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LESSON #04

TARIFF AND NONTARIFF TRADE BARRIERS

ECON103 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS A


WONG FOT CHYI WONG FOT CHYI
Lesson Outline
Welfare Analysis
Tariff As Trade Barriers
Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model
Effects of Import Tariffs on Exporters
Nontariff Trade Barriers
Import quota
Import Quota and Import Tariff Compared
Subsidies (domestic production subsidy / export subsidy)
Dumping and Anti-dumping regulations
Arguments for Trade Restrictions

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Welfare Analysis

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Welfare Analysis
The benchmark for evaluating the welfare effect of any
policy is the perfect competition market.
In an unregulated competitive market, consumers and
producers buy and sell at the prevailing market price.
Consumer surplus (CS)
Represents the difference between what buyers are willing &
able to pay and the actual amount they do pay
Producer surplus (PS)
Represents the difference between what producers are willing
and able to receive and the actual amount they do receive

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Consumer and Producer Surplus
Consumer A would pay $10 for
a good whose market price is
$5 and therefore enjoys a
benefit of $5.
Consumer B enjoys a benefit of
$2,
and Consumer C, who values the
good at exactly the market
price, enjoys no benefit.
Consumer surplus, which
measures the total benefit to all
consumers, is the yellow-shaded
area between the demand
curve and the market price.

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Consumer and Producer Surplus
Producer surplus measures
the total profits of producers,
plus rents to factor inputs.
It is the benefit that lower-cost
producers enjoy by selling at
the market price, shown by the
green-shaded area between
the supply curve and the
market price.
Together, consumer surplus
and producer surplus
measure the welfare benefit
of a competitive market.
For the economy, this Welfare effects: Gains and losses to
represents national welfare consumers and producers.
benefit.
WONG FOT CHYI
Welfare Analysis of Free Trade

Case for Imports


Pre-trade or autarky
Pre-trade: equilibrium

Autarky equilibrium at PA and


QA
Domestic supply = domestic
demand
No imports
CS and PS

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Welfare Analysis of Free Trade

Case for Imports


Pre-trade or autarky
With free trade: equilibrium
Import price = PW
Produces Q1; consumes Q2
Imports = Q2 Q1
CS expands
PS shrinks
CS = a + b + c
PS = a
Net welfare gain = b + c
positive
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Welfare Analysis of Free Trade

Case for Exports


Pre-trade:
Autarky equilibrium at PA and
QA
Domestic supply = domestic
supply
No exports
CS and PS

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Welfare Analysis of Free Trade

Case for Exports


With free trade:
Export price = PW
Produces Q4; consumes Q3
Exports = Q4 Q3
CS shrinks
PS expands
CS = e f = (e + f)
PS = e + f + g
Net welfare gain = g
positive
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Tariff As Trade Barriers

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Tariff As Trade Barriers

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Tariffs Some Definitions

Tariff: A tax (duty) levied on a product when it crosses


national boundaries
Import tariff: Tax levied on an imported product
Export tariff: Tax imposed on an exported product
Specific vs Ad Valorem (of value) Tariffs:
Specific Tariff: Fixed amount of money per physical unit of
the imported product (e.g. 15 cents/unit)
Ad Valorem Tariff: Fixed percentage of the value of the
imported product ( e.g. 15%/unit)

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Tariffs Some Definitions

Specific Tariff

Ad Valorem

Compound Tariff

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Tariffs Some Definitions

Singapore 0
Hong Kong 0
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Tariff Effects: An Overview
Tariff - imposes costs to domestic economy
Buyers pay more for domesticallymade goods than
imported goods under free trade
Job loss in retail and transportation sectors that import
foreign-made goods
Job loss in any domestic industry that suffer from
retaliatory tariffs
Additional cost of imported goods (inputs) are
passed on to consumers and export industries that use
these goods as inputs in the production process
Job loss in export industries arising from higher costs
and loss of export competitiveness
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model

