SUCCESSION CASES
G.R. No. L-19270 March 31, 1962
MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED MARIA
GERVACIO BLAS, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. CECILIA MUOZ-PALMA,
as Judge of the Rizal Court of First Instance; ROSALINA SANTOS, as
Executrix of the testate estate of the late Maxima Santos; MARTA
GERVACIO BLAS CHIVI, LUDOVICO PINPIN and TOMASA
AVENDAO, respondents.
Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against the order of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Judge Cecilia Muoz Palma, presiding, dated
October 25, 1961, which (1) granted the motion of respondent executrix
Rosalina Santos to set Civil Case No. 4395 of said court, appealed to this
Court as G.R. No. L-14070, for hearing to determine certain factual issues
before proceeding with the execution of the judgment rendered therein by
this Court, (2) admitted the complaint in intervention of intervenors Ludovico
Pinpin and Tomasa Avendao, and (3) denied the motion filed by plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, to enforce the judgment of this Court in the above-
mentioned case without the necessity of further hearing.
The events that led to the present petition may be summarized as follows:
On July 26, 1961, plaintiffs, petitioners herein, filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a motion for the execution of the decision of this Court in
G.R. No. L-14070, dated March 29, 1961 (Civil Case No. 4395, Court of First
Instance of Rizal), which motion was granted by the respondent judge in an
order dated August 16, 1961. Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was
issued by the clerk of the lower court on August 24, 1961, and notice thereof
served upon respondent Rosalina Santos on August 29, 1961, giving the
latter 10 days within which to comply the same. Instead of complying with the
order, respondent executrix, on September 15,1961, filed a motion to set the
case for hearing, alleging that it would be difficult to comply with the court's
order unless the following questions were first resolved: (1) what properties
to be conveyed by the executrix; (2) to whom conveyance is to be made; and
(3) in what proportions conveyance should be effected. This motion was
opposed by herein petitioners as well as by Marta Chivi on the ground that
the decision of this Court was clear enough on the questions raised and
could be complied with without the necessity of adducing evidence. A reply to
this opposition was filed by respondent executrix and a rejoinder thereto
presented by petitioners.
On October 3, 1961, plaintiff again filed a motion to enforce the final
judgment in the above-numbered case in accordance with Sec. 10, Rule 39,
to which motion defendant executrix filed an opposition reiterating the
necessity of a hearing before the judgment of this Court could be executed.
In the meantime, or on August 29, 1961, Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa
Avendao presented a complaint in intervention, alleging that they are
legatees named in the last will and testament of the deceased Don Simeon
Blas as well as in that of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, and
that they are, therefore, entitled to participate in the one-half share of Maxima
Santos in her conjugal partnership with Simeon Blas. Petitioners opposed the
admission of the intervention complaint on the ground that Pinpin and
Avendao have absolutely no interest in the case, not being the heirs and
legatees contemplated in the document Exhibit "A", signed by the late
Maxima Santos, nor in the will and project of partition covering the estate of
Simeon Blas nor in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court sought to be
executed; and that the admission of the intervention complaint would violate
the rule of res judicata and the doctrine of "law of the case". A reply to the
opposition was filed by the claimants-intervenors and a rejoinder thereto
presented by plaintiffs. After considering the allegations of the parties in their
respective pleadings, respondent judge issued an order dated October 25,
1961, wherein the motion for intervention was admitted, the motion for
hearing granted, and the motion to enforce the judgment of this Court was
denied. A motion for reconsideration of this order presented by petitioners on
October 31, 1961 was denied by respondent judge on December 7, 1961.
Hence, the present action was brought before this Court.
The pertinent parts of the order against which the present petition has been
instituted is, for the sake of clarity, hereby quoted:
In pages 27 to 46 of said Project of Partition, an enumeration was
made of the properties constituting the entire share of Maxima
Santos on the basis of the above-quoted distribution. It is, therefore,
incorrect to state that all these properties listed in pages 27 to 46 of
the Project of Partition constitute the one-half share of Maxima
Santos in the conjugal properties for as already indicated, said
enumeration includes: (a) the one-third portion devised to her by her
husband, Simeon Blas in his will; (b) the one-third portion
constituting the share of Lazaro Gervacio Blas; and (c) her one-half
share in the conjugal properties. In view of this, there is need of
segregating in that list of properties found in pages 27 to 46 of the
Project of Partition, those which constitute the one-half share of
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas in the conjugal properties from those
portions which she inherited from her husband as well as those
which she bought from Lazaro Gervacio Blas.
As regards the allowance of the intervention of several parties in this
proceeding, this Court is simply guided by that portion of the
Decision of the Supreme Court which states that considering that all
heirs and legatees designated in the will of Simeon Blas have not
1

appeared in this Civil Case, the said heirs and legatees may file
adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every
one of them in the properties to be conveyed.
For a proper understanding of the case at bar, we hereby quote the
dispositive part of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-14070:.
... the defendant-appellee, administratrix ... is ordered to convey and
deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as
her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, ... to
the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.
The objection to the execution of the above-quoted dispositive part of the
decision lies, as contended by counsel for respondent executrix Rosalina
Santos and as found by the trial court, in the supposed impossibility of
pointing out from among the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the
project of partition of the estate of her deceased husband, the properties that
should be conveyed and delivered.
It must be borne in mind that it was not the intention of our decision in the,
previous case (G.R. No. L-14070) which was ordered executed, that of the
very numerous properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the project of
partition, those that should be conveyed and delivered to the petitioners
herein, petitioners also in the previous case, be specifically pointed out
separately from the rest of the properties that should remain as Maxima
Santos' share. It was not expected, in view of the fact that the project of
partition of the estate of Simeon Blas does not indicate the properties
adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal partnership
separately from those received by her from her husband as devisee of the
free portion of his estate, or those acquired by purchase, that the properties
constituting the one-half to be conveyed out of Maxima Santos' share in the
conjugal partnership, be expressly singled out from the others. What was
expected to be done by the court executing the judgment, in order to carry
out the decision of this Court, was to determine what undivided portion or
aliquot part of all the properties adjudicated to her in various capacities
should be conveyed by virtue of the judgment, and then to have said
undivided portion or aliquot part conveyed in an appropriate deed and
delivered to the petitioners, without need of actually partitioning the bulk of
the properties and pointing out which of them belongs to petitioners and
which belongs to the widow Maxima Santos.1wph1.t
The practice in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons is to
assign the whole of the properties left for distribution to the heirs in a certain
definite proportion, an aliquot part pertaining to each of the heirs. This
SUCCESSION CASES
method or plan of distribution and partition of estates is provided for in
section 1 of Rule 91, which reads thus: .
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. Testimony
taken on controversy preserved. When the debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession. ...
It might be pertinent to recall, in order to show the propriety of this method of
partition by determination of the aliquot portion pertaining to each heir, that
the original action, G.R. No. L-14070, was instituted to obtain a judicial
declaration that one-half of the properties of Maxima Santos assigned to her
as her share in the conjugal properties of herself and her husband, be
conveyed to the petitioners, because of a document signed by Maxima
Santos (Annex "H" of complaint) in which she promised to convey to the
heirs of her deceased husband one-half of the properties that she would
receive as her share in the conjugal properties of herself and her husband.
The action was expressly based on said document, Annex "H" of complaint,
in which the promise to convey said one-half portion was made. There was
no demand that said one-half be expressly and actually segregated in the
action, or that the conjugal properties be actually divided or partitioned. The
defendants in that case contended that the document Annex "H" was not
executed by Maxima Santos and that if it was so executed, the same was
null and void as constituting a promise to convey future inheritance. There
was no intent to designate or point out the properties to be conveyed. The
properties appear in the inventory filed in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Simeon Blas but no demand was made for their
determination in the case. In view of the nature of the claim, which was to
compel conveyance in accordance with the written contract or promise, and
the nature of the defense, which is the supposed invalidity of the promise, the
decision could not be other than a mere declaration of the validity of the
instrument, coupled with an order for the conveyance and delivery to the
petitioners of the said one-half share as promised in the document Annex
"H". All of the above circumstances would have been ascertained had the
court below taken pains to read even the decision and the project of partition
alone.
2

