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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURES JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN


Title G.R. No. L-12030
ROTEA v HALILI Date: September 30, 1960
Ponente: PERALTA, J..
JOSE J. ROTEA, plaintiff-appellant FORTUNATO F. HALILI, defendant-appellee
Doctrine of the Case: The decision rendered in the criminal case insofar as the indemnity is concerned is null and void for
having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction of the court of first instance when the offended party has
made an express reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action to recover the indemnity and the court still
awarded such indemnity beyond its jurisdiction.
FACTS
Case timeline for better appreciation:
1. August 17, 1952- ANGELO BASCON was driving a bus belonging to FOTUNATO HALILI along the national road of
Makati, Rizal when it collided with a Rosado bus where a certain JOSE ROTEA, a passenger of the HALILI bus, was
injured. A criminal complaint for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Makati against Bascon, and the offended party having reserved his right to file a separate civil
action.
2. BASCON was found guilty and in addition to his sentence, the court ordered him to indemnify the offended party
in the amount of P513.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, to pay P3,000.00 as
liquidated damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary or corrective damages, and the costs.
3. March 19, 1955 - Because of BASCONS insolvency, ROTEA against HALILI an action praying that HALILI be
declared subsidiarily liable for the indemnity awarded consisting in the sum of P13,513.00 (as mentioned
aboved), and that he be awarded P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs.
4. The court ordered defendant to pay an indemnity in the amount of P3,513.00 and to pay P500.00 as attorney's
fees, and the costs but DENIED plaintiff's claim for P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Petitioners contentions:
1. ROTEA contends that the trial court cannot make such diminution for that would be tantamount to an
amendment or modification of the decision rendered in the criminal case insofar as the indemnity is concerned
which has long become final and executory.
2. HE furthers avers that in the absence of collusion between the offended party and the accused in the criminal
case, or unless it is claimed that the court had no jurisdiction to act on the matter, the employer is liable for the
whole amount of indemnity awarded to the offended party in a subsequent civil action filed to enforce it.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
denying the plaintiff's claim for P10,000.00 as exemplary damages. NO

RATIO
On the petitioners contentions:
1. When a civil action is based upon the subsidiary liability of an employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code resulting from the indemnity awarded to the offended party in a criminal action the court has no
other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power
to amend or modify if even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. HOWEVER, such rule is
not absolute as when the court in the criminal case has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, in which
case the decision should be ignored because being null and void it never existed in contemplation of law.
On the issue:
2. IN the issue at bar, it is clear that the offended party has made an express reservation of his right to institute a
separate civil action to recover the indemnity, and thus, the decision rendered in the criminal case insofar as the
indemnity is concerned is null and void for having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction of the court
of first instance. The trial court, therefore, was justified in ignoring the decision in the criminal case and in
rendering judgment according to its discretion based upon the evidence on hand. 1awphl.nt
RULING
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

2-S 2016-17 (SALANGUIT)

CRIMPRO RULE 111: Death survives Civil Liability on BP 22 Cases which may be enforced against the heirs
of the accused
Title GR No. 182210
Bernardo v. People of the Philippines Date: October 5, 2015
Ponente: Brion, J.
Paz T. Bernardo, substituted by heirs, Mapalad G. Bernardo, People of the Philippines Respondents
Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T. Bernardo and
Gervy B. Santos Petitioners
Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari filed by accused petitioner Paz Bernardo under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the CA decision and resolution.
FACTS

3. Paz Bernardo obtained a loan from private complainant Carmencita Bumanglag in the amount of P460,000
payable on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991. This was evidenced by a promissory note signed by
Bernardo and her husband solidary binding themselves to pay the loan with 12% interest per annum payable
upon default. Bernardo likewise gave Bumanglag the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 151841 as additional
security.
4. Prior to the loans maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as collateral in another
transaction. In exchange, Bernardo issued five FEBTC checks covering the loans aggregate amount. However,
when Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardos account, they were dishonored because the account was
closed. Bumanglag sent Bernardo a notice informing her of the dishonor of the checks.
5. The demand went unheeded prompting Bumanglag to initiate a crimpinal complaint against Bernardo with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for 5 counts of violation of BP 22.
6. After the requisite of preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Bernardo for
the offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not guilty plea on arraignment.
7. Bernardo argued in her cross-examination that: 1) she could not be held liable for the violation of BP 22 as they
were presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law; 2) she did not receive any notice of dishonor
which she insisted was essential to prove the material element of insufficiency of funds; 3) the checks were never
meant to be presented as she had always paid her loans in cash and that Bumanglag never bothered to issue her
receipts. Bumanglag did not return the checks.
8. After the cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for a redirect examination. It was further reset due to the
absence of Bernardos counsel. When they once again failed to appear, the RTC considered her right to present
additional evidence waived. Bernardo moved for reconsideration but RTC denied her motion. However, the RTC
gave her 10 days within which to submit her formal evidence but she failed to do so. Thus, the RTC declared that
Bernardo had waived her right to submit her formal offer of evidence.

RTC Ruling:
1. The RTC found Bernardo guilty of the 5 counts of violation of BP 22 as she failed to substantiate her claim of
payment and that it is not the nonpayment of obligation but the issuance of a worthless check that is the
gravamen of BP22. RTC sentenced her to a year of imprisonment and ordered to indemnify Bumanglag P460,000
plus 12% interest and 5% penalty charges.
2. Bernardo unsatisfied, she brought the case to the Court of Appeals.

CA Ruling:
1. The CA affirmed RTCs ruling of conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment in liue thereof, imposed a
P460,000 fine. The Civil indemnity of P460,000 was retained.
2. The CA noted that Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment; that the 90-day period within which
to present a check under BP 22 is not an element of the crime; that Bernardo was not denied of due process in
view of the RTCs order waiving her right to present additional evidence as she has been given several
opportunities to present evidence but failed to appear four times.

Petitioners Contentions:
1. She was denied of due process as she was denied the full opportunity to present her evidence and was thus
deprived of the chance to prove her innocence of the crime charged.
2. She avers that CA erred in affirming her criminal and civil liabilites because the prosecution failed to prove her
knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
3. There was no violation of BP 22 as the checks were presented beyond the mandatory 90-day period.
4. The subject checks were issued without consideration as she had already paid the loan

OSGs Arguments:
1. Bernardo was given the opportunity to present her defense.
2. The 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense.
3. Bumanglag failed to substantiate Bernardos claim that she had settled the obligation.
4. BP 22 penalizes the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the nonpayment of the obligation.

