Briefing The Yemen Conflict and Crisis

Finlay Asher Briefing The Yemen Conflict and Crisis 12/02/2017
Briefing The Yemen Conflict and Crisis
Summary
This report provides a background and history to Yemen, the current civil war in the country and the
associated humanitarian crisis.
It is structured as follows:
Introduction to the country: its geography, religion and culture
History of Yemen, prior to the current conflict
Events of the current civil war (March 2015 present) and those involved
Overview of the humanitarian crisis, currently affecting the majority of the countrys population
Allegations of war crimes reported violations of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law by parties to the conflict
The external influence and involvement of Iran, the US, the UK and other European countries
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Table of Contents
Summary .........................................................................................................................................................1
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................3
1. Introduction to Yemen ............................................................................................................................4
1.1. Geography ......................................................................................................................................4
1.2. Population ......................................................................................................................................6
1.3. Religion...........................................................................................................................................6
1.4. Other Culture .................................................................................................................................8
2. History of Yemen: Pre-Conflict................................................................................................................9
2.1. Ottoman and British Occupation ...................................................................................................9
2.2. Division into North and South Yemen (1967/1968) .......................................................................9
2.3. Unification of Yemen under President Saleh (1990) ....................................................................10
2.4. Rise of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2000s) ......................................................................10
2.5. Houthi Insurgency (2004-2010) ...................................................................................................10
2.6. National Uprising Arab Spring (2011-2012) ..............................................................................11
2.7. President Hadis Government (2012-2014) .................................................................................11
3. The Yemen Conflict (March 2015 Present) ........................................................................................13
3.1. The Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen ................................................................................................13
3.2. Internal Involvement ....................................................................................................................14
4. The Humanitarian Crisis ........................................................................................................................15
5. Alleged Violations of IHL .......................................................................................................................17
5.1. The Houthi-Saleh Forces ..............................................................................................................17
5.2. The Saudi-led Coalition ................................................................................................................18
5.3. Calls for International Independent Investigations......................................................................20
6. Involvement of Iran...............................................................................................................................21
7. Involvement of the Unites States (US) ..................................................................................................21
8. Involvement of the United Kingdom (UK).............................................................................................22
9. Involvement of Other European Countries...........................................................................................26
References ....................................................................................................................................................27
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Introduction
While political events of the past year were overshadowed by the US Presidential Election and the British
EU referendum, 2016 will also be remembered for the horrifying events of the Syrian Civil War and the
Battle for Aleppo [1].
The resulting humanitarian and refugee crisis in Syria has been widely reported and the actions of those
(principally Russia and Iran) who have supported the incumbent Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, have
been widely condemned by US and European governments, politicians and the media. For example, the
UK, US and France have been openly critical of Russian airstrikes which have allegedly targeted hospitals,
aid convoys and densely populated areas in Syria, killing and injuring thousands of civilians. The UK has
accused Russia of war crimes and has called from them to be tried by the International Criminal Court [2].
By contrast, the concurrent Yemen Conflict has been described by Oxfam as Syria without the cameras
[3] and has received relatively less attention in western political debate and media coverage [4]. This
could be due to the lack of refugees generated by the conflict or vested western interests in supporting
the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, who have been conducting airstrikes in Yemen in an attempt to re-
instate the ousted government. Meanwhile, Yemen is suffering a catastrophic humanitarian crisis of its
own, threatening to rival that in Syria for scale and atrocity.
As with Russia in Syria, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has been repeatedly accused of war crimes and
violations of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law since their
campaign began in March 2015 [5] [6]. The coalition has complete control over Yemeni airspace and their
campaign has largely consisted of airstrikes, some of which have allegedly hit aid convoys, farms,
hospitals, markets, schools and key economic infrastructure [7]. These airstrikes are blamed for a
disproportionate number of the civilian casualties caused by the conflict [7]. Furthermore, the coalitions
strategic naval and aerial blockage of the country has severely restricted crucial imports of food, water,
fuel, medicine and foreign aid from reaching Yemen. This has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and led
to widespread starvation amongst the 27.4 million Yemenis inhabiting the country [5].
As the conflict involves a complex mix of multiple sides and external influence, this report aims to brief
the reader, using thoroughly referenced source material from the public domain.
The report begins with an introduction to Yemen; its geography, population, religion and culture. It goes
on to outline a brief history of the country prior to the current civil war. It then provides a description of
the conflict so far, details the main parties involved and outlines the extent of the current humanitarian
crisis. It also covers the external influence and involvement of countries such as Iran, the US, UK and
other European countries. It then finishes by documenting the numerous alleged violations of
international humanitarian law that have been reported during the conflict.
Above all, the report hopes to stimulate the reader to think and talk about the situation in Yemen. For
any further information or discussion on this topic, which is positively encouraged, please get in contact
using: finlaya@hotmail.co.uk
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1. Introduction to Yemen
1.1. Geography
Yemen, also known as The Republic of Yemen, is an Arab country located at the southern end of the
Arabian Peninsula. Yemen is land bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north and Oman to the east.
Yemens coastline is bordered by the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the south. Its also bordered by
the Red Sea to the west. The Suez Canal in Egypt links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.
Suez Canal
The geographic location of Yemen is of high global economic importance due, in particular, to the Bab-el-
Mandeb strait which links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. This makes Yemen of key strategic importance
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for shipping routes between Europe and countries in the Persian Gulf, India and Asia. The port of Aden,
near the southern tip of Yemen, is a key refuelling stop for ships entering and leaving the Red Sea.
Port of Aden
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
The Bab el-Mandeb strait is a chokepoint for global maritime transit of oil. The map of the globe below
shows estimated oil transit volumes, in millions of barrels per day, based on 2013 data [8]. By 2014, its
estimated that almost 5 million barrels of oil passed through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait each day [9].
Blocking a chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in total energy costs and world
energy prices, as disruptions to these routes can affect oil prices and add thousands of miles of transit in
alternative routes. Chokepoints also leave oil tankers vulnerable to theft from pirates, terrorist attacks,
shipping accidents that can lead to disastrous oil spills, and political unrest in the form of wars or
hostilities. U.S. Energy Information Administration [8].
This demonstrates why the Yemen conflict and in particular, the occupation of the port of Aden and the
south-west corner of the country, is of such interest to the US, European nations and other Gulf states.
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1.2. Population
The population of Yemen was 4.5 million in 1950 but is now over 27 million [5]. It is projected to reach 60
million by 2050 [10]. The diagram below depicts the population rise in the country over the last 50 years,
with Syria also shown for comparison [11]:
This rapid increase in the Yemeni population is due to the high levels of poverty and associated high birth
rate, with around 45% of the current population under the age of 15 [12]. The lack of refugees able to
flee Yemen is also very apparent in contrast to the millions that have escaped Syria since the Syrian
Conflict began in 2011.
1.3. Religion
Islam is the official religion in Yemen and Islamic law is used as the source of all legislation. The majority
of the Yemen population are Muslims, with a Sunni Islam majority (65%) and a Shia Islam minority (35%).
Most Sunnis adhere to the Shafi sect of Sunni Islam and most Shias to the Zaidi sect of Shia Islam [13].
% Yemen Population
35
65
Zaidi Shia Shafi Sunni
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The following tree diagram illustrates the breakdown of Islam into its various sects [14]:
It is worth noting that the Yemeni constitution does not favour one Islamic sect over the other and that
historically the predominant Shafi-Sunni and Zaidi-Shia communities have lived together amicably.
However, an increase in the presence of Salafi-Sunnis in some parts of Yemen has resulted in increased
tensions with Zaidi-Shia communities, although this appears to be mainly politically motivated rather
than religiously motivated [13].
Salafism is an ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam and is practiced in Saudi Arabia and some parts of
Yemen. Most Salafists are peaceful and reject violence as un-Islamic, so Salafi jihadi is generally used to
describe those radical militant Salafists, such as Al-Qaeda or Islamic State (IS), that have chosen to use
violence against other groups [15]. There is a large and active Al-Qaeda presence in the east of Yemen.
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1.4. Other Culture

