures such as the prohibition
of mixed bathing in public bath houses, although the idea that it was
wrong seems more Chinase than Japanese. See NKSJ, 1137, for a de-
ecription of these reforma.
91 Price policy was aiined at maintaining rice prices relatively stable and the
pricee of other commodities low relativa to rice prices, a policy to benefit the
samurai classee. Horie, . . Keizai Seisaku, 127-8.
126 THE .MERCHANT CLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
to lower prices.93 Actually, by 1841 the discipline of the ka.hu nakama

both over their members and over outsiders ha.d declined considerably
and their monopolies were not so tight, aJ.though this wa.s probably
not appa.rent to the a.uthorities." The rise in prices a.t tha.t particular
time seems to ha.ve been more due to increa.sing trouble on the part
of Osa.ka merchants to get Edo mercha.nts to pay up their accounts
with them and they were resorting to withholding shipments.96 Ta.da.-
kuni not only dissolved the ka.hu nakama, including the ton' ya, which
were specifica.lly named as a.n evil type of nakama due to their mo-
nopolistic control of markets, 96 but he aJ.so a.ttempted to cut out some
of the middlemen in the complica.ted distribution system. Whole-
saJ.ers were instructed to sell at retail, and a.U merchants were wa.med
not to hold goods for higher prices,97
The dissolution of the ka.hu nakama mea.nt the destruction of the
orga.niza.tion of commerce. It interfered with tra.nsport beca.use Osa.ka.
merchants were given no a.ssura.nce of being paid by Edo merchants
for goods or for shipwreck settlements. It ca.used a. disloca.tion in the
money market beca.use kahu, the most importa.nt securities, were no
longer a.cceptable.98 In addition, new mercha.nts were not sufficiently
fa.miliar with the intrica.ces of commercia.l methods, a.nd the esta.b-
lished mercha.nts, disturbed a.t the instability of prices a.nd not k.now-
ing wha.t to expect from officia.l policy, tended to be especiaJ.ly ca.reful>
88 Nomura, "Tokugawa. Hoken Sei to Shogyo," op. cit., 131. Nomura. pointa
out that Ta.da.kuni did not mean free tra.de in any modero sense as can b&
seen when other provisions are examined. lbid. Ta.da.kuni aleo decreed th&
abolition of han monopolies, but it seems doubtful if this had much eff~
Horie, "San Dai Kaika.ku to Zaisei," 34.
N Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 130.
H Smith, "Materia.Is .. ," 81-2.
88 NKSJ, 1147. Cartela (k) were not affected beca.use they were not organized
as kabu nakama but were merely agreements for the purpose of allotting
ma.rkets. Ka.nno, "Tokugawa. Jidai Shonin no Chifu," 32.
'7 Smith, "Materia.Is . ., " 97. Yoshimune had also tried to cut out middlemen
(see above, p. 118). In Ta.da.kuni's reform, for example, a mercha.nt dea.1-
ing in charcoal, whether wholesa.ler, middlema.n or reta.iler, was to callhim-
self merely a "dealer in charcoal" (sumi-ya). lbid. For details of some
aspects of the Tempo reform, see ibid., 96-104, taken from KOda's Edo to
Osaka.
18 lbid., 104.
often withholding goods for the storm to pass. In the free ma.rkets
created when the kohu nakama were dissolved, open bidding drove
prices up a.t the production points. The result was tha.t prices did not
fall as expected, and the Bakufu turned in desperation to forceful
lowering of prices by decree, requiring the merchants of semi-official
standing such as the nanushi to see tha.t they were enforced.99 Price
cuts were ordered in all the cities, but merchants promptly complied
by giving short weight or measure or by selling goods of poorer
quality, nullifying to a large extent the effect of the order.100 In Osa.ka,
a cut of 20% was ordered on a.11 goods, wages, rents, etc., resulting in
a general avoidance of the Osa.ka market by sellers. The shortages
which inevitably developed caused even higher prices. Ironically, the
policy of price reduction by dissolution of the kohu nakama on behalf
of freer trade resulted in a retreat from this freer trade to the im-
position of stringent controls, a policy which was likewise bound to
fa.il. 11 Mter the resigna.tion ofTadakuni in 1843, the legal restoration
of the ton' ya and kohu nakama was seriously considered. The restora-
tion, however, did not actually become policy until 1851 when it was
decided that it was the only wa.y to restore the commercial distribu-
tion system to working order.102
To relieve the direct retainers of the Tokugawa. house who were
a.ga.in deeply in debt to the fudasashi, a.nother partial ca.ncella.tion
(kien) was considered, but it was decided in 1842 to revise the
Saruya-cho Kaisho lending la.w to provide loa.ns to hatamoto and
go-kenin so that they could pay off their debts.108 At the ea.me time,
a. ceiling of 10% was set on the interest rates fudasashi could demand,
a reduction of 2% compared to previous legisla.tion.104 However, be-
fore this program could get well under way, Tadakuni was forced to
resign, and his successor put into effect the plan which Tadakuni had
been holding in reserve. This was a new kind of kien which cancelled
"NKSJ, 1137.
100 Smith, "Materia.Is .. ," 99.
101 Cf. NKSJ, 1137.
1oa Horie, . . Keizai Seiaaku, 116.
108 lnterest was 7 % and loa.ns were to be paid off in 26 years. Horie, "San Dai
Kaikaku to Za.isei," 38.

1' lbid.
128 THE .MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
all interest rather th&n principal. lt ordered &ll MJ/mOto a.nd go-kenin
to pay off their loa.ns to the fudasaski without interest a.t the ra.te of
roughly 5 % & ye&r over a. period of twenty yea.rs. "lt is sa.id tha.t
approximately ha.lf of the fwlasaski closed their doors.''15 Thia plan
w&s not without precedent. In 1806, for exa.mple, disputes over debts
ha.d been ordered to be settled out of court with both parties making
-concessions. lf no settlement was m&de within 30 da.ys, m&gistra.tes
were to settle the dispute by reducing the a.mount of the debt a.nd
giving a. number of yea.rs to repa.y, &ccording to a. schedule.106
Bakufu fina.nces ha.d reached the point where unless a. b&sic ch&nge
in policy were carried through, financia.l ruin wa.s only a. ma.tter of
time. But no such policy emerged. The reforma were entirely re-
actiona.ry in n&ture, and did nothing to increase production or pros-
perity. T&dakuni relied on recoina.ges and goyo-kin. In 1841, a good
profit of 1,155,000 ryo was obta.ined from a recoina.ge, a.nd 500,000 ryo
in 1842. As this was insufficient to ma.ke up the trea.sury deficit in
1843, the la.rgest goyo-kin of the Tokuga.wa period w&s dema.nded,
1,902,500 ryo from 705 prominent mercha.nts of the "three cities,"
as well as Saka.i, Hyogo, Nishinomiya. and other Baku/u towns.
The amount actua.lly collected is not known, but w&s proba.bly overa.
million ryo.107 Despite these mea.sures, T&da.kuni's shortlived reform
must ha.ve bestowed little fina.ncial benefit to the Baku/u.108
One of the justifications for raising prices which the kabu nakama
used was the fa.et tha.t they had to pay unjo and myoga fees. This
shifting of the burden to the consumar was recognized &s one of the
-causes of high prices, a.nd Ta.dakuni dissolved the kabu nakama with-
out much thought about the losa of this source of revenue.109 Never-
theless, he proposed a. mea.ns of ma.king up this loss. He pla.nned for
the Shogun to rea.rra.nge fiefs, reducing them enough so tha.t a.reas
within a. radius of 24.4 miles (ten ri) around the three cities would be-
-come Bakufu land, under direct control. These were a.reas of high
1o5 NKSJ, 1137. Honjo's description of this kien, in The Social and ECO'TllJ'mic
History of Jcvpan, 40-1, is ra.ther difficult to understa.nd due to the poor
tra.nslation. ios Cf. Wigmore, "Materia.Is . .," Supplements 3-4, 349-362.
101 NKSJ, 1137; Ta.kiga.wa, Nihon Shakai Shi, 325.
ua Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisai," 33. 108 Horie, . . Keizai SeiJJalcu, 115.
agricultura! production a.nd would ha.ve a.dded to the Bakufu's feudal

revenues. However, this wa.s not ca.rried through due to the vocal
opposition of the daimyo involved, a.nd pa.rticula.rly the powerful lord
of K.ishii, the hea.d of one of the three Tokuga.wa. bra.nch fa.milies,
whose landa were involved. This wa.s the immedia.te ca.use for Ta.da.-
kuni's faJl.11
The fa.ilure of the Tempo reform wa.s ha.stened by the fa.et tha.t
Mizuno Tada.kuni did not ha.ve the authority of a. Y oshimune nor the
friends of a. Sa.danobu, a.nd the severity of his reforma served only to
multiply the number of his enemies. He also la.cked a.ble assista.nce
a.nd advice. But no matter how excellent the implementa.tion of his
reforma might ha.ve been, they were bound to fa.il beca.use they could
not undo more tha.n two hundred yea.rs of development in commerce
and production.111 It is natural that Ta.dakuni beca.me the object of
the Edo merchants' hatred. Finally, a.fter almost three years, and
with his work ha.lf done, he wa.s forced to relinquish his post by the
plots of his political opponents and betra.ya.l by his subordina.tes.
When, in 1843, the news was sprea.d that he ha.d resigned, a shouting
crowd of severa! thousa.nd Edo townsmen ga.thered and pushed their
way to the Mizuno residence. They threw stones at the residence and
demolished one of the guardhouses outside the ga.te, "thus expressing
their long-accumulated resentment towa.rds Tada.kuni. The fa.ilure of
the Tempo reform showed that the Tokuga.wa. Bakufu ha.d lost its right
to exist. The history of the Meiji Restoration ha.d already begun."112
Commerce and money transactions offered new sources of income
a.nd an opportunity to shift the ha.sis of the feudal regime with its
hea.vy burden of a non-productive samurai popula.tion to support.
1 10 Horie, "San Dai Kaikaku to Zaisei," 34-5. The Lord of Kish, who was
benefiting from a shipping nakama, had already been alienated by Tada
kuni's dissolution of the kabu nakama. Ibid.
111 Sakata, Ohnin, 131; NKSJ, 1138.
1 11 Sakata, Ohanin, 131. Tadakuni's reforma were really a remarkable succes-
sion of failures. Besides those discussed here, his policy of sending people
back to the countryside had a similar fate. Previously, this policy had been
to prevent the depopulation of the agricultural communities, but in the
Tempo reform it took on the added purpose of decreasing the population of
Edo. This policy was only very temporarily effective and ended in failure.
NKSJ, 1137.
However, utilization of these sources caused higher prices and larger

official disbursements. Moreover, to shift the basis of govemment
from its traditional feudal base was unthinkable to those who followed
the almost universally accepted orthodoxy of the agricultura} state
where commerce was a fruitless and despised occupation. Resort to
goyo-kin and kien had the double purpose of suppressing the power
and infiuence of the merchants and saving Bakufu (or han) fina.nces.
These expedients could never be really successful, and ironically
enough, reveal the fact that the feudal finances, in the final analysis,.
had to depend in some way upon the financia! power of the merchants
for the difference between bankruptcy a.nd solvency.
The three reforma of the Tokugawa. period were similar in intent
but different in methods and resulta. Y oshimune was successful both
in effecting economies and in increasing revenues. Sadanobu, how-
ever, pursued a largely negative policy, spending most of his effort
on economies and frugality, perhaps finding little room for increasing
revenues. The fact tha.t he increa.sed the merchants' burden through
emergency mea.sures such as the goyo-kin and kien revea.Is a lack of
understa.nding of realities. On this point, the policies of the Tanuma.
period a.re of gres.ter interest. However, the Kansei reforms of S&da-
nobu did bolster Bakufu finances, even if temporarily. But the Tempo.
reforma did not result even in financia} improvement. Rather, they
revealed the lack of agreement among the Bakufu authorities a.nd the
fact that it ha.d become almost impossible to carry through a feudal
policy. Each of the three reforma followed what were considered pe-
riods of extravagance and luxury, when the Bakufu treasury beca.me
exhausted. For this reason, the reforma were necessa.rily economie
retrenchments. However, the differences in methods a.nd effects were
a function of changing conditions. In the Kyoho period, it was still
possible for the Bakufu fina.nces to be based on agriculture. La.ter, it
was no longer possible. u.a In terms of impersonal forces, the difference
was the increased strength of the money and commercia.l economy..
In human terma, it was the continued rise of the mercha.nt class.
113 It is noteworthy that Yoshimune had nineteen years to enact his reforma.
and another ten years to preside over them, a total of twenty-nine yea.rs.
Sadanobu had seven years to put through his reforma; Tada.kuni had les&
than three.
CHAPTER VII
IDEAS OF SAMURAI AND MERCHANT SCHOLARS ABOUT

COMMERCE AND MERCHANTS
I in feudal and city cha.pter,

N THE PRECEDING we outlined historicaJly the a.lterna.tions
predominance largely from the ata.ndpoint of the
authorities, a.a the role played by the merchant class throughout wa.a
neceaaa.rily a pa.aaive one. As Sa.kata pointa out, ali attempta to coerce
the merohanta served only to make them more wary. They could not
oppose the samurai actively, but were a.ble to oppose them pa.asively.1
But an important question remains unconsidered. In view of the fail-
ure on the part of the feudal ruling classes to cope with the problema
crea.ted by the new commercial and money economy, wa.a there no
one to suggest a different approach 1 Were there no schola.rs to a.na-
lyze the economic and social phenomena of the da.y correctly and
prescribe a remedy 1 Since the history of thought is a legitima.te part
of history, we ahall attempt to outline some of the more infiuential
thought directed towards the problema poaed by the rise of commeroe
a.nd the merchant ola.as.
Samurai Confuoia.n scholars of the early Tokuga.wa period, during
a time of feudal predominance, generally rea.ffirmed the official ola.as
polioy and allowed the merchant his role as distributor of the neoea-
sities of life. But when the merohants gradually beca.me the hated
wieldera of eoonomic power, there was a general shift to the position
that commerce wa.a necessary but mercha.nts were evil.2 It is typioal
of Confucian thinking to blame ali ills not on the syatem or
organization of the society, but on defects of personal morality.
Writers were a.pt to complain that the merchant forgot his duty
to society in his scramble for personal gain, and they branded
him a.a a.n immora.l creature. This typical attitude can be seen in the
writings of Ya.maga Soko (1622-1685). There wa.a rea.son for this
1 Ohnin, 92.
1 Honjo, Eoonomic Theory and Hi8tory of Japan in the Tokugawa Period
Tokyo: 1943), 104, 10~8.
131
132 THE MERCHA.NT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
view, as the commerce of the time wa.s to a. la.rge extent the a.rt of
bilking both producers and consumera, or at least buying cheap and
selling dear, using the pressures of monopolistic devices.8
As the penetra.tion of money economy and the rise of the merchant
clase ca.me to be recognized as subversive to the feuda.l system, de-
finite mea.sures to remedy the situation were demandad and were
deba.ted thoroughly a.mong contempora.ry schola.rs. Most schola.rs
recognized the necessity of commerce, but their contempt for the
merchante coupled with envy for their success ga.ve rise to two com-
mon types of propasa.Is: (1) Those who detestad the scra.mble for pro-
fits a.dvoca.ted the restriction of the merchante a.nd a. return to a.
simple rice economy; (2) Those who, a.lthough disliking the profit
motive, could find some justifica.tion for it which could be expressed
in a.ccepta.ble moral terms (e.g., tosa.ve the people from poverty, or
to assure provision of suf:ficient food, etc.) a.dvocated officia.l control
of commerce. Some schola.rs stood between these two schools, and
a.dvised both the restriction of the money economy and the utilization
of it, even though restricted. Both schools opposed mercha.nt prosperity
and a.tta.cked monopolistic profits. These continued a.ttacks fina.lly
resulted in Ta.dakuni's ill-fa.ted reforms.4
Among those who a.dvoca.ted a return to a. self-sufficient rice
economy, thus restraining the infiuence of the merchant clase, were
Kumaza.wa. Banzan (1619-1691) a.nd Ogy Sorai (1666-1728), who
wa.nted the samurai sent ba.ck to the country-side and reintegrated
into the la.nd economy as peasant-soldiers (n0hei A~). Banzan, as
part of his program for preventing rapid drops in rice prices, advo-
ca.ted tha.t rice a.nd other grains should be used in buying and selling
and should be used together with currency in pa.ying interest on
loa.ns. He wrote, "lf the five gra.ins are used as media. of excha.nge,
when they a.re either in oversupply or undersupply it will be difficult
to profiteer. Therefore, prices will be lower, a.nd without being extra-
3 Endo, . .SMgyo Shihon . , 14, citing Yamaga Gorui, in Yamaga Soko Sh,
op. cit., 288.
' Cf. Nomura. Ka.neta.ro, Tokugawa Jidai no Keizai Shiao ti Jll ~ ft O) &
lJt{- JiH. ~ [The Economic Thought of the Tokuga.wa. Period] (Tokyo: 1939)
104.
IDEAS OF SAMURAI AND MERCHANT SCHOLARS 133
va.gant, both samurai and commoners will ha.ve enough, and artisans
a.nd merchants will be productive. " 6 Sorai expressed his attitude
toward the mercha.nts in this way: "Merchants carry on an insignifi-
ca.nt occupation . . . it should be no concern of ours if they ruin
themselves. "
Miura Baien {1725-1789) explained that dueto the penetration of
the money economy, the rich were getting richer, the poor poorer.
In order to remedy this, he maintained that the use of money as an
instrument of exchange must be stopped in spite of all opposition,
and insisted that a policy be adopted to carry this out by ca.using the
feudal lords to economize and avoid borrowing moneyfrom merchants,
at the sa.me time as accumulating stores of goods and giving surpluses
tothe peasants. 7 MotooriNorinaga (1730-1801) also pointed out various
evils arising from the development of money transactions, and urged
that the practice be restricted. He maintained that if it were restricted
and reduced, human feelings would be alienated from gold and silver,
and the people would become diligent in the pursuit of their proper
occupations. These argumenta that the development of a money
economy be suppressed were closely connected with the prevalent
idea of "revere grain, despise money" (kikoku senkin ft .ft JI~).
Although the methods suggested were often not feasible, these writers
asserted that the merchants ha.el grasped economic preroga.tives a.nd
insisted that this situation had to be rectified.8
Kumazawa. Banzan, an unorthodox a.nd original thinker, advoca.ted
a return to the use of rice and other grains as media of exchange, but
realized that the money economy to some extent was bound to stay.
He representa an early view tha.t the feudal a.uthorities should control
it. He wrote, "Money is to be despised by the superior man (kunshi
tt .::..), but the right to control wealth is not to be given over to in-
feriors. The masses are low-minded, and the right to control them
11 Shgi Geaho, in Nihon Rinri Ihen, op. cit., II, 220. See also "Da.i Gaku
Wakumon, a Discussion of Public Questions in the Light ofthe Great Leam-
ing, by Kwnazawa. Ba.nzan," transla.ted by Galen M. Fisher, TASJ, XVI,
2nd Series (May 1938), 259-356.
1 Sei.dan, in Nihon Keizai Sosho, III, 427.
8 Ibid.
rests with the rulers. The superior man reverences virtue and despises
money, but the right to control the nation's money rests with the
rulers."9 Sato Shin'en (1769-1850) wrote: "From ea.rly times the oc-
cupa.tion of tra.de in commodities has been only in a. general way under
the supervisionofthe ruling authorities. Duetothefact that they leftthe
merchants even such an important power as control of the market,
mercha.nts and others ha.ve given free rein to their cleverness a.nd
greed, ha.ve caused prices to go up and down a.t will, a.ll ma.king huge
profits, many making themselves extremely wealthy, and they are
confronting the authorities with their wealth. . . . Despite the high
position of the ruling class, the wealth is a.U falling into the hands of
mercha.nts. It has become difficult to control them, a.nd rulers ha.ve
come to bow their hea.ds before them. By this it should be recognized
what a great loss to the country has resulted from leaving to mer-
chants the privileges of tra.de ... For these reasons, the power of the
merchants should be cru.shed, privileges of tra.de taken away and
made the possession of the rulers, the ton' ya all put under their super-
vision and operated by their a.ppointees. Also, mercha.nts should be
ordered to build markets, live there, and they should be strictly for-
bidden to be in the fields."10
The development of the argument for samurai pa.rticipation in, or
a.t least control over, commercial activities paralleled the rise o han
monopolies, and gave these monopolies an aura o Confucian justi.6.-
cation. Those who opposed samurai participation still admitted the
great development of commerce and realized that profits could be
ma.de from it. They opposed it on the grounds that exploitation of
profits from such an immoral and detestable source a.s commerce was
beneath the samurai class, and would result in intensified exploi
tation and impoverishment of the peasa.nts. Those who fa.vored it
insisted that since profits were clearly ma.de in commerce, it wa.s
better for the feudal rulers than for the merchant class to benefit from
11 Shilgi Geslw, in Nilwn Rinri lhen, op. cit., ll, 224. The translation of this
quotation in Horie Yasuzo, "An Outline of Economic Policy in the Tokuga.-
wa Period," KUER, 64-5 is freer, but farther from the original text.
1 Keizai Teiyo & 8ff lfi: ~ [A Manual of Political Economy], SatO Shin'en-ka
Gaku Zenah, U, 582-5.
IDEAS OF SAMURAI AND MERCHANT SOHOLARS 135
such profits.11 This argument can be seen, for instance, in the Kei-
zairoku & 1'ff fl of Dazai Shundai (1680-1747).12 Kaiho Seiryo (17 55-
1818) justified samurai participation in commerce with an interesting
rationaJ.istic argument. He pointed out that it was not logical that
a samurai could huy whatever he needed without being considered
strange by anyone, but if he once sold something, it was a great
disgrace. Seiryo insisted there was no great difference between
buying and selling, and it wa.s quite just for samurai to ma.ke profits
by selling his stipend rice openly rather than through mercha.nts.13
There are ma.ny exa.mples where the export of goods from the han
and the import of specie to pa.y for them was a.dvoca.ted. Th.e acholar
of Dutch, Haya.shi Shihei (1754-1793), denounced the mercha.nts in
stinging terms, "Townspeople only soak up the stipends ofthe samu-
rai. They are otherwise profitless things, rea.lly useless destroyers of
grain!"14 However, he went on to a.dvoca.te commercia.l monopolies
to be controlled by the han authorities: ''When the products of your
land are plentiful, they are a profit to your doma.in; when acaree,
they become a loss. When products are exported, gold a.nd silver can
be imported. On the other hand, if ma.ny products are imported from
other han, there is an outfiow of gold a.nd silver. At present, since
more goods a.re imported than exported, ali gold and silver has been
lost to other han. Therefore, local products must be increased, pre-
pared and sold to other han for gold a.nd silver, to fill the treasury
11 End~. . SMgy SMhon . . , 15.
11 In Nihon Keizai Ssho, op. cit., XI, 291.
18 Masukodan :ft- t; ~. in Nshon Keizai Ssho, XVIII, 217-18. He satirizad
the samurai's unrea.listic ideas a.hout money: "The memhers of a samurai

fa.mily think that money and rice fa.11 from hes.ven, so a.11 merely ea.t. It is
like a house infested with mice - the rice just disappears. . . They do not
know how to value the money with which to huy rice, as it is the samurai
style to despise money, a.nd it quickly vanishes. It is the universal fa.shion to
scoff at people who value money, calling them mercena.ry creatures." Zen-
chdan '5 r:f:a ~. in Nihon Keizai Taiten (Tokyo: 1928), XXVII, cited in
Se.ka.ta., Oh'flli:n, 81. Rela.ted to Seiry's atta.ck on the ethic which permitted
merchants to huy hut not sell wa.s the opposition of Ta.naka. Kygu ( 1663-
Seiy
u Jsho J:.
*
1729) to the prohihition aga.inst the huying and selling of la.nd. Minkan
P'I ~ ~ in Nihon Keizai Ssho, I, 673-4:
[Memorial] (the first of a series presentad to Date, the daimy
of Sendai), in Nihon Keizai Ssho, XII, 25.
of the lord of Sendai." 16 As late a.s the period 1853-67, memoria.lists