NOTE: Subsequent Developments
1. Paz T. Bernardo had passed away
2. Bernardos councel informed the Court of this matter and provided the names of the heirs and their address.
3. The Court required Bernardos heirs to appear as substitutes for the deceased Bernardo in the present petition
for purposes of Bernardos civil liability.
4. The heirs moved to reconsider as they believe that Bernardos death extinguished her civil liability. They
contended that any civil liability should be settled in a separate civil case. But this was denied and explained that
Bernardos civil liability survived her death as it is based on a contract.
ISSUE/S
II. Whether or not the Bernardos civil liability may be enforced despite her death YES
III. Whether or not Bernardo was denied of due process -- NO
IV. Whether or not Bernardo sufficiently adduced evidence of payment NO
RATIO
On Civil Liability

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on the part of the offender. If
the conduct constitutes a felony, the accusd may be held civilly liable under Art. 100 of the RPC. Civil liabilty arises from
the offense charged. It is not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to civil ilabilty based on delict. As long
as the facts constituting the offense charged are established by a preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be
awarded. Civil liability based on a delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Acts or omissions may also give rise to independent civil actions based on other sources of obligation (Art. 1157 of NCC)
and those intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34 of the NCC and for quasi-delicts under Art. 2176 of NCC. It is possible
for one to be free from civil liability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and still be civilly liable based on
contract or by laws other than criminal law.

BERNARDOS CIVIL LIABILITY MAY BE ENFORCED IN THE PRESENT CASE DESPITE HER DEATH.

As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil
liability based solely on the offesne. Death absolves the accused from any earthly responsibility arising from the offense.
The independent civil liabilites survive the death and an action therefore may be generally pursued but only filing a
separate civil action and subject to RULE 111, SECTION 1 of th Rules of Court. This may be enforced against the estate of
the accused. In BP 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions. A single suit is
filed and tried. This is to signifacntly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored
chacks and is expected to expedite the disposition of cases. The death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the
civil action as the independent civil liability based on a contract which was deemed instituted in the criminal action for BP
22 which may be enforced against her estate in the present case.

On Due Process

Bernardo was not denied of due process as she was given several opportunities to present her evidences which in all
cases she failed to do so. Jurisprudence has established that Failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of
the case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and warnings that failure to do so appear would be deemed a waiver
to present in his evidence and that the case woul be deemed submitted for judgment upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution was sufficient legal justification of the trial court to proceed and render judgment before it.

On Sufficent Evidence of Payment

Bernardo did not sufficiently adduce evidence of payment. One who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it. The
existence of the obligation is sufficiently proven by the promissory note and the checks submitted in evidence. This was
confirmed during Bernardos testimony. However, Bernardos claim of payment was nothing more than an allegation
unsupported by proof.

RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.' CR No. 28721
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The heirs of Paz T. Bernardo are ordered to pay the amount of P460,000.00, with
interest at 12% per annum from the time of the institution of criminal charges in court.


Notes

2-S 2016-17 (SALVACION)
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015octoberdecisions.php?id=795

CRIMPRO RULE 111


Title GR Nos. 179814 and 180021
CHIOK V. PEOPLE Date: December 7, 2015
Ponente: JARDELEZA, J.
GR No. 179814: WILFRED N.CHIOK GR No. 179814: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA
GR No. 180021: RUFINA CHUA GR No. 180021: WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER)
Nature of the case: These are consolidated petitions seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007 Decision2 and
October 3, 2007 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The CA reversed and set aside the December 3, 1998 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig-Branch 165, and acquitted petitioner Wilfred Chiok (Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal
Case No. 109927, but ordered him to pay civil liability to Rufina Chua in the total amount of P9,500,000.00, plus interests.
FACTS
9. Chua and Chiok met in mid-1989, during which the latter offered to be the formers investment adviser. Up until 1994, For
each of their transactions, Chua claimed she was not given any document evidencing every stock transaction and that she
only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of
P9,563,900.00. Chua alleged that she depositedevidenced by a deposit slip P7,100,000.00 to Chioks bank account on
June 9, 1995 and delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same date.
10. Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to show any
document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, both of which were ultimately dishonored
upon presentment for payment due to garnishment and insufficiency of funds.
11. In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the prospect of buying
shares of stocks in bulk. He contended that it was in 1995 when both of them decided to form an unregistered partnership.
He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for the United States was her investment in this
unregistered partnership and that she instructed him to invest according to his best judgment and asked him to issue a
check in her name for her peace of mind.
12. On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and "P1.6" million earlier. He
testified that exercising his best judgment, he invested P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo, a businesswoman. To reassure
Chua, Chiok informed her that he had invested the money with Yu Que Ngo and offered to give Yu Que Ngo's checks to
replace his previously issued interbank checks. Chua agreed, but instead of returning his checks, she retained them along
with the checks of Yu Que Ngo.
13. After Chiok was charged with estafa, Chiok and Yu Que Ngo met with Chua, accompanied by their lawyers, in an effort to
amicably settle Chua's demand for the return of her funds. Chua demanded more than P30,000,000.00, but Chiok and Yu
Que Ngo requested for a lower amount because the original claim was only P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their
request.
14. On December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa.
15. On July 19, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the Decision dated December 3, 1998 of the trial
court, and acquitted Chiok for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
16. The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but merely recited the
evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts constituting estafa. Instead of
relying on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the trial court relied on the weakness of the defense. According to
the CA, the acceptance by Chua of the checks issued by Yu Que Ngo ratified his application of the funds based on the
instructions to invest it. Simply put, the prosecution was not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation
from Chua's instructions).
17. As to the civil aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00, the amount he admitted on
record.
Contentions
18. Chiok claims that the Joint Decision dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal Case No. 44739 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved him from civil liability, is res judicata on
this case.
19. On the other hand, Chua claims that the CA erred when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of P9,500,000.00 when it
was shown by evidence that the amount should be P9,563,900.00.
ISSUE/S
V. Whether or not Chiok, by virtue of the crime of estafa, is civilly liable to Chua despite (a) being absolved from civil
liability in the BP 22 case, and (b) being acquitted from the criminal case for estafa? - NO
RATIO
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation of Chua's
money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and
Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.
In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in
June 1995 and for "P1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of
P9,500,000.00 only. However, the Court found that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and
October 13, 1997, the reference to "P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of P9,563,900.00.
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the same
transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment."
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, the Court explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action in estafa
case. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of
BP 22, without need of election by the offended party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously
available to the offended party. The Court explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil
liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject of both civil
actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only be one recovery of the single civil liability.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application. Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes
that facts and issues were actually and directly resolved in a previous case. However, the records show that in the BP 22 case, the
facts and issues proving the transaction were not actually and directly resolved in the decision. The basis or Chiok's acquittal
therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first given to Chiok.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari and mandamus in
G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated
July 19, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua the principal amount of P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum computed from October 25, 1995 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
Notes
From Rodriguez v. Ponferrada:
Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the
issuance of the same check. The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado (ret.), former
chairman of the committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on BP 22
cases was added, because the dockets of the courts were clogged with such litigations; creditors were using the courts as
collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary inclusion
of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid down to prevent the
practice of creditors of using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.
Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds to the
estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other.
There is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses charged
in the informations are perfectly distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact.
What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding civil action. The criminal
action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. [U]nless a separate civil action has been filed before the
institution of the criminal action, no such civil action can be instituted after the criminal action has been filed as the same has
been included therein.
2-S 2016-17 (SEORAN)
Source:

CRIM PRO Separate civil action for damages in cases defamation, fraud and physical injuries
under Art. 33 of NCC
Title G.R. No. L-8238
CARANDANG VS. SANTIAGO Date: May 25, 1955
Ponente: LABRADOR, J.
CESAR M. CARANDANG, petitioner. VICENTE SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila and TOMAS
VALENTON, Sr. and TOMAS VALENTON,
Jr., respondents.
Nature of the case: Physical injuries in Article 33 of NCC should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.
FACTS
Petition for certiorari against Judge of CFI Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled
Carandang vs. Valenton, Sr., suspending the trial of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case
No. 534, CFI Batangas.