Yemen was the first country in the world to drink coffee [16]. It is also well known for its honey.
Yemeni architecture is very distinctive, e.g. the city of Shibam which is a UNESCO World Heritage Site and
is described as "the Manhattan of the Middle East" for its mud brick tower blocks, one of the oldest
examples of urban vertical construction in the world [17]. The capital city of Yemen, Sanaa (pictured
below) is also a UNESCO World Heritage Site and one of the highest capital cities above sea level [18].
The most popular sport in the country is Football and in 2010 Yemen hosted the Gulf Nations Cup [19].
The majority of the country is addicted to Khat or Qat, a mild narcotic plant, which releases stimulants
when chewed. Khat production accounts for around half of Yemens agriculture, which in turn uses 90%
of its water. As a result, around 45% of all water in Yemen is used to grow a plant of no nutritional value.
This has contributed to a risk that Sanaa may become the first capital in the world to run out of a viable
water supply [20]. It has also exacerbated the current humanitarian crisis in the country which has left a
large swathe of the population severely water and food insecure.
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2. History of Yemen: Pre-Conflict

2.1. Ottoman and British Occupation
Prior to the first world war, the Ottoman empire controlled much of eastern Europe, North Africa and the
Middle East. Between the 16th and 19th centuries, the Ottomans intermittently occupied various parts of
Yemen; they mainly controlled southern coastal regions but struggled to bring rule to the Zaidi tribes in
the mountainous North.
In 1839, the British Empire attacked and captured the port of Aden on the south
Yemen coast. The port was then used by the British East India Company (pictured)
as a refuelling stop for trade ships between the Suez Canal and Bombay [21]. The
British signed treaties with nine tribes surrounding the city to ensure protection
and loyalty ahead of other colonial powers.
The Ottomans withdrew from Yemen in 1918 following the First World War [21]. The 1920s were then
characterised by conflict as the Zaidi Imams of the north attempted to claim sovereignty over Yemen by
capturing the other territories from various tribes and the British government in Aden. This proved futile
due to the military capacity of the British air force and eventually ended with a treaty signed in 1934 that
guaranteed British sovereignty over the Aden protectorate for 40 years. During the Second World War,
Aden expanded economically and became the second busiest port in the world after New York City [22].
2.2. Division into North and South Yemen (1967/1968)

In 1962 the North Yemen Civil War began, it was fought for 6 years between rebels backed by Egypt and
royalists backed by Saudi Arabia, Britain, Jordan and Israel. It ended in victory for the rebels in 1968 and
resulted in the formation of the Yemen Arab Republic in North Yemen. Concurrently, Arab nationalism
resulted in the end of British rule in the south and formation of the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen in South Yemen [21]. The map below illustrates the division of Yemen prior to 1990 [23].
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2.3.Unification of Yemen under President Saleh (1990)

Following the division into North and South, the two states fought each other
several times, notably in 1972, 1979 and 1986. The south was backed by Saudi
Arabia and the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, North
and South Yemen were unified into The Republic of Yemen in 1990 [21].
The unification agreement involved the former president of North Yemen, Ali
Abdallah Saleh (pictured), becoming president of the new country, with the
former president of South Yemen becoming vice-president. The new capital
became Sanaa in former North Yemen.
In 1993, the vice-president withdrew south to Aden, protesting over economic
marginalisation and violence against the south by those in the north. This resulted
in a political deadlock and then civil war in 1994 with fighting between northern and southern armies
which had failed to integrate since unification. The south was backed by Saudi Arabia but was defeated
by the north who re-captured Aden, forcing many southern politicians to flee abroad into exile and
cementing President Saleh in power [21].
2.4. Rise of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2000s)

The terrorist faction Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansar al-
Sharia, an affiliate of AQAP, have long had a presence in the east of Yemen. These
groups (and ISIL) are militant jihadi Salafi-Sunni Muslims.
Al-Qaeda have been involved in various attacks on ships of the Yemen coast including notable attacks
against the US naval vessel USS Cole in 2000 and against the oil super-tanker MV Limburg in 2002 [21].
The Yemen government has cooperated with the US and the UK [24] on counter-terrorism and have
allowed them to carry out regular drone strikes on Al-Qaeda in the east of Yemen since the War on
Terror began in 2001 [25].
2.5. Houthi Insurgency (2004-2010)

The Houthis, also known as The Houthi Rebels or Ansar Allah (Supporters of
God), are a militia named after the groups founders and leaders, the al-Houthi
family. The current leader of the Houthi insurgency in Yemen is Abdul-Malik al-
Houthi (pictured). The Houthis are formed of Zaidi-Shia Muslims, a community
concentrated in mountainous north-west (Saana region) of Yemen [26].
The Houthis were formed in response to a rising Salafi-Sunni influence in northern
Yemen. They have accused the Yemen government of marginalising the Zaidi-Shia minority group and
have blamed them for the widespread poverty, rising fuel prices and food-insecurity in the country.
The Houthis are opposed to terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS, as these groups are militant jihadi
Salafi-Sunni extremists. However, they are also opposed to a US presence in Yemen. The Houthi slogan is
"God is Great; Death to America; Death to Israel; Damnation to the Jews; Victory to Islam" [27].
The Houthis have vowed to overthrow the government, tackle the presence of Al-Qaeda and provide
educational and social services to Yemenis. To this end, they fought the Saleh government intermittently
every year from 2004 to 2010 [26].
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2.6. National Uprising Arab Spring (2011-2012)

A national uprising against President Saleh took place in 2011. This was led by a
secessionist movement of Southern Separatists from Aden and the region
formerly known as South Yemen (pictured) prior to unification with the North [28].
The unification with North Yemen in 1990 was unpopular with many in South
Yemen. Their attempted breakaway in 1994 was crushed by Saleh to cement
Northern control from Sanaa. Since then, many Southerners have felt isolated and let down by political
and economic marginalisation from the government in the North. They also resented the relative wealth
of the North and President Saleh in particular who appeared to corruptly prosper from Yemens natural
reserves of oil and gas, despite these being located in the South [29].
Security forces loyal to President Saleh were deemed responsible for killing
hundreds of civilians during the 2011 protests. However, he was granted immunity
from prosecution for any crimes as part of an agreement to transfer from power in
2012 [30].
Saleh denies any allegations of corruption during his 33-year tenure as President
(1978-2012). However, a UN investigation suspects he corruptly amassed a
fortune of $32-60bn, which is more than Yemens entire annual GDP. He has also been accused of
continuing to stoke instability in the country since stepping down from power and has been fiercely
critical of his successor, President Hadi [31].
2.7. President Hadis Government (2012-2014)

