September 3

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999]
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP), petitioner,

vs. PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, ALERT AND
CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER SSS (ACCESS), SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order, filed by Social Security System Employees Association
(SSSEA), seeking to annul and set aside the Order of the Bureau of Labor Relations [1] dismissing the
election protests or motions to annul the certification elections among the rank and file SSS employees.
On September 28, 1989, respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better Social Security
System (ACCESS) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election to determine
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of respondent Social
Security System (SSS).
On August 24, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered a certification election to be conducted
among the rank and file employees of the Social Security System in its main office and regional branches.
Petitioner Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP) was one of the
contending parties in the certification election, with respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better
SSS (ACCESS) as the other party.
On October 11, 1991, the certification elections were held, with ACCESS garnering 1,378 votes,
SSSEA obtaining 1,116 votes, and No Union collecting 40 votes.[2]
On October 16, 1991, SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest and/or
motion to annul the certification Election. Director Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations, in an Order
dated March 20, 1992, denied the protest and/or motion.
On September 29, 1992, SSSEA filed an Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification
Elections in the SSS Regional Office After October 11, 1991.
On November 18, 1992, respondent Velasco denied the Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify
Certification Elections in the Regional Offices After October 11, 1991, declared ACCESS the winner in the
certification election, and certified ACCESS as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
rank and file employees of SSS for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with the latter. [3]
On January 25, 1993, respondent Velasco denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to
the courts.[4] The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. [5] This
rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly,
but would also prevent the unnecessary and premature resort to courts.[6]
In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations
to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code.[7]
Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of an exhausted the appropriate administrative
remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.
Moreover, the issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings of public
respondent. Petitioner argues that the certification election should not have proceeded because of the
pendency of a formal charge of a company-initiated, dominated, or supported union with the bureau of
Labor Relations.[8] Petitioner further contends that no certification election was held in the regional offices
of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in incomplete certification election, thereby rendering
null and void the proclamation of ACCESS as the winner of the election.
Unfortunately for petitioner, factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials.[9] Judicial review does not extend to an
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its
determination.[10]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36958 July 10, 1986
MARIANO ZABAT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and MANOTOK REALTY, INC., respondents.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioner.
Rodolfo G. Santiago for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the lower court which on
separate dates: a) dismissed a complaint to quiet title for failure of the complainant and his counsel to
appear at the scheduled pre-trial hearing; and b) upheld the counterclaim that the plaintiff should pay to
the defendant rentals on the disputed land on the ground that the same belonged to the latter. 1
The complaint was dismissed on October 26, 1976, and notice of the dismissal was served on the plaintiff
on October 29, 1966. 2 The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on February 28, 1967, which was
denied on March 7, 1967. 3 Notice of the denial was served on him on March 15, 1967. 4
The judgment on the counterclaim was rendered on June 19, 1967, and notice thereof was served on the
plaintiff on June 27, 1967. 5 He filed a motion for reconsideration on July 27, 1961, which was denied on
October 28, 1967. 6 Notice was served on him on November 11, 1967. 7
On July 23, 1968, the plaintiff tried once more and filed what he called a petition to set aside the
proceedings, including the judgment, etc. This was denied on July 27, 1968, and copy of the order of
denial was received by him on August 3, 1968. 8
The plaintiff now comes to us as petitioner and invokes due process. His claim is that he was deprived of
his day in court when his complaint was summarily dismissed and his motions for reconsideration,
including his petition to set aside the proceedings, were denied by the trial court. 9
We hold that the dismissal of the complaint became final thirty days from notice on October 29, 1966, and
therefore could not have been validly reconsidered almost four months later. This was not an interlocutory
order but a final disposition of the complaint.
Besides, the grounds invoked by the plaintiff for non-appearance are not acceptable Notice to the counsel
is notice to the client. 10 As for the alleged asthma attack of the petitioner's counsel, this should have been
established earlier, to be credible, instead of almost four months later.
While it is true, as noted by the Court of Appeals, that the trial court had acted rather precipitately in
dismissing the complaint at the first hearing thereof, 11 we observe that the petitioner is himself not
entirely without fault. It is significant that he failed to move for reconsideration of the dismissal during all
of 122 days.
We reject the claim of the private respondent that the reglementary period for appealing the judgment on
the counterclaim began on the date of the notification to the petitioner of the dismissal of his
complaint. 12 The counterclaim was not ancillary to the main action and, in fact, could have been
maintained separately. 13
The private respondent could have filed an independent action for recovery of rentals on the basis of its
claimed ownership of the land even if the petitioner had not filed his action to quiet title. Hence, the thirty-
day period for appealing the judgment on the counterclaim began on June 27, 1967, and ended on July
27, 1967, date of the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
Notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was served on the
petitioner on March 15, 1967, and notice of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the judgment
allowing the counterclaim was received by him on November 11, 1967. 14 The record does not show that
he did anything immediately thereafter. On the contrary, his petition to set aside the proceedings, which
he submitted on July 25, 1968, was filed 16 months after the first denial and more than 7 months after the
second denial.
As a petition for relief from judgment, it must necessarily fail for late filing. Such a petition should have
been filed within 60 days after the petitioner learned of the judgment sought to be invalidated and in no
case later than six months from entry of such judgment. 15 Moreover, there is no showing here of the
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence as an indispensable ground for a petition of
this nature. 16
The petitioner himself concedes, however, that his petition does not come under Rule 38 but is "anchored
more on the grounds of equity and the nullity of the
proceedings. 17
On the claimed nullity of the proceedings, we have already held that notice to the counsel was notice to
the petitioner and that his absence at the pre-trial hearing was a valid ground for the dismissal of his
complaint. 18
The petitioner says that he should not have been declared in default on the counterclaim because he had
already answered the same. He was not. The court simply continued the hearing ex parte to receive the
evidence of the defendant conformably to established rules. 19 Consequently, the proceedings are not null
and void as contended.
As for equity, which has been aptly described as "a justice outside legality this is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunquam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should pre-empty and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. 20
Decision of this case on the merits is precluded by the negligence of the petitioner in reacting seasonably
to the dismissal of his complaint and to the judgment on the counterclaim. He was not denied due
process for it was he who slept on his rights and failed to invoke them on time.
The rules have been promulgated precisely to insure an orderly procedure in the conduct of cases before
the courts of justice. We frustrate that objective by departing from these rules.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO
GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.
Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition the correct application
of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize
timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a
period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and
the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for
injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over
the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction
sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court
of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of
September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with.
The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for
judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its
Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000
hectares in Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA
covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitioner.
Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.
"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging

operations of the defendant has caused heavy siltation not only in the
Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian City in
1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and
Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the logging
operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that
feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of Pagadian City.
Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back,
particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When the grant of logging
concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . It is common
knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places adjoining
logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).
Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would

ensue unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging
from its inaction on the council's request seven years back.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where
"irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation
Corporation v. Board of Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public
interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.
The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:
Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or
growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any
action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses,
permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition,
exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the
Philippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, 7where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the
courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD
605 was improper.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The
deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a
motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a
better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less
important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also
relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their
heavily loaded dockets. 9
As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the
doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in
estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7)
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is
involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. 19
The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry
laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question
they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and
public interest is involved.
We rule for the petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative
remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its
observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent
laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction,
exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management
and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the
Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid
regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the
very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under
its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private
respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before
the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the
TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the
presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative
authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated,
before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.
As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the
national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these
extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative
remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat
against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the
TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.
In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging
operations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the District
Forester from the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows:
DISTRICT FORESTER
PAGADIAN CITY
QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM

SECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT
REPORT ASAP.
RED
BATCA
GAN
The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLA is
still pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the
Secretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23
In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of the DENR
suspended petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to
this date after the lapse of almost 3 years." 24
These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the
respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.
There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court.
Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the
unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA
and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of
this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application
of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent
for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.
In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided
where the case can be decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before
us. The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites
of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be
time for the Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and
its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated December 11,
1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional
Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
At the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional provision that is at the core of the
controversy now confronting us, thus:
Article XVI, Section 6:
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law. 1
With the aforequoted provision in mind, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated
version of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463.
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on December 13, 1990, it was
published on December 17, 1990. 2
Presently, however, petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the
Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990, seeking this Court's declaration of
unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for temporary restraining order.
But in an en banc resolution dated December 27, 1990, We simply required the public respondents to file
their Comment, without however giving due course to the petition and the prayer therein. Hence, the Act
took effect after fifteen days following its publication, or on January 1, 1991. 3
Before we settle down on the merits of the petition, it would likewise be well to discuss albeit briefly the
history of our police force and the reasons for the ordination of Section 6, Article XVI in our present
Constitution.
During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus of the Philippine
Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC was made part of the PGF
but its administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by the then Department of the
Interior. After the war, it remained as the "National Police" under the Department of National Defense, as
a major service component of the AFP. 4
Later, the Integration Act of 1975 5 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under the Office of the
President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian components. The PC-INP
was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent Director-General of the INP, exercised command
functions over the INP. 6
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) 7 exercised administrative control and supervision while
the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over the INP units assigned within
their respective localities. 8
The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component, which is the PC,
severely eroded the INP's civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of the PC-INP resulted
in inefficient police service. 9 Moreover, the integration of the national police forces with the PC also
resulted in inequities since the military component had superior benefits and privileges. 10
The Constitutional Commission of 1986 was fully aware of the structural errors that beset the system.
Thus, Com. Teodulo C. Natividad explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NATIVIDAD. . . . The basic tenet of a modern police organization is