Criminal Case: Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the
person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed to CA where the case is now
pending.

The decision in the criminal case was rendered on September 1, 1953 and petitioner herein filed a complaint in
the CFI of Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents, damages, both actual and
moral, for the bodily injuries received by him on occasion of the commission of the crime of frustrated homicide
by said accused. After the defendants submitted their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the trial of
the civil case, pending the termination of the criminal case against Valenton, Jr. in CA. The judge ruled that the
trial of the civil action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration
was submitted, but the court denied the same; hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioners contention:

- Article 33 of the new Civil Code should be invoked. The Code Commission itself states that the civil
action allowed (under Article 33) is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and
battery under American law (Reports of the Code Commission, pp. 46-47).

Respondents contention:

- The term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code,
and therefore said term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the
rules statutory construction.

ISSUE/S
Whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means any physical injury or bodily injury, whether
inflicted with intent to kill or not. - YES
RATIO
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it
was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein
Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated
homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these
terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used
not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.

With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used
in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article some in their general and another in its technical
sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code
Commission recommended that the civil for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation
must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent
has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for
assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is
that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

Parallel Case: (Bixby vs Sioux City) - In that case, the appellant sought to take his case from the scope of the
statute by pointing out that inasmuch as notice is required where the cause of action is founded on injury to the
person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the person. The court ruled that a
claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly "founded on injury to the person" as
would be a claim to recover damages for a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.

RULING
Respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that affect is
hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of
the pending criminal case. With costs against the defendant-appellees.
Notes
Article 33: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
2S 2016-2017 (SOBERANO)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 111

Title G.R. No. 127934


ACE HAULERS VS. CA
Date: August 23, 2000

Ponente: PARDO, J.:

ACE HAULERS CORPORATION petitioner THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EDERLINDA
ABIVA respondents

Nature of the case: The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 106, except for the award of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, which was deleted.
FACTS

The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap which involves a truck owned by petitioner Ace
Haulers Corporation and driven by its employee, Jesus dela Cruz, and a jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven
by Rodolfo Parma.
A third vehicle, a motorcycle, was bumped and dragged by the jeepney, and its rider, Fidel Abiva, was run over by
the truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation, causing his death.
A criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the two drivers, Dela Cruz
and Parma.
While the criminal action was pending, a separate civil action for damages against the two accused in the criminal
case, as well as against Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp., the owners of the vehicles.
Petitioner Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz filed a motion to dismiss bringing to the trial courts attention the
fact that a criminal action was pending before another branch of the same court, and that under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent civil action arising from a quasi-delict is no longer allowed.
Furthermore, said defendants alleged that respondents private counsel actively participated in the criminal
proceedings, showing that the respondent was in fact pursuing the civil aspect automatically instituted with the
criminal case.
respondent filed an opposition to the motion arguing that she was not pursuing the civil aspect in the criminal case
as she, in fact, manifested in open court in the criminal proceedings that she was filing a separate and independent
civil action for damages against the accused and their employers, as allowed under Articles 2177 and 2180 of the
Civil Code.
the trial court dismissed the action for damages on the ground that "no civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution in a case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The appellate court reversed the dismissal order of the trial court. The case was elevated to Supreme Court. Sc
denied the petition for review. It held that for failure "to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed
any reversible error in the questioned error". The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
In the meantime that the petition for review was pending before the Supreme Court, fire razed the portion of the
Quezon City Hall building which housed the trial courts and the records of the case
RTC, Quezon City, Branch 83 rendered judgment in the criminal case. Convicting dela Cruz and Parma of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to homicide with damages.
The pre-trial conference of the civil case was finally set.
However, no representative nor counsel for petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation appeared. Consequently, upon
motion of respondent Abiva, the petitioner was declared as in default. Trial court rendered a decision, ruling
against petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation to pay the defendants for damages

ISSUE/S

Whether or not in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident plaintiff may recover damages against
the employer of the accused driver both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil case for damages based on quasi
delict.

RATIO

In Padua v. Robles, we held that "Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases, the
offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. x x x Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission."
Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals,11 with modification. The Court deletes the award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,
and reduces the attorney fees to twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Notes

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_127934_2000.html

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

Madeja vs. Caro

Facts:

Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an
appendectomy by the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended
party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages.

While the criminal case is still pending, Madeja sued Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same
court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
which reads:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant
civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."

The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion
to dismiss.

Issues:

Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action against Japzon

Held:

Yes. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable
provision. The two enactments are quoted herein below: t.hqw

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right
is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil
Code,)
The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. The general rule is that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately;
and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has
been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the
claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the
criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil
action.

The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide. Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms
defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense.In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

CRIM PRO SUPPORT: Order of Liability If Several Persons Are Obliged to Give Support (Art. 199, FC)
Title G.R. No. 172505
October 1, 2014
ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent. Ponente: LEONEN, J.:


ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner, FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.
Nature of the case: petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August
11, 2005 and its resolution dated April 27, 2006, denying petitioner Antonio Garcia's motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
Case timeline for better appreciation:

Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered into a deed of
absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock on July 15, 1988. The deed was for the sale and purchase of
shares of stock from various corporations, including one class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and one
proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc. These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio Garcia.
The contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at public
auction to pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio Garcia.

On March 3, 1989, a deed of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of the deed of
absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock was entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals,
Inc. Under the deed of right of repurchase, Antonio Garcia can redeem the properties sold within 180 days from
the signing of the agreement.

Before the end of the 180-day period, Antonio Garcia exercised his right to repurchase the properties. However,
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase of the shares of stock. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an
action for specific performance and annulment of transfer of shares.

On September 6, 1989, the class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and proprietary membership in the
Manila Polo Club, Inc., which were included in the contracts entered into between Antonio Garcia and Ferro
Chemicals, Inc., were sold at public auction to Philippine Investment System Organization.

On September 3, 1990, the information based on the complaint of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was filed against
Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial Court. He was charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other
Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares
subject of the contracts entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances.

Regional Trial Court Ruled: Antonio Garcia was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence

On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals the July 29, 1997 order of the
Regional Trial Court as to the civil aspect of the case on the ground that it is not in accordance with the law
and the facts of the case that the trial court "acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it rendered the judgment of acquittal based on affidavits not at all introduced in evidence by
either of the parties thereby depriving the people of their substantive right to due process of law." The
verification/certification against forum shopping, signed by Ramon Garcia as president of Ferro
Chemicals, Inc., disclosed that the notice of appeal was filed "with respect to the civil aspect of the
case."

Trial court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. resulting in finality of the trial courts
decision. The decision found Antonio Garcia not guilty of the offense charged, and no civil liability was awarded
1awp++i1

to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. However, at present, there is a conflicting decision from the Court of Appeals awarding
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. civil indemnity arising from the offense charged.