It is true that objection was also raised by the defendants in the previous
case to the action on the ground that the deceased Maxima Santos had
received in one single mass of properties, not only her share in the conjugal
estate but also a devise of one-third of the free portion of the estate of her
husband Simeon Blas, as well as the share of one of the latter's heirs. But
such objection could not prevent compliance with the promise made the
deceased Maxima Santos (to convey to the heirs of her husband one-half of
what she received of the conjugal properties of her husband and herself).
And the objection then raised was opportunely denied.
The project of partition mentioned in the dispositive part of our decision
sought to be enforced, which is the project of partition in Civil Case No. 6707
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, contains the following resume of the
properties received by Maxima Santos in various capacities in the settlement
of the estate of her husband Simeon Blas:
1/2 of all properties left by the deceased, as her
share in the conjugal partnership property . . . . . . . . . P339,440.00
1/3 free disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113,146.66
1/3 of strict legitime devised to Lazaro Blas
and sold by the latter to the widow . . . . . . . . . . . 37,715.56
T O TAL .......... P490,302.22
The properties received by Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal
partnership properties is expressly stated to be P339,440.00. In accordance
with the promise made in Annex "H", to convey and deliver to the heirs of the
deceased husband one-half thereof, the value of the properties that she was
obliged to convey and deliver is one-half of said properties, or P169,720.
Following what we have stated above, that the practice in the settlement of
assets of deceased persons is to assign to each heir or participant a certain
aliquot portion, undivided if division is difficult to carry out, the share to be
assigned by Maxima Santos is P169,720 divided by P490,302.22 or
approximately 34.61-1/3%. In order to carry out the decision of this Court,
therefore, the administratrix should have been compelled or ordered to
convey and deliver the 34.61-1/3% of the total amount of the properties that
she received in the project of partition.
The procedure to be followed is that outlined in section 8 of Rule 90 which
reads as follows:
SUCCESSION CASES
Sec. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which
deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. Where the
deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed
real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of
the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the
executor or administrator to convey such property according to such
contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the
parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey
real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court
shall execute the deed. The deed executed by such executor,
administrator or clerk of court shall be as effectual to convey the
property as if executed by the deceased in his lifetime; but no such
conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that
purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons
interested, and such further notice has been given, by publication or
otherwise, as the court deems proper; nor if the assets in the hands
of the executor or administrator will thereby be reduced so as to
prevent a creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his
dividend.
The above-quoted section is applicable because the deceased Maxima
Santos had agreed and promised to convey in her will one-half of her share
in the conjugal assets to such of the heirs of her husband as she may
designate. If the administratrix Rosalina Santos is reluctant to execute the
deed as ordered by the Court, the deed of conveyance and delivery of the
properties may be executed by the clerk of court, in which case, as declared
by the rule, the deed shall be as effectual to convey the property as if
executed by the deceased in her lifetime.
We note that the petitioners prepared a deed of conveyance to be signed by
the clerk of court, but the error in the said deed of conveyance lies in that it
includes all of the properties mentioned in the project of partition, adjudicated
to Maxima Santos which, as above indicated, should not be the case,
because what was actually adjudicated to her in the project of partition
included not only her share in the conjugal property, but also what she
received from her husband out of the free portion, and what she had
purchased from an heir of her husband.
It is to be noted further that in order to have the document executed and
approved by the court, the specific steps prior to the execution of the deed of
conveyance as pointed out in the last part of the above-quoted section must
be strictly followed.
With the above explanations, there should be no difficulty for the court below
to proceed with the execution of the decision in accordance with its terms.
3

Our attention has been called to the fact of the properties included in the
inventory of the estate left by the deceased Simeon Blas, certain properties
listed in Annex "2" of the petition in the case at bar, are not included in the
project of partition. We have checked the said properties and have found that
the same are actually included in the inventory of the estate left by Simeon
Blas but do not appear among those adjudicated to any of the heirs in the
project of partition. Without making a final pronouncement as to the effect of
such conveyances, it is possible that such conveyances violated the express
promise made by Maxima Santos in Annex "H" that she convey one-half of
her share in the conjugal properties to the heirs of her deceased husband.
On the other hand, the persons who may have purchased the same may
have acquired them in good faith, without knowledge of the existence of the
promise made by the deceased Maxima Santos in Annex "H". The only just
ruling regarding these properties would be to reserve to the petitioners herein
the right of action to claim from the administratrix of Maxima Santos, or from
the persons to whom they have been transferred, or from both, their one-half
share therein as promised by Maxima Santos in Annex "H".
The above considerations dispose of the main issue submitted to this Court
in the case at bar. One minor matter remains to be considered, and that is,
the petition for intervention filed by Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendao
alleging that they have interest in the action as legatees of the deceased
Simeon Blas. This petition was opposed by the petitioners herein, but was
finally admitted by the court a quo.
These intervenors appear to have received legacies in the will of the
deceased Simeon Blas. The portion of said will containing the legacies to
these intervenors are as follows:.
IV
"Ang isang ikatlong bahagi, etc.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay TOMASA AVENDAO, etc.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay LUDOVICO PINPIN, etc."
(Pp. 254-255, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-14070, Maria
Gervacio Blas, et al. vs. Rosalina Santos.).
The question at issue, therefore, is whether these intervenors are embraced
within the term "herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking
nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento," to which
persons Maxima Santos had obligated herself to convey one-half of her
share in the conjugal properties.
SUCCESSION CASES
A study of the testament of Simeon Blas (Record on Appeal, pp. 249-257,
G.R. No. L-14070) and the promise or contract executed by Maxima Santos,
Annex "H", shows that the two terms (herederos and legatarios) are used in
the devises or legacies to the various heirs and legatees. With respect to the
legitimate heirs of Simeon Blas, to whom he devised the strict legitime and
the mejora, he used the expression "ibinibigay ko at ipinamamana sa aking
apong Maria Gervacio Blas, Marta Gervacio Blas at Lazaro Gervacio Blas"
(Chapter II, paragraph 2 of the testament of Simeon Blas). With respect to
the mejora he uses the same term "ipinamamana" and he says thus:"Para sa
aking mga apong Luding at Leoncio Blas ay ipinagkakaloob ko
at ipinamamana ang halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000) sa
bawat isa sa kanila." In the last or fourth chapter where the one-third subject
to the free disposal are disposed of, he uses only the term "ipinagkakaloob".
This term is used for Andres Pascual, Leoncio Santos, Catalina
Blas, Tomasa Avendao, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pinpin, and Fermin
Santiago, all of whom are not relatives of the deceased. Taking into account
the fact that both the will of the deceased Simeon Blas and the document
Annex "H" executed by Maxima Santos were prepared by the same persons
and at about the same time, both bearing date of December 26, 1936, and
are attested by the same witnesses, and the further fact that it was the
deceased Simeon Blas that had asked for the execution of the document
Annex "II", it stands to reason that the word "ipinamamana" refers to devices
made legal heirs (heirs at law) of the deceased Simeon Blas, whereas the
term "ipinagkakaloob" refers to persons who are not related to him, on his
heirs at law. Accordingly, in the document Annex "H" which reads as follows:.
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang,
kasal kay SIMEON BLAS, taga bayan ng Malabon, Rizal,
Philippines, sa pamamagitan ngkasulatang ito ay malaya kong
ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na
nilagdaan ng aking asawa, SIMEON BLAS, at ipinahahayag ko sa
ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa harap ng aking asawa na igagalang
at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at bawat isang bahagi ng nabanggit na
testamento at ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang
ito na ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at kayamanan naming mag-
asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin sa paggawa ko naman
ng aking testamento ay ipinagkakaloob ko ang kalahati (1/2) sa mga
herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na
asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento na ako'y makapipili
o makahihirang sa kahi't kangino sa kanila ng aking pagbibigyan at
4
 SUCCESSION CASES
pamamanahan sang-ayon sa pag-galang, paglilingkod, at
pakikisama na gagawin sa akin.

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, ay nilagdaan ko ang

kasulatang ito ngayong ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong 1936, dito sa
San Francisco del Monte, SanJuan, Rizal, Philippines.

MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS

the words "herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na

asawa," mean the heirs at law or relatives of the deceased Simeon Blas and
not other persons who are not heirs but had received legacies in money or
otherwise. Consequent to this conclusion, intervenors Ludovico Pinpin and
Tomasa Avendao cannot claim any right by virtue of said document Annex
"H" and their petition for intervention should be, as it hereby is, disallowed.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the order sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and
the court below is ordered to proceed with the execution of the judgment in
G.R. No. L-14070 in accordance herewith. With costs against the respondent
Rosalina Santos.