The internationally recognised but domestically opposed government of Yemen is
currently headed by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (pictured). After Saleh
stepped down, Hadi took power in February 2012 by winning a presidential
election in which he was the only candidate. This position was intended to last for
a transitional period of 2 years, after which another election would be held.
Hadis policies between 2012 and 2014 involved advocating counter-terrorism,
attempting to unify Yemens military and pushing for political reform towards a federal model of
government by dividing Yemen into 6 distinct regions [32]. However, despite international backing, his
government is unpopular with many of the key groups in Yemen.
He is unpopular with Shia Houthis in the north, who saw his plans for decentralisation as a means of
reducing central government funding to the Saana region and cutting off their access to the sea [26]. He
is also opposed by Southern Separatists and other regional tribes, as they resent historical political
corruption and blame him, in part, for the current conflict in Yemen [33].
Following the 2011 uprisings, the Houthis took advantage of nationwide discontent with the government
in Sanaa to expand their presence and bolstered their support through anti-government preaching, vows
to cut government corruption and destroy Al-Qaeda [27].
Al-Qaeda also made gains during this period by capitalising on weakened government and national
security forces to expand their reach over central and south-west Yemen.
The map below illustrates the fractious nature of the country in 2012 [34].
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In 2014, incensed by the Hadi governments plans to divide Yemen, the Houthis advanced south. Despite
past differences, they partnered with a section of the government armed forces still loyal to ex-President
Saleh for support. They then invaded and captured the capital of Sanaa. The Houthis brokered a peace
deal with President Hadi and forced him to resign, before placing him under house arrest [27].
In February 2015, Hadi escaped and fled to government-held Aden in southern Yemen. He retracted his
resignation, denounced the Houthi takeover as unconstitutional and declared Aden the new capital. The
Houthis then advanced further south and besieged Aden, forcing Hadi to flee Yemen by boat for Saudi
Arabia. This lead to a military intervention by the Saudi-led coalition in March 2015 [35].
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3. The Yemen Conflict (March 2015 Present)

3.1. The Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen
A coalition of nine middle-eastern countries, led by Saudi Arabia, was formed in
March 2015 in order to launch a military intervention (Operation Decisive Storm)
into Yemen. This coalition is made up of naval, ground and air forces from Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and Qatar. Saudi Arabia are the largest contributor of troops and aircraft [36].
The UAE are the second largest contributor to the coalition with 30 aircraft. They also increased their
support in August 2016 by sending a military brigade, tanks and armoured vehicles into Aden, while Qatar
deployed around 1,000 soldiers from their Armed Forces [37]. However, Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not
see eye-to-eye in terms of conflict strategy; they are both suspicious of the other advancing their own
agendas and have deliberately worked against each other in some cases [38].
The Saudi-led coalition have demanded that President Hadis legitimate government is reinstated by the
Houthis, who they believe are being backed by Iran [39].
The coalition made initial gains during the first months of the intervention, pushing the Houthis out of
Aden and the surrounding provinces in southern Yemen, allowing Hadi to return to Aden in late 2015.
Their tactics have predominantly involved the use of airstrikes to attack rebel held buildings and areas.
However, these tactics have been controversial and have attracted widespread international criticism
from the UN and various governments, charities and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
Saudi-led coalition airstrikes are allegedly responsible for the vast majority of civilian deaths caused by
the conflict [40]. They have also confirmed the use of cluster bombs, a munition banned by many
governments due to the propensity of unexploded clusters to kill or maim civilians [41]. The airstrikes
have hit ports [42], markets [43], hospitals [44], schools [45], factories [46], prisons [47], wedding parties
[48], funeral halls [49] and hundreds of private residences [40].
Despite initial success, the progress of coalition soon stalled. Now, almost two years on since the initial
intervention, the rebels still control much of western Yemen including the capital city, Sanaa, and the
important port of Hudaydah. A stalemate has also appeared in the city of Taiz, which has been a source
of heavy fighting and civilian casualties. The map below provides an overview of the situation in Yemen as
of the 10th October 2016 [50].
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3.2.Internal Involvement
The UN Security Council currently view the Houthis and government military forces still loyal to ex-
President Saleh as a hybrid-armed group [7].
In the south, the Houthi rebellion has also led to renewed calls for southern separation through either
total independence or increased regional autonomy. Although lacking clear leadership, a Southern
Resistance has now formed which is opposed to both the Houthis and the current Hadi government.
They blame both groups, The North, for the deadly fighting and destruction of Aden in 2015 [33].
The population of southern Yemen is predominantly Shafi-Sunni Muslim. This is in contrast to the Houthis
who originate from the predominantly Zaidi-Shia north-west region. This situation leads to fears that
militant jihadi Salafi-Sunni groups with a large presence in southern Yemen, such as Al-Qaeda or IS, may
be able to garner support in the south during the conflict by stoking religious sectarian sentiment [33].
Islamic State (IS) also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has also
grown its presence in Yemen during the power vacuum left by the conflict and has
carried out various deadly attacks. Both Al-Qaeda and IS are attempting to recruit
members of the Sunni population to fight against the Shia Houthis [51].
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4. The Humanitarian Crisis