Small Nation
Imports a very small portion of the world market
supply and is a Price taker
Import Tariff effects
Raises the home price of imports by the full amount
of the duty
Results in higher domestic production & producer
surplus PS
Lowers domestic consumption & decreased consumer
surplus CS
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model

With free trade at world


Small Nation
price PW:
Imports = Q2 Q1
Consumer surplus = CS
Producer surplus = PS
CS

PS

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model
With import tariff, t:
Price PW (PW + t)
Small Nation
Imports = Q4 Q3

Consumer surplus falls:

CS = (a+b+c+d)

Producer surplus increases:

PS = + a

Government tariff revenues (TR) rises

TR = + c

Net welfare effect of tariff = CS +


PS + TR = (b+d)

WONG FOTNegative
CHYI Net welfare loss
Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model
Before import tariff, t: After import tariff, t:

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model

Redistributive Effect (Area a) Small Nation


Transfer of Consumer Surplus
to domestic producers of
import competing product
Transfer of income from
consumers to producers

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model

Protective effect (Area b) Small Nation


Loss to the domestic economy
Wasted resources used to
produce additional goods at
increasing unit costs
Less efficient domestic
production replaces more
efficient foreign production
Loss of welfare

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model

Revenue Effect (Area c) Small Nation


The governments collection
of duties calculated by
quantity of imports times the
tariff rate
Loss in consumer surplus
transferred to government

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model

Consumption effect (Area d) Small Nation


Residual not accounted for
elsewhere
Loss of welfare occurs
Increased price
Lower consumption

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model

Deadweight loss (DWL) of the Small Nation


tariff (Areas b+d)
Protective effect (b)
Consumption effect (d)
DWL: value of wasted
resources devoted to
expanded domestic production
and expenditures devoted to
less-desired substitutes
brought about by a tariff
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Large Nation
An importing nation is large enough that a
change in the quantity of imports will affect
the world price of the product
United States
Autos, steel, oil, and consumer electronics
European Union

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation
Model

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

A tariff acts like a transportation cost, making sellers


unwilling to ship goods unless the Home price (PT) exceeds the
Foreign price (PT*) by the amount of the tariff:

PT t = PT* or PT = PT* + t

A tariff makes the price rise in the Home market and fall in
the Foreign market. It drives a wedge in the prices between
the 2 markets:
Home market
Price for Importers

t
Price for Exporters
WONG FOT CHYI Foreign market
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

For a small importing nation, it takes the world price as given


and, hence, the full amount of the tariff t is passed on to
domestic producers and consumers, as shown earlier.

Not so when a large importing nation imposes import tariff,


as will be shown next.

Home market
Price for Importers

t
Price for Exporters
WONG FOT CHYI Foreign market
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

XF

MH

With free trade: Equilibrium world price = PW


Homes imports = MH = QW
WONG FOT CHYI
Foreigns exports = XF = QW
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Price for Importers


XFT
MHT t Price for Exporters

When home country imposes import tariff, t:


Homes imports = MHT = QT < QW at an import price = PT > PW
Foreigns exports = XFT = QT < QW at an export price = P*T < PW
WONG FOT CHYI
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Because the price in the Home market rises from PW


under free trade to PT with the tariff,
Home producers supply more and Home consumers demand
less, so
the quantity of imports falls from QW under free trade to QT
with the tariff.
Because the price in the Foreign market falls from PW
under free trade to PT* with the tariff,
Foreign producers supply less, and Foreign consumers
demand more, so
the quantity of exports falls from QW to QT .
WONG FOT CHYI
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

The quantity of Home imports demanded equals the


quantity of Foreign exports supplied when
PT PT * = t

The increase in the price in Home can be less than the


amount of the tariff.
Part of the effect of the tariff causes the Foreign export
price to decline.
But this effect is sometimes very small.

