PINEDA V. DELA RAMA
L-25836-
121 SCRA 671
FACTS:
Pineda was caught in a case against the NARIC for his
alleged
misappropriation of many cavans of palay. He hired Atty. Dela
Rama to delay the filing of the complaint against him, on alleged
representation of the lawyer that he is a friend of the NARIC
administrator.
Pineda then issued a promissory note in favor of dela Rama to
pay for the advances that the lawyer made to the administrator
to delay the filing of the complaint. Dela Rama on the
other hand contended that the promissory note was for the loan
advanced to Pineda by him. Dela Rama filed an action against
Pineda for the collection of the amount of the note.
HELD:
The presumption that a negotiable
instrument was issued for valuable consideration is a rebuttable
presumption. It can be rebutted by proof to the contrary.
In the case at bar, the claims of dela Rama that the promissory
note was for a loan advanced to Pineda is
unbelievable. The grant of a loan by a lawyer to a moneyed
client and whom he has known for only 3 months cannot be
relied on. Pineda had actually just purchased numerous
properties. It is highly illogical that he would loan from dela
Rama P9500 for 5 days apart.
Furthermore, the note was void ab initio because the consid
eration given
was to influence the administrator to delay charges against
Pineda. The consideration was void for being against law and
public policy.
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Aruego [G.R. Nos.
37. January 31, 1981]
FACTS:
Aruego signed instruments, labeled bills of exchange, as follows:
JOSE ARUEGO (Acceptor) (SGD) JOSE ARGUEGO
Philippine Bank of Commerce filed an action against Aruego. The
sum sought to be recovered represents the cost of the printing of
World Current Events, a periodical published by the latter. To
facilitate the payment of the printing Aruego obtained a credit
accommodation from the plaintiff. Thus, for every printing of the
World Current Events, the printer, Encal Press and Photo
Engraving, collected the cost of printing by drawing a draft against
Philippine Bank of Commerce, said draft being sent later to the
Aruego for acceptance. Aruego contends that he signed the drafts
only as an accommodation party and as such, should be made
liable only after a showing that the drawer is incapable of paying.
He also contends that the drafts signed by him were not really bills
of exchange but mere pieces of evidence of indebtedness because
payments were made before acceptance.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not the drafts may be considered negotiable bills
of exchange.
(b) Whether or not Aruego may be held liable only as an agent.
(c) Whether or not an accommodation party is liable.
RULING
(a) YES. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a bill of exchange
is an unconditional order in writting addressed by one person to
another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to
whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or
determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to
bearer. As long as a commercial paper conforms with the
definition of a bill of exchange, that paper is considered a bill of
exchange. The nature of acceptance is important only in the
determination of the kind of liabilities of the parties involved, but
not in the determination of whether a commercial paper is a bill
of exchange or not.
(b) NO. For failure to disclose his principal, Aruego is personally
liable for the drafts he accepted. Section 20 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law provides that Where the instrument contains
or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs
for or on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, he is
not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the
mere addition of words describing him as an agent or as filing a
representative character, without disclosing his principal, does
not exempt him from personal liability.
(c) YES. Such person is liable on the instrument to a holder for
value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of the taking of the
instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party. In
lending his name to the accommodated party, the accommodation
party is in effect a surety for the latter. He lends his name to enable
the accommodated party to obtain credit or to raise money. He
receives no part of the consideration for the instrument but
assumes liability to the other parties thereto because he wants to
accommodate another. In the instant case, Aruego signed as a
drawee/acceptor. Under the Negotiable Instrument Law, a
drawee is primarily liable. Thus, he should not have signed as an
acceptor/drawee because in doing so, he became primarily and
personally liable for the drafts.
CLARK V. SELINER- Liability Of An Accommodation Party42
PHIL 384
FACTS:
Sellner with two other persons, signed a promissory note
solidarily binding
themselves to pay to the order of R.N Clark. The note matu
red but the
amount wasn't paid. The defendant alleges that he didn't re
ceive any
amount of the debt; that the instrument wasn't presented to
him for
payment and being an accommodation party, he is not liable
unless the note is negotiated, which wasn't done.
HELD:
On the first issue, the liability of Sellner as one of the signers of
the note, is not dependent on whether he has or has not,
received any part of the
debt. The defendant is really and expressly one of the joint
and several debtors of the note and as such he is liable under the
provisions of Section 60 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
As to the presentment for payment, such action is not
necessary in order to charge the person primarily liable, as is
the defendant Sellner.
As to whether or not Sellner is an accommodation party, it
should be taken into account that by putting his signature to the
note, he lent his name, not to the creditor, but to those who
signed with him placing him in the same position and with the
same liability as the said signers. It should be noted
that the phrasewithout receiving value therefore as used in
section 29 means without receiving value by virtue of the
instrument and not, as it apparently is supposed to mean,
without receiving payment for lending his name. It is
immaterial as far as the creditor is concerned, whether one of the
signers has or has not received anything in payment for the use
of his name. In this case, the legal situation of Sellner is that of a
joint surety
who upon the maturity of the note, pay the debt, demand th
e collateral
security and dispose of it to his benefit. As to the plaintiff, he is a
holder for value.