TOPIC DEFINITION OF JURISDICTION Acuna

CASE TITLE PCGG V. DUMAYAS

CASE NO 765 SCRA 524

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 12-1251, UCPB alleged that the capital or equity used in establishing the CIIF
companies was not exclusively sourced from the coconut levy funds. It claimed that while P633 Million
was invested by it as Administrator of the CIIF, as universal bank it also invested around P112 million in
the six oil mill companies or oil mills group (CIIF OMG).

UCPB thus prayed for a judgment declaring the rights and duties of [UCPB] affirming and confirming
[UCPBs] proportionate right, title and interest in the Oil Mills Group Companies, its indirect equity of the
14 Coconut Industry Investment Funds (CIIF) Holding Companies and the San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) Shares, the dividends thereon and the proceeds of the redemption thereof and that any
disbursement or disposition thereof should x x x respect and take into account [UCPBs] right, title and
interest thereto.

PCGG filed a motion to dismiss citing lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
On April 29, 2013, respondent Judge issued the first assailed Order denying the motion to dismiss and
directing the PCGG to file its Answer. PCGGs motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the
Order dated June 28, 2013.

In Civil Case No. 12-1252, COCOLIFE raised similar claims of ownership in the subject companies and
shares of stock by virtue of its being a stockholder, owning 146,610,567 UCPB shares independently of
its right as direct shareholder of the CIIF OMG and the 14 holding companies, as well as the CIIF SMC
Block of Shares.

Like UCPB, COCOLIFE asserted that the CIIF OMG and 14 CIIF holding companies are not wholly
owned by the Government. Since it was not impleaded in the complaint filed by the PCGG for the
recovery of allegedly ill-gotten properties (CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares), COCOLIFE
argued that it should not be deprived of its proportionate interest (11.01%) in the said properties
sequestered by PCGG.

Civil Case No. 12-1252 was consolidated with Civil Case No. 12-1251. PCGG likewise moved to dismiss
the petition in Civil Case No. 12-1252 on the same grounds it raised in Civil Case No. 12-1251.

The Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2013 denied the motion to dismiss and further required PCGG to file
its Answer. PCGGs motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent Judge on December
4, 2013.

PCGG argues that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the acts performed by PCGG pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions, particularly those relating to the issuance of writs of sequestration, and that all cases
involving ill-gotten wealth assets are under the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

UCPB and COCOLIFE argue that since they have properly alleged a case for declaratory relief,
jurisdiction over the subject matter lies in the regular courts such as the RTC of Makati City. Having filed a
motion to dismiss, PCGG is deemed to have admitted the material allegations of the complaint,
specifically that UCPB and COCOLIFE had jointly acquired the six CIIF oil mills by investing direct equity
of P112 Million (UCPB) and P112 Million (COCOLIFE) for the four CIIF oil mills.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over suits involving the sequestered coco levy
assets and funds.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over suits involving the sequestered coco
levy assets and coco levy funds.

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and is determined by the allegations of
the complaint and the relief prayed for, regardless of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or
some of the claims prayed for therein. Jurisdiction is not acquired by agreement or consent of the parties,
and neither does it depend upon the defenses raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.

Under Section 4 (C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and related cases:

(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.

xxxx

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided,That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC
that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case
involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no importance. The
benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all
incidents affecting the UHC shares and PCGGs right of supervision or control over the UHC must be
addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction
and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted effort, more expenses, and
irreparable injury to the public interest.

2
TOPIC DEFINITION OF JURISDICTION

CASE TITLE MAMISCAL VS. ABDULLA

CASE NO 761 SCRA 39

FACTS:

On March 24, 2011, Abdullah issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce (CRD) finalizing the divorce
between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.

On April 20, 2011, Abdullah denied Mamiscal's motion. In sustaining the divorce between Mamiscal and
Abdullah, Abdullah opined that it was simply his ministerial duty to receive the COD and the
attached kapasadan filed by Adelaidah. Abdullah also noted that when the AAC was convened during the
February 28, 2010 hearing, only Mamiscal and his representatives appeared. Considering the fact that
Adelaidah manifested her opposition in writing to any reconciliation with her husband and the fact that the
90-day period of 'iddah had already lapsed, Abdullah ruled that any move to reconstitute the AAC would
have been futile because the divorce between Mamiscal and his wife had already become final and
irrevocable.

Contending that the issuance of the CRD was tainted with irregularity, Mamiscal comes to this Court,
through the subject complaint, charging Abdullah with partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee.

In its report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Abdullah guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and recommended that he be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same offense shall be dealt with severely.

On January 30, 2014, Abdullah filed a motion, praying for the early resolution of the complaint filed
against him. Reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the said complaint, Abdullah claimed that he was due
for compulsory retirement on June 5, 2014.

ISSUE:

Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction against Abdullah for his acts.

RULING:

The Court rules in the negative.

The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital events and other documents
affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil Registry Law embraces all acts of civil life affecting the
status of persons and is applicable to all persons residing in the Philippines.

Thus, when Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993 of the Office of the Civil Registrar-General
(OCRG) was passed to implement CA No. 3753 it was declared:

Rule 1. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar-General. - The Civil Registrar-General shall have the
following duties and powers:

d) To report any violation of the provisions of Act No. 3753 and other laws on civil registration, and all
irregularities, negligence or incompetency of city/municipal civil registrar to the concerned

3
 mayor who shall take the proper disciplinary action against the offender.

This authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative jurisdiction over Circuit Registrars was also
recognized generally, under Section 47(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, and specifically, under
Rule 11 of Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1993 of the OCRG, and the more recent Administrative
Order No. 5, Series of 2005 of the same office, which applies specially to the registration of acts and
events concerning the civil status of Muslim Filipinos.

At this juncture, it should be remembered that the authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative
supervision over C/MCRs is not exclusive. The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel
agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Under Section 9 of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the CSC is granted original
concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases. Thus:

Section 9. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. - The Secretaries and heads of agencies, and other
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction with the
Commission over their respective officers and employees. x x x

Consequently, it behooves the Court to also forward the subject complaint to the Office of the Mayor,
Marawi City and to the CSC for appropriate action.

4
TOPIC JURISDICTION IN GENERAL

CASE TITLE PAJE VS. CASENO

CASE NO 749 SCRA 39

FACTS:

In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in
Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).

On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interest under the MOU to Redondo Peninsula Energy,
Inc. (RP Energy), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with the
primary purpose of building, owning, and operating powerplants in the Philippines, among others.

Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-ENB to amend the ECC. Instead of
constructing a 2X150-MW coal-fired power plant, as original planned, it now sought to construct a 1X300-
MWcoal-fired power plant.

On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC (second
amendment).

On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149,
opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant.

On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of
2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.

On July 20, 2012 Hon/ Teodoro A. Casio, et.al filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan
against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR.

On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1) issue a Writ of Kalikasan; and (2) refer the
case to the CA for hearing and reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.

On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of Kalikasanwas docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00015 and
raffled to the Fifteenth Division of the CA. In the Petition, the Casio Group alleged, among others, that
the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage; that it would adversely affect the
health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic,Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of
Olongapo; that the ECC was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior approval of the concerned
sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (LGC.

On January 30, 2013, the CA rendered DENYING the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the application
for an environmental protection order.

The DENR and SBMA separately moved for reconsideration. RP Energy filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, attaching thereto a signed Statement of Accountability. The Casio Group, on the other
hand, filed Omnibus Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration.

5
On May 22, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution denying the aforesaid motions for lack of merit.

Unsatisfied, the parties appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in compliance with Section 27, inrelation to Section 26, of the LGC, Sanggunian has
jurisdiction in approval in the implementation of the power plant project in SBMA.

RULING:

In the case at bar, we find that the power to approve or disapprove projects within the SSEZ is one such
power over which the SBMAs authority prevails over the LGUs autonomy. Hence, there is no need for
the SBMA to secure the approval of the concerned sanggunians prior to the implementation of the subject
project.

This interpretation is based on the broad grant of powers to the SBMA over all administrative matters
relating to the SSEZ under Section 13 of RA 7227, as afore-discussed. Equally important, under Section
14, other than those involving defense and security, the SBMAs decision prevails in case of conflict
between the SBMA and the LGUs in all matters concerning the SSEZ, viz.:

Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units.

(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Subic Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of funds over
the Subic Special Economic Zone in conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion
Authority.

(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government units concerned on
matters affecting the Subic Special Economic Zone other than defense and security, the decision
of the Subic Authority shall prevail.

Clearly, the subject project does not involve defense or security, but rather business and investment to
further the development of the SSEZ. Such is in line with the objective of RA 7227 to develop the SSEZ
into a self-sustaining industrial, commercial, financial and investment center. Hence, the decision of the
SBMA would prevail over the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs.

6
TOPIC JURISDICTION IN GENERAL

CASE TITLE NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION VS CIR

CASE NO 749 SCRA 570

FACTS:

Petitioner Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation (petitioner) is a corporation duly organized and
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is also a value-added tax (VAT)-registered
entity with the Large Taxpayer District of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). For the year 2001, it
regularly filed its amended quarterly VAT returns. On April 24, 2003, it filed an administrative claim for
refund of 20,345,824.29 representing excess input tax attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales in
2001. Pending review by the BIR, on April 25, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA,
requesting for the issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of 20,345,824.29.

The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration it pointed out that the CTA had no jurisdiction over the petition
for review because it was filed before the lapse of the 120-day period accorded to the CIR to decide on its
administrative claim for input VAT refund.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant case.

RULING:

The provision in question is Section 112(D) (now subparagraph C) of the NIRC:

Sec. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax

(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the
Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may,
within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one
hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners position, the 120+30-day period is indeed mandatory and jurisdictional,
as recently ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation. 23 Thus, failure to
observe the said period before filing a judicial claim with the CTA would not only make such petition
premature, but would also result in the non-acquisition by the CTA of jurisdiction to hear the said case.

Because the 120+30 day period is jurisdictional, the issue of whether petitioner complied with the said
time frame may be broached at any stage, even on appeal. Well-settled is the rule that the question of
jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any time during the proceedings.

7
Jurisdiction cannot be waived because it is conferred by law and is not dependent on the consent or
objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them. 24 Consequently, the fact that the CIR
failed to immediately express its objection to the premature filing of the petition for review before the CTA
is of no moment.

Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Stroem ADIAZ

G.R. No. 204689, January 21, 2015

Facts:

Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem entered into an Owners-Contrator Agreement with Asis-Leif & Company,
Inc. for the construction of a two-storey house on the lot owned by the Spouses Stroem.

On November 15, 1999, pursuant to the agreement, Asis-Leif secured a Performance Bond in the amount
of P 4,500,000.00 from Stronghold Insurance Company Inc., Stronghold and Asis-Leif, through Ma.
Cynthia Asis-Leif, bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the Spouses Stroem the agreed amount
in the event that the construction project is not completed.

Asis-Leif failed to finish the projection time despite repeated demands from the Spouses Stroem. The
Spouses Stroem subsequently rescinded the agreement. They hired an independent appraiser to
evaluate the progress of the construction project.

Stronghold sent a letter to Asis-Leif requesting the company to settle its obligations with the Spouses
Stroem.

The Spouses Stroem then filed a complaint for breach of contract and for sum of money with claim for
damages against Asis-Leif, Cynthia, and Stronghold. Only Stronghold was served summons. Cynthia
allegedly absconded and moved out of the country.

The RTC rendered judgement in favor of Spouses Stroem. Stronghold now contends the jurisdiction of
the lower court which rendered judgement.

Issue:

WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:

Generally, parties may not raise issues for the first time on appeal. Such practice is violative of the rules
and due process and is frowned upon by the courts. However, it is also well-settled that jurisdiction can
never be waived or acquired by estoppel. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action or subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, be
acquienscence, or even by express consent of the parties.

Section 4 of E.O. No. 1008 defines the jurisdiction of CIAC, the same shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract,
or after the abandonment or breach thereof. The disputes may involve government or private contracts.
For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbritation.

8
The jurisdiction of CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and
worksmanship; violation of terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual time and
delays; maintenance and defects; payment, default of employer or contractor and changes in contract
cost.

Now, the court explained Alternative Dispute Resolution which is related to the case. The coverage of the
law when it comes to construction disputes which fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
CIAC shall include those between or among parties to, or who are otherwise bound by an arbitration
agreement, directly or by reference.

In the case, the issue is the agreement to submit the case to arbitration. Respondents argue that the
petitioner is not a party to the arbitration agreement. Petitioner did not consent to arbitration, that it is only
Asis-Leif that may invoke the arbitration clause in the contract. Jurisprudence tells that a guarantee or
surety contract under the Civil Code is an accessory contract because it is dependent for its existence
upon the principal obligation guaranteed by it.

In this case, the performance bond was silent with regard to arbitration, on the other hand the
construction contract was clear as to arbitration in the event of disputes. Applying the doctrines, the court
ruled that the silence of the accessory contract herein could be construed as acquienscence to the main
contract. It is more reasonable to assume that the party who issued the performance bond carefully and
meticulously studied the construction contract that it guaranteed, and if it had reservations, it would have
and should have mentioned the same in the surety contract.

In sum, it is in the Owners-Contractor Agreement where the arbitration clause is found, where only the
respondents and Asis-Leif is the signatory. It is basic that contracts can only effect between the parties
therein. Petitioner, thus cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC.

9
Yu vs. Yu
G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016

Facts:

Philip Yu and Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 18, 1984. They had four children and maintained
their conjugal home at Room 1603 Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila. In 1993,
Viveca left the conjugal home with the four children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Philip
before the RTC of Pasig. She prayed for permanent custody over the children, support and the dissolution
and distribution of their conjugal partnership.

Philip denied the accusations against him. He prayed in his counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage, but on April 24, 2007, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.

Notwithstanding the court findings of the denial of the petition as both parties are in pari delicto, the same
becomes moot with declaration of nullity of marriage of the parties, pursuant to the decision of the RTC of
Batangas, which attained its finality. Since the marriage of the parties was declared a nullity, there is no
legal basis to issue a decree of legal separation.

A petition for Annulment of Judgement was filed with the CA, Viveca contends that she is completely
unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of Batangas, that jurisdiction over the person was not
properly vested as she was not served summons. She alleges that she was deprived of right to due
process when Philip erroneously filed her last address, knowing that she was no longer living in the same.
The CA cannot turn a blind eye on the deceitful scheme ployed by Philip, thus the justification warrants
the annulment of the judgement.

Issue:

WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction of the person of Viveca through publication

Ruling:

Annulment of judgement may be rendered on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process.

Viveca was completely prevented from participating in the Declaration of Nullity case because of the
fraudulent scheme employed by Philip insofar as the service of summons is concerned. Philip contends
that publication and summons served in her conjugal home was sufficient. The court ruled in the negative.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.

In the present case, it is undisputed that when the case was filed in court, Viveca was already residing the
United States of Amera, extraterritorial service of summons is the proper mode which summons may be

10
served on Viveca. Philips act tantamounts to deception warranting the annulment of the judgement.
There is no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that the address provided by him was the last
known address as it is a fact that he knew Viveca intentionally left the conjugal home.

Furthermore, a petition filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or respondent
has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, it was found that Philip is not also a
resident of Batangas at the time of its filing.

The court denied Philips petition.

11
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Singzon-Aguirre

G.R. No. 170746-47, March 09, 2016

Facts:

A collision between M/V Doa Paz and M/T Vector brought forth an inferno at sea. In December 1988, the
heirs of the victims of the tragedy, instituted an action with the Civil District court for the Parish of Orleans,
State of Lousiana, United States of America. The court entered a conditional judgement dismissing the
case on grounds of forums non-conveniens. The respondents then filed a civil action for damages and
breach of contract of carriage and quasi-delict with the RTC of Catbalongan, Samar on March 6, 2001
against petitioners, Sulpicio, Vector Shipping, and Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association, Bermuna
Limited (Steamship).

In its order, dated March 28, 2001, the RTC of Catbalogan, motu proprio dismissed the complaint as the
respondents cause of action had already prescribed. However, the petitioners as defendants therein, who
were not served summons, filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they are waiving their defense
of prescription.

The foreign court, upon cognizance of the case, again conditionally dismissed the action and ordered to
bring their claims to the RTC of Manila by intervening in the consolidated cases before the latter court.

The RTC of Manila issued its order denying the respondents motion to intervene for lack of merit. The
RTC of Manila ruled that the RTC of Catbalogan had already dismissed the case with finality; that a final
and executory prior judgement is a bar to the filing of the complaint in intervention of the respondents; and
that the waivers of the defense of prescription made by petitioners are of no moment.

The petitioners instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA, the higher court concurred with the RTC of
Manila that the finality of the Order issued by the RTC of Catbalogan has the effect of res judicata.

Issue:

WON the action has prescribed; Does the final judgement apply to those who are not serve summons

Ruling:

Article 1106 of the Civil Code discusses prescription, mainly about extinctive prescription whereby the
rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. The case involves this prescription, which is to protect the
diligent and vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and taking no trouble of
exercising them one way or another to show that he truly has such rights. The rationale laid by the court is
that it is to supress fradulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time when all the
proper vouchers and evidences are lost or the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time.

The respondents brought their claim before a Philippine court only on March 6, 2001, more than 13 years
after the collision occured. Article 1139 of the Civil Code states that actions prescribe by the mere lapse of
time fixed by law. Accordingly, the RTC of Catbalogan cannot be faulted for the motu proprio dismissal of
the complaint filed before it. It is settled that prescription may be considered by the courts motu proprio if
the facts supporting the grounds are apparent from the peadings or evidence on record.Initially, not

12
having been served with summons, the petitioners were not considered under the jurisdiction of the court.
However, the filing for Motion for Reconsideration constitutes as voluntary appearance to submit
themselves to the courts jurisdiction, so even without summons, the final judgement shall apply to the
respondent Caltex.

Begnaen vs. Caligtan

G.R. No. 189852, August 17, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner Thomas Begnaen filed a Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondents
Spouses Leo and Elma Caligtan for Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights before the Regional
Hearing Office of the National Commission on Indigeneous People at La, Trinidad, Benguet. The RHO
issued an order dismissing the complaint based on respondents arguement that the case should have
gone to the council of elders and not through the Barangay Lupon, as mandated in the Indigenous
Peoples Right Act.

However, instead of abiding with the order of RHO, Begnaen filed against the Sps. Caligtan a Complaint
for Forcible Entry with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction before the MCTC of Bauko-
Sabangan, Mt. Province.

Bagnaen alleged that he was the owner of the land and that the respondents, by using force, intimidation
and stealth entered the property and hurriedly put up a fence without his consent.

Respondents averred that they owned the area in question as part of their land purchased from Leona
Vicente in 1959.

The MCTC dismissed the ejectment complaint in favor of respondents. This is without prejudice to the
filing of a case before the RHO of the NCIP, the MCTC recognized the same having the primary, original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Aggrevied, petitioner-appellant filed an appeal before the RTC.

The RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MCTC, saying that the MCTC had jurisdiction over
the case for forcible entry. The provisions of IPRA do not espouse exclusivity and cannot divest the MCTC
of its jurisdiction over forcible entry. Respondent-appellees moved to reconsider the decision of the RTC,
but was denied, so it appealled with the CA.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the ruling of the MCTC upholding the jurisdiction
of the NCIP over the present case. The passage of the IPRA divested the regular courts of jurisdiction
when the parties involved are members of the ICCs/Ips and the disputed property forms part of their
ancestral land or domain.

Issue:

WON the jurisdiction of the NCIP excludes the regular courts; Jurisdiction of NCIP against regular courts
to case of Forcible Entry

Ruling:

It is undisputed that the parties to the case are members of the ICC/IPs; that the land in question even if
purchase in 1959 forms part of the ancestral land because it is pursuant to age-old customs and traditions

13
from their relative Leona Vicente. Under R.A. 8371, Indegineous Peoples Right Act of 1997, as defined
the land is considered as ancestral land.

The court held that the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in
the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within
the legal bounds of rights and remedies.

The latest iteration of the NCIP, that declared the jurisdiction of the RHO as original and exclusive is void
for expanding the law. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand
its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement.
They are intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law.

BP Blg. 129 provides the regular courts of jurisdiction over the forcible entry case herein.

It follows the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter, We have consistently upheld the settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance
of; the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, to allow the same
complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and
defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed.

In sum, RHO had taken first cognizance of the case to the exclusion of regular courts from jurisdiction.
The MCTC was correct to exclude itself from the case as it is proper for the RHO to take charge of the
case.

14
JURISDICTION IN GENERAL AMPELOQUIO

TAN vs. CINCO,

793 SCRA 610

FACTS:Respondent Simon Lori Holdings, Incorporated (SLHI), Jovencio F. Cinco, et al. extended a loan
to Dante Tan in the amount of P50,000,000.00. The loan was facilitated by Penta Capital Investment
Corporation and was secured by Dante shares in Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC). When
Dante failed to pay the load upon maturity and despite demands, he proposed to settle the same by
selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to SLHI, the individual lenders, and Penta
Capital.

However, Dante disappeared and left his obligations unpaid when he was due to execute the
corresponding deeds of assignment. Respondents filed an action for sum of money against him before
the RTC of Makati City. Makati RTC rendered judgment ordering Dante to pay respondent the sum of
P100, 100, 000. 00 with legal interest until the principal amount is fully paid, plus attorneys fees and
costs. Dantes attempts to reverse the decision on appeal proved futile, thus, a Writ of Execution was
issued.

In order to enforce the writ, Deputy Sheriff Rommel Ignacio levied on a property covered by TCTNo.
12698113 registered in Dante's name. An auction sale was then conducted. Consequently, Dante sought
the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita Tan
attesting to the conjugal nature of the subject property. Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject
property lapsed without redemption having been made; hence, a Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued
in favor of respondents.

Dante filed and Omnibus Motion alleging that the subject property was a family home and therefore,
exempt from execution, and that being a conjugal property, it cannot be made to answer for his personal
obligations without any showing that it had redounded to the benefit of the family. The Makati RTC denied
Dantes Omnibus Motion, ruling that Dante had belatedly raised issues respecting the conjugal nature of
the subject property, and the issue on whether the subject property was a family home had already been
previously resolved.

Moreover, he had contracted the obligation while engaged in his business; hence, it can be presumed that
the conjugal partnership was benefited. Finally, the Makati RTC held that attachment and levy on the
subject property had been validly done. Consequently, it directed the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of respondents and ordered Dante and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the subject
property. Dante's motion for reconsideration was denied, and there being no appeal taken therefrom, the
Makati RTC's disposition of the case became final.

15
Teresita, Dante's wife, filed before the Paraaque RTC a complaint against respondent for the nullification
of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale issued in favor of respondents.

Paraaque RTC initially dismissed27 the nullification case on the ground of res judicata, ruling that the
issues raised therein had already been passed upon by the Makati RTC with Teresita's active and
voluntary participation.

It held that Teresita was considered a third party in the collection case before the Makati RTC, not having
been impleaded therein together with her husband Dante, and that the submission of her Affidavit before
the Makati RTC did not make her a party to the said case.

She had not waived her right to institute a separate action to recover the subject property, and the
nullification case was not, after all, barred by res judicata.

Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied. Intending to file a petition for certiorari before the
CA, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time. Eventually realizing their error, and apparently unaware that
the CA had already denied their motion for extension, respondents withdrew their motion for extension
before the CA, and instead, simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal before the Paraaque RTC.
Unfortunately, it was filed ten days late.