5

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA.
IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A.
TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.
1. Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Words and Phrases;
The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256 is not defined by the
Family Code, leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each
particular issue is submitted to them.-
The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256, is not defined by
the Family Code. The Committee did not define what is meant by a vested
or acquired right, thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as
each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer
for each and every question that may arise in the future.
2. Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Actions; An action
for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which
was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code must be governed by Article
285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code.-
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by
private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the
Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by
Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be
given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her
case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her
by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
3. Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Actions; Jurisdiction;
The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached,
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the
case.-
Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor
when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285
SUCCESSION CASES
of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the
case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines. Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a
court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint 1 for Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F.
Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother
and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose
E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A.
Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr.,
now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married
man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until
his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F.
Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963,
respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private
respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased
Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and
acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego;
that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open
and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children" as stated in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and
recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among
plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad
different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
6

(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions
of family rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status
of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who
showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of
paternal care and affection as above outlined.2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego
and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with
Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share
of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as
the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her)
share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
SUCCESSION CASES
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the
sum of P10,000.00 as atty's fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.3
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision
alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by
virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive
Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines
which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower
court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due
course on the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals,
the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on
August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the
respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the
following grounds:
A
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS
DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION
ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION
FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL
CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT
THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY
7

BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING
THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE
PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE
CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT
LEAST MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE
FAMILY CODE.
D
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS'
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH
ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child
was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS,
specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate
children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; . .
..
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the
New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of
prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in
relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an
action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on
the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent
without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by
prescription.
SUCCESSION CASES
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified
in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the child], except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172,
in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of
private respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7,
1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed father
on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly prescribed under the new
rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain
that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to
Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested of acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
8
 SUCCESSION CASES
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the
be: Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by
Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her
impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her
given retroactive effect in this particular case? by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor
the Family Code. "The Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested
when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285
or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as
of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the
each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer
case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
for each and every question that may arise in the future." 5
despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines.
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint
denominated as "Claim for Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court,
compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of
whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by
the Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
"open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains
had occasion to rule that:
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. 8
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of
Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993
the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to
are hereby AFFIRMED.
the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the
recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition SO ORDERED.
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the
same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in
force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or
impaired by the enactment of a new law.

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper

application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect
adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the
minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the
filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding
that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by
private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and

9

G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T.
SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD,
EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.
Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct
orders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively
passing upon title to the properties subject of such deeds? Is a compromise
agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the approval of
the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner?
The Case
These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for
review on certiorari before us assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 which annulled the
decision3 of the trial court4 and which declared the compromise agreement
among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial court's
approval. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and
discussed, the instant petition is GRANTED and the
challenged decision as well as the subsequent orders of the
respondent court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October
14, 1992 is made PERMANENT. The compromise
agreement dated October 30, 1969 as modified by the
memorandum of agreement of April 13, 1970 is DECLARED
valid and binding upon herein parties. And Special
Proceedings No. 44-M and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.5
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of
spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private
respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S.
Lugod are the legitimate children of [herein private respondent]
Rosalia.
SUCCESSION CASES
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September
29, 1967, [herein private respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22,
1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration over the
estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez,
who was at the time in state of senility (Annex "B", Petition).
On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as
administratrix of the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an
inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of her late
mother (Annex "C", Petition).
Before the administration proceedings Special in Proceedings No.
44-M could formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez,
[herein private respondent] Rosalia's father, died on October 21,
1968.
On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C.
Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration (Special
Proceedings No. 1022) over the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez,
which petition was opposed by (herein private respondent) Rosalia. 6
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia
and [herein petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels
executed a compromise agreement (Annex "D", Petition) wherein
they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late
Juan C. Sanchez.
On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial
court], and took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate
estate.
On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require
administratrix, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, to deliver
deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement
(Annex "E", Petition).
Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and
[herein petitioners] entered into and executed a memorandum of
agreement which modified the compromise agreement (Annex "F".
Petition)
10

On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed,
thru counsel, a motion to require [herein private respondent] Rosalia
to submit a new inventory and to render an accounting over
properties not included in the compromise agreement (Annex "G",
Petition). They likewise filed a motion to defer the approval of the
compromise agreement (Annex "H", Ibid), in which they prayed for
the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.
On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners]
moved to withdraw his appearance and the two motions he flied,
Annex "G" and "H" (Annex "I", Petition).
On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing
[herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of
properties under her administration and an accounting of the fruits
thereof, which prompted [herein private respondent] Rosalia to file a
rejoinder on March 31, 1980 (Annex "K", Petition).
On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a
motion to change administratrix (Annex "L", Petition) to which [herein
private respondent] Rosalia filed an opposition (Annex "M", Ibid).
The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective
position papers, which they did (Annexes "N" and "O", Petition). On
September 14, 1989, former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered
his re-appearance as counsel for (herein petitioners).
On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial
court], this time presided by Judge Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated
its decision on June 26, 1991, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows by declaring and ordering:
1. That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca
Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 44-M consists of all
her paraphernal properties and one-half (1/2) of the conjugal
properties which must be divided equally between Rosalia
Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;
2. That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under
Special Proceedings No. 1022 consists of all his capital
properties, one-half (1/2) from the conjugal partnership of
SUCCESSION CASES
gains and one-half (1/2) of the intestate estate of Maria
Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-M;
3. That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C.
Sanchez shall be inherited by his only legitimate daughter,
Rosalia V. Sanchez de Lugod while the other one-half (1/2)
shall be inherited and be divided equally by, between and
among the six (6) illegitimate children, namely: Patricia
Alburo, Maria Ramuso Sanchez, Rolando Pedro T. Sanchez,
Florida Mierly T. Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T.
Sanchez;
4. That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan
C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in favor of Rosalia
Sanchez Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and
Roberto S. Lugod on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967 are
all declared simulated and fictitious and must be subject to
collation and partition among all heirs;
5. That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision,
Rosalia Sanchez Lugod is hereby ordered to prepare a
project of partition of the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez
under Special Proceedings No. 1022 and distribute and
deliver to all heirs their corresponding shares. If she fails to
do so within the said thirty (30) days, then a Board of
Commissioners is hereby constituted, who are all entitled to
honorarium and per diems and other necessary expenses
chargeable to the estate to be paid by Administratrix Rosalia
S. Lugod, appointing the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Gingoog City as
members thereof, with the task to prepare the project of
partition and deliver to all heirs their respective shares within
ninety (90) days from the finality of said decision;
6. That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision,
Administratrix Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod is hereby
ordered to submit two (2) separate certified true and correct
accounting, one for the income of all the properties of the
entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special
Proceedings No. 44-M, and another for the properties of the
entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special
Proceedings No. 1022 duly both signed by her and both
verified by a Certified Public Accountant and distribute and
deliver to her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters in equal
shares, one-half (1/2) of the net income of the estate of Juan
11

C. Sanchez from October 21, 1968 up to the finality of this
decision;
7. For failure to render an accounting report and failure to
give cash advances to the illegitimate children of Juan C.
Sanchez during their minority and hour of need from the net
income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which adversely
prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of college
education, (the trial court) hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez
Vda. de Lugod to pay her six (6) illegitimate brothers and
sisters the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
Pesos, as exemplary damages, and also the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos for attorney's
fees;
8. Upon release of this decision and during its pendency,
should appeal be made, the Register of Deeds and
Assessors of the Provinces and Cities where the properties
of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca are located, are all
ordered to register and annotate in the title and/or tax
declarations, the dispositive portion of this decision for the
protection of all heirs and all those who may be concerned.
SO ORDERED.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration
dated July 17, 1991 (Annex "P", Petition) on August 6, 1991.
On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution
and opposition to [herein private respondent] Rosalia's motion for
reconsideration (Annex "Q", Petition).
On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order
(Annex "S", Petition) declaring, among other things, that the decision
at issue had become final and executory.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Omnibus Order (Annex "T", Petition). Said
[herein private respondent] was allowed to file a memorandum in
support of her motion (Annex "V", Petition).
On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying
petitioner Rosalia's motion for reconsideration (Annex "W", Petition). 7
SUCCESSION CASES
Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via
a petition for certiorari and contended:
I The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise
agreement.
II The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent]
Rosalia S. Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which
was impossible.
III The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the
constitutional rights of [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod,
Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod when [the trial court]
decided to annul the deed of sale between the said [herein private
respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without affording them their day
in court.
IV [The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-
established and entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts
sans any evidence thereon.
V [The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent]
Rosalia S. Lugod's right to appeal.8
For clarity's sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromise
agreement9 of the parties:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by
their mutual desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations
between and among themselves, for mutual valuable considerations
and in the spirit of good will and fair play, and, for the purpose of this
Compromise Agreement, agree to the following:
1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on
October 21, 1968 was legally married to Maria Villafranca de
Sanchez, who predeceased her on September 29, 1967, out of
whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Oppositor herein, was born,
thus making her the sole and only surviving legitimate heir of her
deceased parents;
2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children,
Intervenors-Oppositors and Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;
12