to remove it from the military. 11
xxx xxx xxx
Here in our draft Constitution, we have already made a constitutional postulate that the
military cannot occupy any civil service position [in Section 6 of the Article on the Civil
Service 12] Therefore, in keeping with this and because of the universal acceptance that a
police force is a civilian function, a public service, and should not be performed by military
force, one of the basic reforms we are presenting here is that it should be separated from
the military force which is the PC. 13
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the civilian police cannot blossom into full profession because most of the key
positions are being occupied by the military So, it is up to this Commission to remove the
police from such a situation so that it can develop into a truly professional civilian police. .
. . 14
Hence, the "one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character" provision that is now Article XVI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
And so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand.
In the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated the National
Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police
(PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police
Commission and the PNP were placed. 15
We do not share this view.
To begin with, one need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the
President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest petitioner's
contention on the matter.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk 17 and has been held by us, in the landmark case
of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 18to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." 19
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the
same time and in person, 20he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, 21 "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." 22 (emphasis ours)
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department." 23
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized
Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a
system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the
PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police
force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the
Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level, as shown in
the following provisions, to wit:
Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical
requirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime
prevention and crime reporting;
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary
actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the
Philippine National Police by the Chief of the PNP;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through .the regional. appellate boards over
administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief of the PNP
. . . Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to
subordinate officials with respect to the units under their respective commands, in
accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the Chief of the
PNP may constitute such other support units as may be necessary subject to the
approval of the Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. . . . There shall be established a performance evaluation system which shall be
administered in accordance with the rules, regulations and standards; and a code of
conduct promulgated by the Commission for members of the PNP. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM over the
PNP, RA 6975 vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the
Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power of "operational supervision and control" over police units
in city and municipal mayors; in the Civil Service Commission, participation in appointments to the
positions of Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the administration of qualifying
entrance examinations; disciplinary powers over PNP members in the "People's Law Enforcement
Boards" and in city and municipal mayors. 25
Once more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions.
It is true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 1986 provided that the authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law, they intended that the day-to-
day functions of police work like crime, investigation, crime prevention activities, traffic control, etc., would
be under the operational control of the local executives as it would not be advisable to give full control of
the police to the local executives. 26
They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries for vices and
abuses. 27
It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to choose the officers in question,
the Act went beyond the bounds of the Constitution's intent.
Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every presumption should be
indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in question
should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental
law. 28
Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows:
D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

PNP.
Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP Units or Forces.
Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their

respective territorial jurisdictions. As such, the local executives shall discharge the
following functions:
a.) Provincial Governor (1) . . .
The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three (3)
eligibles recommended by the PNP Regional Director.
4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority over the PNP units in
their respective jurisdictions:
i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by
the Provincial Police Director. . . . (Emphasis ours)
full control remains with the National Police Commission.
We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that "there is no usurpation of the power of
control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the
local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are
answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus,
unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the
NAPOLCOM." 29 It is significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives, will
choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for
appointment to the PNP) 30 to be recommended by PNP officials.
The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and control
exercised by the local officials. Those officials would simply be acting as representatives of the
Commission.
As regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the questioned
provisions, which read:
Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. The Appointment of the officers
and members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
a.) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. Appointed by the PNP regional director
for regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for national headquarters personnel and
attested by the Civil Service Commission;
b.) Inspector to Superintendent. Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as recommended

by their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission;
c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General. Appointed by the President
upon recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with proper endorsement by the
Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission . . .
Sec. 32. Examinations for Policemen. The Civil Service Commission shall administer
the qualifying entrance examinations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by
the NAPOLCOM.
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will undoubtedly
professionalize the same.
The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" (or the
PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the commission's power of control over
the PNP.
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional appellate boards,
over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is
the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the
PLEB for in the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal
consultants of the PLEBs (Section 43-d4, d5).
As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints against erring officers
and members of the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs in every city, and municipality would all the more
help professionalize the police force.
Petitioner would likewise have this Court imagine that Section 12 of the questioned Act, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
Sec. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense.
During a period of twenty- four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present role of preserving the internal
and external security of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by the
President, if he finds it justifiable, for another period not exceeding twenty-four (24)
months, after which, the Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the
primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the AFP its primary role of
preserving external security.
xxx xxx xxx
constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive
control and commander-in-chief powers."
That We are not disposed to do for such is not the case at all here. A rejection thus of petitioner's
submission anent Section 12 of the Act should be in order in the light of the following exchanges during
the CONCOM deliberations of Wednesday, October 1, 1986:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not
suppose they come under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the
Philippines.
MR. NATIVIDAD. They do, Madam President. By law they are under the supervision and
control of the President of the Philippines.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national
police.
MR. NATIVIDAD. He is the President.