Paraaque RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed out of time. Respondents' motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
arguing, inter alia, that the Paraaque RTC had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a
co-equal court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Paraaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the
nullification case filed by Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale,
and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.

RULING:

The petition is devoid of merit.

In Barroso v. Omelio, the Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows:

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court
is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought
by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion
of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

In this case, the Court finds that the Paraaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated
falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at
the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the Paraaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of
the subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court. In
fact, the Paraaque RTC was already on the right track when it initially dismissed the nullification case in
its Decision. However, it changed its stance and reconsidered its disposition upon Teresita's motion for

16
reconsideration, thereby committing reversible error. To reiterate, the determination of whether or not the
levy and sale of a property in the execution of a judgment was valid properly falls within the jurisdiction of
the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.

Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Paraaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of
the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well
as the execution thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the
Paraaque RTC, a court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify,
or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the
judgment or order is rendered or issued. Consequently, the Paraaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the
same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision and other orders issued thereon, void
for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
City, the proceedings therein, as well as all orders issued thereafter are hereby declared NULL and VOID
for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

17
JURISDICTION IN GENERAL

RAPPLER, INC. vs. BAUTISTA,

788 SCRA 442

FACTS: Petitioner Rappler, Inc., herein petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
respondent Andres D. Bautista, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Election. The petition
seeks to nullify Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) on the 2016 presidential and vice-presidential debates, for being executed without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and for
violating the fundamental rights of petitioner protected under the Constitution. The MOA, was executed by
the COMELEC through its Chairman, respondent Bautista, and the
KapisananngmgaBrodkasterngPilipinas (KBP), and the various media networks.

Petitioner argues that the MOA grants radio stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of
the debates, even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any obligation under the MOA. Yet, this
right to broadcast by live streaming online the audio of the debates is denied petitioner and other online
media entities, which also have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates. Petitioner insists that
it signed the MOA believing in good faith the issues it has raised will be resolved by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents implementation of pertinent parts of MOA that violate the rights of
the petitioner is unconstitutional, specifically Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of
the MOA.

RULING: Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which expressly allows the debates produced by the
Lead Networks to be shown or streamed on other websites, clearly means that the Lead Networks have
not "expressly reserved" or withheld the use of the debate audio for online streaming. In short, the MOA
expressly allows the live streaming of the debates subject only to compliance with the "copyright
conditions." Once petitioner complies with the copyright conditions, petitioner can exercise the right to live
stream the audio of the debates as expressly allowed by the MOA.

Under the MOA, the Lead Networks are mandated to promote the debates for maximum audience.9 The
MOA recognizes the public function of the debates and the need for the widest possible dissemination of
the debates. The MOA has not reserved or withheld the reproduction of the debates to the public but has
in fact expressly allowed the reproduction of the debates "subject to copyright conditions." Thus, petitioner
may live stream the debate in its entirety by complying with the "copyright conditions," including the
condition that "the source is clearly indicated" and that there will be no alteration, which means that the
streaming will include the proprietary graphics used by the Lead Networks. If petitioner opts for a clean
feed without the proprietary graphics used by the Lead Networks, in order for petitioner to layer its own
proprietary graphics and text on the same, then petitioner will have to negotiate separately with the Lead

18
Networks. Similarly, if petitioner wants to alter the debate audio by deleting the advertisements, petitioner
will also have to negotiate with the Lead Networks.

Therefore, the debates should be allowed to be live streamed on other websites, including petitioner's, as
expressly mandated in Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA. The respondent, as representative of the
COMELEC which provides over-all supervision under the MOA, including the power to "resolve issues
that may arise among the parties involved in the organization of the debates,"11 should be directed by
this Court to implement Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which allows the debates to be shown or
live streamed unaltered on petitioner's and other websites subject to the copyright condition that the
source is clearly indicated.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. Respondent Andres D. Bautista, as Chairman of the
COMELEC, is directed to implement Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which allows the debates to
be shown or live streamed unaltered on petitioner's and other websites subject to the copyright condition
that the source is clearly indicated. Due to the time constraint, this Resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

19
WHEN TO INVOKE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

CIR vs. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION (now TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION),

781 SCRA 364

FACTS: MPC, formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc., and also formerly known as Hopewell Phil.
Corporation, is a domestic firm engaged in the generation of power which it sells to the National Power
Corporation (NPC). For the construction of the electrical and mechanical equipment portion of its
Pagbilao, Quezon plant, which appears to have been undertaken from 1993 to 1996, MPC secured the
services of Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan.

Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6395, the NPCs revised charter, NPC is exempt from all taxes.
MPC, on the belief that its sale of power generation services to NPC is, pursuant to Sec. 108(B) of the
Tax Code, zero-rated for VAT purposes, filed with Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 60 in Lucena City an
Application for Effective Zero Rating. The application covered the construction and operation of its
Pagbilao power station under a Build, Operate, and Transfer scheme.

Not getting any response from the BIR district office, MPC refiled its application in the form of a request
for ruling with the VAT Review Committee at the BIR national office. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued VAT Ruling No. 052-99, stating that the supply of electricity by Hopewell Phil. to the NPC,
shall be subject to the zero percent (0%) VAT, pursuant to Section 108 (B) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997.

MPC, while awaiting approval of its application aforestated, filed its quarterly VAT return for the second
quarter of 1998 where it reflected an input VAT of P148,003,047.62, which included PhP 135,993,570
supported by OR No. 0189. Pursuant to the procedure prescribed in Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, MPC
filed on December 20, 1999 an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT in the amount of
P148,003,047.62.

Since the BIR Commissioner failed to act on its claim for refund and obviously to forestall the running of
the two-year prescriptive period under Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, MPC went to the
CTA via a petition for review, docketed as CTA Case No. 6133.

Answering the petition, the BIR Commissioner, citing Kumagai-Gumi Co. Ltd. v. CIR, asserted that MPCs
claim for refund cannot be granted for this main reason: MPCs sale of electricity to NPC is not zero-rated
for its failure to secure an approved application for zero-rating.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent MPC is entitled to the refund of its input VAT payments made from
1993 to 1996 amounting to P146, 760, 509. 48.

RULING: For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can
be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the

20
taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in
a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the taxpayer of its
right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous, illegal, or wrongful payment
angle does not enter the equation.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), the Court explained the nature
of the VAT and the entitlement to tax refund or credit of a zero-rated taxpayer:

Viewed broadly, the VAT is a uniform tax x xx levied on every importation of goods, whether or not in the
course of trade or business, or imposed on each sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or properties or
on each rendition of services in the course of trade or business as they pass along the production and
distribution chain, the tax being limited only to the value added to such goods, properties or services by
the seller, transferor or lessor. It is an indirect tax that may be shifted or passed on to the buyer,
transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or services. As such, it should be understood not in the
context of the person or entity that is primarily, directly and legally liable for its payment, but in terms of its
nature as a tax on consumption. In either case, though, the same conclusion is arrived at.

The law that originally imposed the VAT in the country, as well as the subsequent amendments of that
law, has been drawn from the tax credit method. Such method adopted the mechanics and self-
enforcement features of the VAT as first implemented and practiced in Europe x xx. Under the present
method that relies on invoices, an entity can credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales
or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports.

If at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by a seller are equal to the input taxes passed
on by the suppliers, no payment is required. It is when the output taxes exceed the input taxes that the
excess has to be paid. If, however, the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried
over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated transactions or from the acquisition of capital goods, any excess over the output taxes shall
instead be refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue taxes.

Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and supply of services. The tax rate is
set at zero. When applied to the tax base, such rate obviously results in no tax chargeable against the
purchaser. The seller of such transactions charges no output tax, but can claim a refund of or a tax credit
certificate for the VAT previously charged by suppliers.

Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112(A) of the NIRC, providing a two-year
prescriptive period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales or transactions
were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to the instant case, and not to the other actions
which refer to erroneous payment of taxes.

As a final consideration, the Court wishes to remind the BIR and other tax agencies of their duty to treat
claims for refunds and tax credits with proper attention and urgency. Had RDO No. 60 and, later, the BIR
proper acted, instead of sitting, on MPCs underlying application for effective zero rating, the matter of
addressing MPCs right, or lack of it, to tax credit or refund could have plausibly been addressed at their
level and perchance freed the taxpayer and the government from the rigors of a tedious litigation.

The all too familiar complaint is that the government acts with dispatch when it comes to tax collection,
but pays little, if any, attention to tax claims for refund or exemption. It is high time our tax collectors prove
the cynics wrong.

21
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 22, 2005 and the
Resolution dated March 31, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78280 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the claim of respondent MPC for tax refund or credit to the extent of PhP
135,993,570, representing its input VAT payments for service purchases from Mitsubishi Corporation of
Japan for the construction of a portion of its Pagbilao, Quezon power station, is DENIED on the ground
that the claim had prescribed. Accordingly, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to
refund or, in the alternative, issue a tax credit certificate in favor of MPC, its unutilized input VAT payments
directly attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales for the second quarter in the total amount of PhP
10,766,939.48. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

22
WHEN TO INVOKE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

NATIONAL PETROLUEM GAS, INCORPORATED vs. RCBC,

767 SCRA 653

FACTS: Respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed against petitioner corporation and its
directors/officers a Complaint5 for civil damages arising from estafa in relation to violations of the Trust
Receipts Law. After an ex parte hearing was conducted, respondent's prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment was granted and the corresponding writ was issued. Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas
served upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent's
affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment.

A copy of Writ of Attachment issued by the Court in the above-entitled case was received by the
undersigned for service and implementation.

Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss.They asserted that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly served upon
Claudia Abante, who is a mere liaison officer and not one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated
in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. Likewise, the individual petitioners argued that the sheriff and/or
process server did not personally approach them at their respective address as stated in the Complaint.
Neither did he resort to substituted service of summons, and that, even if he did, there was no strict
compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules. The Court's pronouncements in Spouses Mason v. Court
of Appeals, E. B. Villarosa& Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito,Laus v. Court of Appeals, and Samartino v.
Raon were invoked in praying for the dismissal of the complaint and the discharge of the writ of
attachment.

Respondent countered in its Opposition with Motion to Declare Defendants in Default that there was valid
service of summons upon petitioners. With respect to the corporation, Abante received the summons
upon the express authority and instruction of the corporate secretary, petitioner Melinda Ang. As regards
the individual petitioners, the Sheriffs Report reflects that they were served "at their given addresses, but
they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof." Respondent stressed that said Report is prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein and that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official functions. In any case, it averred that, according to Oaminal v. Castillo,
petitioners already voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction when they prayed for the discharge of
the writ of attachment, which is an affirmative relief apart from the dismissal of the case.

The RTC denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and respondent's motion to declare them in default. In
upholding the jurisdiction of the court over the persons of petitioners and requiring them to file an Answer,
the Order ratiocinated.

Petitioners elevated the jurisdictional issue to the CA via petition for certiorari and prohibition.22 As afore-
stated, the appellate court later dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration; hence,
this petition raising the following issues for resolution.

23
ISSUE/S: I. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
corporation by service of summons upon its mere employee.

II. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the individual defendants by
resorting to substituted service of summons despite absence of earnest efforts on the part of the serving
officer to serve summons personally.

RULING: Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her.
Its purpose is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant
that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim
against him. "Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due
process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a
person can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory
on which such claim is premised."

Respondent alleges that the summons was served to the individual petitioners through substituted service
by entrusting the same to their house helpers, all of whom are of suitable age and discretion. It did not,
however, elaborate that these persons know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the individual
petitioners at the earliest possible time for them to take appropriate action. There is no way for Us to
conclusively ascertain that the sheriff ensured, among others, that the persons found in the alleged
dwelling or residence comprehend the significance of the receipt of the summons and the duty to
immediately deliver it to the individual petitioners or at least notify them of said receipt of summons.

The foregoing considered, it can be deduced that since there were no actual efforts exerted and no
positive steps undertaken to earnestly locate the individual petitioners, there is no basis to convincingly
say that they evaded the personal service of summons and merely gave the sheriff a run-around, thus,
justifying substituted service upon them.

Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The second sentence of
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance" clearly
refers to affirmative defenses, not affirmative reliefs.

In the present case, the individual petitioners prayed, among others, for the following: (1) discharge of the
writ of attachment on their properties; (2) denial of the motion to declare them in default; (3) admission of
the Comment/Opposition (to the motion to declare them in default) filed on December 19, 2006; and (4)
denial of respondent's motion to strike off from the records (their opposition to the motion to declare them
in default). By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual petitioners are deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.52 Therefore, the CA cannot be considered to have erred in affirming
the trial court's denial of the Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper service of
summons.

24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The December 12, 2007 Decision and June
17, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787, which sustained the March 29,
2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 06-882, are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

25
WHEN TO INVOKE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE Bautista

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. CHUA

762 SCRA 128

FACTS;

Respondent Lilia S. Chua was employed as a bank executive by Far East Bank, rising through the latter's
ranks and holding the position of Assistant Vice President from October 1, 1997 until the termination of
her employment.re
It is not disputed that on July 1, 1999, Chua's employment was terminated as Far East Bank found Chua
to have engaged in multiple kiting transactions, which are fraudulent transactions involving the drawing
out of money from a bank account that does not have sufficient funds in order to cover a check.
Chua was dismissed by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co.due to a finding that she engaged in
multiple kiting transactions which was a serious violation of Far East Bank's Code of Conduct. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that there was illegal dismissal. This was reversed by the National Labor Relations
Commission. Chua participated in the appeal proceedings before the NLRC.
The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's ruling, stating that Far East
Bank's appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission was not perfected.
SC was asked reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Assailing Far East Bank's basis for terminating her employment, Chua filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato City of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
In the course of the proceedings before the Regional Arbitration Branch, the parties were ordered to
submit their respective Position Papers. Despite an extension having been given to Far East Bank, it
failed to timely file its Position Paper.
On April 25, 2000, Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B. Cueto III (Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto) rendered a
Decisionfinding Chua to have been illegally dismissed.On May 15, 2000, this Motion was denied.
On May 25, 2000, Far East Bank directly filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the
National Labor Relations Commission.
On April 30, 2001, the National Labor Relations Commission Fifth Division issued a Resolution reversing
and setting aside the April 25, 2000 Decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto. It held that Far East
Bank's delay of "a few days" in filing its Position Paper was excusable, especially considering that it and
its counsel were based in different cities, Cotabato City and General Santos City, respectively. It added
that it was successfully shown by Far East Bank that Chua "had indeed committed irregular acts in
relation to his position as Assistant Vice President,""acts that would constitute for loss of trust and
confidence," thereby justifying the termination of her employment.
Aggrieved, Chua filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE;

Whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the directly filed
unperfected appeal of respondent.

HELD;

The Constitution leaves to the legislature the authority to establish lower courts, as well as "to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, except of this court. Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

26
For their part, administrative agencies are statutory constructs. Thus, they are limited by the statutes
which created them and which spelled out their powers and functions. "It is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.8 Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-judicial powers,
but only to the extent warranted by administrative action.

Unlike courts, the National Labor Relations Commission's existence is not borne out of constitutional fiat.
It owes its existence to Article 213 of the Labor Code:La
Art. 213. National Labor Relations Commission. There shall be a National Labor Relations
Commission which shall be attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy
coordination only, composed of a Chairman and fourteen (14) Members.
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
1 Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes,
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
-Unfair labor practice cases;
-Termination disputes;
-If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
-Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations:
-Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts; and
-Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
2 The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.
3 Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.

Article 218 of the Labor Code vests in the National Labor Relations Commission the authority to adopt
procedural rules:
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
1 To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before it and
its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code

The Court of Appeals thus failed to account for the crucial fact that the issue of jurisdiction was invoked by
respondent only upon her elevation to it of the case. It failed to recognize that respondent had all the
opportunity to raise this issue before the very tribunal whom she claims to have had no competence to
rule on the appeal, but that it was only after the same tribunal ruled against her twice first, in its initial
Resolution and second, in denying her reconsideration that she saw it fit to assail its jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals failed to see through respondent's own failure to seasonably act and failed to realize that
she was guilty of estoppel by laches, taking "an unreasonable . . . length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier

Respondent cannot now profit from her own inaction. She actively participated in the proceedings and
vigorously argued her case before the National Labor Relations Commission without the slightest
indication that she found anything objectionable to the conduct of those proceedings. It is thus but
appropriate to consider her as acceding to and bound by how the National Labor Relations Commission

27
was to resolve and, ultimately did resolve, petitioner's appeal. Its findings that the requisites of
substantive and procedural due process were satisfied in terminating respondent's employment now
stand undisturbed.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is
REINSTATED
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

28
AYALA LAND vs CASTILLO
780 SCRA 1

FACTS;

CCFI owned two parcels of land (the subject land) with a total area of 221.3048 hectares located at
Barangay Tibig in Silang,Cavite. The subject land was mortgaged in favor of one of CCFIs creditors,
MBC. Pursuant to Resolution No. 505 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
MBC was placed under receivership on22 May 1987, in accordance with Section 29 of the Central Bank
Act. Pursuant to this law, the assets of MBC were placed in the hands of its receiver under custodia legis.
On 29 September 1989, the DAR issued a Notice of Coverage placing the property under compulsory
acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

In the meantime, CCFI was unable to comply with its mortgage obligations to MBC. The latter foreclosed
on the lien, and the land was awarded to it in an auction sale held on4 January 1991. The sale was duly
annotated on the titles as Entry No. 5324-44. In a Deed of Partial Redemption, CCFI was authorized to
partially redeem the two parcels of land and sell them to a third party, pending full payment of the
redemption price.Under the Deed, the down payment, which was 30% of the purchase price, would be
payable to the bank only upon approval of the exemption of the two parcels of land from the coverage of
CARL or upon their conversion to non-agricultural use.

On the same date, the property was sold to petitioner ALI in a Deed of Sale over the properties covered
by TCT Nos. 128672 and 144245. The sale was not absolute but conditional stating that MBC was to
continue to have custody of the corresponding titles for as long as any obligation remained due it.

Prompted by the numerous proceedings for compulsory acquisition initiated by the DAR against MBC,
Governor Reyes requested then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao to issue an order exempting the
landholdings of MBC from CARL and to declare a moratorium on the compulsory acquisition of MBCs
landholdings. But Secretary Garilao denied the request. On1 August 1995, MBC and Governor Reyes
filed with the OP a Petition for Review of Secretary Garilaos Decision. The OP issued a Stay Orderof the
appealed Decision. Thereafter, MBC filed with the OP a motion for the issuance of an order granting the
former a period of five years within which to seek the conversion of its landholdings to non-agricultural
use.

Instead of ruling on the motion alone, however, the OP, through Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres
remanded the case to the DAR and ordered the agency to determine which parcels of land were exempt
from the coverage of the CARL. Secretary Torres denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the DAR.

Secretary Garilao issued a Resolution dated3 October 1997, granting MBCs Request for Clearance to
Sell, with the sale to be undertaken by CCFI. He applied Section 73-A of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657, as
amended by R.A. 7881, that allows the sale of agricultural land where such sale or transfer is
necessitated by a banks foreclosure of a mortgage. DAR Memorandum Circular No. 05, Series of 1996
further clarified the above provision, stating that foreclosed assets are subject to existing laws on their
compulsory transfer under Section 16 of the General Banking Act. CCFI thereafter filed an application for
conversion and/or exemption pursuant to its prerogative as a landowner under Part IV of DAR A.O. 12-94
and the procedure outlined therein.

On 31 October 1997, Secretary Garilao issued Conversion Order No. 4-97-1029-051, approving the
conversion and/or exemption of the 221-hectare property in Silang, exempting the properties from
agrarian reform coverage, as it was beyond eighteen (18) degrees in slope.

On 19 May 2000, he farmers tilling the subject land filed a Petition for Revocation of Conversion Order
No. 4-97-1029-051 alleging: (1) that the sale in 1995 by CCFI to ALI was invalid; and (2) that CCFI and
ALI were guilty of misrepresentation in claiming that the property had been reclassified through a mere

29
Resolution, when the law required an ordinance of the Sanggunian. The issue of the alleged Notice of
Acquisition was never raised. Neither was there any mention of the issuance of a Notice of Coverage.

On18 December 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, Jr.declared that the action to revoke the
conversion had not yet prescribed. According to him, Section 34 of A.O. 1-99 imposing the one-year
prescription period did not apply, because administrative rules should be applied prospectively. Thus, the
rule to be followed was that prevailing at the time of the issuance of the Conversion Order DAR A.O. 12-
94 not A.O. 1-99, which was the rule prevailing when the Petition for Revocation was filed. But he never
passed upon or even mentioned any matter related to the Notice of Acquisition.

It is important to note, however, that Secretary Morales declared that CCFI and ALI had completed the
payment of disturbance compensation to the farmers, as shown by theKasunduan,which was a waiver of
all the farmers rights over the landholding, and by theKatunayan ng Pagbabayad,which expressly
acknowledged the amounts paid as the full and final settlement of their claims against CCFI and ALI.

On26 September 2002, acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by ALI, DAR Secretary Hernani
Braganza reversedthe Revocation of Conversion Order 4-97-1029-051. Again,Secretary Braganza was
not afforded an opportunity to discuss any evidence related to the existence or effect of any Notice of
Acquisition, as the joinder of issues was limited.

Secretary Braganza found that the Deed of Partial Redemption was conditional, and that there was no
transfer of ownership to CCFI or its successor-in-interest, ALI. Hence, there could be no violation of the
CARL arising from an unauthorized transfer of the land to ALI. In fact, the obligation of ALI to pay the
purchase price did not arise until the DARs issuance of an order of exemption or conversion. On14
January 2003, Secretary Braganza granted ALIs Motion for Extension to develop the land for another five
(5) years.

The farmers questioned the jurisdiction of the DAR to determine the ownership of the lands and to
determine whether or not the sale was conditional, as these issues are within the ambit of the civil courts.

Secretary Roberto Pagdanganan denied the farmers Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the finality
of the Braganza Order.

On appeal, the upheld Conversion Order No. 4-97-1029-051 issued by then Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Ernesto Garilao, as well as the Orders issued by Secretary Hernani Braganza
and Secretary Roberto Pagdanganan both affirming the conversion.

The CA found merit in the OPs rationale for maintaining the Conversion Order, yet invalidated the same
on the basis that a Notice of Coverage and a Notice of Acquisition had already been issued over the
lands, thus they could no longer be subject to conversion.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE;

Whether or not the CA is barred from resolving the issue of the alleged Notice of Acquisition thaw only
raised for the first time on appeal?

30
HELD;

The CA found the Conversion Order valid on all points, with the sole exception of the effect of the alleged
issuance of a Notice of Acquisition.

After perusing the records of the DAR and the OP, however, there is no admissible proof presented to
support this claim. A Notice of Acquisition was never offered in evidence before the DAR and never
became part of the records even at the trial court level. Thus, its existence is not a fully established fact
for the purpose of serving as the sole basis the entire history of the policy decisions made by the DAR
and the OP were to be overturned. The CA committed reversible error when it gave credence to a mere
assertion by the tenant-farmers, rather than to the policy evaluation made by the OP.

In fact, the records show that this issue was not raised in the original Petition for Revocation in the second
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the farmers before the DAR, and that no Notice of Acquisition was
attached to their Appeal Memorandum to the OP.As a consequence, the OP, Secretary Pagdanganan,
Secretary Braganza, and Secretary Morales did not have any opportunity to dwell on this issue in their
Orders and Decision. Instead, what respondents persistently allege is the concealment of the sale by
CCFI and ALI.