(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on March 17, 1926 at
Cebu City, Philippines, to Emilia Alburo;
(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of wedlock on May 9,
1937 at Gingoog, Misamis Oriental, now, Gingoog City, to
Alberta Ramoso;
(3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May 19, 1947,
(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February 16, 1949,
(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950, and
(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all born out of
wedlock to Laureta Tampus in Gingoog City, Philippines.
3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties,
to wit:
I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ
NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot No.
1041 C-2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot Nos. 1033, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040, 1042 &
1043; South by Lot No. 1080, 1088, 1087 & 1084; East by Lot Nos.
1089, 1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos. 954, 1038, 1057 & 1056,
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183, 672) sq. ms. more or less.
P21,690.00
II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA
VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No.
2745, C-7 located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot Nos. 2744, 2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by
Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No. 2741, containing an area of
FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14,700) sq. ms. more
or less.
SUCCESSION CASES
P1,900.00
(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No.
3271 C-7 located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded
on the North by Lot No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East
by Panyangan River & F. Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West
by Samay Creek, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P11,580.00
(3) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad. Lot No.
2319, Case 2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot No. 1061; South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No.
1044; and West by Lot No. 1041, containing an area of THREE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (3,225) sq. ms. more
or less.
(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No.
3272, C-7 Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan
River; South by Panyangan River; and West by Lot Nos. 3270 &
3271, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Damian
Querubin.
P2,370.00
(5) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No.
3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded
on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 &
3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek,
containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P61,680.00
(6) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457, Cad. Lot No.
3273, C-7 Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East
by Panyangan River; and West by Lot No. 3270, containing an area
of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (34,300) sq. ms.
more or less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.
13

P3,880.00
(7) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000, Cad. Lot No.
2806, Case 7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on
the North by Agayayan River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by
Isabelo Ramoso; and West by Restituto Baol, containing an area of
SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (6,676) sq. ms.
more or less.
P380.00
(8) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924, Cad. Lot No.
1206 C-1 located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
NW., by Lot No. 1209; SW., by Lot No. 1207; Eastby National
Highway; and West by Lot No. 1207; containing an area of FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (4,513) sq. ms. more or
less.
P740.00
(9) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925, Cad. Lot No.
5554, located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded
on the North by Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486; East
by Lot No. 5555; and West by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528)
sq. ms. more or less.
P320.00
(10) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926, Cad. Lot No.
5555 C-7 located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558;
South by Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488, 3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot
No. 3496; and West by Lot No. 5554, containing an area of
SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX
(77,776) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,350.00
(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot
No. 61-C-1 located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot 64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza
St; East by Lot Nos. 63, and 62; West by Road-Lot 614-Guno St.,
SUCCESSION CASES
containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FORTY TWO (1,042) sq.
ms. more or less.
P9,320.00
(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5,
Block 2, located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot No. 4, block 2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot
No. 6, block 2, West by Subdivision Road, containing an area of
FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. ms. more or less.
P12,240.00
(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No.
7-A-16-0 located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot No. 7-A-16-0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No.
7-A-18-Road; West by Lot No. 8, PSU-120704-Julito Arengo
vs. Restituto Baol, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN
(216) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,050.00
(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot
No. 5157-C-7, located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot No. 5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-
Steep Bank; East by NW, by Lot No. 5158, Villafranca, containing an
area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (96,200) sq. ms.
more or less.
P3,370.00
III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)
NATURE AND DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL
1. Fifty (50) shares of stock
Rural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.
at P100.00 per share P5,000.00
2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock
with San Miguel Corporation 400.00
14

4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-
enumerated properties in the following manner, to wit:
(a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland
Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T.
Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso
shares, considering not only their respective areas but also
the improvements existing thereon, to wit:
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot
No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City
and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267;
South by Lot Nos. 3271 and 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 &
3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of
FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. and assessed in the sum of
P61,680.00.
(b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties,
both real and personal, enumerated above with the
exception of the following:
(1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel
Corporation, indicated in San Miguel Corporation
Stock Certificate No. 30217, which two shares she is
ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo;
(2) The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block
2 together with the improvements thereon and
identified as parcel No. II-12, lot covered by Tax
Decl. No. 15798 identified as Parcel No. II-13 in the
above enumerated, and Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7
together with the improvements thereon, which is
identified as parcel No. II-14 of the above-
enumeration of properties, which said Rosalia S.
Lugod is likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of
Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso shares;
5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and
severally in form of advances after October 21, 1968 the aggregate
sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE
PESOS (P8,533.94) and NINETY-FOUR CENTAVOS;
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6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the
indebtedness of the deceased Juan G. Sanchez and his deceased
wife Maria Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the
sum of P43,064.99;
7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the
estate and inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their
respective shares as may be determined by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and shall likewise be responsible for the expenses of
survey and segregation of their respective shares;
8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro
Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna
Sanchez hereby waive, relinquish and renounce, jointly and
individually, in a manner that is absolute and irrevocable, all their
rights and interests, share and participation which they have or might
have in all the properties, both real and personal, known or unknown
and/or which may not be listed herein, or in excess of the areas
listed or mentioned herein, and/or which might have been, at one
time or another, owned by, registered or placed in the name of either
of the spouses Juan C. Sanchez or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or
both, and which either one or both might have sold, ceded,
transferred, or donated to any person or persons or entity and which
parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify together with all the
improvements thereon, as well as all the produce and proceeds
thereof, and particularly of the properties, real and personal listed
herein, as well as demandable obligations due to the deceased
spouses Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of the
aforementioned spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de
Sanchez, in favor of oppositor Rosalia S. Lugod;
9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorney's fees shall
be borne respectively by the parties hereto;
10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her
minor children, namely: Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez, hereby declare that she has no right, interest,
share and participation whatsoever in the estate left by Juan C.
Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, or both, and that she
likewise waives, renounces, and relinquishes whatever rigid, share,
participation or interest therein which she has or might have in favor
of Rosalia S. Lugod;
11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of
each other any whatever claims or actions, arising from, connected
15
 SUCCESSION CASES
with, and as a result of Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro City
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Rosalia S. Lugod, Gingoong City
warranting that the parcel of land ceded to the other parties herein
contains 48 hectares and 36 ares. (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ
12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the Petitioner Petitioner
payment to Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of the sum of P51,598.93
representing the indebtedness of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez and (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Maria Villafranca de Sanchez and the advances made to Rolando FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZ
Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and Myna all surnamed Sanchez, mentioned Petitioner Petitioner
in paragraphs 5 hereto agree to have letters of administration issued
in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any bond. (Sgd.)
LAURETA TAMPUS
That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and For herself and as Guardian
enjoyment of the parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and Ad-Litem of the minors
intervenors immediately after the signing of this agreement and that Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and
the latter also mutually agree among themselves to have the said lot Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez
subdivided and partitioned immediately in accordance with the
proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and intervenor ASSISTED BY:
and that in the meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet
effected, the administrations of said parcel of land shall be vested
jointly with Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of petitioners and TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.
Maria Ramoso, one of the intervenors who shall see to it that each Counsel for Petitioners
petitioner and intervenor is given one sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds Cagayan de Oro City
of all agricultural harvest made thereon.
The Clerk of Court
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing Court of First Instance
compromise agreement be approved. Branch III, Medina, Mis. Or.

Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969. Greetings:

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of
PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGOD the Honorable Court today, Oct. 30, 1969.
Intervenor-Oppositor Oppositor
(Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
(Sgd.) PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L.
MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ ASSISTED BY: FERNANDEZ
Intervenor-Oppositor
The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the parties
(Sgd.) entered into with the assistance of their counsel, amended the above
ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYES compromise. (It will be reproduced later in our discussion of the second issue
R-101-Navarro Bldg. raised by the petitioners.)
(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St.