ISSUE/S
1 Whether the act of FerroChemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals and the
petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision amounted to forum shopping

2. Whether Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was entitled to the awards given as civil liability ex delicto


RATIO
There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the same trial court decision. This is true
even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia
Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)." The "civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed to make a reservation before
the trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or institute a separate
civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.

There is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio Garcia, and respondent, Ferro Chemicals, Inc., are both parties
in the appeal filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari before this court.

There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At a glance, it may appear
that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal before the Court of Appeals is purely on the civil
aspect of the trial courts decision while the petition for certiorari before this court is allegedly only on the criminal
aspect of the case. However, the civil liability asserted by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of
Appeals arose from the criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or institute
a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. Thus, it is an adjunct of the criminal aspect
of the case. 1wphi1

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the
criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil
liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final
outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the
criminal action declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."

When the trial courts decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before this
court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. Thus, the relief prayed for by Ferro
Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil liability ex delicto, is asserted in both actions before this court
and the Court of Appeals.

Litigants cannot avail themselves of two separate remedies for the same relief in the hope that in one forum, the
relief prayed for will be granted. This is the evil sought to be averted by the doctrine of non-forum shopping, and
this is the problem that has happened in this case.

When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal action, whether by
choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior filing of a separate civil action) or as
required by the law or rules, the case will be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
The civil action cannot proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on
the criminal action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the public prosecutor in filing
the petition for certiorari before this court. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals, Inc., signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari.

We must clarify, however, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. An
exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of
Appeals or this court is "when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower
court."

In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising there from. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect there of is concerned and may be made only by the
public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or
offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.
However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or
acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private
complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his
motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or
mandamus,if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no
right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This is in consonance with the doctrine that:

[T]he extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the
latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex
delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accuseds
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto:

(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and

(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted.

However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting the
accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action, the civil liability
ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto
is impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant
cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum
shopping.

On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to institute the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial Court or institute a
separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered
as forum shopping. This is not the situation here.
1wphi1


RULING
WHEREFORE, the resolution in G.R. No. 130880 is reiterated. We grant the petition insofar as it prays for the
setting aside of the Court of Appeals' decision d~ted August 11, 2005 and resolution dated April 27, 2006 as a
final decision over the assailed Regional Trial Court decision that was rendered on November 16, 1998 in G.R.
No. 130880
Notes

2-S 2016-17 (VARGAS)


http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/oct2014/gr_172505_2014.html

CRIMPRO Rule 111


Title GR No. 145823
Maccay vs. Sps. Nobela Date: March 31, 2005
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO Petitioners SPS. PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA Respondents
Nature of the case: Petition for review seeking to reverse the CA decision affirming the RTC decision dismissing the
case for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents filed by petitioner against respondent spouses.
FACTS
Case timeline:
20. Petitioners orchestrated a fraudulent scheme to persuade the respondent spouses to purchase a parcel of
land belonging to petitioner Maccay at the price of Ph300,000.00
21. Respondent spouses paid the Ph300,000.00 to the petitioners and in turn they were given the Deed of Sale,
TCT No. 473584, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and other documents.
22. Potenciano went to the police and executed an affidavit-complaint against the accused spouses before,
relating that she was fooled by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela. She related how the accused spouses cheated
her by stealing TCT No. 473584.
23. Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to them because of an ailment of
Prudencio, asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to help them in the registration of Deed of Sale. They
knew de la Vega as she used to frequent a real estate agent living in their place. When they were told that
for the P300,000.00 consideration, they would need around P20,000.00 to include capital gains taxes,
Serlina gave P21,000.00. The mother of de la Vega was supposed to know many people in the Register of
Deeds. The new title was delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina.
24. Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor E. Cruz on August 17,
1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for Estafa and Theft.
25. Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused and she was astonished
to discover as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the name of Linda Cruz. She also found the
payments of the capital gains tax as only P1,000.00 plus. Then she realized the reason for the alleged
falsification charge of petitioners. The deed of sale given to them for P300,000.00 which they paid the
Maccays was not the one registered but one which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her mother
Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration transaction. They filed a complaint
against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling.
26. Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification
of Public Document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
27. The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners swindled respondent spouses. The
trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the Estafa charge against respondent spouses to turn the
tables on respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered petitioners to reimburse
the Ph300,000 to respondent spouses and ordered petitioners to pay damages amounting to Ph50,000 and
Ph40,000 as moral damages and attorneys fees, respectively.
ISSUE/S
1. W/N the trial court may rule on the civil liability of complainant in a criminal case where the civil action was
not reserved or filed separately NO.
2. W/N a witness, who is not a party to the case, may be held liable for damages NO.
RATIO
On the first issue:
Section 1 of Rule 111, of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibits counterclaims in criminal cases. A court
trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited to
determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper
proceedings to determine the private complainants civil liability, if any. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-
party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate
proceedings at the proper time.
In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a
baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding.
On the second issue:
The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with complainant
petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties
to the action. A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is not a party to the case. The
records clearly show that petitioner Potenciano is not a party to this case. The Information filed by the prosecutor
had only petitioner Maccay as its complainant. The Verification attached to the Information had only petitioner
Maccay signing as complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played a role other than
being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would violate petitioner Potencianos constitutional right to
due process.
RULING
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 dated 26
January 1995 in Criminal Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The order to reimburse the P300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela is deleted;
2. The award of P50,000 as moral damages and the award of P40,000 as attorneys fees are likewise deleted.
2S 2016-17 (ALFARO)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_145823_2005.html