It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the
lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to
trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. More important, if these matters
had been raised earlier, they could have been seriously examined by the administrative agency
concerned.

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

KING vs ROBLES
776 SCRA 175

FACTS;

In a Decision dated February 28, 1997 rendered by the Third Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo were adjudged guilty of having
illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered to reinstate Rogelio to his former position, to
pay him full backwages from the time his salary was withheld up to his actual reinstatement. This
Decision became final and executory. On November 19, 2001, Arbiter Robles issued a writ of
execution5 commanding the execution arm of the NLRC to proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of
Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located at J.P. Ramos St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may
be found and collect the sum of x x x P471,200.99 representing [Rogelios] backwages and 13th month
pay. In case you fail to collect said amount in cash, you are to cause the satisfaction of the same from the
movable or immovable properties of the respondent not exempt from execution.

In compliance with the directive in the writ of execution, respondent Deputy Sheriffs served a Notice of
Levy/Sale on Execution on Personal Properties upon the representative of therein respondents on March
5, 2002. Personal properties found inside the compound of Azkcon at No. 220 Lias Road, Lambakan
Street, Marilao, Bulacan were levied upon. Meanwhile, on March 13, 2002, Philippine Metal and Alloy
Fabrication Corporation (PMAFC, one of the companies represented by King) filed an Affidavit of Third
Party Claimbefore Arbiter Robles, asserting ownership over the levied properties. Subsequently, PMAFC
filed a Motion to Quash Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal Property and to
InhibitSheriffs. PMAFC contended that the Deputy Sheriffs levied on properties belonging to PMAFC
worth P12 million and that the Deputy Sheriffs intended to sell the said properties for a measly sum of
P471,200.99. PMAFC thus prayed that the Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution be set aside for being void
ab initio and the Deputy Sheriffs be disqualified. In an Order dated April 18, 2002, Arbiter Robles directed
Rogelio to post a Sheriffs Indemnity Bond in an amount double the judgment award.

On April 26, 2002, Arbiter Robles approved Rogelios Sheriffs Indemnity Bond, directed the Deputy
Sheriffs to obtain physical possession of the levied properties, sell them at public auction, and apply the
proceeds thereof for the satisfaction of the judgment award. Rogelio, through his attorney-in-fact, Rodrigo
Mendoza, emerged as the highest bidder in the auction sale conducted on May 2, 2002. After the
Certificate of Sale was issued, Rodrigo and his workers started to pull out and haul the sold properties.
Contending that the value of the properties taken and hauled by Rogelio through his attorney-in-fact were
worth more than the monetary award of the NLRC, petitioner King, claiming to be the President of Azkcon
Metal Industries, Inc., Azkcon Refrigeration Industries, Inc., Azkcon Construction Development
Corporation, Azk Trading and PMAFC, filed criminal complaints for Robbery, Violation of RA 3019 and
Falsification of Public Documents against respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman docketed as
OMB-C-C-02-0339-F and C-C-02-1340-F. He alleged that respondents conspired in the unlawful taking of
the machineries and equipment which caused him and the aforesaid companies undue injury. King
claimed that the properties were owned by PMAFC inasmuch as the Azkcon Group of Companies is not a
registered corporation; that in the Notice rescheduling the auction sale, the Deputy Sheriffs misleadingly
indicated the address as 220 Lambakin St., Marilao, Bulacan, when the correct address of Azkcon is 220
Lias Road, Bo. Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan; that the Deputy Sheriffs did not actually hold a public auction
consistent with respondents intention to rob Azkcon; and that Joseph and Teresita conspired with the
other respondents when they allowed the safekeeping of the hauled machineries and equipment in their
compound. The National Bureau of Investigation whose assistance was sought by petitioner likewise filed
similar charges against the aforenamed accused before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan
and docketed as I.S. No. 02-05-1059 and I.S. No. 02-06-1406.

32
After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties respective position, the Ombudsman in its
Joint Resolution dated August 29, 2008 dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of
probable cause.
According to the Ombudsman, petitioners evidence failed to establish the four elements of the crime of
robbery. The Ombudsman held that the intent to gain is totally absent since Rogelio is the owner of the
subject properties on account of his being the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale issued to him.
Thus, Rogelio cannot be charged for taking the personal property of another.
The Ombudsman likewise ruled that the sale of the levied properties through auction was not made with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable negligence. The Deputy Sheriffs actions
were done pursuant to the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment.
With respect to the charge of Falsification of Public Documents, the Ombudsman found no record to show
that respondents falsified any pertinent document in this case.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed Joint
Order dated November 17, 2010.
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. King insists that probable cause exists to charge
respondents with Robbery, Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
On July 20, 2011, we resolved to require respondents to file comment. Respondents Romeo and Rodrigo
filed their Comment maintaining that King failed to prove that there was probable cause to charge them
with the foregoing crimes. They also posit that King did not establish conspiracy among them. Moreover,
they maintain that Arbiter Robles and the Deputy Sheriffs were only performing their duties as mandated
by law. Also, the withdrawal of the properties was done by authority of the law and by virtue of the
Certificate of Sale. King thereafter filed his Reply. To date, the other respondents failed to comment.
Hence, they are deemed to have waived their right to file comment.

ISSUE;

Whether the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents for trial.

HELD;

The Petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to
investigate on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of a public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears tobe illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.By constitutional fiat and
under RA 6770, the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers on
offenses committed by public officers free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention.Because of
the endowment of broad investigative authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on
the sufficiency of the complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or substance, it
may also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it except when
the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the
publicofficer concerned, equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. A perusal of the Petition shows that petitioner failed to
demonstrate the Ombudsmans abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charges
against respondents for lack of probable cause. On the contrary, a review of the records readily reveals
that the Ombudsmans assailed Joint Resolution is based on substantial evidence.

33
From the well-explained Joint Resolution, in our view, petitioners Affidavit/Complaint is bereft of sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crimes imputed on respondents have been committed
and that they are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. In fine, the Ombudsman did not
abuse his discretion warranting the Courts intervention, in dismissing the charges against respondents.

Petitioner complained of procedural flaws in the enforcement of the writ of execution arguing in the main
that the value of the levied and hauled properties were much more than the monetary award of the NLRC.
This we believe is not an adequate ground to reverse the action of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners bone of contention in the present Petition boils down to the appreciation and determination of
factual matters. The question of whether there was indeed an over levy of properties is one that is
essentially a factual concern as it goes into the determination of the fair market value of the properties
levied upon vis--vis the value of the properties hauled and taken out of the companys premises.
Obviously, petitioner invites an evaluation of the evidentiary matters which is not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari. Besides, this Court is not a trier of facts. Matters pertaining to proofs and evidence
are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45 Petition except in the presence of some
meritorious circumstances, none of which is availing in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Joint Resolution dated August 29, 2008 of the Office of the
Ombudsman and its Joint Order dated November 17, 2010 are AFFIRMED.

34
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

GARCIA vs TOLENTINO
766 SCRA 277

FACTS;

RA 8291 was enacted by Congress on May 30, 1997 provided for, among others, the compulsory
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) coverage of all government employees, regardless of
employment status.
Tolentino, et al., all contractual employees of the various projects and programs within and under the
control and supervision of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), wrote the
GSIS to inquire about their standing, since, prior to RA 8291, they were not under compulsory GSIS
coverage.
The GSIS, in a letter dated January 8, 1998 through its Senior Vice President for the Social Insurance
Group Lourdes G. Patag, advised that while casual and contractual employees paid from the regular
lump-sum appropriation are covered under RA 8291, contractual employees who were hired co-terminus
with projects and are receiving additional 20% pay were not. The GSIS communicated SVP Patags view
to the DENR in a letter dated January 12, 1998.

On April 30, 1999, the GSIS and the Department of Budget and Management issued Joint Circular which
set forth the guidelines in the payment of the government statutory expenditures on personal services of
contractual employees. It states that on May 30, 1997, Republic Act No. 8291 was passed, mandating the
mandatory GSIS coverage of all government employees regardless of employment status. Prior to its
passage, contractual employees were not entitled to leave benefits. Instead, they received 20% premium
pay. As such, their salaries were 20% higher than the salaries of regular employees occupying equivalent
positions, provided that the total amount does not exceed 120% of the latters minimum salary.

The DENR, through a Memorandum dated September 16, 1999, accordingly informed its Project/Program
Directors that deductions from the premium pay shall be reflected in the payroll starting October 1999 to
include arrearages for the months of January to September 1999.On October 4, 1999, Tolentino, et al.,
again, wrote to the GSIS and the DENR requesting the deferment of the deduction of the monthly GSIS
contributions pending resolution of the issue regarding their membership coverage.
Before the concerned government agencies could act on their letters, Tolentino, et al., on October 28,
1999, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with very Urgent Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against then GSIS President and General Manager Frederico C.
Pascual, then Secretary of Budget and Management Benjamin E. Diokno and then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources Antonio H. Cerilles.
In their petition before the trial court, Tolentino, et al. essentially argued that the GSIS and the DBM
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the governments share on GSIS contributions to be paid
out of the 20% premium on the monthly salary of contractual employees.
In his Answer and Motion to Dismiss, Pascual pleaded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
case because RA 8291 vests in the GSIS the original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute
arising under the said Act. This motion was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 24,
2000.Meanwhile, the concerned DENR officials argued that they cannot be held to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion because they merely implemented the joint circular.

ISSUE;

1. Whether or not the GSIS is guilty of forum shopping; 32

2. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the petition filed by Tolentino, et al. and
3. Whether or not the Joint Circular is valid.

35
HELD;

On August 29, 2000, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the concerned
government agencies from implementing the Joint Circular. Subsequently, or on March 11, 2001, the trial
court rendered a Decision making permanent the preliminary injunction it issued earlier. It ruled that the
Court finds merit in the petitioners contention that indeed the joint circular runs afoul of the provisions of
RA 8291.
Under this circular, the contractual personnel shall in effect be paying the governments share of the
contributions inasmuch as no additional funds shall be appropriated for the purpose. This is a clear
contravention of the very law it seeks to implement.
GSIS as an administrative agency vested with quasilegislative powers shall exercise such delegated
legislative power with no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in
the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.

Clearly, the joint circular had been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for being violative of the letter of the law it seeks to implement. Indeed, administrative
regulations must not override, but must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement.
They are intended to carry out, not to supplant nor to modify the law. Stating CIR vs CA 240 SCRA 149

Finally, respondents assail the jurisdiction of this Court citing Sec. 30 of RA 8291 and Sec. 14.1 and 14.3
of the Implementing Rules. Granting arguendo that the GSIS has primary jurisdiction over the instant case
as it appears that petitioners did not avail nor exhaust the administrative remedies by not moving for the
reconsideration of their coverage under RA 8291, the Court, however, deemed it just and equitable under
the circumstances to give due course to the instant petition because the petitioners had no other speedy
and adequate remedy available to them in view of the impending implementation of the questioned
circular.

Moreover, the Courts act to take cognizance of the instant case finds justification in the provisions of the
par. 2, Sec. 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the GSIS-DBM Joint Circular No. 99-3
is hereby annulled for being contrary to law. The preliminary injunction previously issued is hereby made
permanent.

The DBM and the GSIS each filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration but these were denied by
the RTC in an Order. The DBM filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial courts Decision.GSIS, on the other
hand, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

On February 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on whether the DBMs appeal may be given due course.
The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment, argued that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Tolentino, et al.s petition considering the subject matter thereof
pertains to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the GSIS. Moreover, the OSG asserted that even
assuming arguendo that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Tolentino, et al.s petition,
the government could legally rechannel the funds provided for said purpose in the 1999 General
Appropriations Act (GAA) to answer the government share of the GSIS contributions for that same year.
On February 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reversing that of the trial court. Denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision, Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered DISMISSING the petition for lack of
merit, prematurity and lack of cause of action.

In their comment on the GSISs Petition for Review, Tolentino, et al. argued that GSIS committed forum
shopping in this case. At the time GSIS filed its petition on July 23, 2002, it already had knowledge that a
co-party, DBM had already filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Despite this knowledge, the GSIS
filed G.R. No. 153810;37 more, contrary to its undertaking in its certification against forum shopping, the
GSIS did not inform this Honorable Court of the pending case before the Court of Appeals.

36
The GSIS vehemently denied that there is forum shopping. It argued that while the GSIS has already
decided that it will be filing a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court as early as June 20, 2002, its
counsel only received a copy of the DBMs Notice of Appeal on June 21, 2002.
This argument fails to persuade.Here, the commonality of interests among the DBM, the GSIS and the
DENR cannot be denied. The pleadings filed from the inception of the case will show that they have
essentially the same arguments and defenses and seek the same reliefs. More, in terms of the issuance
of the Joint Circular, these agencies have equal stakes should the challenged circular bedeclared invalid.
Without a doubt, the different modes of appeal taken by the GSIS and the DBM will, in the process, create
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issue. Indeed, a
final decision in one would constitute res judicata in the other. SC dismissed the petition with a warning to
the GSIS that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
construction, only application.
Thus, the concerned government agenciesare correct in their contention that the GSIS has the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 8291.
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort and, its corollary doctrine, exhaustion of
administrative remedies, are applicable in the instant case. Therefore, the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the said Tolentino case.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

37
17. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES INC. VS BF HOMES INC

765 SCRA 131

FACTS:

San Miguel Properties purchased from BF Homes, then represented by Atty. Orendain130 residential lots
situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque. The transactions were embodied in three separate
deeds of sale.The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to
San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land purchased under the third deed
of sale, executed in April 1993 were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.

BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the
third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions. Despite demands, BF Homes refused to deliver the TCTs causing San Miguel Properties to
file a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City (OCP Las Pias) charging
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles. At the same time, San Miguel
Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release
the 20 TCTs in its favor.

The OCP Las Pias denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration and ruled that the criminal
liability would attach only if BF Homes failed to comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to
deliver the titles. The DOJ denied the motion for reconsideration as well and such decision was affirmed
by the CA on the ground that the HLURB had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has primary jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes. The action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. A
case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact,
relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts.

The High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising
from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the

38
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations. Hence, the HLURB should
take jurisdiction over respondents complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURBs
competence and expertise.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

18. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES INC. (CCBPI) VS ILOCOS PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL
EMPLOYEES UNION (IPTEU)

770 SCRA 229

FACTS:

IPTEU filed a verified Petition for certification election seeking to represent a bargaining unit consisting
of approximately twenty-two (22) rank-and-file professional and technical employees of CCBPI Ilocos
Norte Plant. CCBPI prayed for the denial and dismissal of the petition, arguing that the Sales Logistics
Coordinator and Maintenance Foreman are supervisory employees, while the other positions are
confidential employees hence, ineligible for inclusion as members of IPTEU. It also sought to cancel and
revoke the registration of IPTEU for failure to comply with the twenty percent (20%) membership
requirement based on all the supposed employees in the bargaining unit it seeks to operate.

Mediator-Arbiter Florence Marie A. Gacad-Ulep granted IPTEUS petition. CCBPI elevated the case to the
Secretary of Labor and Emplyment (SOLE) but the same denied its appeal. CCBPI then filed before the CA
a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA denied the petition as well as CCBPIs subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Mediator-Arbiters ruling that employees who encounter or handle trade secrets and
financial information are not automatically classified as confidential employees is proper.

HELD:

39
Yes. The determination of factual issues is vested in the Mediator-Arbiter and the Department of Labor
and Employment.The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence.

JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT
NOT DEPENDENT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

19. BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH

801 SCRA 218

FACTS:

A contract of loan was entered into between Philippine Baptist S.B.C. (PBSBC) and Balibago Faith Baptist
Church (BFBC) where the latter borrowed money from the former to enable it to purchase a parcel of
land located in Angeles city owned by PBSBC. BFBC then took possession of the said property and began
to hold religious activities there.

Reynaldo Galvan (Galvan) began attending BFBCs religious activities and after some time he formed and
incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property. BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the
property through a demand letter but due to non-compliance of the latter BFBC filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and Galvan.

40
The MTC ruled that the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful detainer which was later
affirmed by the RTC. FCJBC filed a petition for review on certiorari before the appellate court and the CA
granted the petition ruling that MTC had no jurisdiction over the case and reversing the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

No. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible entry if the
complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry, respectively. It cannot be made to depend on
the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.

The complaint must show enough on its face the court's jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. In
this case the allegations in the complaint show that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer.
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it has been long settled that in forcible
entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.

JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT
NOT DEPENDENT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

20. FOREST HELLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES

797 SCRA 655

FACTS:

41
Kingsville Construction and Development Corporation (Kingsville) and Kings Properties Corporation (KPC)
entered into a project agreement with respondent Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI), whereby the latter
agreed to improve several parcels of land owned by Kingsville in Antipolo, Rizal, into Forest Hills
Residential Estates and Golf and Country Club.

Due to the delayed construction of the second 18-Hole Golf Course, Madrid a shareholder wrote two
demand letters to the Board of Directors of petitioner FHGCCI asking them to initiate the appropriate
legal action against respondents FEPI and FEGDI. The Board of Directors, however, failed and/or refused
to act on the demand letters so Madrid, on behalf of petitioner FHGCCI, filed with the RTC of Antipolo
City a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, without prejudice to the re-filing of the same with the proper special commercial court
sitting at Rizal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is cognizable by the lower court as a regular court or by the RTC-BBinangonan
Branch 70, as a special commercial court for intra-corporate controversies.

HELD:

No. The Complaint, denominated as a derivative suit for specific performance, falls under the jurisdiction
of special commercial courts.The fact that petitioner FHGCCI denominated the Complaint as a derivative
suit for specific performance is sufficient reason for the RTC to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction, as the
RTC where the Complaint was raffled is not a special commercial court. Upon the enactment of RA No.
8799, jurisdiction over intra- corporate disputes, including derivatives suits, is now vested in the RTCs
designated as special commercial courts by this Court pursuant to A.M. No. 00- 11-03-SC promulgated on
November 21, 2000.

NUMBER 21: Doctrine of non-interference or Judicial Stability

42
CASE TITLE: ADLAWAN VS. JOAQUINO et. al (2016)

CASE NUMBER: GR. 203152

FACTS: Leonora Yngles owned a parcel of land (lot 7-B) in Cebu City. Leonoras daughter, Gavina has a
compulsory heir named Vicenta. Vicentas daughter, Remedios filed a petition for reconstitution of lot 7-B
with the RTC of Cebu Branch 14, claiming to have acquired the lot from Vicenta evidenced by a TCT
which was burned in a house fire.

RTC Branch 14 granted her petition and ordered the reconstitution. The said order became final and
executory. Remedios divided the lot into 4 parcels of land and then sold lot 7-B1 to Spouses Robles.

Respondents herein, Leonoras predecessors, filed a complaint with the RTC of Cebu Branch 17 to
annul Remedios titles alleging Remedios conspiracy with Spouses Robles because Remedios did not
acquire lot 7-B. A notice of lispendens were then annotated on the title sought to be annulled.

Spouses Robles and Remedios moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute
because respondents herein failed to comment on their motion to dismiss. RTC Branch 17 dismissed the
case. Its order then became final and executory.

Respondents then filed a motion for relief with RTC Branch 17 alleging the negligence of their counsel for
their failure to comment on the said motion to dismiss. Meanwhile Spouses Robles sold lot 7-B1 to herein
petitioners, Spouses Adlawan.

RTC Branch 17 granted the petition for relief and ordered the reinstatement of respondents complaint for
annulment of title. Remedios and Spouses Robles moved to reconsider the RTCs decision but it was
denied. They appealed with the CA which also denied their appeal, and to the SC which ultimately denied
their appeal and the same became final and executory.

THIS IS WHERE THE CASE STARTS: Respondents then filed a supplemental complaint impleading
petitioners herein (SPOUSES ADLAWAN) as additional defendants. The latter claimed to be buyers in
good faith and denied knowledge of the pending case alleging that the title of lot 7-B1 no longer contain
any annotation of any pending litigation because the notice of lispendens was already cancelled before it
was sold to them by Spouses Robles.

RTC Branch 17 reinstated respondents complaint for annulment of title and thereafter declared
Remedios reconstitution of title, which was granted by RTC Branch 14, null and void. The CA on appeal,
affirmed the nullity because it found no TCT over lot 7-B issued to Remedios and ruled that Petitioners
are not buyers in good faith since they bought the title before there was reconstitution. Hence this petition
for certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE: WON RTC Branch 17 may annul the order of RTC Branch 14 which granted the reconstitution of
title.

HELD: NO. Under the Doctrine of Non-Interference or Judicial Stability, a trial court has no authority to
interfere with the proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction, much less annul the final judgment of a co-
equal court.

RTC Branch 14 is a co-equal court of Branch 17. The latter has no jurisdiction to annul the reconstitution
of title previously ordered by the former.

43
The Respondents complaint to annul said title should have been filed with the CA since the assailed
reconstituted title in this case was ordered by RTC Branch 14, from where the petitioners title
originated.Petition Granted.

44
NUMBER 22:A Controversy NOT SOLELY involving GOCCs is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

CASE TITLE: ORION WATER DISTRICT (OWD) VS. GSIS (2016)

CASE NUMBER: GR. 195382

FACTS:GSIS filed a complaint of sum of money and damages before the RTC of Pasay against OWD, a
GOCC, and its officers for the latters failure to pay and remit its employees personal share in their life
and retirement premiums amounting to more than half a million pesos despite several demands.

OWD filed a motion to dismiss alleging that RTC has no jurisdiction because GSIS and OWD are both
GOCCs therefore jurisdiction over disputes between them lies with the SOJ pursuant to EO 292, Chapter
14, Book 4, Sections 66 to 70.

The RTC denied the motion because OWD failed to alleged in their dispute controverting the claim or that
such dispute arises from the application of statutes, contracts or agreement involved in the case. Their
MR was likewise denied.

CA:OWD then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion. The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision ruling that EO 292 is inapplicable since the dispute is not solely between
GOCCs for it also involved the employees and officers of OWD. The applicable statute is RA 8291 or the
GSIS Act of 1997 sanctioning the filing of the complaint with the RTC. The CA likewise denied OWDs
MR. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON GSIS properly instituted its complaint with the RTC.

HELD: YES. EO 292 explicitly provides that only disputes, claims and controversies SOLELY between
and among departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government
including GOCCs SHALL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY SETTLED OR ADJUDICATED (DOJ: SOJ -> OP ->
CA petition for review under Rule 43).

Clearly, the case at bar cannot qualify for administrative settlement since the case also involved officials
and employees of the OWD and NOT SOLELY between GSIS and OWD.

Since there was a delayed remittance, continued refusal of OWD to remit contributions gives rise to a
cause of action on the part of GSIS applying RA 8291. GSIS then properly instituted the complaint with
the RTC which has jurisdiction in civil cases where the demand for sum of money or value or
propertyexceeds 300,000 pesos in the provinces and 400,000 pesos in Metro Manila.Petition Denied.

