G.R. No.

196049

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails
the Order[1] dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March
2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage) based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.[3]

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.[4] On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio
under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).[6]
 The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.[7] The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in gross violation of the above provisions. The
trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that [f]ailure to comply
with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.[8] Apparently, the
RTC took the view that only the husband or the wife, in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition
to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact,[9] and not a civil action which is for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.[10] In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant
rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines[11]
on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.[13] Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to
sue. In the words of Fujiki, [i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage.[14] Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the procedural implementation of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)[15] in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.[16] The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.[17] Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the
civil registry relating to marriages, judgments of annulments of marriage and judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning are subject to cancellation or correction.[18] The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court gravely erred when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own.
Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court[19] which held that the trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.[20] Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have immediately dismissed the petition under Section 5 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.[21] The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a third person[22] in the
proceeding because he is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x.[23] On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that [a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of
this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x.[24]

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.[25] The Court in Braza ruled that [i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages x x x.[26] Braza emphasized that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as
[a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x.[27]

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
The trial court held that this is a jurisdictional ground to dismiss the petition.[28] Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5[29] of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the immediate dismissal of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.[30] The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.[31]

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs pronouncement that the petitioner
failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside and that the case be reinstated in the trial
court for further proceedings.[32] The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic[33] which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial
period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action
to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the injured spouse who should be given a legal
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.[34]

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding.[35] In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,[36] this Court held that [t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.[37] While
Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected
the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record [a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, [t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x.[38] The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro[39] and Nial v. Bayadog[40] which declared that [t]he validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked.[41]

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on
the petition.[42] Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.[43] Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.[44] On the other hand, Marinay
wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.[45] She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything
she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.[46]

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,[47] this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.[48]

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.[49] Petitioner may
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested
by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service
in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.[50]

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,[51] the
service of summons,[52] the investigation of the public prosecutor,[53] the setting of pre-trial,[54] the trial[55] and the
judgment of the trial court.[56] This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.[57] The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,[58] this Court explained that [i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.[59]

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that [l]aws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute
their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of
party expectations,[61] as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.[62]

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[63] Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.[64] Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.[65]

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule
1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that [a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage,[66] which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General,
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.[67]

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances[68]) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage.[69] These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family[70] and preserving the property regime of the marriage.[71]

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,[72] but a spouses right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III (Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife) of the Family Code.[73] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot diminish, increase, or modify the substantive right
of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.[74] In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity
of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that [a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife[75]it refers to
the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages
are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,[76] which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.[77] If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,[78] there is more
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely
civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.[79] Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.[80] Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a
court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry
of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.[81] Thus, the validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action to nullify
the marriage.[82] The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,[83] support pendente
lite of the spouses and children,[84] the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,[85] and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.[86] A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located.[87] In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor
of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In
Republic v. Orbecido,[88] this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse[89] under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under
the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo[90] which declared that the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[91]

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground
to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already presumptive evidence of a right between
the parties. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as
the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact[92] that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of
the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution
for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.[93] The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, [t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue
and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
406 Phil. 434

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 (formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ), March 08, 2001

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,

INFANTA, PANGASINAN, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing
marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of
the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on
21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born
out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew
or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he
would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.
He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass
him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint
and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate
 affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon
his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they
were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages
had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits,
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract,
it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano's and Payao's subsisting previous
marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already
is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed.
Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve
as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,[8]
who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9]
And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.[10]

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

384 Phil. 661

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL FOR HERSELF AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF THE MINORS

BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., PETITIONERS,
VS. NORMA BAYADOG, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant
suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father's death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with
this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are `true and correct'." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review.[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous
social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as
"a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family,
avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity - that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x"
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between
him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage
bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it
never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife,
and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage[27] and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either
the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
568 Phil. 724

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,

Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J,:

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,[2] declaring that (1)
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for
a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan,
in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C.
Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as
husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private
practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has
reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.[4]

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to
save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was
not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived
together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father
of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered
him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a
judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the
subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal
to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time
he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to
relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible.[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted
the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate
father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation
of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as
required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that
the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity,
and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation
of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into
by petitioner and respondent.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS
(1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring
the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.[9] Hence this
petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown
by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses
that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that
he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or
admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.[10] Petitioner additionally argues that there was no
need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and
not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the
trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative
defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner claims that a void marriage can be
the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity
where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be
time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.[12] Finally, petitioner claims that in
view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.[13]
In her Comment,[14] respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the
legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her
candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their
sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner
strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.[15]

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to
declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v.
Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to
support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without
a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.[17] In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial
court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.[18]

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the
daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.[20]
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,[21] the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.[22]

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.[23] In the instant case, it is
clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years.[24] However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination, thus
 ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband
and wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the
Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.[25]

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license.[26] In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in
fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from
the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void
ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.[27] Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[28]

The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;[30]

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the
latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner
was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which
ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced
to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3,
C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-
2 and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen putting the
wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the
act of kissing the petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in
JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.