Despite widespread conflict, 27.4 million Yemenis are still living in Yemen.
Only 180,000 refugees or 0.65% of the population have been able to leave
since the conflict began [5]. This has been due to the naval and aerial
blockade imposed on the country. As a comparison, the conflict in Syria has
seen 4.86 million refugees leave the country [52] which is 23% of the initial
21 million population [11].
It is worth noting that although Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian
Peninsula, it stands out for its generosity towards refugees from elsewhere
and was the only one to sign the 1951 refugee convention and its 1967 protocol [53]. Yemen currently
hosts over 250,000 refugees from other nations [53] with 100,000 new arrivals observed in 2016 alone,
from mainly Ethiopia and Somalia [5].
Paradoxically, a large proportion of the refugees fleeing Yemen are nationals from Somalia, Djibouti,
Sudan and Ethiopia who originally fled to Yemen to escape war in their own country but are now
returning home [54]. This demonstrates that the number of actual Yemenis fleeing the country is
incredibly low.
In terms of the level of suffering experienced by the Yemeni people, the numbers below speak for
themselves. As the numbers are so shocking, they can be difficult to comprehend. Perhaps all the more
alarming is that the most vulnerable and worst affected groups are women [55] and young children:
At least one child dies every ten minutes in Yemen because of preventable diseases such as diarrhoea,
malnutrition and respiratory tract infections. UNICEF, December 2016 [56]
Prior to the conflict, Yemen was already one of the poorest countries in the world and faced a very high
humanitarian need with 15.9 million requiring some kind of assistance. This was due to years of poverty,
under-development, rapid population growth, intermittent conflict, and weak rule of law. The current
conflict has now caused a further sharp rise (20%) in this need [5].
From the total population of 27.4 million, a UN report on Yemen from November 2016 reported [5]:
1,275 verified cases of child recruitment by armed groups
1,309 verified cases of child death as a result of the conflict
1,950 verified cases of child injury as a result of the conflict
4,744 children affected by grave child rights violations
8,031 reported cases of gender-based violence (GBV)
11,332 civilian casualties have been reported by health facilities (7,207 injured, 4,125 dead)
44,000 total casualties have been reported by health facilities (37,000 injured, 7,000 dead)
180,000 have fled the country
2 million school-age children are out of school
3.3 million are acutely malnourished (462,000 children face Severe Acute Malnutrition)
3.8 million internally displaced people (IDP) have fled their homes (2.2m remain displaced)
4.5 million need emergency shelter or essential household items (utensils, blankets, clothes)
8 million have lost their livelihoods or live with minimal to no basic services
11.3 million need protection for safety, dignity & basic human rights (2.9m acutely affected)
14 million are considered food insecure (7 million severely/acutely food insecure)
14.4 million lack access to safe drinking water or sanitation (8.2m in acute need)
14.7 million lack adequate healthcare (8.8 million severely underserved)
18.8 million are in need of some kind of humanitarian assistance (10.3m in acute need)
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Some of the causes and contributing factors to this humanitarian crisis are [5]:
Violent clashes, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes carried out in built up residential areas
have resulted in a high number of civilian casualties.
This has also forced millions to flee their homes. Overcrowding, damaged or destroyed homes,
lack of repair materials and the price of rent are preventing many from returning.
1,600 schools are unfit for use due to conflict damage, hosting IDPs or military occupation.
The World Bank estimates that the poverty rate has doubled to 62% since the conflict. Deliberate
policy and strategy has contributed to this increase including military targeting of key economic
infrastructure and imposed restrictions on imports and financial transactions.
In September 2016, the Yemeni Government (backed by the Saudi-led coalition) relocated the
central bank from Sanaa to Aden, in an attempt to target rebel funding. However, this is also
expected to cause further economic deterioration in the country as the wages of state workers,
doctors and funds for urban fuel, water and electricity are cut off [57].
The country is highly reliant on imports to satisfy domestic demand for food, water, fuel and
medical supplies. For example, Yemen imported 90% of its staple food before the conflict.
A naval and aerial blockade of the country has restricted the supply of these vital imports.
Bombing and damage to crucial infrastructure such as ports, roads, bridges, factories and
markets has also impeded the delivery of commercial imports and humanitarian aid.
There has been a rapid decline in agricultural production due to damage, insecurity, and high
cost/lack of inputs (seeds, fertiliser, animal feed and fuel for irrigation pumps/vehicles).
The agriculture sector employs over 50% of the rural Yemeni population whose livelihoods are in
jeopardy and are suffering financially from this decline.
There has been a 50% reduction in the number of fishermen due to the conflict.
The price of commodities has increased due to the lack of supply:
o Average price of monthly minimum food basket is 20% higher than pre-crisis level
o Average prices of locally produced staple commodities are 50% higher
o Average price of fuel is 25% higher
The increased commodity prices and decreased incomes are forcing millions to depend on aid.
Critical water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure has been damaged by the conflict. Where
facilities remain undamaged, they often cant be maintained due to lack of fuel to run water
pumps and the inability of consumers to pay water bills.
Failing urban water and sanitation systems are contributing to a public health crisis, with a
significant increase (148%) in malnutrition rates, outbreaks of cholera [58] and other diseases.
Children under 5 (including infants), pregnant and lactating women are the most affected.
The number of people living in areas without adequate health services has increased by 76%
from pre-crisis levels. This is because:
o 274 health facilities have been damaged or destroyed by conflict (only 45% still function)
o Stocks of medical materials are in chronically short supply due to import restrictions
o A lack of salary payments to health personnel is depleting the capacity of the public
health sector due to lack of staff
For further, detailed information regarding the points above, the reader is urged to
access the thoroughly researched, up-to-date and well-presented UN OCHA report [5]
and related micro-site [6] from which this information was taken.
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5. Alleged Violations of IHL

Various actors in the Yemen Conflict are considered responsible for exacerbating the humanitarian crisis
in the country and carrying out alleged war crimes.
Yemen is legally bound to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of those within its jurisdiction. In
addition, all parties to the conflict in Yemen, including Saudi Arabia and other members of the coalition,
are obliged to respect the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. These include the
obligations to respect the principles of distinction and proportionality, and to take all feasible precautions
to protect the civilian population. Civilians and civilian objectives are protected from attack. Hospitals,
schools and religious sites are also subject to heightened protections, and attacks on them have an impact
on peoples enjoyment of their rights, including to health, education and freedom of religion. Parties to
the conflict must also allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial humanitarian relief
for civilians in need. It is important to recall that a situation of armed conflict does not exempt any State
from its human rights obligations. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [59].
There is now a large body of evidence of that international humanitarian law (IHL) and international
human rights law (IHRL) has been violated by all parties to the conflict.
UN Member States, UN organizations, humanitarian partners and human rights organizations, have
outlined serious concerns regarding the conduct of the conflict, in which violations of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law have been committed by all parties to the conflict.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) [5].
5.1. The Houthi-Saleh Forces

Throughout the course of the current conflict, armed Houthi and Saleh forces have
been accused of breaching international humanitarian law and principles.
The UN Security Council have noted that Houthi-Saleh forces have committed a
systematic pattern of attacks resulting in violations of the principles of distinction,
proportionality and precaution. This includes carrying out targeted shelling and
indiscriminately aimed rocket attacks, destroying homes, damaging hospitals and
killing and injuring many civilians. The random and indiscriminate firing of poorly aimed surface-to-air
missiles, especially in Aden, caused significant damage to property and loss of life.
The shelling of boats carrying civilians attempting to flee heavy fighting in Aden
between March and July amounted to a grave violation of international
humanitarian law. The use of landmines upon retreat from Aden has also resulted
in an increased number of fatalities and injuries. The indiscriminate shelling and
use of rockets in and around civilian areas in Taizz continues to cause injuries and
fatalities, along with the destruction of homes, residential areas and hospitals [7].
Houthi-Saleh forces have also been reported to routinely intimidate, delay and harass humanitarian
workers: preventing them from carrying out their work, threatening them with arrests and deportation,
or demanding the diversion of humanitarian assistance to their fighters [60].
Human Rights Watch have reported that the Houthis and other Sanaa-based authorities in Yemen have
arbitrarily detained, tortured, and forcibly disappeared numerous people without charge. Under
international human rights law, an enforced disappearance occurs when authorities take someone into
custody and deny holding them or fail to disclose their fate or whereabouts. Disappeared people are at
greater risk of torture and other ill-treatment, especially when they are detained outside formal
detention facilities, such as police jails and prisons. 53 cases of arbitrary detention and 26 cases of
enforced disappearance had been reported by November 2016 [61].
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5.2. The Saudi-led Coalition