were urging daimyo to pursue mercantilist policies.16 During the
Tempo reform, the idea of esta.blishing a Baku/u monopoly system
in Baku/u territories like tha.t of Satsuma. wa.s actually considerad,
but given up beca.use it appea.red that more squeezing of the already
rebellious farmers would ha.ve been necessa.ry, and the result of such
a monopoly promised to be higher prices.17 These examples show tha.t
the feudal a.uthorities could despise the mercha.nts and still plan to
use commerce to enrich themselves.
The success of many of the han monopolies served as a stimulus
to the idea that foreign trade could be beneficial to the country, and
it wa.s easy to apply mercantilistic ideas about the han to the entire
country. Despite the feudal honda of commerce, there was a gradual
development of the realization that foreign trade wa.s necessary. This
idea is seen first in the eighteenth century, after commerce had
experienced a great expa.nsion internally. An exa.mple is the a.rgument
of Ya.maga.ta Ba.nto (1789-1821), the merchant acholar, that as a.n
inevitable result of the money a.nd commercial economy, not only
should domestic commerce be expanded, but foreign trade should be
resumed.18 A more complete a.nd thorough-going a.rgum.ent for
foreign trade wa.s made by Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821), a acholar of
Dutch who a.tta.ined a considera.ble knowledge of foreign countries.
He proposed to sta.ndardize prices on a.U commodities and do awa.y
with profits dueto merchante' dishonesty and monopolistic activities.
He wrote, "By opening up the sea.ways to other countries, and setting
standard prices on ali our produce, both samurai and pea.santa would
be se.ved, profits for the country would multiply da.y by da.y ... Be-
ginning with the rice from ali parts of the country, and a.pplying
to ali products, an average uniform price should be a.ssigned to ea.ch
category, va.luing equally the industry of ali the people u pon which
15 JoBho, inNihon Keizai Soaho, XII, 25.
18 An example is the memorial of U eno Shoj to the daimyo of Fukuoka in this
period, in which the writer cautions against the draining away of gold and
silver by the importation of paper currency of other han. Endo, . .SMgyo
Shihon . . , 18, citing a manuscript of Ueno Shoj.
17 Sakata, "Meiji Ishin to Tempo Kaikaku," op. cit., 14-15.
18 Endo, . . ShOgyo Shihon , 18-19.
they depend for their existence. In this wa.y aJl the people, without
exception, can hope for long life . . . There is no way to make the
nation prosperous except through the importation o gold, silver and
copper from other countries. " 19 Another famous ad.voca.te of foreign
trad.e was Sato Shin'en, who pointed at England as a country with
limited resources which had become both wealthy and powerful
through foreign trade.m It should be noted here that these proposals
for opening up foreign trade were not mad.e to the Bahufu. They
were usually unpublished and circulated secretly among a few persona
of a.dvanced views.
A major dilemma of Bakufu commercial policy was the problem of
whether to permit monopolies and tax them, giving rise to higher
prices, or to a.bolish them a.nd forego the taxes in the interest oflower
prices. It wa.s a dilemma beca.use feudal sources of revenue were no
longer sufficient, and squeezing of the pea.santa had. reached a. point
o dhninishing returns, when peasants left the land a.nd resorted to
rebellion. In the conditions of the early nineteenth century, to abolish
the monopolies wa.s virtually to disorganize the commerce upon which
the feudal classes living in cities and castle towns were dependent. It
was attempted only once, a.nd with disastrous results, by Tadakuni.
The only altemative to financia! ruin, under the conditions which
obta.ined, wa.s to continue Y oshimune's policies which included the
recognition o the monopolies. However, revenues from commerce
were limited by the haggling of the mercha.nts, who used their su-
perior knowledge of the complexity of commerce effectively to de-
crease all types of levies. Moreover, there were limits to the squeezing
of the mercha.nts. Public opinion, in the form of city mobs, was fea.red,
and there was no desire to remove the sources of the loa.ns so needed
by the samurai class.
Scholars generally did not like the idea of taxing mercha.nts, and
often opposed my0ga and unjo fees beca.use they ca.used prices
to rise. 21 Another importa.nt rea.son was relucta.nce to a.ccept money
11 Keisei Hisaku f1 fit fi~ fl [A Secret Plan of Government], in Vol.X, Kinaei
Shakai Keizai GakuaeUJu Taikei, op. cit., 13-15.
so Kaib Saku ifij ll}j fl [A Policy for Coastal Defense], Sato Shin'en-ka Gaku
Zemh, op. cit., II, 821. 11 Nomura, Tolcugawa Jidad, no Keizai ShisO, 101.
from mercha.nts. A representa.tive view is tha.t of Shingii Ryotei

(1787-1854), who wrote, "There ha.ve been cases of late where
vassaJ.s of va.rious feudal lords ha.ve ca.used losses to ckiYnin without
any qua.lm of conscience or even defrauded them. This is a very
deplorable ata.te of a.ffa.irs. . . Besides, the frequent imposition of
.goyo-kin on chOnin a.nd pea.santa is regretta.ble as it is ta.nta.mount to
seeking alms from those below and it reflecta discredit on the feudal
lords concerned."22 The theory th&t the right to participa.te in com-
merce wa.s a privilege justified merchants' "gifts" to the ruling
ola.ases in the form of unjo and myi5ga-kin. This put the feudal
rulers in a. difficult moral position to dicta.te the a.mounts a.nd put the
system on a.n impersonal basis. Moreover, it might be a.dded that
impersonality in economic rela.tions ha.d not yet been discovered.
This distaste for accepting favors from inferiors no doubt played a
part in the advoca.cy by many scholars of the kind of control of com-
merce which had proved successful in sorne of the kan. But to carry
out effectively such a policy in Bakufu territories where commerce
was so complex and on so large a sea.le wa.s entirely impossible.
The minimum program of control attempted wa.s the regula.tion
of prices, but in this there wa.s no success wha.tever. 23 The mercha.nt
schola.rs Kusa.ma. Naokata. (1753-1831) and Ya.maga.ta Banto,
both of whom started as apprentices a.nd worked up in the commercia.l
world, expla.ined (Banto for the first time) the working of the market,
supply a.nd demand, and the effect of ba.d crops on the price of rice.
They did their best to discourage attempts to regula.te rice prices
asan impossibility.2'
A traditional Confucia.n a.ttitude towards commercial profits wa.s
that the superior man kept righteousness a.nd rejected profits, but
the merchant kept profits a.nd rejected righteousness. An interesting
contrast to this view is found in some writings of tea.chers of the Shin
sect of Buddhism (Jodo Shinsh fJ X *) which justified profits
which were not gained from selfish motives. A Shin writer of the
:11Honjo, Economic Theory and History o/ Japan, 201, quoting from Ry~tei's
Y abure ya no Tsuzukuri Banaahi.
sa Nomura, Tolcugawa Jidai no Keizai Shiao. 101.
H Jbid.
IDEAS OF SAMURAI AND MEBCHANT SCHOLABS 139
period described justifiable profits in terms of a doctrine of jiri-rita

(~ llJ ~Ji&), profiting self and others:
In merchandising we receive remunera.tion for supplying the con-

sumer with ma.nufactured goods. The a.rtisans receive their re-
muneration by producing the goods a.nd supplying them to the
consumer. Wh&t the world c&lls this remuneration is profit. But the
basis of receiving this profit dependa on profiting others. Thus both
the business of merch&nts and of artisans is the profiting of others.
By profiting others they receive the right to profit themselves. This
is the virtue of the harmony of jiri-rita. The spirit of profiting
others is the Bodhisattva spirit. Ha.ving a Bodhisattv& spirit a.nd
saving all beings, this is ca.lled Bodhisa.ttva. deeds. Thus Bodhisattva.
deeds a.re just the deeds of merchants and artisa.ns. In general the
secret of merchants' and a.rtisans' business lies in obtaining con-
fidence through Bodhisattv& deeds. 25
One might expect mercha.nt scholars to strive for the stabiliza.tion
and enhancement of commerce, but this expectation is not fulfilled.
Merchant scholars, including the skingaku school established by
Ishida Baiga.n (1685-1744), roa.de no attempt to glorify tra.de orto
make a more realistic (i. e., higher) place in society for the merchant
class. Ra.ther, they tried to ha.rmonize commerce and the merch&nts
within the feudal system, a.nd to make the mercha.nts satisfied with
the social structure as it was. 26 The shingaku school ela.borated the
common-sense mora.lity of the Osaka. mercha.nt code, the "way of the
86 As quoted in Bellah, Tokugawa Religion, op. cit., 120. Omi merchante were
very often Shin believers. Shin doctrine gave strong emphasis to frugality
and the value of hard work, ideas found in merchant house rules. Jbi,d.,
117-126. Bellah finds that Shin was "the closest a.na.logue to Western Pro-
testantism and its ethic most similar to the Protestant ethic.'' Jbi,d., 122.
' Nomura, Tokugawa Jidai no Keizai Shillo, 103. This roerchant shingaku
school, which drew froro Shinti5, Buddhisro and Confucianism, should not
be confused with the Oyoroei (Wang Yang-ming) Confucian school, also
callad shingaku, whose roost important proponente were Nakae Toju (1608-
1648) and Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691). For a recent study of Ishida
Baigan and his shingaku rooveroent, see Bellah, Tokugawa Religion, 133-
176; 199-215. This interesting movement, begun in Kyoto and Osa.ka, be-
came an important ethical and religious force, and was la.ter erobraced by the
Bakufu to give greater e:ffect to its moral injunctions.
mercha.nt." Nishika.wa Joken (1648-1724), a mercha.nt-a.stronomer-

ma.thematicia.n, la.id the foundations for this school by suggesting a
be.sis upon which the mercha.nts could atta.in a degree of self-respect
within the feudal society. He wrote, "A true mercha.nt is one who
calcula.tes things of all kinds, in large a.nd small amounts, of high and
low value, considering ge.in a.nd loss, a.nd without taking a. high profit
for himself, fulfills a.n importa.nt function for the country by taking
things from where they are plentiful to where they are acaree, trans-
porting themfrom one province to a.nother, linking together the wealth
of the nation." 27 Ishida Baiga.n, the founder of ahingaku, whose ea.rly
training was in Shin Buddhism, empha.sized the atta.inment of a. just,
organic society with an identifica.tion of interests and goa.ls of all
segmenta, in which all cla.sses ha.d their proper places, a.nd a.ll lower
cla.sses, including the merchante, were a.ida to the ruling cla.ss. 28 This
tea.ching is in agreement with concepta prevalent a.mong mercha.nts,
who, forexa.mple, joinedsa.murai mora.lista indeploring thesocialchaos
ca.used by merchants who were a.dopted into samurai fa.milies. Among
the esta.blished mercha.nts, "For a. mercha.nt to a.cquire a higher status
was looked upon a.s a. vice ofegotism. Such a person wa.s thought to ha.ve
lost his mind a.nd wa.s to be a.voided a.t all costs. " 29 Ba.iga.n believed that
although all classes of men were the same in principie, they differed in
form. He would have agreed with the common expression, "The off-
spring of a toad is a toad; the o:ffspring of a mercha.nt is a mercha.nt. " 30
The acceptance by mercha.nt scholars of a subordina.te role for
mercha.nts is no doubt be.sed in part on the recognition of the close
interdependence of the merchant and samurai ele.ases. It wa.s also
strongly influenced by powerful social pressures for the sacrifice of
individual, family or sma.ller group interests to the larger group
interest, ultimately, to the interests of the society as a whole.81 For
scholars of merchant origin, there me.y also ha.ve been an element of
17 OhOnin Bukuro lllJ A ji. Vol. I, cited in Nomura, Tokugawa Jidai no Kei-
zai Shis, 78.

ss Bamba. Masa.tomo 1K, ~ .JE Jlij. Nihon Juky Ron alfi: S ft lf [An
Essay on Ja.panese Confucianism] (Tokyo: 1939). 283.
Miyamoto, Nihon Shgy Shi, 186.
ao lbid., 178.
u For an interpretation of the continuing priority given in Tokuga.wa Je.pan
to "polity" over economic or a.ny other motivation, and its increased em-
fear in proposing drastic changes to the ruling cla.sses whom they

often a.dvised and memorialized, as the only method for putting their
ideas into pra.ctice. This me.y furnish some explanation for the strange
ambiv&lence in the attitude of a. Ya.maga.ta. BanW who argued for a.n
expansion and extension of commerce and against official interference
in the ma.rket, but who could embrace the prevalent theory of the
agrarian state and a.dvocate the suppression of the merchant class of
which he was a member.s2
Ishida Baigan a.ttempted to justify commercial profits as the sa.me
thing, in principie, as the stipends of the samurai. He emphasized a
cardinal point of the merchant code, loyalty to one's master, and his
insistence on frugality for merchants a.a well for all cla.sses struck a
chord with the Bakufu. His writings on frugality, as well as those of
another famous merchant acholar, Nakai Chikuzan {1730-1804), and
those ofMatsudaira Sa.danobu sound like echoes of one another. 38
Both samurai and merchant writers on economic subjects seem to
ha.ve thought it immoral to stimulate demand for commercial goods.
No one appears to ha.ve considered the possibility of a general expan-
sion of production, purchasing power and commerce, through more
efficient use of land and labor and through the stimulation of techno-
logical innovations.34 This is perhaps understandable during a period
phasis in the Meiji period and since, see Bellah, Tokugawa Religion, espe-
cially pp. 5-6, 13-30.
31 In his principal work, Yume no Shiro ~z ft, Ba.nM wrote, "Agriculture
should be encoura.ged while commerce should be discoura.ged. Fa.rmers are

the essence of the country ... They are more important tha.n a.ny other cla.ss
of people. Farmers cannot be dispensed with, though we can do without
merchante and artisans . . . Efforts should be me.de to increase the number
of farmers and to reduce tha.t of merchante. It is the prerequisite of sta.tes-
manship to adva.nce the interests of the farming population at the expense
of the townspeople." In Nihon Keizai Taiten, XXXVII, 302, as translated
in Norma.n, "Ande; Sheki . .," 279. A full-scale study of Ba.nt, a brilliant
but appa.rently erratic acholar, might be most fruitful.
38 Sa.kata, Ohnin, 106-7. An importa.nt element in the mercha.nt culture of
Osa.ka wa.s the Confucia.n school of the N a.ka.i family known as the Kaitokud
fl fl ~ (Cf. NKSJ, 212-13). It was wque in tha.t members of different
classes - samura.i, pea.sant, a.rtisan a.nd mercha.nt - sat together at the
feet ofmercha.nt Confucia.nists. Sa.kata., OMnin, 106-7.
~ This is not to se.y that there wa.s ~o thought of the improvement of agricul-
ture. On the contrary, there was a. huge output oftrea.tises, and sorne ofthe
when production, popula.tion a.nd purchasing power ha.d rea.ched a.

virtual ata.ndstill a.nd the city mercha.nts who controlled most of
the production a.nd marketing relied upon monopoly to secure their
sha.re and upon limitation o production (sometimes even the de-
struction of goods) to ma.inta.in a. pro:fita.ble price.35 Also, it was a.
period when the methoda o modern science which could improve
technology were virtua.lly unknown.
Most of those who opposed the utiliza.tion of commercia.l mono-
polies by the Bakufu a.nd the kan were in favor, like Miura. Ba.ien, of
reverting to a rice economy. However, Professor Horie ha.a found
two ra.ther obscure writers who opposed these monopolies a.nd a.t the
ea.me time a.dvoca.ted the encoura.gement of ta.xation of commerce.
These two scholars, Sa.kura.da. Ta.da. a.nd Oshima. Konin, as writing in
the la.st yea.rs of the Tokuga.wa. period, a.fter the fa.ilure of the Tempo
reform, used the Confucia.n precept, "The prosperity of the people
mea.ns the prosperity of the ruler," as a point of depa.rture. They
a.dvoca.ted bolstering the feudal treaauries through taxes on commerce,.
as the existence of well-to-do peaaa.nts and wea.lthy merchants wa.s
a aource of na.tiona.l wealth. Konin in particular pointed out tha.t
merely following the tra.ditiona.l line that the ha.sis of the country wa.s
a.griculture a.nd its proaperity lay in the exercise of fruga.lity, a.nd
neglecting to encoura.ge commerce and production would never bring
prosperity to the nation. 37 This indica.tes a. step towa.rda a. reappraisa.l
feudal lords a.nd Shoguns (nota.bly Yoshimune) were quick to put new ideas
into effect, primarily to improve their own fine.neas, but perhe.ps a.leo, in a.
general way, to benefit the people.
85 Han monopolies were often tighter the.n the merchant monopolies. Cf.
Horie, "Clan Monopoly Policy in the Tokugawa Period," KUER XVII,.

1 (Jan. 1942), 31-52.
88 Konin (1826-1901) was a samurai student of Dutch who beca.mean ex:pert.
in military science, ordinance, metalurgy and mining. Dai Nihon Jimmei
Jisho * B *A~ IH!f (Tokyo: 1937 ed.), 1, 576. Sa.kura.da is not listad
in any of the standard biographical dictiona.ries.
87 Keizai Seisaku, 178-9. Kan.da. Takahira. (1830-1898), writing on the ev&
of the Restora.tion, pointed out disadva.nta.ges of relying entirely on agri-

culture, especially emphe.sizing that there were no mea.ns to expa.nd revenues
when the ta.xes on land were so high the.t peasa.nts couldexist only by cultivat-
ing the most productiva land, leaving the rest to go to wa.ste. Honjo, Econo
mio Thwry and Hisrory o/ Jopan, 212-3. A plan to ta.x commerce proposed
of the relationship between feudal and commercial power, a.s the

arguments for foreign trade represented a challenge to the cherished
policy of the closed country. Perhaps a rea.son why a more realistic
policy toward commerce was not more strongly advocated wa.s tha.t
the person who had taken a few fa.ltering steps towards the encourage-
ment and utilization of commerce was Tanuma, and he wa.s under a.
dark Confucian cloud of moralistic denunciation.
It is apparent from this short outline that economic thought wa.s
important in shaping officia.l policies. Where it did not support officia.l
policy, it often was unacceptable beca.use it overlooked strategic con-
siderations, as did the proposa.l of sending samurai back to the land~
or beca.use it opposed sacrosanct policies such as the closed country.
Proposa.ls almost all assumed strong state control to carry them out~
a state control which was no longer effective in practice. Most pro-
posa.ls of a revolutionary nature were reactionary,38 a.lthough it is
possible to find some hesitating steps towards a more progressive
policy. However, even assuming that such proposa.ls reached the
authorities, the chances against their adoption were formidable. Only
when the foreign powers, by forcing the Bakufu to a.bandon its ex-
clusion policy, created a gaping hole in its feudal armor, was the Bak'IV
fu compelled to experiment with new economic policies.
by Lon Roches, the French Minister in Ja.pan from 1864 to 1868, wa.s
considerad by the Bakufu but not put in.to effect. There wa.s a sma.ll
business ta.x levied by prefectures a.fter the Restora.tion, but it beca.me a.
na.tiona.l tax only in 1896.
38 The obscure acholar Ando Shoeki furnishes a rema.rkable example of revo-
lutiona.ry reactiona.ry thought. He wanted a return to a simple, self-sufficient
agrarian society, and his condemnation of the mercha.nts wa.s perha.ps the
most sweeping of all: "The merchants shun physica.l labor such as the
pea.santa ha.ve to endure even in stormy weather, confidently expecting to
pass their life in ea.se and comfort. With fa.ir words and a plausible manner
they tell delibera.te lies, flatter the upper and lower classes, deceive ea.ch
other and even their own pe.renta and brothers. Y et it is this class which
grows richer than the other three classes of samurai, pea.santa and artisans.
Hence the merchants wish to live without physica.l effort, expending only
smooth words. A very few make an honest living by direct cultivation, but
most of them thirst for na.me and ge.in. Thus greed, envy and error reign
supreme." Quoted in N orma.n, "Ando Shoeki .. ", 71.
CHAPTER VIII
A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE CITY MERCHANTS:

THE RISE OF PROVINCIAL MERCHANTS
T HE DEVELOPMENT o the money economy and the accompa.nying

rise o the mercha.nts did not a.ffect a.U pa.rts o the country in the
sa.me wa.y or a.t the sa.me time. Ba.rter economy a.nd the use o rice
as money wa.s seen throughout the period in the outlying sections,
and even in the central a.reas in the first yea.rs o the period, but the
money economy soon took precedence in the central a.reas, extending
first a.round the cities, then gradually to the remotest villages.1 From
the middle Tokugawa. period onwa.rd, the la.rger part of commercial
capital in the ma.jor cities turned into usury capital, while in the
provinces it tended to evolve a.wa.y from simple commercial and
money transa.ction capital. It turned rather towa.rds production
capita.1.2 Through the "putting-out" system, the city ton'ya reached
out to some extent into the country-side for both ra.w materia.Is a.nd
finished products. But the ma.rkets exploited by the city merchants
were mainly the city ma.rkets. lt wa.s left largely to provincial mer-
cha.nts to extend selling opera.tions to the countryside. The chief
method wa.s sending out itinerant tra.ders. The next step wa.s to esta.-
blish bra.nches in va.rious parts of the country. This sometimes led
to investment in productiva enterprises. The best exa.mple of this is
the Omi mercha.nts. One of the a.reas in which they tra.ded even as
early as the time of Hideyoshi wa.s Yezo (Hokkaido). When the
daimyo of Ma.tsumae needed money, Omi mercha.nts lent to him in
return for commercia.l privileges, and whenever he refused to repa.y
a loan, they received additional privileges. They established ma.ny
bra.nches in Hokka.ido a.nd even in the Kurile Isla.nds, and embarked
upon a. very successful progra.m of encoura.gement to fisheries, re-
sulting in grea.t increases in the a.mounts of sea. foods which they
1 Miya.moto, Nihon SMgyo Ski, 138.

