Rights of an Accused during Trial burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. The court recognizes that
pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due
process right to fair trial. However, petitioner needs to show more weighty social science evidence
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Thus the
of law.
petition was dismissed.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined to prejudicial publicity
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting an
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already developed a bias against the
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
petitioner. He submits that it is a violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal and
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when
the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different. US courts
Estrada vs. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an
accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the test of actual prejudice shall be applied. The
Facts
test shows that there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The Court rules that there is not enough
After Estradas impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation from the Presidential
evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
post, a cluster of legal problems started appearing. Several cases previously filed against him in
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion including among others, bribery and graft and
burden of proof.
corruption, plunder, perjury, serious miscounduct, malversation of public funds, illegal use of public
funds. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The
investigate the charges against the petitioner.Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for
petitioner alleges that there were news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
prejudged the cases against him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may
Court also cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be
warranted Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the
conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity
cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him
on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file
is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.
Equipoise Rule Corpus vs. People, GR No. 74259, February 14, 1991
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks for the reversal of the decision of the respondent court finding him guilty beyond
Held
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of malversation of public funds.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the
No. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as
received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to
well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
government accounts.
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22,
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08
Letter of demands was issued and the petitioner was able to pay 10, 159.50 and 12, 067.51
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
through payment of salary deduction before he was terminated from the service.
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove
A final letter of demand constituting of 50,000 was issued. The demand not having been met a
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. Our judges
Malversation case was filed.
are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of
Petitioner contends that he did not used the money and the money was used by a third person
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se
named Pineda, that he was forced to post the said amount even though he did not received the
fatally infect their impartiality.
said amount of money.
He also contends that he was on official leave of absence on the said date and he did not know
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
anything about the issuance of the check.
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. To warrant a finding
Testifying for the prosecution he argue that petitioner was not on official leave that day, that the
of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
petitioner was present on the morning and went to hospital to visit her wife and back to the office
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records
in the afternoon.
do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
He also said that there are 4 checks issued Dec. 22, 23 and 29 1980 respectively and liquidated
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
but only the said amount was not posted.
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity
Acting provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pinedas testimony.
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
He also denied that he had put pressure on him on posting the 50,000.
ISSUE: WON Equipoise Rule is applicable in the case at bar.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties
is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales
in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence
he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
Caes vs. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 (1989)
Facts:
On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate Informations with illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. The cases were consolidated on December 10, 1981. Arraignment was originally scheduled
on January 11, 1982, but was for some reason postponed. On August 31, 1982, Caes was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled for October 13, 1982, but this was reset
upon agreement of the parties. Several other trial dates were reset mostly because the
prosecutions witnesses were not available.
On November 14, 1983, upon motion of the prosecution, the judge provisionally dismissed the
case for lack of interest of the prosecution witnesses to appear. On January 9, 1984, Maj. Dacanay
and Sgt. Lustado filed a motion to revive the case who alleged that they could not attend the
hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of notice. The judge acting on the motion,
revived the cases and set a hearing on June 1984. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied, and the revived cases were set from hearing on November 19, 1984.
The petitioner questioned the judge's order on certiorari with the SC, which referred his petition to
the respondent court. The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on and reconsideration
denied. Caes then came to SC again and raised a petition is based on two arguments, to wit: (a)
that the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was not filed by the proper party nor
was a copy served on the petitioner; and (b) the revival of the cases would place the petitioner
double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs right to speedy trial has been violated?
Ruling:
Yes, his right to speedy trial has been violated. As the record shows, the petitioner was arraigned
on August 31, 1982, but was never actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14,
1983, following eleven postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution
was not prepared. The accused was never absent at these aborted hearings. He was prepared to
be tried, but either the witnesses against him were not present, or the prosecutor himself was
absent, or the court lacked material time. Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang
over his head even as he was not given an opportunity to deny them because his trial could not
be held.
Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This would have been in keeping with People v.
Cloribel, where the case dragged for almost four years due to numerous postponements, mostly
at the instance of the prosecution, and was finally dismissed on motion of the defendants when
the prosecution failed to appear at the trial. This Court held "that the dismissal here complained
of was not truly a dismissal but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence
on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on
the date of trial."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the respondent court dated
May 20, 1986, and the orders of the trial court dated May 18, 1984, and October 9, 1984, are SET
ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. C-16411(81) and C-16412(81) is hereby declared
as final.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
Go vs. Ramos, GR No. 167569, September 4, 2009
Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis
T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against
Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while
Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy,
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as
FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He
also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,verring that the complaint for
deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful
share in their business dealings.
Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is
a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father
and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against Jimmy.
On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their contention
is that Carlos election of citizenship was made out of time.
The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and deportation of
Jimmy Go to China. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the
said court.
They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
appeals. The petition was granted.
Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureu of immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
RULING: NO
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed
by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired
into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[99]
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to
quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should