45
NUMBER 23: Designation of Special Commercial Courts ismerely an incident related to the court's
exercise of jurisdictiondistinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

CASE TITLE: CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM BY ITSELF AND ITS UNIT OWNERS vs. BACULIO,
president NEW PPI; ASIAN SECURITY and SECURITY GUARDS; BUILDING OFFICIAL OF MAKATI
(MORALES); FIRE MARSHAL OF MAKATI (PERDIGON); RD OF BFP-NCR (LAGUNA) AND ANY
OTHER PERSONS ACTING WITH OR UNDER THEM (2016)

CASE NUMBER: GR. 203678

FACTS: On April 2012, Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction, writ of preliminary
injunction, and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents. The petition seeks to enjoin
respondents from misrepresenting to the public that they are owners of the disputed lots and Concorde
from pushing its demolition which they do not even own; deploying security within the perimeter of the
building; and to restrain from responding to letters send by Baculio, a mere imposter, and has no legal
personality to matters concerning the revocation of the building and its permits.

The case was raffled to RTC Branch 149 which was designated as a SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURT.
The RTC called the case for hearing to determine the propriety of issuing the TRO thereafter issued
orders to respondents to conduct an inspection and investigation on the building and for the
Condominium President to repair the building for four months to remedy its problems and deficiencies.

Baculio filed an urgent motion to re-raffle claiming that RTC Branch 149 does not have jurisdiction over
the case since it is a Special Commercial Court. The RTC denied the motion for Baculio failed to comply
with Sections 4 and 5 Rule 15 of the ROC (on hearing and notice of motion).

Baculio again filed a Motion to Vacate Order and Motion to Dismiss assailing the RTCs order is without its
jurisdiction and that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a condition precedent before
filing a petition.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It noted that petitioners allegations and admissions
are absent of intra-corporate controversy cognizable by the RTC sitting as a Special Commercial Court.

Petitioner filed an MR which was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence this review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends the ff:

1. They correctly filed with the RTC their petition for injunction with damages is an ordinary civil case
incapable of pecuniary estimation but was thereafter raffled to an RTC tasked to hear intra-
corporate disputes (Special Commercial Court).
2. The jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the RTCs and such
transfer does not limit or diminish the jurisdiction of those RTCs designated as a Special
Commercial Court. That designation of RTC branch 149 as a Special commercial court did not
divest it of its power as a court of general jurisdiction.
3. The RTC judge had already determined from the petition that it is an ordinary civil action and not
an intra-corporate matter, thus he should have referred it back to Executive Judge or the Office of
the Clerk of Court for re-raffle, instead if calendaring it for hearing or dismissing it.

OSG and Respondents avers that:

1. Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies hence the filing of the petition for injunction
with damages is premature and immediately dismissable.

46
 2. That if the case is remanded back to the RTC, the same will not prosper due to procedural and
substantive defects.
3. That the petition filed before the RTC should be dismissed for lack of proper verification and since
RTC branch 149 has no jurisdiction over the petition because it is not an intra-corporate
controversy.

ISSUE: WON the RTC Branch 149, a designated Special Commercial Court, committed an error of law
and acted contrary to law and established jurisprudence in dismissing the petition.

HELD: YES.Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

GR: Actions for injunction and damages lie within the jurisdiction of the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 of BP
129.

Jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate cases was transferred to Courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court when R.A. No. 8799 took effect on August 8, 2000.

Although they (RTCs) are designated as Special Commercial Courts, they are still considered courts of
general jurisdiction which have the power to hear and decide cases of all nature criminal, civil or special
proceedings.

As a basic premise, a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter is different
from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed
by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court.

The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction.

CONGRESS INTENTION/DELIBERATION: From SEC to RTC (RA 8799) - The SEC, as an

administrative agency, has been authorized under this proposal to reorganize itself. We strengthened it
and at the same time we take away the quasi-judicial functions. The quasi-judicial functions are not given
back to the court of general jurisdiction - The Regional Trial Court, except for two categories of cases:

(a) In the case of corporate disputes, only those that are now submitted for final determination of the SEC
will remain with the SEC and (b) Cases involving rehabilitation, bankruptcy, suspension of payments and
receiverships that were filed before June 30, 2000 will continue with the SEC.

In other words, we are avoiding the possibility, upon approval of this bill, of people filing cases with the
SEC, in manner of speaking, to select their court.

Hence, as courts of general jurisdiction, the designated Special Commercial Courts and the regular RTCs
are both conferred by law the power to hear and decide civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as an action for injunction.

47
Basically, designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite
the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was
not made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules
governing matters of procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the administration of all courts
and the personnel thereof.

SC: PETITION FOR INJUNCTION PROPER - An action for injunction is a suit which has for its purpose
the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance
of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act. It has an independent
existence, and is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except
only as a part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. In an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.

The petition filed before the RTC is an action for injunction, from the allegations made and reliefs sought
by petitioner, namely:

(1) to enjoin respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation from misrepresenting to the public, as well as
to private and government offices/agencies, that they are the owners of the disputed lots and Concorde
Condominium Building, and from pushing for the demolition of the building which they do not even own;

(2) to prevent respondent Asian Security and Investigation Agency from deploying its security guards
within the perimeter of the said building; and

(3) to restrain respondents Engr. Morales, Supt. Perdigon and F/C Supt. Laguna from responding to and
acting upon the letters being sent by Baculio, who is a mere impostor and has no legal personality with
regard to matters concerning the revocation of building and occupancy permits, and the fire safety issues
of the same building.

SC: PETITION FOR INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES IS AN ORDINARY CIVIL CASE AND NOT AN
INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY.

Applying the RELATIONSHIP TEST and the NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY TEST, no intra-
corporate relations exists between the opposing parties, namely:

(1) petitioner condominium corporation, by itself and comprising all its unit owners, on the one hand, and
(2) respondent New PP1 Corporation which Baculio claims to be the owner of the subject properties,
together with the respondents Building Official and City Fire Marshal of Makati City, the Regional Director
of the Bureau of Fire Protection, and the private security agency, on the other hand.

SCENARIO A: Ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts.

- (What should be done)The Ordinary civil case should then be referred to the Executive Judge for
re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then order the
raffling of the case to all branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations under existing internal
rules, and the payment of the correct docket fees in case of any difference.

SCENARIO B:Limited assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches designated as Special

Commercial Courts.

- The re-raffling of an ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is permissible due to the fact
that a particular branch which has been designated as a Special Commercial Court does not

48
 shed the RTCs general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of Statutory
Law(like BP 129).

The designation of the said branch as a Special Commercial Court by no means diminished its power as
a court of general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special
proceedings. There is no question, therefore, that the Makati RTC, Branch 149 erred in dismissing the
petition for injunction with damages, which is clearly an ordinary civil case. As a court of general
jurisdiction, it still has jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.PETITION GRANTED.

49
NUMBER 24:Unlawful detainer cases is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

CASE TITLE: SPOUSES ERORITA VS. SPOUSES DUMLAO (2016)

CASE NUMBER: GR. 195477

FACTS: Through an extrajudicial foreclosure, Spouses Dumlao bought a parcel of land in Oriental
Mindoro which was previously owned by Spouses Erorita. The Dumlaos allowed the Eroritas to
continuously operate the San Mariano Academy which is built on the said property, with the condition that
the latter shall pay to the former 20,000 pesos as monthly rental fee. The Eroritas however failed to pay
and vacate the property despite demands.

RTC:Within a year from the last demand, Spouses Dumlao filed with the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Possession against the Spouses Erorita.

After declaring the Spouses Erorita in default for their failure to appear despite due notice and ordering
the presentation of evidence ex parte, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Dumlao and ordered Spouses
Erorita to vacate and turn over the property. It also prohibited the Academy to accept enrollees.

CA:Spouses Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that since the complaint patently show a case of
Unlawful Detainer, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The CA however affirmed the RTCs decision by applying RA 7691 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
MTCs and MCTC(then BP 129) which provides that in civil actions involving real propertys title or
possession, jurisdiction depends on the propertys assessed value and location. That if the assessed
value exceeds 50,000 pesos in Metro Manila and 20,000 pesos outside Metro Manila, the RTC has
jurisdiction. It referred the assessed value of the property from the tax declaration where it exceeds
20,000 pesos.

Likewise, the CA denied their MR. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction in the case at bar.

HELD: NO. Allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint alone nor does it changed by defenses made in the
answer.

Although the complaint bears the caption RECOVERY OF POSSESSION, its allegations contain the
jurisdictional facts for an Unlawful Detainer cases, to wit:

1. Possession: Eroritas lawful possession of the property (by tolerance or contract)

2. Notice: Dumlaos notice of termination of such right
3. Continuance: Eroritas continued possession and enjoyment of the property
4. Complaint: Dumlao filed a complaint WITHIN 1 YEAR from their last demand

Under RA 7691 (then BP 129), an action for Unlawful Detainer is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MTCs regardless of the propertys assessed value.

Since the decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, the RTCs decision in the case at bar is
VOID. Petition Granted.

50
JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW/ALLEGATION IN THE
COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

25. REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. VS. ANTONIO DELA CRUZ

781 SCRA 607

FACTS:

Regulus Development Inc. (petitioner) is the owner of San Juan Apartments. Antonio dela Cruz
(respondent) leased two units at San Juan Apartments of which the contract of lease of the two units
similarly provides a lease of one month subject to automatic renewals unless terminated by the petitioner
upon written notice. The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two units.
Respondents refusal to vacate the units.Regulus Development filed a complaint for Ejectment before the
MTTC.

MTTC resolved the case in favor of Regulus (petitioner) and ordered Dela Cruz (respondent) to vacate
the premises and pay the rental dues until actual compliance.

Dela Cruz appealed to the RTC. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTTC and issued an Alias Writ of
Execution allowing the withdrawal of the rental deposits and the value of the supersedeas bond. Regulus
Development claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments directly made by
the respondent to the petitioner, were insufficient to cover. A Manifestation and Motion praying that the
levy upon the respondents property covered by TCT to satisfy the judgment credit which the RTC granted
in favor of the petitioner.

The CA reversed and set aside the decision the orders of the RTC directing the levy of respondents real
property. The respondent merely reiterated CAs conclusion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondents real property.

RULING:

Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction to levy on real property.The levy of the respondents property was made in
relation to the RTC Orders issued in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction apart and independent of the
ejectment case originally filed in the MTC.

The RTC order on June 2008 directing the levy of the respondents real property shows that it was based
on the RTC order in July 2003. The levy respondents property was issued to satisfy the amounts due
under the lease contracts and not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.

The Court of Appeals made an error when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in
the ejectment case when it directed the levy of the respondents property. The Order to levy on the
respondents real property was consistent with the first Writ of Execution on December 2003 to implement
the RTC orders.Subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondents property was merely a
reiteration and an enforcement of the original writ of execution issued.

51
The order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, RTC as the court of Origin has jurisdiction to order
the levy of the respondents real property. Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin in
accordance with Sec.1 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondents real
property before the RTC as the court of origin.

52
JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW/ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT
NOT DEPENDENT TO DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

26. HEIRS OF SIMEON LATAYAN, NAMELY: LEONIDES Q. LATAYAN, ARIEL Q. LATAYAN, AND
ETHEL Q. LATAYAN-AMPIL, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LEONIDES Q.
LATAYAN, , V. PEING TAN, JOHNNY TAN, HERMTNIGILDO CASALAN, WEBINO VILLAREAL,
DIOSCOROMOLO, DAMACINO BAYAWA, EDGAR NARITA, YOLANDA NARITA, POLICRONIA
CAPIONES, ANDRES LOZANO, GREGORIO YAGAO, EMILIANO GUMATAY, JESUS ALCONTIN,
ADAM DULAUON, MARIO PEREZ, LARRY CEMAFRANCA, FELIXBERTO BULADACO,
CIPRIANOAHIT, BUENAVENTURA B ACALSO AND SALDE ESPIA,
G.R. No. 201652

FACTS:

On January 31, 2000, Simeon Latayan, represented by his son and attorney-in-fact, Leonides Latayan,
filed an Amended Complaint[ before the PARAD Davao City, for cancellation of the CLOAs issued to
respondent. Simeon alleged that he is the registered owner of two adjoining lotscomprising 23.1488
hectares.He contended that the titles to the subject lots were unilaterally and arbitrarily cancelled without
his consent or knowledge, and without notice and placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) sans payment of just compensation.

The respondents denied that Simeon's allegations and insisted that, on the contrary, Simeon's titles were
duly and properly cancelled in accordance with law.

On July 10, 2000, the PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Simeon. PARAD noted that Simeon was
never notified of the coverage by CARP of his properties and that he learned of the same only when he,
filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a petition for exemption of his landholdings from the
operation of the CARP

Respondents filed an appeal with the DARAB.] While the appeal was pending, Simeon died and was
substituted by his sons, Leonides and Ariel, and his daughter, Ethel, herein petitioners.DARAB set aside
the PARAD Decision and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the January 6, 2009
Resolution.Petitioners filed for a Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals.CA upheld the DARAB with
modification.The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the DARAB in Case No. 10403 with
modification.Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution

ISSUES:

Whether or not the DARAB and the DAR Secretary, has jurisdiction to resolve the merits of DARAB Case
No. 10403.

RULING:

Yes. The controversy between the parties is not agrarian in nature and merely involves the administrative
implementation of the agrarian reform program which is cognizable by the DAR Secretary.All cases
involving the cancellation of CLOAs and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are now
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.

53
All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership
award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR. Consequently, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the
herein controversy, rendering its decision null and void.

The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law.
The court or tribunal must look at the material allegations in the complaint, the issues or questions that
are the subject of the controversy, and the character of the relief prayed for in order to determine whether
the nature and subject matter of the complaint is within its jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties
are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal the
dispute must be addressed and resolved by the said court or tribunal

Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the filing of the
petition, provides:

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving following:
f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of [CLOAs] and Emancipation Patents (EPs)
which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;

While the DARAB may entertain petitions for cancellation of CLOAs, as in this case, its jurisdiction is,
however, confined only to agrarian disputes.For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the controversy must
relate to an agrarian dispute between the landowners and tenants in whose favor CLOAs have been
issued by the DAR Secretary.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction was initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not allow a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of non-issuance of a
notice of coverage being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The
power to determine such issue lies with the DAR, not with this Court.In the event that petitioners shall
indeed opt to re-file this case, the DAR Secretary shall resolve the matter pursuant to the laws, rules, and
jurisprudence applicable at the time of the commencement of the action.The court ruled do deny the
petition with modification.Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

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JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW/ALLEGATION IN THE
COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

27. ENGINEER BEN Y. LIM, RBL FISHING CORPORATION VS. HON. SULPICIO G. GAMOSA

FACTS:

Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Coron Palawan filed a petition before the National
Commission in Indigenous People (NCIP) against the petitioners for Violation of Rights to Free and Prior
Informed Consent and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary
injunction and TRO.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that NCIP lack jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the petition because petitioners are not members if the ICC/IP despite a motion to dismiss being a
prohibited pleading under NCIP Administrative Circular No.1-03.

The NCIP denied the motion to dismiss.The Court of Appeals affirmed the NCIPs denial and raised that
the wording of Sec.66 of the IPRA, the NCOP was bestowed with an all-encompassing grant of
jurisdiction on all claims and disputes involving the rights og ICCs/IPs and the requirement in the proviso
contained in the section i.e. obtaining certification from the Council of Elders that the parties had
exhausted all possible remedies provided under their customary law prior to the filing of an action applied
only to instances where both parties are members of an ICC/IP.

The Court of Appeals ruled that when a claim or dispute involves the rights of the ICCs/IPs the NCIP has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case regardless of the opposing party being a non-ICC/IP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Commission in Indigenous People (NCIP) has the exclusive jurisdiction over
claims or disputes involving a non-member oppositor of the ICC/IP.

RULING:

No.Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary. It specifically excludes disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
where the opposing party is a non-ICC/IP.The limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a
special cause involving ICCs/IPs, can only be exercised under the limitations and circumstances
prescribed by the statute.

Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, emphasizes the primacy of customs and customary law in the lives of the members of
the ICCs/IPs:

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as
a source of law x x x. [I]n the absence of any applicable provisions in the Civil Code, custom,
when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies
to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil
law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and
recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land
registration.

55
The primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for the NCIPs limited and special
jurisdiction and its consequent application in dispute resolution. The proviso in Section 66 of the IPRA
limits the jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where both
parties are ICCs/IPs because customs and customary law cannot be made to apply to non-ICCs/IPs
within the parameters of the NCIPs limited and special jurisdiction.
Clearly, the phraseology of all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs does not necessarily
grant the NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without
regard to the status of the parties, i.e, whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The NCIPs Resolution is reversed and set aside and respondents
may refile their complaint against petitioners in a court of general jurisdiction.

56
JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW/ALLEGATION IN THE
COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

28.JOSE V. TOLEDO, GLENN PADIERNOS AND DANILO PADIERNOS, v. COURT OF APPEALS,

LOURDES RAMOS, ENRIQUE RAMOS, ANTONIO RAMOS, MILAGROS RAMOS AND ANGELITA
RAMOS AS HEIRS OF SOCORRO RAMOS, GUILLERMO PABLO, PRIMITIVA CRUZ AND A.R.C.
MARKETING CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ALBERTO C. DY,

FACTS:

On May 5, 1958, Del Rosario Realty (represented by Pedro Del Rosario) entered into a Contract to Sell
with spouses Leonardo Faustino and Angelina Lim (Faustino spouses). Del Rosario Realty agreed to
sell a lot in Sunrise Hills Subdivision, Quezon City for the amount of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred
Seventy-Two Pesos (P13, 572.00), with an initial payment of P4, 200.00 and the balance to be paid in
consecutive quarterly installments.

On January 20, 1959, the Faustino spouses sold their rights over the property to spouses Vicente
Padiernos and Concordia Garcia, and the latter agreed to assume the former's obligations under the May
5, 1958 contract to sell. This transfer was registered and annotated on the property's TCT as an adverse
claim as early as October 20, 1960.

May 7, 1959, Pedro Del Rosario executed a deed assigning all of his rights and interests in the May 5,
1958 contract to sell to Socorro A. Ramos. In the same deed, Socorro Ramos acknowledged and
approved the transfer or assignment of rights made by spouses Leonardo Faustino and Angelina Lim in
favor of Vicente Padiernos over the property including all the incidental rights, interests and obligations
inherent thereto.

January 9, 1962, Vicente Padiernos sold one-half of the property to petitioner Jose Toledo and his wife
Elisa Padierno (hereafter, spouses Toledo). The deed embodying the Partial Assignment of Rights noted
that the spouses Toledo had already commenced payment of the installments since August 5, 1961. It
further provided that the spouses Toledo shall continue payments until fully paid, with said payments to
be made in the name of Vicente Padiernos as the purchaser on record. After completion of payment, the
Toledo spouses shall own one-half of the property.

On March 21, 1967, Vicente Padiernos sold the remaining half of the property to spouses Virgilio and
Leticia Padiernos. Later on, or on January 17, 1986, Virgilio and Leticia Padiernos assigned their rights
over the property to their children, petitioners Glenn and Danilo Padiernos.

Spouses Toledo and spouses Virgilio and Leticia Padiernos paid quarterly installments on the property
until full payment sometime in 1971. When petitioners requested for the release of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, respondent Antonio A. Ramos, representing the heirs of Socorro Ramos, issued a
Certification stating that while the property has been paid in full by Mr. Vicente Padiernos and could not
be released pending final decision of the Supreme Court.

In 1974, Virgilio Padiernos and petitioner Jose Toledo constructed their houses on the property, resided
therein, and paid the corresponding real property taxes.

Execution proceedings were taken against the estate of Socorro Ramos. As a consequence, eighteen
(18) parcels of land belonging to the estate, including the property, were sold in auction to Guillermo N.
Pablo and Primitiva C. Cruz, who later sold to ARC Marketing.

57
On March 14, 1977, all heirs of Socorro A. Ramos, filed a Complaint for Nullity of Execution Sale against
auction sale winners Guillermo N. Pablo and Primitiva C. Cruz, and their transferee ARC Marketing. In
1990, the Heirs of Ramos, by way of a Deed of Assignment, assigned all their rights and interests in the
case (and the properties it covered) to Lourdes A. Ramos.

On January 13, 1993, the parties entered into a Final Compromise Agreement (Compromise
Agreement). The then sole plaintiff Lourdes A. Ramos agreed to settle the case for the total compromise
amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to be paid by ARC Marketing to the former in installments.
Upon joint motion by the parties, the Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial court.

On April 8, 1997, petitioners Jose Toledo, Glenn Padiernos and Danilo Padiernos filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Enrique Ramos moved to dismiss the case on the ground that petitioners failed to state a cause of action
against him because he has already assigned his interests to his co-respondent Lourdes Ramos.

ARC Marketing, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim because it is
essentially an action to annul the judicially-approved Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-22850;
(2) petitioners failed to pay the correct docket fees;
(3) the action was barred by the statute of limitations;
(4) the action is barred by a prior judgment; (5) the complaint shows that petitioners failed to comply with
the conditions of the contract to sell and (6) laches, among others.

The Ruling of the RTC

December 15, 1997, Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by Enrique Ramos.Upon
petitioners motion, Judge Laqui inhibited himself from proceeding with the case and the same was re-
raffled to the court of Judge Apolonio Bruselas, Jr. Judge Bruselas, in an Order dated June 2, 2000,
denied respondent ARC Marketings motion to dismiss.

June 19, 2000, ARC Marketing sought for a reconsideration of the Order, reiterating a) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; and b) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due to
petitioners' failure to pay the proper docket fees.

RTC granted ARC Marketing's motion. He held that petitioners action is really one for annulment of the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-22850 and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. A petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found that Judge Bruselas did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners' complaint due to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in affirming Judge Bruselas' dismissal of their complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and that the Regional Trial Court have no jurisdiction to annul a compromise judgment
approved by a co-equal court

58
RULING:

No. Evidently, petitioners would want respondent Judge to annul the decision of a co-equal court, nay, a
branch of the same Regional Trial Court which approved the compromise agreement. Specifically, they
pleaded for the cancellation of private respondent ARC's Transfer Certificate of Title, the issuance of a
new one in their favor, and asked for the award of damages.

Respondent Judge cannot be faulted for subsequently divesting himself of jurisdiction he earlier
recognized. The issuance of the said Order, in observance of judicial restraint, is felicitous, not capricious,
whimsical or despotic. A judge is presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction
of his court. Restated, respondent Judge soundly dismissed petitioners' complaint, on his firm belief that
he has no jurisdiction over the case. Otherwise, he would be retrying and settling once more the issues
that had already been litigated and decided by a competent court, RTC-Branch 77; and, worse, he would
only create confusion and costly delays in the dispensation of justice. As a matter of law, this is not
permitted under the rule of stare decisis.

The Court of Appeals has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts whereas actions for reconveyance of real property may be filed before the Regional
Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts, depending on the assessed value of the property involved.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

We find that the action filed by petitioners is one for reconveyance.

For one, and as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the complaint they filed before the Regional Trial
Court shows that they never prayed for the annulment of the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
22850. What petitioners sought was the cancellation of the title issued in ARC Marketing's name and the
issuance of a new one in their favor.[32] This is characteristic of an action for reconveyance which respects
the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those
who claim to have a better right.

The court grants the petition and set aside the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated October 22, 2004 and April 13, 2005, respectively, in CA G.R. SP No. 73670. Judgment is hereby
rendered declaring petitioners the owners .The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to:

(a) CANCEL TCT No. RT-17876 (242918) in the name of ARC Marketing Corporation; and

(b) ISSUE a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of petitioners JOSE V. TOLEDO, GLENN
PADIERNOS and DANILO PADIERNO

59
JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW/ALLEGATION IN THE
COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

132. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY HONORABLE LOURDES M.