2 Endo, . . SMgyo Shihon . . , 12.
144
A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE CITY MERCHANTS 145
ma.rketed in Edo a.nd elsewhere. According to Kanno, "They can be

called rea.lly the first economic developers of Hokkaido."8
The Toyama. medicine salesmen were very fa.mous itinera.nt tra.ders
and deserve mention here. About 1682, the lord ofToyama on the Ja.pan
Sea coast wa.s treated e:ffectively with a new medicine made from a
secret formula.. It was called "spirit-restoring medicine" (hankontan
OC iJl ft). The feudal lord gave permission to a merchant of his castle
town to manufacture and sell it throughout Ja.pan. The business was
organized as a nakama a.nd pe.id regular fees to the daimyo, a.nd ita
operation is most interesting. Ea.ch peddler wa.s sent out to his ter-
ritory carrying prepared kits containing a fixed assortment of medi-
cines. He simply left a kit or two with the customer a.nd me.de a record
on his register. The next time he called, perhaps six months or a year
la.ter, he collected only for those medicines used, and replaced them.
Sales resistance must ha.ve been very low against this psychologically
persuasive technique, and the business thrived throughout the coun-
try. As the formulas were secrets and competed only in those han
where local production was fostered, the Toyama peddlers were
permitted to sell in most of the feudal doma.ins, sometimes gaining
admission by paying for licenses.4
The influence of the city ton' ya was generally limited to the a.reas
a.round the Bakufu cities, and there were many obsta.eles in the way of
the expansion of commercial enterprises into the various han. It will
be remembered that early Bakufu policy was to prevent as much as
possible the restriction of commerce by the daimyo. This policy,
never effective in the han, was soon dropped. It has been suggested
8 NKSJ, 157.
'NKSJ, 1196-8; Miyamoto, Nihon Shgyo Shi Gairon, 197-8. The business
continuad to flourish, and increased during the Meiji period. There were
5,000 peddlers in 1875, and Toyama. medicines were also exported in fairly
large amounts. In 1904 Toyama. manufacturad about one quarter of all
medicines produced in Japan. Royds, W. M., ''Japanese Patent Medicines,''
T ASJ, XXXV, Part I (Aug. 1907), 2, 4, 7. The business has roa.de adjustments
to the times. Some modern scientific medicines are now sold a.long with the old
remedies, many women are employed 88 peddlers, and all use modern mea.ns
of tra.nsportation, but the old system of collecting only for what is used is
still unchanged, according to informants in Tokyo and Karuizawa, where
1 saw Toyama. medicines being peddled in 1954.
146 THE :MERCH.ANT OLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA J.APAN
tha.t one of the purposes of this cha.nge of policy wa.s to restra.in the
further expa.nsion of the mercha.nts.5 It wa.s not usually easy for
merchants of other han to enter ca.stle towns to sell their products at
the markets. In sorne han, merchante from other han were a.ctually
forbidden from entering the markets in the castle town. 6 When mer-
chants were permitted to trade in the markets of the han, they were
usually required to stay in designated inns where their activities
could be under observation.7 It wa.s common practice to levy a tax
on importa into the han, which permitted sorne goods to come in, but
often prohibited particular goods. For exa.mple, Toya.ma medicines
were permitted to enter the Kumamoto han (in Kysh) as they did
not compete with local products. However, the Toyama mercha.nts
were forbidden to take in any goods which were banned, and were per-
mitted to ta.ke out only Kumamoto goods, and no money, except for
tra.velling expenses.8 All these restrictions were not necessarily to
protect local merchants, but were intended primarily to prevent
specie from going out of the han. However, the initiative for
restrictions sometimes carne from local merchants, who, fearing for
their profits, successfully petitioned the machi bugyo of the ca.stle
town for expulsion of "foreign" mercha.nts and bra.nch shops based
outside the han.9
Commerce of all types which provided goods to pea.santa wa.s under
a. great variety of restrictions. Purcha.ses by merchants of both raw
materia.Is a.nd finished products from the peasa.nts were subject to
restrictions in sorne domains due to the fear on the part of the feudal
lords of the penetration of the money economy into the pea.sant

villages.1 Frequency of fairs and trips of itinerant traders as well as
types of goods were regulated for reasons of economic self-sufficiency
11 Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 124.

1 Miyamoto, Nihon ShOgy Shi Gairon, 179. In Satsuma (Kyiish), which had
one of the most thorough-going monopoly systems, "foreign" merchants
were not even allowed within the bounda.ries of the han. Ibid.
7 Ibid., 179. Miyamoto points out the similarity with the Wirtzwa.ng inns in
medieval Germany. Ibid., 180.
8 Horie, . . Keizai Sei.Baku, 122-3.
9 Miyamoto, Nihon Shgy Shi Gairon, 180.
!O ]bid., 181-2.
and to protect the position of privileged merchants.11 This no doubt

fa.vored the merchants in the castle towns and prevented the city
merchants from expanding into the han. However, there were cases
where the city merchants exercised strong infiuence within the han.
As many of the daimyo were deeply in debt to rice and money ex-
cha.nge mercha.nts of Osaka, these merchants came to have consider-
able infiuence on kan fina.nces. They offered economic advice, as
they were interested in bolstering kan finances to assure the repay-
ment of loans.12 They also aided in programa of encouraging produc-
tion in those kan where industry was late in developing, mainly in the
northern and eastern part of Honsh.13 For example, there are some
cases where daimyo arranged loans with these city mercha.nts to be
used in encouraging production, with the understanding that this
excess production would be handled exclusively by the merchants
who lent the money .14
Where kan monopolies were established, a close collaboration is
seen between daimyo and provincial merchants who were usually
organized in protected nakama similar to those in the cities. Most of
these kan monopolies were in western and southern Ja.pan where
industry was comparatively early in developing.15 Of the total of
some 260 kan in Ja.pan, 53 were known to ha.ve had monopolies, 16
of which were begun during or before the Kyoh period (1716-1735).
11 Ibid., 180.
11 Honjo, Social and Econom,ic History o/ Japan, quotes Ka.iho Seiryo's de-
scription of the Osa.ka merchant Masuya. Heieroon as "having ta.ken unto
himself the management of the household fi.nances ofthe Lord of Sendai.''
This reference is from Seiryo's Keizai Dan & M llJ, written in 1816, to be
found in Nihon Keizai Ssho, op. cit., XVII, 376. Yamaga.ta. Banto began as
a Masuya a.pprentice, a.nd his best known work, Yume no Shiro, was a trea.-
tise presented to Da.te, the daimy of Sendai.
13 Kobata., Kinsei Keizai no Hattatau, op. cit., 267.
u Ibid.
111 Ibid. See the article by Horie, "Clan Monopoly Policy in the Tokugawa.
Period," KUER XVII, 1 (Jan.1942), 31-52.Horie's monogra.ph, Waga Kuni

K insei no Sembai Seido a iJ jli, iD: <J.) . . ff ffjlj Jl [The Monopoly System in
Ja.pan in the Early Modem Period] (Tokyo: 1933) is the standard work on
this subject. "Outer" han, especially those most active in the Restora.tion
movement, enjoyed the greatest degree of economic a.utonomy and had
the strongest and most lucrativa monopolies.
In the north and west where crop encouragement plana were carried
out, monopolies were generally limited to rice, but in the south a.nd
west, they embraced a wide variety of goods.18 Local han merchants
were usually limited in their a.ctivities to the territory of the han
itself. If they wished to expand, they had to do so with the permission
of the daimy. This is beca.use the daimy were the first to market
excess commodities, especially rice, in the merca.ntile centers, the
most important of which was Osa.ka. This busi~ess wa.s handled by
protected mercha.nts, beca.use the daimy had to depend upon them
for all business activities. Thus it was advantageous for local mer-
chants to receive such protection.17 The experience of the provincial
merchants in commercial transactions a.nd their role as money lendera
made them indispensable to the daimy in carrying out their monopoly
policies. In sorne cases the functions were delegated to such an
extent to the merchants that they proved to be ''the absolute
controller~ of this policy."18 On the other hand, there were isolated
cases where daimy attempted to exclude merchants from monopoly
activities. The Aizu han, for example, tried to exclude the local
wholesale merchants (ton'ya) from the monopolistic distribution of
imported salt within the han, and the Wakayama han tried to exclude
the Edo ton' ya from participation in the monopolistic distribution of
mandarn oranges in Edo. Such attempts invariably fa.iled, thereby
indicating that the cooperation of the merchants was essential.
Another activity in which local protected merchants were closely
associated with the daimy was the issua.nce of paper currency (han-
satsu). Well-to-do local merchants were appointed as the originators
and guarantors of the notes, and they took charge of the exchange of
the notes for specie. For this special privilege, from which they were
in a position to benefit financially, the daimy obliged them topa.y
unj fees, or to provide loa.ns in the form of goy-kin, sometimes a
combination of both.20 The issuance of hansatsu was often associated
18 Kobata, Kinsei Keizai no Hattatsu, 267.

17 Horie, "Clan Monopoly Policy in the Tokugawa Period,'' 36.
18 lbid.
19 lbid., 37.
10 NKSJ, 635.
A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE CITY MEROHANTS 149
with kan monopolies, but wa.s carried out by most of the kan a.t sorne
time during the Tokugawa. period.21
Provincial rice merchants a.nd money lendera in points of impor-
ta.nce in the distribution system ca.me into prominence in the la.ter
yea.rs of the Tokugawa. period. An indica.tion of the oommercia.l devel-
opment of the provinoes is the growth of speculative ma.rkets. Not
only were they to be found in such towns as N a.goya., Otsu and Fushi-
mi, but by the end of the period were scattered throughout Ja.pan. The
rice ma.rket of Shimonoseki is a nota.ble exa.mple.22 Illustrative of the
rise of protected provincial mercha.nts are the rice brokers and finan-
cia! agents (kakeya) in Hida, Bungo province, Kysh. Living in the
most important of the Bakufu territories in Kysh, a.nd with Bakufu
protection, they exploited the twin fields of commerce and usury
with unusual thoroughness and success. They sold local timber in
the cities a.nd towns of Kysh and in Osa.ka, and ca.me to control the
production of sake, oil, soy sauce and other products whioh they sold
both in the agricultura! villa.ges of Kysh at monopoly prices and
in the three cities.,,a Later, when they gained Bakufu protection, they
made loa.ns to Bakufu officials and daimyo. The local Bakufu ad-
ministration placed in their handa the collection and sale of all exoess
rice a.nd local specialty products. The money collected wa.s remitted
by billa of exchange (te.gata) directly to Edo, Nagasaki, Osa.ka and
other Bakufu offices within a fixed period after collection. Closely
connected with their commercial operations, they made advances to
11 See the list of han and the types and time ofissue, in NKSJ, 634-645. Major
han, especially tozama, were the first to issue hanaatau, after about 1670,
ordering all coins converted, at a premium. Reconversion was either pro-
hibited or discouraged by setting a disadvantageous rate. lbi,d.
11 Endo, . . SMgyo Shihon . . , 9. Ueno Shoju, a local acholar, wrote a memorial
in the Tempo period ( 1830-43) to Mori, the daimyo of Choshu whose domains
included Shimonoseki, in which he lamente the fa.et that peasants as well as
merche.nts in the neighborhood of Shimonoseki were wasting much time
e.nd getting involved in rice market "gambling." He describes their watch-
ing with binoculars for the flags which were raised a.hove the exchange at
closing, denoting the closing quotations by their colore. Those successful
enough to make a fortuna overnight were welcomed back to the villa.ges "like
famous e.nd victorious warriors." IbU., 10-11.
18 Endo, . . SMgyo Shihon . . , 22. NKSJ, 1372 contains a short summary taken
from Endo's study.

150 THE MERCHANT CLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
the local Bakufu deputy and eventually to almost all the daimyo of
Kyiish in the form of usurious loans, a.nd their loans to peasants and
other commoners throughout Kysh brought a.n a.nnua.l return of
from 20 % to 40 %.21
Most of the major merchant houses in the cities, such as Mitsui,
Sumitomo, and Konoike established themselves in the period of
economic expansion during the first hundred years of the Tokugawa.
period. From that time on, there wa.s little further expansion in the
cities. Commerce and usury ca.me to be extremely monopolistic a.nd
rigid, offering little opportunity for new merchants. However, the
castle towns a.nd agricultura.! communities did presentan opportu-
nity, because economic a.ctivities were not so monopolized and mer-
chants were closer to the increasingly important source of commercia.l
commodities, the agricultura! villa.ge. Outside of the so-ca.lled skilled
artisans (shokunin) 25 such as carpenters and meta.l workers, the larger
part of the production of both luxury and everyda.y goods ca.me to
be ca.rried on in the agricultura.! communities. 26
Provincial mercha.nts existed in the early da.ya of the Tokugawa.
period but ca.me into prominence only in the la.ter years, especially
from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, when han mono-
polies grew to large proportions and when the countryside became
predomina.nt in the production of commercia.l commodities. AB ha.a
been pointed out before, the agricultura! villa.ges presented a limited
ma.rket dueto low purchasing power. However, they did furnish a.
ma.rket which was capa.ble of some expansion.27 Although feudal ta.xes
and impositions on agriculture were very hea.vy, they did not absorb
all surpluses.28 Moreover, a class of well-to-do la.ndowners who were
at once peasa.nts and local mercha.nt-usurers wa.s increasing in im-
porta.nce in the countryside. They enjoyed ma.ny of the amenitiea
of life a.nd provided a ma.rket for commercia.l goods.29
14 Endo, . . Shogy Shihon . . , 28. For a detailed study of the Hida merchants,
see ibid., 137-339.
15 @A. Professor Allen translates this term "journeyman." A Short Economw
Hi8tory o/ Japan, 22. 18 Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . . , 32.
17 Nomura, "Tokugawa Hoken Sei to Shogyo," 133. 118 Ibid.

119 Cf. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modem State, 22, and footnote 27 on
that page. Thomas C. Smith, in "The J apanese Village in the Seventeenth

The castle towns were the centers of the han economica.lly as well
as politically, and in principie, commerce was permitted in no other
places in the han. However, with the sprea.d of the money economy,
retail ma.rkets a.nd fa.irs were permitted in stipula.ted pla.ces in the
countryside a.s well. There were four wa.ys in which commercia.l goods
rea.ched the peasa.nts :80 ( 1) Peasants went to castle towns or other
markets to shop, often on pilgrimages; (2) Small tra.velling fa.ira
me.de regular circuits which included agricultural communities, a.nd
were expected a.t ea.ch point on a particular da.y of the month,
such as 6-16-26; (3) Individual itinera.nt merchants were the most
important suppliers of commercial goods to the peasants; (4) Despite
prohibitions against merchants, living in agricultura.! communities,
this beca.me more and more common. They me.de tripe to the nea.rest
ma.rkets and brought back goods for sale. Peasa.nts also did this on
a part-time ha.sis, some finding it profitable to carry on full-time tra.de,
a tendency which the feudal lords and Confucia.n schola.rs denounced
as diaturbing the clase lines which were the very basis of feudal
society, but it was a practice which they found most difficult to
prevent.
The undeveloped economy of Hokkaido provided both a ma.rket
and a source of raw materials which wa.s first exploited by Omi mer-
chants but which continued to be of importance as one of the very few
new fields open for enterprising mercha.nts. It is noteworthy tha.t the
enterprising merchante who roa.de their fortunes in this field were
provincial merchante. An example is Ta.ka.da.ya Ka.hei, who moved
to Hyogo (present Kobe) in the Kansei period (1789-1800), and went
into the shipping business. He became important in the Hokkaido
trade, opening a branch store in Hakodate in 1798. He eeta.blished
ten fisheries on the island and taught the native Ainu the best fish-
ing methods. He gained such a reputation for honesty that merchants
accepted goods from him without examining them, a most unusual
practice in those times. He made Ha.kodate his headqua.rters, traded
Century, Joumal o/ Economio HilJtory, XII, 1 (Winter, 1952), 1-20, has

shown tha.t these well-to-do "pea.sa.nts" existed in pre-Tokuga.wa. times, and
in the remota countryside.
ao Miya.moto, Nihon SMgy Shi Gair<m, 180-1.
with the Russians - he wa.s once captured and la.ter relea.sed by

them - and built up a considerable fortune. 31
No doubt the most famous of the provincial mercha.nts of the la.st
years of the Tokuga.wa. period wa.s Zeniya. Gohei (1773-1852). Since
the rise of the provincial merchante in this period is little known in
Western language literatura and since Zeniya's career furnishes a good
example of the acope of their activities a.nd their methods of making
money, we she.11 trace bis career in some detail.32 He wa.s bom in
Miyakoshi, a port town in Kaga, the la.rgest single kan in Ja.pan,
under the powerful and conservative daimyo family of Maeda, and
he me.de Miyakoshi the hee.dquarters for ali his fa.r-flung commercial
a.ctivities.33 Gohei's father alternated between, and sometimes com-
bined, a sma.11 shipping enterprise a money exchange and a usury
business. However, in his la.teryea.rs the family fortunes were ata very
low ebb and he abandoned the shipping business which he found
full of danger and loases.84
In accorda.nce with his father's desires, Gohei operated a pawn
shop and a secondhand dry goods store, and a.lso dealt in soy sauce
and timber until he wa.s 39, when bis father died.35 The next thirty
yea.rs saw a most unusual commercial expansion from these humble
beginnings.
n NKSJ, 525-6; 1003.

32 The account which follows was included in my article, "Sorne Economic
Reasons for the Marked Contrast in J apanese and Chinese Modernization .. , "
op. cit., 36-42.
83 NKSJ, 916-17 has a good short summary of Zeniya's career, but has Zeniya.
embarking on the Hokkaido trade at age 17, whereas he was actually 40.
Miyakoshi functioned as the port' for the important castle town of Kana-
zawa.

34 lbi,d., 916.
35 Shof Katei, Zeniya Gohei Shi'!lden, op. cit., 43, 51. It is much less of &
biography than a criticism of all previous biographies, with long quotations
from correspondence and other documenta written in the epistolary style
(aorobun) which is, Shof admits, filled with errors and ambiguities. Honjo,
in his bibliography of economic history (Nilwn Keizai Shi Bunken), says:
"This work is based on contemporary documenta secretly stored by Zeniya's
descenda.nts. It attempts to correct a.nd supplement the ma.ny writings on
Zeniya Gohei,andshould clarifythe conditionsoftrade ofthetime." (Tokyo:
1933), 163.
A NEW CHAIJ.ENGE TO THE CITY MEBCHANTS 153
Gohei was untraditional in not following his father's advice aga.inst

new enterprises. It was usual to hold fa.st to the ancestral business
and to avoid innovations. Family constitutions of rich merchants of
the period often contain such phrases as: "Nothing other than the
traditional business will be engaged in," "lt is prohibited to change
the business," "Continue without change. " 86 Zeniya not only went
into shipping, but he seems to have interested himself in any project
which had some promise of profits.
It was somewhat by chance that Zeniya entered the shipping
business. In 1813, when he was 40, three small boats were forfeited to
his pawn shop. They ha.d belonged to one of the pioneers in the Hok-
kaido tra.de, a.nd, arm.ed with information from him and probably
also from the writings of Honda Toshiaki and other "Dutch scholars"
who were interested in expansion northward, Zeniya himself me.de
the dangerous trip to Matsuma.e with a cargo of rice and returned to
Miyakoshi with edible seaweed and dried herring, on which he real-
ized a very good profit.87 Gradually he expanded his business by these
mea.ns, dispatching boats from Miyakoshi not only north to Hok-
kaido but south to Kysh, and to the Ose.ka a.rea. He established
no fewer than 34 branch warehouses and atores in the key harbors,
made contracts with the grea.t commercial houses of Osa.ka. and Edo,
and arranged for reputa.ble and successful merchants in other places
to be his agents, on longterm contracts.88
As a shipper beginning with three small boats, he became an im-
portant boat owner, eventually building some of his own. His fleet
reached a total of 13 vessels of between 1,000 and 2,500 koku capa-
H Horie Yasuzo, ''The Life Structure of the Japanese People in its Historical
A.spects," KUER XXI, 1 (April 1951), 3.
87 Shof, op. cit., 51-2; NKSJ, 916. The information about Zeniya in Dona.Id
Keene, The JwpaneaeDisooveryof Europe (London: 1952), 76, seems to derive
frominaccurate sources ratherthan from his cited source,Honjo's introduction
to the collection ofHonda's writings, Honda Toahiaki Sh (Tokyo: 1935), 9.
88 Shof, 83-5. This type of commercial expansion wa.s not unusual in his time,
and his success was nearly paralleled by such men as Kongoya Jirobei
tm =*
fl- IJllJ !.ti_ ~ #j of Echizen, with whom Zeniya had close connections
and with whom he cooperated on many tra.nsactions. Kongoya, a samurai
turned merchant, tried to help Zeniya. when he got in trouble a.t the end of
his life with the Ka.ge. a.uthorities. lbid., 84.
city, and sorne 110of1,000 koku capacjty and less. Adding to this the
small boats he maintained in various ports, "there is no k.nowing
how ma.ny hundreds of boats he operated." 89 They ranged regularly
as far as the Miyake and Hachijo Islands in the south a.nd Etorofu in
the Kuriles, a.nd there are ma.ny stories of his boats "drifting," in
happy compliance with unseasonable winds a.nd in violation of the
Baku/u prohibitions, to Korea, China, the South Sea. Isla.nds, and
even to America. The last story has been proven to be the fabrication
of one of Zeniya's capta.ins who expanded a. trading trip to Korea
into a great and plausible story of adventure in America, but the
accepted authority on Zeniya's life concludes that his boats did
"drift" as far as the South Sea Islands.40
Zeniya's boa.ta plied an illegal but profitable foreign trade on a
regular be.sis both in the islands of the Satsunan-shoto south of
Kagoshima and in the region of Etorofu in the Kuriles.41 It was a.
secret trade, but had the tacit approval of the Maeda family. It was
begun in the north when one of Zeniya's boats one day encountered
a. very large ship off Etorofu and the boa.t operator, summoning
all his courage, approached it. Only after the Japanese capta.in
went a.board and conferred with the foreign capta.in did he k.now it
was a Russian tra.ding ship. He made arrangements for regular
meetings at sea for the purposes of trade, and Zeniya profited greatly
from it. This was in 1825.42
Zeniya's precise relationship with the Maeda house must rema.in
somewha.t of a mystery, but it appea.rs that he was considered a pro-
tected merchant only in sorne of his activities, such as in trading
monopolies in specific types of goods within the kan. Shof, his la.test
biographer, emphasizes severa! times that his greatest activity as a
shipper-trader was before he carne under Maeda protection, and that
his boa.ta carne under official protection only when Zeniya wa.s 67
years of a.ge. If this is true, Zeniya was quite different from most of
the merchants of his time. When Zeniya was 54, he began building
89 Shof, Zeniya Gohei Shinden, 83.
" lbid., 83, 138-9.
41 NKSJ, 916; Shof, 83. Sources do not indicate with whom he traded in the
south, but probably it was with Ryukyuans and perhaps Chinase.
u Shof, Zeniya Gohei Shinden, 83, 90, 97, 138.
his own boats to add to his already large :fleet.'8 Ten yea.rs la.ter, in
1837, the Kaga. treasury was empty, and severa.! prominent mer-
chants, including the irrepressible Zeniya., were summoned to an
a.udience with kan officials, all expecting notice of forced loa.ns. Be-
fore seating himself, Zeniya ca.me forward a.nd said with proper
humility tha.t he had not consulted the others, but was willing to
provide 100,000 ryo himself if one request were granted. The officials
were much surprised a.t such magnificent beneficence, and the presid-
ing official inquired what the request wa.s. The conversation went
something lik.e this :
Zeniya: "I ha.ve only a simple request, that you lend
me two large ships."
Presiding official: "What a strange request ! How large 1
Zeniya: "I have eight or nine ships of 1,900 koku capa-
city, but what a cMnin finds very difficult to
obtain are ships of 2,000 koku or more. For this
I would like to borrow your influence."
Presiding official: "If so, how many would you build 1"
Zeniya: "At first, two. Two would be quite sufficient."
Thus, he was given permission to build large ships which would
nominally belong to the daimyo of Kaga but which were in fact the
property of Zeniya. He built one of 2,500 koku capacity, ata cost of
2,000 ryo, in Osa.ka, and one of 2,000 koku capacity in Miya.koshi,
marked as official ships of the daimyo and a.ble to sail anywhere.44
Soon after Zeniya received permission to build these large ships,
a1l his boats were placed "at the service of, and under the protection
of, the daimyo."45 His resourcefulness was apparent to the Kaga.
authorities, they treated him with ca.re, and "to a certain extent" had
Zeniya a.et for them, but Zeniya did not take undue advantage of this
'Shof, Zeniya Gohei Shinden, 48, 51.