not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term
court in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order
the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[100] Likewise,
the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.[101]
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending
his deportation, coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered
moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments
advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
Reyes vs. Gonzales, GR No. 182161, December 3, 2009
WRIT OF AMPARO
DEFINITION:
Is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, or security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
FACTS:
Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel Seige and were charged of
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. DILG issued Hold Departure Order in the
interest of national security and public safety.
On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against the
petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. That petitioners and other accused civilians
were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to
come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite the dismissal of the
crime of rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his name is included in the Hold
Departure List. This happens every time he left for abroad.
Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the petitioners constitutional
right to travel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD:
No. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private person or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or threats thereof.
Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the right to be free form arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed from arbitrary into mere freedom from physical restraint of
the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities he has
been endowed by his Creator.
Security is the freedom of persons from fear, freedom from threat.
In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner;s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency
of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that
his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it AMOUNTED to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy.
Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, GR No. 182498, December 3, 2009
FACTS:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin
Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31,
2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House.
Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for
Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong
to simply wait for Tagitis return.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim
studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the
Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean
Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed
against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon,
Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as petitioners), with the
Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set
the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
enforced disappearance under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed
the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case
qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis
and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect
the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions
to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the
military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-
CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
"enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried
"great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and
belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the
abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police
theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous
brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money
entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that
he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that
Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondents
testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that
there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second.
Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM
paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the
military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of
ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his
family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task
Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the
same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen
Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the
military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements
that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence
at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key
with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however,
from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that
Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in
terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent
but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For
why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had
not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the
governments cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the
evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case
of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration,
heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact
of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and
unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively
placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were
remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the
validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
RULE 7
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.
Speedy Disposition of Cases (No Cases)
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279
FACTS:
More than two hundred members of the Philippine Armed Forces raided the compound of the
petitioners at Gov. Alvarez Street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and
other explosives.
The military operation was known as ZONA which is not unlike the feared practive of KEPEITAI
during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered
by a hooded informer, and executing them outright.
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was of course to resist the invasion with a
burst of gunfire, but there being only an intention to warn the intruders and deter them from
entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected, the situation aggravated soon enough and the
soldiers counter fire and a bloody shoot out ensued, resulting to number of casualties.
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, 16 males occupants were arrested,
and later on finger-printed, paraffin tested and photographed over their objection. The military also
confiscated different rifles and explosives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to self-incrimination can be invoked or applies to photographing, finger
printing, and paraffin testing of the petitioners.
HELD:
No. The prohibition against self incrimination applies only to TESTIMONIAL COMPULSION. The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort COMMUNICATIONS FROM HIM, not an
exclusion of his BODY AS EVIDENCE WHEN IT MAY BE MATERIAL.
People vs. Gamboa, 194 SCRA 372
FACTS:
Petitioner herein, John Gabriel Gamboa, with Miguel Celdran were charged of murder and were
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. However, Celdran was discharged of the charges.
While while one of the witnesses, Cristina Soledad was talking with the deceased, and his
common law husband of Rene Impas, the petitioner with Celdran kicked open the door and shot
the victim hitting the latter on his shoulder. The accused, then shot another hitting the latter into
his abdomen that made him fall face down on bed that immediately caused his death. Soledad,
shouted for help and then, one of the tenants, Rico Acre responded. Upon seeing the victim on
bed with difficulty on breathing, he shouted for help and then their neighbor, Gascon came
together with Acre to lift the victim and loaded him in the car of police Maj. Impas, the father of the
victim.
The victim, was then subjected to paraffin test without the presence of a counsel, and he invoked
his right to self incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the paraffin testing conducted is violative of the Constitutional Right of the accused
and is equivalent to self incrimination.
HELD:
No. What is protected by the constitution is the compulsory exaction of testimonies from the
accused that may be used against himself and not the body evidence which may be used as
evidence if material.
Wherefore the decision appealed from is affirmed.
Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil 145
FACTS: In a criminal case pending before the CFI of Manila, EMETERIA VILLAFLOR and
FLORENTINO SOUINGCO are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for
trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant
fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Villaflor, petitioner herein, to submit
her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or
not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person
was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was
found in contempt of court and was ordered to be imprisoned in Bilibid Prison until she should
permit the medical examination required by the court.
The sole legal issue arising from the facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the
Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of the Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin
in the Constitution of the United States, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.
Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional
provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the
constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is
brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical question as contended
for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
ISSUE: WON compelling a woman to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant
violates her right against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty,
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited
to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition
is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians
due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is
absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family
doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an
examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should,
nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal.
The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against, the
petitioner.
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181
Facts:
Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a private corporation known
as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2,
promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986,
respectively, and (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in
accordance with said executive orders by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
and/or its Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation. The sequestration order issued
on April 14, 1986 was addressed to three of the agents of the Commission, ordering them to
sequester several companies among which is Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. On the
strength of the above sequestration order, several letters were sent to BASECO among which is
that from Mr. Jose M. Balde, acting for the PCGG, addressed a letter dated April 18, 1986 to the
President and other officers of petitioner firm, reiterating an earlier request for the production of
certain documents. The letter closed with the warning that if the documents were not submitted
within five days, the officers would be cited for "contempt in pursuance with Presidential Executive
Order Nos. 1 and 2." BASECO contends that its right against self-incrimination and unreasonable
searches and seizures had been transgressed by the Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to
produce corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the Commission if it fails
to do so." BASECO prays that the Court 1) declare unconstitutional and void Executive Orders
Numbered 1 and 2; 2) annul the sequestration order dated April- 14, 1986, and all other orders
subsequently issued and acts done on the basis thereof, inclusive of the takeover order of July
14, 1986 and the termination of the services of the BASECO executives.
ISSUE: WON documents ask in by PCGG would vitiate their right against self incrimination.
RULING:
It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons.
While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and
franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.
Corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections, which private individuals have.
They are not at all within the privilege against self-incrimination; although this court more than
once has said that the privilege runs very closely with the 4th Amendment's Search and Seizure
provisions. It is also settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce its records in
its possession upon the plea that they will either incriminate him or may incriminate it." The
corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.
It received certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the
state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not
authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it
obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve right in the legislature to investigate its contracts
and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a
state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise
of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been
abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The
defense amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which is charged with a criminal violation
of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To
state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating
questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested
with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse
of such privileges.
Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil 570
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent
judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting
from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order requiring to write so that his handwriting may be validated documentary
evidence is considered self-incrimination.
RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, it is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.
An order requiring the accused to write so that his handwriting may be validated with the
documentary evidence is covered by the constitutional proscription against self-incrimination.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or
not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
The case at bar is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And as
to such production of documents or chattels by a person may be refused.
For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and those
under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take
down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
In civil case Bagadiong vs. De Guzman, 94 SCRA 906 (1979)
FACTS: On January 12, 1966, the herein plaintiffs-respondents filed the civil case for prohibition
with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction with the CFI of Catanduanes against
defendants Jorge V. Almojuela, Dominador Monjardin, FERMIN A. BAGADIONG (the herein
petitioner) and Armando Ala who are the Governor, Vice Governor, Provincial Treasurer and
Provincial Auditor of the Province of Catanduanes, respectively.
In the said petition for injunction, it is alleged that defendants, including the herein petitioner
(BAGADIONG), are authorizing, approving and effecting the disbursements of public funds of the
province based on the annual provincial budget that, allegedly, was not duly approved by the
Provincial Board since plaintiffs-respondents did not participate in the deliberation of the same.
On January 14, 1966, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the respondent Judge against
the defendants commanding them to desist from authorizing and making any further
disbursements of funds from the budget in question.
A complaint in intervention was filed by herein respondent PERFECTO praying, among others,
that all original parties to the case be ordered to refund the province all moneys appropriated
under the falsified budget; and that all the said original parties be condemned to pay an amount
equal to all disbursements under the falsified budget, by way of exemplary damages.
On January 31, 1966, the respondent judge denied the motion to vacate and lift the writ of
preliminary injunction.
When the case was called for trial, counsel for plaintiffs called one of the defendants, the herein
petitioner, BAGADIONG, to the witness stand as one of the witnesses for the plaintiffs.
Counsel for the defendants raised the objection that the said party cannot be called as a witness
for the plaintiffs because it would violate his constitutional right against self-incrimination. On the
other hand, counsel for the plaintiffs contended that since this is a purely civil action, the right
against self-incrimination is not involved, and if any testimony elicited from the herein petitioner
would tend to incriminate himself, there would be ample time for the herein petitioner to raise the
proper objection.
The respondent Judge sided with the plaintiffs. After a verbal motion to reconsider the aforesaid
order was denied by the respondent Judge, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.
In its memorandum, the BAGADIONG contends that the provision of the Rules of Court which
authorizes a party to call the adverse party to the witness stand applies only to purely civil actions
where the defendant does not run the risk of being prosecuted for any offense. Likewise, the
petitioner asserts that the right against self-incrimination can only be claimed when the
incriminatory question is being propounded and not before, by a mere witness, but not by a party
defendant, as in the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can be compelled to testify as a witness for respondents and WON such
violates his right against self-incrimination.
RULING: There is no legal impediment for a party to call any of the adverse parties to be his
witness, as clearly provided in Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
It is (only) in a criminal case where the accused may not be compelled to testify. But while the
constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in ALL types of cases, said
privilege, in proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an
option to refuse to answer incriminating question, and not a prohibition of inquiry.
As aptly stated by this Court in the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al:
Except in criminal cases, there in no rule prohibiting a party litigant form utilizing his adversary as
a witness. As a matter of fact, Section 83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court, expressly authorizes a party
to call an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule is, of course, subject
to the constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify against himself. But it is
established that the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and
the proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for a criminating answer is propounded. This