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Import Price, PT

Export Price, PT*

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Welfare Analysis for Home


Country:
CS = (a+b+c+d)
PS = + a
Import Price, PT TR = (c+e)
a c
b
e
d
Net welfare effect of
Export Price, PT* tariff
= CS + PS + TR
= e (b+d)

WONG FOT CHYI


Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Before import tariff, t After import tariff, t

Import Price, PT
a b c d
e

Export Price, PT*

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Economic effects of an import


tariff on Home Country:
Redistributive effect a
From domestic consumers to

Import Price, PT domestic producers


a b c d Deadweight loss:
e
Protective effect b
Export Price, PT*
Consumption effect d

Revenue effect
Domestic revenue effect c

Terms-of-trade effect e
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Economic effects of an import


tariff on Home Country:
If e > (b + d)
National welfare is
Import Price, PT increased
a c
b
e
d If e = (b + d)
Export Price, PT* National welfare remains
constant
If e < (b + d)
National welfare is
diminished
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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

PW
PT*

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Welfare Analysis for Foreign


Country:
CS = + f
PS = (f + g)
TR = 0
PW
Net welfare effect of Home f g
PT*
Countrys import tariff on
Foreign Country:
= CS + PS + TR
=g
i.e. negative
WONG FOT CHYI
Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Before import tariff After import tariff

PW PW
f g
PT* PT*

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Tariff Welfare Effects: Large-Nation Model

Optimum tariff
Maximize the positive difference between
Gain of improving terms of trade (area e)
Loss in economic efficiency from the protective effect
(area b)
Consumption effect (area d)

Isonly beneficial to the importing nation


Beggar-thy-neighbor policy, could invite
retaliation
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The Optimum Tariff

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Effects of Import Tariffs On Exporters
Although a tariff protects import-competing producers, it
impose a burden on domestic export producers.
The higher prices of imports hurt domestic exporters in 3
ways
Higher production costs from imported inputs
Can result in higher prices and depending on elasticity of
demand can reduce overseas sales
Raise the cost of living
Higher wages and higher production costs
International repercussions
Lead to reductions in domestic exports from possible
WONG FOT CHYI retaliatory tariffs
Effects of Import Tariffs On Exporters

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Nontariff Trade Barriers (NTBs)

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Nontariff Trade Barriers (NTBs)
NTBs are policies other than tariffs that restrict
international trade.
These measures are intended to reduce imports and
thus benefit domestic producers.
They include:
Import quota
Subsidies (domestic production subsidy / export subsidy)

Anti-dumping regulations

Export quota / Voluntary export restraint

Domestic content requirements

Government procurement policy


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Import Quota
Physical restriction on the quantity of goods that are
imported during a specific time period
Requires an import license
Specifies the total volume of imports allowed
Used primarily on manufactured goods
Outlawed by the World Trade Organization

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Import Quota Welfare Effect
Consider this example on USs import of cheese from EU.
With free trade, the world price of cheese is $2.50
US consumption = 8 pounds
US production = 1 pound
US import = 8 1 = 7 pounds
When US imposes an import
quota of 3 pounds, supply of
cheese SUS SUS+Q.
P = $5.00
US production = 3 pounds
US consumption = 6 pounds
US import = 6 3 = 3 pounds
WONG FOT CHYI
Import Quota Welfare Effect
With the import quota:
CS = (a+b+c+d)
PS = + a
Quota rent = c
Quota rent:
quotas revenue effect, due
to the fact that US consumers
must pay a higher price for
each of the 3 pounds of
cheese imported under the
quota, as a result of the
quota-induced scarcity of
cheese.
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Import Quota Welfare Effect
An import quota:
Results in price increase

Decrease in consumer
surplus a+b+c+d
Redistributive effects a
Deadweight losses
Protective effects b
Consumption effects d
Revenue effects
Windfall profits / Quota
rents
WONG FOT CHYI
Import Quota Welfare Effect
An import quota:
Results in price increase