" lbid., 49-50, 64. The conversation is from a historica.1 novel, Zeniya Gohei,
by W ata.na.be Katei l1l j i ft !j[, which is generally far from accura.te, but
this story has been documentad, according to Shof. The ship built in Miya-
koshi aroused such interest that people ca.me for miles to see it. Cha.racter-
istically, Zeniya. postponed launching for four months, built no lesa than 54
small tempora.ry tea. houses for visitors, and cha.rged a sma.11 fee to inspect
the ship. Unfortunately, it was blown onto a reef and broken in two during
a. typhoon in 1848. Ibid., 75, 51. & Ibid., 118.
protection, and the Ma.eda kept secret his association with them
in most things.'8
lnformation is simila.rly scanty in regard to Zeniya.'s methods o
orga.nization and operation, and ma.ny questions must go una.nswered,
such as how his ship capta.ins a.nd a.gents scattered throughout Japa.n
were paid or obtained profits. Their correspondence with Zeniya is
voluminous, a.ndextra.ctsfromitmake up most ofShof's book, butit
lea.ves much unsaid. It has a. conspiratorial tone, and the poor a0rbun,
(epistolary style) in which it is written is not conducive to precision.
However, some of the descriptions of the actual trading a.re very
detailed, filled with statistics and fra.nk enough to describe, for
instance, the illegal trade with the Russians. Zeniya must ha.ve
trusted his men, and the fa.et that he accumulated such capital in
such a short time would suggest that his trust was not misplaced.
In Miyakoshi, he ca.rried on his usury business and directed his
multifa.rious trading activities. He had close relations with other
merchante and often shipped their goods for them, and no doubt
participated in the contra.et business of shipping tax rice, but his
fleet was mainly used in his own trading operations. In his bra.nch
wa.rehouses he la.id in large stocks of paper, cotton and silk goods,
raw silk, wax, candles, sugar, salt, honey, rice and innumerable other
items. These goods were purcha.sed throughout Ja.pan, but pa.rticu-
la.rly in Osa.ka and Chgoku (the southwest area. of Honsh). In
Hokkaido his principal purchases were dried herring, seaweed and
soybeans, and in Kysh his major purchase was lumber. He followed
the common practice of charging samurai higher prices.'7
Zeniya's great wealth was not attained without treading on a.
number of toes. There were two major mercha.nt families in Ka.ga.
who were well established before him a.nd whom he soon outstripped.
However, although a nouveau riche, he seems to ha.ve remained on
fairly good terma with them, mainly by dealing them in on some of
" Shof, Zeniya Gohei Shinden, 117. In 1828, at the age of 55, Zeniya went
into nominal retirement (as his father had when Gohei was 17) and let his
three sons handle the details of the busineBB, but he continuad to direct
activities from a small and quiet villa.ge near Miyakoshi. lbid., 85.
'7 lbid., 84, 97-8.
his schemes.48 But his activities were bound to bring him into con-
flict with the established monopolista. The Maeda were conservatives
in econom.ic policy, and followed Baku/u policies generally. One of
the traditional Kaga monopolies was the candle guild (roaoku-za),
with 29 shareholding members and headquarters in Kanazawa. It
held a long-standing monopoly of sale (at very high prices) for Kaga.
and the two neighboring provinces of Noto and Etch. Zeniya had a
flourishing trade with Aizu, north of Edo, where candles were a
major product, and in the 1820's his stocks of candles were piling up
while he looked feverishly for new outlets. He decided to use his in-
fluence with the kan authorities to break into the candle markets
closest to home.49
Zeniya first memorialized the han authorities, explaining that he
had a large stock ofAizu candles which were much superior in quality
and lower in price than those of the Kanazawa candle guild. There-
fore, he proposed to sell Aizu candles at a low price, bringing in new
stocks with his own boats and remitting "the larger part of the pro-
fits" to the han as a voluntary contribution. He justified itas being
in the interest ofthe majority of the people as well as a benefit to the
han finances, and added that at a private discussion with the members
of the candle guild, he had urged them to handle his Aizu candles,
but "on one pretext or another" they had turned a deaf ear. This
refusal is understandable because the guild's own product could not
possibly compete with the low-priced Aizu candles. Zeniya then
asked the authorities to constitute him as a special guild, to share the
market with the existing guild, no doubt knowing that this would
ca.use the eventual failure of the guild.50
Zeniya's proposa.l was well calcula.ted to interest the han authorities
who in the 1820's were ha.ving grave financia.! troubles. However,
they decided to let the candle guild have a hearing. The guild members
NKSJ, 916-17.
u Endo Ma.sao, "Zeniya. Gohei no Ka.ga. Ryona.i Rosoku-za Appa.ku Jiken
ft ~ :Ii-* # (J) 1JD fJJt Pi ti mI JR itJ. $ ft: [The Incident of Zeniya
Gohei's Pressure on the Ca.ndle Guild in the Doma.in of Ka.ge.] KSK, XLVI
(Aug. 1933), 46-7. This a.rticle is reprinted in Endo's Nihon Kirutei Shgyo
Shihon Hatt.atau Shiron, op. cit., 58-104.
60 Endo, "Zeniya Gohei. . ," 16~, 169.
insisted that Zeniya ha.d ma.de una.ir and inaccurate statements due
to his own greed, and they presented a spirited defense of the high
price of candles in Kaga in terms of costs which Zeniya ha.d omitted
from his detailed memorial, pointing out the inconvenience of depend-
ing u pon a distant supply, with no mea.ns to deal with emergency
needs, and branding Zeniya's proposal as a paper scheme overlooking
present and future difficulties.61
The outcome was in doubt and Zeniya. expressed pessimism, but
the decision finally went in his favor, not beca.use the authorities
decided it would profit the people, and not primarily beca.use it prom-
ised more benefit to the kan finances, but, according to Endo,
simply beca.use the pro-Zeniya party was larger among the officials
due ultimately to Zeniya's gres.ter financia! power. 62 The result was, as
might ha.ve been predicted, no grea.t triumph for free tra.de. Zeniya soon
carne to monopolize the entire candle trade of the three provinces. 63
In this conflict Zeniya earned the ha.tred and fea.r of the entrenched
guilds, and he even stepped on the toe of one of his colleagues. Kubo
Kihei, another Kaga merchant, who acted as a go-between for Zeniya,
wrote the memoria.! for him, and contributed 500 ryo towards the
proposed special candle guild. When the result was in their favor,
he expected Zeniya to share profits with him. After a long silence,
he asked Zeniya about how the business was going, a.nd Zeniya re-
plied that he had been silent beca.use the business was running at a.
loss, and that he had only refra.ined from asking Kubo to contribute
more capital. Kubo was suspicious and procured information from
one of Zeniya's employees that the enterprise was making a fair
profit. Kubo then brought the matter to litigation, whereupon Zeniya..
o:ffered as evidence records which showed a steady loss. Kubo attacked
the records as having been falsified, but lost the suit. Endo concludes
that the records were in fa.et falsified, but points out also that Kubo's
figures were fixed in his own favor. Litigation of this kind added to
the suspicion of Zeniya's methods and contributed to his fall. 64
61End, "Zeniya. Gohei. . ," 50, 174, 286-90.

H lbid., 291. End believes bribes roa.y ha.ve been used by Zeniya., distributed
by go-betweens. lbid. 53 lbid.
w Ibid., 292-8. The summary of the incident given here is much compressed.
A NEW CH.ALLENGE TO THE CITY MERCHANTS 159
Zeniya. died at the a.ge of 80 a.fter a. few weeks in prison, presuma.bly

from old a.ge and shock, a.wa.iting trial on a. ra.ther stra.nge cha.rge,
na.mely, tha.t he had been responsible for the poisoning of fish which
in turn poisoned some people, some of whom died. It a.ll bega.n when
his third (a.nd fa.vorite) son, Yz, a. chip off the old block, conceived
a gra.ndiose scheme of dra.ining a. la.rge ma.rshy la.ke nea.r Miya.koshi
to recla.im the la.nd for agriculture. It was a. dficult engineering
problem, but Zeniya. approved the plan and quickly ga.ined the a.ssent
of Maeda., Tosa. no Ka.mi, a. high official of the han. Formal permission
was ga.ined in 1851 despite considera.ble opposition from the fisher-
men who fished on the la.ke. Yoz immedia.tely went to work, hiring
coolies to dig a. la.rge dra.inage ditch, but ha.d qua.rrels with fishermen
who broke the timbers being used for the ditch as they stood on them
to ca.tch fish. The fish, a.ttracted by the new timbers in the water,
swa.rmed a.round the ditch. Yozo replied to this by ha.ving lime, coa.l
a.nd oil thrown into the water to keep the fish a.wa.y. One morning
the fisherman found a. la.rge number of fish lying on top of the water,
a.nd "joyous a.t having such a. big ca.tch," quickly gathered them up
and sold them in Miya.koshi. The unfortuna.te people who a.te the
fish beca.me despera.tely ill, a.nd some even died. The result was a. grea.t
cry a.gainst Zeniya. in which his enemies joined with gusto, a.nd the
han authorities a.rrested him and his three sons. 66 The incident
furnished them with a. good pretext to confisca.te Zeniya.'s wea.lth in
Ka.ga.. It wa.s a.n excellent ha.ul, estimated at 365,800 ryo in gold
a.nd silver alone, and numerous trea.sures as well as la.rge stocks of
goods. 66
Zeniya.'s career demonstrates both the great opportunities which
still existed for a. commercia.1 ca.reer a.nd its limitations - in Zeniya.'s
H Shof, Zeniya Gohei Shinden, 171, 184-7. Te.kigawe.'s e.ccepte.nce (Nihon
ShaJcai Shi, 323) of the popular tradition the.t Zeniye. was crucified for his
pe.rticipe.tion in foreign tre.de illustrates one of the pitfalls of treating histo-
rical figures whose lives he.ve become encrusted with legends.
68 Shof, Zeniya Gohei Shirlden, 232-44. Shof is not quite certain that this is the
correct explane.tion for the confiscation (kesaho), and believes the real reason
for it may he.ve been another offense which will probably remain a secret to
history. He rejects entirely the usual explanation, the.t Zeniya was punished
for participating in illegal foreign tre.de. The Zeniya confiscation is probably
as famous as that of Y odoya.
case, its tra.gio limita.tions. Only a. compa.ra.tively few provincial mer-

cha.nts could participa.te in the Hok.ka.id6 tra.de a.nd in illega.l foreign
tra.de. Since the provincia.l ma.rkets were ra.ther limited ones, a.nd the
city ma.rketa, atill by fa.r the moat importa.nt, were monopolizad by
city mercha.nta, it is understa.nda.ble that provincial merchanta deaired
to ha.ve a.cceaa to theae ma.rkets without heing a.t the merey of the
city monopolists. One method used was to intercept boa.ta bound for
the Osa.ka ma.rket. Provincial merch&nta, eapecially from Owari
(whose castle town wa.s Nagoya) sta.tioned boats in the Inl&nd Sea
to intercept and buy goods deatined for Osa.ka "using money lent
them by their customers," ra.ther than to buy in Osa.ka a.t monopoly
pricea. In the Tempo period (1830-43) there were a.s many BB two
hundred Owa.ri boa.ta of this kind. 111
Anyone by-passing a city nakama or ton'ya was blacklisted. The
specia.l privilegea permitted by cha.rter to kabu nakama and ton' ya
were geographical, a.nd routes were fixed so tha.t they would not be
by-passed. 68 However, with the decline of the kabu nakama in the
late Tokugawa., they were often by-pasaed. Mercha.nts appea.red to
carry on more direct tra.de. An exa.mple of this is when cotton mer-
cha.nts from Echizen (on the Japa.n Sea coast) a.nd Ozu, Iyo Province
(Shikoku) would go to Na.goya, obta.in lodging where they could
a.uction off their goods, and sell directly to middlemen without going
through the ton' ya, on the pretext that the goods ha.d been ordered.
Also, the daimyo who ha.d monopolies of goods which they sold in
ma.rkets outside their kan were in effect powerful mercha.nts who did
not ha.ve a.lwa.ys to go through the established ton' ya a.nd nakama,
a.nother factor in their decline.59 Provincial merchants bega.n to avoid
Osa.ka and brought their goods in to other ha.rbors like Hyogo, where
they could market them on their own terms. As a result of this
pra.ctice, receipts of cotton goods in Osa.ka. dropped off to half. 80 Even
the monopoly in Kyoto of the famous Kyoto Nishijin silks was in
17 Smith, "Materials .. ," op. cit., 87.

18 This was generally true in the provinces as well. Miyamoto, Nihon Shogyo
Shi, 172-3.
11 Ibid., 173-5.
.o Koba.ta, Kinaei Keizai no Hatt,atsu, op. cit., 272.
A NEW OHALLENGE TO THE OITY MEROHANTS 161
danger of competition from provincial production, and three mer-

chants of Omi fi.nally broke the monopoly. They ga.ined entry to the
Kyoto ma.rket through bribing the Nijo magistra.te (bugyo) of Kyoto. 81
Ma.ny more examples could be cited to show how provincia.l merchants
by-pa.ssed and broke ma.ny of the existing city monopolies in the
period from a.bout 1818 to the Tempo reform.82
While the monopolistic privileges of the city mercha.nt orga.ni-
za.tions were being successfully cha.llenged from without, there wa.s
an interna.1 brea.kup in procesa. From their beginnings, the desire of
nakama members to increa.se their profits a.lways pushed a.ga.inst the
restra.ints of the organization.83 The mercha.nts who had banded to-
gether in the interests of corpora.te security underwent yea.rs o feu-
da.listic discipline, but finally viola.tions of kabu rwkama restrictions
beca.me more a.nd more common. The ma.ny exa.mples of viola.tions
of these self-imposed regula.tions in the yea.rs preceding the Tempo
reform a.re indica.tive, according to Professor Miya.moto, of the a.sser-
tion of individua.lism and the idea tha.t "in a profit society, profits
should come first. "" The kabu rwkama lost the power to stop the
struggle both inside and outside the orga.nization. By the time of the
dissolution in the Tempo reform, despite encroa.chment from without
and the inner procesa of self-destruction, however, they still appea.red
from the outside to be strong. Tada.kuni's dissolution seems to ha.ve
been carried out without the knowledge tha.t the kabu rwkama were
aiready approaching dissolution. 85
The period from 1843 to 1851, when the kabu rwkama and ton'ya
were officially illega.l, gave an opportunity for new merchants. Al-
though economic conditions were chaotic, or perhaps beca.use they
were, enterprising merchants who were not tied to the restrictions
of the city monopolies made progresa. Even a.fter the kabu rwkama
were revived in 1851, official policy did not revert to the Yoshimune
policy. New kabu rwkama were encoura.ged to form, a.nd new members
1Miya.moto, Kabu Nakama no Kenky, op. cit., 280.
1See ibd., 277-82. ea See e.hove, p. 57.
"Miye.moto, Kabu Nakama no Kenky, 272. For exa.mples of viole.tions e.nd
non-e.ttende.nce e.t kabu nakama meetings, fe.ilure to pe.y dues, etc., see
ibid., 272-7.
" Nomure., "Tokuge.we. H~ken Sei to Sh~gy~," 132, 130.
permitted entry. The Bakufu authorities saw that the revival of the
kahu nakama was necessa.ry, but they did not want monopoliatic
kahu nakama.86 It would seem highly doubtful if the kahu nakama
could ha.ve retrieved their former monopoliatic position, in any case.
The opening of the country to foreign tra.de in 1858 worsened the
a.lrea.dy cha.otic economic conditions of the time, and dea.lt an ad-
ditional blow to the tra.ditiona.l mercha.nt orga.nizations. One of the
conditions under which tra.de was opened wa.s tha.t it would be open
to a.11 comers. 67 The provincial merchante and sma.11 rural industrial-
ista swarmed into the treaty ports. They learned what goods were in
dema.nd, and went through the country rounding them up, and espe-
cia.lly buying up raw silk.68 The daimyo with monopolies also took
a.dvantage of this opportunity and were among those most active in
foreign tra.de, represented by the provincial merchants who colla-
bora.ted with them. 89 Besides the military industries introduced in
Bakufu, Mito, Kagoshima. and Saga. domains during this pre-Resto-
ration period, a. Western type cotton factory wa.s built in Akita about
1858 or 1859, a.nd in 1867 a. cotton-spinning fa.ctorywa.s set up inKa.go-
shima, under han sponsorship.70
The reaction of the old-style city merchants is a.lmost predicta.ble.
They petitioned the Bakufu to cut off all foreign tra.de, bla.ming it
as the source of the shortage of goods and the rising prices. This <lid
68 Nomura, Tokugawa Jidai no Keizai Shiso, op. cit., 74. The proclamation
restoring the kabu nakama included this plea: "We trust that people will
make no attempt to monopoliza supplies, nor to supply goods of inferior
quality, undersized or underweight. Prices should be as low as possible a.nd
business done fairly." Smith, "Materials .. ," op. cit., 105.
7 See M. Paske-Smith, Westem Barbaria:ns in Japan and Formoaa, 1603-1868
(Kobe: 1930). 201, for a translation of the decree a.llowing free pa.rticipa.tion
in the trade.
98 Nobutaka Ike, The Beginnings o/ Politic<il Democracy in Japan (Baltimore:
1950), 16. This excellent study is the first in a. Western language to bring out.
clea.rly the important role of the provincial merchante in the last yea.rs of the
Tokuge.wa period, the Restoration and the politica.l movements of the time.
Horie, . .Shihon Shugi . . , 41.
7 Kobata, Kinsei Keizai no Hattatsu, 273. See Thomas C. Smith, "The ln-
troduction of Western lndustry to Japa.n during the Last Years of the

Tokugawa Period," Harvard Joumcil o/ ABiatic StudieB II, 1 & 2 (June
1948), 130-52.
not go unchallenged by the provincial merchants, who insisted cor-

rectly that it was not foreign trade but the disparity between supply
a.nd demand that was to blame for higher prices. This point was made
in a memorial to the Shogun. "Moreover, as if to put teeth into their
argumenta, they hired ronin to terrorize the guild merchants."71 This
was a struggle between the new and the old in the economic field
which was pa.ralleled in the political field in the anti-Bakufu move-
ment. The outcome was in doubt until the Restoration was achieved.
The protected merchants and merchant organizations in the pro-
vinces bear many resemblances to their city counterparts. They were
perhaps as dependent upon feudal protection and privilege. But,
with the exception of the city ton' ya which reached out into the coun-
tryside for their goods, the provincial merchants were leas dependent
upon the feudal relationships for their sources of materials and for
their markets. Most of the commercial commodities which were
marketed in the cities came in the form of goods collected as taxes
by the feudal lords and the Bakufu. The most dependent merchants
were those of Edo. The provincial merchants were freer to develop
their own markets and sources of commodities. It is true that they
were under many restrictions due to the mercantilistic policies of the
various han, but so long as they conformed with han regulations,
paying their tariffs or license fees, they were able to push their trade
fa.rther and farther and, as the amazing career of Zeniya Gohei de-
monstrates, they sometimes could try anything that held promise of
profit. Perhaps their most important source of commercial freedom
was the fact that their activities were not sedentary nor so minutely
specialized as they were in the cities. They carried on trade more as
individual enterprisers than as members of organizations where con-
formance to feudalistic regulations had become a habit and was
considered a moral obligation. The provincial merchants injected
a definitely new and more enterprising note into the commercial
history of the period.
It is very likely that the inner decline of the kribu nakama, which
was due to the rise of individual interests over corporate interests,
was influenced by the individualistic element in the provincial mer-
71 Ike, The Beginnings of Political, Democrooy in Ja;pan, 16.
cha.nts. If thia is true, it can be s&id that the decline of the kabu na-
kama and the old guilds like the Ka.ga candle guild as well was due
indirectly to the rise of new provincial merchante. The by-passing
of the city monopolista by the provincial merchante was a direct cause
of the decline of the city merchant orga.nizations. The nakama re-
presented a voluntary self-restriction by the merch&nts in order to
fit into the feudal society and not disturb it enough to damage their
peculi&rly advanta.geous economic position. Its decline meant the
decline of an economic structure which had permitted thea>existence
of feudal a.nd mercantila power. The Tempo dissolution a.nd the fail-
ure of the feudal a.uthorities to provide an altemative meant that
the economic system had crumbled before the political revolt had
begun.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RISE OF THE MERCHANT
CLASS
T HE LATE Ashikaga period wa.s one of major economic a.nd social

change in which the merchant cla.ss ma.de great strides and gained
for the first time in J apanese history a degree of political as well a.s
economic power. This is seen in the emergence of such autonomous
merchant cities a.s Sakai. With the unifica.tion of the country by
Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and the restoration of pea.ce, there wa.s a
significant development ofoversea.s tra.de by Japanese merchant ships,
but this vigorous activity was dealt a death blow by the exclusion
edicts, completing the process of bringing the merchants under the
political domination of the feudal rulers, and channeling economic
energies into the narrower strea.m of domestic commerce. Both
Bakufu and daimyo viewed the merchant cl&ss as a useful tool which,
deprived of political infiuence, they did not expect ever to become
a danger to the feudal system.
In the Tokugawa period, the rise of the merchant cla.ss went on
almost unnoticed in the first hundred years. During this period of
expanding economy, merchante were successful in ingratia.ting them-
selves with the feudal authorities, and while the samurai class was
enjoying the fruits of pea.ce and gra.dually losing its taste for the stern
fruga.lity of the military code, the merchants were silently and in-
dustriously creating and elaborating the most ingenious commercial
and financia! institutions. At the same time they were evolving from
their experience a code of their own which fostered mutual honesty
and loyalty among members of tra.de associa.tions which sought to take
advantage of the merchants' monopoly of commercial activities
while avoiding friction with the feudal authorities.
It was not until after the Genroku period, when the economic ex-
pansion slowed to a virtual halt, that the feudal rulers began to real-
ize that the merchant cla.ss was a serious mena.ce to the feudal system.
The Yodoya confiscation began a long struggle which ended in com-
165
plete failure on the part of the feudal authoritiea either to use or to

auppreas the merchants.1 The one exception to this general failure
was the han monopoly aystem which was auccessful in restoring sol-
vency through the use of commerce, but it had ita limitations and
could not be adapted to the needs of the Bakufu. As evidence of the
growing atrength of the merchant clasa in this period could be cited
firat the fa.et that, unlik.e the many general cancellations of debta
(tokusei) in ea.rlier times, there were only two kien during the Toku-
gawa period, both greatly limited in acope, indicating the progresa of
the money economy and the increased strength of the merchant class.
Also one could cite the refusal of merchant money lendera to lend
money except on their own terms, a refusal which was made effective
by the solidarity of the merchant organizations; the increasing degree
of failure of ea.ch of the three "great reforms," and the ability of the
merchants to modify in practice the impoaitions of unjo, myoga-kin
and goyo-kin, and to oppose price regulations passively by getting
around them, as in the attempted price reductions in the Temp0
reforma.
The inherent strength of the merchants' position lay in their mono-
poly of commercial and financia! activities and the consequent depen-
dence of the samurai class on the merchants for the distribution of
food and all types of commercial commodities, and for the essential
financial services, especially lending services, which beca.me more
and more necessary to them beca.use of their deepening indebtedness.
The large non-productive samurai population in the cities and castle
towns whose livelihood constituted the basic feudal financia! problem
had to rely for their very existence on a distribution system whose
tra.nsport inefficiencies gave the merchants an opportunity for mono-
poly profits. The inefficiencies in the monetary system gave the
money exchanges and financia! agents (especially the kakeya) a.n
equally advantageous position. The degree of interdependence of the
1 In China, even up to recent yea.rs, the success of the officia.ls in utilizing

commerce for their own enrichment wa.s a far greater obsta.ele to moderni-
za.tion than any factor to be found in pre-modero Japa.n. Cf. my a.rticle,
"Some Economic Rea.sons for the Marked Contrast in Japanese a.nd Chinase
Modernization .. ," op. cit., 49-60.
CONCLUSION 167
merchants and the feudal lords in Ja.pan furnishes a significant con-