has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the
information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on
Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify "cannot decline to
appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness" and "no claim of privilege can be made until
a question calling for a criminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that
time only, the claim of privilege may properly be imposed." (Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any question being propounded,
and simply declined to take the witness stand. In the above-cited Gonzales case, it will be noted
that the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded (asked) because before a question is asked, there would be
no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not.
Moreover, the herein petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a criminal case where
he is an accused but in civil action. This is expressly permitted by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court which authorizes a party to call any adverse party as his witness.
In the later case of Suarez v. Tengco, 2 SCRA 71, 73-74, the following was stated:
Here, petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any question, and simply declined to take the
witness stand. Note that in the Gonzales case, above-cited, the adverse party was directed to take
the witness stand in proceedings to investigate an alleged failure to pay overtime compensation,
which, under corresponding special laws, carries a penal sanction. Here, petitioner was being
directed to take the stand, not in a criminal case where he is an accused, but in an independent
civil action which, although arising from the same facts involved in a criminal case pending before
the same court, is still be regarded by law as an "entirely separate and distinct" action, governed
by a corresponding different set of rules (Civil Code of the Phil., Art. 2177).
The almost exact similarity of the instant case and the case just cited leaves no room for doubt,
and there is complete justification therefore that the same ruling must be applied here.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition to prohibit the respondent judge from directing petitioner to
take the witness stand and testify is denied, without prejudice to petitioner's properly invoking the
guaranty against self-incrimination when questions are propounded to him on the stand.
In criminal case Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 (1968)
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle,one Thunderbird car, with
accessories amounting to P22,000.
That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the help of one, Asistio have completed a
deed of sale of Thunderbird which belongs to Johnson Lee. Chavesz telephoned Lee and made
an appointment for the sale of Thunderbird with Sumilang as a introduced buyer.
As payment was made to Eugenes restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove to the place.
Chavez and Sumilang, pretending to get the money for the perfection of sale of the Thunderbird
car, left the two Chinese alone, Johnson Lee and his brother.
When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chavez and Sumilang, they could no longer locate
the former and the Thunderbird car was also from the parking lot.
Nevertheless the Thunderbird was impounded however, it was already been repainted.
During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia presented Chavez as a witness. And despite of Chavezs
objection being aware that the latter would be self incriminated, the Court sustained the stand of
the Fiscal saying.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand
including the accused.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners statement against himself can be used to convict him.
HELD:
No. It is in the context that we sat that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with
unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory: it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive
right.
The court may not extract from a defendants own lips and against his will an admission of his
guilt.
In reality, the purpose calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.
In the case at bar, the petitioner did not volunteer to take the witness stand in his own defence;
he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to
testify.
There is not even a valid waiver of the privilege. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be certain
and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably and willingly made.
Wherefore the accused is acquitted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated
to warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original
claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to
the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy
to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accuseds constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely
is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective
may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the
Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an
extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is
at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another
constitutional right, in this wise:
A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due to
failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release of habeas corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule
102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
In administrative case Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the
petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that
to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of
grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only
when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged
that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge
for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the
Self-Incrimination Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to
take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer
not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands
for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the
high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
Two types of STATUTORY IMMUNITY Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, GR
No. 100295, April 26, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However he was
granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided
that he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States
Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos
were being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the
PCCG when they flew to New York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand
Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby
acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity
from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However, the record shows that the petitioners
provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO cases against the
Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.
HELD:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person
from being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.
In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is
being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York
to testify implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the
information given by him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of
the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since
the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law and the parties implementing
agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can
be said that it not their own fault.
Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG,
which under the law has the power to grant immunity.
TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant the witness
can no longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
Power of the Commission on Human Rights Sec. 18(8), Art. XIII
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for
the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
(1) Freedom of Political Beliefs (political prisoners)
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
(2) Freedom Against Involuntary Servitude
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Relate with Art. II, Sec. 4
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government
may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Right Against Cruel, Degrading and Inhuman Punishment
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
RA 9346 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic
Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand
Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed
or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being
considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided, however, That nothing herein
shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of
the Constitutions.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of
general circulation.
Right Against Imprisonment for Debt or Non-Payment of a Poll Tax
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor
more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said
amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check
of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment.
Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie
presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because
of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that
such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays
the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 236 (1988)
introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay
"stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima
facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee
on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof
to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

SSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment
for debt.

HELD: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor
to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold,
can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.

Poll tax, define

A poll tax in the Philippines Constitution is a tax that is levied on each citizen to raise
moneys to support the government. It is typically raised in order for that person to be
able to go to the polls to vote.
A fixed tax levied on all persons in a certain area, especially as a condition of voting in
elections.

Double-Jeopardy
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186 (1991)

FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila,
an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by
Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino
Gonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for People vs. Relova, 148 SCRA 292 [1987]
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275
of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim.

On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime
of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the
meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered a plea
of not guilty.

He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was denied. He raised before the SC that that he
cannot be penalized twice for an accident and another for recklessness. He maintained that
since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense carries heavier
penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under
Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to render to the persons whom he has accidentally
injured.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar
to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code because it constitutes double
jeopardy.

RULING:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The rule on double
jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.

He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez,
the SC held that it is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offenses. Where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important
act which is not an essential element of the other.

The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The first, for reckless
imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen
(Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, for Abandonment of one's
victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes
Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.

Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are
committed by means of dolo.

Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses charged. The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to
exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.

People vs. Relova, 148 SCRA 292 [1987]

Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline
L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty
of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the
second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner sought reconsideration
but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense charged, bars his prosecution in the
second offense charged.
HELD:
Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on persons and property are material
only to determine the penalty.
The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under the
same provision of the RPC, as amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi
offenses.
The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself
but simple a way of committing it.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi offense.
The Court thru Justice JB Reyes: Reason and precedent both coincide in that ones convicted or
acquitted to a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determined the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of an offense.
Tests to determine double jeopardy:
1. Whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
2.Whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts
alleged in the first if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice
versa; or whether the crime is an ingredient of the other
Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175
FACTS:
Petitioner herein is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia Naitonal Vocational
School in del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. He was entrusted, as a Collecting and Disbursement
Officer to hold in trust moneys and/ properties of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
That while being in the said position, he intentionally, feloniously and without lawful authority
appropriate and misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for
the Government of the Philippines in the total amount to PHP16, 483.62. He as unable to account
for the said amount during the audit.
Warrant of arrest was issued to arrest the petitioner but he was nowhere to be found.
On December 10, 1978, Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD No 1606, conferring to it
original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII
of the RPC
November 1984, when the petitioner herein was finally arrested. He was released on provisional
liberty upon the approval of the bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC, he pleaded not guilty.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Quiones-Marcos however opined that since Navallo had
already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should
continue taking cognizance of the case. That matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman
which held otherwise. The information was however docketed in Sandiganbayan. A new order of
arrest for the petitioner was issued by the Sandiganbayan.
Navallo filed a motion to quash contending that since he had already been arraigned by the RTC,
the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not double jeopardy sets it when petitioner was arraigned by the RTC.
HELD:
NO. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment
of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover,
neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
Petition is dismissed.
People vs. Judge Villarama, GR No. 99287, June 23, 1992
FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After
the prosecution rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court
that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425.
Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the
prosecutor to the change of plea.
The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense,
alleging that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an
accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accuseds motion
and convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Republic
Act No. 6425 thus this instant petition for review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondents change of plea and his
conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer
open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
respondents change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot
claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section
7, Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any
of the following instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the
offended party;
xxx xxx xxx
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of
violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who
also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial courts approval of
his change of plea was irregular and improper.
People vs. Balicasan, 17 SCRA 1119 [1966]
FACTS: Defendant-appellee Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos
Norte. The information alleged that on December 3, 1964, in Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte, the accused
assaulted and stabbed to death Leonicio Bulaoat.
The accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. At his counsel's petition, however, he
was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. The accused testified that he
stabbed Bulaoat in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. He further stated that he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police after the incident.
The court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused on the basis of his testimony. Hence,
the instant appeal.
ISSUE: WON the instant appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy
RULING: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In
the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however,
he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision
had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to
plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This
was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a
quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal
herein.
Furthermore, as aforestated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the
prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental
prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of
due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former
jeopardy.
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already gave
credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way
doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo
for further proceedings under another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court
for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial
with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter.
People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 164185, July 23, 2008
FACTS:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapandos wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan
del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated
Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.
On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape
for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the two were charged
for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case
against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July 26,
2000. Villapando filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found with merit and acquitted