In Jan 2016, a report prepared for the UN Security Council by a panel of experts on
Yemen identified 119 Saudi-led coalition air strikes relating to violations of IHL. It
stated that airstrikes have targeted civilians and civilian objects, including
residential areas, markets, schools, mosques, factories, food warehouses, and
gatherings such as weddings. The report also calculated that 60% (2,682) of civilian
deaths and injuries at that point in the conflict had been caused by coalition airstrikes [7].
A report by Human Rights Watch documented coalition airstrikes between March
2015 and February 2016 on 13 civilian economic structures including factories,
commercial warehouses, a farm, and two power stations. These strikes killed 130
civilians and injured 171 more. These facilities had produced, stored, or distributed
goods for the civilian population including food, medicine, and electricity.
Collectively, the facilities employed over 2,500 people; following the attacks, many
of the factories ended their production and hundreds of workers lost their
livelihoods [62].
On 15 March 2016, a Saudi-led coalition airstrike hit a crowded market in the village of Mastaba in north-
western Yemen. A United Nations human rights team visited the site the following day and recorded the
deaths of at least 97 civilians, including 25 children, with a further 10 bodies burned beyond recognition.
A Saudi military spokesman claimed that the airstrike had targeted a militia gathering, despite Human
Rights Watch identifying that the only Houthi military presence in the area appeared to be a checkpoint
manned by two or three fighters about 250 meters north of the market [63].
On 26 October 2015, a hospital supported by Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF) was destroyed by several
Saudi-led coalition airstrikes. As it was the only hospital still functioning in the area, this deprived at least
200,000 people of access to lifesaving medical care. An MSF spokesperson maintained that the hospitals
GPS coordinates had been regularly shared with the Saudi-led coalition, and the roof of the facility was
clearly identified with the MSF logo [64]. However, a Saudi ambassador to the UN appeared to fault MSF
for providing wrong coordinates of their location. This statement appeared to contradict earlier remarks
by a Saudi-led coalition Brigadier General, who had denied their aircraft had hit the hospital [65].
Page | 18
On 15 August 2016, a MSF supported hospital in the Hajjah governorate,

northwest Yemen, was hit by an airstrike, killing 19 people and injuring
24 others. At the time of the airstrike, there were 23 patients in the
surgical unit, 25 in the maternity ward, 13 new-borns and 12 children in
paediatrics. Following the attack, MSF were forced to evacuate all the
patients, staff and close the facility, depriving the community in the
surrounding area of essential medical services [44].
MSF noted that the August airstrike was the fourth attack against an MSF facility in less than 12 months.
As a result, they decided to evacuate their staff from 6 hospitals they had supported in the Saada and
Hajjah governorates in northern Yemen. They blamed the withdrawal on indiscriminate bombings and
unreliable assurances from Saudi-led coalition forces [66]. That month, a Saudi-led investigation into
eight separate incidents in Yemen that had killed hundreds of civilians, including previous air strikes on
MSF facilities, largely absolved the coalition of responsibility for the deaths. The investigation concluded
that faulty intelligence was to blame in only one of the eight episodes, and said that aid groups, such as
MSF, should simply not station medical facilities near Houthi encampments [67].
Saudi-led coalition airstrikes have also been reported to hit schools and areas near to schools [45]. In
August 2016, 10 children were killed and another 28 injured by an airstrike on a school in Saada. An MSF
medical facility confirmed these numbers and stated that the children were all between 8-15 years old
[68]. The day after that attack, a Saudi military spokesman denied that the airstrike had hit a school,
saying the target was a Houthi training camp. The spokesman, General Ahmed Asiri, said that the dead
children were just evidence that the Houthis were recruiting children as guards and fighters. We would
have hoped, he said, that MSF/Doctors Without Borders would take measures to stop the recruitment
of children to fight in wars instead of crying over them in the media [67].
Some large civilian gatherings have also been hit by coalition airstrikes. In September 2015, two tents at a
wedding reception being held for a man linked to the Houthis were suspected to have been struck by
missiles from coalition aircraft. The UN and local medics reported that at least 130 people had been
killed. The Saudi-led coalition denied responsibility for the attack [48].
In October 2016, in perhaps the single most deadly incident of the conflict, a coalition airstrike hit a
funeral gathering in Sanaa, killing more than 140 people and injuring at least 525 more. Saudi Arabia
initially denied allegations that the coalition was responsible but following international pressure and
outrage over the attack, later admitted responsibility and agreed to launch an investigation [49]. The
funeral was attended by many top individuals from the Houthi-Saleh forces [69]. Video footage, released
by Al-Masirah TV, shows the aftermath of the initial airstrike, followed by a second double tap strike
which hit the same building minutes later [70]. A report by UN monitors in Yemen found:
in respect of the second air strike, that the Saudi Arabia-led coalition violated its obligations in respect of
hors de combat and the wounded in this 'double tap' attack. ... The second air strike, which occurred
three to eight minutes after the first air strike, almost certainly resulted in more casualties to the already
wounded and the first responders. These first responders included civilians who immediately entered
the area after the first air strike to provide urgent first aid and undertake casualty evacuation [69].
The targeting of any location where it is known in advance that bombing is likely to cause civilian
casualties or damage vital non-military installations is in violation of Protocol 1 of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949. The UN Security Council Panel report from January 2016 concluded that
the coalitions targeting of civilians through air strikes, either by bombing residential neighbourhoods or
by treating the entire city of Sadah and region of Maran as military targets, was a grave violation of the
principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. In certain cases, they found such violations to
have been conducted in a widespread and systematic manner [7].
Page | 19
Coalition naval forces have also imposed a blockade on Yemeni ports. This is believed to have greatly
exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, contributing to severe food and fuel shortages [5]. A naval blockade
is unlawful if it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denies the population goods
indispensable for its survival. A blockade also violates the laws of war if it has a disproportionate impact
on the civilian population, when the harm to civilians is, or may be expected to be, greater than the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade. For these reasons, concerns have
been raised that the blockade may also be causing serious violations of IHL and IHRL [71].
As of January 2017, it was reported by the BBC that the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) was tracking a
total of 252 allegations of IHL violations by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen [72].
5.3. Calls for International Independent Investigations