traat to European conditions. In western Europe of the middle ages,
the city and town economy revolved around relations of direct ex-
change between peasants in the countryside and handicraft workers
in the towns. In Ja.pan, however, the merchants had far closer rela-
tions of exchange with the feudal ruling classes.
The reaaons why the samurai class continued to live under an
economic system which beca.me more and more disadvantageous to
them are many. The dead hand of bureaucratic lethargy can be
counted as one. The individual samurai was an essential part of this
rather unimaginative bureaucracy. With a regular stipend, often
increased by allowances for official duties, the samurai seldom felt a
real need for the essentials of life, and the comparative decline in the
samurai's standard of living waa not sudden enough to stimulate any
real desire for change, especially if such a change meant forfeiting his
status as samurai. One reason that J apanese writers usually empha-
size is the moral principie, based on Japanese Confucian-feudal
theory and reinforced by law, that the handling of money, the cal-
culation of profits, in short, commercial conduct, waa beneath the
samurai. Avoidance of commercialism was one of their claims to pride
in being samurai. However, this way of thinking alone waa by no
mea.ns decisive. Some of the most important of the merchant houses
were established in the early Tokugawa period by samurai who re-
linquished their status to become merchants. But those early years
were filled with commercial opportunities. This was before commerce
waa tightly organized into monopolistic groups jealous of their privi-
leges and watchful to keep outsiders out. In addition, the extraordi-
nary complexity andminute specialization of financia! functions which
were fully developed by about the Genroku period must ha.ve been
strong deterrents to samurai who were expected to pride themselves
()n their lack of knowledge of such things, and who would hardly
ha.ve welcomed a long commercial apprenticeship.
The evolution of merchant organization went through three general
phases. In the first phase, the merchants built up a body of ingenious
commercial and financia! techniques and succeeded in forging a new
class solidarity and class consciousness within the feudal system and
168 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA J.AFAN
under a.n ever-present threa.t to their security. During this first phase>
the merchante relied to a. large extent upon borrowed strength -the
protection of feuda.l lords or Bakufu. An exa.mple is the dependence
of mercha.nt money lendera in Bakufu territories upon the Bakufu
courts to uphold their claims a.ga.inst the daimyo. The second phase
was the achievement of a. degree of security through organiza.tion_
Although still dependent upon feudal protection, the merchante were
:finally a.ble to wield a. certain power of their own. Their refusal to
lend money except on their own conditions a.nd their boycotting of
recalcitrant debtors, both impossible without effective organiza.tion>
a.re examples of this newfound power. The third phase wa.s the gradual
breakdown of their own feudalistic orga.niza.tions and the decline of
the uneasy coexistence which began in the time of Yoshimune. This
phase saw the rise of provincial merchante who were less dependent
upon feudal protection, a.nd it aleo saw the inner decline of the kabu
'IWkama whose members now felt safe enough to put their individual
interest before the group interest. The decline of the economic orga.n-
ization which was adapted to Tokugawa feudalism left a chaotio
situation which was rea.dy for the reforma of the Meiji period at lea.st
:fifteen yea.rs before the Restoration.
It can be se.id that two kinds of eoonomy existed during the Toku-
gawa period: the feudal economy be.sed directly on the la.nd, and the
rising money and commercial economy. The la.tter was gra.dually
ta.king precedence over the former, and the merchante benefited
from this historical tra.nsition beca.use they controlled the money and
commercial economy completely. Some Japanese schola.rs speak of
the contradiction between the land and the money economy in Toku-
gawa times. However, in actuality, there was no such contra.diction
unless the term "land economy" is defined to mean a typical
natural or self-sufficient economy. In fact, the money economy
developed through a dependence upon the feudal land eoonomy.
This was the cause for its feudal cha.racter. However, there was an
incompatibility in power rela.tionships between the la.nd economy
a.nd the money economy. The feudal lords, for example, were entirely
involved in the money economy for their consumption and daily
existence, whereas their source of income was the la.nd. Although col-
CONCLUSION 169
lections were definitely limited, expenditures were not, and this was
the basic rea.son for their financia! bankruptcy. Into this financie.!
gap, commercial ca.pite.! and capital from usury encroached, and
ca.used an ever-increa.sing impoverishment, especially when merchants
and usurera beca.me landowners and creditors and siphoned off
feudal revenues. It wa.s the same for the samurai on their fixed sti-
pends. The feudal rulers depended economically on the production
of the pea.santa, and for this rea.son, when their finances were pinched,
they had no alterna.tive but to reduce their samura.i's stipends and -
more important -they were forced to squeeze the pea.santa. To ma.ke
matters worse, the money economy, through commercial transactions
a.nd the lending of capital, penetrated directly into the agricultura!
communities and became a direct cause of further discontent. The
relative impoverishment of the lower peasants disturbed the founda-
tions of the feudal social and political order. In this way, the mer-
chante touched off a series of chain reactions which became really
serious to the feudal ruling cla.sses when the squeezing of the peasants
reached a point of diminishing returns and resulted in a decline in
productivity through pea.sants' leaving their land and resorting to
rebellion and restriction of population. The policy of squeezing the
pea.santa thus ultimately defeated its own purpose.2
The rise of the merchant cla.ss is significant not only beca.use it
exercised a profound and destructive influence on the feudal economy.
Growing in numbers and in economic power, merchants exerted tre-
mendous influence on Japanese culture and sooiety. Although tra-
ditional literary and artistic schools continued to exist, they were in-
fluenced by and far overshadowed by the new forms created by the
merchant culture of the cities. Leisure, the prestige which culture
enjoyed among merchants, anda desire to get ahead gave rise toan
insistent demand for eduoation. Ishida's ahingaku school and the
Kaitokudo of Osa.ka were established in response to this demand.
The number of temple schools (terakoya) '=!f 1J' M for commoners
in the towns and cities inoreased from 94 at the beginning of the
Tokugawa period to 5,867 at the end.8 Merchant Confucianists gained
1 Cf. Horie, . . Keizai Seiaaku, 76-7, and Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . ., 43-4.
3 NKSJ, 1121.
170 THE MERCHANT CLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
a hearing from feuda.1 lords and they aspired to become the intel-
lectual leaders of the nation.' Knowledge, culture, and power were
spread over a larger area of population than ever before in J apanese
history.
Merchant scholars were primarily concerned with the problem of
integrating the merchant more completely into the feudal society,
and there a.ppears to ha.ve been no antifeuda.1 thought sponsored by
merchants. However, the new social conditions which the merchant
dass was instrumental in creating in the cities ga.ve rise to intellectual
discontent and a questioning of tra.dition. The na.tiona.list (or na-
tivist) school (kokugaku) had its point of origin in the consciousness
-0f a way of life on the part of townspeople, and looked back to pre-
feudal Ja.pan as its ideal. Kokugaku bega.n as a city litera.ry movement,
arising from an emotional revulsion a.ga.inst the feudal elements in
-city life. From the denial of the restrictions of medieval life to the
denial of the literature it produced, it went back to ea.rly literature.
Although there were men of mercha.nt background who were leaders
in the movement,5 its nucleus wa.s the stipended samurai of the
-cities, especially Edo, as the discontented intellectual group in the
cities.6
The development of city culture included a new humanism and
rea.lism and a degree of receptivity to -Western natural sciences which
oontrasts strongly with the history of Western ideas in China..7 This
new spirit had its roots in the cities, and wa.s opposed by the feudal
psychology which criticized European natural sciences as lacking the
true characteristics of a.bstract learning. The prevailing feudal men-
tality tried to incorpora.te Westero natural sciences into the spirit
of Chu Hsi's "investigation of nature" whose object was not to con-
.quer and use nature but to know its fixed laws in order to be in har-
'Takigawa, Nihon Shakai Shi, 246.
11 K.amo Mabuchi once ma.naged an inn in Hamama.tsu, a.nd Motoori Norinaga
wa.a also of merchant stock.

8 Ya.ma.moto a.nd Wata.nabe, Ko~aku Ron, op. cit., 9 -10; 53.
" Ishida, Kinsei Bunka no Tenkai, op. cit., 412. Rea.lism is seen in such writers
a.s Saika.ku. Realism in the arta can be seen in the importa.nt influence of
Western art which moved from Na.ga.sa.ki to Kyoto, Osaka. a.nd Edo. Ishida.
cha.ra.cterizes this new spirit a.a "positivism." !bid., 391.
CONCLUSION 171
mony with them.8 These new currents of thought were unable to sha.ke
the foundations of the Chu Hsi feudal mora.Iity, but the isolated
scholars who devoted themselves enthusia.stica.lly but with great
$&erifice and under difficult conditions to the study of Dutch and
Western sciences were to be of great service in the modernization of
their country.
The hostility between the samurai and merchant ola.ases never
appears to ha.ve been very active or profound. This was no doubt
dueto the consciousness of their interdependence. At any rate, towards
the nineteenth century this hostility ca.me under the modifying in-
::0.uence of more official collaboration with merchante and more social
mobility with the sale of samurai rank and the linking of wealth and
status by merchant-samura.i marria.ge alliances and a.doptions.9 The
closest working merchant-official collaboration wa.s in the han mono-
polies. The merchante were used, closely supervised and not given
much freedom of action, beca.use the monopolies were created by
mea.ns of the political prerogatives of the feudal lords and they were
meant to serve a feudal purpose. However, the feudal lords themselves
beca.me capita.listic entrepreneurs willing to leam from the mercha.nts
and were in no position to look down at them in the traditional
manner. The samurai who were in close collaboration with the mer-
chante sometimes beca.me important industrialista themselves in the
Meiji period.1
The breakdown in the rigid social structure through the inter-
mingling of the classes which began as early as Y oshimune's time
and accelerated towards the end of the Tokugawa period has been
amply and skillfully described elsewhere.11 The substitution of a
a Ishida, Kinaei Bunka no Tenkai, 414, 390. 11 Endo, . . SMgyo Shihon . . , 15.
1 Horie,
. .Shihon Shugi . ., 40. Mitsubishi, second only to Mitsui among the
zaibatsu, was founded by lwa.saki Yataro, a country samurai (g08hi g >
who got his start working for the Tosa trading organ, the Tosa Shokai,
eventually becoming its head. Later he wa.s put in charge of Tosa fi.na.nces.
When han.-controlled enterprises were prohibited in 1870, the To~ enter-
prise continued under another name, with 1wasaki as president. N KSJ, 1565.
11 Especially in Sansom, Ja;pan, a Short Cultural History, 520-22, the best
summary, which seems to be based on Honjo's The Social and Economio
History of Japan. Also see Norman, Ja;pan's Emergen.ce as a Modem State,
56, 61. For more details, see Honjo, 85, 127-8, 204-6, 226-7.
172 TRE MERCB.ANT CLASS IN TOK.UGA.WA JA.PAN
"ca.ah nexus"11 for the feudal relations ha.sed on loyalty and service
on the one ha.nd a.nd patemalism on the other wa.s seen more and more
in such practices as the replacement of heredita.ry reta.iners by hired
men on a yea.rly ha.sis. This long procese of dissolution of feudal
rela.tionships and replacement by more impersonal and economically
ra.tionalized relationships wa.s of inestimable value to the Meiji re-
formers in their abolishment of the political structure of feuda.lism
a.nd encoura.gement of capita.lism.
To a.nalyze the role of the merchant clase in the modernization of
the Meiji period would be to go beyond the scope of the present study.
Such an a.nalysis, with this study of the merchant in the Tokuga.wa.
period a.s the point of departure, is one which could be of much value
in understa.nding the complica.ted forces which combined to a.chieve
the Meiji reforma. For our purposes, a. prelimina1y sketch of the out-
lines of such an analysis will have to suffice. 1t is the general consensus
that the role of the merchante in the Meiji moderniza.tion wa.s, with
certain exceptions, nota very active one.18 In a. general way, this can
be understood from our description of the nature of the Tokugawa.
u A term often used by writers on European economic history to describe the

ea.me phenomenon in Europe.
18 In the ma.neuverings a.nd struggles of the Restoration period, the Mitsui
appear to have been on both sides, but they point to their large-scale support
of the Imperial forces as evidence of their patriotism, although foresight
might be a better word. Their precise position, as well as that of other
major commercial and financia! houses, is a difficult subject but one well
worth further study. The Restoration movement was led by samurai and
supported financially by prominent city and provincial merchante, thereby
establishing close and lasting ties. A study of the natura of these ties, and
the origine and lives of prominent Meiji businessmen, would be of much
interest. Although a. large number of able samurai entered business and
injected a new and often dynamic influence, many leaders of Je.panese
business in this period of feverish modernize.tion of the economy were of
strictly merchant class background. For example, one of the foremost
financia! geniuses who emerged in the Meiji period was Hirose Saihei,
who started in Tokugawa times as an apprentice for Sumitomo at the age
of ten. He worked his way up to be in che.rge of the Besshi mines at the time
of the Restoration. After the Restore.tion, he we.s put in charge of all Sumi-
tomo interests and saw them very successfully through the difficult tran-
sitional period during which me.ny enterprises failed, whether directed by
merchante or samurai.
CONOLUSION 173
merchants and their "built-in" dependence upon the feudal ru1ing

class. It is a.lso a. function of the limita.tions on the development of
industrial capital, a. subject which deserves some ela.bora.tion, and
which will serve to snmmarize the position of the merchant class as
an economic force for change at the end of the Tokuga.wa period.
Professor Horie enumera.tes five obsta.eles to the development of
industrial ca.pita.! in Tokuga.wa Ja.pan:l'
(1) Na.rrowness ofthe market. The circula.tion of commercia.l goods
was becoming na.tion-wide, the provincial economies were developing
and becoming part of the na.tiona.l economy. However, the policy of
the kan to maintain as much a.s poBBible their economic autonomy
ra.n counter to the trend towa.rds a. nation-wide economy. Also, the
agricultura.l products collected by the feuda.l lords reached the ma.rket
through the feudal lords themselves, preventing the pea.santa from
an active pa.rticipation in trade which would ha.ve meant a direct
transition from a self-sufficient peasant economy to a commercia.l
economy. In &ddition, the insistence upon feudal frugality (to the
extent that it was effective) and, more important, the squeezing of
the pea.santa, ha.mpered greatly the increase in the standard of living,
and m&de impossible any rapid extension of the domestic market.
In the case of Western nations, the narrowness of domestic markets
was remedied by the opening up of foreign markets, especia.lly the
new colonial markets of undeveloped a.reas. In the ca.se of Ja.pan,
however, this course was not open to her beca.use of the exclusion
policy. The small volume offoreign trade with China and Holland (both
more highly developed countries than Ja.pan) permitted at Naga-
saki was wholly passive in nature.
(2) The lack of the technical mea.ns of manufacture (i.e., implements
and machinery) which would attract and utilize industri&l capital.
This technical inadequacy was due in part to the narrowness of the
market and to the undeveloped state of natural sciences in Ja.pan.
(3) The lack of a labor ma.rket sufficient to meet the needs of la.rge
sea.le industrial enterprises. Agricultura was highly intensive and
required even the labor of women and children. The peasant economy
was a self-sufficient one, and as handicraft production was mainly
u Condensed from Horie, . . Shihon Shugi . , 46-8.
174 THE MERClIANT OLA.SS IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
by pea.santa, there was in actuality no real social division of labor

between agriculture and industry. Also, beca.use of the employment
conditions in the cities, the exclusivism of organized artisans and
merchants, and the restraints of status dueto tradition and law, there
were many difficulties for the propertyless peasant in leaving his villa.ge.
(4) The lack of progressiveness in commercial capital itself. Com-
mercial capital was accumulated mainly due to special relationships
with. feudal lords and common samurai, and was me.de possible
through the heavy exactions squeezed by the ruling classes from the-
peasants. Therefore, to destroy the feudal system and change over te>
a new economic system meant the death of the old type merchant.15
In addition, due to the obsta.eles already discussed, commercial
capital tended to go into usury rather than into industrial capital.
(5) The kabu nakama system was an obstacle beca.use it prohibited
free competition. Economic liberalism is a principie of the capitalist
economy which could not exist under the kabu nakama system.
Members of kabu nakama were una.ble to advance to the stage of free
competition for subjective as well as objective reasons. Subjectively~
their aggressive and enterprising spirit was almost non-existent.
Their efforts were spent in preserving the family enterprise intact and
essentially unchanged. They knew their place and kept it. In ad-
dition, for wealthy merchants there was no greater honor than to wear
the two swords of the specially protected merchant and to consider
themselves equal to the samurai in status. They wanted nothing more.
Professor Horie concludes, "There were fixed bounds to the devel-
opment of commercial capital during the Edo period due to the feudal
character of its accumulation and related reasons. Of course, it can
be well imagined that in time these limitations could have been broken
down and the way cleared for a general development of industrial
capital. However, as far as can be seen from the stage of economio
development reached by the end of the Tokugawa period, it must be
concluded that it had reached a point where industrial capital was
only in its infancy. This is definitely not to say, however, that this
stage had no influence on the formation of J apanese capitalism. On
16 Cf. Taka.hashi Kamekichi, Nihon Shihon Shugi Hattat,su Shi, op. cit., 36
and Norman. Japan'a Emergence aa a Modem State, 51, ftnte. 7.
CONCLUSION 175
the contrary, the total of the elements put together mea.nt the
existence of the potential for industrial capital development. ,,18
Thus, the merchants - especially the city merchants - entered
the period of modern Meiji capitalism under serious disa.dvantages.
Some, like the Mitsui, Konoike and Sumitomo who financed the
beginnings of the new government were a.ble to a.djust to the times
and with government collabora.tion, succeeded in reaching new heights
of power and activity. This was ma.de possible by the continuation of
government protection, even though it took new forms. The kabu
nakama system, although abolished, was a.dapted to the needs of
government-controlled foreign trade and was found helpful for this
purpose.17 But Sir George Sansom is probably correct in his judgment
of the old type merchants: "Their outlook was too narrow, they
had thrived on protection, and with a few exceptions they fell back
to huckstering, while ambitious samurai of low and middle rank
became bankers, merchants and ma.nufacturers."18 The unusualinge-
nuity and enterprise which the merchants demonstrated in the ea.rly
years of the Tokugawa period was dulled by the need to settle
down comfortably within the feudal system, content with mono-
polizing their respective shares of a static economy. However, inge-
nuity and enterprise were not dead by any mea.ns, as we ha.ve seen
in the examples of provincial merchants. Provincial merchante, just
beginning to rise and to break down the old monopolies, were active
in the Restoration movement19 because they welcomed a change whioh
would give them new opportunities. But their potential power was
limited, and the majority of the merchants, passive, oautious, and
conservative, clung to their old comfortable ways, and it was the
ambitious young samurai in government and business who took the
active lea.din the economic modernization of the Meiji period, although
making use of the mercantile community and drawing upon its wide
and valuable experience and techniques.
te Horie, . .Shihon Shugi . ., 48.
17 According to Honjo, "The necessity for promoting cooperative advantages
still existed, pa.rticularly in foreign trade. Therefore, a system of tra.de
associations was carried out." NKSJ, 262.
18 Japan, a Short OUltural History, 509.
19 Cf. Ike, The Beginnings of Politi.coJ, Democracy in Japan, 18-23.
LIST OF NAMES
OF PERSONS WITH DATES WHEN KNOWN
Ando Shoeki c. 1700-

Buyo lnshi ~-~~
:lit li} el
Chikamatsu Monzaemon ili. ~ r~ ti. r~ 1653-1724
Chu Hsi ;!;!{ 1130-1200
Dazai Shundai
GamoKumpei
Ha.yashi Shihei
***
-~tt~
#-T 31-
1680-1747
1768-1813
1754-1793
Hiranoya. 2Ji !f li.
Honda Toshiaki
Ibara Saikaku
*=* ~ -'11 PJ1
J.i j . .
1744-1821
1642-1693
Ishida Ba.igan
IW Jinsai
;omm 1685-1744
1627-1705
fJtiit:ff
Ka.iho Seiryo
Kamo Ma.buchi
m.w:
ft /i .Jtmt
~ 1755-1818
1697-1769
Ka.nda. Takahira. jllffi~lp 1830-1898
Kawamura Zuiken W#J/Mff 1618-1700
Kawashima Matahei Jll h X* #i
Kinokuniya Bunzaemon te ()) liU ~ :se ti. #i r~
Ke>noike Shinroku
Kubo Kihei i-t id! fJf
~.W:%*#i
*
Kumazawa Banzan 1m 1'. .lJ 1619-1691
Kusama N aokata 1it IW it 1J 1753-1831
Matsudaira Sa.danobu ~lp~ffl' 1758-1829
Mitsui Hachirobei =~1\.llB*#i d. 1694
Miura Baien
Mizuno Tadakuni
=11m111 1725-1789
1794-1851
*lf ,\f!~
MotooriNorinaga *15ll~ 1730-1801
Muro Kyuso ~1'AJl 1658-1734
Na.ka.e Toju
Na.kai Chikuzan
r:rrram 1608-1648
1730-1804
rp ~ 1t .lJ
Na.raya Mozaemon !tf a m. & ti. r~
Nishikawa. Joken li Jrl :tm Jt 1648-1724
Oda. Nobuna.ga Mlffifg~ 1534-1582
Ogyii Sorai Y~fll~ 1666-1728
Oshima Konin *fhQjB: 1826-1901
Sakurada. Ta.da m~
Sato Shin'en ti .iJi ffl' VIII 1769-1850
Shimomura -F#
Shing Ryotei *Jf ~ l;l.ll 1787-1854
Sumitomo Masatomo itbt JE~ c. 1585-1652
LIST OF NA.MES OF PEBSONS 177
Takadaya. Ka.hei 1769--