Decrease in consumer
surplus a+b+c+d
Redistributive effects a

Deadweight losses

Protective effects b
Consumption effects d
Revenue effects
Windfall profits / Quota
rents
WONG FOT CHYI
Import Quota Welfare Effect
But who gets the quota rent? It can accrue to any these 3 entities:
Domestic importers, e.g. grocers
They organize as a single importing company and become a monopoly buyer; while
European exporting companies behave as competitive sellers.
US grocers pay at $2.50/pound and re-sell to US consumers at $5/pound.
Since the windfall accrues to US companies, this does not become a welfare loss for the
economy
Foreign producers or exporters
They collude to become monopoly seller; while US grocers behave as competitive buyers to
bid up price of cheese which is delivered at $5/pound
Since the windfall accrues to European exporters, this becomes a welfare loss for the US
company
Government
It sells import licenses to the US grocers. It can charge for permission to import so it takes
some of the quotas windfall profit. Or if government sells to highest bidder for the license,
it can capture ALL of the windfall profit if competition among importers drive up auction
price to selling price.
Since the windfall accrues to US government, this does not become a welfare loss for the US
company
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Import Quota vs Import Tariff
The previous analysis shows how the revenue effect of import
quotas differs from that of import tariffs.
These two policies can also differ in the impact on the volume
of trade.
The next slide illustrates how, during periods of growing
demand, an import quota restricts the volume of imports by a
greater amount than does an equivalent import tariff.
Also, by imposing an absolute limit on the imported good, a
quota is more restrictive than a tariff and suppresses
competition, as it forecloses the market mechanism, for
example, for foreign producers to cutting prices by lowering
profit margins.
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Import Quota vs Import Tariff
With a tariff, an increase in demand will be met by a rise in imports;
with a quota, no new imports are allowed in.

SUS+Q

M1 > M0
M1 M1
M1=M0=Q
M0 M0

WONG FOT CHYI


Subsidies
Outright cash disbursements, tax breaks, insurance
arrangements, and subsidized loans
Given to producers to improve market position

Provide domestic firms a cost advantage


(domestic production subsidies)
Allows firms sell goods at prices below cost or
profit considerations (export subsides)

WONG FOT CHYI


Subsidies
Two types of subsidies can be distinguished:
Domestic production subsidy: granted to producers
of import-competing goods
Export subsidy: goes to producers of goods for
exports.
In both cases, the government adds an amount to
the price the purchaser pays rather than
subtracting from it.
The net price actually received by the producer
equals the price paid by the purchaser plus the
subsidy.
WONG FOT CHYI
Subsidies Welfare Effects
Domestic Production Subsidy
Before subsidy, but with free
trade at world price of $400
US consumes 14m tons, produces
2m tons imports 14 2 = 12 m
tons
With a production subsidy of
$25 per ton, cost advantage
to domestic producers SUS.0
SUS.1
US production = 7m tons
US imports = (14 7) = 7m tons
(Note: US consumption is
unchanged at 14m tons)

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Subsidies Welfare Effects

Price for producers

Subsidy

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Subsidies Welfare Effects
Domestic Production Subsidy
Results in higher output
Redistributed Effects increase