him of the crime charged.
The Ombudsman filed a petition through the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of his acquittal before the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Although this Court held that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts
to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition
found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one
year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned
or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no
candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their
subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is not
synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by law
and that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position may
be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year
prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so
long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory
construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.
Melo vs. People, 85 Phil 766 [1950]
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT/ SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon
Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part
of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating
him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time.
During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night,
the victim died from his wounds. Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution
and the information was amended.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.
HELD:
Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It meant that when
a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with
the same or identical offense.
The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the
only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act. SAME OFFENSE under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not
only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information,
but also that the two offenses are identical.
There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice
versa.
This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.Thus, where
the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the
charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which charges the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense.
People vs. Buling, 107 Phil 712 [1960]
FACTS:
Accused was charged with less serious physical injury to another person in which the former
pleaded guilty. After serving his sentence, the wounds inflicted by the accused allegedly did not
heal. So, another complaint was filed against him, this time, he was charged with serious physical
I injury. This is now the case at bar sought to be reversed and set aside by the accused.
The following uncontroverted facts appear in the record: On December 7, 1956, the accused was
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious
physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which according
to the complaint would "require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will
incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of his customary labors for the game
period of time." The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on December 8, 1957 found
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay
damages to the offended party in the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and so on February 20, 1957,
the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, charging him of serious physical injuries. The information alleges that the wounds inflicted
by the accused on Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him for a period of
from 1 months to 2 months. After trial the accused was found guilty of serious physical injuries
and sentenced in the manner indicated in first paragraph hereof. This is the decision now sough
to be set aside and reversed in this appeal.
The only question for resolution by this Court whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba
for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a
bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
RULING:
YES. Unlike in the case of Melo v. People, there was no supervening facts in this case which
would allow for the subsequent charge against the accused even after serving his sentence. The
physical injury then committed was the same physical injury being brought up by the prosecution.
Thus, there was no change in the nature of the injury suffered by the complainant.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of conviction is set aside and the
defendant-appellant acquitted of the charge of serious physical injuries. Without costs.
People vs. Tria-Tirona, GR No. 130106, July 15, 2005
FACTS: This is a petition for review on
certiorari seeking the annulment of the
decision of respondent Judge Tria-Tirona
acquitting accused-private respondent
Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot and in lieu
thereof a judgment be issued convicting the
latter of the crime charged.
Armed with two search warrants, members
of the NBI and the Presidential Task Force
Hammer Head serving as security,
conducted a search on the house of accused MUYOT located in Banawe, Quezon City. The
alleged finding of 498.1094 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which led to the
filing of an information charging private respondent with Violation of Section 16, Article III of
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.
The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent judge PERLITA J. TRIA-TIRONA
Private respondent, assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After
trial on the merits, public respondent rendered a decision acquitting private respondent on ground
of reasonable doubt. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed grave
abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on record which, when considered,
would lead to accuseds conviction.
ISSUE: Can the government appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the
merits without violating the constitutional precept against double jeopardy?
I In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was
RULING: To settle the issue of whether or not an acquittal can still be appealed, this Court
pronounced in People v. Velasco that as mandated by the Constitution, statutes and
jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand
to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot
be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. Only when there is a
finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as
represented by the prosecution, were denied due process.
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an
acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only
exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting
in a denial of due process.
We have categorically ruled in People v. Velasco that, except when there is a finding of mistrial,
no appeal will lie in case of an acquittal. There being no mistrial in the case before us, we find no
need to reexamine the evidence, because if we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made
on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the accuseds right against double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
Almario vs. CA, 355 SCRA 1, March 22, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of public
document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended
party in both cases.
The hearing was reset several times due to the trial judge was elevated to higher court and lack
of proof of notice to the accused. The hearing was started October 1992 on September 1995, the
complainant failed to appear in spite due notice moved that the case against the latter be
dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.
The motion was granted by the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was raised and the court
granted and reversed its first decision on dismissing the case against Roberto Almario.
A motion for reconsideration was raised by the defendant but rejected. Upon rejection they seek
for certiorari in the CA they contend that reversal of the decision was a violation of the doctrine of
double jeopardy. After trial the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N right of the accused against double jeopardy have been violated.
Ruling:
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded
to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted
or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused.[8]
made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of
the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a
criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions,
namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.[9] Double jeopardy may
attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accuseds
right to speedy trial.
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so that
violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be
recalled that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.[11] Both the trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of petitioners case
was terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous trial was set in the months of December 1994,
and January and February of 1995. The scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the
presiding judge was promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not
immediately appointed, nor another judge detailed to his sala.
Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the
private prosecutor without objection from petitioners counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995
was reset, despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Law or Bill of Attainder
of notice to co-accused Dante Duldulao and the spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz.[12]
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought,
we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioners right to speedy
trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, In Re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429, GR No. L-32485, October 22, 1970
there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.