Tanuma Okitsugu 1719--1788
Tennojiya Gohei
Tokugawa Hidetada. 1579-1632
Tokugawa lemitsu 1603-1651
Tokugawa Ieya.su 1542-1616
Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 1646-1709
Tokuga.wa Yoshimune 1677-1751
Toyotomi Hideyoshi 1536-1598
Ya.maga Sok~ 1622-1685
Yamagata Ba.nW 1789-1821
Yodoya Keian
Yodoya. Sa.buroemon c. 1867- ~
Zeniya. Gohei 1773-1852
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED MORE THAN ONCE
Baku/u J(f Literally, "tent government": the To-

kugawa bureaucracy.
chishi-sen i& .:.ti A tax on houses and lots upon which
they were built.
cMnin IUT A Townspeople. Literally, the residents
of the commercial streets or districtst
as distinct from the residents of the
samurai quarters. They comprised two
classes, the artisans and the merchants.
daimyo *1i Literally, "great names": feudal lord.s.
During the Tokugawa period, those
holding fiefs (han) whose annual rice
production was assessed at more than
10,000 koku.
Eiraku-sen ik~tl Chinese coins of the Ming period, Y ung-
lo ;;k ~ reign (1403-1424), used as a.
standard coin in Ja.pan until prohibited
in 1608.
/udasashi -~t~ The kalceya of Edo. See kalceya.
go-kenin tll*A Literally, "housemen": samurai of low
rank who were direct vassals of the
Tokugawa house.
gonin-gumi :IiA *11. Five-family associations, the basic unit
in administrative organization of the
people.
goyo-lcin flPJfl~ Forced loans. In principie they were
to be repaid, but seldom were. The term
means literally, "money for govem-
ment use."
han Feudal domains or fiefs. In Tokugawa.
times, those fiefs of more than 10,000
koku assessed annual rice production.
Sometimes translated "clan."
hatamoto Banner knights, immediate vassals of
* the Tokugawa house whose domains
178
GLOSSARY 179
were assessed a.t leas than 10,000 koku

annua.l rice production and were a.dmin-
istered directly by the Bakufu.
Membership privileges in nakama, kabu
nakama, or ton'ya.
kahu nakama ~ {"1 00 A chartered guild (or trade associa.tion)
with a legal limita.tion of the number
of kabu.
Kaitokudo Mfl '.f: The Confucian school in Osa.ka where
the Nakai family taught.
kakeya -~ Merchant appointed to handle fina.n-
cial services connected with the sale of
tax rice and other commodities by the
fendal lord.a. Sometimes included the
functions of kuramoto.
kesslw MJiJf Confiscation of property, a part of most
criminal punishments, always when
a. person was exiled. Used against
merchants who exceeded the bounds of
what the authorities could claim was
permissible in the way of luxury and
ostentation.
kien ~m A modified type of debt cancellation.
koku :;p A unit of capacity measurement stan-
dardized at 5.12 bushels.
kogaku-ha t; lJ! Ji The school of ancient learning, a Con-
fucian school of Japanese origin.
kokugaku-ha iJ $ Di The nationalist (or nativist) school, an
anti-Confucian school.
kumi a (1) Groups, either made up of ton' ya, or,
in some cases, nakama. (2) Divisions
of a nakama. Variant form: gumi.
kuramoto Yl JC Merchant appointed as warehouse keep-
er, usually took care of the sale of tax
rice for the feudal lords, sometimes
a.lso handled the financia! services or-
dinarily carried out by a kakeya.
kurayashiki I! ~ 8 Warehouses used by daimyo and other
feudatories for the storage of tax rice
and other commodities.
machi bugyo P1J * ff Town magistrate. A samurai official
180 TBE MEBCHANT CLA.88 IN TOKUGAWA JA.PAN
who held a.dministrative, judicial and

pollee powers.
Semi-official councils of city elders of
either merchant or artisan class through
whom the feudal authorities adminis-
tered towns and cities.
myoya-hin Ordinarily an enterprise fee pe.id each
year to the feudal authorities, in many
cases fixed for a. number of years but
alwa.ys subject to re-negotiation. Some-
times caJled simply myaga.
nakagai Intermediary trader. Either a. broker
or a middleman.
nakama Trade a.ssociations or guilds (unchar-
tered) of the Tokugawa period.
Mfl/IMhi Commoners appointed as semi-officials,
of some cities, towns and villa.ges,
charged with the transmittal and en-
forcement of orders. A term used mainly
in Edo and Eastern Japan. In Kansai and
the west, shoya was the common term.
rakuichi Free markets.
rakuza Free guilds.
ryo The numerical unit of the gold curren-
cy, derived originally from a weight
unit equal to 10 momme (or 37.5 grams).
Gold ryo differed from this in actual
weight.
ryagae-ya Money exchanges, which ca.me to carry
on most of the functions of a modem
bank.
Banlcin kotai The system requiring all feudal lords
to attend the Shogun's court a.t period-
ical intervals, a.nd to lea.ve their wives
and children in Edo as bosta.ges while
they were in their own doma.ins. Re-
gula.rized a.nd ma.decompulsory in 1634.
sekiiko Barriera maintained by feudal authori-
ties on roads and waterwa.ys for mil-
itary, economic a.nd policing purposes.
Also called seki.
GLOSSARY 181
Bkingaku ,~,.
The Confucia.n school of Ishida. Ba.iga.n,
a.lso called Sekimon skingaku :fi pi] ,(t
to differentiate it from the Oyomei
(Wa.ng Y a.ng-ming) school.
&iirobun ~:?e Epistolary style.
80 toskiyori Osa.ka. council corresponding to the
~~* macki doskiyori of most cities and
towns.
toiya rm~ Wholesale houses. Doiya is a. va.ria.nt
form.
ton' ya Edo dialect for toiya. Don' ya is a va.ria.nt
form.
unjo-kin iiJ:~ "Tha.nk money," a. type of enterprise
ta.x paid on occasion of cha.rtering a.nd
on certain other occasions. Usually
called simply unjo.
za Guilds.
BIBLIOGRAPHY*
l. Source Materia.Is
A. In J apanese
l. Collections.
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13 *ll- [Historical Materia.Is of Ja.pan.]
Honjo Eijiro *
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Honjo, ed., Kinsei Shakai Keizai Sosho fil. iit iitt fr & re
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10 Vols.
Sato Shin'en-ka Gaku Zenshu fti .Di fj" tJ1H jt $ ~. [Complete
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*
Takimoto Seiichi fi Wil -, ed., Nilwn Keizai Sosho 13
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* &
Sosho Kanko Kai, 1914-17. 36 Vols.
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Period Commercial Series]. Tokyo: Kokusho Kank.okai, 1913-
14. 3 Vols.
2. Individual Works.
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Vol. 1 of Kinsei Shakai Keizai Sosho.
!tema with a.sterisks a.re works which ha.ve been consulted but to which
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Materiala. (Ann Arbor: 1954).
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY 183
Hayashi Shihei # =f l]i, J08ko J: [Memoriala], in Nihoo Keizai
Honda Toshiaki *
Sosko, XII, 5-50.
~ tlJ PJJ, Keisei Hiaaku ft iltD ift [A Secret
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Koji Ruien t; $ I'{ ~ [ An Encyclopedic Collection of Historical
Materia.Is]. Tokyo: Koji Ruien Kankokai, 1935-38 ed. 60 Vols.
Kumazawa Banzan g 1' .e
Nikon Rinri lken, 11, 9-332.
l.IJ, Skiigi Gesko ~ . , in
Kumazawa Banzan, Sk(/ Wasko l1] f1, in Nikon Rinri,
lken, I, 255-560.
Mitsui Takafusa ~ jt=- jf6 J, Ckonin Kken Roku llT A~ Ji fl [A
Record of ObservationB of ToWnBmen], in Tokugawa Jidai
Skogyo Sosko, 1, 155-194.
Ogy Sorai ~~tu. ff, Taikeisaku ::t: l]i jt, in Nikon Keizai
Sosko, II, 531-563.
Ogy Sorai, Seidan ~ [Talks on Political Economy], in Nihon
Keizai Soako, III, 339-530. (Also found in Kinsei Shakai Keizai
Gakusetsu Taikei, VI.)
Sato Shin'en, Kaib Saku ii (Sj jf [A Policy for Coastal Defense],
in Sat Skin'en-ka Gaku Zensku, III, 819-829.
Sato Shin'en, Keizai Teiy ~ ?ff- f1 ~ [A Manual of Political
Economy], in Saw Skin'en-ka Gaku Zenaku, 11, 549-89.
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Tokugawa Kinrei Ko j i Jll ~ '1t ~ [A Commentary on Toku-
gawa Prohibitory RegulationB]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan,
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Yamaga. Soko llJ Ji* fi, Yamaga Gorui llJ Ji m. l'f, in Kinsei
Shakai Keizai GakuBetBu Taikai, JI, 171-376.
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*Ca.ron, Franc;ois, A True Description o/ tke M ighty K ingdorriu
o/ Japan and Siam. Reprinted from the English edition of 1663
with notes by C. R. Boxer. London: Argonaut, 1935. 197 pp.
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*Thunberg, Charles Peter, Voyages de C. P. Tkunherg, au Japon,
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A. In Japanese.
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Akabori Matajiro 1fF tJl 3t ~ t(B, Tokugawa Jidai no S/Wnin
fl JJI 11:; ft O) i8f A [Merchants of the Tokugawa. Period],
in N ihon Shiinin Ski B * i8 A JJ?. TA History of J apa.nese
Merchants]. Tokyo: Nihon Rekishi Chiri Gakkai, 1935, 187-234.
Bamba Masa.tomo 14 ~ JE N.J, Nihon Jukyo Ron B
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*m ft a
1939. (Vol. XVIII of Nihon Rekishi Zemho). 328 pp.
Endo Masa.o ll g JE !1J, N ihon K imei SMgyo Shihon H attatsu
Ski Ron B * *
ili. ilt Jli ft ft ~ B! t [An Essay on the
History of the Development of Commercia.l Capital in Ja.pan in
the Early Modern Period]. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha., 1936.
354 pp.
*Honjo Eijiro, Bakumatsu no SkiMeiaaku tJ * (J) '1f it jff [The
New Policies of the Last Years of the Ba.kufu]. Tokyo: YUhi-
kaku, 1940, rev. ed. 335 pp.
Honjo, JinkO oyobi JinkO Mondai A a Ji O: A a 1UJ 11 [Po-
pulation a.nd Population Problema]. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha,
1930. 158 pp.
*Honjo, Nihon Keizai Shiso Ski Kenky B * e
& M MJ, B! if
~ [Studies in the History of Japa.nese Economio Thought].
Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1942. 466 pp.; supplementary vo-
lume, se.me title, 1947. 270 pp.
Honjo, Nihon Shakai Keizai Ski B * if: 'ft & M J1! [A Socio-
Economic History of Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Ka.iz0sha, 1928. 631 pp.
Honjo, Tokugawa Bakufu no Beika OhOsetsu fi JI) a
11) fij [The Regulation of the Price of Rice by the Tokugawa.
J(f O)* 11f
Bakufu]. Kyoto: Kobundo Shobo, 1924. 415 pp.
Horie Y a.suzo .t}ffi iI .fi JJt, N ihon K eizai Ski B
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* 11 li* B! [An
322 pp.
Horie, Kimei Nihon no Keizai SeiBaku ili..111: B *O) & M jlJc ft
[Economic Policies of Ja.pan in the Ea.rly Modern Period]. To-
kyo: Yhikaku, 1942. 396 pp.
Horie, Nihon Skihon Shugi no Seiritsu B * * jf .:t f(l O) lit 1c.
[The Forma.tion of Capita.lism in Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Yhikaku,
2nd ed., 1948. 292 pp.
Horie, W aga K uni K imei no Sembai Seido ~ 1iJ ili. 1lt O) W. J(
flj!J 1f [The Monopoly System in our Country in the Ea.rly Mod-
~rn Period]. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1933. 280 pp.
Isbida Ichiro 15 m- Jl, Kimei Bunlca no Tenlcai i!i.
}ji Dft [The Unfolding of the Early Modern Culture], in Kimei
ilt" {t OJ
Shakai (q.v.), Kobata Jun, ed., 308-415.

Ka.nno Wata.ro ~ !f *1 :;t fm, Nihon KaiBha Kigyo HaB1Jei Ski
BIBLIOGJUP.HY 185
no Kenky B * '9" il: ~ ~ V- ~ 11! (J) if ~ [Studies in the

History of the Origination of Company Enterprises in Japan].
Kanno, Nikon SMgyo Shi 13 *

Tokyo: lwanami Shoten, 1931. 726 pp.
(tj ~JI!. [Commercial History of
Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1930. 352 pp.
Kanno, OmiSMnin no Kenky i [ iI f6 A (J) f}f ~ [A Study of
O.mi Merchante]. Tokyo: Yhikaku, 1941. 329 pp.
Kobata Jun ,1J' Ji ED ~ ed., KinBei Shakai i [ iJt il: 'ft' [Early
Modern Society]. Tokyo: Asakura Shoten, 1952. (Vol. IV of
Skin Nikon Ski Taikei). 429 pp.
Kobata Jun, Kinsei Keizai no Hattatsu il( ilt & 1Jlf (J) ~
[Economic Development of the Early Modern Period], in
Kinsei Shakai, 21~307.
Koda Shigetomo $ mJ& ~, Edo to Osaka rr. *
Ji !. 1ii
Koda., Nikon Keizai Ski Kenky B *
[Edo and Osa.ka]. Tokyo: Fuzambo, 1934. 333 pp.
& M 11! if ~ [Studies in
Japanese Economic History]. Tokyo: Ookayama Shoten, 1928.
854 pp.
Matsuyoshi Sadao ~ 1if j{ -X Nikon Ryogae Kin'y Ski Ron
*
a mtf fl M 11!. it [History of Japanese Money Exchange
a.nd Money Market]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjsha, 1932. 447 pp.
*Matsuyoshi, Shinden no Kenky jJf m(J) if ~ [A Study of
Reclaimed Fields]. Tokyo: Yhikaku, 1936. 311 pp.
Miyamoto Mata.ji 'g * )( ~' Kahu Nakama no Kenky ~ 1ifi fl8
(J) f}f ~ [Studies in Chartered Guilds a.nd Trade Associations].
Tokyo: Yhikaku, 1938. 434 pp.
Miyamoto, Kinsei SMgyo Keiei no Kenky il( ilt f6 &
JJf ~ [Studies in the Commercial Opera.tions of the Early
* (J)
Modern Period]. Kyoto: Dai Hassu, 1948. 389 pp.

Miyamoto, Kinsei SMgyo Soshiki no Kenky il( 1lt f6 *1111
(J) if ~ [ Studies in the Commercial Orga.nization of the Early
Modern Period]. Tokyo: Ynhikaku, 1939. 293 pp.
Miyamoto, KinBei Sh0nin lskiki no Kenky il( ilt f6 A :a M (J)
JJf ~ [Studies in the Merchant Mentality of the Early Modern
Period]. Tokyo: Yhikaku, 1941. 320 pp.
Miyamoto, Nihon Kinsei Ton'ya Sei no Kenky a
~ ffjlj (J) JJF ~ [Studies in the Ton'ya System in Ja.pan in the
*
if. i1t 1DJ
Early Modern Period]. Tokyo: Tokoshoin, 1951. 426 pp.
Miyamoto, Nikon SMgyo Shi B * f6 ~ 11!, [Commercial History
of Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Ryginsha, 1943. 423 pp.
Miyamoto, Nikon SMgyo Ski Gairon 13 * Rf 11!, ft Jt [An
Outline of Japanese Commercial History]. Kyoto: Sekai Shi-
sosha, 1954. 367 pp.
*Miyamoto, Zoku Nikon Kinsei Ton'ya Sei no Kenky 1f a
i [ rJJ Al. ffjlj (J) iF ~ [Continuation of Studies in the Ton'ya
*
System in Ja.pan in the Early Modern Period]. Kyoto: Sanwa
Shoin, 1954. 366 pp.
186 THE MEBCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGAWA JAl'AN
*Nomura Kaneta~ !f # ::k tas, Nilwn Keizai Skiao E

ij!f m. e [Japanese Economic Thought]. Tokyo: Keio, 1914:.
* fE
163 pp.
Nomura, Tokugawa Hoken Skakai no Kenky fl Jt1 Mil if: 'ft Q)
if ~ [Studies in the Tokugawa Feudal Society]. Tokyo: Nikko
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Nomura, Tokugawa Jidai no Keizai Skiso fil Jl1 ~ ft O) &
e
MJ, [The Economic Thought of the '.IJ>kugawa Period]. Tokyo:
Nihon Hyoronsha, 1939. 562 pp.
Ono Kin 1J' !f ~' Kinsei Joka-macki no Kenkyu j!i ilt JJl r lllf
O) ~~[A Study ofCa.stle Towns in the Early Modem Period].
Tokyo: Shibundo, 1928. 298 pp.
Ono Takeo 1J, !f Jit :j, Noson Skakai Ski RonkO Jl # iii:f: fr j!
[Discussions on the Social History of Peasant Villa.ges].
*
Osa.ka Municipal Council
m
*
Tokyo: Ganshodo, 1935. 422 pp.
l?.i 1# lJ 'ft, comp., saka Ski Ski
1?.i JJ! [History of the City of Osaka]. Osa.ka: 1911-15.
8 Vols.
Sakata Yoshio ~ mti it, GMnin P1J A [The Townsmen].
Tokyo: Kobundo Shobo, 1939. 158 pp.
Shofii Katei ~ JI. & ~' Zeniya Gokei Skinden f1 1i. n
1' [A True Biography of Zeniya Gohei]. Kyoto: Fujioka Koji,
*
# .nt
1930. 264 pp.

*Suzuki Naoji ~ * W: .=, Tokugawa Jidai no Beikoku Haikyu
Soskiki fl Jll ~ ft O) :* ft ftc *ft *11 M [The Organization of
the Distribution of Rice in the Tokugawa Period]. Tokyo:
Ganshodo, 1938. 728 pp.
Takahashi Kamekichi f.lj tl li ti, Nilwn Skilwn Skugi Hatf.ats'U
Ski E * *
jf ~ ~ ~ re [History of the Development of
Capitalism in Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 6th ed., 1939.
412 pp.
*Takaha.shi, Tokugawa Hoken Keizai no Kenkyu fl JI) Mil &
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Toyo Shokan, 1941. 452 pp.
Takigawa Masajiro ift Jll JE
re
* ftB, Nikon Skakai Ski E
[A Social History of Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Kangensha., 3rd ed.,
*
iii:f: 1t
1948. 377 pp.
Takimoto Seich fi * -,
~ Nilwn Kahei Ski E *ti ff ~ [A
Monetary History of Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Shunjiisha. 1929. 172 pp.
Toyoda Shiro -9.
jf *
~
m llQ !l~, Nilwn Skilwn Skugi Hattatsu Ski E
~ ~ JJ! [History of the Development of Capitalism
*
in Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Rodo Bunk.a.sha, 1950. 195 pp.
Tsuji Zennosuke i ff z JVJ, Tanuma Jidai miB ~ ft [The
Tanuma Period]. Tokyo: Nihon Gakujitsu Fuky.ka.i, 1936.
346 pp.
*Tsuchiya Takao ~ ~ *ft, Hoken Skakai Hokai Katei no Ken-
n
ky !-J' if: ir JI M iA .ft O) ~ 1f [A Study of the Procesa
BIBLIOGRAPHY 187
of Disintegration of the Feudal Society]. Tokyo: Kobundo,

1927. 729 pp.
Tsuchiya Takao, Nikon no SeisM E *O) i{t ff(j [Political Mer-
chants of Ja.pan]. Tokyo: Keizai Orai Sha, 1956. 287 pp.
Wada. Atsunori lO mJI~. Bansen to Seisku Torikiki no Kanrei
lt M !. fR 1i!i 10C 'i I O) 'ti iJtJ [The Customs of Bansen and
E *
Transa.ctions in Refined Sake], in Nikon Kots Ski no Kenkyu
~ ii i!, O) iF 1Z [Studies in the History of Japa.nese
Y ama.moto Masahide tlJ

Kokugaku Ron 11J $- [
*
Transportation]. Honjo, ed., Tokyo: Kaizosha., 1929, 417-448.
JE 2J and Watanabe Sh jli :i! *'
An Essay on Kokugaku]. (Vol. XIX of
Yokoi Tokifuyu Wi ji: ~ ~. Nikon SkOgyo Ski E *

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ff(j ~ i!,
445 pp.
2. Periodical Articles.
Endo Masa.o ~ j i JE !J}, "Zeniya Gohei no Kaga Ryonai Rosoku-
za Appaku Jiken i1 ~ :Ii * #i O) 1JD fr fil{ ti ti; ~ }D if!
$fil:" [The Incident of Zeniya Gohei's Pressure on the Candle
Guild in the Doma.in of Kaga], Keiwi Ski Kenkyu (henceforth
cited as KSK), XLVI (Aug. 1933), 38-54; XLVII (Sept. 1933),
162-174; XLIX (Nov. 1933), 286-302.
Hamamura Shozaburo j-1 #JE,=:. llJS, "Eiraku-sen no Kinshi wo
Ronzu ;;j<. ~ ft O) ~ ir ~ Q> ~" [Comments on the Prohi-
bition of Eiraku-sen], KSK, XXVII (1942), 362-78.
Honjo Eijiro, "Sankin Kotai Seido no Keizai Kan D ~ ft $11
Jl O) & lfl U." [An Economic View of the Sankin Kotai Sys-
tem], Keiwi Ronso, II, 6 (Dec. 1916), 828-41; IV, 4 (Oct. 1917),
55-74.
Honjo, "Tokugawa Jidai no Kin'y Seido Gaisetsu f1 )11 p ft
(J) ~ I! ffj!J ~ f ~" [ An Outline of the Credit System in the
Tokugawa Period]. KSK, XI-X (Aug.-Sept., 1930), 47-57;
57-68.
H<>ga ;fJ *
*Horie Ya.suz<>, "Bakumatsu ni Okeru Shihon Shugi Keizai no
: ~ lf ~*.O) ijj: ~" [TheGermination
of Capitalist Economy in the Last Years ofthe Bakufu], KSK,
XIX, 2 (Feb. 1928), 50-74.
Horie, "Edo Jidai no Osa.ka no Kogyo l[ p ~ ft O) -};;. ~ (J)
I ~" [Osa.ka lndustry in the Edo Period], Keiwi Ronso,
LI, 5 (Nov. 1940), 128-147.
Horie, "San Dai Kaika.ku to Zaisei _=:. -J;. ak .. t JU ifk" [The
Three Great Reforma a.nd Finances], KSK, XV, 1(Jan.1936),
23-41.
Horie, "Tokugawa Jidai no Rikujo Kots fl Jll p:f ft O) Ji J:
~ ii [Overland Transportation of the Tokugawa. Period],
KSK, XI, 2 (Feb. 1934), 73-86.
188 THE MERCHANT CLASS IN TOKUGA.WA. JA.PAN
Horie, "Tokugawa Jidai no Suijo Kots J11 ~ O) 11< J: ~ ji"

[Water Transportation of the Tokugawa Period], KSK, XIV,
1 (July, 1935), 74-87.
Ka.nno Watar, "Tokugawa Jidai no Tokumei Kumia.i f1 JI) ~
ft (J) M 4; tD. -&" [The Anonymous Combin&tions of the Toku-
gawa Period], KSK, IX (July, 1930), 38-46.
Ka.nno, "Tokugawa Jidai Shonin no Chifu fil Jll ~ ft j(fj A O)
it &" [The Accumulation of Wea.Ith by Merchants of the
Tokuga.wa Period], Hikone Kas/W Ronso VIII (Dec., 1930),
15-64.
Matsuyoshi Sadao, "Tokugawa Bakufu no Kaikon Seisa.ku Ka.n-
e
ken 14 Jr1 ;fJ 1(.f (J) 1m t ft 'lf Ji" [A Personal Interpret&tion of
the Policy of the Tokugawa Bakufu for the increase of Arable
Mitsui Taka.kore =
La.nd], KSK, XIII, 3 (Mar. 1935), 13-26.
jt: iOj fil, "Edo Jidai ni Okeru Tokushu
Shgyo to shite no Gofuku-ya. to Ryogae-ya U. fi lf:t ft :
~ H- 'Mi ~ itti 1:. L "C O) ! g ~ 1:. m # ~,, [The
Dry Goods Businesa as a Special Type of Commerce in the Edo
Period, and Money Exchanges], Shakai Keizai Ski Gaku, II,
9 (Sept. 1932), 57-62.
Miyamoto Mata.ji, "Kinsei no Sonraku to Sh<:>gy il( ilt O) # fg
I;. itfj 11" [Villa.ges a.nd Commerce in the Early Modera Period],
Hikone KosM Ronso, XXIV (June, 1941), 147-177.
Miyamoto, "Tempo Kaika.ku to Ka.bu Na.ka.me. "j Q! & 1fi !.
BU" [The Tempo Reform and Ka.bu Na.ka.me.], KSK, XV, 1
** 14'
(Jan. 1936), 85-111.
Miya.moto, "Waga. Kuni Kinsei ni Okeru Shogyo Rijun no Toku-
shitsu ~ il lf. ilt : ~ H itfj ~ ,i!J 11! O) ~ Ji" [The Specia.l
Cha.racteristics of Commercial Profits in Our Country in the
Early Modern Period], KSK, XVII, 1 (Jan. 1937), 137-156.
Nomura Kanet&ro, "Tokuga.wa Hoken Sei to Shogyo fll Jll #
B $1j !. itfj ~" [The Tokuga.wa Feudal System and Commerce],
Shakai Keizai Ski Gaku, VI, 10 (Jan. 1937), 113-133.
Sakata. Yoshio, "Meiji Ishin to Tempo Ka.ikaku P)l i'' 11 fi' !.
-:: -fl & "Jti" [The Meiji Restoration and the Tempo Reform],
Jimhun GakuM, II (1952), 1-26.
Shiba. Kentaro ~ji ::k JB, "Nagegane to wa. Na.ni, Ka.ijo Ka.-
shitsuke ka, Kommenda Toshi ka ti ll !. tci {PI MJ: 11: Ff.t ;Jf :2
~ ,,;l :Y !JI.. :ti ff 71" [What was 'Na.gega.ne' 1 A Marine Loan,
or Commenda Investment 1], KSK, 45-7 (July-Sept., 1933),
617-634; 14-27; 123-145.
Y oshimura. Miyao 'ti # g !1J, "Edo Jidai ni Okeru Shogyo no
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INDEX
Abacus (aoroban), 69 Bant (chief apprentices), 52, 53;