TRASMONTE IN HER CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, AND AHONORABLE JENNIFER JARDIN-MANALILI, IN HER CAPACITY AS THEN
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, v. HUMANLINK MANPOWER
CONSULTANTS, INC. (FORMERLY MHY NEW RECRUITMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC.), Respondent.

FACTS:

In 2007 Renelson Carlos applied at Worldview as a heavy equipment driver in Doha, Qatar with a salary
of US$700.00. Worldview submitted Carlos' application and other documents to the POEA under
Humanlink as his recruiting agency. He paid placement fee adding up to a total of P60,000.00 with no
receipt issued.

While awaiting his departure, he was made to sign an employment contract stating that he was to work as
a duct man with a salary of US$400.00, instead of the heavy equipment driver position he applied for. He
was told that this will be for entry purposes and was assured that he would work as a heavy equipment
driver as advertised.

Upon his arrival in Doha, he worked as a duct installer with a salary of US$400.00. Carlos complained
that the terms of the employment contract were not complied with.

In 2008 The foreign employer made Carlos sign a new employment contract reducing his monthly salary
in half. Carlos filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Labor Office but the complaint was not acted
upon. This prompted him to speak with the Qatar Labor Office where he discussed his grievance.

Carlos was informed that his visa was cancelled and that he was being repatriated at his own
expense.After his return to the Philippines, Humanlink's President made him sign a quitclaim absolving it
of any liability from the collection of the placement fee.

In 2010, the POEA Adjudication Office found the assertions of Carlos credible and supported by sufficient
evidence.

Humanlink engaged in misrepresentation and liable for violation of Section 2(b), (d) and (e) of the 2002
POEA Rules and Regulations. Worldview liable for violating Section 2(e) of the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations.

DOLE ruled for the penalty of cancellation of license and fine in the amount of PHP80,000.00 imposed
upon Humanlink Manpower Consultants, Inc. As a consequence of the cancellation of its license, its
officers and directors as of November 2007 are hereby ordered disqualified from participating in the
overseas employment program of the government.

Humanlink appealed before the DOLE and was dismissed for lack of merit in the DOLE February 17,
2011 Order. It moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Humanlink appealed to the CA via a petition for certiorari.The CA affirmed with modification the Order. It
agreed that Humanlink was guilty of violating Section 2 (b), (d), and (e) of the POEA Rules and
Regulations and ordered the cancellation of its license. However, it disagreed that as a consequence of
the cancellation of the license, automatic disqualification of officers and directors from participating in
government's overseas employment program should be imposed. Because it is violative of due process
and in excess of the POEA's supervisory powers.

60
Humanlink moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

The DOLE and POEA contend that the disqualification of the officers and directors from participation in
the overseas employment program of the government is expressly sanctioned under Section 2(f), Rule I,
Part II of the POEA Rules and Regulations

Humanlink, reiterates that petitioner did not raise any substantial argument to warrant the reversal of the
CA Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the POEA has the power to automatically disqualify officers and directors from
participating in the government's overseas employment program upon the cancellation of a license.

RULING:

Yes.The role of the POEA and the DOLE has the jurisdiction over cases involving labor with respect to the
recruitment, placement and deployment of overseas workers.

The State seeks to protect the interests and well-being of these workers with creation of specialized
bodies such as the POEA under the direct supervision of the DOLE Secretary.

The role of the POEA is the regulation and adjudication of private sector participation in the recruitment
and placement of overseas workers.

Article 25 of the Labor Code, as amended, reads:

ART. 25. Private Sector Participation in the Recruitment and Placement of Workers. Pursuant to
national development objectives and in order to harness and maximize the use of private sector
resources and initiative in the development and implementation of a comprehensive employment
program, the private employment sector shall participate in the recruitment and placement of workers,
locally and overseas, under such guidelines, rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
Labor. (Emphasis supplied)

This is echoed in Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and Section 23(b.l), R.A. No. 8042 as
amended by R.A. No. 9422, where the legislature empowered the DOLE and POEA to regulate private
sector participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers, to wit:

ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License Authority. - The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for
violation of rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, the Overseas Employment
Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other
applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of Instruction.

Section 23. x x x

(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. The Administration shall regulate private sector
participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a licensing and
registration system. It shall also formulate and implement, in coordination with appropriate entities
concerned, when necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino
workers taking into consideration their welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.

61
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform migrant workers not only of their
rights as workers but also of their rights as human beings, instruct and guide the workers how to assert
their rights and provide the available mechanism to redress violation of their rights.

In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for trained and competent
Filipino workers of foreign governments and their instrumentalities, and such other employers as public
interests may require, the administration shall deploy only to countries where the Philippines has
concluded bilateral labor agreements or arrangements: Provided, That such countries shall guarantee to
protect the rights of Filipino migrant workers; and: Provided, further, That such countries shall observe
and/or comply with the international laws and standards for migrant workers.

This Court in Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation v. Secretary of Labor affirmed the POEA's power
to cancel the license of erring recruitment agencies as a consequence of not adhering to the rules and
regulations set by the POEA and DOLE. Rules and regulations referred to includes POEA Rules and
Regulations.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule I, Part II of the POEA Rules and Regulations provide the qualifications and
disqualifications for private sector participation in the overseas employment program. Section 1 of this
rule provides that for persons to participate in recruitment and placement of land-based overseas Filipino
workers, they must not possess any of the disqualifications as provided in Section 2. Section 1 partly
reads:

Section 2. Disqualification. The following are not qualified to engage in the business of recruitment and
placement of Filipino workers overseas.

d. Persons, partnerships or corporations which have derogatory records, such as but not limited to the
following:

x x x x 4 Those agencies whose licenses have been previously revoked or cancelled by the
Administration for violation of RA 8042, PD 442 as amended and their implementing rules and
regulations as well as these rules and regulations. x x x x

f. Persons or partners, officers and Directors of corporations whose licenses have been previously
cancelled or revoked for violation of recruitment laws.

Thus, upon the cancellation of a license, persons, officers and directors of the concerned corporations are
automatically prohibited from engaging in recruiting and placement of land-based overseas Filipino
workers. The grant of a license is a privilege and not a right thus making it a proper subject of its
regulatory powers. If we are to protect the welfare of vulnerable overseas workers, then we must prevent
all instances wherein they may be taken advantage upon. This must be so since the rules must be read
as a whole to achieve its particular purpose. Particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied
as detached and isolated expressions but as a whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.

It is inconsequential therefore whether or not the POEA or the DOLE stated then in their decision that
persons, officers and directors are disqualified from participating in the government's overseas
employment program. The law and rules implementing the same unequivocally state that once a
recruitment license of an entity is cancelled, its officers and directors are automatically prohibited from
engaging in such activity. The failure of the POEA and DOLE to indicate this fact cannot by any means
indicate the contrary. Dura lex sed lex.

The court affirms with modification the decision of the CA and reiterate that officers and directors of
Humanlink are prohibited from engaging in the recruitment and placement of overseas workers upon
cancellation of Humanlink's license. Based on the listed qualifications and disqualifications of the Rules,

62
they are not qualified to participate in the government's overseas employment program upon such
cancellation. It was thus unnecessary for the POEA or the DOLE to issue a separate decision explicitly
stating that persons, officers or directors of Humanlink are disqualified from participating in government
overseas recruitment programs.

The petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals is partially reversed insofar as it modified
the February 17, 2011 Order and July 6, 2011 Resolution of the Undersecretary of the DOLE by declaring
the disqualification of the officers and directors of Humanlink Manpower Consultants, Inc. to engage in the
overseas employment program of the government as null and void. Accordingly, the aforesaid order and
resolution of the DOLE Undersecretary are AFFIRMED and UPHELD in toto.

63
TOPIC: JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ALLEGATION IN
THE COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER
CASE TITLE: Unduran v. Aberasturi
CASE NO. 773 SCRA 114

Facts:

Respondents filed a Petition for AccionReivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages 4 (original complaint for
accionreivindicatoria) against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of ManoloFortich, Bukidnon.
Petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed their Answer, alleging that respondents have no cause of action
against them while the rest of the petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners alleged that with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), they, together with the rest of the tribe
members, assisted the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in the processing, validation,
and delineation of their Ancestral Domain claim in May 2003. The RTC ruled that defendant's [herein
petitioners'] motion to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP and its manifestation for an ocular inspection are
hereby denied for being bereft of merit.

Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and the CA consequently rendered
a Decision affirming the RTC's Order, which in turn denied the referral of the case to the NCIP. The CA
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, hence this appeal on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the jurisdiction of the court a quo over a complaint for
injunction involving an ancestral domain of the Talaandigs.

Ruling:

The court ruled applying the principle "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."

Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA. Pursuant to Section
66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only
when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes
arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different
ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper
Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig
Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.

64
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral
domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and
decide this case.

65
TOPIC: JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ALLEGATION IN
THE COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER
CASE TITLE: Continental Micronesia Inc. v. Basso
CASE NO. 771 SCRA 329

Facts:

Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of and
domiciled in the United States of America (US). It is licensed to do business in the Philippines. Basso, a
US citizen, resided in the Philippines prior to his death. During his visit to Manila, Mr. Keith R. Braden (Mr.
Braden), Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), offered Basso the position of
General Manager of the Philippine Branch of Continental. Basso accepted the offer. It was not until much
later that Mr. Braden, who had since returned to the US, sent Basso the employment contract dated
February 1, 1991, which Mr. Braden had already signed. Basso then signed the employment contract and
returned it to Mr. Braden as instructed. CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso
retaining his position as General Manager in latter part of 1992.

In 1995, Basso is informed through a telephone call of the company's decision to relieve him as General
Manager. Basso, instead, was offered the position of consultant to CMI. Basso rejected the counter-
proposal and, thus, terminated his employment in anuary 1996.

Basso filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary Damages against CMI on alleging
the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy. In an Order, the Labor Arbiter granted the
Motion to Dismiss. Applying the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter held that the terms and
provisions of the employment contract show that the parties did not intend to apply our Labor Code
(Presidential Decree No. 442). The Labor Arbiter also held that no employer-employee relationship
existed between Basso and the branch office of CMI in the Philippines, but between Basso and the
foreign corporation itself.

On appeal, the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the determination of certain facts to
settle the issue on jurisdiction. NLRC ruled that the issue on whether the principle of lex loci
contractusor lex loci celebrationis should apply has to be further threshed out. The NLRC did not agree
with the pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter that his office has no jurisdiction over the controversy. It ruled
that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his office's
jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the legality of its acts, and praying
for reliefs on the merits of the case.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case and over the parties. The Court of Appeals explained that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the law. Since the case filed by Basso is a
termination dispute that is "undoubtedly cognizable by the labor tribunals", the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. On the issue of jurisdiction over he person of the
parties, who are foreigners, the Court of Appeals ruled that jurisdiction over the person of Basso was
acquired when he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal, while jurisdiction over the person of CMI was
acquired through coercive process of service of summons to its agent in the Philippines. The Court of
Appeals also agreed that the active participation of CMI in the case rendered moot the issue on
jurisdiction.

After the parties filed their Motions for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals promulgated Resolution
denying CMI's motion, while partially granting Basso's as to the computation of backwages, hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction to hear
and try the illegal dismissal case.

66
Ruling:

The Court ruled that the labor tribnals have jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and by the material allegations in the
complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
sought therein. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. That the employment contract of Basso was replete with
references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the US, do not automatically
preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case. The Labor Code, under
Article 217, clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving termination
disputes to the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Labor Arbiter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship, when he filed his complaint
against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive
process of service of summons. It is noted that CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI
has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign
corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The
purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do
so, is to subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.

67
TOPIC: JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ALLEGATION IN
THE COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER
CASE TITLE: Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals
CASE NO. 773 SCRA 1

Facts:

Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Private
respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs (L.C. Diaz), is a professional partnership engaged in the
practice of accounting. L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank.
L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya (Macaraya), filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip
for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50.Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz,
Ismael Calapre (Calapre), to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the
Solidbank passbook.The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate
copies of the two deposit slips. The tellerstamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE and
SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to
make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then
went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, he was informed that
somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
The teller handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated for the deposit of a check for P90,000 drawn on
Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC). This PBC check of L.C. Diaz was a check that it had long
closed.PBC subsequently dishonored the check because of insufficient funds and because the signature
in the check differed from PBCs specimen signature. Failing to get back the passbook, Macaraya went
back to her office and reported the matter to the Personnel Manager of L.C. Diaz, Emmanuel Alvarez.
The following day, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz (Diaz), called up
Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account.On
the same day, Diaz formally wrote Solidbank to make the same request. It was also on the same day that
L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of P300,000 from its
savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of
L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal
slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, EmeranoIlagan (Ilagan) and one RosconVerdazola with Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Document. The Regional Trial Court of Manila dismissed the criminal
case after the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss. L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from
Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused.
L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and
dismissing the complaint.L.C. Diaz then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued its
Decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It issued its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of Solidbank. The appellate court, however, modified its decision by deleting the award of
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the instant case is a last ditch effort of private
respondent to recover its P300,000.00 after failing in its efforts to recover the same from its employee
EmeranoIlagan.
Ruling:
The trial court believed that L.C. Diazs negligence in not securing its passbook under lock and key
was the proximate cause that allowed the impostor to withdraw the P300,000. For the appellate court, the
proximate cause was the tellers negligence in processing the withdrawal without first verifying with L.C.
Diaz.

68
 Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.Proximate
cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent.
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in
possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction,
Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the
passbook to another person.Solidbanks failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the
withdrawal of the P300,000 by the impostor who took possession of the passbook. Under Solidbanks
rules on savings account, mere possession of the passbook raises the presumption of ownership. It was
the negligent act of Solidbanks Teller No. 6 that gave the impostor presumptive ownership of the
passbook. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not
have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in
not returning the passbook to Calapre.

69
TOPIC: JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ALLEGATION IN
THE COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER
CASE TITLE: Green Star Express, Inc. v. Nissan Universal Robina Corporation
CASE NO. 761 SCRA 1

Facts:

A Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned figured in a vehicular accident
with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.'s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the van's
driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner FrutoSayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.

Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent Nissin-Universal Robina Corporation (NURC) for the
repair of its passenger bus amounting to P567,070.68 which was denied by NURC while further argued
that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case
was dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence.

The RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC.

Issue: Whether or not the court have acquired its jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Ruling:

It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity
must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.

Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court provides:

Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on
the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. 8

In this case, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004.
Green Star claims that it was received upon instruction of JunadetteAvedillo, the general manager of the
corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not even state
whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant
manager. Furthermore, the court states that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present
evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The
service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. Corporations would be easily
deprived of their right to present their defense in a multi-million peso suit, if the Court would disregard the
mandate of the Rules on the service of summons.

Hence, the petition is denied.

70
TOPIC: Jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution and the law/ allegation in the complaint not
dependent to the defenses raised in the answer

THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN B. GUTIERREZ v HEIRS OF SPOUSE JOSE and GRACITA
CABANGON Respondents
G.R. No. 210055 June 22, 2015

Facts:

Herein Respondents, spouses Jose Cabangon and GracitaCabangon bought (3) from herein Petitioner
Juan B. Gutierrez for a total of: 45,223.53, on installment basis. Juan allegedly promised to transfer the
title upon full payment. Having almost paid the said property in full and with a remaining balance of Php
3,723.53, Juan stopped collecting payment and told the spouses Cabangon that he will no longer
proceed with the sale unless they will be willing to take only 1 of the originally 3 .

The respondents did not agree with the new condition and consigned the payment with the Clerk of Court
and filed a suit for Specific Performance and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cotabato
City, Branch 13 praying that Juan accepts the payment and transfer the ownership of the said properties..

On August 26, 2005, RTC rendered a Decisionordering the transfer of ownership, possession, and
control of the subject lots to the respondents Spouses Cabangon and granted the Motion for Execution of
Judgment and directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution.

The Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the CA. The appellate
court denied said petition and sustained the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

The Petitioners mainly reiterates its arguments before the CA. It contends that the assailed decision and
subsequent orders are null and void for lack of jurisdiction, power, and authority. It argues that Judge
Indar, who issued the assailed RTC decision, no longer had authority over the case because Judge
Imbrahim was already the presiding judge of the court at the time of their issuances

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC for lack of jurisdiction, power, and
authority as the order was issued no longer had authority over the case because Judge Imbrahim was
already the presiding judge of the court at the time of their issuances.

HELD:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, regardless of whether or not he is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 6 Here, the action which the Spouses
Cabangon filed was one for specific performance, well within the jurisdiction of the Cotabato RTC.

As for the authority of Judge Indar to issue the assailed decision, it is settled that cases that have been
submitted for decision or those past the trial stage, such as when all the parties have finished presenting

71
their evidence, prior to the transfer or promotion, shall be resolved or disposed by the judge to which
these are raffled or assigned.

VELASQUEZPetitioner v CRUZRespondents

72
G.R. No. 191479, September 21, 2015

FACTS:

Respondents Spouses Paterno and Rosario Cruz are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated
at Barangay Sta. Monica in Hagonoy, Bulacan, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Accounting and Damages against petitioner Jesus Velasquez alleging that petitioner's father-in-law,
Bernabe Navarro, was a tenant in said lot until 6 April 1985 when the latter relinquished his tenancy rights
by virtue of a SinumpaangSalaysay;

They further claimed that that no other person was installed as tenant of the farmlandand that they
discovered that petitioner Jesus Velasquez entered the farmland without their knowledge and consent;
that from 1985 up to the time of the filing of the complaint, petitioner never paid a single centavo as rent
for the use of the land and that the latter refused to vacate the property.

Respondents further prayed for the surrender of possession of the property to them and for accounting
and damages.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, The petitioner contended that, jurisdiction pertains to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) because in the instant controversy is an
agrarian dispute. He claimed that he continued working on the land after the death of Navarro his non-
payment of rentals due to the fact that the subject land has lost its suitability for agricultural production,
thus, his non-payment is not a ground for dispossession.

The RTC ruled dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.

The Respondents Spouses Paterno and Rosario Cruz filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals arguing that the elements of tenancy, which would vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, were not
sufficiently established.

The CA granted the petition ordering the CA to assume jurisdiction. The appellate court ruled that
petitioner failed to establish tenancy relationship between the parties. According to the appellate court, the
elements of consent and sharing of harvest are lacking. Moreover, petitioner was held as unqualified to be
a successor-tenant by virtue of hereditary succession because he is not among those listed under Section
9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, he being only a relative by affinity.

Aggrieved, The petitioner, Jesus Velasquez filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending
that the award of an emancipation patent in the name of petitioner is the best proof that Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) has identified him as the bonafide successor of his deceased father-in-law,
Navarro. Petitioner adds that by becoming the farmer-beneficiary and registered owner of the subject lot,
the issue of the existence or non-existence of tenancy relationship between the parties has become moot
and academic. Petitioner maintains that since Original Certificate of Title was issued pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and Operation Land Transfer, any and all actions pertaining to the right
and obligation of petitioner in connection thereto is vested in DARAB which has primary and exclusive
original and appellate jurisdiction. Similarly, any and all matters relating to the identification, qualification
or disqualification of petitioner as a farmer-beneficiary over the subject land and the validity of his
emancipation patent over the same land are in the nature of an agrarian dispute beyond the jurisdiction of
the RTC.

ISSUE:

73
Whether or not the DARAB and not RTC has jurisdiction over the issue since the herein petitioner as a
farmer-beneficiary over the subject land and the validity of his emancipation patent over the same land
are in the nature of an agrarian dispute and beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC.

HELD:

Reading the material allegations of the Complaint, the decision under review concluded that the case
below was for recovery of possession or an accionpubliciana, a plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had become
illegal, the action will be an accionpubliciana.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be tenancy relationship between the
parties.Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a
result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land

Petitioner, a relative by affinity of Navarro, is, to the Court of Appeals, not qualified to succeed as tenant

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v DEVANADERA

74
G.R. No. 193253, September 08, 2015

FACTS:

Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in marketing, distribution, and sale of
petroleum, oil and other products, while its co-respondent OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in
manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of
petroleum, oil, gas and of any and all refinements and its byproducts.

Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Audit Notification
Letter informing the President of OILINK that the Post Entry Audit Group (PEAG) of the BOC will be
conducting a compliance audit, including the examination, inspection, verification and/or investigation of
all pertinent records of OILINK's import transactions for the past three (3)-year period. OILINK submitted
initially the documents required and expressed its willingness to comply with the request for the
production of the said documents and initially submitted part of the requested documents

On June 4, 2007, OILINK sent a letter stating that the documents which the Audit Team previously
requested were available with the Special Committee of the BOC, and that it could not open in the
meantime its Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) - registered books of accounts for validation and review
purposes.The Audit Team informed OILINK of the adverse effects of its request for the postponement of
the exit conference and its continuous refusal to furnish it the required documents. On July 24, 2007,
Commissioner Morales approved the filing of an administrative case against OILINK for failure to comply
Which prompted commissionerMorales approved the filing of an administrative case against OILINK for
failure to comply with the requirements of Customs Administrative Order.

The Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision finding that OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c) and (e)
of CAO 4-2004 when it refused to furnish the Audit Team copies of the required documents, despite
repeated demands and and a DECISION is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION to pay the equivalent of twenty percent

(20%) ad valorem on the article/s subject of the Importation for which no records were kept
and maintained as prescribed in Section 2504 of the Customs Code in the amount of Pesos:
Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand
Three Hundred Four and 80/100 (Php 2,764,859,304.80);

Rochelle E. Vicencio, Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL, citing the existing Terminalling
Agreement dated January 2, 2008 with OILINK for the Storage of UNIOIL's aromatic process oil and
industrial lubricating oils (collectively, "base oils"), requested District Collector Suansing Jr. to allow it to
withdraw base oils from OILINK's temporarily closed Terminal

Commissioner Morales granted the request of UNIOIL to withdraw its base oils stored at OILINK's
terminal/depot based on the Terminalling Agreement between the two companies, subject to the following
conditions:

1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by the BIR and BOC.
2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are fully paid or settled.
3. The company should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely monitored and continuously
underguarded by assigned Customs personnel.

In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a member of the petitioner
BOC's Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating Committee that investigated the illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil
products consigned to OILINK, valued at P181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes in the

75
amount of P35,507,597.00 and that the said act by unioil circumvent the reason which oilink was ordered
to refrain from conducting business pending the resolution of the issue.

Commissioner Morales referred to the Office of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno the said
complaint-affidavit, together with its annexes, for preliminary investigation. Arman A. De Andres, State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for
lack of probable cause.

Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent, the
Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera, Prompting the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA.

The CA dismissed outright the petition due to procedural defects:

The instant petition (i) contains no explanation why service thereof was not done personally (Sec.
11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure); (ii) shows that it has no proper verification and
certification against forum shopping and (iii) the docket and other lawful fees payment is short by
P1,530.00

The CA stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required
to be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not The CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition on mere
technicalities

HELD:

On the procedural issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the sole ground
of lack of verification and certification against forum shopping, the Court rules in the affirmative

The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Despite the BOC's failed attempt to comply with the requirement of verification and certification against
forum shopping, the Court cannot simply ignore the CA's perfunctory dismissal of the petition on such
sole procedural ground vis-a-vis the paramount public interest in the subject matter and the substantial
amount involved, i.e., the alleged illegal withdrawal of oil products worth P181,988,627.00 with
corresponding duties and taxes worth P35,507,597.00. Due to the presence of such special
circumstances and in the interest of justice, the CA should have at least passed upon the substantive
issue raised in the petition, instead of dismissing it on such procedural ground. Although it does not
condone the failure of BOC to comply with the said basic requirement, the Court is constrained to
exercise the inherent power to suspend its own rules in order to do justice in this particular case.

SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATIONPetitioner v. COURT OF APPEALSRespondents

G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015

76
FACTS:

In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the SangguniangPanlungsod of Antipolo City to
construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway. 3 The request was approved
through the enactment of Resolusyon Big. 027-99.4 In view of the same The Technical Committee created
by City Ordinance No. 08-98 posted notices to property owners that would be affected by the construction
of the city road

Sunrise Garden Corporation was one of the affected landowners submitted its wiling to undertake and
finance development of the City Park and City Road connecting Marcos Highway to Marikina - San Mateo
- Antipolo National Highway which cost shall be applied to their taxes and other fees payable to the City
Government;. That I am willing to sign and execute all legal instrument necessary to transfer ownership of
the same to the City government[.

When the petitioner was about to start the construction, armed guards, allegedly hired by Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move
the construction equipment.Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order directing Hardrock to cease and desist from
preventing/blocking the contractor in moving its equipment to the site of the proposed city road however
the latter continued with their acts to which the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary injunction.

While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed city
road. Sunrise Garden Corporation, thus, filed a Motion and Manifestation to amend the Preliminary
injunction to include and all person or group in preventing or obstructing all of petitioner's etc. which was
granted by the RTC. Although the informal settlers complied with the order, another armed guards K-9
Security Agency, allegedly hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. blocked Sunrise Garden
Corporation's contractor's employees and prevented them from proceeding with the construction.

The petitioner filed a contempt against the guards K-9 Security Agency, and First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. for violating the amended the Preliminary injunction which include and all person or
group in preventing or obstructing the petitioner from proceeding with its construction. The respondent by
way of motion contested that they are not bound by the amended preliminary injunction as it was directed
against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc and subsequently to those who illegal settlers encroaching the area and
that they never received any order to to that effect.

However, the Petitioner contended that the latter has been covered by the said issued preliminary
injunction when the actively participated in the by way of motions and voluntary appearance when they
questioned the issuance of the preliminary injunctions.

The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion and issued an Order dated requiring K-9
Security Agency to comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction

K-9 Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. filed a Motion for
Reconsiderationreiterating their arguments that since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over them,
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction could not be enforced against them. the same was denied by the RTC.

First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing that theamended
preliminary injunction order of the Lower court, never acquired jurisdiction over them reiterating that they
are not bound with the amended preliminary injunction.

77
The Court of Appeals,

The Court of Appeals, on November 5, 2003, granted First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s
Petition for Certiorari and annulled the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the trial court;

Indeed, public respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction
when it sought the enforcement of its amended writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner,
who was never a party to the pending case. Worse, it threatened petitioner with contempt of court
for not following an unlawful order.

Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1st sentence provides, thus: "No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined" (underscoring for
emphasis). In the case at bench, petitioner was not only not impleaded as party to the case, but
that it was never given prior notice regarding the writ of injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.as the court acquired jurisdiction over them when
they actively participated in the case by way of motions and voluntary appearance.

HELD:

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et al.,214 this court discussed that
voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of a court.

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of
legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This,
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
have submitted to its authority.

The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency
should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was
raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings. 216

Considering that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it sought to enforce the Amended Writ
of Preliminary Injunction against respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., the Court of
Appeals did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.

JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ALLEGATION IN THE

COMPLAINT NOT DEPENDENT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER
CE CASECNAN WATER and ENERGY COMPANY, INC.
vs.

78
THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA,
G.R. No. 196278

FACTS:

The petitioner entered into a build-operate-transfer agreement for the construction of a Multi-purpose
irrigation and hydroelectric power project in Nueva Ecija. The said contract was amended where it was
agreed that NIA will reimburse petitioner for real property taxes, provided that it be paid upon the directive
of NIA and with concurrence of the Department of Finance.

Petitioner received a Notice of Real Property Assessment amounting to 248,676,349.60 from the Office of
the Provincial Assessor. The same was assailed by the petitioner by filing a notice of appeal in Nueva
Eciaj Central Board of Assessment Appeals but during the pendency of the appeal Respondent collected
from the Petitioner.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction and damages with the prayer of issuance of a
temporary restraining order against Respondent, alleging the it was NIA who should pay the taxes.

The Temporary restraining Order was granted by the RTC but the complaint for preliminary injunction and
the motion of reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner filed a petition in the Court of Appeals to annul and set aside the order of denial by the RTC,
which was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of Jurisdiction, holding that it was the Court of Tax
appeals who has jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner comes to the Supreme court alleging the error of the Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals and not the Court of Tax Appeals has Jurisdiction

Held:

There is no merit in the Petition, Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any
controversy, which is converted by law and not by the consent of waiver upon a court. If a tour lacks
jurisdiction, it cannot decide the case on its merits and must dismiss it.

In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdothe Court ruled that the CTA likewise has the
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the CTAs exclusive appellate jurisdiction

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the
CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

In maintaining that it is the CA that has jurisdiction over petitioners certiorari petition, the latter argues
that the injunction case it filed with the RTC is not a local tax case but an ordinary civil action. It insists
that it is not protesting the assessment of RPT against it but only prays that respondents be enjoined from
collecting the same.

The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the collection of RPT, petitioner also implicitly
questions the propriety of the assessment of such RPT.1awp++i1 This is because in ruling as to whether
to restrain the collection, the RTC must first necessarily rule on the propriety of the assessment. In other
words, in filing an action for injunction to restrain collection, petitioner was in effect also challenging the
validity of the RPT assessment.

79
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
v. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Respondent
G.R. No. 209830, June 17, 2015

Facts:

80
Respondent filed a case against the Petitioner for the collection of alleged unpaid taxes and customs
dues, in the aggregate amount of 46,844,385.00 before the Regional Trial Court, on the ground that
Petitioner used allegedly fraudulently secured Tax Credit Certificates in its several importations for the
payment of customs duties.

RTC granted the demurrer to plaintiffs evidence file by the Petitioner, and dismissed the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, that respondent failed to show through evidence, fraud and
conspiracy on the part of the petitioner in the procurement of the Tax Credit Certificate. Motion for
Reconsideration by the Respondent was denied.

On appeal, the Appellate Court referred the records of the collection to the Court of Tax Appeals, further
admitting that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents appeal. The petitioner on his
motion for reconsideration assails the referral of the appellate court, alleging that it cannot perform any
action to except to order the dismissal, the said motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Now the Petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue;

Whether or not the Court of Appeals Correctly referred the records of the collection case to the Court of
Tax Appeals for proper disposition

Held;

The petition is meritorious. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of
the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties, or by erroneous belief of court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50.

Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be explained hereunder, the Court finds that the CA
erred in referring the records of the collection case to the CTA for proper disposition of the appeal taken
by respondent

MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD VILLAMENA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016

Facts:

81
The Respondent initiated a case against the Petitioner, for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute sale,
alleging that she is the owner of the parcel of land, The petitioner informed the respondent that the
respective TCT that she was relying on was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of them.

The Regional Trial Court declared the Petitioner in default and rendered th default judgment nullifying the
Deed of Absolute Sale and the Transfer Certificate Title and ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the
Petitioners and reinstate the Respondents Transfer Certificate Title.

The default Judgement was affirmed on appeal by the Appellate Court further holding that the
Respondent was able to establish her claim of forgery by preponderance of evidence. The motion for
reconsideration of the Petitioner was also denied, hence this appeal to the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed an error in upholding the default judgement

Held:

The appeal lacks merit, the claim is unfounded the Petitioners counsels appearance was equivalent to
voluntary service of summons, it cured any defect in service of summons. The Court of Appeals was right
in upholding the discretion of the RTC to refuse to set aside the default order where it finds no justification
for the delay in finding the answer.

WILFREDO DE VERA
G.R. No. 179457 June 22, 2015
vs.
SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO

82
Facts:

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession against respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court. They alleged that they are the owners of the subject parcel of land by actual and
continuous possession and occupation for 30 years. In their Answer Respondent assailed the jurisdiction
of the MTC, alleging that it has no jurisdiction, because the assessed value of the land in dispute is more
than 20,000.00 php. The respondents also alleged that they are holder of titles of the land as early as
1996.

The MTC went to try the case and rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, declaring respondents
as lawful owners and possessor of the land.

The petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC, whom reversed the decision. Respondents filed a petition for
review in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Review and annulled and set aside the decision of both the
RTC and MTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and declined to resolve and deemed as moot and
academic the other factual issues raised in the petition. The Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied, Hence the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in annulling the decision of the MTC and RTC

HELD:

The petition is meritorious. In resolving the issue of whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision
for lack of jurisdiction, the Court is guided by the well-settled rule that "jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.The jurisdictions of the
RTC and the MTC over civil actions involving title to, or possession of real property or interest therein, like
petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, are distinctly set forth
under Section 19 (2) and Section 33 (3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended

A careful perusal of the allegations in their complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with
damages, would show that petitioners failed to indicate the assessed value of the subject real property. At
any rate, based on the Tax Declarations14 attached to their complaint, the disputed land located in
Bolinao, Pangasinan, has a total assessed value of 54,370.00. In line with the above-quoted statutory
provisions, therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners' civil action involving title to a real property
outside Metro Manila with a total assessed value in excess of 20,000.00.
Thus, while the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance
and recovery of ownership and possession of a land with an assessed value over 20,000.00, the same
cannot be said of its ruling with respect to the RTC. Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the
MTC tried a case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be
reviewed on appeal by the RTC

In contrast, the CA erroneously reversed and set aside the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction.1wphi1
Indeed, the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the case and its decision should be deemed promulgated
in the exercise of that jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW/ALLEGATION IN THE

COMPLAINT NOT DEFENDANT TO THE DEFENSES RAISED IN THE ANSWER

REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION VS.DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT,

INC.

83
750 SCRA 37

FACTS:

Reicon and Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. entered into a Contract of Lease (January 9,
1991 Contract), whereby Reicon leased the subject property for a period of twenty years, from January
15, 1991 to January 15, 2011, for a monthly rental of P75,000. Diamond sublet portions to Jollibee Foods
Corporations and Maybunga U.K. Enterprise. On June 2006, Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals
due and the checks it had issued by way of payments from June 2006 to December 2006 were all
dishonored upon presentment. Reicon send a letter demanding the payment of the rentals and
terminating the January 9, 1991. Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and
Maybunga over the portions of the subject property they occupy.

On December 2009, Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon,
Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, and May before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 166, alleging that the
January 9, 1991 Contract did not provide for its unilateral termination by either of the parties; also, the act
of the defendants in entering the contracts, despite the existence of the said contract, constitutes unlawful
interference, for which they must be held solidarily liable for damages. Diamond prayed that the January
9, 1991 Contract as well as the separate contract of lease be declared invalid and illegal.

Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over its
person; (b) lack of legal capacity to sue as a juridical person on the part of Diamond; and (c) lack of cause
of action.

RTC denied Reicon motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper service of summons is not among the
grounds allowing for the dismissal of a complaint. Regarding to the legal capacity of Diamond to sue as a
juridical person, RTC ruled that the Diamonds legal existence can only be impugned in a quo warranto
proceeding. Reicon moved for reconsideration was denied in an Order.

Reicon aggrieved this petition to Court of Appeals. The CA required Reicon to show cause as to why its
petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Diamond. CAs resolution addressed to Diamond, with an address at Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire
Tower, ADB Ave Cor. Garnet Road, Ortigas Center 1605 Pasig City, was returned, with the notation that
the Diamond was moved out. Reicon stated that the said address was Diamonds address on record.
Diamond has not submitted any paper notifying the RTC of any change in its address. Thus, it was
deemed that the said address was effective. As alternative, it proffered that Diamond may be served
through its counsel of record, Atty. AnselmoMarqueda of A.A. MARQUEDA LAW OFFICES.

Diamond, through Atty. Marqueda, filed its manifestation under a special appearance, averring that
Reicons petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright for its failureto serve a copy on its counsel of
record.

CA dismissed Reicons certiorari petition without passing upon its merits based on the following grounds:
(a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition; and (b) non-compliance with
the rule on service upon a party through counsel.

ISSUE;

Whether or not Reicons certiorari petition before CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.

84
RULING:

Yes, it was properly served upon the person of Diamond.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules stated that:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of
the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed
for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent
with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling
subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents
relevant or pertinent thereto

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition.

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action
on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

The certiorari petition filed by Reicon shows that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the
registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service and/or filing of the person who filed and served the
/petition via mail on behalf of Reicn. A copy of Reicons certiorari petition had been served to the RTC as
well as to the Diamond through the said address in compliance with Section 13, rule 13 of the rules on
proof of service as well as with Section 3 and 4 rule 46. Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said
address because Diamond did not notify the RTC regarding in their new address.

The Court observes that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA
through its voluntary appearance by virtue of Manifestation, filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who
represented Diamond before the proceeding in the court. The CAs resolution indicating its initial action on
the petition which was returned with the notation that the Diamond was already moved-out, the alternative
mode of the Diamonds voluntary appearance was enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over its
person. Diamond cannot escape this conclusion by invoking the convenient excuse of limiting its
manifestation as a mere special appearance, considering that it affirmatively sought therein the
dismissal of the certiorari petition. Seeking an affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no
voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection,
necessitates submission to the Courts jurisdiction. Here, Diamonds special appearance cannot be
treated as a specific objection to the CAs jurisdiction over its person for the reason that the argument it
pressed on was about the alleged error in the service of Reicons certiorari petition, and not the CAs
service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the said pleading. Asking for an affirmative relief, i.e.,
the dismissal of Reicons certiorari petition, bereft of the proper jurisdictional objection, the Court therefore
concludes that Diamond had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

85
The petition is Granted.

STATUTE IN FORCE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION DETERMINES

JURISDICTION

BARANGAY MAYAMOT, ANTIPOLO CITY VS. ANTIPOLO CITY

86
800 SCRA 558

FACTS:

BP Blg 787 to 794 was passed crating 8 new barangays in Municipality of Antipolo. These were Barangay
Beverly Hills, Daig, BagongNayon, San Juan, Sta.Cryz, MuntingDilaw, San Luis, and Inarawan. In order
to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of 16 barangays, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed
Resolution No. 97-80, commissioning the City Assessor to plot and delineates the territorial boundaries of
the 16 barangays pursuant to Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 and the provisions of BP
BLr. 787 to 794.

Barangay Mayamot filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Resolution No. 97-89
and Injunction against Antipolo City, SangguniangPanglungsod of Antipolo, Barangays Sta.Cruz,
BagongNayon, Cupang, and Mambungan, City Assessor, and City Treasurer before the RTC of
AntipoloCity.Brgy. Mayamot claimed that while BP Blg. 787-794 did not require Brgy. Mayamot to part with
any of its territory, the adoption of the Resolution reduced its territory to one-half of its original area and
was apportioned to BrgysStaCuz, BagongNayon, Cupang, and Mambungan. It also claimed that the City
Assessor preparation of the plan and the SangguniangPanglungsods adoption of the resolution were not
preceded by any consultation nor any public hearing. They alleged that the resolution violated Sec. 82 of
Local Government Code of 1983, the law in force at the time, which provided that alteration, modification,
and definition of barangay boundaries shall be by ordinance and confirmed by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose

RTC dismissed the petition. It explained that it was never the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Antipolo to alter or modify the territorial boundaries of Barangay Mayamot. Under the presumption of
regularity, it relied on the Cadastral Survey Plan duly approved by the Bureau of Lands as indeed
correctly defining the existing territorial boundary of Barangay Mayamot. Not intending to alter any
territorial boundary, Resolution No. 97-89 is not an ordinance contemplated under Section 82 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 337 as required to hold a plebiscite.

Court of Appeals denied Barangay Mayamots appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that Sections 118-119
of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA No. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991, the statute in force at the
time of commencement of Barangay Mayamot's action, provide the mechanism for settlement of
boundary disputes. Thus, the RTC correctly dismissed the case because it has no original jurisdiction to
try and decide a barangay boundary dispute, to wit:

Notably, the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the SangguniangPanlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan in resolving cases of barangay boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of bringing the
contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the
SangguniangPanlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to
actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its
implementing rules and regulations. The trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of
barangay boundary disputes and only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the RTC decide the
case.

ISSUE:

Is the resolution of boundary dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the RTC?

87
RULING:

Yes, boundary dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.

At the time Barangay Mayamot filed its petition before the RTC of Antipolo City, RA No. 7160 was already
in effect. Sections 118 and 119 of RA No. 7160 provide:

Section 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. - Boundary disputes

between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniangpanlungsod or sangguniangbayan concerned.

(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date
the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be
formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the
date of the certification referred to above.

Section 119.Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may
elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the
filing thereof.

It is clear that the RTC is without jurisdiction to settle a boundary dispute involving barangays in the same
city or municipality. Said dispute shall be referred for settlement to thasangguniangpanglungsod or
sangguniangbayan concerned. Thus, the CA is correctly held that the RTC was correct in dismissing the
petition due to lack of jurisdiction.

The petition ids denied for lack of merit.

WHEN JURISDICTION CAN BE TACKLED MOTO PROPIO BY THE COURT EVEN IF NONE OF THE
PARTIES RAISED THE SAME

88
NARRA NICKEL MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES
CORPORATION

777 SCRA 258

FACTS:

Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., a domestic corporation took interest in mining and exploring certain
areas of the provinces of Palawan. After inquiring with the DENR, it learned that the areas where it
wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered by Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur.

Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitration (POA) of the DENR three separate petitions for denial of
petitioners applications for MPSA. Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur,
Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian
corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the
driving force behind petitioners filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by applications since it knows
that it can only participate in mining activities through corporations which are deemed Filipino citizens.
Redmont argued that given that petitioners capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were
likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for
Filipino citizens.

Petitioners stated that they are qualified person under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. They also stated
that their nationality as applicants is immaterial because they also applied for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements (FTAA) denominated as AFTA-IVB-09 for McArthur, AFTA-IVB-08 for Tesoro and
AFTA-IVB-07 for Narra, which are granted to foreign-owned corporations. Nevertheless, they claimed that
the issue on nationality should not be raised since McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are in fact Philippine
Nationals as 60% of their capital is owned by citizens of the Philippines. They asserted that though MBMI
owns 40% of the shares of PLMC (which owns 5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which
owns 5,997 shares of McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of
Tesoro), the shares of MBMI will not make it the owner of at least 60% of the capital stock of each of
petitioners.

POA issued a Resolution disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSA.

McArthur and Tesoro filed a joint Notice of Appeals and Memorandum of Appeal with the Mines
Adjudication Board while Narra separately filed its Notice of Appeal. They emphasized that they are
qualified person under the law. They informed the MAB that they have individual MPSA applications
converted to FTAAs.

Redmont filed a Complaint with the SEC seeking the revocation of the certificates for registration of
petitioners on the ground that they are foreign-owned and controlled corporations engaged in mining in
violations of Philippine law. Redmont filed a Manifestation and Motion for Suspend Proceeding before the
MAB. Subsequently, Redmont filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for Injunction with
application for issuance of TRO and/or preliminary injunction.

89
MAB denied Redmonts motion. Hence, Redmont filed before the CA a petition for review. CA upheld the
decision of POA while assailed the decision of MAB. CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration by the
petitioners. CA found that there was a doubt as to the nationality of petitioners when it realized that
petitioners had a /common major investor which as a 100% Canadian corporation. CA upheld that the
petitioners are foreign corporations.

Redmont filed with the Office of the President (OP) a petition dated May 7, 2010 seeking the cancellation
of petitioners FTAAs. The OP rendered a Decision26 on April 6, 2011, wherein it canceled and revoked
petitioners FTAAs for violating. The OP, in affirming the cancellation of the issued FTAAs, agreed with
Redmont stating that petitioners committed violations against the abovementioned laws and failed to
submit evidence to negate them.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was further denied by the OP in a Resolution30 dated
July 6, 2011. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the OPs Decision and Resolution
with the CA.

ISSUE:

Is the CA erred when it did not dismiss the case for mootness despite the fact that the subject matter of
the controversy, the MPSA application, have already been converted into FTAA applications and that the
same have already been granted.

RULING:

This case not moot and academic.

The "mootness" principle does accept certain exceptions and the mere raising of an issue of "mootness"
will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do so. In David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo (David), the Court provided four instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot case, thus:

1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;

3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and

4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

All of the exceptions stated above are present in the instant case. We of this Court note that a grave
violation of the Constitution, specifically Section 2 of Article XII, is being committed by a foreign
corporation right under our countrys nose through a myriad of corporate layering under different,
allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate layering utilized by the Canadian company, MBMI,
is of exceptional character and involves paramount public interest since it undeniably affects the
exploitation of our Countrys natural resources. The corresponding actions of petitioners during the

90
lifetime and existence of the instant case raise questions as what principle is to be applied to cases with
similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been pronounced by the Court; hence, the
disposition of the issues or errors in the instant case will serve as a guide "to the bench, the bar and the
public." Finally, the instant case is capable of repetition yet evading review, since the Canadian company,
MBMI, can keep on utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate layering
and conversion of applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition against foreign mining in Philippine
soil.

Regarding in the conversion of MPSA applications into FTAA applications, it is obvious that it is the
petitioners strategy to have the case dismissed against them for being moot.

The filing of the Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement application is a clear admission that the
respondents are not capable of conducting a large scale mining operation and that they need the financial
and technical assistance of a foreign entity in their operation that is why they sought the participation of
MBMI Resources, Inc. The participation of MBMI in the corporation only proves the fact that it is the
Canadian company that will provide the finances and the resources to operate the mining areas for the
greater benefit and interest of the same and not the Filipino stockholders who only have a less substantial
financial stake in the corporation.

It is quite evident that petitioners have been trying to have this case dismissed for being "moot." Their
final act, wherein MBMI was able to allegedly sell/assign all its shares and interest in the petitioner
"holding companies" to DMCI, only proves that they were in fact not Filipino corporations from the start.
The recent divesting of interest by MBMI will not change the stand of this Court with respect to the
nationality of petitioners prior the suspicious change in their corporate structures. The new documents
filed by petitioners are factual evidence that this Court has no power to verify.

The only thing clear and proved in this Court is the fact that the OP declared that petitioner corporations
have violated several mining laws and made misrepresentations and falsehood in their applications for
FTAA which lead to the revocation of the said FTAAs, demonstrating that petitioners are not beyond going
against or around the law using shifty actions and strategies. Thus, we can say that their claim of
mootness is moot in itself because their defense of conversion of MPSAs to FTAAs has been discredited
by the OP Decision.

SUPREME COURT SAGUISAG VS. OCHOA, JR.

798 SCRA 292

91
FACTS:

EDCA authorizes the US military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain Agreed
Locations in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executives understanding that do so
was no longer necessary. On June 2014, the DFA and the US Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes
confirming the completion of all internal requirements for the agreement.