In September 2016, the UK blocked an EU proposal at the UN Human Rights
Council for an international independent inquiry into alleged violations of IHL in
Yemen [73]. They rejected the need for such an inquiry and have stated that
they would rather first see the Saudi-led coalition investigate any allegations of
breaches of IHL law which are attributed to them, and for their investigations to
be thorough and conclusive [72].
The Saudi-led coalition has formed a Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) to assess some of the
allegations. The JIAT maintains that it is an independent group that operates with full independence and
impartiality during investigations [74]. However, the credibility of this point has been widely disputed as
the team is formed solely of members from within the Saudi-led coalition, including: Bahrain, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen and the UAE.
Despite the hundreds of alleged violations of IHL, a report issued by the JIAT in August 2016 investigated
only 8 incidents. They found that the Saudi-led coalition had acted in line with IHL in 6 of the cases and
only admitted to some shortcomings in the other 2. Blame is frequently attributed to other parties
rather than the coalition and the JIAT also dispute the reported number of civilian casualties. A few
legitimate military targets in the area are often given as justification that airstrikes resulting in many
civilian deaths were in compliance with IHL [74].
A separate investigation into the funeral hall bombing in October 2016 simply attributed the incident to
wrongly passed information that there was a gathering of armed Houthi leaders in that location. The
findings note that the airstrike resulted in several deaths and injuries [75]. In fact, the date and location
of the funeral ceremony had been publicly available [76]. Top figures from the Houthi-Saleh forces,
including Saleh himself and his son, were reported to be attending the funeral [69]. It therefore appears
likely that the coalition command may have received news of the funeral, those apparently attending and
had decided to target it on that basis. Furthermore, the several deaths and injuries is a more than a
mild understatement given that 140 people died and 525 more were injured during this incident [49].
The former UK international development secretary, Andrew Mitchell, who visited Yemen in 2016, has
described the JIAT as the Saudi-led coalition effectively marking their own homework [72].
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have expressed concern that the JIAT is failing to meet
international standards regarding transparency, impartiality, and independence. In January 2017, Human
Rights Watch sent an open letter to the JIAT that thoroughly detailed factual and legal discrepancies
between the conclusions reached by the JIAT relative to those reached by the UN and other human rights
organisations such as MSF who had conducted their own investigations into the same incidents [76].
Following a detailed UN Human Rights Council report into situation of human rights in Yemen in August
2016 [77], the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has also called on the international community
to establish an international, independent body to carry out comprehensive investigations in Yemen [78].
Page | 20
6. Involvement of Iran
There is evidence that the Houthis have been backed financially and militarily by
Iran [39] [7]. Iran (Shia) is the main opposition for regional power in the Middle-
East to Saudi Arabia (Sunni). However, while the Houthis are often labelling as an
Iranian Proxy in media reports [79], this could be misleading.
The Iranian regime are from a different Shia Islam sect (Twelver-Shia) to the Houthis (Zaidi-Shia) and
although both Shia, their beliefs diverge significantly [13]. While the Houthis admit to receiving funding
and support, they claim not to be controlled by Iran [80] [81] and there is some evidence of this as the
Houthis apparently acted against the wishes of Iran when invading the capital, Sanaa, in 2014 [82].
This paper argues that primary drivers of tension and conflict in Yemen are local, but the perceived, and
often exaggerated, roles of external players continue to affect the calculations of the Yemeni players and
of different regional actors. Saudi Arabia perceives the Houthis as an Iranian proxy. However, while
the group has some support from Iran, this is not the same as taking orders from it. Chatham House,
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 2015 [83]
While the extent of their control over the Houthi movement is in doubt, what is clear is that Iran share a
convergence of interest with the Houthis in opposing the Saudi-backed Hadi government in Yemen and in
doing so, diluting Saudi Arabian and US influence in the region [81].
7. Involvement of the Unites States (US)

The US military has carried out regular drone strikes against Al-Qaeda in the east
of Yemen since 2001 [25]. Theyve also provided the Yemen government with over
$500m in military aid in the form of weapons and vehicles, much of which is now
feared to have fallen into the hands of the Houthi-Saleh group or Al-Qaeda [84].
The US has had a long-lasting military alliance with Saudi Arabia and estimates are that the Obama
administration alone has offered the Saudis more than $100bn in arm sales [85] [86]. This includes a
$60bn sale of military aircraft in 2010 [87]. The Obama administration also sanctioned a further $7bn of
sales in military aircraft, tanks and missiles to members of the Saudi-led coalition in December 2016 [88].
During the current Yemen Conflict, the US Pentagon has provided the Saudi-led coalition with targeting
intelligence and mid-air refuelling for the aircraft involved in the air campaign. According to the United
States Central Command, American military tankers have flown nearly 1,200 sorties since the war began
and refuelled more than 5,600 coalition aircraft [67].
The US has also carried out strikes of its own after the naval ship U.S.S Mason, which is stationed in the
Red Sea, fired cruise missiles at three radar installations on the Yemen coastline. This was reported as a
move of self-defence, after being targeted by missiles believed to be fired from Houthi insurgents [89].
The US administration have largely defended their support of the Saudi-led coalition. They see their
involvement as a move to support their allies, tackle the terrorist factions of Al-Qaeda and ISIL, and curb
the spread of Iranian influence in the region. Furthermore, the belief is that US logistical and intelligence
support helps the coalition to target militants more accurately and minimises civilian deaths [90].
However, there have been many calls of concern from within US politics and media around their
involvement in the Yemen Conflict and continued arms sales to members of the Saudi-led coalition:
I just dont see any evidence right now that the Saudis are conducting that military exercise in a way
thats responsible. Its just feeding the humanitarian crisis inside Yemen Even if we do forestall the
Page | 21
growing Iranian influence in the region ... the growing footprint of Al-Qaeda and ISIS inside Yemen is
much more damaging to U.S. interests Chris Murphy, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee [90]
Following a Saudi-led coalition airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa in September 2016, which killed 140
people, the US White House released the following statement:
We are deeply disturbed by reports of [the] airstrike on a funeral hall in Yemen, which, if confirmed,
would continue the troubling series of attacks striking Yemeni civilians. US security cooperation with Saudi
Arabia is not a blank cheque. Even as we assist Saudi Arabia regarding the defence of their territorial
integrity, we have and will continue to express our serious concerns about the conflict in Yemen and how
it has been waged. In light of this and other recent incidents, we have initiated an immediate review of
our already significantly reduced support to the Saudi-led coalition and are prepared to adjust our support
so as to better align with US principles, values and interests, including achieving an immediate and
durable end to Yemens tragic conflict. Ned Simon, US National Security Council spokesman [91]
This concern has led to some practical action, with the notable recent decision made by the White House
to block the sale of Raytheon guided munitions kits worth around $350m, despite the personal lobbying
of Raytheons chief executive, Thomas Kennedy. The White House pointed to flaws in Saudi Arabias
airstrike targeting as rationale for blocking the sale [92]. However, it should be noted that this has not
appeared to stop the $7bn of US arms sales to the Saudi-led coalition agreed in December 2016 [88].
Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney are also key US suppliers to the Saudi-led coalition [93].
8. Involvement of the United Kingdom (UK)