Abortion, 100 ftnte., p. 66
Actors, 94 Barriera (aekiaho), 12-13, 15, 24
Advertising: lack of effective medium, Barter economy, 144
48; "singing commercial," ftnte., Bekke (separate merchant's or artisa.n's
p. 48; immoral to stimulate demand establishment), 52
for commercial goods, 141 Billa of exchange (tegata), 43, 56, 65,
Agricultural productivity; increaee in 70, 149
early period, 4; only small gains Birth control, 100
after Genroku, 100; improvement Biwako (La.lee Biwa), 32
of, ftnte., pp. 141-142; crop en- Black-listing by nakama, 56
couragement, 148 "Blind money," 77
Ainu, 70, 150 Bodhisattva, 92, 139
Aizu, 46, 148, 157 Bon (Buddhist festival for the dead),
Akita, 162 52; ftnte., p. 68
Alienation of land, 27, 7 5 Bottomry (nagegane), 19
And~ Sh~ki. ftnte., p. 143 Brasa guild, ftnte., p. 50; 115-116
Anonymous combinations for plural Bridge building, 15
ownership of enterprises, 51-52 Bribery. See Gifts and bribes.
A pprentice system, 52-53; ftnte., p. 66;Buddhist organiza.tions: formidable
91, 112 enemies of N obuna.ga.; 7; Shin sect,
Arai Hakuseki, ftntes., pp. 67 and 112 9, 138; temple warehouses, 10;
Artisans (ahokunin): ra.tionale of social protecting mercha.nts, 12; temple
status, 26; treatment as a. class by "manors" (aMen), 13; money lend-
the Bakufu, 30-31; outproduced by ing by temples, 7 5; keeping prosti-
pea.santa, 150 tutes, ftnte., p. 115
Artisan-merchants (ahoku-akindo), 26 Bugyo (ma.gistrate), ftnte., p. 33
Ashikaga. period, 12, 22, 45, 165 Bunka-Bunsei eras, 102, 124
Bmhi.do (code of the warriors), 96
"Back-to-Ieyasu" movement, 104 Buying on margin, 56, 57
"Back-room rentera," ftnte., p. 118 By-passing and breaking of city
Bakufu, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, monopolies by provincial merchante,
33-37, 41, 42, 46, 49, 50, 51, 58, 65, 160-161, 164
66, 68, 71, 73, 76, 77, 86, 87, 99,
102-108, 110-120,122-125,127-130, Canal building, 68
136-138, 141-143, 145, 149, 150, Cancellation of debts (kien), 122 and
162-163, 165, 166, 168 ftnte.; 123, 127-128, 130, 166;
Banishment, ftntes., pp. 103, 119 and (tok'U/Jei), 166
129 Candle guild (r08oku-m) of Ka.ge.,
Banaen system, 59, 61, 62, 73 156-158, 164
194
INDEX 195
Capital utilization, 74-75 p. 123; 131-143, 167, 169-170,

Cartela (k), 72-73; ftnte., p. 126 170-171
"Ca.eh nexus" substituted for feudal Construction of castles, temples, etc.,
relations, 171-172 5-6, 10; ftnte., p. 28; 41; ftnte.,
Ca.stle towns, 5-6, 72, 146, 147, 150, p. 67; 76, 87-88, 89, 100, 104
151 Cooperativa credit organizations (Mu-
Censorship of literatura, ftnte., 123; jin k), ftnte., p. 79
124 Cornering markets, 50
Census-taking, ftnte., p. 10 Ooroe, ftnte., p. 29
Cha.ya family, 6 Cottage industry, 26, 84. Also see
Chika.matsu Monza.emon, 92 Handicrafts
China. tra.de : illegal, 154 ; legal, 173. Cotton exchanges, 49
Also see Chinese tra.ders. Courtesans. See Prostitutes.
Chinase coins, 16. Also see Eiraku-sen Credit, establishment of, 56
Chinase history, 37 Credit system, 43, 56; ftnte., pp. 76-7;
Chinese officials' success in using com- 88
merce, to its detriment, ftnte., p . 166 "Crow money," 78
Chinase tra.ders, 20-21 Currency. See Monetary system.
Ohishi-aen (or jishi-aen), 10, 35 Currency devaluations. See Devalu-
Ohnin (townsmen), ftnte., p. 1; 30, ation of coinage.
31, 35, 86, 114, 138
Ohnin d (way of the mercha.nt), Daimaru (retail atores), 66, 117
96-98, 138-141 Daimy (feuda.l lords), 12, 13, 14, 18,
Ohnin ikki (uprisings of townspeople ), 31, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 49, 53,
118-119; ftnte., p. 118 65, 67, 75, 76, 79-80, 85, 87, 89,
Chu Hsi, 38, 93 and ftnte. ; ftnte., 90, 99, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108,
p. 123; 170-171 114, 117, 120, 129, 136, 145, 147,
Cinnebar guild, 50 148, 149, 150, 155, 160, 165
City elders (machi doshiyori), 33, 34, 35 Date, daimy of Sendai, 135-136;
Clase distinctions, 25 ftnte., p. 135
Closing the country (aakoku). See Ex- Dazai Shunda.i, 135
clusion policy. Devaluation of coinage, 80, 88, 89,
Code of the warriors (buahid), 96 101, 129
Commercial capital, 81, 83-84, 144, "Dissipation money," 78
174 Dissolution of kabu nakama and ton' ya,
Commercial company of Western type 125-127, 161-162, 164
established by Konoike, ftnte., p. 52 Distribution system. See Commercial
Commercial credit. See Credit system. distribution system.
Commercial distribution system,45-49, Division of markets, 72-73
126 Dojima rice excha.nge (in Osa.ka), 48,
Commodity exchanges, 49 68
Communications: improvements, 14; "Double on death," 78
inconveniences, 73 Dutch tra.ders, 20
Competition, 101; 111 and ftnte.; 174
Confiscation (keaaho), 102-103; 159 Echizen province, 160
a.nd ftnte.; 165-166 Economic contraction after Genroku,
Confucianism, 38, 92, 93, 110; ftnte., 100-101
196 INDBX
Economic expansion of the l 7th cen- Famines: and the exclusion policy,
tury, 69 22; in the 18th century, 118-119
Edo, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 33, Feudal lords. See Daimy.
34, 43, 44, 46-49, 67, 58, 61, 64-68, Feudal relations in family enterprises,
70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 89-92, 94, 96, 96
97, 104, 106-108, 114-116, 118, Financia! agents. See Fudaaaahi, Ka-
124, 126, 128, 129, 148, 149, 163, keya, Merchants.
170 Five-fa.mily associations (gonin gumi),
Edo castle, 87 28, 33, 34
Edo Machi Kaisho (official lending Fires in Edo, ftnte., p. 89
organ to poor people), ftnte., p. 123 Forced loa.ns. See Goy-kin.
Edo rice market, 50 Foreign trade, 19-23, 36, 41, 58, 117,
Eiraku-aen (Chinese coins), ftnte., 136-137, 143, llH-152, 153-154,
p. 17; 39 162-163, 173, 175
Elizabethan Poor Laws, ftnte., p. 119 Free markets and guilds (rakuichi-
Encouragement to merchante to settle rakw:a), 11-12, 49, 54
in castle towns and cities, 7, 8 Free ports (rakuahin), 11
Enterprises, types of organizational Frugality policy, 111-112; ftnte.,
units, 51-52 p. 112; 121, 123, 125, 173
Eroticism (iro) in the arts, 124 Ftulai ("inner") lords, 4, 14
Establishment and guarantee of mem- Fudaaallhi (financia! agents in Edo),
bers' credit by nakama, 56 42,70,75,77,105,107,115,122-123.
Eta (outcasts), ftnte., p. 25 124, 127, 128
Etorofu (in the Kuriles), 154 Fushimi (commercial town near Kyo-
Europa: evolution of gold standard, to), 9, 49, 66, ftnte., p. 121; 149
17; direct relations between peas- Futuras, transactions in, 56, 57
ants and bourgeoisie in middle ages
contrastad with Japan, 167; openingGambling, ftntes., pp. 79, 119, 123
up foreign markets a stimulus to Gam6 Kumpei, 114
rise of merchant clase, 173 Gay quarters, 66, 78, 84, 89-90, 94;
Europea.ns: discovery of Japan, 3; (referred to as "bad places") 95,
territorial ambitions, 20; religious99; ftnte., 108. Also see Shimmachi,
propagation, 20; trade with Japan, Yoshiwara.
20-21; capitalism, 21; carrying Genroku era, 4, 64, 85-99, 100, 101,
trade, ftnte., p. 22; ships and guns,
102, 108, 112, 113, 165, 167
ftnte., p. 22; at Hirado, 66 "Genroku style," 89, 115
Exclusion edict of 1638, 20, 60 Ginza (official silver guild), ftnte.,
Exclusion policy, 20-23; ftnte., p. 38;p. 49; 89
173 Gifts and bribas, ftnte., p. 29; 41;
ftnte., p. 67; 114 a.nd ftnte.; ftnte.,
"Face" (taimen), 98 p. 158; 161
Factory system, 84 Go-kenin (housemen of the Tokuga.wa.),
Fairs. See Ma.rkets and fairs. 75, 105, 107, ftnte., p. 122; 123,
Family enterprises: extended (or fa- 127, 128
mily group), 51; small unitary, 51 Gold exchanges, 48
"Family" type financing by Bakufu Gonin-gumi (five-fa.mily associations).
and han, 88 28, 33, 34
INDEX 197
Goy-kin (forced loa.ns), 107 and ftnte.; 118; ftnte., p. 119. Aleo see Ne-
119-121 and ftntes.; 122, 128, 138, machi.
148,154-155,166 Hokkaido (Yezo), 70, 117, 144-145,
Goyo ahiinin (protected merchante), un, 153, 156, 160
41. Aleo see Merchante. Hokuriku district (northwestern Hon-
Guilds (za), 11, 49-50, 54. Aleo see sh), 46
Ginza, Hakari-za, Kinza, Roaokuza, Hokusai, 14
Zeniza. Holland, trade with, 173. Also see
Dutch traders.
Haehijo islands, 154: Homma.chi (in Osa.ka), 71
Hairdressers organizad into kabu na- Honda Toshiaki, 13~137, 153
kama, 58 Hosokawa, daimy of Higo, 106
Hakari-za (official guilds for measwing Huma.u feelings (j) emphasized in the
equipment), ftnte., p. 16 a.rts, 124
Ha.kata (commerciaJ town in Kysh), Huma.nism in the arte and con-
8, 23 temporary thought, 92-94:, 99, 124,
Ha.kodate (in Hokkaido), 151 170
Han (fiefs), 12, 13, 27, 70, 87, 88, 101, Hyogo (present Kobe), 128, 151, 160
111; ftnte., p. 126; 130, 134, 135,
136, 138, 142, 145, 146, 147, 148, Iba.re. Saikaku, ftntes., pp. 78 and 81;
150, 151, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 91, 92; ftnte., p. 95
166, 171, 173 laya.su. See Tokugawa laya.su.
Han monopolies, ftnte., p. 126; 134, Ikeda, aake of, 46
135-136, 142; ftnte., p. 146; 147- Imperial Pala.ce at Kyoto, 87
149; ftnte., p. 148; 150, 160, 166,171 Impoverishment of the Baku/u. and
Handicrafts: by samurai, ftnte., pp. han,76,87-89,98--99,168--169;coun-
2~27; 82; by pee.santa, 82, 83, termea.sures proposed by scholars,
150; in towns and cities, 82 132-138, 142-143; counten;nea.sures
Hankonwn ("spirit-restoring medi- taken (see Devaluation of the coina-
cine"), 145 ge, Goy-kin, Han monopolies, Han-
Hanaatau (paper money issued by the aatau, Kien, Loa.ns, Myga-kin, Re-
han), ftntes., pp. 80, 88; 101, 148- forme, Refusal to hear ca.ses in-
149; ftnte., p. 149 volving debts to merchants, Refusal
Harem (of Tsuna.yoshi), 89 to pe.y debts, Taxing of commerce,
H atmnoto (ba.nner knights of the Sho- "Three Great Reforme," UnjD-kin).
gun), 75, 105, 107; ftnte., p. 122; Incense meetings (k-awaae), ftnte.,
123, 127, 128 p.91
Ha.yashi Shihei, 135 Individualism: evidenced in the arts
Hideyoshi. See Toyotomi Hideyoshi. and intellectual movements, 93-94;
Higaki Ke.isen (shipping compa.ny), in the relativa freedom of provincial
59-62 merchante, 151-161, 163, 168; in the
Hinin (outca.sts), ftnte., p. 25 interna! breakdown of kabu naka-
Hiranoya (Osa.ka merchant fa.mily), ma, 161, 163-164:, 168
103 Industrial capital, 81-82, 83-84, 144:;
Hirose Saihei, ftnte., p. 172 in Europe, ftnte., p. 81; limitations
Hiroshige, 14: on development, 173--175
Hoa.rding: of money, 84; of foodstuffs, Infanticida, 100
198 INDEX
lnflation, 80-81, 86; during specie Kaitokudo (merchant Confucian

scarcity, ftnte., p. 80 school), ftnte., p. 141; 169
"Inner" lords (/udai), 4, 14 Kakeya (official financia} agente), 42,
Inns: Naniwa. Ko, ftnte., p. 15; pa.ying 44, 67, 70, 76, 149, 166
myga-kin for keeping prostitutes, Ka.makura period, 96
ftnte., p. 110; for merchante, 146 Kamo Mabuchi, 93; ftntes., pp. 93,
Interest ratas, 77, 78, 79, 109, 122, 127, 170
150 Kanaza.wa, ftnte., p. 152; 156
Internal brea.kup of the kabu nakama Kanda Takahira, ftnte., p. 142
161, 163-164, 168 Kansa.i region, 92
Investment, 75; (in foreign trade) 19; Ka.nsei era, 102, 122, 130, 151. Also
(in houses) ftnte., p. 83; (in land) see Reforme.
84 (also see Reclaiming land); (in Ka.nti5 region, 10
productiva enterprises) 81-82, 84 Kawachi, cotton of, 46
!ron guild, ftnte., p. 50; ll~ll6 Kawamura. Zuiken, 68, 73
"Ise beggar," 71, 97 Ka.wa.shima Matahei, 73-74
Ise province, 12, 71 Kessho (confi.scation), 102-103; 159
lshida Baigan, 139-140, 141, 169 and ftnte.; 16~166
Itami, sake of, 46 Kien (cancellation of debte), 122 and
Itinerant trade, 15, 70-71, 144, 14~ ftnte.; 123, 127-128, 130, 166
146. Also see Merchante (of Omi, K ikoku senkin ("Revere gra.in, despise
of Toyama), Peddlers. money"), 133
Ito Jinsa.i, 92 Kinai district (five provinces around
lwasaki Ya.taro, ftnte., p. 171 Kyoto), 46, 49
Iyo province (in Shikoku), 160 Kinokuniya Bunza.emon, ftnte., p. 48;
89, 94-95; ftnte., p. 95; 102
Kinza (official gold guild), ftnte., p. 49;
Jiri-rita (profiting self and others), 139
89
Jishi-sen. See Ohishi-sen.
K irisute-gomen (permission to cut
Joruri (metrical romances), 90
down and lea.ve), 38 e.nd footnote.
Jnin Ryogae (Ten Exchange Houses),
Kish province (Kii including W a-
67 and ftnte.
kayama), 129
Kiso forest, 68
Kahu (membership privileges), 52, 82, Kitamura (merchant family in Edo),
109, 126 33
Kabu nakama (chartered trade as- K (as cartels), 72-73; ftnte., p. 126
sociations ), ftnte., p. 55; 58, 71, 72, Ko-awase (incense meetings), ftnte.,
79, 98, 101, 108-112, 113, 115, p. 91
12~127,160,161-162,163-164,168, Kogaku-ha (school of ancient learning),
174. Also see Nakama. 92, 93
"Ke.buki fellows" (kabuki mono),ftnte., Kokugaku-ha (nativist or nationalist
p. ll9 school), 92-93, 170
Kaempfer, Engelbert, 48, 62, 73 Kongoya Jirobei, ftnte., p. 153
Kaga (han), ftnte., p. 122; 152, Konoike (za.iba.tau family), 7, 66-67,
155, 156, 158, 163 75, 83, 97, 102, 150, 175; establi-
Kagoshima (in Kysh), 154, 162 shment of fi.rst Western type com-
Kaiho Seiryo, 135 pany, ftnte., p. 52
INDEX 199
Konoike Shinroku, 66 Local specialty goods in na.tionwide

Korean war (16th century), 9 circulation, 46
Korea.n trade: legal, 20-21; illega.l, 154
KshokuNidaiOtoko (Two Gener&tions Machiai (assignation houses), ftnte.,
ofMen who Loved Love), 92 p.90
Kubo Kihei, 158 Machi Bugyo (town :me.gistrate), ftnt.e.,
Kuge (court nobility), 12; ftnt.es., 25 p. 33; 35, 77, 110, 146
a.nd 101 Machi Doshiyori (city elders), 33-35
Kumamoto (in Kyiish), 146 Machi Kaisho (town office and meeting
Kumaza.wa. Banza.n, ftnt.es., pp. 29 and place), 34
67; 76, 132-133, 133-134; ftnte., Maeda. (claimyo of Kaga), 152, 154-
p. 139 156, 159
Kumi (groups), 51, 55, 56, 59, 71, 79 Ma.gistrate (bugyo), ftnt.e., p. 33
Kunshi (the superior man), 133 Me.nora (ahen), 13
Kura Bugyo (chief Bakufu financia.l "Manufacture" controversy, ftnte.,
official), 50 p. 84
Kuramoto (official wa.rehouser opera- Marine insurance, 58, 59
tor), 42, 67, 70, 76 Ma.rket expa.nsion, virtual halt after
Kurayakunin (wa.rehouse officia.l), 41 Genroku, 100
Kurayashiki (wa.rehouses), 10, 41, 42 Markets and fa.ira, 11, 49, 146, 151.
Kurile Islands, 117, 144, 154 Also see Speculative excha.nges.
Kusa.ma Naokata., 138 Marria.ge alliances and adoptions
Kusatsu (commercial town in Omi), 7 among samurai and merchants, 105,
Kuwana (port on Ise Be.y), 8 140, 171
Kyoho era, 102, 104, 114, 130, 147. Matsuda.ira Sadanobu, 117, 121-124,
Also see Reforma. 125, 129, 141
Kyoto, 9, 10, 11, 14, 32, 48, 50, 64, Matsumae daimyo (in Yezo): and
66, 72, 77, 79, 87, 90, 91, 92, 106, secret trade with the RUBBia.ns, 117;
160, 161 and Omi merchante, 144
Kyiish,46, 146, 149, 150, 153 Matsuzaka (commercial town in Ise
province), 64; ftnte., p. 71
Labor ma.rket, 173-174 Meiji period, 52, 62, 74, 80, 171, 172,
La.ke Biwa, 32 175
Land economy, coexist.ence with the Meiji Restoration, 129; ftnt.e., p. 147;
money economy, 168 162 a.nd ftnt.e.; 163; ftnte., p. 172;
Land mortge.ges, 75 175
Land ta.x (nengu), 28-29 and ftntes. Meireki fue (in Edo in 1657), 68, 73, 81
Levelling function of money tra.ns- Mercantilism, ftnte., p. 38; 135-136,
a.ctions, 93 137, 145-146
Linking verses (renga), 103 Merchante: "merchant commerce," 4;
Loa.ns: to daimyo, 65, 67, 75-77, 103, of Omi, 7, 32-33, 70-71, 73-74;
147, 149; defaulting on, 75-76, 105, ftnt.ee., pp. 82, 139; 144-145, 151,
106, 107, 108, 114; made on security, 161; epirit of ent.erprise (in the 16th
75, 113-114; commercia.l loa.ns, 77- century) 22, (17th century) 67,
79; litigation concerning, 77, 105- (in decline thereafter) 23, (of pro-
106, 107, 108, 113-114; on future vincial merchante) 144-164, (lack
production, 81-82 of, in city merchante) 162, 163, 174,
200 INDEX
175; rationale of low social status, 88-89, (in kabu nakama), 109-110;
26, 31, 140; attacked (verbally) 27, coneolidation of economic power,
105, 133, 135; ftnte., p. 143; (phy- 88, culture, 90-95; influence on
eically attacked or threatened) 115, a.rts, 90-91, 98-99, 169; of Kyoto,
118, 123, 163; treatment as a clase 91; "political merchante" com-
by the Bakufu, 30-31 (aleo eee pete in epending for contracta, ftnte.
Goy-kin, Kien, Myga-kin, Re- p. 89-90; leieure, 91; retirement.
forme, Refusal to hear cases in- 91; eemi-retirement, 91; ftnte., p.
volving debte to merchante, Unf- 155;code,96-98, 138-14l;conspicu-
kin) ; monopoly of commercial acti- ous consumption, 94-95, 102-103;
vitiee, 31-32, 166, (attacked) 134; restriction of modas of eelf-expree-
political impotence, 32-36, 38-39, sion, 94; amorous adventuree in the
104, (in city counoile), 33-35; lack gay quartere, 95; family constitu-
of legal proteotion for pereon or tions (or house rules), 95; ftnte .
property, 38, 102-104, 107; ftnte., p. 139; 153; mentality of the period,
pp. 107-108; organiza.tione, 40-63, 98; of the Ka.migata region, 97;
(three phaeee of evolution) 167-168 extravagance, 99, 102-103; wearing
(a.leo eee Kabu nakama, Ko, Kumi, eworde, 102, 121, 174; control of
Nakama, Ton' ya); delega.tion by the daimy/J'a finances, 103; 147 and
Bakufu a.nd han of oommercia.l a.nd ftnte. ; purchasing samurai status,
fina.noia.l functione to merchante, 105, 140, 171; boycotting debtore,
41-43; diehoneety, 41, 55, 57, 104, 114, 166 ; hiring rnin, 115, 123, 163 ;
136; of Osa.ka, 42, 43, 44, 45, 89, violations of price regulations, 127;
90-92, 95-97, 102-103, 108, 119; ftnte., p. 162; 166; attempte by
ftnte., p. 120; ownerehip of official merchant echolars to harmonize
warehousee, 42; of Edo, 43, 44, mercha.nts within feudal eyetem,
88-89, 91-92, 97, 104-105, 115; 139-141; justification ofmercha.nt's
monopoly control of ma.rkete, 50, role in the eociety, 140; ofToyama,
101 (aleo see Monopolietic practicas, 145; excluded from eome han, 147;
Monopoly pricing, N emachi, Kabu of Hida, 149-150; education, 169-
nakama and Nakama); energetic 170
activitiee eeen by Ka.empfer, 62-63; Metauke (censora and spies), 39
pricing a.ccording to customer, ftnte., Middlemen, 46, 47-48, 118, 126;ftnte.
p. 64; 69, 156; antisocial natura, p. 126. Also eee Nakadachinin, Na-
68, 118; ingenuity, 68, fareight- kagai.
ednees, 68; ftnte., p. 172; use of Mikawa province (present Aichi Pre-
codee to indica.te market va.luee, fecture-Nagoya), 71
ftnte., p. 69; cloee connectione a.nd Military industries, 162
reliance on feudal ruling cla.seee, Mining, ftnte., p. 22; 36-37, 66, 81
70, 88-89, 102, 104-105, 166-167; Mito (han), 162
of lee, 71; of Mikawa, 71; ban- Mitsubiehi (zaibateu), 62; ftnte., p. 171
kruptcy due to daimy defaulting Miteui (zaibateu fa.mily), 7, 51, 53-54,
on loa.ns, 75-76, 106, 107, 108; 62, 64-65, 66; ftnte., p. 71; 74, 83,.
banking functione, 76 (aleo see 97, 117; ftnte., p. 120; 150; ftnte.,.
Money Exchangee, Rygae-ya); p. 172; 175
provincial merchante, 83, 144-164, Mitsui Hachirobei, 64
168, 175; attainment of eecurity, Miteui Takafusa, 75-76; ftnte., p. 106
INDEX 201
:Miura Baien, 133, 142 Nagasa.ki, 8, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
:Miya.ke island, 154 40, 58, 67' 70, 117' 149, 173
:Miyakoshi (port in Kaga near Kana- Nagegane (bottomry), 19
zawa), 152, 153, 159 Nagoya, 49, 66, 149, 160
Mizuno Tadakuni, 124, 125-130, 161 Nakadachinin (middlemen), 47
Monetary system, 16-18, 43; ftnte., N akagai (brokers or intermediary
pp. 76-77; 80; 101, 148 traders), 47
Money economy: penetration of the N aka.e Tojii, ftnte., p. 139
countryside, 81, 169; expansion, N akai Chikuzan, 141
85-86; coexistence with land econo- Nalt:ama (trade associations), 45, 51,
my, 168 52, 54-58, 70, 71, 72, 77, 79, 84,
Money exchanges, 57, 64, 65, 106. Also 96, 98, 101, 108-112, 113, 114, 145,
see Ry0gaeya, Jnin Ryogae, Zeni 160, 161, 164.Also see Kabu nakama.
Ryogae. Na.kasendo, ftnte., p. 7
Monopolies: opposed by Bakufu, 50; NaniwaKO (group ofinns), ftnte., p.15
utilizad by Yoshimune, 108-112; Nanushi (headman), 33, 34; ftnte .
utilizad by Tanuma., 114-115; at- p. 36; 127
tempted dissolution by :Mizuno Ta- Nara, 10, 46
da.kuni, 125-127; to tax or abolish 7 Na.raya (merchant family in Edo), 33
137. Also see Han monopolies, Mer- N araya MOzaemon, 89; 95 and ftnte. ;
chante (orga.nizations), Monopolistic 102
practicas. N a.rrowness of the domestic market,
Monopolistic practicas: cornering mar- 173
kets, 50; prohibition of competition, Nativist (or nationalist) school (ko-
kugaku-ha), 92-93, 170
101, 111 ; limita.tion of production,
111-112, 142; prohibition of "new Natural disasters, 87, 115, 118-119,
things," 112; bla.med for high prices, 121
125. Also see Nemachi (waiting for a Nemachi (wa.iting for a price), 73
price). Nengu (la.nd ta.x), 28-29
Nihonbashi (in Edo), 14, 71
Monopoly pricing, 71-74, 83, 109, 115
NikkO mausoleum, 87
M onzen machi (commercial district
Nishika.wa J oken, 40
a.round a temple or shrine), 9
Nishinomiya (town near Osaka), 61,
Mori (daimyo of ChOshii), and foreign 128
trade, 20; memorial to, ftnte., p. Nobility (kuge), 12; ftntes., 25 and 100
149 Nobuna.ga. See Oda Nobunaga.
"Morning to night money," 78 Nohei (peasant-soldiers), 132
Mujin Ko (cooperativa credit organi- Noto province, 157
zations), ftnte., p. 79
Motoori Norinaga, ftnte., p. 93; 133; Oda.Nobunaga, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12; 13
ftnte., p. 170 and ftnte.; ftnte., p. 14; 37, 49
Muro (commercial town active in the Ogyii Sorai, 6, 45, 92, 105, 132, 133
16th century), 8 Oil excha.nges, 49, 116
Muro Kyiiso, 85, 107 Omi merchants, peddlers. See Mer-
My0ga-kin (enterprise fee), 58; 110- chants (of Omi), Peddlers.
111 and ftntes.; 114, 120, 128, 137, Omi province, 32 and ftnte.; 70, 71,
138, 166. Also see "Thank money" 72
202 INDEX
"Omi robbcr," 71, 97 Plural enterprises, 51-52