Two petitions for certiorari were filed before us assailing the constitutionality of EDCA. They primarily
argue that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an executive
agreement.

On 10 November 2015, months after the oral arguments were concluded and the parties ordered to file
their respective memoranda, the Senators adopted Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105. The resolution
expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be
transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.

ISSUE:

Whether the essential requisites for judicial review are present.

RULING:

Yes, although the petitioners were lack of legal standing, they raised the matters of transcendental
importance which Court may set aside procedural technicalities.

In a number of cases, this Court has indeed taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal
standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official
act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its
sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to
show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act

The transcendental importance of the issues presented here is rooted in the Constitution itself. Section
25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much stricter mechanism required before
foreign military troops, facilities, or bases may be allowed in the country. The DFA has already confirmed
to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines have already been complied with." It
behooves the Court in this instance to take a liberal stance towards the rule on standing and to determine
forthwith whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.

SUPREME COURT

92
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INC. VS. ALIBUDBUD
791 SCRA 134 ,

FACTS:

Alibudbud was employed by Malayan on July 5, 2004 as Senior Vice President (SVP) for its Sales
Department. As SVP, she was issued a 2004 Honda Civic sedan under Malayan's Car Financing
Planconditioned on the following stipulations: (1) she must continuously stay and serve Malayan for at
least three full years from the date of the availment of the Car Financing Plan; and (2) that in case of
resignation, retirement or termination before the three-year period, she shall pay in full 100% share of
Malayan and the outstanding balance of his/her share of the cost of the motor vehicle.Relatively,
Alibudbud also executed a Promissory Noteand a Deed of Chattel Mortgag in favor of Malayan. On July
18, 2005, Alibudbud was dismissed from Malayan due to redundancy. In view thereof, Malayan
demanded that she surrender the possession of the car to the company. Alibudbud sternly refused to do
so.

On September 21, 2005, Malayan instituted a Complaintfor replevin and/or sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and prayed for the seizure of the car from Alibudbud, or that she be
ordered to pay P552,599.93 representing the principal obligation plus late payment charges and
P138,149.98 as attorney's fees, should said car be no longer in running and presentable condition when
its return be rendered impossible

On October 12, 2005, Alibudbud, in turn, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Malayan before the
Labor Arbiter (LA) wherein she prayed for her reinstatement.She prayed for the suspension of the
proceedings in view of the pendency of the labor dispute she filed. She explained that the resolution of
the labor case will determine her rights and obligations, as well as that of Malayan.This was, however,
questioned by Malayan in its replyas there was no prejudicial questionraised in the labor dispute.

The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Alibudbud was dismissed. The LA's Decision 29dated February
19, 2008 held that the redundancy she suffered resulted from a valid re-organization program undertaken
by Malayan in view of the downturn in the latter's sales. It further ruled that Alibudbud failed to establish
any violation or arbitrary action exerted upon her by Malayan, which merely exercised its management
prerogative when it terminated her services.31

dated February 17, 2006, the RTC of Manila, Branch 27, denied Alibudbud's motion. It was opined that:
(1) reference shall be made only on the Promissory Note which Alibudbud executed in favor of Malayan in
determining the rights and obligations of the parties; (2) the cause of action in the replevin case is rooted
from the Promissory Note; and (3) the issue in the labor dispute is in no way connected with the rights
and obligations of the parties arising out of the Promissory Note.
On November 28, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision32 which granted the complaint for replevin.

On appeal, the CA ruled, in its Decisiondated May 15, 2013, to set aside the decision of the trial court.
The CA explained that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance over the replevin action because of
the "employer-employee" relations between the parties which Malayan never denied. Certainly,
Alibudbudcould not have availed of the benefits of the Car Financing Plan if she was not employed by
Malayan. Citing Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA upheld to dismiss the replevin action

93
considering that the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since
jurisdiction is conferred by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to rule on the complaint for replevin

RULING:

Yes, a careful study of the case would reveal that the RTC correctly took cognizance of the action for
replevin contrary to the pronouncement of the CA. "Replevin is an action whereby the owner or
person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who
has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to
permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or
detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to
the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be
obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action."

Present action involves the parties' relationship as debtor and creditor, not their "employer-employee"
relationship. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the car or, to
surrender its possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory Note
and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her financial obligation to avail of
the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing Plan.41 Clearly, the issue in the replevin action is
separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 15, 2013 and Resolution dated
September 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92940 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Civil Case
No. 05-113528 is, accordingly, REINSTATED.

SUPREME COURT

94
PEMBERTON VS. DE LIMA
70 SCRA 292

FACTS:

Complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City Police Office and private
respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton).6

On October 17, 2014, Pemberton received a Subpoenaissued by the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City
giving him 10 days from receipt within which to file a counter-affidavit.Laude filed an Omnibus
Motiondated October 21, 2014 praying that the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City issue subpoenas
addressed to: (a) "Pemberton, directing him to present himself for the lifting of his fingerprint and of
buccal swabs during the clarificatory hearing set on November 5, 2014; and (b) the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, directing the Chief of Office to assign forensic personnel to gather fingerprints
and buccal swabs from Pemberton and subject him to "forensic examination and analysis, including DNA
testing." Pemberton opposed this in his Opposition to the Omnibus Motion dated 21 October 2014dated
October 27, 2014. He also filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion: (1) For Clarification; (2) To Declare
Absence of Probable Cause for Murder or Any Other Crime Against [Petitioner]; and (3) By Way of Ad
Cautela [sic] Prayer, in the Event that this Honorable Office does not Declare the Absence of Probable
Cause, at the very least, To Reduce the Charge to Homicide Considering the Lack of Circumstances
Qualifying the Offense to Murderdated October 27, 2014.

During the preliminary investigation on October 27, 2014, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City stated that
Pemberton's right to file a counter-affidavit was deemed waived. In the Order dated October 29, 2014, the
City Prosecutor directed the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to obtain latent fingerprint and
buccal swabs from Pemberton and "to submit the results of the forensic examination.

Pemberton filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion: 1) to Determine Probable Cause on the Basis of
Evidence Submitted as of 27 October 2014; and 2) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 29 October
2014 dated November 4, 2014.

However, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City continued to evaluate the evidence and conducted ocular
inspections in connection with the preliminary investigation. Through the Resolution dated December 15,
2014, it "found probable cause against [Pemberton] for the crime of murder." On the same day, an
Information22 for murder was filed against Pemberton before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City.23The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 865-2014 and was raffled to Branch 74 of the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest.

On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On the
same day, he filed a Motion to Defer the Proceedings 27 before the Regional Trial Court.

In the Resolution dated January 27, 2015, Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Reviewand
stated that based on the evidence on record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City." Pemberton's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated February 20, 2015.

95
Aggrieved, Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. 32

Pemberton argues that in sustaining a finding of probable cause, Secretary De Lima committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or absence of jurisdiction based on the following grounds: (a)
Secretary De Lima took into account additional evidence which the City Prosecutor allegedly had no
authority to receive and which Pemberton had no opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him
due process of law;(b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to charge Pemberton with the crime of
murder when "the evidence on record does not support the existence of probable cause to indict [him] . . .
with either homicide or murder[;]" and (c) Secretary De Lima found that "the killing was attended with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength[,] and cruelty despite prevailing
jurisprudence dictating that the elements of these qualifying circumstances . . . be established by direct
evidence."35

Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that this Petition is procedurally
infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De Lima, which are "errors
of judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari."Further, by filing this Petition before this
court and not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.Moreover, the
case is moot and academic, considering that the Regional Trial Court has convicted Pemberton for the
crime charged.38

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before this Court
instead of the Court of Appeals

RULING:

Yes, a direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In this case,
petitioner alleges that the case against him has been scheduled for an expedited trial. Thus, petitioner
claims that it is necessary to expeditiously arrive at a definitive ruling as to whether . . . respondent [De
Lima] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. In his view, a direct
invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction is necessary. Petitioner argues that without this Courts
intervention, a situation may result where the trial has already concluded, while the issue on whether
there exists probable cause to charge [petitioner] with the crime of murder . . . has not been settled with
finality. This argument is completely bereft of merit. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals,
which has concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be considered as
sufficient for review of petitioners case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The January 27, 2015 Resolution and the
February 20, 2015 Resolution of respondent Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima in I.S. No. III-10-INV-
14J-01102 are AFFIRMED

SUPREME COURT

96
QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC. VS. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
784 SCRA 505

FACTS:

On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued
Department Order No. 54, Series of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.The Department of Education explained the reasons for the
issuance of the Department Order as follows:

The Department Order sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No. 23,
s. 2003 and was issued in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members
of PTAs, such as, but not limited to (1) officers absconding with contributions and membership
fees; (2) non-disclosure of the status of funds and non-submission of financial statements; and (3)
misuse of funds.4 (Citations omitted)

The Department Order is divided into 11 articles: (I) General Policy; (II) Organization of PTAs at the
School Level;(III) General Assembly; (IV) Board of Directors and Officers; (V) Recognition and Monitoring
of PTAs;(VI) Privileges of Recognized PTAs; (VII) Activities;(VIII) Financial Matters;(IX) Prohibited
Activities and Sanctions; (X) Transitory Provision;and (XI) Repealing Clause.

Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present Petition in the belief that the above-quoted
provisions undermine the independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and by-
laws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due process, as
well as other existing laws.

On November 17, 2009, the Department of Education filed its Comment, and on February 9, 2010,
Quezon City PTCA Federation filed its Reply.the Department of Education assails the filing of this Petition
as being violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of hierarchy of courts

RULING:

Yes, we sustain the position of the Department of Education. The present Petition was filed in violation of
the principle of hierarchy of courts. Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the
Secretary of Education pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power and pursuant to the purposes
for which the organization of parent-teacher associations is mandated by statute. Likewise, there was no
fatal procedural lapse in the adoption of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009.

It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fall
under the original jurisdiction of this court. However, this is also true of regional trial courts and the Court
of Appeals.

97
This Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort
to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari." Indeed, "concurrence [of jurisdiction] does not allow
unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition.

In Vergara v. Suelto:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance
of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it
is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. This is
and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

Petitioner argues that the present Petition justifies direct recourse to this court "considering the pervasive
effect of the assailed Department Order to all the different PTCAs or PTAs across the country and in order
to avoid multiple suits that would only serve to further clog the courts dockets." 30

This reason fails to impress.

That the effects of the Department Order extend throughout the country is a concern that can be
addressed by recourse to the Court of Appeals. Its territorial jurisdiction, much like this courts, also
extends throughout the country. Moreover, the Court of Appeals is well-equipped to render reliable,
reasonable, and well-grounded judgments in cases averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Recourse to the Court of Appeals is not a futile exercise that results to nothing
more than the clogging of court dockets.

98
SUPREME COURT

AGUSTI-SE VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

783 SCRA 213

FACTS:

Petitioners are Assistant Special Prosecutors III of the Office of the Ombudsman, who have been
assigned to prosecute cases against Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Leopoldo S. Acot (Acot), Bgen. (Ret.) Ildelfonso N.
Dulinayan (Dulinayan) and several others before the Sandiganbayan for alleged ghost deliveries of
assorted supplies and materials to the Philippine Air Force amounting to about Eighty Nine Million Pesos
(P89,000,000.00).

Sometime in early 1995, the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed
a complaint before the Ombudsman against Acot, Dulinayan and several others which was eventually
docketed as OMB-AFP-CRIM-94-0218. In a Resolution dated 12 April 1996,Ombudsman Investigators
Rainier C. Almazan (Almazan) and Rudifer G. Falcis II (Falcis) recommended the filing of Informations
against Acot, Dulinayan, and several others for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019 [RA No. 3019]) and/or for Malversation through Falsification.

Casimiro was then the Director of the Criminal and Administrative Investigation Division of the Office of
the Ombudsman and the immediate supervisor of Almazan and Falcis. Casimiro concurred with and
signed the 12 April 1996 Resolution and indorsed the same to Bgen. (Ret.) Manuel B. Casaclang, then
Casimiro's immediate superior. In a Memorandum dated 10 July 1996, 6 then Special Prosecution Officer
III Reynaldo L. Mendoza recommended the modification of the 12 April 1996 Resolution to charge Acot,
Dulinayan and several others only with the violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

In a Memorandum dated 12 January 1998,Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo (Tamayo)

recommended that the charges against Acot and Dulinayan be dismissed for lack of evidence. Affirming
the recommendation of Tamayo, on 2 March 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the 12 April
1996 Resolution with the modification to dismiss the charges against Acot and Dulinayan.

Acot and Dulinayan filed their respective Motions to Quash/Dismiss and to Defer Arraignment mainly on
the grounds that: (1) the right of the State to prosecute had already prescribed; and (2) given the amount
of time the case was filed after the preliminary investigation was started almost 15 years, their right to
speedy disposition of case had been violated.Dulinayan further alleged that a clearance had been issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman stating that there were no pending cases against him. The
Sandiganbayan required petitioners, the assigned prosecutors for this case, to comment on the motions
filed by Acot and Dulinayan.

Based on their evaluation of the records, petitioners found that there were procedural lapses in the
handling of the cases, which they attributed to Casimiro. Thus, instead of filing the required Comment
and/or Opposition with the Sandiganbayan, petitioners submitted a Memorandum dated 5 January
2010, which contained their findings against Casimiro. This Memorandum, while addressed to then
Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, was submitted to Turalba, who was the Officer-in-Charge,
Director, Prosecution Bureau V. Turalba, however, merely attached the said Memorandum as part of the
records and thereafter relieved petitioners from the cases, alluding that they were remiss in their duty to
file the necessary Comment and/or Opposition with the Sandiganbayan.Turalba filed his Comment and/or

99
Opposition which prompted petitioners to seek the approval of Villa-Ignacio of their version of the draft
Comment and/or Opposition, which they eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan. However, the
Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several others were subsequently dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of the case.

On 3 November 2010, petitioners filed their own Complaintbefore the OP, alleging that Casimiro and
Turalba committed the following administrative infractions: (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross negligence; (3)
oppressions, (4) conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; (5) violation of the rules on
confidentiality; (6) violation of Office Order No. 05-18, and Office Order No. 05-13; and (7) violation of
Section 35 of RA No. 6770,21 amounting to dishonesty and gross misconduct.22chanRoble

In a Decision dated 14 June 2011, the OP dismissed the complaint filed against Casimiro and Turalba. On
the allegation that Casimiro caused the delay in the investigation of the cases against Acot, Dulinayan
and several others,No delay, therefore, may be attributed to respondent Casimiro who came across the
records of the case nine (9) years after he signed the Resolution dated 12 April 1996 recommending the
filing of informations to his superior, if the Office of the Ombudsman itself never considered that the
Resolution dated 12 April 1996 as final and executory.

The Court of appeals affirmed the decision rendered by the OP The CA ruled that respondentCasimiro
cannot be faulted in the delay, if any, in filing the appropriate criminal &Information
against Acot and Dulinayan considering that Ombudsman Desierto overruled the recommendations and
concurrence by the investigators and Casimiro as to the finding of probable cause against the said
military officials.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST RESPONDENTS, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, BUT
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS PREVIOUS RULINGS;

RULING:

No,the findings of the Court of Appeals are all supported by the evidence on record and further, are in
accordance with the findings of the OP. In fact, other than the bare and general allegation that the Court
of Appeals did not consider the evidence presented, petitioners were not able to identify the Court of
Appeals' alleged error in the appreciation of facts. A reading of the assailed decisions shows that both the
OP and the Court of Appeals considered the pleadings and corresponding evidence submitted by both
parties in arriving at their respective decisions. Thus, we find no error in the appreciation of facts by the
Court of Appeals.

A question of law arises when there is a doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.For a question to be a
question of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts
and circumstances.

100
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question is one of fact. Thus,
the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without examining
or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.

Applying the test of whether the question is one of law or of fact, the aforementioned are questions of fact
because petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the Court of Appeals. We have previously held
that questions on the probative value of the evidence, or those which relate to the analysis of the records
by the lower courts are questions of fact which are not proper for review by this Court.

Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as
feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and
adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party,
weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be
strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be
accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side;
whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to
give said proofs weight - all these are issues of fact.

Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA
is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.

Moreover, it is well-settled that as a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts.Thus, absent the
recognized exceptions to this general rule, this Court will not review the findings of fact of the lower
courts. In this case, petitioners failed to show that the exceptions to justify a review of the appreciation of
facts by the Court of Appeals are present.

101
No. 49

THE SUPREME COURT

Fortaleza vs Gonzales
G.R. No. 179287 (February 1, 2016)
782 SCRA 504

FACTS:

In this case, petitioners herein were charged with kidnapping with murder of Maximo Lemoljo, Jr.,
Ricardo Suganob and EleuterioSalabas. Elizabeth Orola-Salabas, the wife of Eleuterio filed a criminal
complaint against herein petitioners with the MTC. The MTC dismissed the case for lack of factual and
legal merit. Orola-Salabas then filed an amended affidavit of complaint with the Provincial Prosecution
Office. The Provincial Prosecution Office then issued a resolution finding probable cause against Dongail,
Estanislao and 15 other John Does and dismissing Fortaleza, Cimatu ,Hulleza et. al. for insufficiency of
evidence.
Dongail filed a motion for reconsideration with the RTC whileOrosa-Salabas filed a motion for
reinvestigation to include the petitioners herein. RTC then directed to conduct reinvestigation. The DOJ
on the other hand, directed to forward records of the case. The DOJ then issued a resolution modifying
the Provincial Prosecution Offices resolution and included the petitioners herein. The petitioners then filed
a motion for certiorari whileDongail, et.al. filed with the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petitioners appeal while the office of the President set aside the resolution of the DOJ
which was contended by Orosa-Salabas by filing a motion for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in its decision affirming the decision of the DOJ and Provincial Prosecution
Office?
Whether or not the Office of the President acted in grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolution?

RULING:

No. The court held that if it is established in jurisprudence that the Secretary of Justice has
statutory power of control and supervision over prosecutors. In the recent case of Department of Justice
vs. Alaon, the court reiterated that there is no quarrel over the actions of Justices power of review over
the actions of his subordinates specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in
the Secretary of Justices authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and agencies
under him, subject only for specified guidelines.
Yes. The court held that due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did
not appeal or who resorted to other remedies and such additional award constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Office of the President.
Office of the Presidents resolution is set aside and the case is remanded to the Secretary of
Justice.

102
No. 50

THE SUPREME COURT

Republic vs Baez
G.R. No. 169442 (October 14, 2015)
772 SCRA 297

FACTS:

In this case, the respondents offered for sale a parcel of land to Cellophil Resources Corporation.
Cellophil granted cash advance to the respondents herein and introduced improvements including a staff
housing. Respondents herein would be staying abroad for a time and executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Hojilla. CRC stopped operations and was turned over the APT. Respondents declared
the said property as UbanoBaez property and rented out the said staff housing to third parties. RTC
ruled that the contract was beyond the 10-year prescriptive period which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals stating that the petitioner was not demanded compliance.
The petitioner argues that the complaint is not yet barred by prescription and the period of
prescription have been interrupted by extrajudicial demand. The petitioner referred to a letter by Hojilla
which the petitioner argues to have estopped Hojillas acts for misleading the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may determine the receipt of letters by Hojilla although the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts?

RULING:

Yes. The Court has reiterated it is not a trier of facts and parties may raise only questions of law.
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to reviewing errors of law and findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive because it is not the Court's function to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh
the evidence all over again.The rule, however, is not without exceptions. In the case at bar, the findings of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals are contradictory: the RTC did not make any finding on the receipt of
the demand letters by Hojilla, while the Court of Appeals resolved that assuming arguendo that the letters
were demand letters contemplated under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, the same are unavailing because
the letters do not bear any proof of service of receipt by respondents.
Petition is granted.

103
No. 51

THE SUPREME COURT

Villanueva vs JBC
G.R. No. 211833 (April 7, 2015)
755 SCRA 182

FACTS:

In this case the petitioner filed a motion for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition arguing that the
rule of the Judicial Bar Council which states that a judge must have 5 years of service in the first-level
courts to qualify for second-level courts is unconstitutional. The petitioner is an applicant and upon
learning the he was not on the list of qualified applicants took recourse to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present
Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition,
and both are governed by Rule 65." However, The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review
the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the
petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend
nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim
any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional
and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's
name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

Yes. The court held that administrative supervision involves overseeing the operations of
agencies to ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference
to day-to-day activities. In contrast, supervision involves ensuring that the agency supervised follow their
functions directing them to redo their actions should these be contrary to law.
Furthermore, when a law grants a government agency supervision over another agency, it
automatically includes administrative supervision. Thus, if an agency merely exercises administrative
authority over another this should be specified in the law granting it. Additionally, the court has, in the
past, exercised its general supervision over the JBC.

104
No. 52

THE SUPREME COURT

Salvador vs Rabaja
G.R. No. 199990 (February 4, 2015)
749 SCRA 654

FACTS:

In this case, petitioners were the sellers through an agent and respondents were buyers. The
petitioners herein complained to the respondents because they did not receive payments for the said
property from their agent. The respondents then suspended payments which prompted the petitioners to
file for ejectment. The RTC rendered decision in favor of the respondents and stated that the contract was
a contract of sale and not a contract to sellOn March 29, 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC-
Br. 114 with modifications. It ruled that the contract to sell was indeed a contract of sale and that
Gonzales was armed with an SPA and was, in fact, introduced to Spouses Rabaja by Spouses Salvador
as the administrator of the property. Spouses Rabaja could not be blamed if they had transacted with
Gonzales.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court may be a trier of facts in this case?

RULING:

No. The Court held that as a general rule, the Courts jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to
the review of pure questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference exists as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. Negatively put, Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions
of fact. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations.
The present petition presents questions of fact because it requires the Court to examine the veracity of
the evidence presented during the trial, such as the improvised receipts, the SPA given to Gonzales and
the contract to sell. Even the petitioner spouses themselves concede and ask the Court to consider
questions of fact, but the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the lower courts absent
any compelling reason to the contrary.

105
THE SUPREME COURT

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON

CASE NO: 747 SCRA 1

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains
the message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or RepublicAct No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH)
Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form
Team Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not
of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election. Atty.
Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulins removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2) by three feet (3).

On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a
definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and
the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.

On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated
this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.They question respondents notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued
on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further
proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and
hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and
void, and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order.

After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013.
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final
orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its
adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

106
ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme court has jurisdiction over case considering that the notice/order by
respondents is not a final order reviewable under Rule 65

Whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before this
court

RULING:

Yes. The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition.
Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority "to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers."

No. The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that
the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to
shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that
the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist
to justify an exception to the policy.

In Baez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto:

The Supreme Court is a court of lastresort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.

107
THE SUPREME COURT

SERGIO R. OSMEA III vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, EMMANUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., SPC POWER CORPORATION, AND THERMA
POWER VISAYAS, INC.

CASE NO: 771 SCRA 559

FACTS:

The Board of Directors of the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)
approved the commencement of the 3rd round of bidding for the sale of the 153.1MW NPPC.
Respondents SPC Power Corporation (SPC) and TVPI submitted their respective bids for the project.
PSALM issued a Notice of Award dated April 30, 2014 in favor of TPVI, declaring the latter as the Winning
Bidder. The award, however, was cancelled because of the exercise by SPC Power Corporation (SPC) of
its Right to Top. TVPI then implores the Court to clarify the effect on the Notice of Award of the
subsequent annulment of the said Right to Top in our September 28, 2015 Decision, and prays for the
reinstatement thereof.

