ARROYO VS DE VENECIA

GR NO. 127255 AUGUST 14, 1997

(An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House of Representatives
involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This was later passed accordingly
and brought to the House of Senate.)

FACTS:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question
on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having
been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

HELD:
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.

RATIO: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a
coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department
itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty
of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case
does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases
such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar
as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago,
and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after
the debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every
time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a
bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if
old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend
casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor
do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just.

ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995)
Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution

FACTS:
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.
Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways &
Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino
averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes
the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco
even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD:
No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the
initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate
passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

ABAKADA GURO V. ERMITA

G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005

FACTS:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al.,
insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on
provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and
Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for
power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for
the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for
sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on
provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict
because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional
imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution
when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT.
Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the
recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two
events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required
extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right.
Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it
has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.

ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?

HELD:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of
either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare
the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or
tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the
facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.
His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of
the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right,
and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the
Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly,
the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is
a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be
accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds.

The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court is LIFTED.

Bara Lidasan vs Commission on Elections

21 SCRA 496 Political Law Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
FACTS:
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however
discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant
to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to
this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred
that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill?

HELD:
No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult
to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is
to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC

73 P.R. 288, 1942

FACTS:
Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted a resolution
providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons
named therein. Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, claims
the exclusive right to propose the appointment of such inspectors. He contends that the resolution of
the Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of the Nationalista Party the
right to propose one election inspector for each of the precincts in each of the 53 legislative districts,
contravenes Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that under that section the
Nationalista Party has the right to propose one, and only one inspector for each precinct, and that the
resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in each and every precinct within those
legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that the discretion given by Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No.
657 to the Comelec in the Choice of election inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the provision of
the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only one inspector.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of
the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of the
discretion granted to it by law.

HELD:
The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec is a
constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly, and honest elections. The
Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal /
constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. The Comelec because of its fact-
finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience
in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex
political questions. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the
Constitution requires that the power of the Supreme Court to review the acts of that body should, as a
general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.

WENCESLAO PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS

110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed

FACTS:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals.
Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved
were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a
member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta
misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be
unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then
prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for
such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the
City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD:
No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent
donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private
property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for
the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were
to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

DEMETRIO DEMETRIA VS MANUEL ALBA

148 SCRA 208 Political Law Transfer of Funds Power of the President to Realign Funds

FACTS:
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit
Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1,
Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD:
No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under
the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers,
but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision
in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in
the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from
one department to another here.

MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III

Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program - Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of
the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken
from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B
for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity
of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by
the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to
the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them
in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the
GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is
an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for
the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP,
funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that
they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to
the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

ANDRES GARCES VS. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image
of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations
and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic
parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of
the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to
return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because
church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case
against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed
an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when
they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional
provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor
any sect or church.

ISSUE: Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private
funds in connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional
socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the
patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and
(2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained
through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion,
nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The
image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is
entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was
the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass
was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint
for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio
fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta
relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

GREGORIO AGLIPAY VS JUAN RUIZ

64 Phil. 201 Political Law Appropriation Religious Sect Religious Freedom

FACTS:
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place
sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the
production of certain stamps the design of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and
stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to
Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production and
sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular
religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the
appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.

HELD:
No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on
the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such
event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act
No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with
new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated
in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact
that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his
discretion.
On religious freedom
The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as
elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to
establish an ideal government. If should also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional
mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

LLADOC VS COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (1965)

FACTS:
M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000.00 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental,
for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the
purpose intended.
A year later, M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. CIR issued an assessment for
donee's gift tax against the parish, of which petitioner was the priest.
Petitioner filed a protest which was denied by the CIR. He then filed an appeal with the CTA
citing that he was not the parish priest at the time of donation, that there is no legal entity or juridical
person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable for the
donee's gift tax and that assessment of the gift tax is unconstitutional.
The CTA denied the appeal thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner and the parish are liable for the donee's gift tax.

HELD:
Yes for the parish. The Constitution only made mention of property tax and not of excise tax as
stated in Section 22, par 3. The assessment of the CIR did not rest upon general ownership; it was an
excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way
of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
No for the petitioner. The Court ordered petitioner to be substituted by the Head of Diocese to
pay the said gift tax after the CIR and Solicitor General did not object to such substitution.

JEAN ARNAULT VS NAZARENO

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation

FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined
by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a
partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault
refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . .
. the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD:
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct
inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a
query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but
the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour
Constitutionality of E.O. 464

FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the
Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said
anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource
persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing
due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar
letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in
the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National
Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined
by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2
military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of
EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in
the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other,
should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on
her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on
its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect
the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter
of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress
may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons
stated in Arnault.

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order
No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow
and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of
Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

CAMILO SABIO VS RICHARD GORDON

504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers

FACTS:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly
ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD:
No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that
the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them
to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation.

JOSE BENGZON, JR. VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in Aid of
Legislation When not Allowed
FACTS:
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained
with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control
over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell
Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took
over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred
to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee
hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case
against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to
Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to
have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of
RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36
or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation
because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within
the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that
Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.