Ominato (commercial town on Ise Population: increase in first hundred
Bay), 8 years; 5; of Ose.ka, 10; of Edo, 11;
On (obligation), 98 of Kyoto, 11 ; stagnation after Gen-
Ono family, 51 roku, 100
Opening the country to foreign trade, Portuguesa: mining techniques, 16;
162-163 expelled, 20
Osa.ka, 7, 9, 10, 11, 17, 33--35, 42-44, Post system for official mail, 65
46, 47, 49, 58, 61, 64, 67, 72, 73, Price fixing (by nakama), 55-56
75, 77; 78 and ftnte.; 82, 90-92, Price haggling, 60, 110
95-97, 99, 102, 103, 108, 116, 118, "Price revolution" in Europa, ftnte.,
124, 126, 139, 147-149, 153, 155, p.81
156, 160 Price regulation: unsucceasful at-
Oshima Konin, 142 tempts at, 116, 125-126, 127, 128-
Oshoya (headman), ftnte., p. 36 129, 138; considered impoasible,
Otsu (commercial town on Lake Biwa.), 138
7, 32-33, 49, 149 Pricing according to customer, ftnte.,
Ou district (Honah north ofEdo), 10 p. 64; 69, 156
"Outer" lords, ftntes., pp. 101, 147. Profiteering, 73, 132
Also see Tozama. Profits, 56, 80; justified (by Shin
Owari (han of Nagoya.), 160 doctrine) 139, (by Iahida Baigan)
141
Paternalism, 65 and ftnte.; 172. Also Prohibitions of merchant combina-
see Apprentice system. tions: in early period, 50; in the
Pawnbrokers, 58, 64, 71, 79, 118, 152, Tempo reform, 126
153 Prostitutes, ftnte., p. 15; 90, 92, 94;
Pawning, 75 ftnte., p. 110; 114-115; ftnte., p. 123
Pea.santa: migration to cities, 6, 27-28, Protected mercha.nts. See Goyo Shi>nin.,
100, 112, (countermeasures) ftntes., Merchante.
pp. 119 and 129; 174; as local Provincial merchante, 83, 144-164,
merchante, 26-27, 151; rationale 168, 175
of social status, 26-30; attempts to Public bathhouses: organized into
bind to the land, 27-28; livelihood, kabu nakama, 58; mixed bathing in,
28-29, 85-86, 100, 173; serfs? ftnte., ftntes., pp. 123 and 125
p. 29; need to borrow money for Purchasing power in the agricultural
basic needs, 79-80; lack of em- villages, lack of, 100-101, 173
ployment in cities a.fter Genroku, Purveyors (Yotat.m), ftntes., pp. 34
100, 174; reetriction of population, and 42; 41, 70
100, 169; uprisings, 100, 117-118; "Putting-out" system, 83, 101
ftnte., p. 118; 137, 169
Peddlers: organized into kabu nakama Rakuiehi-rakuza (free markets and
in Edo, 58; of Omi, 70-71, 73-74; guilds), ftnte., p. 7; 11-12, 49, 54
medicine peddlere of Toyama, 145; Raku.ahin (free porte), 11
as most important suppliers of Rangakmha (scholars ofDutch), ftnte.,
peasants, 151 p. 52; 13~ 13~ 15~ 171
Pilgrimages, 55, 151; ftnte., p. 72 Realism, 170, (in literatura and the
Piratee, ftnte., p. 16 arte) ftnte., p. 170
INDEX 203
Receptivity to Western natural eci- Rural industrialiste, ftnte., p. 83; 162

ences, 170 Russians, secret trade with, 117, 152,
Reclaiming land (shinden, reclaimed 154, 156
fi.elde), 65, 67, 82, 83, 159 Rygaeya, 70; 76-77 and ftntes.; 106.
Recoinages. See Devaluation of coin- Also see Money excha.nges.
age Ryiikyii Islande, 21, 153, 154
"Refeudaliza.tion," 23, 25
Reforme: of the Kyoho period (1716- Sadanobu. See Matsudaira Sadanobu.
1735), 104--114; ofthe Kansei period Saga {han), ftnte., p. 122; 162
(1787-1793), 121-124; of the Tempo Saikaku. See Ibara Saikaku.
period (1841-1843), 125-130, 132, Sake.i, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 23, 92, 95, 128,
136, 142;compared, 130 165
Refusal to hear cases involving debte Sake brewing and selling: by Miteui,
to merchante, 105-106, 107-108, 64; by Konoike, 67; by Omi and Ise
113-114, 122 merchante, 71 ; 88 an attraction for
Refusal to pay debts (o kotowari), 114, capital, 75, 82
122. Also see Loans. Sake dealers attacked in uprisings,
Relaying stations (shulcueki), 15 118
Renga {linking vereses), 103 Sakeproducers form.shipping company,
Retail markets, 72 60
Retailing, development of, 45-46, Sakurada Tada, 142
64--65 Sales by sample, 56
Rice: as money, 40, 144; as taxes, Samurai: becoming mercha.nts, 6-7,
ftnte., p. 28; 40; shipment of, ftnte., 65-66, 66-67, 69-70, 167; popula-
p. 60; 68 tion, 11 ; ftntes., pp. 10, 11 ; handi-
Rice brokers, 43; as money lendera, 44. craft work by, ftnte., pp. 26-27;
Also see Fudasashi, Kakeya, Kura- 82; contempt for commerce, 31-32,
moto 167; barred from commercial ac-
Rice economy, advocacy of reversion tivities, 32; a leisure class ? ftnte.,
to, 133, 142 pp. 40-41; as bureaucrats, ftnte.,
Rice exchanges, 49, 149 pp. 40-41; 167; bested by merchante,
Rice merchante attacked in town 69; interdependence of samurai and
uprisings, 118 merchants, 70, 88-89, 102, 104--105,
Rice prices: increases, 80-81; sharp 167; indebtedness to merchante, 76,
fluctuations, 86. Also see Prices. 87, 98, 105; need to borrow money
Road-building, 14 for ha.sic neede, 79-80; lavish spend-
Roade. See Nakasendo and Tokaido. ing, 85; impoverishment, 86; feudal
Roches, Lon, ftnte., pp. 142-143 mentality compared to merchants,
Rnin {masterless samurai): hired by 98; irritation and hostility towarde
merchante for protection, 115, 123; merchante, 101, 171; eelling samurai
used by hatamoto and go-kenin 88 status, 105, 140, 171; favored in
go-betweens with mercha.nt credi- cases involving merchante, 105,
tors, 123; hired by provincial mer- 106; stipends reduced, 112 {by
chante to terrorize guild merchante, Yoshimune), 169; defaulting on
163 loa.ns, 114; extravagance od Edo
Rosokuza (e&ndle guild) of Kaga, samurai, 115; to be made peasant-
156-158, 164 soldiers (nahei) ? 132; participation
204 INDEX
in commerce discussed, 13~135; Shin0iah0 (four-claes ammgement of

unrealistic ideas about money ea- the society), 25
tirized, ftnte., p. 135; toleration of Shinto shrines: operating warehouses,
disadvantageous economic system, 10; protecting merchante, 12, 103;
167; as discontented intellectuals, and nakama, 65; money lending, 75
170 Shipbuilding, ftnte., p. 22; 154, 155
Sankin ktm (hostage and alternate Shipping, 58-62, 152, 15~154
residence system), 18-19, 43, 67, BMen (manors), 13
76, 107 Shogun, 10, 36, 85, 89, 112, 125, 128.
Saruya-cho Kaisho (official lending Aiso see under names of Tokugawa.
organ to fudaaaahi), 122, 127 Shoguns.
Sasaki (feudal lords of Omi), 7, 11 Shogunate. See Bakufu.
Sato Shin'en, 134, 137 Shoku-akindo (artisan-merchante), 26
Scandals, 121 and ftnte. Shokunin (skilled artisans), 26, 30-31,.
Satsunan-shoto (islands south ofKy- 150
sh), 154 Shortages of food and other commo-
ScholarsofDutch (Rangakmha},ftnte., dities, 73, 118, 127
p. 52; 135, 136, 153, 171 SMya (headman), ftnte., p. 36
Sculpture, 94 Shukueki (relaying stations), 15
Secondhand dealers, 58, 152 Silver exchanges, 47
Sekiga.hara, battle of, 3, 4, 10, 33 Smuggling, 21
Seidan (Political Talks, by Ogy Social mobility: in the l 7th century,.
Sorai), 105 26, 27; decreased by nakmna, 112;
Seji Kemmon Roku (Record of Worldly deplorad by cstablished merchante..
Affaire), 69, 71 140; increased in la.te Tok.uga.wa..
Sekiho (barriera}, 12-13, 15, 24 171-172. Aleo eee Samurai, Mer-
Self-goveming cities, 7-8, 37, 165 chante, Ma.rria.ge alliances.
Sengoku period, 3, 4, 9, 23, 28, 96 Soroban (aba.cus}, 69
Sepa.ration of feudal (political} and Srb'Un (epistola.ry style), 156
commercial (economic) power, 36, So Toahiyori (merchant council in
104 Osa.ka), 34
Shikoku, 160 South Sea Islands, tra.de with, 154
Shimaba.ra Rebellion, 87
Specializa.tion in commercial products
Shimada. family, 51 and nation-wide circulation, 46
Shimazu (daimyo of southern Kysh) Specialization ofcommercia,l functions..
and foreign trade, 20, 21; 106 45-46
Shimmachi (gay quarters in Osa.ka), 97 Speculative exchanges, 48, 56, 109..
Shimomura fa.mily, 66 149
Shimonoseki: a.e commercial port, 46; Standard of living increased in the
rice excha.nge of, 49, 149 17th century, 86-87
Shin sect. See Buddhist organizations. Status cha.nges. See Ma.rriage allianoes,.
Shinagawa (town nea.r Edo}, 68 Merchante, Samurai, Social mobility.
Shinden (reclaimed fielde). See Re- Status limitations: legal 25-29, 31-32,.
claiming land. 105; ftntes., 119 and 129; 174;
Shingaku. See IshiQa Baiga.n. psychological and social, 98, 140,.
Shing Ryotei, 137 174
INDEX 205
Storing grain for emergencies, ftnte., ''Three cities, the," 8-9, 11, 70, 128.
p. 123 Also see Edo, Kyoto, Osa.ka.
Suminokura family, 6 "Three great reforma," 104, 130, 166.
Sumitomo (zaibatsu family), 7, 65-66, Also see Reforma.
97; ftnte., p. 120; 150; ftnte., p.172; Tobi-cM (separa.te parcela of territory),
175 15
Sumitomo Masatomo, 66 Tohoku district (northeastern Honsh,
Sumiyoshi Ko (cartel), 72 north of Edo), 46
Sumpu (commercial town, present Toiya. See Ton.'ya.
Shizuoka), 9 TOkaidO, 15, 32
Suzuki Harunobu, ftnte., p. 94 Tokugawa: political and territorial
system, 4 and ftnte. ; bureaucracy,
Tadakuni. See Mizuno Tadakuni. lethargy and lack of imagination,
Tadadaya Kahei, 151-152 167
Tanaka Kygu, ftnte., p. 135 Tokugawa Hidetada, 87
Tango (province near Kyoto on the Tokugawa Iemitsu, 15, 87
Ja.pan Sea), famous for salted Tokugawa Ienari, 1.25
salmon, 45 Tokugawa. Ietsuna, 87
Tanuma Okitsugu, 114-121, 143 Tokugawa. leyasu, 3, 8, 9, 15, 16, 18,
Taru (merchant family in Edo), 33 19-20; ftnte., pp. 36-37; 37, 67, 87,
Taru Kaisen (shipping company), 60, 104; ftnte., p. 114
62 Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, 87, 89, 100
Tax collecting, ftnte., p. 11; 15 Tokugawa Yoshimune, 29, 50, 73,
Tax rice shipments, 14; ftnte., p. 60; 104-114, 115, 117, 121, 122, 123,
68 125, 129; ftnte., p. 130; 161, 168
Taxes, unsuccessful attempt to levy Tokumi don'ya (federation of ten
on silk sales, 116-117 groups of wholesalers in Edo), 59;
Taxing of commerce, 116-117, 128, ftnte., p. 111
137-138, 142-143 ToktuJei (cancellations of debts), 166
Taxing of merchante: passed on to Ton'ya (wholesale dealers), 45-48, 51,
consumera, 128, 137; opposed on 56, 59, 70, 71, 73, 82, 83, 109, 116,
moral grounds, 137-138. Also see 118, 125-127, 134, 145, 148, 160,
M yoga-kin, Taxing of Commerce, 161
Unjo-kin. Tosa (han), ftntes., pp. 133, 171
Tedai (apprentice helper), 52 Tosa Shokai (Tosa trading orga.n),
Tea ceremony, 103 ftnte., p. 171
Tegata (bilis of exchange), 43, 56, 65, Town Magistrate (Machi BugM), ftnte.
70, 149 p. 33; 35, 77, 110, 146
Temmei era, 118 Toyama merchants, peddlers, 145
Temples. See Buddhist organizations. Town Office a.nd Meeting Place (machi
Tempo era, 102, 125, 129, 130, 137, kaialUJ), 34
142, 160, 161, 164.Also seeReforms. Townsmen (ch0nin), ftnte., p. 1; 30,
TennOjiya (Osa.ka merchant family), 31, 35, 86, 114, 138
103, TennOjiya Gohei, ftnte., p. 38 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11,
"Thank money," 77. Also see Unjo- 12, 13, 19, 20, 25; ftnte., p. 36; 37,
kin. 49, 67' 70, 144
Theater, 90, 99 Tozama ("outer" lords), 4, 15
206 INDlilX
Trade associations. See Kabu Nak<Mrw, Wirtzwang inns, ftnte., p. 146

NakamtJ. 1 Wholese.le dealers. See Ton'ya.
Transfers of official funda (by Mitsui), W oodblock prints, 90, 94
64-65 Workhouses for unemployed, ftntes.,.
Transporta.tion: improvements, 14- PP 119 and 123
16; inefficiencies, 73-74, 101. Aleo
see Shipping. Yamaga Sok, ftnte., p. 25; 92, 131
Tsu (han), ftnte., p. 122
Yamagata Bant, 136, 138; 141 and
Tsushjrna., trade with Koreans on, 21
ftnte.
Yezo (Hokkaid), 70, 117, 144-145,.
Uchikowashi (uprisings in cities and
151, 153, 156, 159
towns), 118-119, 137
Yodogawa (Yodo River), 9, 12
Ueno Shj, ftntes., pp. 136 and 149
Yodoya family, 67-68, 102-104, 165
Ukiyo-e, 90, 94
Yodoya Keian, 9
Unemployment in the cities, ftnte.,
Yodoya Saburemon, 103
p. 119
Yoshimune. See TokugawaYoshimune.
Unification of the country, 4-5
Y oshiwara (gay quarters in Edo ), 90
Unj-kin, 11()-111; ftnte., p.110; 114-
and ftnte.; 97
115, 117, 120, 128, 137, 138, 148, 166.
Yotatau (purveyors), ftntes., pp. 33
Aleo see "Thank money."
and 42; 41, 70
Uprisings: in cities and towns, see
Uchikowaahi; in the countryside,
see Pea.santa. Za (guilds), 11, 49-50, 54. Aleo se&
Usury, ftntes., pp. 22, 23, 44; 74, 75, Ginza, Hakari-za, Kinza, Rosokuza,,
77, 78, 82, 84, 144, 149-150, 156, Zeniza.
169, 174; in Europa, ftnte., p. 79; Zaibatsu, 64, 66. Also see Knoike,.
80; in China and India, ftnte., p. 79 Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo.
Zeni Rygae (copper coin exchanges),.
Waiting for a price (nemachi), 73 ftnte., p. 77
Wakayama, 72, 148. Aleo see Kish. Zeniya Gohei, 152-160, 163
"Warehouse front style," 115, 124 Zeniya Yz, 159
Warehouses (kurayashiki), 10, 41, 42 Zeniza (official copper coin guild),.
Weights and mee.sures, 16 ftnte., p. 49
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THE RISE OF THE MERCHANT CLASS

IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN, 1600-1868

CHARLES DAVID SHELDON

Published for the Association for Asan Studies by

J. J. AUGUSTIN INCORPORATED PUBLISHER

ALL RIGHTS RESBRVED

Japanese personal namesaregivenintheJapaneseorder, withfam-

KSK - Keizai Ski Kenkyu

A rise of the moneyofeconomy

1 E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modem State (New York:

1. How was the rise of the merchant class possible 1

By dealing with these questions, it is our intention to outline the

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT TO

see Honj Eijir, * ~ *

unification was without doubt the most effective in Japanese history,

castles were generally built on mountains or hilltops, for purely

Taiheiaaku :k Zfi jt, in Nihon Keizai Soaho 13 * & M tF [Jape.nese

For the Suminokura, see ibid., 893-4.

of Mitsui's cla.ims to samurai extraction.

U. Ji~ ft l: ~ ltj- ;tj ~O) tt Ji" [The Nature ofCommerce in the

whoee citizens opposed the feudal lorde eucceesfully, building bamboo

the Balcufu. Others included Sakai, Nagasaki, Otsu, and Sumpu.

and it became the commercial center of Japan. The daimyo of the

t 7 Takekoshi, Economic Aspecta . . , I, 523.

cessions and encouragements to Edo and Osaka townspeople before 1615

figures available for Kyoto show a town population of 410,089. How-

History of Ja.pan] (Tokyo: 1926), 182.

were prohibited from leaving their native provinces, merchante were

ae Yokoi, Nilwn Shagyo Shi, 182.

passed through were taxed. They were important obstacles to com-

Edo period, although the territories under direct Tokugawa control

scrutinized for quality and carefully weighed to determine their

"Cf. Ta.kimoto, Seiichi ll*M-,NihonKaheiShi f:I *itffi!. [AMone

he beca.me increa.singly suspicious tha.t the Europea.na were looking

with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki.'1' Trade was carried on in

Takekoshi II, 158-185.

militariatic policy of the Tokugawa. Also, the foreign trade of the

towards disintegration." Nih<m Keizai Shi Gaiy 8 *

Hattatau Shi Ron 8 * *

Then, government policies contributed to conditions favorable to

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITION OF THE MERCHANT

1 Sa.kata., OhOnin, 2. Also see Honjo's a.rticle, ShinkshO, in NKSJ, 727-9.

view of society common to the agrarian states of Asia. Agriculture

trade in the countryside. Prohibitions of both commercial and manu-

a Miyamoto, Nt.hon Shiigy Shi, op. cit., 177-8.

fu at one time actually gave legal a.ssent, although probably no en-

of the Tokugawa period, there were many large construction enterprises in

changed to five and five during the administration of Yoshimune

should not be representad as a typical attitude of the feudal ru1ing classes.

Peasants were often called "stupid people" in Tokugawa edicts

Bakufu attitudes towards the chonin appear almost magnanimous,

was legally reinforced. Samurai were absolutely forbidden to engage

the location of a free ma.rket as ea.rly as 1539.16 After his victory at

In Osaka, the council which corresponded to the Edo machi

to have been eupervision of the water eupply. The responeibilitiee of

It is clear that the merchant class enjoyed no real political in-

minting operations was another significant source of revenue for the

continued to be mined in quantities far sorne time. Takekoshi, Economic

Confucian bureaucracy had been remarkably successful in controlling the

The principie of freedom of commerce was conaistent with Con-

early Tokugawa period is interestingly revealed in an incident which

in Dai Nih<m Shiry * *

THE QUEST FOR SECURITY

"Cf. Ta.kimoto, Seiichi llM-,NihonKaheiShi f:I itffi!. [AMone