16

10
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated September 4, 1992, initially
dismissed private respondents' petition. Acting, however, on a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated
September 14, 1992 and September 25, 1992, respectively, 11 Respondent
Court thereafter reinstated private respondents' petition in a
resolution 12 dated October 14, 1992.
In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed
Decision granting the petition, setting aside the trial court's decision and
declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding.
Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
In this appeal, petitioners invite the Court's attention to the following issues:
I The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 considering that the special civil action
of certiorari may not be availed of as a substitute for an appeal and
that, in any event, the grounds invoked in the petition are merely
alleged errors of judgment which can no longer be done in view of
the fact that the decision of the lower court had long become final
and executory.
II Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in
annulling the decision of the lower court for the reason that a
compromise agreement or partition as the court construed the same
to be, executed by the parties on October 30, 1969 was void and
unenforceable the same not having been approved by the intestate
court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by
petitioners on the ground of fraud.
III The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding
findings of facts of the lower court that the alleged conveyances of
real properties made by the spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca just before their death in favor of their daughter and
grandchildren, private respondents herein, are tainted with fraud or
made in contemplation of death, hence, collationable.
IV In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the
lower court's declaration of fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a
final adjudication of annulment.
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V The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of
the intestate proceedings even as the lower court had not made a
final and enforceable distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan
C. Sanchez.
VI Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly
erred in not at least directing respondent Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver
the deficiency of eight (8) hectares due petitioners under the
compromise agreement and memorandum of agreement, and in not
further directing her to include in the inventory properties conveyed
under the deeds of sale found by the lower court to be part of the
estate of Juan C. Sanchez. 13
The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are
hereby consolidated into three main issues specifically dealing with the
following subjects: (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy before the Court
of Appeals, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the
presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of the
properties sold.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari
Before the Court of Appeals
Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal
within the reglementary period, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals
erred in allowing private respondent's recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. They contend that private respondents' invocation of certiorari was
"procedurally defective." 14 They further argue that private respondents, in
their petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the trial court
which, being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were
not correctable by certiorari. 15 This Court disagrees.
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for
a lost appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions
to this rule, viz.: "(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and
adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33
appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will
inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-
27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued
either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30,
17

1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 231985); (3) for
certain special consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs.
Zulueta, et al. 16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in
criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in
case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L029039,
Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De
Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in
the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc.
vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)." 16 Even in a case where the
remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where
the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction, 17 as in
the present case.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and
allowable when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against
a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. 18 After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are
convinced that all these requirements were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it
issued its assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the
intestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its
limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. 19 It is
hornbook doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal
force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar." 20 In the instant case,
the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the
deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia
Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S.
Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties
covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2)
of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined
with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof . In doing so, it
clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
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inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so. 21
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
rendered its decision in disregard of the parties' compromise
agreement. 22 Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement
"was nor approved by the court," 23 is tantamount to "an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation and within the bounds of law. " 24
The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial
court's decision but also the latter's jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not merely errors of
judgment. 25 Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition
for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is well-settled that "(a)n
act done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by certiorari." 26
Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent
appellate court is apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner
Rosalia here under Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court. But the
availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute
sufficient ground to [prevent] a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate
remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient (Echauz vs. Court
of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381). Here, considering that the respondent
court has disregarded the compromise agreement which has long
been executed as early as October, 1969 and declared null and void
the deeds of sale with finality, which, as a probate court, it has no
jurisdiction to do, We deem ordinary appeal is inadequate.
Considering further the [trial court's] granting of [herein petitioners')
motion for execution of the assailed decision, 27 [herein private
respondent] Rosalia's resort to the instant petition [for review
on certiorari] is all the more warranted under the circumstances. 28
We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court
may be challenged through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. At the very least, this case is a clear exception to the
general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the
trial court's decision and resolutions were issued without or in excess of
18

jurisdiction, which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. "A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source
of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is void; ' . . . it may be said
to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.' " 29
Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed
during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is
necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had
jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. They add that
Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all miners represented
only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus. 30
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting
of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its
perfection. 31 Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid for lack
of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of
Appeals, 32 where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the
compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is
perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the
contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De
los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that moment
not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De
Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res
judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially
approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De
Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA 762 [May 27,
1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA
361). (Emphasis found in the original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely
entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their
respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four
months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As
noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared
successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the
SUCCESSION CASES
fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30,
1969, 33 followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long
drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective
interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that
the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be
bound thereby. 34 To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based
on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties
thereto. 35
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed
but also encouraged in civil cases. 36Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates
that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree
upon some fair compromise."
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement,
petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing
Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's approval is
necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of
their wards or children. 37
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement,
the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article
1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction."
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires
the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2)
the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3)
the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the
partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with
the Register of Deeds. 38 We find that all the foregoing requisites are present
in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise
agreement/partition in this case.
In any event, petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial
court. This new question or matter was manifestly beyond the pale of the
issues or questions submitted and threshed out before the lower court which
are reproduced below, viz.:
I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased
spouses to their grandchildren collationable?
19

II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased
spouses to their legitimate daughter also collationable?
III The first and second issues being resolved, how much then is the
rightful share of the four (4) recognized illegitimate children? 39
Furthermore, the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17, 1990 filed by
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court 40 readily reveals that they never
questioned the validity of the compromise. In their comment before the Court
of Appeals, 41 petitioners based their objection to sad compromise agreement
on the solitary "reason that it was tainted with fraud and deception," zeroing
specifically on the alleged fraud committed by private respondent Rosalia S.
Lugod. 42 The issue of minority was first raised only in petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision; 43 thus, it "is as if it was
never duly raised in that court at all." 44 Hence, this Court cannot now, for the
first time on appeal, entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the
basic rule of fair play, justice and due process. 45 We take this opportunity to
reiterate and emphasize the well-settled rule that "(a)n issue raised for the
first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower
court is barred by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within the
issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 46
The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in
No. 8 of the aforequoted compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a
relinquishment by petitioners of "a right to properties which were not
known." 47They argue that such waiver is contrary to law, public policy,
morals or good custom. The Court disagrees. The assailed waiver pertained
to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent's estate which
were not included in the inventory of the estate's properties. It also covered
their right to other properties originally belonging to the spouses Juan
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been transferred to
other persons. In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm
and ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid because, contrary to petitioners'
protestation, the parties waived a known and existing interest their
hereditary right which was already vested in them by reason of the death of
their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent."
Hence, there is no legal obstacle to an heir's waiver of his/her hereditary
share "even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate." 48 At any rate, such waiver is consistent
with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for
the settlement of civil disputes. 49
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Finally, petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod's
alleged fraudulent acts, specifically her concealment of some of the
decedent's properties, attended the actual execution of the compromise
agreement. 50This argument is debunked by the absence of any substantial
and convincing evidence on record showing fraud on her part. As aptly
observed by the appellate court:
[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of
fraud or deception by alleging, inter alia, that the parcel of land given
to them never conformed to the stated area, i.e., forty-eight (48)
hectares, as stated in the compromise agreement. We find this
argument unconvincing and unmeritorious. [Herein petitioners']
averment of fraud on the part of [herein private respondent] Rosalia
becomes untenable when We consider the memorandum of
agreement they later executed with [herein private respondent]
Rosalia wherein said compromise agreement was modified by
correcting the actual area given to [herein petitioners] from forty-eight
(48) hectares to thirty-six (36) hectares only. If the actual area
allotted to them did not conform to the 48 hectare area stated in the
compromise agreement, then why did they agree to the
memorandum of agreement whereby their share in the estate of their
father was even reduced to just 36 hectares? Where is fraud or
deception there? Considering that [herein petitioners] were ably
represented by their lawyers in executing these documents and who
presumably had explained to them the import and consequences
thereof, it is hard to believe their charge that they were defrauded
and deceived by [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners], when actually
surveyed, happened to be different in area to the stated area of 48
hectares in the compromise agreement, this circumstance is not
enough proof of fraud or deception on [herein private respondent]
Rosalia's part. Note that Tax Declaration No. 06453 plainly discloses
that the land transferred to [herein petitioners] pursuant to the
compromise agreement contained an area of 48 hectares (Annex
"A", Supplemental Reply). And when [herein petitioners] discovered
that the land allotted to them actually contained only 24 hectares, a
conference between the parties took place which led to the execution
and signing of the memorandum of agreement wherein [herein
petitioners'] distributive share was even reduced to 36 hectares. In
the absence of convincing and clear evidence to the contrary, the
allegation of fraud and deception cannot be successfully imputed to
[herein private respondent] Rosalia who must be presumed to have
acted in good faith. 51
20
 SUCCESSION CASES
The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties (Sgd.)
on April 13, 1970 and referred to above reads: LAURETA TAMPOS
For herself and as Guardian
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ad-litem of Rolando, Mierly,
Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez
The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby
agree:
Assisted by:
1. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30,
1969 so as to include the following: (Sgd.)
TEOGENES VELEZ, Jr.
Counsel for Petitioners
a. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners and
intervenors, all illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Sanchez,
forty-eight (48) hectares, thirty-six (36) ares as embodied in the (Sgd.)
aforementioned compromise agreement to thirty-six (36) hectares ROSALIA S. LUGOD
only, thus enabling each of them to get six (6) hectares each. Administratrix

b. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel of
land which is now covered by O.C.T. No. 146 (Patent No. 30012) and
the adjoining areas thereof designated as Lot A and Lot C as
reflected on the sketch plan attached to the record of this case
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario E. Zalles pursuant to the
Court's commission of March 10, 1970 provided, however, that if the
said 36-hectare area could not be found after adding thereto the
areas of said lots A and C, then the additional area shall be taken
from what is designated as Lot B, likewise also reflected in the said
sketch plan attached to the records;
c. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the late
Juan C. Sanchez (petitioners and intervenors) shall be effective
among themselves in such a manner to be agreed upon by them,
each undertaking to assume redemption of whatever plants found in
their respective shares which need redemption from the tenants
thereof as well as the continuity of the tenancy agreements now
existing and covering the said shares or areas.
d. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said
petitioners and intervenors prorata.
e. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary administration
of the area designated as Lot 5 of the Valles Sketch Plan pending
final survey of the said 36-hectare area.
Cagayan de Oro City, April 13, 1970.
Assisted by:
(Sgd.)
PABLO S. REYES
Counsel for Administratrix
(Sgd.)
MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZ
Intervenor 52
Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement;
they even amended it when they realized some errors in the original. Such
correction emphasizes the voluntariness of said deed.
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had
already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their
compromise. 53 This Court has consistently ruled that "a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its
benefits." 54 By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from
questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this
conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine
years after its execution, when they filed with the trial court their Motion to
Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated October 26, 1979. 55 In
hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that petitioners filed said motion for the
sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their compromise
agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their view was
unwise and unfair. While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of
petitioners, we can only stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or
21

disregard the legal effects of said compromise which, by its very nature as a
perfected contract, is binding on the parties. Moreover, courts have no
jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision
different therefrom. 56 It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract,
entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what
he was doing" 57 and "a compromise entered into and carried out in good
faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact,
(McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488) because courts have no
power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply
because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments." 58 Volenti non fit injuria.
Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion in deeming Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 "CLOSED
and TERMINATED," arguing that there was as yet no order of distribution of
the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. They add that they had
not received their full share thereto. 59 We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90
of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate may be made
when the "debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any," had been paid. This
order for the distribution of the estate's residue must contain the names and
shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record,
particularly the trial court's conclusion, 60 reveals that all the foregoing
requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the
indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the
amount of P51,598.93 was shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia, who
also absorbed or charged against her share the advances of Rolando T.
Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil
Code on collation. 61 Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is
the law between them, already contains the names and shares of the heirs to
the residual estate, which shares had also been delivered. On this point, we
agree with the following discussion of the Court of Appeals:
But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its
appreciation of the facts of this case are the uncontroverted
facts that (herein petitioners) have been in possession and
ownership of their respective distributive shares as early as
October 30, 1969 and they have received other properties in
addition to their distributive shares in consideration of the
compromise agreement which they now assail. Proofs
thereof are Tax Declarations No. 20984, 20985, 20986,
20987, 20988, 20989 and 20990 (Annexes "B" to "H",
Supplemental Reply) in the respective names of (herein
petitioners), all for the year 1972. (Herein petitioners) also
SUCCESSION CASES
retained a house and lot, a residential lot and a parcel of
agricultural land (Annexes "I", "J" and "K", Ibid.) all of which
were not considered in the compromise agreement between
the parties. Moreover, in the compromise agreement per
se, it is undoubtedly stated therein that cash advances in the
aggregate sum of P8,533.94 were received by (herein
petitioners) after October 21, 1968 (Compromise Agreement,
par. 5) 62
All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished
said intestate proceedings which, consequently, should be deemed closed
and terminated. In view of the above discussion, the Court sees no reversible
error on the part of the Court of Appeals.
Third Issue: Fraud and Collation
Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent
Rosalia T. Lugod to deliver to them the deficiency as allegedly provided
under the compromise agreement. They further contend that said court erred
in not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged deficiency in the
inventory for purposes of collating the properties subject of the questioned
deeds of sale. 63 We see no such error. In the trial court, there was only one
hearing conducted, and it was held only for the reception of the evidence of
Rosalia S. Lugod to install her as administratrix of the estate of Maria
Villafranca. There was no other evidence, whether testimonial or otherwise,
"received, formally offered to, and subsequently admitted by the probate
court below"; nor was there "a trial on the merits of the parries' conflicting
claims." 64 In fact, the petitioners "moved for the deferment of the
compromise agreement on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of
properties NOT because of any deficiency in the land conveyed to them
under the agreements." 65 Hence, there is no hard evidence on record to
back up petitioners' claims.
In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia's willingness to
reimburse any deficiency actually proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the
geodetic engineer who prepared the certification and the sketch of the lot in
question, and who could have provided evidence for the petitioners, "to bring
records of his relocation survey." 66 However, Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did
not comply with the court's subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum.
Neither did he furnish the required relocation survey. 67 No wonder, even after
a thorough scrutiny of the records, this Court cannot find any evidence to
support petitioners' allegations of fraud against Private Respondent Rosalia.
Similarly, petitioners' allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned
deeds of sale are bereft of substance, in view of the palpable absence of
22
 SUCCESSION CASES
evidence to support them. The legal presumption of validity of the questioned
deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public documents, has not been
overcome. 68 On the other hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations.
We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of
future inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents
during their lifetime. 69 Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are not
collationable because, essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of
the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent
to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.

In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of
shares provided in the compromise, concealment of properties and fraud in
the deeds of sale are factual in nature which, as a rule, are not reviewable by
this Court in petitions under Rule 45. 70 Petitioners have failed to convince us
that this case constitutes an exception to such rule. All in all, we find that the
Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the issues raised by them.
Indeed, they have not persuaded us that said Court committed any reversible
error to warrant a grant of their petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

23

G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR.
THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant, vs. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA
RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE
FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of
ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-
four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual
Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative
(Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-
G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which
was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December
5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto
and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin,
Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest
(paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary
provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de
terreno palayeros situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de
la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de
CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON;
Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie
Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie
y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y
Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie;
a cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la
carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea
Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado son;
SUCCESSION CASES
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba
situados objectos de este legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra
derecho de empezar a gozar y administrar de este legado al
principiar a curzar la Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de
Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que pierde el legatario
este derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar
de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de Presbiterado
(Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a
celebrar cada ao VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio
de mi alma y de mis padres difuntos, y si el actual legatario,
quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este
legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo del actual
Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria,
Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado segun lo arriba queda expresado, pasara la
administracion de este legado a cargo del actual Parroco
Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara,
anualmente todos los productos que puede tener estate
legado, ganando o sacando de los productos anuales el
CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion, y los derechos
correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que
debiera el Parroco celebrar cada ao, depositando todo lo
restante de los productos de estate legado, en un banco, a
nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a
project containing the following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be
given to the nearest male relative who shall take the
priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the
actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real
properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
24
 SUCCESSION CASES
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order
of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew
Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass. Value named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a
T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P340 seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City.
T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 P7290 The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of
Victoria as trustee.
T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 P1880
T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 P3580
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It
held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male
Total amount and value 44.1163 P13,090.00 relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for
twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands
of partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate within twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his
(including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870
administratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective shares. of the new Civil Code.