It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably.[16] For as petitioners right to speedy trial was not
transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy that the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused was not met.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, dated
November 21, 1996 and January 7, 1997, which upheld the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011

Facts:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted accused, namely: Hubert
Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada,
and Gerardo Biong on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it
"denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably
regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case
in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment
of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."

Issue:
Valerosa vs. People, 546 SCRA 450, 2008
Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.
FACTS:
Ruling:
Armed with warrant of arrest and based on the probable reason to believe based on surveillance
No, as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered for it places the accused under
conducted in herein petitioners hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan, and when the petitioner
double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible, but the
is about to board a tricycle, he was then arrested and was charged in violation of illegal possession
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused
of firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, as amended.
its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases,
the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
The lower court imposed a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Php
Althou complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring pleas for
15, 000.
reconsideration under such exceptions. He did not specify that violations of due process and acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. Vizconde did not also
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision with modification of a
alleged that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. What the complainant actually
period of 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution
witnesses' credibility. That the court committed grave error in finding Alfaro as not a credible
The petitioner herein was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
witness. The complaint wants the court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment
under the first paragraph of Section 1 of PD No 1866, as amended. It provides that the penalty of
based on such evaluation which is not constitutionally allowed and therefore, the judgment of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
acquittal can no longer be disturbed.
deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

PD 1866 as amended,was the governing law at the time the petitioner committed the offense/
however RA No 8294 amended PD No 1866 during the pendency of the case with the trial court.
Section 1: Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of Firearms or
ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. - the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Php 15, 000 shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfuly manufacture, deal
in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, suc as..

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended PD 1866 imposing prisional correccional as punishment shall be
imposed to the petitioner in the case at bar.

HELD:
Yes.As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An EXCEPTION to this rule, however is when the law is
advantageous of the accused.

A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. however penal laws that favor a guilty person,
who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception
and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.

People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)