in producer surplus for the


more efficient producers a
Deadweight losses Protective

effect b
Subsidies financed by
taxpayers a+b
Consumption is unchanged
CS=0
Lower welfare losses than a
WONGtariff/quota
FOT CHYI
Subsidies Welfare Effects
Export Subsidy
Before subsidy, but with free
trade at world price of $5
US consumes 4m bushels, produces
8m bushels exports 4m bushels
With a subsidy of $1/bushel,
US producers receive a revenue
of $6/bushel:
US production = 10m
US consumption = 2m
Exports1
US exports = (10 2) = 8m
Exports0
Question: Although the subsidy is not
available on domestic sales, why are
domestic consumers paying the higher
price of $6 per bushel consumption?
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Subsidies Welfare Effects
Export Subsidy
Higher output and prices for
exporters
Higher exports; Lower domestic
consumption
Domestic producers gain at the
expense of the domestic
consumers and taxpayers
Decrease in consumer surplus: CS
= (a + b)
Increase in producer surplus: PS =
(a + b + c) Exports1
Taxpayers bears the cost of export
subsidy = (b + c + d) Exports0
Deadweight losses: Welfare =
(b + d)
WONG FOT CHYI
Subsidies Welfare Effects
Export Subsidy
Higher output and prices for
exporters
Higher exports; Lower domestic
consumption
Domestic producers gain at the
expense of the domestic
consumers and taxpayers
Decrease in consumer surplus: CS
= (a + b)
Increase in producer surplus: PS
= (a + b + c) Exports1
Taxpayers bears the cost of export
subsidy = (b + c + d) Exports0
Deadweight losses: Welfare =
(b + d)
WONG FOT CHYI
Subsidies Welfare Effects
Export Subsidy
Higher output and prices for
exporters
Higher exports; Lower domestic
consumption
Domestic producers gain at the
expense of the domestic
consumers and taxpayers
Decrease in consumer surplus: CS
= (a + b)
Increase in producer surplus: PS
= (a + b + c) Exports1
Taxpayers bears the cost of export
subsidy = (b + c + d) Exports0
Deadweight losses: Welfare =
(b + d)
WONG FOT CHYI
Subsidies Welfare Effects
Export Subsidy
Higher output and prices for
exporters
Higher exports; Lower domestic
consumption
Domestic producers gain at the
expense of the domestic
consumers and taxpayers
Decrease in consumer surplus: CS
= (a + b)
Increase in producer surplus: PS
= (a + b + c) Exports1
Taxpayers bears the cost of export
subsidy = (b + c + d) Exports0
Deadweight losses: Welfare
= (b + d)
WONG FOT CHYI
Dumping: Welfare Effects

Dumping
International price discrimination
Foreign producers charge lower prices than domestic
producers for an identical good (after allowing for
transportation costs and tariff duties)
Selling in foreign markets at a price below the price
charged by the same firm in its home market or below
the cost of production

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Dumping: Welfare Effects

Dumping: PW P1
Consumer surplus
increases
CS = + (a+b+c+d)
Producer surplus falls
PS = a
Net welfare effect of
dumping = CS + PS =
+ (b+c+d)
Net welfare gain
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Dumping: Anti-Dumping Duties

Anti-Dumping Duties
Despite the benefits that dumping may offer to
importing consumers, governments have often levied
penalty duties against commodities they believe are
being dumped into their markets from abroad.

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Dumping: Types of Dumping

Types of Dumping
Sporadic Dumping: Firm disposes of excess
inventories on foreign markets by selling abroad at
lower prices than at home
Predatory dumping: Firm temporarily reduce prices
charged abroad to drive foreign competitors out of
business. Aims to reach a monopoly position
Persistent dumping: Goes on indefinitely. A producer
may consistently sell abroad at lower prices than at
home
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Dumping: International Price Discrimination

Dumping is a form of price discrimination but implemented


across borders: no difference from domestic price
discrimination. (3rd Degree Price Discrimination)
Conditions for successful international price discrimination:
Submarkets demand conditions must differ: different
demand elasticities (home/foreign)
Firm is able to separate the two submarkets: Prevent
arbitrage (resale of goods at higher price)
Markets easier to separate internationally
High transportation costs
Trade restrictions
WONG FOT CHYI
Dumping: International Price Discrimination

Consider the case of a South Korean (SK) steel


producer that enjoys market power as a result of
barriers that restrict competition at home.
Suppose this firm sells in Canadian (C) market that
is highly competitive. This means that the SK
consumer response to a change in price is less than
that abroad; the SK demand is less elastic than the
Canadian demand.

WONG FOT CHYI


Dumping: International Price Discrimination

A profit-maximizing firm would benefit from


international price discrimination, by equating its
marginal cost of production to the marginal
revenue from selling the product in each market,
thus: MC = MRSK = MRC
Thus, it will charge a higher price in SK where
demand is inelastic, and a lower price in Canada
where demand is more elastic.

WONG FOT CHYI


Dumping: International Price Discrimination
The home (SK) market is less price elastic than foreign (C), and
hence has steeper demand and MR curves.
Profit maximization: MC = MRSK+C MC = MRSK = MRC
Horizontal summation
of D and MR curves of
the 2 markets

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
According to the free-trade arguments we have
studied so far, if each nation produces what it
does best and permits trade, then in the long
term it leads:
lower prices
higher levels of output, income, and consumption.