MR. RODRIGO. Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision
that the President is Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD. No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.
MR. RODRIGO. There are two other powers of the President. The President has control
over departments, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under
which does the police fall, under control or under supervision?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Both, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Control and Supervision.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the
President. (CONCOM RECORDS, Vol. 5, p. 296)
It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and
enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers
of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not
a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply

provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the
civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to
repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant
view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a
civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties
imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)
Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under Section 84 of the
Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members (namely: the respective Chairmen of
the Committee on Local Government and the Committee on National Defense and Security in the Senate,
and the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on
National Defense in the House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon and a
diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices."
But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under Section 84. The Special
Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked solely with planning
and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption" into the Department of the Interior and
Local Governments of the "involved agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with the phases of
implementation already laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as
well as the committee itself would cease altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it
exercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which
properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive department, bureau or office is placed
under the control or authority, of the committee. 33
As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution, there are the so-
called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Audit, and the Commission on Elections. (Article IX-A, Section 1)
As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected from external
influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made constitutional bodies, independent of and not
under any department of the government. 34 Certainly, they are not under the control of the President.
The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on Human Rights." (Article
XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is not on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions
under Article IX, although it is independent like the latter Commissions. 35 It still had to be constituted thru
Executive Order No. 163 (dated May 5, 1987).
In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national police
commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established thereunder.
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent Constitutional
Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the
Commission on Human Rights.
By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit, Elections) and the
additional commission created by the Constitution (Human Rights) are all independent of the Executive;
but the National Police Commission is not. 36 In fact, it was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations
that this commission would be under the President, and hence may be controlled by the President, thru
his or her alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.
WHEREFORE, having in view all of the foregoing holdings, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000]
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA
NAZARENO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
39441 dated May 29, 1998 affirming with modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
107, Quezon City, in an action for annulment of sale and damages.
The facts are as follows:
Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970,
while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose,
Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of
Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.
During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in Quezon City
and in the Province of Cavite. It is the ownership of some of these properties that is in question in this case.
It appears that after the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, Branch XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28.Upon the
reorganization of the courts in 1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite.
Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several
deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds
involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to
Natividad on January 29, 1970 for the total amount of P47,800.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale reads as
follows:
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, Filipino, married to Aurea Poblete-Nazareno, of legal age and a resident of
the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines,
-WITNESSETH-
That I am the absolute registered owner of six (6) parcels of land with the improvements thereon situated
in Quezon City, Philippines, which parcels of land are herewith described and bounded as follows, to wit:
TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 140946
A parcel of land (Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-47404, being a portion of Lot 3, Block D-3 described
on plan Bsd-10642, G.L.R.O. Record No.) situated in the Quirino District, Quezon City. Bounded on the
N., along line 1-2 by Lot 15, Block D-3 of plan Bsd - 10642; along line 2-3 by Lot 4, Block D-3 of plan Bsd-
10642; along line 3-4 by Aurora Boulevard (Road Lot-1, Bsd-10642); and along line 4-1 by Lot 3-D of the
subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being S.29 deg. 26E., 1156.22 m. from B.L.L.M.
9, Quezon City,
thence N. 79 deg. 53E., 12.50 m. to point 2;
thence S. 10 deg. 07E., 40.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 79 deg. 53W., 12.50 m. to point 4;

thence N. 10 deg. 07W., 40.00 m. to the point
of beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED (500) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: points 1 and 4 by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons.
bearings true; date of the original survey, April 8-July 15, 1920 and that of the subdivision survey, March
25, 1956.
A parcel of land (Lot 3, Block 93 of the subdivision plan Psd-57970 being a portion of Lot 6, Pcs-4786,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917) situated in Quirino District Quezon City. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2, by
Lot 1, Block 93; on the NE., along line 2-3, by Road Lot 101; on the SE., along line 3-4, by Road Lot 100;
on the SW., along line 4-1, by Lot 4, Block 93; all of the subdivision plan. Beginning at point marked 1 on
plan, being S. 65 deg. 40 3339.92 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Marikina, Rizal;
thence N. 23 deg. 28 min. E., 11.70 m. to point 2;
thence S. 66 deg. 32 min. E., 18.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 23 deg. 28 min. W., 11.70 m. to point 4;
thence N. 66 deg. 32. min. W., 18.00 m. to the point
of beginning; containing an area of TWO HUNDRED TEN SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY SQUARE
DECIMETERS (210.60). All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by
B.L. Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; date of the original survey, Nov. 10, 1920 and Jan. 31-
March 31, 1924 and that of the subdivision survey, February 1 to September 30, 1954. Date approved -
March 9, 1962.
A parcel of land (Lot No. 10, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901,
G.L.R.O.Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the
NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 11 of the consolidation
and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW.,
by Lot No. 9 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the plan, being
S. 7 deg. 26W., 4269.90 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;
thence N. 25 deg. 00W., 12.00 m to point 4;
thence N. 64 deg. 59E., 29.99 m. to the point of
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All
points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60
cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of
the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by
Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 12 of the consolidation and
subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the NW., by Lot
No. 10 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being S. 79 deg.
07W., 4264.00 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;