The Court resolved to deny with finality SPC's motion on December 9, 2015, and those of Osmea and
PSALM on April 6, 2016. Notwithstanding the denial with finality of their respective motions, they were
nevertheless required to comment on TPVI's Manifestation/Motion that remained unresolved. For their
part, respondents SPC and PSALM contend that the Decision resulted in the material alteration of the
terms of the public bidding and called for the conduct of another in its stead.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the finality of Decision prevents the Court from departing from the clear language of the
ruling

RULING:
No. In any event, the Court is not precluded from rendering a nunc pro tunc judgment to amend the
dispositive portion of the September 28, 2015 Decision for it to truly reflect the action of the
Court.25cralawredThe lack of directive in the fallo on how to proceed from the nullification of SPC's Right
to Top and its NPPC-APA and NPPC-LLA contracts, nothing more, left the parties at a quandary,
prompting them to seek judicial intervention anew. The Court must, therefore, supply herein what was
inadvertently omitted in the Decisionthe natural and logical consequence of our September 28, 2015
ruling. Otherwise, a rejection of the plea of TPVI will only spawn a multiplicity of suits and clogging of the
court docket. Such event is without a doubt contrary to the established policy of the Court to provide in its
rules of procedure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

108
EXCEMPTIONS WHEN THE SUPREME COURT CAN TAKE COGNIZANCE OF CASES WITH MIX
QUESTION OF FACTS AND LAW

TECHNO DEVELOPMENT & CHEMICAL CORPORATION vs. VIKING METAL INDUSTRIES,

INCORPORATED

CASE NO: 795 SCRA 397

FACTS:

Respondent Viking Metal Industries, Incorporated (VMI), through its President and General Manager,
Brilly Bernardez, presented to the PNOC Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) its bid proposal
to supply and deliver, within one hundred and sixty (160) days, various fabricated items, consisting of pipe
shoes and structural supports, for the PNOC-EDC First 40 MW Mindanao-Geothermal Project (MG
Project). While petitioner Techno Development & Chemical Corporation, the parties agreed to paint the
fabricated items with Ultrazinc Primer, an anti-rust primer manufactured by petitioner TechNo. Thereafter,
VMI made several deliveries of the fabricated items to PNOC-EDC. The VMI and Techno representatives
met again and agreed that corrective measures on the defective painting would have to be done.While
the corrosion problem on the fabricated items was being remedied, VMI incurred delays in the submission
of required fabrication drawings, encountered difficulties in sourcing construction materials, and
committed gross miscalculations of the tons requirements, ultimately resulting in the delay in the
deliveries of the structural supports. VMI appealed to PNOC-EDC to reconsider its demand of
P2,265,645.09 as the total collectible amount representing liquidated damages and deductions
ratiocinating that the delay was ultimately attributable to the poor and substandard primer paint of
TechNo. In reply, PNOC-EDC affirmed its deduction and informed VMI that its approval of Techno as paint
supplier would not relieve it of its obligation under their contract. Thus, on September 30, 1999, VMI filed
before the RTC of Makati City a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against PNOC-EDC due to
its continued refusal to pay VMI for the remaining balance of the contract price allegedly amounting to
P2,265,644.23 and against Techno for the reimbursement of P550,000.00 for the alleged repairs done on
the defective coating of the fabricated items.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court erred proper in reversing the judgment of the court of appeals

RULING:

YES. At the outset, the Court notes that its jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the appellate court
is limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the
Court since it is not the Court's function to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again. In several
cases, however, it has been repeatedly held that the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
binding on the Court are subject to the following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (l0) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.

109
 In the instant case, while the appellate court aptly ruled upon and rejected VMI's claim of
P550,000.00 subject of VMI's Complaint for Sum of Money against Techno, it clearly overlooked the
factual issues presented by Techno in its counterclaim against VMI. In its thirty-five (35)-page Decision,
the CA seemed to have preoccupied itself with the other issues presented by VMI as against PNOC-EDC
and Techno, without addressing the issue of whether VMI has an outstanding unpaid obligation in favor of
Techno, nor providing any reason for such failure. Had it exerted additional effort in taking Techno' s
claims into consideration, as well as their supporting pieces of proof, it would have warranted their
meritorious and evidentiary value. It must be noted that if Techno's claim was to be denied simply by the
failure of the lower courts to pass upon the same in their decisions, without any factual or legal
explanation therefor, VMI would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Techno for VMI's failure to pay for
the paints it received. Such unjust enrichment due to the failure to make remuneration of or for property or
benefits received cannot be countenanced and must be correspondingly corrected by the Court. In view
of the foregoing, the Court finds Techno to be entitled to the payment of the unpaid paint products
purchased by VMI therefrom.

110
EXCEMPTIONS WHEN THE SUPREME COURT CAN TAKE COGNIZANCE OF CASES WITH MIX
QUESTION OF FACTS AND LAW

OFELIA C. CAUNAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN

CASE NO: 784 SCRA 693

FACTS:

Ofelia Caunan (Caunan) Officer-in Charge of the General Services Offices in the City of of Paraaque
was charged and found guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." The case involves the government's purchase and
payment of equipment not delivered; a transaction dubbed as "ghost delivery." During trial, the defense
primarily argued that an ocular inspection would prove that the compost equipment was actually delivered
to Barangay Marcelo Green. Yet, the Sandiganbayan found that the existing compost equipment in
Barangay Marcelo Green was not delivered by Julia Enterprises, but by Lacto South under another fully
paid transaction. The Sandiganbayan took note of the uncontested fact that the City Government entered
into two separate transactions for the purchase of compost equipment for Barangay Marcelo Green. The
first transaction was initiated by Punzalan's request on August 15, 2000 while the second transaction was
a result of Pacheco's request on September 5, 2002. It is the non-delivery under the first
transaction which is the subject of the case. Caunan moved to reconsider the decision but it was denied
by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution. Thus, Caunan filed a petition for certiorari assailing the decision
and resolution of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by Caunan is proper

RULING:

No. At the outset, it is emphasized that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only
questions of law. "It is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive
upon the Supreme Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; [and] (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
None of the above exceptions obtains in this case.

111
ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER TGE APPELLATE CIYRT
JUSTICES, JUDGES, AND COURT PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. TANDICO

CASE No. 57

FACTS:

A judicial audit conducted by an audit team from the Office of the Court Administrator at the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Calbayog City, Samar, then presided by Judge Felimon S. Tandinco, Jr.
which was done prior to Judge Tandicos retirement on January 16, 2010.

Under Administrative Order No. 152-2007 dated October 8, 2007, Judge Alma-Uy-Lampasa assisted
Judge Tandinco to hear all cases pending, even the newly filed cases. This Administrative Order also
directed Judge Tandinco to immediately cease and desist from hearing cases and to concentrate on
deciding cases within six (6) months from submission for decision.

But the designation of Judge Lampasa was revoked under Administrative Order No. 101-2009.

The Memorandum of the Judicial Audit Team dated April 6, 2010, revealed that the MTCC, Calbayog City,
Samar, had a total caseload of 940 cases, consisting of 607 criminal and 333 civil cases. Of the 940
cases Judge Tandinco failed to:
resolve motions and incidents in thirty (30) criminal cases
to resolve motions and incidents in sixty- seven (67) civil cases
to decide forty-six (46) criminal cases submitted for decision
decide twenty (20) civil cases submitted for decision
and that Judge Lampsa failed to:
resolve motions and incidents in ninety-six (96) criminal cases
resolve motions and incidents in thirty-two (32) civil cases
decide ten (10) criminal cases
decide eight (8) civil cases

Moreover, based on the monthly report of cases in the same court submitted to the Statistical Report
Division of the Court Management Office for December 2009, the audit team discovered that Judge
Tandinco failed to:
decide twenty-four (24) criminal cases submitted for decision
decide twelve (12) civil cases submitted for decision

The audit team observed that many of the case folders were not presented to them while the other case
records were not accurate due to the absence of the latest court orders. Records also showed that neither
Judge Tandinco nor Judge Lampasa requested an extension of time within which to decide the cases
submitted before them.

The audit team further reported irregularities like several case records were not chronologically arranged
and lacked certain documents (i.e., certificates of arraignment, formal offer of evidence, writs of
execution); the case rollos/records of the cases that were jointly tried lacked a mother record containing
all documents; summons were issued in criminal cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure;
there were no records indicating that the accused had been arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 9548,
13719 and 13720; the court's docket books needed updating; and the employees should be reminded to
wear their identification cards.

These were docketed the judicial audit as administrative case against Judge Tandinco for gross
incompetence, inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty upon recommendation of Office of Court

112
Administration.JudgeLampasa and Dioneda, the clerk of court of MTCC Calbayof, City, Samar were
directed to submit their written explanation.

In Judge Lampasas explanation, she stated that her designation was revoked by the Administrative
Order, hence ceased discharging her duties; that Dioneda did not notify her of the pending motions and
incidents that were submitted for resolution in the 93 criminal cases; that she had more than 1,000 cases
when she was stationed as judge of MTCC Calbayog City, Samar; that she was assisting in MCTC
Daram, Samar and simultaneously assisting judge in City Court of Catbalogan, Samar; and her failure to
resolve some motions was due to the impossibility of single handedly resolving motion in MTCC Calbayog
City, Samar together with the two court.

But the OCAs evaluation found that Judge Lampasafailed to resolve cases considering that she was no
longer with the judiciary after being automatically resigned. Thus, they imposed a fine of P50,000 to
Judge Lampasa. OCAs found Dionedas explanation insufficient because the chart submitted showed
that those were with Judge Tandinco. OCA recommended that he be reprimanded for simple neglect of
duty. And the OCA recommended that he be found guilty of gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence,
and dereliction of duty, and be fined P100,000deductible from his retirement benefits.

ISSUE/ RULING:
1. Whether there is an undue delay - YES
- Considering that Judge Lampasa failed to resolve the motions and incidents in ninety-five
(95) criminal cases and thirty-two (32) civil cases, and had belatedly resolved three (3) other
civil cases, we agree with the OCA that Judge Lampasa should likewise be held
administratively liable.

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
classified as a less serious charge17 and is punishable by any of the following sanctions: (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for a period of not less than one (1)
month but not more than three (3) months; or (b) fine of more than PI 0,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.

At the time Judge Tandinco's court was audited on December 6, 7, and 8, 2009, Judge
Lampasa was no longer with the judiciary. On December 1, 2009, she filed a certificate of
candidacy as City Mayor of Calbayog City, hence, she was automatically deemed resigned
from the service and the Court was already divested of jurisdiction to institute an
administrative case against her.

2. Whether extensions of time to decide cases are allowable - YES

- While the rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are regarded as
mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of our judges and has been
understanding of the circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing their
businesses. The Court, in several instances, has allowed extensions of time to decide cases
beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request from the Court an
extension of time to decide the cases, and to justify any request for additional time.

3. Whether Dioneda is guilty of simple neglect of duty YES

- The Manual for Clerks of Court provides that the Clerk of Court is the administrative officer of
the court who controls and supervises the safekeeping of court records, exhibits, and
documents, among others.20 Furthermore, Rule 136, Section 7 of the Rules of Court
provides that the clerk of court shall safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits, and public
property committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture
belonging to his office.

Dioneda, whose responsibilities include ensuring that the case records are safely kept and
organized and are readily available upon the request of the proper parties, was himself
remiss in the performance of his functions. His failure to immediately present all the case

113
records prevented the audit team from examining and auditing the cases with accuracy.
Branch clerk of courts must realize that their administrative functions are vital to the prompt
and proper administration of justice. They play a big role in the complement of the court and
thus cannot be permitted to slacken in their jobs under one pretext or another.

Simple neglect of duty under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service is classified as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension
without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. We find
the OCA's recommended penalty well-taken. Thus, we hereby impose on Dioneda a fine in
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for failure to comply with the Court's
Resolutions, with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

114
COURT OF APPEALS

FRANCISCO VS. LOYOLA PLANS CONSOLIDATED INC.

CASE No. 58

FACTS:

Jose Romulo Francisco was hired by Loyola Plans Consolidated Inc. as a National Training Officer on
probation on November 8, 1993, and became a regular employee by May 9, 1994. But on April 1, 1997,
Fransisco received an allegedly falsified resignation letter dated March 24, 1997 was tendered. Fransisco
through his counsel protested illegal termination addressed to Gerardo Monzon, VP for Marketing and
Sales. He accused Monzon for criminal intentions on the falsified letter and demanded to reinstate him
with the backwages, otherwise its liabilities will increase from the suit that he would file.

Monzon ignored these demands, thus he filed a criminal case for falsification of private document against
Monzon before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

The defense of Loyola Plans was that Francisco showed dismal performance during his stint as Marketing
Manager from May 1996 to December 1996, with his actual sales below his projected forecast. But Loyola
Plans gave him a chance to prove himself in attaining his job forecasts and agreed upon to tender his
resignation should he fail to do so. Records showed that he miserably failed and voluntarily tendered his
resignation dated March 24, 1997.

Labor Arbiter issued an Order to wait for the decision of the falsification of private document docketed in
BR 66 MeTC of Makati. Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration against this Order and prayed that it
should proceed as independently form the criminal case against Monzon.

NLRC treated the Motion for Reconsideration as an appeal and affirmed the LA order to defer the case
pending the criminal case because the determination whether petitioner was illegally dismissed is
dependent upon the resolution of the criminal case involving the alleged forgery of the resignation letter.

The MeTC found Monzon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Private
Document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC; and also held that damage had been caused to
petitioner since he was terminated from his job causing financial constraints as a consequence of the
forgery of the resignation letter.

RTC Makati City and CA affirmed conviction of Monzon. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
Monzon for being the wrong remedy; for failing to state the material dates, and for a defective or
insufficient certification against forum shopping.

LA ruled for Francisco. It held that the final conviction of Monzon in the falsification charges
simultaneously made the illegal termination of petitioner with finality invoking the doctrines of res judicata,
finality of judgment and estoppel by judgment.

Loyola elevated the case to NLRC on the grounds that the personal acts of Monzon should not be taken
against respondents Loyola and Concepcion. NLRC affirmed the ruling of LA with modifications on the
computation of backwages and damages was deleted.

Francisco filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the
NLRC. Petitioner asseverates that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to reverse its own final Resolution dated
June 22, 1999 which affirmed the decision of the LA to hold the proceedings and await the outcome of the
criminal case against Monzon, and to modify the final decision of this Court in the same case.39
Petitioner insists that the award of damages of the LA has become final due to respondents' forum
shopping.

115
Loyola filed a Manifestation and Motion denying any legal relations with Monzon and that he has ceased
to be employed in Loyola. This was denied by the CA stating that legal representation of Monzon subsists
without any withdrawal of counsel by either Monzon or Atty. Alonso.

Hence, Loyola filed an Ex Parte Motion moving to withdraw as counsel of Monzon. This was granted by
the CA and it dismissed the case with respect to Monzon holding tha CA did not acquire jurisdiction over
Monzon because the copy of Resolution granting the Ex Parte Motion was returned unclaimed.

Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the CA ruled that "while Section 2656 of
Rule 138 prescribes the usual means by which an attorney may withdraw as counsel for a client, there
are instances where the court may be justified in relieving a lawyer from continuing his appearance in
action or proceeding, without hearing the client, like when a situation develops where the client stops
having any contact with the lawyer, who is thereby left without the usual means which are indispensable
in the successful or proper defense of the client's cause.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA may acquir jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner upon the filing of the certiorari
petition.

RULING:

- Yes.

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on
the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

In other words, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent upon:
1. The service of the order or resolution indicating the CA's initial action on the petition to the respondent;
or
2. The voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA's jurisdiction.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution dated February 19, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105131 dismissing the case against respondent Gerardo B.
Monzon is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

116
COURT OF APPEALS

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION VS. ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M)

BERHAD
CASE No. 59

FACTS:
PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate
company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into
contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia.

In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four
contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of
Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts . . . and the repayment of the
temporary advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of
Malaysia.

Due to some failure to perform the oblifation, State of Pahang was prompting to demand payment against
Asuavessts performance bonds. It entered into a compromise agreement with the state by paying
reduced amount of Malaysian Ringgit 3,915,053.54. Thus, Asiavest demanded indemnity from PNCC by
demanding the amount it paid to the State of Pahang.

Asiavest filed a recovery complaint against PNCC in the RTC of Pasig. It invoked the Section 98 of the
Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 1119 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956.

PNCC filed form Motions for extension of time to Answer three times, and was granted. But another
extension was filed but was denied.

The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in favour of Asiavest because
The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of
written foreign laws.

RTC denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default. CA also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration
Ad Cautelamdismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this
court.

Hence this petition, where PNCC contends that it had consistently raised the propriety of impleading the
two Malaysian corporations, Asiavest-CDCP and Asiavest Holdings and their participant liability, which are
questions of fact, Asiavest-CDCP undertook to hold PNCC "free and harmless from all its obligations
under the construction agreement, while Asiavest Holdings agreed in the guaranty agreement to share
with PNCC the guarantee liability on a 51% (Asiavest Holdings) - 49% (PNCC) arrangement, the lower
courts erred in ordering PNCC to reimburse the entire amount claimed by the respondent and PNCC
submits that the trial court could have invoked the principle of forum non conveniens and refused to take
cognizance of the case considering the difficulty in acquiring jurisdiction over the two Malaysian
corporations and in determining PNCC's exact liability, PNCC raised prescription pursuant to Item 6 of the
Malaysian Limitation Act of 1953 (Act 254)in that "actions founded on contract or to recover any sum ... by
virtue of any written law . . . shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from accrual of cause of
action." since the Complaint was filed on April 13, 1994, six years had already elapsed from 1988. And
PNCC submits that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad already winded up voluntarily based on the
Certification47 issued by the Director of the Insolvency and Liquidation Department for Official Receiver,
Malaysia.

117
ISSUE/ RULING:

1. Whether our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money
filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed
and performed in Malaysia

- YES.
On the jurisdiction issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.92 Batas
PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one
such law that provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading of Section 1993 shows
that civil actions for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
trial courts:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
....
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000).

These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of
Metro Manila.94 Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's
complaint for recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.

2. Whether the forum non conveniens principle may be applied

- "Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.'" This doctrine
applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it
appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another
one. It is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing
litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were
left entirely to the whim of either party."

Puyat v. Zabarte enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case
even though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the
main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have
their residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum
shopping, merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the
docket may already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be
maintained; and

5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.

On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following
requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort
to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law

118
 and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision."

The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot
operate to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine
first if facts were established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance
from assuming jurisdiction.

The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that
"[o]n the contrary[,] to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient
to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be
more accessible, witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of
legal services."109 We agree.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume
that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main
office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the construction
contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected
that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our
courts would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense"110
in this case against petitioner.

3.
Petitioner invokes Malaysian laws on prescription, but it was not able to prove these foreign law
provisions. Our courts follow the doctrine of processual presumption:
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. The Court's ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int'l, v. NLRC illuminates:In the present case, the
employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not
provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the
law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern
all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International
Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachorprocessual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they
must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court[.]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

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COURT OF APPEALS

CHINA BANK CORPORATION VS. CITY TREASURER OF MANILA

CASE No. 60

FACTS:

China Bank was assessed a P267,128.70 for a local business tax, business permit, and other fees for
taxable year of 2007 by the City Treasurer of Manila. China Bank paid the said amount but protested
through a letter to petitioner one of the particulars, Sec 21, on the ground that it is not liable of said
additional business tax and the same constitutes double taxation.

City Treasurer acknowledged the receipt of payment under protest and informed China Bank that she will
wait for her formal protest.

China Bank wrote a letter-reply averred that pursuatto o Section 195 of the Local Government Code
("LGC ''), petitioner had until March 16, 2007 within which to decide the protest, and considering that
respondent received the Letter dated February 8, 2007, four days after the deadline to decide and
petitioner did not even resolve the protest, respondent formally demanded the refund of the amount of
P154,398.50, representing the business tax collected under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code.

A Petition for Review was filed with the RTC of Manila raising the sole issue of whether or not respondent
is subject to the local business tax imposed under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code. RTC granted
the petition and ordered City Treasurer to refund the Sec 21 paid by the bank. The RTC found that the
City Treasurer had no basis to collect the amount of P154,398.50 because the Department of Justice
(DOJ) was of the opinion that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 were unconstitutional.

RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of City Treasurer. But the CTA reversed the decision of the
RTC and dismissed China Banks protest. It found that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. China
Bank sought reconsideration but was denied.

China Bank elevated the matter to CTA En Banc. It affirmed the decision of CTA Divisionreiterating that
the petition for review was filed out of time. It explained that from January 15, 2007, the date when CBC
filed its protest, it had sixty (60) days or until March 16, 2007 to await the decision of the City Treasurer.
Considering that no action was taken by the City Treasurer, CBC had until April 16, 2007 or 30 days from
March 16, 2007, (April 15, 2007 being a Sunday), within which to appeal the inaction of the City Treasurer
with the RTC, pursuant to Section 195 of the LGC. Upon examination, however, the CTA En Banc found
that when CBC filed its petition for review before the RTC, it was already one day late. Thus, it lost its
right to appeal and the assessment, dated January 11, 2007, became conclusive and unappealable. The
CTA En Banc then concluded that CBC was precluded from interposing the defense of legality or validity
of the assessment.

China Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

The honorable court of tax appeals gravely erred in disregarding the law and interest of substantial justice
by reversing the ruling of the trial court solely because of its assumed pronouncement that the original
petition was filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period?

RULING:

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Under the current state of law, there can be no doubt that the law does not prescribe any formal
requirement to constitute a valid protest. To constitute a valid protest, it is sufficient if what has been filed
contains the spontaneous declaration made to acquire or keep some right or to prevent an impending
damage.27 Accordingly, a protest is valid so long as it states the taxpayers objection to the assessment
and the reasons therefor.

Time and again, it has been held that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid
down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by
the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. At the risk of being repetitious, the Court declares that the right to
appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.

the doctrinal weight of the pronouncement is confined to cases and controversies that emerged prior to
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).

Clearly, with the passage of R.A. No. 9282, the authority to exercise either original or appellate jurisdiction
over local tax cases depended on the amount of the claim. In cases where the RTC exercises appellate
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that there must be a court capable of exercising original jurisdiction
otherwise there would be no appeal over which the RTC would exercise appellate jurisdiction. The Court
cannot consider the City Treasurer as the entity that exercises original jurisdiction not only because it is
not a court within the context of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, but also because, as explained above,
B.P. 129 expressly delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, confining as it does
said appellate jurisdiction to cases decided by Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Verily, unlike in the case of the CA, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate jurisdiction on the RTC over rulings
made by non-judicial entities. The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction only from cases decided by the
Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the proper cases. The nature of the
jurisdiction exercised by these courts is original, considering it will be the first time that a court will take
judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action.

Lest it be misunderstood, this Court is not reversing its pronouncements in Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila,42The City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc.43 and City of Manila v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc.44 that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 are invalid. This Court is simply pointing
out the rule that claims for refunds are the exception, rather than the rule, and that each claim for refund,
in order to be granted, must be proceeded in accordance with the manner set forth by law. After all, in
every claim for refund of taxes paid, the burden is on the taxpayer to show that he has strictly complied
with the conditions for the grant of the tax refund or credit.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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