It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to
analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no
nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the
legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer
the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate
proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on
February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate
proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator
(succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor), who should
deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the
possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The
probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On
January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the
ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25,
1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as
the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish
priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied
for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was
opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
not finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not
liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust
operative and to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest
inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had
studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable
trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court.
They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be
countenanced in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory
construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of the
lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination
of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex.
Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-
28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his
words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different
from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).

Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge
Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the
ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish
priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is
"the life and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the
25

polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos
vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the
testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following
re-statement of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives
who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could
enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could
continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but
the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate
every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father
Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy
and the administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish
priest of Victoria and his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as
contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the
responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors,
and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce
five percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the
twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each
year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the
name of his bequest.
SUCCESSION CASES
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the
testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who
would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would
lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having
been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be
obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the
souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time
that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood
and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be
determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical
vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy
between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the
testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his
death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime
after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter.
"In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be
living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably
construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male
relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could
not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three
sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs.
Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative,
he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his
third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what
26

category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he
could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or
grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the
term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended
for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son
of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs
presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal
grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's
death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise,
although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary,
because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for
his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record
on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G.
Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that
Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of
Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which
was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was
studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be
a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of
Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish
priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to
evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no
probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's
nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was
opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a
judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano
que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his
nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his
will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an
unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a
situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like
SUCCESSION CASES
to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet
in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer
the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the
testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy
and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the
time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the
priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical
career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He
unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on
Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by
the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by
the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee
That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions
regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of
Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator
was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a
trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who
desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been
ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not
arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a
priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888
of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for
any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except
in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el
legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
27
 SUCCESSION CASES
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article
960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does
not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution
nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among
the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51
Phil. 267).

We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED

28

G.R. No. 118114 December 7, 1995
TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDY DE LOS
REYES, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, 2nd Division, in CA-G.R. No. 36177, which affirmed the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental holding that
private respondent Edy de los Reyes had acquired ownership of Lot No.
1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental based on a
document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights", and
ordering the dispossession of petitioner as leasehold tenant of the land for
failure to pay rentals.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental was evidenced by OCT No. R-12179. The lot has an area of
13,720 sq. meters. The title was issued and is registered in the name of
spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died,
their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly
notarized document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute
Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido.
The evidence before the court a quo established that since 1960, petitioner
Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an
area of nine thousand five hundred (9,500) meters. When ownership was
transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the
registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido
and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his widow Laurenciana.
The controversy began when Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981,
his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran
Cadastre," wherein they declared; to quote its pertinent portions, that:
. . . Cosme Pido died in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, he died intestate and without any known debts and
obligations which the said parcel of land is (sic) held liable.
That Cosme Pido was survived by his/her legitimate heirs, namely:
LAURENCIANA PIDO, wife, ELY, ERVIN, ELMER, and ELECHOR all
surnamed PIDO; children;
SUCCESSION CASES
That invoking the provision of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, the above-mentioned heirs do hereby declare unto [sic]
ourselves the only heirs of the late Cosme Pido and that we hereby
adjudicate unto ourselves the above-mentioned parcel of land in
equal shares.
Now, therefore, We LAURENCIANA3 , ELY, ELMER, ERVIN and
ELECHOR all surnamed PIDO, do hereby waive, quitclaim all our
rights, interests and participation over the said parcel of land in favor
of EDY DE LOS REYES, of legal age, (f)ilipino, married to VIRGINIA
DE LOS REYES, and resident of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental,
Philippines. . . .4 (Emphasis supplied)
The document was signed by all of Pido's heirs. Private respondent Edy de
los Reyes did not sign said document.
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the property
continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon
obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor,
private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of
Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claimagainst the original certificate of
title.
Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner (Acap) to personally
inform him that he (Edy) had become the new owner of the land and that the
lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Private respondent further
alleged that he and petitioner entered into an oral lease agreement wherein
petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of palay per annum as lease rental.
In 1982, petitioner allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however,
petitioner refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land, prompting
private respondent to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The MAR invited petitioner
to a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. Petitioner did not attend the
conference but sent his wife instead to the conference. During the meeting,
an officer of the Ministry informed Acap's wife about private respondent's
ownership of the said land but she stated that she and her husband
(Teodoro) did not recognize private respondent's claim of ownership over the
land.
On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, private respondent filed a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner,
alleging in the main that as his leasehold tenant, petitioner refused and failed
to pay the agreed annual rental of ten (10) cavans of palay despite repeated
demands.
29

During the trial before the court a quo, petitioner reiterated his refusal to
recognize private respondent's ownership over the subject land. He averred
that he continues to recognize Cosme Pido as the owner of the said land,
and having been a registered tenant therein since 1960, he never reneged
on his rental obligations. When Pido died, he continued to pay rentals to
Pido's widow. When the latter left for abroad, she instructed him to stay in the
landholding and to pay the accumulated rentals upon her demand or return
from abroad.
Petitioner further claimed before the trial court that he had no knowledge
about any transfer or sale of the lot to private respondent in 1981 and even
the following year after Laurenciana's departure for abroad. He denied
having entered into a verbal lease tenancy contract with private respondent
and that assuming that the said lot was indeed sold to private respondent
without his knowledge, R.A. 3844, as amended, grants him the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price. Petitioner also bewailed private
respondent's ejectment action as a violation of his right to security of tenure
under P.D. 27.
On 20 August 1991, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, Edy de los Reyes, and against the defendant,
Teodoro Acap, ordering the following, to wit:
1. Declaring forfeiture of defendant's preferred right to issuance of a
Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and
his farmholdings;
2. Ordering the defendant Teodoro Acap to deliver possession of said
farm to plaintiff, and;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, the
sum of P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation and the amount of
P10,000.00 as actual damages.5
In arriving at the above-mentioned judgment, the trial court stated that the
evidence had established that the subject land was "sold" by the heirs of
Cosme Pido to private respondent. This is clear from the following
disquisitions contained in the trial court's six (6) page decision:
There is no doubt that defendant is a registered tenant of Cosme
Pido. However, when the latter died their tenancy relations changed
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since ownership of said land was passed on to his heirs who, by
executing a Deed of Sale, which defendant admitted in his affidavit,
likewise passed on their ownership of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff
(private respondent). As owner hereof, plaintiff has the right to
demand payment of rental and the tenant is obligated to pay rentals
due from the time demand is made. . . .6
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the sale of the Pido family of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff
does not of itself extinguish the relationship. There was only a
change of the personality of the lessor in the person of herein plaintiff
Edy de los Reyes who being the purchaser or transferee, assumes
the rights and obligations of the former landowner to the tenant
Teodoro Acap, herein defendant.7
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, imputing error to the
lower court when it ruled that private respondent acquired ownership of Lot
No. 1130 and that he, as tenant, should pay rentals to private respondent
and that failing to pay the same from 1983 to 1987, his right to a certificate of
land transfer under P.D. 27 was deemed forfeited.
The Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioner's argument that the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights (Exhibit "D"), the document
relied upon by private respondent to prove his ownership to the lot, was
excluded by the lower court in its order dated 27 August 1990. The order
indeed noted that the document was not identified by Cosme Pido's heirs and
was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
According to respondent court, however, since the Declaration of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly notarized, no further proof of
its due execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent court was
also convinced that the said document stands as prima facie proof of
appellee's (private respondent's) ownership of the land in dispute.
With respect to its non-registration, respondent court noted that petitioner
had actual knowledge of the subject saleof the land in dispute to private
respondent because as early as 1983, he (petitioner) already knew of private
respondent's claim over the said land but which he thereafter denied, and
that in 1982, he (petitioner) actually paid rent to private respondent.
Otherwise stated, respondent court considered this fact of rental payment in
1982 as estoppel on petitioner's part to thereafter refute private respondent's
claim of ownership over the said land. Under these circumstances,
respondent court ruled that indeed there was deliberate refusal by petitioner
to pay rent for a continued period of five years that merited forfeiture of his
otherwise preferred right to the issuance of a certificate of land transfer.
30