thence N. 25 deg. 00W., 12.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 26 deg. 00E., 12.00 m. to the point of
points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground, are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60
cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50E.; date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of
A parcel of land (Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901,
G.L.R.O.Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the
NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 14, of the
consolidation; and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan;
and on the NW., by Lot No. 12, of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at the point marked 1
on plan, being S.78 deg. 48W., 4258.20 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;
thence N. 25 deg. 00W., 12.00 m. to point 3;
thence S.25 deg. 00E., 12.00 m. to point of
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360, more or less. All
consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by
Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 15, of the consolidation and
subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by
Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at the point marked 1 on plan, being S.78
deg. 48W., 4258.20 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina;
thence N.64 deg. 58E., 30.00 m. to the point of
That for and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P43,000.00)
PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal
age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged
to my entire satisfaction, I do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said
Natividad P. Nazareno, her heirs, administrators and assigns, all my title, rights, interests and
participations to the abovedescribed parcels of land with the improvements thereon, with the exception
of LOT NO. 11 COVERED BY T.C.T. NO. 118886, free of any and all liens and encumbrances; and
That for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P4,800.00)
PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, Filipino, single, of legal
age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, the receipt whereof is acknowledged
to my entire satisfaction, I do hereby CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER, CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said
Natividad P. Nazareno, her heirs, administrators and assigns, all my title, rights, interests and
participations in and to Lot No. 11 covered by T.C.T. No. 118886 above-described, free of any and all
liens and encumbrances, with the understanding that the title to be issued in relation hereto shall be
separate and distinct from the title to be issued in connection with Lots Nos. 13 and 14, although covered
by the same title.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this deed of absolute sale in the City of Manila,
Philippines, this 29th day of January, 1970.[2]
By virtue of this deed, transfer certificates of title were issued to Natividad, to wit: TCT No. 162738 (Lot
3-B),[3] TCT No. 162739 (Lot 3),[4] TCT No. 162735 (Lot 10),[5] TCT No. 162736 (Lot 11),[6] and TCT No.
162737 (Lots 13 and 14),[7] all of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B which is registered under TCT No.
140946. This lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969. Unknown
to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr.,[8] for which reason the latter was issued
TCT No. 293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.[9]
When Romeo found out about the sale to Maximino, Jr., he and his wife Eliza locked Maximino, Jr. out
of the house. On August 4, 1983, Maximino, Jr. brought an action for recovery ofpossession and damages
with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. On December 12, 1986, the trial court ruled in favor of Maximino, Jr. In CA-G.R. CV No.
12932, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.[10]
On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino, Sr., the present case for
annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino, Jr. The case was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-58.[11] Romeo sought the declaration
of nullity of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to Natividad and that made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino,
Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.
On March 1, 1990, Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses
Romeo and Eliza.[12] They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of January
29, 1970 to Natividad, had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new title
(TCT No. 277968) in his name.[13] They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza
to third persons. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his
title, the eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from Lot 3, and the payment
of damages.
The issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. Romeo presented evidence to show that
Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad and that Natividad was only
to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June
28, 1962 executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who
was then abroad and was represented by their mother, Aurea. By virtue of this deed, the nine lots subject
of this Deed of Partition were assigned by raffle as follows:
1. Romeo - Lot 25-L (642 m2)
2. Natividad - Lots 23 (312 m 2) and 24 (379 m2)
3. Maximino, Jr. - Lots 6 (338 m2) and 7 (338 m2)
4. Pacifico - Lots 13 (360 m2) and 14 (360 m2)
5. Jose - Lots 10 (360 m2) and 11 (360 m2)
Romeo received the title to Lot 25-L under his name,[14] while Maximino, Jr. received Lots 6 and 7
through a Deed of Sale dated August 16, 1966 for the amount of P9,500.00.[15]Pacifico and Joses shares
were allegedly given to Natividad, who agreed to give Lots 10 and 11 to Jose, in the event the latter came
back from abroad. Natividads share, on the other hand, was sold to third persons [16] because she allegedly
did not like the location of the two lots. But, Romeo said, the money realized from the sale was given to
Natividad.
Romeo also testified that Lot 3-B was bought for him by his father, while Lot 3 was sold to him
for P7,000.00 by his parents on July 4, 1969.[17] However, he admitted that a document was executed by
his parents transferring six properties in Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13, and 14, to Natividad.
Romeo further testified that, although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated
that the sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale. The transfer
was made in this manner in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.[18] Romeo denied stealing Lot
3 from his sister but instead claimed that the title to said lot was given to him by Natividad in 1981 after their
father died.
Natividad and Maximino, Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution executed in 1962 was
not really carried out. Instead, in December of 1969, their parents offered to sell to them the six lots in
Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13 and 14. However, it was only Natividad who bought the six
properties because she was the only one financially able to do so. Natividad said she sold Lots 13 and 14
to Ros-Alva Marketing Corp.[19] and Lot 3-B to Maximino, Jr. for P175,000.00.[20] Natividad admitted that
Romeo and the latters wife were occupying Lot 3-B at that time and that she did not tell the latter about the
sale she had made to Maximino, Jr.
Natividad said that she had the title to Lot 3 but it somehow got lost. She could not get an original copy
of the said title because the records of the Registrar of Deeds had been destroyed by fire. She claimed she
was surprised to learn that Romeo was able to obtain a title to Lot 3 in his name.
Natividad insisted that she paid the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29,
1970. She alleged that their parents had sold these properties to their children instead of merely giving the
same to them in order to impose on them the value of hardwork.
Natividad accused Romeo of filing this case to harass her after Romeo lost in the action for recovery
of possession (Civil Case No. Q-39018) which had been brought against him by Maximino, Jr. It appears
that before the case filed by Romeo could be decided, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-GR
CV No. 12932 affirming the trial courts decision in favor of Maximino, Jr.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29,
1970. Except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons, the defendant Natividad
shall hold the rest in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated. The Register of
Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 162735
and 162736 as a lien in the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.
The defendants counterclaim is dismissed. Likewise, the third-party complaint is dismissed.
The defendants are hereby directed to pay to the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P30,000 as and
for attorneys fees. Likewise, the third-party plaintiff is directed to pay the third-party defendants attorneys
fees of P20,000.
All other claims by one party against the other are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration. As a result, on October 14, 1992 the
trial court modified its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs Partial Motion for Reconsideration is hereby granted. The judgment dated
August 10, 1992 is hereby amended, such that the first paragraph of its dispositive portion is
correspondingly modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deeds of Sale dated January 29,
1970 and July 31, 1982.
Except as to Lots 3, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third person, the defendant Natividad shall hold
the rest OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (LOTS
10 and 11) in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificates of
Title No. 162735 and 162736 as a lien on the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.
LIKEWISE, THE SAID REGISTER OF DEEDS IS DIRECTED TO CANCEL TCT NO. 293701 (formerly
162705) OVER LOT 3-B AND RESTORE TCT NO. 140946 IN THE NAME OF MAXIMINO NAZARENO
SR. AND AUREA POBLETE.[22]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles
to Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as
to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr. The
dispositive portion of the decision dated May 29, 1998 reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision and the order in question are modified as follows:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1982
are hereby declared null and void;
2. Except as to Lots 13 and 14 ownership of which has passed on to third persons, it is hereby declared
that Lots 3, 3-B, 10 and 11 shall form part of the estate of the deceased Maximino Nazareno, Sr.;
3. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to restore TCT No. 140946 (covering Lot 3-B),
TCT No. 132019 (covering Lot 3), TCT No. 118885 (covering Lot 10), and TCT No. 118886 (covering Lot
11).[23]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated May 27,
1999. Hence this petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
ROMEO P. NAZARENO CAN DESTROY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACCORDED TO
NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS LIKE THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29,
1970 (EXH. 1) EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR.
AND AUREA POBLETE IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE
FACTS OF THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE SAID DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 (EXH. 1) IN THE LIGHT OF THE
FOLLOWING:
A) THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, ALL OF WHICH ARE NOTARIZED, EXECUTED BY
THE DECEASED SPOUSES DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING SOME OF THEIR
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES.
B) THE EXECUTION OF AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION WITH WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND
CONFIRMATION OF SALE DATED MAY 24, 1975 (EXH. 14A) OF THE ESTATE OF
AUREA POBLETE BY THE DECEASED MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND THEIR
CHILDREN INVOLVING THE ONLY REMAINING ESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE THUS
IMPLIEDLY ADMITTING THE VALIDITY OF PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS MADE BY SAID
DECEASED SPOUSES ON THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, HALF OF WHICH
WOULD HAVE BECOME A PART OF AUREA POBLETES ESTATE UPON HER DEMISE.
C) THE ADMISSION MADE BY MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN
OPEN COURT ON AUGUST 13, 1980 DURING HIS LIFETIME IN CIVIL CASE NO. NC-
712 (EXH. 81, 81B) THAT HE HAD SOLD CERTAIN PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO THUS BELYING THE CLAIM OF ROMEO P. NAZARENO
THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970 IS ONE AMONG
THE DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES TO BE WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION.
D) THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY ROMEO P. NAZARENO HIMSELF CONTAINED IN A FINAL
DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IN CA-GR CV NO. 12932 DATED AUGUST
31, 1992 AND AN ANNEX APPEARING IN HIS ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-39018 (EXH. 11-B) INVOLVING LOT 3B, ONE OF THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION THAT THE SAID PROPERTY IS OWNED BY PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P.
NAZARENO.
E) THE PARTIAL PROJECT OF PARTITION DATED MAY 24, 1995 WHICH WAS
APPROVED BY THE INTESTATE COURT IN SP. PROC. NO. NC-28 AND EXECUTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATTER COURTS FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 9, 1991
DETERMINING WHICH WERE THE REMAINING PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29, 1970
EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. AND AUREA
POBLETE DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES IS AN
INDIVISIBLE CONTRACT? AND IF SO WHETHER OR NOT UPON THEIR DEATH, THE
ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR. ALONE CAN SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF
SAID SALE?
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF LOT 3 UNDER THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED
JANUARY 29, 1970 IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, IS VALID
CONSIDERING THAT AS PER THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DATED NOVEMBER
21, 1990. ROMEO NAZARENO ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT PAY THE CONSIDERATION
STATED IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JULY 4, 1969 EXECUTED BY THE
DECEASED SPOUSES IN HIS FAVOR (EXH. M-2).
5. WHETHER OR NOT AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF ROMEO
P. NAZARENO, TCT NO. 277968 (EXH. M) SHOULD BE CANCELLED AND DECLARED
NULL AND VOID AND A NEW ONE ISSUED IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO
PURSUANT TO THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN THE LATTERS FAVOR
ON JANUARY 29, 1970 BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES.[24]
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. Petitioners argue that the lone testimony of Romeo is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of validity accorded to a notarized document.
To begin with, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even
more weight when these coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the
evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of
support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. [25] The lone testimony of a
witness, if credible, is sufficient. In this case, the testimony of Romeo that no consideration was ever paid
for the sale of the six lots to Natividad was found to be credible both by the trial court and by the Court of
Appeals and it has not been successfully rebutted by petitioners. We, therefore, have no reason to overturn
the findings by the two courts giving credence to his testimony.
The fact that the deed of sale was notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. As held
in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:[26]
Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is
not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in
the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the
parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.
Second. Petitioners make capital of the fact that in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which was declared final
by this Court in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of Appeals upheld the right of Maximino, Jr. to recover
possession of Lot 3-B. In that case, the Court of Appeals held:
As shown in the preceding disquisition, Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property in dispute by
purchase in 1970. She was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City. When her parents died, her mother Aurea Poblete-Nazareno in 1970 and her father
Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. in 1980, Natividad P. Nazareno had long been the exclusive owner of the
property in question. There was no way therefore that the aforesaid property could belong to the estate of
the spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete. The mere fact that Romeo P. Nazareno
included the same property in an inventory of the properties of the deceased Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr.
will not adversely affect the ownership of the said realty. Appellant Romeo P. Nazarenos suspicion that
his parents had entrusted all their assets under the care and in the name of Natividad P. Nazareno, their
eldest living sister who was still single, to be divided upon their demise to all the compulsory heirs, has
not progressed beyond mere speculation. His barefaced allegation on the point not only is without any
corroboration but is even belied by documentary evidence. The deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B), being a
public document (Rule 132, Secs. 19 and 23, Revised Rules on Evidence), is entitled to great weight; to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant
(Yturralde vs. Aganon, 28 SCRA 407; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308). Defendants-
appellants own conduct disproves their claim of co-ownership over the property in question.Being
themselves the owner of a ten-unit apartment building along Stanford St., Cubao Quezon City,
defendants-appellants, in a letter of demand to vacate addressed to their tenants (Exhibits P, P-1 and P-
2) in said apartment, admitted that the house and lot located at No. 979 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City where
they were residing did not belong to them. Also, when they applied for a permit to repair the subject
property in 1977, they stated that the property belonged to and was registered in the name of Natividad P.
Nazareno. Among the documents submitted to support their application for a building permit was a copy
of TCT No. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Natividad Nazareno (Exhibit O
and submarkings; tsn March 15, 1985, pp. 4-5).[27]
To be sure, that case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in
that case were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On the other
hand, the parties in the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and
Natividad and Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a
third-party complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, this third-party
complaint concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. [28] Though Romeo
represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from
the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over
Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover
properties which were wrongfully disposed.
Furthermore, Natividads title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other words, the title to the
other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. If the first case resolved
anything, it was the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B alone.
Third. Petitioners allege that, as shown by several deeds of sale executed by Maximino, Sr. and Aurea
during their lifetime, the intention to dispose of their real properties is clear.Consequently, they argue that
the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 should also be deemed valid.
This is a non-sequitur. The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino,
Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the Deed of Sale made on January 29, 1970 is valid.
Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale. The question, however, is
whether these sales were made for a consideration. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the
Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes.
Indeed, it was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals that Natividad had no means
to pay for the six lots subject of the Deed of Sale.
All these convince the Court that Natividad had no means to pay for all the lots she purportedly
purchased from her parents. What is more, Romeos admission that he did not pay for the transfer to him
of lots 3 and 25-L despite the considerations stated in the deed of sale is a declaration against interest
and must ring with resounding truth. The question is, why should Natividad be treated any differently, i.e.,
with consideration for the sale to her, when she is admittedly the closest to her parents and the one
staying with them and managing their affairs? It just seems without reason. Anyway, the Court is
convinced that the questioned Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970 (Exh. A or 1) is simulated for lack of
consideration, and therefore ineffective and void.[29]
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals said:
Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 29 January 1970 void and of no effect. In the case of Suntay vs. Court of Appeals (251 SCRA 430
[1995]), the Supreme Court held that badges of simulation make a deed of sale null and void since parties
thereto enter into a transaction to which they did not intend to be legally bound.
It appears that it was the practice in the Nazareno family to make simulated transfers of ownership of real
properties to their children in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Per the testimony of
Romeo, he acquired Lot 25-L from his parents through a fictitious or simulated sale wherein no
consideration was paid by him. He even truthfully admitted that the sale of Lot 3 to him on 04 July 1969
(Deed of Absolute Sale, Records, Vol. II, p. 453) likewise had no consideration. This document was
signed by the spouses Max, Sr. and Aurea as vendors while defendant-appellant Natividad signed as
witness.[30]
Fourth. Petitioners argue further:
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29, 1970 is an indivisible contract founded on an indivisible
obligation. As such, it being indivisible, it can not be annulled by only one of them. And since this suit was
filed only by the estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. without including the estate of Aurea Poblete, the
present suit must fail. The estate of Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. can not cause its annulment while its
validity is sustained by the estate of Aurea Poblete.[31]
An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts, whatever may be the nature of
the thing which is the object thereof. The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not to the object
thereof.[32] In the present case, the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to
Natividad. The obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in
parts, otherwise the value of what is transferred is diminished. Petitioners are therefore mistaken in basing
the indivisibility of a contract on the number of obligors.
In any case, if petitioners only point is that the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone cannot contest the validity
of the Deed of Sale because the estate of Aurea has not yet been settled, the argument would nonetheless
be without merit. The validity of the contract can be questioned by anyone affected by it. [33] A void contract
is inexistent from the beginning. Hence, even if the estate of Maximino, Sr. alone contests the validity of
the sale, the outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at all.
Fifth. As to the third-party complaint concerning Lot 3, we find that this has been passed upon by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. As Romeo admitted, no consideration was paid by him to his parents
for the Deed of Sale. Therefore, the sale was void for having been simulated. Natividad never acquired
ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being without
consideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her name.
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to
Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the
latter was the only female and the only unmarried member of the family.[34] She was thus entrusted with the
real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to
Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor.
Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states:
There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal
estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part
thereof.
There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with
Art. 1061 which states:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate
any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. on April 20,
1979[35] will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on
the title of Natividad. The rule is settled that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind
the certificate to determine the condition of the property. [36]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999]