CRIMPRO
Republic v CA GR No. 116463
Date: June 10, 2003
Ponente: Carpio, J.:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO in her capacity as
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), petitioner Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
73, Malabon, Metro Manila, and NAVOTAS
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, respondents.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July 1994, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 33094. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon
(Malabon trial court) which denied the motion of petitioner to consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending
before it with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan. This petition seeks to
restrain permanently the Malabon trial court from further hearing Civil Case No. 1153-MN and to dismiss
the case.
FACTS
Case timeline for better appreciation:
1. Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC) is a corporation engaged in dredging operations throughout the
Philippines.
2. The DPWH awarded one of the contractors, NIC, P194,454,000.00 worth of dredging work in four
contracts for completion within 350 calendar days.
3. NIC filed a complaint for sum of money with the Malabon trial court against the Republic of the
Philippines, thru the DPWH.
4. Petitioner contends that upon verification and investigation, the DPWH fact-finding committee
discovered that the dredging contracts of NIC with DPWH were null and void. Petitioner claims that
NIC worked on the project five or six months before the award of the dredging contracts to NIC. The
contracts of NIC were awarded without any public bidding. Moreover, DPWH discovered that NIC,
through its corporate officers, connived with some DPWH officials in falsifying certain public
documents to make it appear that NIC had completed a major portion of the project, when no
dredging work was actually performed. The scheme enabled NIC to collect from
DPWH P146,962,072.47 as payment for work allegedly accomplished. Petitioner thus filed a
counterclaim for the return of the P146,962,072.47 plus interest and exemplary damages of P100
million.
5. Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
finding probable cause for estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3
(e) and (g) of RA No. 3019. Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding Informations
with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan against all the respondents in TBP Case No. 86-01163.
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900
6. Petitioner filed before the Malabon trial court a Motion to Consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-MN
with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 in the Sandiganbayan.Petitioner argued that the civil case for
collection and the criminal cases arose from the same incidents and involve the same facts.
ISSUE/S
1. WHETHER THE PETITION WAS FILED ON TIME.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION
OF CIVIL CASE NO. 1153-MN WITH CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16889-16900 WITH THE
SANDIGANBAYAN AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 4(B) OF P.D. 1606
RATIO
1. Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, and as applied in several cases, where the last day
for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, petitioner filed on
time its petition on 12 September 1994, the next working day, following the last day for filing which
fell on a Sunday.
2. We cannot order the consolidation of the civil case for collection with the criminal cases for two
reasons.
FIRST, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the collection case.
In Canos v. Peralta, the Court held that court may order several actions pending before it to be tried
together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and
depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases
to be consolidated x x x
Thus, an essential requisite of consolidation is that the court must have jurisdiction over all the cases
consolidated before it. Since the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the collection case, the same
cannot be consolidated with the criminal cases even if these cases involve similar questions of fact and
law. Obviously, consolidation of the collection case with the criminal cases will be a useless and empty
formality since the Sandiganbayan, being devoid of jurisdiction over the collection case, cannot act on it.
SECOND, the Rules of Court do not allow the filing of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a
criminal case.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly requires that x x x no counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of
action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action x x x.

In Cabaero v. Cantos, the Court held that [T]he counterclaim of the accused cannot be tried together with
the criminal case because, as already discussed, it will unnecessarily complicate and confuse the criminal
proceedings. Thus, the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability
of the accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third party complaint, if any)
should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the
proper time.

Petitioner lodged its own counterclaim to the collection case filed with the Malabon trial court, praying for
the return of the payment DPWH made to NIC arising from the dredging contracts. However, petitioners
counterclaim is deemed abandoned by virtue of Section 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended.[20] The last
paragraph of Section 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate
civil action shall be deemed abandoned.

Petitioners counterclaim in the civil case pending with the Malabon trial court for the return of the amount
DPWH paid NIC is an action to recover civil liability ex delicto. However, this action to recover civil
liability ex delicto is by operation of law included in the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan. By
mandate of RA No. 8249, the counterclaim filed earlier in the separate civil action with the Malabon trial
court shall be deemed abandoned.

The only other possibility is for NICs civil action to fall under Article 31 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.

Article 31 speaks of a civil action based on an obligation not arising from the act x x x complained of as a
felony. This clearly means that the obligation must arise from an act not constituting a crime.

Clearly, NICs civil case before the Malabon trial court does not fall under Article 31 of the Civil Code. This
calls then for the application of the second paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 111 which states that if the
criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. Consequently, the civil case for collection
pending in the Malabon trial court must be suspended until after the termination of the criminal cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
The suspension of the civil case for collection of sum of money will avoid the possibility of conflicting
decisions between the Sandiganbayan and the Malabon trial court on the validity of NICs dredging
contracts. If the Sandiganbayan declares the dredging contracts illegal and void ab initio, and such
declaration becomes final, then NICs civil case for collection of sum of money will have no legal leg to
stand on. However, if the Sandiganbayan finds the dredging contracts valid, then NICs collection case
before the Malabon trial court can then proceed to trial.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July 1994 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
2S 2016-17 (BALLUNGAY)

CRIM PRO
Title GR No. 73836
Naguiat v. IAC Date: August 18, 1988
Ponente: Padilla, J.
Antolin T. Naguiat, Petitioner Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, Third Special Cases Division, Timog
Silangan Development Corporation Ration and Manuel P. Lazatin, Respondents
DOCTRINE: Civil actions not arising from ex delicto may still be consolidated with criminal actions, in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. They may be tried together when they arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that
the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue
advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.
FACTS
Naguiat bought 4 lots from Timog Silangan Development Corporation. He paid in installments, and after paying
P60.00 per sq. meter for the total area of the lands, he seeks the transfer of ownership by TSDC. TSDC alleges that
the real agreement was for Naguiat to pay P60.00, considering a rebate of P10.00 (for a supposed total of P.70.00
per sq. meter), with the condition that Naguiat be able to build houses on the 4 lots within 6 months. Since he failed to
do so, TSDC alleges he is liable to pay the P10.00 difference for each sq. meter. Naguiat filed a criminal case against
Lazatin for violation of PD957, for failure to deliver the lots upon full payment made by him. In addition, he filed a case
for specific performances and damages to compel TSDC and Lazatin to deliver the lands to him.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not consolidation of the two cases is proper in this case. - YES
RATIO
Petitioner invokes Rule 111, Sec. 3(a), Rules of Court, which provides:
"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil
action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1
hereof, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) 'After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the
evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action,
without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present.

This rule governs where the action is one for recovery of civil liability liablitiy that arises out of the criminal act, or ex
delicto. In this case, his civil action is for specific performance and damages (for TSDC to deliver the titles of the
lands) which arises out of their contract to sell (ex contractu). However, as held in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidation
of a criminal action with a civil action arising not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the express authority of
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court,
it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs
or delay."

A Court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that
the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue
advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to
prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with
the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.

In this case, the issues are alike, and they depend substantially on the same evidence.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court, dated 9 October 1985, is
SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court, in Civil Case No. 4224 and Criminal Case No. 6727, dated 20 March 1985
and 29 May 1985 are REINSTATED.
2S 2016-2017 (BARAMBANGAN)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/aug1988/gr_73836_1988.html
CRIMPRO RULE 111
Title GR No. 150157
MANLICLIC v CALAUNAN Date: Jan 25, 2007
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. Modesto Calaunan Respondent
Petitioners
Nature of the case: Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of
Dagupan finding petitioners solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent

FACTS

Philippine Rabbit Bus no. 353 (plate no. CVD 478), owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and driven by Mauricio
Manliclic, collided with an owner-type jeep (plate no. PER 290) owned by Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza. The mishap took place at approximately kilometer 40 of NLEX in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan. The
front right side of the Phil. Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move on the right side of
the road, and consequently it fell on a ditch. A criminal case was filed by Calaunan, charging Manliclic with reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed
against the company and Manliclic.

The respondents allege that they were cruising at a speed of about 60 to 70 km per hour on the slow lane of the
expressway when the bus overtook them and in the process, hit the rear left side of the jeepney. At the time this
occurred, the bus was still at the back of the jeepney, indicating that it was indeed about to overtake the other
vehicle. This testimony was corroborated by Fernando Ramos. According to him, he was on another jeepney behind
the said bus when the mishap took place. He testified that the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right because it
was bumped by the bus from behind.

The petitioners however, maintain that when the bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the said
jeepney swerved to the left as it was about to overtake another jeepney in front of it. The bus company maintains
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Trial Court: decided in favor of respondents; ordered defendants to pay jointly and severally P40,838.00 as actual
damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs

CA: affirmed the trial courts decision.


