Equal Protection of the Laws

People vs. Cayat

68 PHIL 12

Facts:
Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-
Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired
and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law
made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within
the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat
challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the
equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police
power.

Issue:
Whether or not Act 1639 is constitutional on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the
equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police
power

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, as
counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-
Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-
Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it
may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree
of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
 Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy
90 PHIL 83

Facts:
Commonwealth Act No. 3105 was enacted. Section 16-A thereof, as amended byCommonwealth
Act No. 342, authorized accountants to practice their profession undera trade name. Assailing the
constitutionality of the aforementioned provision, plaintiff, anaccountant, filed an action for
declaratory relief in the CFI of Manila on the groundadvanced that the assailed provision is a class
legislation since by its terms it excludespersons engaged in other callings or professions from
adopting, acquiring or using atrade name in connection with the practice of such callings or
professions. Included asdefendants are Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann, foreign
accountants
practicing their profession in the Philippines under the trade name Fleming andWilliamson.

Issue:
Whether plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality ofCommonwealth
Act No. 342

Held:
No, plaintiff has no sufficient cause of action. Plaintiffs main objection centers on
the exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to those engaged inthe
profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not forhis own personal
benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or asan individual, are adversely
affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging toother professions or callings, who are not
parties to this case. He does not claim havingsuffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his
rights or prerogatives as anaccountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His
complaint is ratheraddressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the
defendantsbecause it is misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has
noactual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which may give him theright to
secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. In orderthat an action for
declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on thefollowing requisite facts or
conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) thecontroversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the partyseeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issueinvolved must be ripe for judicial determination. These
requisite facts are wanting and,therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of
action.
Valid Classification
a. Substantial Distinctions

Mirasol vs. DPWH

GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public

Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on
limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8,
2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative
issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles
along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite
(Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all
motorized vehicles created equal?

Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized
to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to
regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not
possess in the first place.

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only
justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-
motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially
different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the
latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46
We find that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of
transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling
difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned
than a four-wheeled vehicle.
 Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon
163 SCRA 386

Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the

recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing
the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to
the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed
the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department
Order No. 1.

Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the
Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the
special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies
only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification,
provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment
ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects
among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law.
Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power
as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
 Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs. POEA
243 SCRA 666

Facts:

Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an incorporated association of

licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies
who hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-owner-
principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the
POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.

The petitioners contended that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamenworking in
ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.

Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and
increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section C,
paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers

Issue:

Whether or Not the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power.

Held:

Yes. The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by thepublic
respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.

The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessaryrules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of theAdministration
(POEA).

To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not tosay, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from itsdelegates, who are supposed
to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority topromulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be
met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended
the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid
standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no
longer be disputed.
 Himagan vs. People
237 SCRA 538

Facts:

Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of
Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe.
Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending
the murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.
Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree
provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would
be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the
PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until
the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case.
The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with
the time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while
his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.
the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate
the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be
terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless,
the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject
to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or
civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is
deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of
the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
 Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it
was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA
Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to
procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air
time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out
radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air timeto advertisers
and to require these stations to provide free air time is toauthorize unjust taking of private property.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each
day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs
requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwavefrequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own theairwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air
time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for
the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry
requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by
the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
 People vs. Jalosjos
GR Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.
 International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing
GR No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:
The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign hires are also paid
a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local hires. The School justifies the difference on
two significant economic disadvantages foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the dislocation
factor and (b) limited tenure.
The compensation scheme is simply the Schools adaptive measure to remain competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international
education.
Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Schools system of compensation is violative of the principle of equal
pay for equal work

RULING: Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article
135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to female
employees as against a male employee for work of equal value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in an labor organization.

Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should paid similar salaries. If an employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption
is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer has discriminated against an employee, it
is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
 b. Germane to the purpose of the law
c. Not limited to existing conditions only
People vs. Cayat
68 PHIL 12

Facts:
Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-
Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired
and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law
made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within
the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat
challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the
equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police
power.

Issue:
Whether or not Act 1639 is constitutional on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the
equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police
power

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, as
counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-
Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-
Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it
may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree
of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
 Ormoc vs. Sugar Co. Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City
22 SCRA 603

Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign
countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against
the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance
is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of
taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?

Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions
substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong
to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.
 d. Must apply equally to all members of the same class

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

227 SCRA 703
FACTS:
The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of
the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-
named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 (see ISSUE for the
grounds stated by the petitioners).

ISSUE:
WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds:
1) its *title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill
in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

HELD:
1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the
body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has
been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing clause
which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of the
statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
title.

2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the mechanism for

compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to
this question. It may propose an entirely new provision. The court also added that said the bill in
question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was enrolled with
its certification by Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was then
presented to and approved by President the President. Under the doctrine of separation powers,
the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined
to look into the petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government.

3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons
or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem of the respondents is the loss of
revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from
all agencies of government. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may
or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.

Therefore, Sec 35 of RA 7345 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan
248 SCRA 700