In the present petition, petitioner impugns the decision of the Court of
Appeals as not in accord with the law and evidence when it rules that private
respondent acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130 through the aforementioned
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights.
Hence, the issues to be resolved presently are the following:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT DECLARATION OF
HEIRSHIP AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS IS A RECOGNIZED MODE
OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OVER
THE LOT IN QUESTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID DOCUMENT CAN BE
CONSIDERED A DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT OF THE LOT IN QUESTION.
Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court, in its order dated 7 August
1990, explicitly excluded the document marked as Exhibit "D" (Declaration of
Heirship, etc.) as private respondent's evidence because it was not
registered with the Registry of Deeds and was not identified by anyone of the
heirs of Cosme Pido. The Court of Appeals, however, held the same to be
admissible, it being a notarized document, hence, a prima facie proof of
private respondents' ownership of the lot to which it refers.
Petitioner points out that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is
not one of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership under Article 712 of
the Civil Code. Neither can the same be considered a deed of sale so as to
transfer ownership of the land to private respondent because no
consideration is stated in the contract (assuming it is a contract or deed of
sale).
Private respondent defends the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as
in accord with the evidence and the law. He posits that while it may indeed
be true that the trial court excluded his Exhibit "D" which is the Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights as part of his evidence, the trial court declared
him nonetheless owner of the subject lot based on other evidence adduced
during the trial, namely, the notice of adverse claim (Exhibit "E") duly
registered by him with the Registry of Deeds, which contains the questioned
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights as an integral part thereof.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a
thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to
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give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by
fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights
are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the
juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of
ownership over a thing in question.8
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are
generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e.,
through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and
the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or
mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature
and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the
same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. 9
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates
as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the
intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between
the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.10
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and
a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract
or deed of sale between the parties. 11 The second is, technically speaking, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention
to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession.12 Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of
Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale,13 or a donation,14 or any other derivative mode of acquiring
ownership.
Quite surprisingly, both the trial court and public respondent Court of Appeals
concluded that a "sale" transpired between Cosme Pido's heirs and private
respondent and that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of said sale when
he was summoned by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to discuss private
31

respondent's claim over the lot in question. This conclusion has no basis both
in fact and in law.
On record, Exhibit "D", which is the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights" was excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August
1990 because the document was neither registered with the Registry of
Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido. There is no showing that
private respondent had the same document attached to or made part of the
record. What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of adverse
claim filed with the Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of
Heirship with Waiver of rights and was annotated at the back of the Original
Certificate of Title to the land in question.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private
respondent's ownership over the tenanted lot. "A notice of adverse claim is
nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of
which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no better
than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in
court."15
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly
proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed
between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of
Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent's
right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which
cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same
in private respondent's name.
Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private
respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as
a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a
mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the
corresponding proof thereof.
Petitioner had been a registered tenant in the subject land since 1960 and
religiously paid lease rentals thereon. In his mind, he continued to be the
registered tenant of Cosme Pido and his family (after Pido's death), even if in
1982, private respondent allegedly informed petitioner that he had become
the new owner of the land.
Under the circumstances, petitioner may have, in good faith, assumed such
statement of private respondent to be true and may have in fact delivered 10
cavans of palay as annual rental for 1982 to private respondent. But in 1983,
it is clear that petitioner had misgivings over private respondent's claim of
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ownership over the said land because in the October 1983 MAR conference,
his wife Laurenciana categorically denied all of private respondent's
allegations. In fact, petitioner even secured a certificate from the MAR dated
9 May 1988 to the effect that he continued to be the registered tenant of
Cosme Pido and not of private respondent. The reason is that private
respondent never registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights
with the Registry of Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private respondent)
sought to do indirectly what could not be done directly, i.e., file a notice of
adverse claim on the said lot to establish ownership thereover.
It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there was no unjustified or
deliberate refusal by petitioner to pay the lease rentals or amortizations to the
landowner/agricultural lessor which, in this case, private respondent failed to
establish in his favor by clear and convincing evidence.16
Consequently, the sanction of forfeiture of his preferred right to be issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer under P.D. 27 and to the possession of his
farmholdings should not be applied against petitioners, since private
respondent has not established a cause of action for recovery of possession
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition
and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 1 May 1994 which affirmed
the decision of the RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental dated 20 August
1991 is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent's complaint for recovery
of possession and damages against petitioner Acap is hereby DISMISSED
for failure to properly state a cause of action, without prejudice to private
respondent taking the proper legal steps to establish the legal mode by which
he claims to have acquired ownership of the land in question.
SO ORDERED.
32

G.R. No. 116018 November 13, 1996
NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA
S. ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S.
AUSTRIA, respondents.
JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas,
Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S.
Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres,
as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee, entered into a
contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty
(250) square meters. The lot, owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being
occupied by petitioners' mother and sister. An adjoining lot, also co-owned by
the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim.
Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the
necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.
After having the document drafted with several spaces left blank including
the specification as to the metes and bounds of the land petitioner asked
the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the
document with the understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of
the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the
Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was
subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos. T-292265
and T-292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision plan and
the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of
Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property purportedly
sold to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties. It
already included the portion being occupied by the spouses Severino and
Consuelo Lim.
On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding
the surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the
subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for
annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer
for recovery of damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. 1
Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October
1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among
themselves the inherited property with an area of one thousand five hundred
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and three (1,503) square meters. In the same document, they caused the
subdivision of the property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-
009105 identified as Lot 4-A with an area of one thousand ninety-six (1,096)
square meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and seven (407)
square meters, and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a
consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-
292265 in the name of the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in
the name of petitioner.
In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document
before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no
definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the
signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the survey and
the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the
area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that they
could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed
because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which
was already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and
their predecessor.
The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and
due execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Sale taking into account that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs
signed before the notary public and in her presence, she was not able to
enumerate all the signatories to the document; (b) while petitioner claimed
that the document was signed only after the survey of the land was
completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her own
witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October
1984; and, (c) while petitioner alleged that the document was signed and
notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the same could not have
been signed and notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which
could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned. Additionally, the
trial court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their
demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September
1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266 and
Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-009105. It also ordered petitioner to pay
private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit. 2
On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the
trial court, 3 and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider its
decision. 4
33

Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding
documentary evidence already presented, marked and identified on a purely
technical ground, and (b) for concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties.
Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to
admit formal offer of evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as late
filing, citing Siguenza v. Court of Appeals. 5 We are not persuaded. Indeed,
we held in Siguenza that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense as they are used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the present case as the
trial court had a reasonable basis for denying petitioner's motion
On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendant's counsel,
manifested in Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He
asked that he be given 15 days to make a formal offer of evidence
and which the Court granted. At the scheduled hearing of April 03,
1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado . . . . was not in Court. Atty.
Veneracion, plaintiffs' counsel, called the attention of the Court that
Atty. Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or complied with the Court
Order dated February 06, 1990, which is to file his formal offer of
evidence. On motion of Atty. Veneracion, defendant's right to file a
formal offer of evidence was deemed waived. Atty. Veneracion
waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence considering that the
defendant can (sic) no longer make a formal offer of evidence.
On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit
formal offer of exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty.
Ponciano Mercado, on May 02, 1990. Considering that the same
was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having filed their memorandum
already, the motion to admit formal offer of exhibits was denied
(emphasis supplied).
The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to
formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3)
months, had already passed before petitioner's counsel made effort to
formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioner's motion to
admit her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-
compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless
delays and derail the speedy administration of justice.
Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire
Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-
examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf
of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot
SUCCESSION CASES
occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo
Lim). Moreover, according to petitioner, the assertions of private respondents
to petitioner contained in the demand letter should not necessarily be true
and that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Sale was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than
where the subject matter thereof was situated, citing Sales v. Court of
Appeals. 6
These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of
respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there
was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private
respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the premises.
Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to the assertions in the demand
letter after having weighed the respective evidence of the parties. But even
without the letter, the evidence of respondents had already amply
substantiated their claims.
We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not
affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the
subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under
the Notarial Law is that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the
document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not
applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary
public had the authority to acknowledge the document executed within his
territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him
and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did
not.
The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in
Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail
casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and
signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten (10)
Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document
notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are
residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find.
Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the
document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble
claim to the contrary.
Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed
prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of
credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey
or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was
contradicted by petitioner's own witness who positively asserted in court that
the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the
34
 SUCCESSION CASES
signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the
deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left
several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the
property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only
upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their
understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after
obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed
understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign
the deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity
thereto. 7 Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank
spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then
causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge,
much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for
purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting
party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract;
(c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party
seeking annulment. 8

Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of

settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifests
that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A
and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein
were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures
thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized.

WHEREFORE, their being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and

resolution in question of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant
petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

35