Manliclic now contends that he cannot be made liable for damages as we has exonerated by the CA from the
criminal case when it ruled that he cannot be held negligent as the swerving of Calaunans jeep to the left when it
tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond his control and that absent evidence of negligence, therefore,
hecannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries as defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration
of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part YES.
RATIO
From the CAs decision, it appears that Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not
the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads: (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies
only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Section 2 (b) of Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based
on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex
delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is
not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced
to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
Notes
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

2-S 2016-2017 (BUSTAMANTE)



CRIMINAL RULE 111
PROCEDURE

Title GR No. 150785


Nuguid vs. Nicdao Date: September 15, 2006
Ponente: Corona, J.
Emma Nuguid, petitioner Clarita Nicdao, respondent
Nature of the case: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals with
respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of respondent Clarita Nicdao
FACTS
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen counts. The
criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of
Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some
obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner],
the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused
until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00. As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the
following open dated Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid
within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit several checks issued in their favor. In June 1997, [petitioner] together
with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge
the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson
Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The checks
were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the bounced checks,
but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the [respondent].

In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan,
Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced to pay P1,150,000, plus
interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one year for each violation of BP 22, or a total of 14 years of
imprisonment.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan. Respondent
elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted
respondent. According to the CA, certain substantial facts were overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if
properly considered, justified a different conclusion on the case.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the sum of P1,150,000 NO
RATIO
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the
disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it
involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part
of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the
crime). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law.

Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that the gravamen of BP 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment [and] the
accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from
notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to
achieve a goal intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is
irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also
irrelevant.

On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal
charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof
beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order
to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the
offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this
does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the
offense charged.

Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not
criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal
act of which the accused was acquitted.

In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil
liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23054 is AFFIRMED.
2-S (Cabacang)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_150785_2006.html

CRIMPRO Prejudicial Question; Rule 111, Sec. 3


Title GR No. 148193
PEOPLE v. COSING Date: 16 January 2003
Ponente: YNARES- SANTIAGO, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court.
FACTS
Case timeline:
1. Petitioner and his mother represented to Plus Builders Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of the
subject parcel of land. The PBI purchased the same relying on their representations. Sometime after, PBI discovered
that respondent did not have a valid title over the property which was never sold to them by its current owners (Tan
Teng and Yu).
2. PBI was ousted of the property. They made several demands but the respondent refused to return the initial
payment. This prompted PBI to file 3 cases: (1) an action for Injunctive Relief; (2) a complaint for damages and
attachment; and (3) a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
3. Respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question present in the action for
injunctive relief and complaint for damages filed before different courts.
4. The motion was denied by RTC. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA and sought a TRO. The CA granted the petition. Sometime after, a decision was rendered by
the trial court which enjoined itself from proceeding by virtue of the presence of a prejudicial question.
5. OSG filed this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S
VI. WON there is prejudicial question- NO
RATIO
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as
to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other,
then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question

The issue with the FIRST CASE (INJUNCTIVE RELIEF) is whether or not respondent acted as an agent of his mother. Even if
respondent is declared as an agent he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for estafa.

The issue with the SECOND CASE (DAMAGES) is whether or not PBI is entitled to damages. Similarly, its resolution will not
affect the criminal case.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.


RULING
Petition is Granted.
CABRITO
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jan2003/gr_148193_2003.html


CRIMPRO RULE 111

Title: GR No. 166836

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. vs. PEREZ Date: September 4, 2013

Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., petitioner SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO
B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS,
STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO
M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R.
AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, respondents.

Nature of the case: The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of
title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of
1
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of
the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

FACTS


Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and
April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes
Paraaque. The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first
and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs purchased under the third deed of sale were not
delivered to San Miguel Properties. On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions.


BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the same time, San Miguel Properties
sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.


The Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias rendered its resolution,dismissing San Miguel Properties criminal complaint for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from
the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained
under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action
until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and
that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict
respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.Subsequently, it also denied San Miguel Properties
motion for reconsideration , holding that BF Homes directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the
TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendains actions; and that the criminal
liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the titles.

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pias to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary
denied the appeal.


Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJs resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus , contending that
respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and
officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or
not HLURB Case presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957. The CA also dismissed San Miguel Properties petition and also subsequently dismissed their
Motion for Reconsideration.


Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S

I. Whether or not an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of of Presidential Decree
No. 957- YES
RATIO

YES. Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF
Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first
be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal
case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial
question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.


The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties
submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose
was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply
because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.25


The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the
facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal
complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be
determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus
necessary.


An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it
was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of
specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the
Civil Code.


Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As presently worded,
Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil
Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a partys breach
of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the
former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions,
either the rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of
the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged
on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of
reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances.
Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed
in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its
provisions.


Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel
Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether
or not BF Homes directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20
TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been
terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.


Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused.
It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted
that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution
has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the
allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.

RULING


WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO.
73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

2- S 2016-17 (CAPIO)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/sep2013/gr_166836_2013.html

CRIMPRO Prejudicial Question


Title PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. vs. G.R. No. 142362
LICHAUCO Date: May 3, 2006
Ponente: CORONA, J.:
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and SEC. JOSEFINA TRINIDADLICHAUCO and the
MICHAEL. U. DE GUZMAN, Complainants, HON. OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

FACTS
Case timeline:
1. On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding[1] (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
represented by then Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. relative to the launching, ownership, operation and
management of a Philippine satellite by a Filipino-owned or controlled private consortium or corporation.
2. By letter[2] dated June 28, 1996, PASI president Rodrigo A. Silverio (Silverio) requested the then DOTC
Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine
orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites. In response to Silverios letter, Secretary
Lagdameo, by letter[3] dated July 3, 1996, confirmed the governments assignment of Philippine orbital slots
161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites. PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching,
operation and management of its satellites.
3. Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including
153E. PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn that
another company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital
slot 153E, filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City against Lichauco and the Unknown Awardee, for injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E,
declare its nullity, and for damages.
4. PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary
Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco with gross violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
5. The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, by
Evaluation Report[8] dated April 15, 1998, found the existence of a prejudicial question after considering
that the case filed with the RTC involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based and that the guilt or the innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined in the resolution of the issues raised in the civil case. It thus concluded that the filing of the
complaint before the Ombudsman is premature since the issues involved herein are now subject of
litigation in the case filed with the RTC, and accordingly recommended its dismissal.

ISSUE/S
VII. Whether there exists a prejudicial question - YES
VIII. Whether the dismissal of the complaint on that account is in order. - NO
RATIO
1. The civil case against Lichauco on the other hand involves three causes of action. The first, for injunction,
seeks to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E, the DOTC having previously assigned the same to PASI; the
second, for declaration of nullity of award, seeks to nullify the award given to the undisclosed bidder for
being beyond Lichaucos authority; and the third, for damages arising from Lichaucos questioned acts.
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153E is, in the civil case, declared valid for being
within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be
no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by
petitioner. The finding by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus well-taken.
2. When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a
prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in
a suppletory character. As laid down in Yap v. Paras, said rule directs that the proceedings may only
be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the
judge alone or as in this case, the investigating officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioners criminal complaint due to prejudicial
question would not only run counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It
would sanction the extinguishment of criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article
89 vis a vis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 17, 1998 of respondent Ombudsman dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416
against respondent then Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco isSET ASIDE.