Nonetheless, nations imposed trade restrictions


led by various arguments

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Job protection argument:
Allegation: job losses due to foreign competition
historically a major force behind the desire of most US labor
leaders to reject free-trade policies
Counter-agurment:

Ignores dual nature of international trade

Job gains for only a few industries

Job losses spread across many industries (e.g. in retail and


transport sectors of import goods; and in export industries)
Each job saved ends up costing domestic consumers more
than the workers salary
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Protection against cheap foreign labor:
Allegation: Low wages abroad makes it hard for U.S.
firms to compete with firms using cheap foreign labor
Counter-argument:

Fails to recognize the links among efficiency, wages,


and production costs
Low wages do not guarantee low costs => better
indicator is unit labour costs (ULC)
Low-wage nations competitive advantage: Only in the
production of goods requiring greater labor and little of the
other factor inputs

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions

Not adjusted for


productivity differences!

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Adjusted for productivity differences

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Fairness in trade:
Allegation: Foreign governments play by a different set

of rules / foreign firms have unfair competitive


advantage
Counter-argument:

Trade benefits the domestic economy even if foreign nations


impose trade restrictions
retaliating by levying import barriers, which protect
inefficient domestic producers, decreases welfare even more
Overlooks the potential impact on global trade
a worldwide escalation in restrictions trade wars
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Maintenance of the domestic standard of living:
Allegation: by reducing the level of imports, tariffs encourage
home spending, which stimulates domestic economic activity
increase employment and income
Counter-argument:

Beggar thy neighbor policy


Retaliatory tariffs, resulting in a lower level of welfare for
all nations
For example: the US Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930
average tariff levels rose to almost 60% and covered more
than 12,000 products other countries retaliated by
raising their tariff levels world trade and U.S. exports
dropped sharply
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
The Contracting Spiral of World Trade, January 1929 to March 1933
(total imports of 75 countries in millions of U.S. dollars)

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Equalization of production costs:
Allegation: impose scientific tariff to eliminate unfair
competition from abroad
Counter-argument:

Different costs across business makes comparison impossible.


Since costs differ from business to business within a given
industry, how can costs actually be compared?
It leads to higher domestic prices, thus domestic consumer
would be subsidizing inefficient production.
Scientific tariff approximates a prohibitive tariff, which
completely contradicts the notion of comparative
advantage and wipes out the basis for trade and gains
from trade
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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Infant-industry argument:
Allegation: contends that for free trade to be meaningful,
trading nations should temporarily shield their newly
developing industries from foreign competition
Counter-argument:
Some merits, but once a protective tariff is imposed - very
difficult to remove
special-interest groups convince policy makers that further
protection is justified
Hard to determine which industries will realize comparative
advantage potential in long-run - does the government
know better?
Not valid for mature, industrialized nations
Better alternatives may include providing subsidy to
domestic industry in place of tariffs, or just importing it
WONG FOT CHYI
Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Domestic market failure argument:
Allegation: contends that free trade rested on cost-benefit
analysis using the concepts of consumer and producer surplus,
but these concepts, producer surplus in particular, do not
properly measure costs and benefits, such as technological
spillovers from industries that are new or particularly
innovative. Thus, there is a marginal social benefit to
additional production that is not captured by the producer
surplus measure.
Counter-argument:
domestic market failures should be corrected by domestic
policies aimed directly at the problems sources, e.g. direct
production subsidy
market failure cannot be diagnosed well enough to
prescribe policy
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Domestic Market Failure Argument for a Tariff

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Arguments for Trade Restrictions
Non-Economic Arguments
Examples include:
National security argument: Protect essential
industries
This argument is over-used.
Defense needs may be better served by allowing or
expanding imports rather than restricting them.
A better policy for meeting defense needs is through a
domestic production subsidy with free trade.
Cultural and sociological considerations
WONG FOT CHYI
End of Lesson

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