The UK and the royal Saud family of Saudi Arabia have enjoyed a
diplomatic relationship which has lasted over 100 years. They signed the
Treaty of Darin in December 1915, which guaranteed British sovereignty
of numerous states in the Middle East and led to Saudi Arabia entering
the First World War as an ally of the UK against the Ottoman Empire [94].
In 1985, the UK and Saudi Arabia signed a deal known as Al-Yamamah or The Dove. This involved the
sale of BAE Systems (formerly British Aerospace) aircraft to Saudi Arabia 72 Tornado jet fighters and
30 Hawk trainers. A further set of 48 Tornados were sold in 1993. Combined, these deals are believed to
have been worth 43bn [95]. Saudi Arabia paid for this sale by agreeing to supply the UK Government
with up to 600,000 barrels of oil per day [96]. Allegations of corruption soon surfaced around the deal:
Such was the sensitivity of the arrangement that a National Audit Office report in the early 1990s was,
unprecedentedly, suppressed. The official British line has always been that this was a government-to-
government contract, and no agents were involved. But evidence that commissions or bribes were paid by
BAE, as it now is, and some of its sub-contractors such as Rolls Royce [97], Thorn EMI and Royal Ordnance,
have been seeping into the public domain for years. Rolls Royce was even sued in the high court by agents
acting for one of the princes because it had reduced the level of its commissions. The Guardian [98]
Page | 22
It is now known that Margaret Thatcher, then British Prime Minister, personally lobbied the Saudi royal
family in 1985 to buy aircraft from the UK rather than France [99]. It is calculated that 6bn in corrupt
commissions may have been distributed by BAE and its subcontractors, allegedly authorised by the British
MoD, to members of the Saudi royal family, including Saudi Prince Bandar [100].
In 2004, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) launched an enquiry into
bribery allegations around various BAE Systems arms deals including the
Al-Yamamah deal. This investigation was dropped in 2006 after direct
intervention from the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair [101]. Security
concerns and loss of industry jobs were cited as rationale for dropping
the case. The government had also been put under pressure by the
Defence Industries Council (DIC), a consortium of British defence
companies led by Sir John Rose, the chief executive of Rolls-Royce at the
time. Shortly after the case was dropped, BAE finalised a new agreement
with Saudi Arabia for 72 Eurofighter typhoons [102].
However, in 2010, BAE pleaded guilty to offences of false accounting
related to their deals with Saudi Arabia and agreed a settlement with the
US Department of Justice (DoJ) to pay fines of 255m in the US and 30m in the UK [101].
Saudi Arabia are currently the biggest customer of the UK defence industry and accounted for 42% of all
UK arms exports between 2009-2013 [103]. In 2015, Saudi Arabia had more UK-manufactured military
aircraft available for its bombing campaign in Yemen than the entire British Royal Air Force (RAF) [104].
Philip Hammond, the UK Foreign Secretary at the time, promised to support the Saudi-led coalition in
every practical way short of engaging in combat when they entered Yemen in March 2015 [105].
Between 1 January and 30 September 2015, the UK issued 152 additional licences for military exports to
Saudi Arabia, totalling $4.16bn. Nine of these licenses, together worth more than $1.6bn were for bombs,
torpedoes, rockets and missiles, granted for end-use by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). Another 23
licences worth a total of $2.5bn were for aircraft and component parts. The UK did not refuse any
standard licences to Saudi Arabia in the first nine months of 2015. The UK has also confirmed its support
and maintenance for UK supplied equipment, with MoD and BAE Systems personnel stationed in Saudi
Arabia to support the RSAF [106].
In December 2015, a legal opinion report prepared by legal firm Matrix Chambers and commissioned by
Amnesty International UK, Oxfam and Saferworld, concluded that:
For the reasons set out in this opinion, on the basis of the evidence available to us,
any authorisation by the UK of the transfer to Saudi Arabia of weapons and related
items within the scope of the Arms Trade Treaty, the EU Common Position and the
UK Consolidated Criteria, in circumstances where such weapons are capable of
being used in the conflict in Yemen, including to support its blockade of Yemeni
territory, and in circumstances where their end-use is not restricted, would constitute a breach by the UK
of its obligations under domestic, European and international law.
In the current circumstances we can be clear in concluding what the UK is required
to do to bring itself into full compliance with its legal obligations: it should halt with
immediate effect all authorisations and transfers of relevant weapons and items to
Saudi Arabia, capable of being used in the conflict in Yemen, pending proper and
credible enquiries into the allegations of violations of IHL and IHRL that have arisen
and that could arise in the future, as addressed in this opinion and the sources here
referred to [107]
Page | 23
With concerns around civilian deaths in Yemen growing in 2015, the former UK
business secretary Vince Cable (pictured) suspended the sale of Raytheon Paveway
IV laser-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia. He said he would not approve the export
licences until the MoD agreed extra safeguards to minimise the risk of UK missiles
causing casualties. He was then persuaded to sign off the licences after the MoD
allegedly provided him with assurances that they would increase their level of
oversight into the targeting of airstrikes [108].
However, the MoD have since publicly denied giving this assurance and have stated that they do not
actually have any military personnel embedded within the Saudi airstrike targeting chain. They assert that
they only provide the Saudis with guidance on the targeting process but are not involved in the Saudi
targeting decision-making process itself [108]. This may appear only a subtle or insignificant difference,
but it could make the difference between the UK being seen as complicit to any
violations in international humanitarian law attributed to the airstrikes. This stance
also weakens a key argument of the UK Government, which is that their continued
arms sales to the Saudi-led collation allows them to monitor and help prevent
further violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen.
A similar narrative has unfolded during debates and inquiries held on Yemen within the UK parliament.
After UK Government ministers initially issued a statement confirming that they have assessed that
there has not been a breach of IHL by the [Saudi-led] coalition, this was later retracted and replaced with
an alternative statement that they have been unable to assess that there has been a breach of IHL by the
Saudi-led Coalition [109]. The wording of the original statement was attributed as a mistake but the
move to replace it has been openly criticised as an attempt to mislead members of parliament over the
extent of UK involvement and oversight to coalition airstrikes. The move has also been perceived as an
effort by the UK Government to move itself to a position where they can claim
inability to assess whether coalition airstrikes have violated IHL. This could prove
key in enabling continued arms sales to members of the Saudi-led coalition under
UK, European and international law.
Under Criterion Two (c) of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, the UK
Government will: not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the
commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law [110].
In 2016, the House of Commons commissioned the International Development Committee to carry out an
inquiry and produce an associated report into the Yemen Crisis. The micro-site for this inquiry [111] can
be used to access a copy of the report [112], which was issued in April 2016. The report contains a letter
from then Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond (pictured below) to the inquiry team. In relation to UK
manufactured aerospace arms that may be used by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, he wrote:
The Government has concluded that the mandatory refusal threshold in criterion
2(c) has not been met. There is no clear risk that Saudi Arabia might use the UK
export to commit serious violations of IHL. In particular: (1) the Saudi-led Coalition
are not targeting civilians; (2) Saudi Arabian processes and procedures have been
put in place to ensure respect for the principles of IHL; (3) Saudi Arabia is
investigating incidents of concern, including those involving civilian casualties; (4)
Saudi Arabia has throughout engaged in constructive dialogue with the UK about both its processes and
incidents of concern; (5) Saudi Arabia has been and remains genuinely committed to IHL compliance
[112].
It is worth noting that when questioned about arms sales to Yemen on the BBCs Newsnight programme,
he responded: Wed always like to do more business, more British exports, more British jobs and in this
case very high end engineering jobs protected and created by our diplomacy abroad [113].
Page | 24
Despite Philip Hammonds assurances, the inquiry report noted very strong evidence that delivery of
humanitarian relief is undermined by ongoing breaches of IHL. It recommends that an independent
investigation into alleged violations of IHL by both sides of the conflict in Yemen is conducted without
delay and that the Committee on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) should consider the case for suspending
UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia until such an investigation is carried out [112].
The House of Commons ordered a follow-up inquiry report on The use of UKmanufactured arms in
Yemen, which was produced jointly by the Business, Innovation and Skills and International
Development Committees in September 2016 [114]. This concluded that considering the evidence we
have heard, it seems inevitable that any violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by
the coalition have involved arms supplied from the UK and recommended that the government suspend
sales of arms which could be used in Yemen to Saudi Arabia until the independent, UN-led investigation
has come to its conclusions and then review the situation again [114].
This report also deals with the alleged use of cluster munitions (CM) by Saudi Arabia in Yemen. The UK
signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008, which prohibits the use, development, production
or transfer of cluster munitions. It also prohibits signatories from assisting, encouraging or inducing any
other party to engage in any of these activities [115]. Facilitating another country to use cluster
munitions is therefore a breach the UKs legal responsibility under the treaty.
In a written letter to the inquiry on 18 May 2016, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Tobias
Ellwood wrote that The UK did provide CM to Saudi Arabia in the 1990s, but we believe none of these CM
have been used in Yemen and no UK-supplied aircraft have been used to deploy CM in Yemen [116].
Five days later, Amnesty International UK found new evidence of UK-supplied BL-755 cluster bombs being
used in a village in northern Yemen. The BL-755 is designed to be dropped from the UK manufactured
Tornado fighter jets that have been sold to Saudi Arabia [117]. Following this new evidence, a House of
Commons debate was scheduled on 24 May 2016 to discuss the urgent question of cluster munitions in
Yemen. Responding to intense questioning, the Minister for Defence Procurement, Philip Dunne, stated
that Based on all the information available to us, including sensitive coalition operational reporting, we
assess that no UK-supplied cluster weapons have been used, and that no UK-supplied aircraft have been
involved in the use of UK cluster weapons, in the current conflict in Yemen [118].
On 19 Dec 2016, Saudi Arabia released an official statement that Saudi Arabia
confirms that it has decided to stop the use of cluster munitions of the type BL-
755 and informed the United Kingdom government of that. This statement was
followed by confirmation in parliament from the UK Defence Minister, Michael
Fallon (pictured), that UK-made cluster munitions had been used in Yemen [119].
The UK Government has been careful to not criticise the actions of the Saudi-led
coalition in Yemen publicly, with current Prime Minister Theresa May (pictured
below) defending UK support by stating:
Where there are legitimate human rights concerns in relation to Saudi
Arabia, we raise them. In relation to the action in the Yemen, we have
been clear that we want the incidents that have been referred to
properly investigated, and if there are lessons to be learned from them,
we want the Saudi Arabians to learn those lessons. I reiterate a point
that I have made in this House before: our relationship with Saudi
Arabia is an important one. It is particularly important in relation to the
security of this country, to counter-terrorism and to foiling the activities
of those who wish to do harm to our citizens here in the UK [120]
Page | 25
In December 2016, the current UK Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, stated that
so far we do not believe there has been a clear risk of breach of international
humanitarian law and at the moment we do not think the threshold has
been crossed when asked about a possible suspension of UK arms sales [121].
This position was re-affirmed by letters from Boris Johnson to Liam Fox, the
Trade Secretary in late 2016, that advised to continue exports to Saudi Arabia
despite the inherent risks and grave situation in Yemen [122].
In July 2016, Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT), won permission for a
judicial review into whether arms sales to the Saudi Arabia breach British and
European weapons export laws. The hearing will go ahead in February 2017 [123].
The challenge followed the UN report leaked in January 2016, which detailed
thousands of civilian deaths caused by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes and reported
evidence of 119 violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) [7].
9. Involvement of Other European Countries