The Ombudsman is ORDERED to REINSTATE to its docket for further proceedings, in line with the
foregoing ratiocination, OMB Case No. 0-98-0416.

SO ORDERED

Notes

CARPIO
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/july2006/G.R.%20No.%20134887.htm

MONTAEZ V. CIPRIANO

G.R. No. 181089

October 22, 2012

Doctrine: In criminal cases, it is the OSG that should file an appeal in behalf of the aggrieved party, not the
aggrieved party himself.

FACTS:

1. On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during
the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.
2. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 25, a Petition for the Annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of
the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision
declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory
on October 13, 2003.
3. On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
4. On November 17, 2004, an Information for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 31.
5. Petitioners Contention: Her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus,
there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic
element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.
6. RTC ruled in favor private respondent. In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted
a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did
not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage.
7. Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner (private complaint) is the proper person to file a petition assailing the decision of the RTC.

HELD:

No.

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed
by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government
in all judicial proceedings filed before us.

In Antone v. Beronilla, the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the
RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the
ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG,
being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due
course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented
by the OSG and said:

In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the
trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or
ruling before us. x x x Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the
plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead,
we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its
Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

CRIMPRO RULE 111


RILLON VS RILLON G.R. No. L-13172
Date: April 28, 1960.
Ponente: LABRADOR, J.
GILBERT RILLON and MARCELINA RILLON, FILEMON RILLON, defendant and appellee.
plaintiffs and appellants,

This is a civil action instituted by the minor Gilbert Rillon, assisted by his mother, Marcelina Rillon, as his
guardian ad litem
FACTS
Case timeline:

1.Sometime in September 1953 in the Province of La Union, the Filemon Rillon (defendant) using force and
intimidation cohabited and proceeded to have carnal knowledge with Marcelina Rillon. As a result,
Marcelina Rillon gave birth to a child after 180 days from the carnal intercourse and within 300 days
thereof.
2. Plaintiff Marcelina Rillon and Filemon Rillon are both single at the time of conception without any legal
impediments to marry and continue in the same status. This is a civil case for support, recognition and
damages instituted by the minor Gilbert Rillon, assisted his mother. It is alleged that the minor needs
food for subsistence as he is living with his mother who has no means to support him. His mother is
also asking the defendant to recognize the minor as a natural child and provide him with support.

DEFENDANTs CONTENTION:
1. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the action is premature as there is no final
judgment in a criminal case for rape against the defendant and no cause of action has accrued
against him.

ISSUE/S
1. WON a criminal prosecution for rape should be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment
before instituting a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman and the
recognition of the offspring - NO
RATIO
Art. 30 states that, When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. This article implies the right of an
offended party to bring a separate civil action for the criminal act without instituting the criminal
proceedings for the prosecution of the offense. A civil action may now be instituted without and
prosecuted to final judgment without awaiting the institution and termination of a criminal action.

RULING
Remanded to the lower for further proceedings.
Notes
INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION UNNECESSARY; RULE 107 OF THE RULES OF COURT
REPEALED. The provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court are no longer in force because a civil
action may now be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment without waiting the institution and
termination of a criminal action (Arts. 30 and 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). These new
provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court and the latter must give
way thereto. In consequence, it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted
and presented to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman
and recognition of the offspring can be instituted and presented to final judgment. The provisions of Rule
107 of the present Rules promulgated in 1940, are, therefore, considered repealed or modified pro tanto by
Articles 30 and 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
DIAO
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1960aprildecisions.php?id=184

CRIMPRO RULE 111


Title GR No. 209330
DE LIMA V. REYES Date: January 11, 2016
Ponente: LEONEN, J.
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA Petitioner MARIO JOEL REYES Respondent
Nature of the case: This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution dated
September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which rendered null and void Department of Justice Order No. 710 issued by
the Secretary of Justice.
FACTS
Dr. Gerardo Ortega was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. In 2011, he was shot dead inside the
Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Marlon Recamata was then arrested and made
an extrajudicial confession that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo Edrad, Dennis Aranas and Armando Noel,
Jr. Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the NBI where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario
Joel Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 91 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to
conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel issued a Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-
Ortega (wife of the victim) filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation and a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
Ad Cautelam of the Resolution dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel.

The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct
reinvestigation of the case. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam)
assailing the First Panels Resolution dated September 2, 2011.

Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel. He argued
that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel since the parties were
already afforded due process.

The Second Panel issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused
including former Governor Reyes. The RTC of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest. Former Governor Reyes
then filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam assailing the Second Panels Resolution dated
March 12, 2012.

In 2013, the CA rendered a Decision declaring Department Order No. 10 null and void and reinstating the First Panels
Resolutions dated June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011. The CA stated that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the
alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second Panel since both parties were given
full opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel. Aggrieved, the Secretary of Justice and the Second Panel
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court,
pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul
RATIO
Yes, the filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of respondents warrant to arrest has already
rendered this Petition moot.

Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the case or to
determine the accuseds guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court. Thus, it would be ill-advised for
the Secretary of Justice to proceed with resolving respondents Petition for Review pending before her. It would be more
prudent to refrain from entertaining the Petition considering that the trial court already issued a warrant of arrest against
respondent. The issuance of the warrant signifies that the trial court has made an independent determination of the
existence of probable cause.

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the
Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Jurisdiction over
the case, therefore, has been transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the
preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot by the issuance of warrant of arrest and the
conduct of arraignment.

The CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest.
Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.

The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial. Respondent, however, is not without remedies. He
may still file any appropriate action before the trial court or question any alleged irregularity in the preliminary
investigation during pre-trial.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot. Branch 52 of the RTC of Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 26839.
Notes

2-S 2016-17 (ELMIDO)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/209330.pdf
CRIMPRO RULE 111
Title EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, GR No. 92319-20
vs. Date: OCTOBER 2, 1900
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) Ponente:
AND HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ in his capacity as Solicitor
General, and the HON. OMBUDSMAN, respondents, MARIA
CLARA L. LOBREGAT and JOSE R. ELEAZAR, JR., intervenors.
PCGG, RESPONDENT COJUANGCO, PETITIONER
FACTS
President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds.
Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible
involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds.

On January 12, 1990, the Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent PCGG docketed under I.S. Nos. 74 and
75. The PCGG assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary investigation. The latter scheduled
both cases for hearing.

Del Rosario prepared a subpoena dated January 16, 1990 setting the preliminary investigation on January 29, 1990 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon as to respondents Maria Clara Lobregat, Jose Eleazar, Felix Duenas Jr., and Salvador Escudero, III, and on
January 31, 1990 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon as to petitioner Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Rolando de la Cuesta, and
Hermenegildo Zayco.

Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General
without violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct
such preliminary investigation.

On March 14, 1990, two informations 3 were filed by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and all other
respondents named in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 which were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 14398 and 14399.