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP), petitioner,

G.R. No. L-36958 July 10, 1986

MARIANO ZABAT, JR., petitioner,

Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioner.

Rodolfo G. Santiago for private respondent.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.

Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging

Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM

G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992

CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner,

Article XVI, Section 6:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NATIVIDAD. . . . The basic tenet of a modern police organization is

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

And so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand.

We do not share this view.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Once more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions.

Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows:

D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their

a.) Provincial Governor (1) . . .

full control remains with the National Police Commission.

b.) Inspector to Superintendent. Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as recommended

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, Madam President.

MR. NATIVIDAD. He is the President.

MR. NATIVIDAD. No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.

MR. NATIVIDAD. Both, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. Control and Supervision.

Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply

[G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000]

NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 140946

thence N. 79 deg. 53E., 12.50 m. to point 2;

thence S. 10 deg. 07E., 40.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 79 deg. 53W., 12.50 m. to point 4;

TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 132019

thence N. 23 deg. 28 min. E., 11.70 m. to point 2;

thence S. 66 deg. 32 min. E., 18.00 m. to point 3;

thence S. 23 deg. 28 min. W., 11.70 m. to point 4;

thence N. 66 deg. 32. min. W., 18.00 m. to the point

TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 118885

thence S. 25 deg. 00E., 12.00 m. to point 2;

thence S. 64 deg. 59W., 29.99 m. to point 3;

thence N. 25 deg. 00W., 12.00 m to point 4;