France authorised 219 arms export licences applications and up to US$18bn
(16.9bn) of arms exports to Saudi Arabia in 2015 [124]. This includes a deal to
sell 23 Airbus H-145 multirole helicopters worth about 500m in June 2015 and
further discussions to sell 30 naval fast patrol boats [106].
In 2015, Spain exported over US$478m (447m) of arms to Saudi Arabia,

including two air-to-air refuelling aircraft and spare parts for fighter jets. During
2016, Spanish media reported the prospective agreement of a US$3.3bn (3bn)
deal for Spanish defence contractor Navantia to build five Avante 2200 frigates
for the Saudi navy [106]. In November 2016, Spanish King Felipe VI carried out a
state visit to Saudi Arabia, with signature of the Navantia deal touted as one of the imperatives of the
visit. The controversial visit was criticised by the Spanish branch of Amnesty International other groups
including Greenpeace and Oxfam sent an open letter to the Spanish government opposing the sale [125].
Despite the apparently relentless flood of arms sales heading from the US and Western Europe to the
Saudi-led coalition. Some European countries have taken a stricter approach:
In March 2015, the Swedish Government announced that a 10-year

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on military cooperation with Saudi
Arabia would not be renewed, after a diplomatic dispute over human rights
between the two countries.
Statements made in January 2016 by the German Vice-Chancellor and Ministry
of Economy suggested that the government was re-evaluating its policy
regarding sales of military equipment to Saudi Arabia. In April 2015, their
government prevented the export of more than 200 Leopard 2 tanks to Saudi
Arabia, and in October, the government stopped approving licence applications
for the export of assault rifles [106].
Since July 2015, the Dutch government has rejected export licence applications
for military equipment that it believes could be used either in aerial bombing or
by ground forces in Yemen, and orders for parts for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) [106]. In 2016, they voted to ban all arms exports to Saudi Arabia [126].
Page | 26
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Briefing The Yemen Conflict and Crisis

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Finlay Asher Briefing The Yemen Conflict and Crisis 12/02/2017

Briefing The Yemen Conflict and Crisis

Zaidi Shia Shafi Sunni

1.4. Other Culture

2. History of Yemen: Pre-Conflict

2.2. Division into North and South Yemen (1967/1968)

2.3.Unification of Yemen under President Saleh (1990)

2.4. Rise of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2000s)

2.5. Houthi Insurgency (2004-2010)

2.6. National Uprising Arab Spring (2011-2012)

2.7. President Hadis Government (2012-2014)

3. The Yemen Conflict (March 2015 Present)

4. The Humanitarian Crisis

5. Alleged Violations of IHL

5.1. The Houthi-Saleh Forces

5.2. The Saudi-led Coalition

On 15 August 2016, a MSF supported hospital in the Hajjah governorate,

5.3. Calls for International Independent Investigations

7. Involvement of the Unites States (US)

8. Involvement of the United Kingdom (UK)

9. Involvement of Other European Countries

In 2015, Spain exported over US$478m (447m) of arms to Saudi Arabia,

In March 2015, the Swedish Government announced that a 10-year

[12] Wikipedia, Demographics of Yemen, 10 Dec 2016. [Online]. Available:

[18] The Buildings of Yemen, 2 Aug 2014. [Online]. Available:

[28] Wikimedia Commons, South Yemen, 14 Jan 2010. [Online]. Available:

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