Meanwhile, the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG several other complaints against petitioner and several others bearing on
the misuse of the coconut levy funds. Two of these complaints were docketed as I.S. Nos. 79 and 82. A panel of prosecutors
designated by the PCGG issued a subpoena to petitioner in order to compel him to appear in the investigation of said cases.

ISSUE/S
The second issue raised is whether or not the preliminary investigation by the PCGG of the aforestated complaints
violates the right of petitioner to due process and to equal protection of law- YES
RATIO
Such a preliminary investigation is required for offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan. 14 It
must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This procedure is to be observed in order to assure that a person undergoing such preliminary investigation will be afforded due
process.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of due process is that the person who presides and decides
over a proceeding, including a preliminary investigation, must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Although such a
preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The
officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view
of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in
effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has
then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and
for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.

Soon after the creation of the PCGG under Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG sequestered and froze all the properties of
petitioner Cojuangco in accordance with the powers vested in it by law.

Insofar as the general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be divided into two stages. The first stage
of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the fact-finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they
find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary
investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient
evidence to bring a person to trial.

In the petition before this Court, it is not denied that the PCGG conducted the appropriate criminal investigation of petitioner
and intervenors as a law enforcer. In the process it sequestered all the properties of the petitioner after a prima facie finding
that the same amount to ill-gotten wealth and/or were acquired in relation to allegedly anomalous disposition or misuse of the
coconut levy funds.

The PCGG then filed on July 31, 1987 a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against petitioner and intervenors not only
for alleged ill-gotten wealth as associates of former President Marcos but for the unlawful concert with the former President
and his wife to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people through the alleged misuse, misappropriation
and dissipation of the coconut levy funds, as enumerated in the complaint. This complaint was verified and filed by the then
Chairman of the PCGG and also signed by the Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General.

The PCGG, as a law enforcer, gathered evidence as to the alleged ill-gotten wealth of petitioner and intervenors and, after
satisfying itself that there is a prima facie case, sequestered and issued a freeze order for all the properties of petitioner.
Based also on the said finding of a prima facie case, the PCGG filed a civil complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against
petitioner and intervenors for alleged ill-gotten wealth including the alleged misuse, misappropriation, and diversion of
coconut levy funds.

The Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier instances, the PCGG had already found a prima facie case
against the petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the sequestration of the properties and the issuance
of the freeze order of the properties of petitioner. Thereafter, acting as a law enforcer, in collaboration with the Solicitor
General, the PCGG gathered the evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor filed the aforestated civil complaint.
Consequently the Solicitor General filed a series of criminal complaints.In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who
conducted the criminal investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and
unjust.

It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and
filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own
complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.

The circumstances of the instant petition are even worse. To repeat, the PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie
basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of
the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. While ostensibly,
it is only the Solicitor General who is the complainant in the criminal cases filed with the PCGG, in reality the PCGG is an
unidentified co-complainant.

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of a
prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy
funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints
with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. Add to this the fact that there are many suits
filed by petitioner and the intervenors against the PCGG and vice versa.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Notes
On the first issue wherein petitioner and intervenors question the authority of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints filed
against them by the Solicitor General, the Court finds and so holds the same to be devoid of merit.

Under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure the officers authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.Under
Section 2 likewise of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court before its present amendment, the officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation are as follows:

Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary examination: Every justice of the peace, municipal judge, city or provincial fiscal, shall have authority to
conduct preliminary examination or investigation in accordance with these rules of all offenses alleged to have been committed within his municipality, city or
province, cognizable by the Court of First Instance.

The justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of the municipality in which the provincial jail is located when directed by an order of the Court of First
Instance, shall have authority to conduct such preliminary examination or investigation of any offense committed anywhere within his province at the expense of
the municipality wherein the same was committed.
Under Section 3 thereof in case of temporary absence of the justice of the peace or his auxiliary, the municipal mayor may conduct the preliminary investigation.
For complaints filed directly with the Court of First Instance, the judge of the said court may refer the case to the justice of the peace or he may himself conduct
both the preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously, under Section 13 of the same rule.

Upon the enactment of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on August 17, 1960, 5 and Republic Act No. 1379 (covering unexplained wealth cases) on August
18, 1955, the preliminary investigation of cases involving the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and/or unexplained wealth cases was vested on the
aforestated officers.

July 17, 1979, Presidential Decree No. 1630 was promulgated whereby the Tanodbayan was vested with the "exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." 6 Under Presidential Decree No. 1486 which was approved on June 11, 1978, the Sandiganbayan
was created and vested with exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by public officers enumerated therein. This was amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1606 dated December 10, 1978 and further amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 issued on March 23, 1983 wherein the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However this exclusive jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to conduct preliminary investigation of said cases was modified by Executive Order No. 1
signed by President Corazon C. Aquino on February 28, 1986 creating the PCGG and constituting its membership to assist the President in the recovery of ill
gotten wealth accumulated by the former President, his relatives and cronies.

From the foregoing provisions of law, particularly Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that
the PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt
practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the
PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. 7

Thus, the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of these types of cases by the promulgation of the said Executive
Order Nos. 1 and 14 whereby the PCGG was vested concurrent jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct such preliminary investigation and to prosecute said
cases before the Sandiganbayan. 8 The power of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the aforementioned types of cases has been recognized by
this Court in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co. Inc. (BASECO) vs. PCGG. A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power
of investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive. Hence, the said provision of the Constitution did not repeal or remove
the power to conduct an investigation, including the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation, vested on the PCGG by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 14.
Indeed the passage of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989," it is therein specifically provided in Section 15. Under Section
15(l) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any
stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to
include the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts and municipal
circuit trial courts.

2S 2016-17 (FALCOTELO)

CRIMINAL RULE 111


PROCEDURE
Title GR No. 192935
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010 Date: December 07, 2010

Ponente: MENDOZA, J.

Lous Barok C Biraogo Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

FACTS
President Benigno Aquino Jr signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010. The PTCs primary task is to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the PREVIOUS
ADMINISTRATION, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President. The PTC
shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.

The petitioners asks the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions.
ISSUE/S

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question
Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

RATIO
1. Yes, as to petitioners-legislators because their their petition invokes usurpation of the power of
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. LEgislators are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. As to Biraogo, he
has no legal standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget of its operations. It
emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken
from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for
the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President's
power over contingent funds. Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing
is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."
2. No. While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As
correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to
aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability
and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
3. No. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving
evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. At any rate, the
Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770. The act of
investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary
investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the
PTC's sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and
guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
4. Yes. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order. It must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other
past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
TEST OF REASONABLENESS OF THE CLASSIFICATION
1. Classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. Classification is germane to the purpose of the law
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class

5. Yes (no explanation)


RULING

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions
of Executive Order No. 1.

Notes

Injunctive relief, also known as an injunction, is a legal remedy that may be sought in a civil lawsuit, in
addition to, or in place of, monetary damages. Rather than offering money as payment for a wrong in a civil
action, injunctive relief is a court order for the defendant to stop a specified act or behavior.

PS: Sorry medyo mahaba yung digest saka hindi ko rin makita yung relate niya sa Rule 111 :(